The Issue The issues to be decided are whether Respondent violated portions of chapter 458, Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaints; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to section 20.43 and chapters 456 and 458, Florida Statutes. At all times material to this matter, Dr. Mubang was a licensed physician within the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME55171. Respondent’s address of record is 741 Martin Luther King Boulevard West, Seffner, Florida 33584. Since at least March 17, 2010, Dr. Mubang’s practice at 741 Martin Luther King Boulevard has been registered as a pain management clinic with Petitioner. Dr. Mubang is board-certified in geriatric medicine and ambulatory medicine. Dr. Mubang immigrated to the United States from Cameroon, West Africa, to obtain his college education at State University of New York-Buffalo (“SUNY-Buffalo”). Dr. Mubang received a bachelor of arts degree in biology from SUNY-Buffalo. Dr. Mubang attended medical school at Southwestern University School of Medicine in the Philippines. Upon completion of his medical education, Dr. Mubang attended the Medical College of Pennsylvania for clinical rotations. He performed his residency at State University of New York-Brooklyn and Hahnemann University. Dr. Mubang’s license was first issued June 14, 1989, and is valid through January 31, 2020. His license has not been the subject of prior discipline. Dr. Mubang has maintained his Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) Certificate of Registration without revocation, suspension, or other sanction. He has additionally qualified for, and obtained, a separate DEA Certificate of Registration to dispense Suboxone and buprenorphine. This secondary DEA Certificate of Registration requires training in addiction medicine. Dr. Mubang has continuously practiced as the primary care physician for many of his patients. He began his practice in Florida with CIGNA Health Group in one of its managed care clinics at University Mall in Tampa. When CIGNA closed its clinics, Dr. Mubang became employed by Correctional Medical Services (“CMS”), initially at Lake Correctional Facility, and then as the medical director for the Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office. During his tenure with the Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office, Dr. Mubang was recognized as the “Medical Director of the Year” for CMS in 1998. After leaving the Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office, Dr. Mubang joined a practice with Dr. Encarnacion in Seffner, Florida. When Dr. Encarnacion retired, Dr. Mubang acquired the practice. In May 2009, Dr. Mubang received from the Board of Medicine and the Department of Health a publication entitled, “responsible opioid prescribing.” Dr. Mubang learned through his participation in various continuing medical education seminars about certain forms recommended for the treatment of patients suffering from chronic pain. He did not use electronic medical records prior to the dates of treatment charged in these consolidated Administrative Complaints. While in private practice, Dr. Mubang continued to treat patients committed to the State of Florida Juvenile Assessment Centers in Pasco, Pinellas, Sarasota, and Manatee counties. Dr. Mubang’s practice was licensed as a pain management clinic in 2010, despite his having limited formal training or education in pain management. Since initial licensure, his pain management clinic has remained continuously in operation, and has consistently passed all inspections. Pain Management Clinics are subject to annual inspections by DOH pursuant to section 458.3265(4)(a). Dr. Mubang’s Pain Management Clinic has never failed an inspection. DOH Investigator Victor Troupe of the Investigative Services Unit performed inspections of Dr. Mubang’s clinic. The clinic passed inspection. Dr. Mubang’s charged treatment of Patients A.M., B.B., C.C., W.B., and M.H., as alleged in the Administrative Complaint, occurred prior to October 17, 2010, the effective date of revised rule 64B8-9.013. Both parties presented expert witnesses board-certified in pain management to testify as to the standard of care required in this matter. Dr. Robert Guskiewicz testified as a medical expert for Petitioner. Dr. Guskiewicz is board-certified by the American Board of Anesthesiology in anesthesiology with a subspecialty in pain medicine. Dr. Guskiewicz practices as part of a large multispecialty practice in Gainesville, Florida, called Southeast Integrated Medical (“SIMED”). SIMED’s practice areas include neurology, neurosurgery, rheumatology, gynecology, psychology, urology, physiatry, allergy, family practice, and internal medicine. Dr. Guskiewicz is not now, and never has been, a primary care physician. About 40 percent of Dr. Guskiewicz’s practice is performing injections or interventions on patients. Most of the balance is patients on medication management seeking to achieve better functionality. Dr. Guskiewicz defines the standard of care as “what a prudent physician would do with a particular patient in a particular situation at that particular time.” In his practice, Dr. Guskiewicz prescribes 30 mg of oxycodone. Oxycodone is an effective pain medication. According to him, there is no maximum recommended dose for 30 mg of oxycodone. For the purposes of his expert testimony, Dr. Guskiewicz has no knowledge or information regarding Dr. Mubang or his practice. He does not know how big the clinic is where Dr. Mubang practices, who owns it, how many patients are seen each day, how many employees work there, or the types of patients treated there. Dr. Guskiewicz was paid an hourly fee for his expert testimony and preparation for deposition in this matter. Dr. Guskiewicz testified that he did a page-by-page review of the medical records he initially reviewed and those provided for his deposition in lieu of live testimony. Dr. Guskiewicz testified that the records were identical for Patients A.M., B.B., W.B., and M.H., but that the Bates numbers for the records for Patients C.C. and B.D. were not in sync. For Patient B.B., it was apparent at the hearing that Dr. Guskiewicz was in possession of the requisite records, which Respondent argued, had not been reviewed. For Patient M.H., Dr. Mubang argued that Joint Exhibit 6, covering records of treatment from 2010-2012, was not reviewed by Dr. Guskiewicz. Dr. Guskiewicz testified that the records for Patient M.H. were identical. In any event, the records subject to Respondent’s objection concern treatment after the treatment dates at issue in the Administrative Complaint. Only the records concerning the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaints will be considered for purposes of this Recommended Order. Dr. Mubang also raised the issue that Dr. Guskiewicz was not a similarly situated practitioner to Respondent. Dr. Mubang self-identified as practicing in pain management, and he owned and operated a clinic that was registered as a pain management clinic with DOH. Each patient treated by Dr. Mubang signed an Attestation for Pain Management, along with an Agreement for Treatment with Controlled Substances Therapy for Pain. Dr. Mubang acknowledged that if he gave a patient a pain management agreement, he was providing pain management to that patient. If a health care provider is providing evaluation, treatment, or diagnosis for a condition that is not within his or her specialty, a specialist trained in the evaluation, treatment, or diagnosis for that condition shall be considered a similar health care provider, pursuant to section 766.102(8), Florida Statutes. Because Respondent’s care at issue in this case is pain management, which is not specifically within his specialty, Dr. Guskiewicz is considered a similarly situated practitioner to Respondent. Petitioner did not provide Dr. Guskiewicz with any deposition testimony in this action until after his deposition in lieu of live testimony on October 9, 2018. Consequently, the depositions were not considered at the time Dr. Guskiewicz prepared his reports in this action. Dr. Guskiewicz never interviewed any of the patients at issue in this matter; never conducted any physical examination of the patients; and does not know where any of these patients are today. Further, he does not know what their current condition is; whether any of the patients are still receiving treatment for chronic pain; and whether any of the patients are still receiving opioid pain medications for the treatment of chronic pain. During the time periods relevant to these consolidated actions, Florida did not have a prescription drug monitoring database or E-FORCSE. At the time Dr. Guskiewicz authored his November 29, 2011, report, there was not a prescription drug monitoring database in Florida to permit practitioners to verify a patient’s representations about the medications they were taking and who had prescribed them. Dr. Guskiewicz is not a primary care physician, and has never been called upon to cover for a primary care physician who is treating a patient and has an ongoing relationship with that patient. Dr. Guskiewicz agrees that physicians in Florida have an obligation to consider their patients’ subjective complaints of pain and to treat them. Dr. Guskiewicz defines pain management as “treating patients who have chronic pain and provide different modalities of care to increase the functionality and well-being within that patient.” The goal of pain management is to optimize the patient’s functionality, lifestyle, and well-being within his or her family and community. Dr. Guskiewicz acknowledged that a patient coming to him for medical management of his or her pain is looking for an increase in function so he or she can get back to work and participate in normal activities of daily living. Dr. Guskiewicz defines intractable pain as “pain that perpetuates itself no matter what modalities are tried and will always be there. It’s now thought of being a more centralized pain that is basically within the brain itself.” Dr. Thomas Simopoulos testified as a medical expert for Respondent. Dr. Simopoulos is board-certified by the American Board of Anesthesiology in anesthesiology with a subspecialty in pain medicine. Dr. Simopoulos testifies as an expert for the defense more than 90 percent of the time. In the last five years, Respondent’s counsel has paid Dr. Simopoulos $30,000 to $50,000 in expert witness fees. Dr. Simopoulos lives in and practices medicine in Massachusetts. Dr. Simopoulos is not licensed to practice medicine in any other state; and he has never practiced medicine in the State of Florida. Dr. Simopoulos testified that the standard of care at the time material to this case was more regional than national. Dr. Simopoulos educated himself about the regional standard of care in Florida through conversations with his students and through hearing from people at national meetings. Dr. Simopoulos testified that patients have the right to reject a surgical recommendation: “Patients who are younger, in their more productive years, may not want to seek out surgery as a solution, particularly of the spine because it usually means that they’re at risk for having multiple surgeries. So and that even continues today, we try to manage younger folks with more conservative measure [sic], including medications to try to avoid surgery, because we know where that trajectory is going to go.” Dr. Simopoulos admitted that there were no studies at the time material to this case that revealed the exact nature and course of practice in the State of Florida. While Dr. Simopoulos is credited as an expert in anesthesiology and pain management, his reliance on the second- hand accounts from students and conferences he attended to form his opinions about the regional standard of care in Florida, are not as persuasive as the accounts of Dr. Guskiewicz, a physician practicing in the area of anesthesiology and pain management in Florida. Accordingly, Dr. Guskiewicz’s testimony is entitled to greater weight in this proceeding. Dr. Simopoulos also opined that the standard of care can only be violated when a patient is harmed. DOH argued that his definition is inconsistent with the definition in Florida law as contained in section 766.102(1). DOH Investigator Victor Troupe served a subpoena on September 2, 2010, for patient records to include: A.M., B.B., C.C., M.H., and W.B. Investigator Troupe took possession of the original files on that date. He has no reason to believe those patient files had been altered in any way. Investigator Troupe had performed numerous annual inspections of Dr. Mubang’s clinic, and neither found any violations or issued any citations. Investigator Troupe never interviewed Patients A.M., B.B., C.C., M.H., W.B., or B.D. Further, Investigator Troupe has no knowledge or information regarding the present whereabouts of any of those individuals. Finally, he has no information about whether those patients are still receiving opioid analgesic pain medication, even though DOH has access to E-FORCSE for investigative purposes. Drug Definitions Oxycodone is commonly prescribed to treat pain. Roxicodone is a brand name for oxycodone. Oxycodone is a Schedule II controlled substance. Oxycodone will be used throughout this Order, even if the brand name Roxicodone was prescribed. All Schedule II controlled substances have a high potential for abuse and have currently accepted, but severely restricted, medical use in treatment in the United States. Abuse of Schedule II controlled substances may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence. § 893.03(2), Fla. Stat. Fentanyl is a very strong opioid that is prescribed to treat pain and is listed as a Schedule II controlled substance. § 893.03(2)(b), Fla. Stat. Hydromorphone is a Schedule II controlled substance that is commonly prescribed to treat pain. Hydromorphone is commonly prescribed under the brand name Dilaudid. § 893.03(2)(a), Fla. Stat. Methadone is a synthetic opioid prescribed to treat pain. Methadone is a Schedule II controlled substance. § 893.03(2)(b), Fla. Stat. Vicodin and Lortab are brand names for hydrocodone/APAP. Hydrocodone/APAP contains hydrocodone and acetaminophen and is prescribed to treat pain. Hydrocodone in the dosages found in Vicodin is a Schedule III controlled substance. § 893.03(3)(c)4., Fla. Stat. All Schedule III controlled substances have a potential for abuse less than the substances in Schedules I and II. Abuse of Schedule III controlled substances may lead to moderate or low physical dependence or high psychological dependence. § 893.03(3), Fla. Stat. Fiorinal with codeine is the brand name for a drug that contains butalbital and codeine and is commonly prescribed to treat migraine headaches. Butalbital is a Schedule III controlled substance. Codeine is commonly prescribed to treat pain. Codeine is a Schedule II controlled substance. § 893.03(3)(a) and (2)(a), Fla. Stat. Ultram is a brand name for tramadol, an opioid-class narcotic medication prescribed to treat pain. At the time of the events of this case, tramadol was not a controlled substance. Tramadol is currently a Schedule IV controlled substance. § 893.03(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2018). All Schedule IV controlled substances have a low potential for abuse relative to the substances in Schedule III. Abuse of Schedule IV controlled substances may lead to limited physical or psychological dependence relative to the substances in Schedule III. § 893.03(4), Fla. Stat. Soma is the brand name for carisoprodol. Carisoprodol is a muscle relaxant commonly prescribed to treat muscular pain. Carisoprodol is a Schedule IV controlled substance. § 893.03(4), Fla. Stat. Adderall is the brand name for a drug that contains amphetamine. Adderall is commonly prescribed to treat attention deficit disorder (“ADD”). Adderall is a Schedule II controlled substance. § 893.03(2)(c), Fla. Stat. Xanax is the brand name for alprazolam. Klonopin is the brand name for clonazepam. Valium is the brand name for diazepam. All three drugs are benzodiazepine-class drugs prescribed to treat anxiety, and all three drugs are Schedule IV controlled substances. During the time Respondent treated the five patients, who are the subject of the DOH Case No. 2010-12384, Florida did not have a prescription drug monitoring database. Before E-FORCSE, practitioners had to rely upon a patient’s representation regarding his or her medication history and verify the information by calling identified pharmacies. This “trust but verify” policy was in place at Dr. Mubang’s practice. During the time of Dr. Mubang’s treatment of these patients, he received a letter from Ana M. Viamonte Ros, M.D., the surgeon general for the State of Florida, and Fred Bearison, M.D., the chairman of the Florida Board of Medicine, dated May 13, 2009. That letter enclosed a copy of Responsible Opioid Prescribing, A Physician’s Guide, written by Scott M. Fishman, M.D. The letter advised Dr. Mubang, and others similarly situated, that Dr. Fishman’s book “is a practical guide to Florida’s current standards for the use of controlled substances for the treatment of pain,” based upon the Federation of State Medical Board’s Model Rule, “so it is right on point for Florida practicing doctors.” The book also stated, at page 25: Although Medicare and other institutions have defined what constitutes a physical examination for purposes of coding and reimbursement, exactly what comprises an appropriate or acceptable physical examination for pain is not well-defined, largely because it will differ from case to case. Regulators who expect to see a physical examination as part of the evaluation that leads to appropriate pain care involving controlled substances assume that a basic, if not focused, examination is warranted. The exact components of the examination are left to the judgment of the clinician who is expected to have performed an examination proportionate to the diagnosis that justifies a treatment. Dr. Mubang testified at the hearing, “many point-of- care screens for ‘opiates’ do not reliably detect any opioid other than codeine and morphine, or may not report if levels are below a certain threshold. Therefore, they may give false negative results for semisynthetic and synthetic oil opioid analgesics.” Dr. Mubang received feedback from pharmacists and patients regarding limitations on prescribing imposed on distributors and pharmacies by the DEA, including during the fall of 2010. During the time Dr. Mubang treated the six patients subject to these consolidated administrative actions, there was no upper limit recommended or identified regarding the maximum dosage for opioid analgesics. New patients to Dr. Mubang’s practice have to fill out paperwork, including a patient history. Patients were also required to sign an opioid contract, which mandated patients to use only one pharmacy and required that the patient only obtain medication from Dr. Mubang. Dr. Mubang obtained authorizations for release of medical information to acquire records of prior treating physicians. His office consistently obtained prior records, including MRIs and other diagnostic studies. Dr. Mubang testified that he performed a physical examination of each patient on each office visit. The initial exam was broad, while follow-up examinations were focal. His physical examinations included a review of systems, from head to toe. He stated that each physical examination included a review of the patient’s neurological status and notes whether the patient is oriented to person, time, and place. Dr. Mubang’s practice was to observe patients in his waiting room, and watch each patient as they come to the exam room. This observation is intended to identify things like gait abnormalities, guarding, and posture. Pain patients in Dr. Mubang’s practice are required to complete a Brief Pain Inventory, which he reviews with each patient. Dr. Mubang also reviews past medications with each patient to determine whether the medication has been effective in relieving pain and increasing activities of daily living. He reviews with each patient potential side effects of medication and the risks and benefits of using those medications. Dr. Mubang prepares a progress note for each office visit with a patient. Additionally, he maintains copies of each prescription issued to a patient. The identified treatment plan for each of these six patients was to improve the patient’s functional abilities, to allow them to return to work, and to participate in relationships. Dr. Mubang periodically required patients to submit to a urine immunoassay. This is a presumptive screening test for illicit substances and some other controlled substances. As Dr. Fishman points out on page 61 in his book Responsible Opioid Prescribing, Dr. Mubang was aware that “point-of-care screens for opioids do not reliably detect any opiate other than codeine and morphine.” During the 2010 timeframe, a physician who ordered a urine drug screen was not required to do anything with the results. Further, the requirements of rule 64B8-9.013(3)(d) to monitor patient compliance were not mandatory until after October 17, 2010. Dr. Mubang is aware of the sedative effects of opioids taken with muscle relaxants like Soma. This combination of medication should be dispensed with caution, but if a patient has been taking it for a period of time with no problems, he believes the prescription is appropriate. Dr. Mubang’s approach to changing pain medication, as explored more fully in the following discussion of the six patients subject to this proceeding is consistent, but deserves close scrutiny. He testified that: If the vital signs are stable, you can do what you want, so long as it doesn't have consequences. If you see the visit after this, this patient did not come in with hypertension or they did not end up in the hospital or I was not called at 2:00 in the morning. So it tells you what you're doing is right. See? That's why we do these vital signs. The Patients Each of the patients in this cause completed a two-page questionnaire about his or her pain, titled “brief pain inventory,” during each visit after the initial visit. The pain inventory contained: an anatomical figure for the patient to mark painful areas, 12 questions with a one-to-ten scale for pain level and for activities of daily living, and spaces for the patient to describe the pain in writing. Dr. Mubang’s progress notes for each of the patients consisted of a printed form, containing a similar anatomical figure at the top of the page with most of the rest of the page containing a checklist for “assessment.” Patient A.M. From December 22, 2009, to October 20, 2010, Dr. Mubang provided pain management treatment to Patient A.M., a then 23-year-old female, for lower back pain related to a car accident that occurred several years earlier. Dr. Mubang had first begun treating Patient A.M. while covering for Dr. Luis Azan at Plant City Polyclinic, where he prescribed her 240 30 mg tablets of oxycodone and 120 10 mg tablets of methadone. Dr. Mubang noted that Patient A.M. had been a passenger in the back of the car and was wearing a seatbelt. He noted that Patient A.M. did not lose consciousness, and while she went to the emergency room, she did not have an in-patient stay. On her initial evaluation questionnaire, Patient A.M. reported trying four alternative treatment methods for her pain out of 18 possible treatment options on Dr. Mubang’s checklist form: chiropractic treatment (no relief); muscle injections (no relief); massage (no relief); and pain relievers (some relief). By her own report, Patient A.M. had not tried physical therapy, nerve blocks, or surgery. Patient A.M. had sequential MRI findings from November 7, 2007 (ordered by Dr. Murthy Ravipati), and March 23, 2010 (ordered by Dr. Mubang), which demonstrated a central focal disc protrusion (herniated nucleus pulposus) at L5-S1. On her first visit at his office, Dr. Mubang increased Patient A.M.’s oxycodone from 240 to 270 30 mg tablets per month. He failed to document a rationale for the 30-pill increase. Dr. Mubang’s medical records included Patient A.M.’s medical history and physical examination; diagnostic, therapeutic, and laboratory results; evaluations and consultations; objectives identified; risks and benefits of the treatment ordered; treatments and medications ordered and documented; and instructions and agreements regarding pain management. Dr. Mubang made referrals to consulting physicians, including Dr. Goldsmith (orthopedic) and physical therapy (Select Physical Therapy). From December 22, 2009, to August 27, 2010, Dr. Mubang prescribed 270 30 mg tablets of oxycodone in combination with 120 10 mg tablets of methadone to Patient A.M. monthly. In ten months, Patient A.M. received 3,870 pain pills from Dr. Mubang. In order to take the pain medication as prescribed, Patient A.M. would have to take 13 pain pills per day. By comparison, Dr. Mubang’s expert, Dr. Simopoulos, testified that in his practice the most 30 mg of oxycodone that he ever prescribed was six tablets per day, or 180-200 tablets per month. Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Guskiewicz, testified that in his practice the most 30 mg of oxycodone that he ever prescribed was five per day, or 150 tablets. In addition to the pain medication, Dr. Mubang prescribed 90 350 mg tablets of Soma to Patient A.M. per month. On August 2, 2010, Dr. Mubang ordered a urine drug screen for Patient A.M. The drug screen was positive for benzodiazepines and negative for methadone. If a patient tests negative for a prescribed medication, the physician should consider the possibility that the patient is not taking the drug and, instead, is diverting it. Given Patient A.M.’s negative test for methadone, Dr. Mubang should not have continued to prescribe methadone to her, or at least should have questioned her about her usage of the prescribed drug. Despite the aberrant test result, Dr. Mubang continued to prescribe potentially lethal doses of oxycodone, methadone, and Soma to Patient A.M. Further, from December 22, 2009, through August 27, 2010, Dr. Mubang did not perform nor did he document performing a complete and adequate physical examination or medical history to justify his prescribing of potentially lethal doses of methadone, oxycodone, and Soma to Patient A.M. From December 22, 2009, through August 27, 2010, Dr. Mubang did not diagnose Patient A.M. with intractable pain prior to prescribing potentially lethal doses of methadone, oxycodone, and Soma to Patient A.M. To meet the standard of care, Dr. Mubang should have immediately reduced the amount of medication that he prescribed to Patient A.M. Additionally, he should have tried to determine the root cause of Patient A.M.’s pain. Dr. Mubang should have followed up on his ordering of alternative treatment modalities, such as physical therapy, and if Patient A.M. refused to follow his instructions, he should have discharged Patient A.M. While Dr. Mubang’s records are at times difficult to read, some were legible enough for review by the two experts who offered opinions in this matter. On the whole, however, the medical records for Patient A.M. were inadequate (and some of them were actually illegible) to provide complete information to either Dr. Mubang or another reviewing physician or investigator. Patient B.B. From March 25, 2010, to August 23, 2010, Respondent provided pain management treatment to Patient B.B., a then 25- year-old female. Patient B.B. initially visited Dr. Mubang on March 25, 2010, with a history of cervical spinal fusion in 2003 following a motor vehicle accident. Dr. Mubang’s Initial Evaluation documented a thorough review of systems, including skin; HEENT (head, eyes, ears, nose, and throat); neurological; and musculoskeletal. Simultaneously, Dr. Mubang and the patient completed a Pain Questionnaire documenting the location and severity of Patient B.B.’s pain and other treatment modalities, which had been tried, but failed (surgery, braces, chiropractic, physical therapy, TENS, and massage). On her initial visit with Dr. Mubang, Patient B.B. reported having neck, shoulder, and upper back pain. Dr. Mubang noted on his initial range of motion assessment that Patient B.B. had no thoraco-lumbar spine pain. Patient B.B. never indicated on her brief pain inventories that she had pain radiating down the leg. Instead, she consistently marked pain in the neck, radiating down the right arm, and pain in the middle back. After the initial visit, Dr. Mubang recorded that Patient B.B. had lower back pain by noting “LBP & radiculopathy” with a line drawn down the leg of the anatomical figure. Dr. Mubang’s explanation for the discrepancy between his notation on the anatomical figure and Patient B.B.’s notation was that the patient was noting pain, but that he was noting tenderness. He did not explain the difference. As discussed below, this same inconsistency appears frequently in many of the patients’ records. Dr. Mubang’s offered explanation for the discrepancy between his records and the patient-generated records is not credible. From March 25, 2010, to August 23, 2010, Dr. Mubang prescribed 240 30 mg tablets of oxycodone in combination with 60 2 mg tablets of Xanax to Patient B.B. monthly. From March 25, 2010, to May 20, 2010, Dr. Mubang also prescribed 120 350 mg tablets of Soma to Patient B.B., in addition to the oxycodone and Xanax each month. To justify the amount of Xanax he prescribed to Patient B.B., Dr. Mubang relied on an anxiety checklist questionnaire completed by Patient B.B. In his practice, if a patient marked five to six of the criteria on his anxiety checklist, Dr. Mubang would prescribe the patient Xanax. For Patient B.B., on three of his five progress notes, Dr. Mubang checked the box for anxiety. Other than that, there is no annotation or documentation by Dr. Mubang concerning Patient B.B.’s anxiety. From March 25, 2010, through August 23, 2010, based on Patient B.B.’s history and physical findings, Dr. Mubang prescribed potentially lethal doses of oxycodone, Xanax, and Soma to Patient B.B. in excessive quantities and without sufficient justification. From March 25, 2010, through August 23, 2010, Dr. Mubang neither performed nor documented performing a complete and adequate physical examination or medical history to justify his prescribing of potentially lethal doses of oxycodone, Xanax, and Soma to Patient B.B. From March 25, 2010, through August 23, 2010, Dr. Mubang failed to diagnose Patient B.B. with an anxiety disorder, which would have supported his prescribing of Xanax to Patient B.B. From March 25, 2010, through August 23, 2010, Dr. Mubang did not diagnose Patient B.B. with intractable pain prior to prescribing potentially lethal doses of oxycodone, Xanax, and Soma to Patient B.B. To meet the standard of care, Dr. Mubang should have done more to treat Patient B.B.’s underlying source of pain through referrals for physical therapy or orthopedics. Depending on the particular findings, he should have tried intervention care to relieve Patient B.B.’s pain instead of relying solely on medication management, particularly, excessive amounts of oxycodone. Patient B.B., as a relatively young patient, would have benefited from more aggressive physical therapy, massage therapy, and other treatment modalities to keep her off of addictive pain medication as much as possible. Dr. Mubang attempted, in part, to justify his excessive amounts of medications, based upon The Super Saver pharmacy profile for Patient B.B., which confirms that this patient was receiving the same quantities and combination of medications from the prior physician, Ibem R. Borges, M.D. He also cites rule 64B8-9.013 (2003) to support the heavy prescribing of medications, which indicates the Board of Medicine will not judge the validity of prescribing, “based upon the quantity and chronicity,” and that a “physician’s conduct will be evaluated to a great extent by treatment outcome.” He argues that Petitioner failed to introduce any evidence to establish Patient B.B. suffered any adverse effect from Dr. Mubang’s treatment. Patient C.C. From April 29, 2010, to May 28, 2012, Dr. Mubang provided pain management treatment to Patient C.C., a then 32-year-old female. At her initial evaluation, Patient C.C. reported having lower back pain and left knee pain. On her subsequent brief pain inventories, Patient C.C. consistently marked pain at the middle of the lower back and pain at the left knee. Almost identical to Patient B.B., Dr. Mubang’s progress notes for Patient C.C. note “LBP & radiculopathy” with a line drawn down the leg of an anatomical figure indicating pain radiating down the leg. Contained in Respondent’s records were notes from two prior treating providers, Drs. David Herson and Marc Weinstein. On a note dated February 27, 2007, Dr. Herson noted that Patient C.C.’s cervical and lumbar range of motion was within normal limits, and he noted no tenderness to palpation of the lumbar spine. Dr. Herson recommended epidural injections to Patient C.C. for the left knee pain. Dr. Herson prescribed Patient C.C. 30 tablets of Ultram for her pain. On a note dated March 1, 2007, Dr. Weinstein noted that “MRI scans of her cervical and lumbar spine and left knee were performed and show no significant abnormalities that would require surgery.” From April 29, 2010, to August 19, 2010, Dr. Mubang prescribed 290 30 mg tablets of oxycodone in combination with 180 10 mg tablets of methadone to Patient C.C. monthly. In a period of four months, Patient C.C. received 2,350 pain pills from Dr. Mubang, which equates to a daily prescription of 15.5 pills. In addition to addictive pain medication, Dr. Mubang also prescribed 60 2 mg tablets of Xanax to Patient C.C. per month. Opioids and benzodiazepines in combination increase the risk of respiratory depression, which can be fatal. On April 29, 2010, and May 27, 2010, Dr. Mubang added 90 350 mg tablets of Soma to the potentially lethal cocktail of medications he prescribed to Patient C.C. Dr. Mubang failed to document his rationale for starting and stopping Soma. On April 29, 2010, as part of her initial evaluation with Dr. Mubang, Patient C.C. reported to him that her current medications were oxycodone, methadone, Xanax, and Soma. On April 29, 2010, Dr. Mubang ordered a urine drug screen for Patient C.C. The drug screen was positive for opiates, oxycodone, and benzodiazepines, but was negative for methadone. Opiates and opioids are discernibly different categories of drugs. Opiates are morphine derivatives. Opioids are synthetic opiates. No medications Patient C.C. reported taking were opiates. The standard of care required Dr. Mubang to inquire as to the reasons behind the aberrant drug test result and adjust Patient C.C.’s medications accordingly. In his 2012 deposition, Dr. Mubang speculated that he may have consulted Patient C.C. about the drug test and that maybe she ran out of medication. He could not tell from his records if he discussed the results with Patient C.C. or the reason for the aberrant test result because his records lacked any such information. At the final hearing in this matter, Dr. Mubang raised for the first time the defense that the urine drug screen he used at that time was incapable of testing for methadone. He also argued that if a patient is taking oxycodone and methadone together, then either one, both, or neither may show up positive on a urine drug screen due to “tolerance” and methadone’s interaction with oxycodone and with the NMDA (the amino acid neuro receptor that increases the tolerance of oxycodone by interacting with methadone). This was a clear misunderstanding by Dr. Mubang of his expert’s testimony regarding the use of methadone in pain management. Dr. Mubang testified many times at hearing that methadone has a tolerance effect on oxycodone, which causes a physician to increase the dose of oxycodone. Respondent’s testimony was incongruent with the description given by his expert witness. Dr. Simopoulos explained that methadone can antagonize NMDA receptors, which can help some patients who have a tolerance to oxycodone. However, Dr. Simopoulos’s testimony regarding NMDA did not relate to the ability to detect methadone in a urine drug screen. Despite the negative test result for methadone, during the same visit, Dr. Mubang prescribed 180 10 mg tablets of methadone to Patient C.C. No questions of whether Patient C.C. may have diverted her methadone or notations of such were in the doctor’s notes. Dr. Mubang failed to order a second urine drug screen for Patient C.C. until ten months later on February 2, 2011. The second test was also negative for the prescribed medication methadone. From April 29, 2010, through August 19, 2010, based on Patient C.C.’s presentation, Dr. Mubang prescribed potentially lethal doses of oxycodone, methadone, Xanax, and Soma to Patient C.C. inappropriately, in excessive quantities, and without justification. From April 29, 2010, through August 19, 2010, Dr. Mubang neither performed nor documented performing a complete and adequate physical examination or medical history to justify his prescribing potentially lethal doses of oxycodone, methadone, Xanax, and Soma to Patient C.C. Dr. Mubang did not diagnose Patient C.C. with intractable pain prior to prescribing to the patient the potentially lethal doses of oxycodone, methadone, Xanax, and Soma. To meet the standard of care, Dr. Mubang should not have prescribed such large amounts of pain medication to Patient C.C., a patient who did not have a significant pathology for pain. Instead, he should have pursued other treatment modalities, such as injections and physical therapy. Patient W.B. From December 13, 2008, to February 18, 2011, Dr. Mubang provided pain management treatment to Patient W.B., a then 52-year-old male. On or about April 20, 2008, prior to visiting Dr. Mubang, Patient W.B. presented to the emergency room at Sarasota Memorial Hospital after being hit by a “slow moving vehicle,” while riding his bicycle. The emergency room physician diagnosed Patient W.B. with a bruise of the left knee and left hip and prescribed an unknown quantity of 7.5 mg Lortab to Patient W.B. Patient W.B. then visited Physician’s Group, LLC, in Sarasota for follow-up care on April 20, May 28, November 11, and December 2, 2008. On May 28, 2008, Patient W.B. reported to a provider at Physician’s Group, LLC, that he had taken Dilaudid from a friend. On November 11, 2008, Patient W.B. saw Dr. Frederic Sonstein. Dr. Sonstein noted that Patient W.B. missed a scheduled appointment because he was incarcerated. While incarcerated, Patient W.B. was treated with Flexeril and Ultram. Dr. Sonstein recommended referral to a pain management specialist and prescribed Vicodin for pain control. A November 24, 2008, MRI report of Patient W.B.’s lumbar spine was unremarkable. On December 13, 2008, Patient W.B. came to Dr. Mubang and reported having pain in his neck and shoulders, with pain radiating down both arms. In contrast to Patient W.B.’s report, on his initial range of motion evaluation, Dr. Mubang did not document any findings under cervical spine. Instead, he noted lumbar spine pain with radiculopathy. On his initial evaluation questionnaire, Patient W.B. reported only having tried one alternative treatment method for his pain, “braces or cast.” By his own report, Patient W.B. had not tried any of the other alternative treatment options on Dr. Mubang’s checklist form, such as physical therapy, chiropractic, muscle injections, or surgery. Despite the minimal objective findings in Patient W.B.’s history, Dr. Mubang began to prescribe escalating amounts of oxycodone to Patient W.B. On December 13, 2008, Dr. Mubang prescribed 120 30 mg tablets of oxycodone to Patient W.B. Then, he increased the amount of oxycodone he prescribed to Patient W.B. over the following monthly visits as follows: 150, 180, 210, 210, 240, 240, and ultimately settling at 270 30 mg tablets of oxycodone per month. From December 13, 2008, to August 24, 2010, Dr. Mubang prescribed Patient W.B. 4,050 30 mg tablets of oxycodone. On July 11, 2009, in addition to oxycodone and Soma, Dr. Mubang added Xanax and Fiorinal with codeine to Patient W.B.’s monthly prescription regimen. Like with Patient B.B., Dr. Mubang prescribed Xanax to Patient W.B. based on Patient W.B.’s answers to his checklist anxiety questionnaire. On July 11, 2009, Dr. Mubang saw Patient W.B. and renewed his medication. He scheduled Patient W.B. to return on August 9, 2009; however, Patient W.B. missed the appointment. Patient W.B. next visited Dr. Mubang two months later, on October 13, 2009. Dr. Mubang failed to document the reason for Patient W.B.’s three-month absence. He failed to document if Patient W.B. continued to receive pain medication from another source. He did not note whether Patient W.B. experienced withdrawal symptoms without his oxycodone for two months or how Patient W.B. managed his pain without oxycodone for two months. Dr. Mubang admitted during the hearing that, “[i]t is important to me to know why he misses visits. And you're right. Your point is well-taken.” Dr. Mubang’s own controlled substance agreement, which was executed by Patient W.B., explicitly stated that renewals are contingent on keeping scheduled appointments. Despite the unexplained absence, on October 13, 2009, he renewed Patient W.B.’s prescriptions for 270 tablets oxycodone, 30 tablets Soma, 60 tablets Xanax, and 90 tablets of Fiorinal with codeine. Dr. Mubang should not have restarted Patient W.B. at the same high dosage of oxycodone that he had previously prescribed, as it was potentially fatal. On November 10, 2009, Dr. Mubang ordered a urine drug screen for Patient W.B. The drug screen was positive for cocaine and hydromorphone. The drug screen was negative for the prescribed medications Soma (carisoprodol) and Xanax (alprazolam). Based upon the November 10, 2009, drug screen result, the standard of care required Dr. Mubang to refer Patient W.B. to a drug treatment center. When questioned about the positive cocaine result, Dr. Mubang’s expert, Dr. Simopoulos, testified, “That’s the part where this patient has a substance abuse disorder, obviously.” Dr. Simopoulos opined that, “if you are going to continue prescribing in this case, because the patient has duel diagnoses, you would want the input of a psychiatrist for this case.” Patient W.B. next visited Dr. Mubang approximately three months later on February 9, 2010. Again, Dr. Mubang failed to document the reason for the absence. At the February 9, 2010, visit, Dr. Mubang ordered a urine drug screen for Patient W.B., which returned completely negative results. After a multi-month absence and with a completely negative urine drug screen, Patient W.B. would have been opioid negative. In his 2012 deposition, Dr. Mubang theorized that the completely negative result may have been because Patient W.B. drove himself to his appointment and Dr. Mubang instructed his patients not to drive while on medication. This made little sense. Despite the completely negative result and unexplained absence, Respondent prescribed Patient W.B. 270 tablets of oxycodone, 30 tablets of Soma, 60 tablets of Xanax, and 90 tablets of Fiorinal with codeine. Again, Dr. Mubang should not have restarted Patient W.B. at the same high dosage of oxycodone that he had previously prescribed, as it was potentially fatal. Despite prescribing 270 tablets of oxycodone per month to Patient W.B., or nine pills per day, Dr. Mubang testified at hearing that, “[i]f I give them what they call ‘breakthrough medications,’ like oxycodone, all these, they'll tell you some days they take it, some days they don't take it.” Dr. Mubang was aware that Patient W.B. did not require nine oxycodone tablets per day and that the amount of oxycodone he prescribed to Patient W.B. was not justified. The foregoing pattern of unexplained absence and completely negative urine drug screen result, followed by Dr. Mubang renewing prescriptions, was repeated in November 2010. From December 13, 2008, through November 10, 2010, Dr. Mubang prescribed potentially lethal doses of oxycodone, Soma, Xanax, and Fiorinal with codeine to Patient W.B. inappropriately, in excessive quantities, and without justification. From December 13, 2008, through November 10, 2010, Dr. Mubang neither performed nor did he document performing a complete and adequate physical examination or medical history to justify his prescribing of the potentially lethal doses of oxycodone, Soma, Xanax, and Fiorinal with codeine to Patient W.B. From December 13, 2008, through August 24, 2010, Respondent did not diagnose Patient W.B. with intractable pain prior to prescribing potentially lethal doses of oxycodone, Soma, Xanax, and Fiorinal with codeine to Patient W.B. To meet the standard of care, Dr. Mubang should have discontinued prescribing the amount of medication that he prescribed to Patient W.B. based on the minimal findings in Patient W.B.’s history and the minimal changes on examination. In addition, Dr. Mubang should have referred Patient W.B. to a drug treatment center. Patient M.H. From January 10, 2005, to May 29, 2012, Dr. Mubang provided pain management treatment to Patient M.H., who first visited him as a 29-year-old female, suffering lower back pain. Prior to seeing Dr. Mubang, on March 24, 2004, Patient M.H. visited Dr. Edward Jacobson. Dr. Jacobson noted that Patient M.H. had been in a car accident on February 21, 2004, and that Patient M.H. was complaining of headaches. He prescribed 15 tablets of Vicodin to her. On January 10, 2005, Patient M.H.’s first visit with Dr. Mubang, he prescribed her 60 tablets of Vicodin. On January 21, 2005, Dr. Mubang added clonazepam and Adderall to Patient M.H.’s medication regimen. Dr. Mubang’s note for the January 21, 2005, visit does not make any mention of Patient M.H. suffering from an anxiety disorder or ADD that would justify his use of clonazepam or Adderall, save for a simple “ADD” noted in the assessment/plan portion of the form. Dr. Mubang should have referred Patient M.H. to a psychiatrist for diagnostic confirmation of ADD before automatically prescribing (or refilling) the Adderall prescription. From June 15, 2005, to March 7, 2007, Dr. Mubang prescribed Valium in combination with clonazepam to Patient M.H. monthly. Then on March 23, 2009, he discontinued clonazepam and started Patient M.H. on 90 2 mg tablets of Xanax. Dr. Mubang neglected to document a justification for prescribing Patient M.H. benzodiazepine-class drugs, or for prescribing her a combination of two different benzodiazepine- class drugs, or for the changes he made to the benzodiazepines he prescribed. On January 6, 2009, Patient M.H. reported having lower back pain from a car accident in 2003. Dr. Mubang noted that Patient M.H. was the driver of a car that was rear-ended. He also noted that Patient M.H. did not lose consciousness during the accident and did not go to the emergency room. At the January 6, 2009, visit, Patient M.H. reported trying three alternative treatment methods for her pain. By her own report, Patient M.H. had not tried any of the other 18 alternative treatment options on Dr. Mubang’s checklist form, such as physical therapy, muscle injections, or surgery. In 2009, for unexplained reasons, Dr. Mubang began significantly increasing Patient M.H.’s opioid pain medication. In January 2009, he increased Patient M.H.’s Vicodin from 60 to 90 tablets per month, then in July 2009 from 90 to 120 tablets per month. On October 19, 2009, Dr. Mubang prescribed Patient M.H. ten 50 mcg patches of fentanyl in combination with 120 tablets of Vicodin. A 50 mcg fentanyl patch is intended to last for 72 hours; so, a prescription of ten patches is intended to last one month. Fentanyl is a very strong opioid. Based on Patient M.H.’s experience with opioids, Dr. Mubang’s prescribing fentanyl to Patient M.H. was potentially lethal. On November 16, 2009, Dr. Mubang discontinued fentanyl and started Patient M.H. on 90 15 mg tablets of oxycodone, which he increased to 120 tablets the next month. Dr. Mubang prescribed the oxycodone in combination with 120 tablets of Vicodin. At hearing, Dr. Mubang could not tell from his notes and was, therefore, unable to explain his rationale as to why he prescribed fentanyl to Patient M.H., or why he discontinued the fentanyl and started Patient M.H. on oxycodone. The limited documentation that was included in Dr. Mubang’s records contradicted his course of treatment, as he routinely documented that Patient M.H.’s pain was a two out of ten with medication. From March 8, 2010, to June 28, 2010, Dr. Mubang added and then discontinued prescribing Soma to Patient M.H. His records do not contain any justification for starting Patient M.H. on Soma or for stopping Soma. On May 3, 2010, Dr. Mubang ordered a urine drug screen for Patient M.H. The urine drug screen result was negative for the prescribed medication oxycodone. The standard of care required Dr. Mubang to ask about the reason for the aberrant result to determine whether she was taking the medications or diverting them. Depending upon Patient M.H.’s answer, he should have ordered a repeat urine drug screen at the following visit. Despite the negative test, Dr. Mubang continued to prescribe potentially lethal doses of oxycodone and Vicodin to Patient M.H. From January 10, 2005, through August 23, 2010, Dr. Mubang prescribed potentially lethal doses of Vicodin, Xanax, Adderall, Soma, Valium, clonazepam, fentanyl, or oxycodone to Patient M.H. inappropriately, in excessive quantities, and without justification. From January 10, 2005, through August 23, 2010, Dr. Mubang did not diagnose Patient M.H. with ADD or any other clinical indication to support his prescribing Adderall to Patient M.H. From January 10, 2005, through August 23, 2010, Dr. Mubang neither performed nor documented performing a complete and adequate physical examination or medical history to justify his prescribing of the potentially lethal doses of Vicodin, Xanax, Adderall, Soma, Valium, clonazepam, fentanyl, or oxycodone to Patient M.H. Dr. Mubang did not diagnose Patient M.H. with intractable pain prior to prescribing to the patient the potentially lethal doses of Vicodin, Xanax, Adderall, Soma, Valium, clonazepam, fentanyl, or oxycodone. To meet the standard of care in his treatment of Patient M.H., Dr. Mubang should not have prescribed fentanyl to Patient M.H. without sufficient medical justification, as doing so was life threatening. Respondent should have referred Patient M.H. to specialists, such as orthopedics, physical therapy, and psychiatry. To the extent Dr. Mubang documented referrals to specialists, he should have followed up on his ordering of referrals to minimize the amount of medications he provided to Patient M.H., instead of escalating the amounts of pain medicine he prescribed. Patient B.D. From November 11, 2010, to November 8, 2012, Dr. Mubang provided pain management treatment to Patient B.D., a then 24- to 26-year-old female. In addition to lower back pain, Patient B.D. was also diagnosed with fibromyalgia. Dr. Mubang’s medical records for Patient B.D. contain a note from Dr. Indira Koshy, a prior treating provider, for a visit on August 24, 2010, in New York. Dr. Koshy noted that Patient B.D. was “entering rehab” and that Patient B.D. has seizures when she does not take her medications. Dr. Koshy’s note indicates potential for doctor shopping. At no point during his treatment of Patient B.D. did Dr. Mubang address the note from Dr. Koshy, specifically; Patient B.D.’s entry into rehabilitation; Patient B.D.’s seizures when she did not take her medications; or Patient B.D.’s potential for doctor shopping. Dr. Mubang previously treated Patient B.D. at Care Point Medical Center as a covering physician. He testified that when covering as a physician he provided “continuation of care” and that his practice was not to change a patient’s medication. Despite his testimony, when covering at Care Point Medical Center, Dr. Mubang increased Patient B.D.’s oxycodone from 210 tablets per month to 240 tablets per month. Then, on November 11, 2010, when Patient B.D. visited his practice, Dr. Mubang decreased her oxycodone from 240 to 180 tablets. As discussed below, this decrease came after he received notice of Petitioner’s investigation. From November 11, 2010, until May 24, 2012, Dr. Mubang prescribed Patient B.D. 180 30 mg tablets of oxycodone, 30 or 60 10 mg tablets of methadone, 60 350 mg tablets of Soma, and 30 0.5 mg to 2 mg tablets of Xanax monthly. On June 21, 2012, Dr. Mubang changed Patient B.D.’s prescribed muscle relaxant from Soma to baclofen; and on July 19, 2012, he changed Patient B.D.’s prescribed anxiolytic medication from 60 0.5 mg tablets of Xanax to 60 2 mg tablets of clonazepam. Dr. Mubang did not document any justification for the foregoing medication changes. From September 13, 2012, until November 8, 2012, Dr. Mubang prescribed 112 8 mg tablets of Dilaudid, 28 10 mg tablets of methadone, and 60 tablets of clonazepam to Patient B.D. monthly. On June 23, 2011, Dr. Mubang performed a urine drug screen on Patient B.D. The drug screen was negative for benzodiazepines, even though he prescribed Xanax to Patient B.D. The urine drug screen was positive for methadone, despite Dr. Mubang’s testimony that his urine drug screen could not detect methadone. On December 8, 2011, and June 21, 2012, Dr. Mubang performed urine drug screens on Patient B.D. Both drug screens were negative for the prescribed medication methadone. The standard of care required a reasonably prudent physician to question the patient about the aberrant urine drug screens results and cease prescribing methadone to a patient whose urine drug screen was negative for the drug. Despite the negative test results, Dr. Mubang continued to prescribe methadone to Patient B.D. From November 11, 2010, through November 8, 2012, Dr. Mubang neither performed nor documented performing an adequate history or physical examination to justify his prescribing of the potentially lethal controlled substances to Patient B.D. From November 11, 2010, through November 8, 2012, based on Patient B.D.’s history and physical findings, Dr. Mubang’s prescribing of the controlled substances to Patient B.D. was excessive and without justification. From June 23, 2011, through November 8, 2012, Dr. Mubang failed to address Patient B.D.’s aberrant urine drug screen results. To meet the standard of care in his treatment of Patient B.D., Dr. Mubang should not have prescribed the quantity and combination of drugs he prescribed to Patient B.D. He should have referred Patient B.D. for a rheumatology consult to confirm or rule out fibromyalgia and other diseases. He should have offered more physical therapy, and other, non-opioid modalities of care, and he should have routinely followed up with Patient B.D. to ensure that she was complying with his orders. Dr. Mubang testified that Soma was part of the “holy trinity,” which is a slang drug term used to refer to the prescription combination of oxycodone, a benzodiazepine, and Soma. He prescribed the “holy trinity” to five of the six patients in this cause. Dr. Mubang’s Medical Records Dr. Mubang’s medical records for the six patients, who are the subjects of the Administrative Complaints, were generally lacking in specificity to justify the level of his prescribing. Some examples common to the patients at issue illustrate these shortcomings. For each visit for each of the patients, Dr. Mubang noted that the patient had straight leg raise pain at 30 degrees, even though he testified that a patient can have straight leg raise pain at 15, 20, 30, or 45 degrees. Maybe this was a coincidence, but more credibly it is a pattern of sloppiness or autofill by the doctor. Also, for each patient, Dr. Mubang routinely drew a line down one leg of the anatomical figure on his progress notes indicating radiculopathy, regardless of where the patient reported pain. At hearing, on multiple occasions, Dr. Mubang could not determine his rationale for changing a patient’s medication regimen, based on his progress notes. His own expert, Dr. Simopoulos, testified that, “there's not much rationale on the plans in--in Dr. Mubang's notes in general.” Dr. Mubang tried to justify the lack of documented rationale by explaining that if a subsequent treating physician needed to know why he made medication changes, the physician would just call him and ask. While this should be true in an ideal world, his attempted justification is contrary to the purpose of medical records, which is continuity of care. No doctor, regardless of his education and experience, can be expected to remember every detail about every patient when he only sees the patient periodically. The medical record and doctor’s notes comprise his guide to ensuring the patient receives continuous, appropriate care. In addition to lacking in rationale, both experts were unable to read some of Dr. Mubang’s handwritten notes due to legibility. His own expert testified that, “The hardest part about these records is, obviously, how legible they are. I wish they were more legible.” Dr. Mubang’s medical records were inadequate for all six of the patients at issue here. Dr. Mubang’s Defenses Dr. Mubang passionately testified at hearing that he practices addiction medicine, that he prescribes Suboxone, and that his goal is to titrate patients’ medication. However, Dr. Mubang’s interest in addiction medicine and Suboxone is a recent phenomenon. In his 2012 deposition, he did not mention practicing addiction medicine, and the word Suboxone does not even appear in that deposition. Dr. Mubang titrated the medication he prescribed for four of the six patients in this cause. His reasoning for titrating the patients’ medication changed from his deposition testimony to his hearing testimony. In his 2018 deposition, he testified that he reduced the patients’ pain medication because the patients’ conditions were improving, and his goal was to titrate the medication. At hearing, he asserted the theory that he changed his prescribing practices because pharmacies contacted him and told him that they would no longer fill prescriptions written for such large quantities. The first of these is based upon a consideration of quality of care, while the second is based upon the practical reality of changing pharmacy practices as the dangers of over-prescribing opiates started to become more prevalent in the eyes of health professionals and regulators. On September 2, 2010, Investigator Victor Troupe personally served Dr. Mubang with a notice of investigation and a subpoena for medical records for Patients A.M., B.B., C.C., W.B., and M.H., among others. Following receipt of the notice of investigation, the doctor radically changed his prescribing practice for the patients in this cause. For ten months, Dr. Mubang prescribed Patient A.M. 270 tablets of oxycodone. Then on September 24, 2010, three weeks after being served by Petitioner, Respondent reduced Patient A.M.’s prescription of oxycodone from 270 tablets to 210, and then from 210 tablets to 180. For five months, Dr. Mubang prescribed Patient C.C. 290 tablets oxycodone. Then on September 9, 2010, Respondent reduced Patient C.C.’s prescription of oxycodone from 290 tablets to 210. At the patient’s next visit on January 5, 2011, Dr. Mubang reduced the patient’s prescription of oxycodone from 210 tablets to 180. Dr. Mubang also reduced Patient C.C.’s methadone. For five months, he prescribed 180 10 mg tablets of methadone to Patient C.C., but he reduced that number first to 60 tablets, then to 30, then discontinued the prescription. Further, in a matter of three visits, the doctor went from prescribing Patient C.C. 470 pain pills per month to 180 tablets. For ten months, Dr. Mubang prescribed Patient W.B. 270 tablets of oxycodone. Then on November 6, 2010, Patient W.B.’s first visit after the doctor received notice of the investigation, he reduced Patient W.B.’s prescription of oxycodone to 240 tablets, then to 210 on the next visit. For five months, Dr. Mubang prescribed Patient B.D. 240 tablets of oxycodone. Then on November 11, 2010, Patient B.D.’s first visit with the doctor after he had received notice of the investigation, he reduced Patient B.D.’s prescription of oxycodone to 180 tablets. The logical explanation for Dr. Mubang’s sudden reduction in amounts of pain medication prescribed is that the Petitioner’s notice of investigation triggered him to change his prescribing practice. The notice of investigation might have been his “eureka” moment or it might have served as a wake-up call to him concerning his prior over-prescribing practices. The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that Dr. Mubang used little critical medical judgment when prescribing dangerous controlled substances to the patients in this matter. His diagnoses were based solely on patient report, and his primary tool for treating these patients was the prescription of controlled substances without first exhausting less harmful treatment modalities or combining lower doses of controlled substances with his patients seeking other treatment modalities.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order: finding that Respondent, John Nkolo Mubang, M.D., violated sections 458.331(1)(nn), 458.331(1)(q), 458.331(1)(t), 458.331(1)(m), and 458.331(1)(cc), Florida Statutes, as charged in Petitioner’s Administrative Complaints; and revoking Dr. Mubang’s Florida medical license. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of June, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of June, 2019. COPIES FURNISHED: Chad Wayne Dunn, Esquire Prosecution Services Unit Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 (eServed) Dale R. Sisco, Esquire Sisco-Law 1110 North Florida Avenue Tampa, Florida 33602 (eServed) Zachary Bell, Esquire Prosecution Services Unit Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 (eServed) Claudia Kemp, JD, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-03 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3253 (eServed) Louise Wilhite-St Laurent, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 (eServed)
The Issue The matters presented for consideration in this case concern an administrative complaint brought by the Petitioner against the Respondent. That complaint alleges violations of various provisions of Chapter 458, Florida Statutes. Those sections of law are more particularly described in the conclusions of law in this Recommended Order. In summary, Respondent is alleged, in the course of his relationship with patients under his care, to have prescribed numerous controlled substances which were in excessive amounts, and were not appropriate prescriptions for the medical problems experienced by the patients, and were not prescribed in the course of the Respondent's professional practice. In the face of these circumstances, Respondent is accused of having committed gross or repeated malpractice in failing to recognized by reasonably prudent similar physicians in his community. Respondent is also accused of having failed to keep written medical records justifying the course of treatment.
Findings Of Fact Teotimo D. Bonzon, M.D., is a physician licensed to practice medicine in Florida through licensure by the State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical Examiners, license No. MF0016786. He has held this license at all times relevant to this inquiry and during this period has practiced medicine at 830 Gary Street, Jacksonville, Florida, and 6229 Merrill Road, Jacksonville, Florida. At present, Respondent does general surgery approximately three times a week and sees 30-35 patients a day in his general office practice. Dr. Bonzon is a graduate of the medical school, Far Eastern University, Manila, the Philippines. The date of his graduation was 1961. In 1962, he took his internship at St. Francis Hospital in Jersey City, New Jersey. There followed five years of general surgery training at Booth Medical Center in Flushing, New York, and York Hospital in York, Pennsylvania. Respondent then took a year of surgical fellowship at the Community General Hospital of Syracuse, New York. Following this practice, Respondent stood examination for medical license to practice in the State of Florida, and in the States of Pennsylvania and Indiana. Having passed those examinations, the decision was made to move to Florida. Respondent arrived in Florida in June of 1971 and has been involved in the practice of general surgery and general office practice since that time. The initial two years in practice in Florida were primarily concerned with general surgery and industrial medicine, which relates to provision of care for those persons who have been injured in industrial accidents. The administrative complaint, which is the subject of this controversy, dates from March 10, 1982, and is the result of a survey made by the State of Florida, Department of number of Schedule II controlled substances per Chapter 893, Florida Statutes, which had been prescribed by physicians who practice in the Jacksonville, Florida, area. This survey transpired over a period of approximately six months, beginning in the fall of 1981. After being properly served with the administrative complaint, Respondent made a timely request for a formal hearing pursuant to Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. ARTHUR LEE SCHEIDER (Counts I, II, IV, V) Dr. Bonzon first saw Arthur Scheider in his office on May 29, 1979. At that time, the chief complaints of the patient had to do with "nerves, that the patient could not sleep, that he itched and broke out in a rash." These matters are reflected on the copy of the patient's records, which are admitted as Petitioner's Exhibit C. Additionally, it was noted that the patient had been utilizing methaqualone or Quaaludes for one year prior to being seen by Dr. Bonzon. Scheider had also been receiving Valium in 10 milligram amounts. On this date, Dr. Bonzon prescribed 100, 300-milligram Quaaludes to assist the patient in sleeping and 100, 10-milligram Valium tablets related to the nervous problem being experienced by the patient. Both of these drugs are Schedule II controlled substances with a potential for abuse by those persons for whom the prescription has been given. Methaqualone is a sleep producer. Valium is a muscle relaxer. Scheider was again seen on August 20, 1979, still complaining of nervousness and problems with sleep together with a rash condition on his torso and extremities. At that time, a further prescription of Quaaludes in the amount of 100 at 300-milligram each and Valium in the amount of 100 at 10- milligram each were prescribed for the patient with the opportunity for one refill related to the Valium. On November 1, 1979, the patient returned and based upon a diagnostic note in the patient's records to the effect that the patient needed nerve medicine, a further prescription Valium with opportunity for one refill was prescribed. These prescriptions were given on November 1, 1979, before the amounts related to the August 20, 1979, prescription for Quaaludes and Valium had been exhausted. This is based upon Dr. Bonzon's appropriate recommendation that no more than one Valium and one Quaalude tablet be taken per day. On January 7, 1980, a brother of the patient Scheider asked for Quaalude medication and was denied. The request for medication is reflected in the aforementioned exhibit related to patient records of Scheider. Scheider was again seen on March 14, 1980, complaining of laryngitis, cough, and of a fever in the range of 100 degrees. On that date, in addition to other medication, 100, 300-milligram Quaaludes and 100, 10-milligram Valium were prescribed for the patient. No explanation is made as to why Quaaludes and Valium were prescribed. On May 19, 1980, the patient record reflects that 50, 10-milligram Valium were prescribed for the patient Scheider; no indication is made as to the reason for this prescription. The Valium prescription was given at a time prior to the exhaustion of the March 14, 1980, prescription for Valium based upon a utilization rate of one Valium tablet per day. On June 11, 1980, a sister of Arthur Lee Scheider's called and spoke to the Respondent and told the Respondent that Arthur Lee Scheider had been selling Valium to Scheider's mother. As a consequence, Dr. Bonzon noted in the patient record that he would not prescribe Valium for Scheider in the future and in fact abided by this choice. Respondent did prescribe 100, 300-milligram strength methaqualone tablets on this date. On September 12, 1980, Scheider was again seen by the Respondent reference an examination which led to the conclusion that the patient needed an operation related to a circumcision. At that time, 100 additional 300-milligram Quaaludes were prescribed for the patient. Prescribed methaqualone or Quaaludes for the patient Scheider, it was always on the basis that Dr. Bonzon felt that the patient needed assistance in sleeping. Although not reflected in the medical record, Bonzon had suggested to Scheider that he see a psychiatrist in trying to combat his problem with sleep; however, Scheider declined this suggestion and the Respondent continued to prescribe methaqualone or Quaaludes. These prescriptions of 100 were made, notwithstanding the fact that the Physicians' Desk Reference indicated that methaqualone or Quaaludes should be prescribed in "small quantities." Respondent believes that this suggestion is a relative matter and really intends that the patients not be allowed to take more than one methaqualone tablet per day, an erroneous assumption. Respondent learned of Scheider's trafficking in the controlled substance, methaqualone, on November 25, 1980, and made a note in the patient's file that the patient had been arrested for this activity and that no more medication should be prescribed for this patient for drugs which were under "narcotic control." It was also indicated that appointments for this patient should pertain to other medical problems unrelated to controlled substances. Dr. Ensor R. Dunsford practices medicine in Jacksonville, Florida. He has, during his career, practiced in general surgery and is board certified in that field. His present practice involves emergency treatment in a freestanding emergency care facility. Upon examination of the patient records related to Arthur Lee Scheider, involving the prescription of methaqualone and Valium over the period May 19, 1979, through September 12, 1980, Dr. Dunsford was of the opinion that the act of prescribing was "grossly overdone." Further, Dr. Dunsford felt that this amount prescribed was risky for a patient because of the potential for abuse. If the patient has an emotional need for the substance, then the risk is there that a physical need might be created. In summary, Dr. Dunsford felt that the number of Valium and methaqualone tablets which were in the best interest of the patient. Moreover, Dr. Dunsford felt that the amounts of methaqualone and Valium which Respondent prescribed for Scheider over the period of time were not acts of a "reasonably prudent physician" related to practicing medicine with a level of care, skill and treatment performed by a similar physician in the community. Dr. Dunsford also expressed the opinion that the decision to prescribe the additional methaqualone or Quaaludes on June 11, 1980, and September 12, 1980, after receiving information that the patient was selling a controlled substance (the information of June 11, 1980, from patient's sister related to Valium) was inappropriate and a reflection of substandard medical judgment. To Dr. Dunsford, the information that was given by the sister of patient Scheider was a "red flag" waving in the face of the practitioner, Dr. Bonzon. Dr. Dunsford also states that the September 12, 1980, medical record does not establish a basis for prescribing Quaaludes related to symptomology of the patient. The record makes no reference to the problem with sleeping and pertains only to scrotal erythema, parietitis and the need for circumcision. Finally, given the facts of the prescriptions from May 29, 1979, through September 12, 1980, with emphasis on the information related to suspected drug sales which was imparted on June 11, 1980, Dr. Dunsford feels that a reasonably prudent physician would not want to be involved with that type of situation, i.e. prescribing the drugs on June 11, 1980, and September 12, 1980. All opinions, as expressed by Dr. Dunsford found above are accepted. Dr. Apolinar C. Ilano gave testimony. Dr. Ilano practices in Jacksonville, Florida, as a general surgeon. Dr. Ilano agrees with Dr. Dunsford that methaqualone has a potential for abuse. Following review of the patient records of Arthur Lee Scheider, Dr. Ilano's opinion was that some record had been made which justified the prescription of methaqualone for the sleep problem of Scheider and Valium related to the nervous problem of that patient. The justification found by Dr. Ilano does not satifactorily explain the lack of explanation for prescribing methaqualone on September 12, 1980, as referred to by Dr. Dunsford. Dr. Ilano did not feel that the amounts of methaqualone and Valium that were prescribed to Scheider were excessive or inappropriate or contrary to good judgment by reasonably prudent similar physicians in that there was some justification for prescribing the medication to be found in the record; no indication in the record that the patient was abusing Valium, as opposed to sticking to the amount or dosage prescribed, and the rationalization that Dr. Bonzon was attempting to limit the number of office visits by prescribing the high amounts of methaqualone and Valium. The opinion expressed in the prior sentence is not compelling in the face of facts presented and the more acceptable explanation offered by Dr. Dunsford. Even Dr. Ilano was concerned about prescribing methaqualone after learning that the patient was possibly selling Valium, although his opinion did not reach the level of finding fault with the quality of care offered by Dr. Bonzon in prescribing methaqualone after being informed of the possible sale of Valium, as Dr. Dunsford had. Again, Dr. Dunsford's opinion is accepted on this topic. Dr. Ilano correctly states that if the patient is selling Valium he might in turn sell methaqualone. Dr. Osbey L. Sayler gave testimony related to the care and treatment of Arthur Lee Scheider. Dr. Sayler practices in Orange Park, Florida, and is a board-certified general surgeon. The sum and substance of Dr. Saylor's opinion of Dr. Bonzon's care and treatment of Arthur Lee Scheider was to the effect that Dr. Bonzon had done nothing inappropriate as alleged in the various counts pertaining to that patient. After considering this opinion testimony and that of the other physicians, Dr. Saylor's opinions are accepted to the extent that they describe methaqualone as being an addictive or habit-forming drug which has been resorted to by persons attempting suicide and which is sold on the street as a "downer" and his opinion that Valium has a potential for abuse and can be addictive. Otherwise Dr. Sayler's opinions are rejected. GLADYS KNIGHT (Counts VI, XII, and XIII) Respondent treated the patient Gladys Knight over a period of years. During that time, the patient was seen on April 28, 1981, and was prescribed 30, 10-milligram Ritalin tablets. Ritalin is a Schedule II controlled substance. A notation of the prescription may be found in Petitioner's Exhibit D admitted into evidence, a copy of the patient records kept by the Respondent related to Gladys Knight. As established through the testimony of Dr. Dunsford, no indication is made in those records of an acceptable reason for prescribing Ritalin which is in the category of amphetamine or sympathomimetic amine drugs, spoke to in Section 458.331(1)(cc) , Florida Statutes. The underlying diagnostic impression upon the April 28, 1981, visit, according to the patient records related to complaints of the inability to get out of bed because of fatigue and insomnia. Remarks are also made in that entry that the patient is without energy and is complaining of arthritis pain in her right shoulder. None of these matters comport with a justifiable basis for prescribing ritalin as allowed in Section 458.331(1)(cc), Florida Statutes. In discussing the prescription of Ritalin, Dr. Bonzon indicated in the course of the hearing that he recognized Ritalin to be a central nervous system stimulant, which it is, and that he prescribed it for Mrs. Knight on April 28, 1981, because of his perception of signs of depression in that patient. More particularly, Dr. Bonzon indicated that she had claimed she didn't have energy, didn't want to get out of bed and was recalling a time when her husband was still alive. As a consequence, Bonzon felt that on this one occasion, in his medical judgment, Knight would benefit from a short term use of Ritalin. This was the only prescription of that substance for the patient. No mention was made in the patient record of the depressed condition; however, this impression which was given of the patient's condition in the course of the hearing is not sufficient justification for the prescription of Ritalin, "depressed state" not being one of the accepted bases for prescribing Ritalin as related in Section 458.331(1)(cc), Florida Statutes. Respondent also prescribed Preludin to the patient, Gladys Knight, commencing February 22, 1979. Preludin is a Schedule II controlled substance. This drug was prescribed for purposes of weight control. On the initial date, the patient was provided with 30 tablets with the opportunity for three refills. At that time, the patient weighed 148 pounds. The patient was seen again on August 14, 1979, for weight control and 50 Preludin tables were prescribed with the opportunity for one refill. This visit was made with a Dr. Lagman. At that time, the patient weighed 145 pounds. On September 27, 1979, the patient was seen by the Respondent and was given a further prescription of Preludin to control her weight. She weighed 143 pounds upon that visit. On December 3, 1979, the Respondent saw the patient again and prescribed Preludin in the amount of 100 tablets for weight control. At that time, the patient weighed 146 pounds. Finally, the patient was seen by the Respondent on February 14, 1980, her weight was shown to be 143 pounds and she was given a further prescription of Preludin in the amount of 100 tablets. This was on prescription by Respondent. Knight had been instructed by the Respondent on the occasion of prescribing Preludin on the question of how to utilize the Preludin tablets. At the time Respondent prescribed Preludin for patient Knight, he was unaware that the drug was an amphetamine or sympathomimetic amine drug. Respondent also discovered that Preludin prescriptions could not be refilled when a pharmacist contacted him in August of 1979 reference an effort by Knight to refill a prescription. Dr. Dunsford had reviewed the patient records related to Gladys Knight, particularly as it related to the prescription of Preludin. He identified that Preludin has been prescribed to assist obese people in weight control through the devise of suppressing the appetite of those patients. Because of a potential for abuse, Preludin is only prescribed for utilization over a period approximating a few weeks, per Dr. Dunsford. His testimony about Preludin, related to utilization, appropriate limits of its use, and potential for abuse is accepted. Dr. Dunsford felt that the Preludin had been over prescribed in the sense of amounts being too large on each prescription and over too long a period of time. Dr. Dunsford placed particular emphasis on the lack of wisdom in prescribing 100 tablets of Preludin on one occasion and felt that would be excessive and inappropriate. These opinions are accepted. Moreover, the opinion by Dr. Dunsford that the pattern of prescribing Preludin for Knight were not the actions of a reasonably prudent physician, under similar conditions and circumstances, is found to be correct. Dr. Ilano did not feel that the amount of Preludin was excessive nor did he feel that the actions of the Respondent constituted a failure to practice medicine with the care and skill that a reasonably prudent physician, under similar conditions and circumstances, would pursue. Dr. Ilano's opinion is not accepted. Nor is the opinion of Dr. Saylor related to the treatment of Mrs. Knight utilizing Preludin found to be compelling when he speaks favorably to treatment choices by the Respondent. JOHN BROUGHTON (Counts VIII, IX, X and XI) John Broughton was a patient of the Respondent in the time period August 13, 1979, through February 16, 1981. Records related to the treatment of Broughton are found as part of the Petitioner's Exhibit E admitted into evidence. During the treatment of Broughton, beginning on August 13, 1979, 40 Preludin, 75-milligram tablets were provided for weight control. Preludin, 75- milligrams was again prescribed for control on September 21, 1979, following examination by Respondent. On October 31, 1979, Dr. Bonzon saw Broughton and prescribed Preludin 75-milligram in the amount of 60 tablets related to weight control. On December 31, 1979, an additional 80 tablets of 75-milligrams Preludin was prescribed by Respondent for the benefit of Broughton. On March 13, 1980, 100, 75-milligram preludin tablets were given to Broughton on prescription issued by Respondent. On June 4, 1980, 50, 75-milligram Preludin tablets were prescribed by Respondent for Broughton. Respondent denied Broughton a request for Preludin upon an office visit on July 28, 1980, to see how the patient would react without the drug. On November 3, 1980, Preludin, 75-milligrams in the amount of 40 tablets was prescribed by Respondent for Broughton for weight control and a notation made that no further prescription would be written unless 40 days had transpired. On December 11, 1980, without examining the patient, Preludin was prescribed for an unidentified condition. The strength of the Preludin was 75-milligrams and 50 tablets were authorized by the prescription issued by Respondent for the benefit of Broughton. Other evidence in the hearing demonstrates that this Preludin was prescribed for weight control on that visit. During the course of the treatment, Broughton lost approximately 20 pounds in weight. In the interval of treatment, Broughton had requested Respondent to prescribe additional Preludin tablets and had been advised by Respondent that they would not be forthcoming based upon the fact that sufficient time had not transpired to have utilized one tablet per day on the previous prescription. In addition, the Preludin was not prescribed for Broughton if his blood pressure was too high upon examination by Dr. Bonzon. At the time Dr. Bonzon prescribed Preludin in November and December, 1980, as identified before, he was unaware that Preludin, an amphetamine or simpathomimetic amine drug, could not be prescribed for weight control after July 3, 1980. 1/ On August 13, 1979, Talwin was prescribed for Broughton by the Respondent upon an office visit. The explanation for this prescription says for "hip." In particular, it related to the provision of pain medication. Talwin, as with the case of Preludin, is a Chapter 893, Florida Statutes, controlled substance with addictive qualities. Talwin is, in effect, a pain medication. On September 21, 1979, a further prescription of Talwin was prescribed by Respondent for Broughton upon an office visit. This Talwin in 15-milligram strength, 40 tablets with opportunity for a single refill. No indication was made in the record as to the basis for prescribing this pain medication. Between August 13, 1979, and September 21, 1979, there is a notation in the patient records effective August 28, 1979, of a refill of Talwin in 50-milligram strength, 30 tablets and a further indication of Talwin being prescribed, 50- milligram strength, 30 tablets on September 13, 1979. On November 8, 1979, the patient record shows a refill of Talwin in the amount of 50 tablets. On November 16, 1979, the file establishes that the patient said he had been caught in the rain and his bottle got wet and that the Talwin turned to mush and a prescription was written in the amount of 50 Talwins to replenish Broughton. Broughton verified this story in the course of his testimony at hearing. The pills had not been destroyed but the Respondent did not know this at the time the prescription was written on November 16, 1979. The records reflect a notation on that date that no refills of Talwin should be given until November 28, 1979. On December 31, 1979, the patient was seen by Respondent for a problem he was experiencing with a hernia condition and a cough, congestion, and headaches. On that date, Talwin in, the 50-milligram strength, 50 tablets was prescribed. On the dates January 22, 1980; February 10, 1980; and February 28, 1980, patient records show prescription of Talwin in the 50-milligram strength, 50 tablets on each of those dates. The patient was seen by Dr. Bonzon on March 30, 1980, complaining of the hernia condition and a prescription was written for 50 Talwin, 50-milligram tablets. On June 4, 1980, the Respondent saw Broughton and prescribed 50 Talwin in 50-milligram strength. On July 28, 1980, Respondent saw Broughton and discussion was made of establishing surgery for hernia repair. Talwin was prescribed in a 50-milligram strength, 50 tablets with an indication of no refill, as established in the patient records. On August 25, 1980, an indication is made in the patient records that Talwin, 50-milligram strength in the amount of 40 tablets was prescribed for the patient. On October 10, 1980, patient records show that Talwin was refilled. On November 10, 1980, patient records reflect that a Pic N Save Drug Store had received a request for refill of Talwin in the amount of 40 tablets and this request was denied by the doctor's office based upon the fact that a refill had just been given on November 3, 1980. On November 20, 1980, the records reflect that the Pic N Save at Sandlewood was given a prescription of Talwin, 50-milligram strength in the amount of 40 tablets for benefit of Broughton. On December 8, 1980, the patient was seen by Respondent. It was noted in the record that Talwin in the strength of 50-milligrams, 20 tablets had been prescribed two days before. Other evidence does not clarify whether that prescription was indeed written. On December 19, 1980, the patient records reflect that Talwin in the strength of 50-milligrams, 50 tablets was prescribed. On January 9, 1981, the records reflect Talwin, 50-milligram strength, 40 tablets was prescribed. On January 19, 1981, the record reflects Talwin, 50-milligram strength, 40 tablets was prescribed. On February 2, 1981, a notation is given that the patient has injured his leg and had received a night appointment and has reported using all the Talwin due to intense pain. Further indication is that Talwin in the amount of 50-milligram strength, 10 tablets was prescribed. A second entry related to February 2, 1981, is made having to do with a visit in which Respondent examined Broughton. He found the leg on the right calf highly inflamed and two large hemotomas and that the patient was experiencing pain and for this condition, Talwin in the amount of 50-milligram strength, 50 tablets was prescribed. On February 11, 1981, a final notation indicates a refill of Talwin and the establishment of an appointment for the following day. That appointment was not kept. On February 16, 1981, the Talwin was ordered refilled. A notation was made at that time that the patient had not been keeping his appointments because of money owed and an expression of the importance to come in even if he could only pay a portion of the bill and a notation that the patient was using too much Talwin. All record notations are accepted as accurate depictions of events reported. Eventually, Broughton was picked up for criminal offenses related to controlled substances and was imprisoned. Unknown to Respondent, Broughton had given Talwin and Preludin which had been prescribed for him through Respondent to other persons. Following his release from incarceration, Respondent has refused to see Broughton. Although the records do not reflect the specific basis for prescribing Talwin in the questioned period, August 13, 1979, through February 16, 1981, other than the occasions of the hip and leg injury to his calf, it has been extrinsically established that Talwin was prescribed for pain related to a hernia condition, at times beginning December 31, 1979, and forward. There is other indication that the patient Broughton had sustained an injury to his coccyx and had some sacro coccygeal pain; however, it is unclear whether the Talwin was prescribed for that condition in the questioned period. Moreover, by May 20, 1980, Dr. Bonzon is expressing the opinion that physical examination of Broughton was negative regarding sacro coccygeal pain. The patient's records do indicate on March 11, 1977, complaints of Broughton with his tail bone or coccyx because of a fall in a Pantry Pride store in San Diego, California. On the subject of Broughton's involvement with drugs, in an interview held in November 1981, Respondent told John E. Danson, an investigator with the Department of Professional Regulation, that he thought Broughton was a drug addict because on one occasion, Broughton had offered him $50 to prescribe Dilaudid, a Schedule II controlled substance, at which time Broughton had been asked to leave Bonzon's office. Dr. Dunsford examined the records of treatment received by Broughton found in Petitioner's Exhibit E and gave the opinion that the amounts of Preludin and Talwin prescribed to Broughton in the time frame described were excessive and inappropriate. The prescription of those drugs over this period of time was not in the best interests of the patient according to Dr. Dunsford and not the actions of a reasonably prudent similar physician dealing with a patient under similar circumstances and conditions, on the subject of the skill and treatment afforded to this patient. As described by Dr. Dunsford, both Talwin and Preludin have addictive qualities. Dr. Dunsford did not feel that the pain the patient Broughton had experienced was sufficiently severe to warrant the number of Talwin tablets received. Continued response to the patient's request for more Talwin was in the words of Dr. Dunsford "bad." Dr. Dunsford also observed that the prescription of Preludin in November and December 1980, was not based upon any of the health conditions described in Section 458.331(1)(cc), Florida Statutes. The overall records of Dr. Bonzon related to the prescriptions of Talwin and Preludin, with particular emphasis on the December 11, 1980, prescription were deficient as it relates to a justification of continuing the regimen of prescribing these substances, according to Dr. Dunsford. The observations and opinions of Dr. Dunsford found in this paragraph are accepted. Dr. Ilano examined the records related to Broughton and did not find that Respondent's treatment was unacceptable. Likewise, Dr. Saylor did not find the treatment of Broughton to be unacceptable. The opinions by these doctors are not accepted. COUNTS XIV and XV Between July 1, 1980, and December 31, 1980, Respondent prescribed approximately 15,260 controlled substances constituted of Percodan, Percocet, Tuinal, Preludin, Tylox, Quaalude, Ritalin, Demerol, Merperganfortis, Biphetamine, Sopar, Eskatrol and Dilaudid. With the exception of these substances related to the patients Scheider, Knight, and Broughton, no notation has been made that these drugs were prescribed, dispensed or administered in excessive or inappropriate amounts i.e., the 15,000 number is not excessive and inappropriate "on its face," nor is this raw number an indication that Respondent has failed to practice medicine with a level of care, skill and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent, similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances.
The Issue Whether Dr. Henson inappropriately administered repeated injections of vitamin B-12 to his patient, Gertrude Ashton, without documenting their necessity in the patient's medical records? Whether Dr. Henson inappropriately administered repeated injections of steroids to his patient, Gertrude Ashton, without documenting their necessity in the patient's medical records? Whether Dr. Henson inappropriately administered repeated injections of Mandol to his patient, Gertrude Ashton, which were not considered to be therapeutically effective?
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated to the following findings of fact: The Respondent, D. Ross Henson, D.O., is currently, and at all times relevant to this proceeding was, licensed as an osteopathic physician in the State of Florida; Dr. Henson's license number is OS 0001793; Between December 1979, and September 1983, Dr. Henson treated a patient by the name of Gertrude Ashton. Ms. Ashton's husband died in 1981. Ms. Ashton witnessed Mr. Ashton's death in the back yard of their residence. Mr. Ashton's death caused Ms. Ashton anxiety and depression. Ms. Ashton's business had some financial problems during the period at issue in this case. During the approximately forty-six months at issue in this proceeding, Dr. Henson treated Ms. Ashton on sixty occasions. During this period of time Dr. Henson prescribed 2,000 micrograms of vitamin B-12, to be administered intramuscularly, for Ms. Ashton. Ms. Ashton received injections of vitamin B-12 on sixteen separate occasions from Dr. Henson. When Dr. Henson prescribed vitamin B-12 injections for Ms. Ashton, he documented the various problems which she was having at the time in her medical records. Dr. Henson indicated that the reasons for the injections were that Ms. Ashton was under stress, she had long-standing, ongoing disease processes which produced further stress, she was on antibiotics and she was receiving diuretic therapy. Additionally, on occasion, Ms. Ashton requested vitamin B-12 injections. Generally, vitamin B-12 should be administered intramuscularly only if a patient is suffering from vitamin B-12 deficiency. A vitamin B-12 deficiency may be caused by pernicious anemia or malabsorption of vitamin B-12. If a physician suspects that a patient is suffering from vitamin B-12 deficiency, a simple blood test should be administered to determine if the patient's vitamin B-12 level is low. If it is, the physician should then attempt to determine the cause of the deficiency. Dr. Henson did not determine whether Ms. Ashton was suffering from a vitamin B-12 deficiency. Occasionally vitamin B-12 may be administered to a patient who believes that the vitamin will help him or her feel better. Although vitamin B-12 is included as part of nutritional supplements, it is not taken intramuscularly as a nutritional supplement. If a patient is in need of vitamin B-12, 1,000 micrograms is a sufficient dosage. An injection of 2,000 micrograms of vitamin B-12 is excessive. It would be difficult to harm a patient by injecting the patient with vitamin B-12. The reasons for administering vitamin B-12 injections to Ms. Ashton advanced by Dr. Henson and Dr. Henson's medical records fail to justify all of the vitamin B-12 shots administered to Ms. Ashton. Nowhere in Dr. Henson's records concerning Ms. Ashton is it indicated that Ms. Ashton suffered from a vitamin B-12 deficiency. Nor is any other adequate reason for administering the shots she received indicated. It is true that a few of the vitamin B-12 shots prescribed by Dr. Henson for Ms. Ashton may have been requested by Ms. Ashton because she believed they would help her. Not all of the sixteen shots were requested by Ms. Ashton, however. Nor would all sixteen shots be justified by such a request had it been made. Prescribing 2,000 micrograms of vitamin B-12 for Ms. Ashton was also not justified. The repeated injections of 2,000 micrograms of vitamin B-12 administered to Ms. Ashton were a deviation from the accepted standard of care. Dr. Henson also prescribed 34 intramuscular injections of steroids for Ms. Ashton over the 46 months at issue in this proceeding. Dr. Henson injected Ms. Ashton with methylprednisolone acetate, a form of injectable steroid. The brand name of the methylprednisolone acetate used by Dr. Henson was Depo-Medrol. The 34 injections of methylprednisolone acetate were given in doses of fifty milligrams. Methylprednisolone acetate should be given in doses of twenty to eighty milligrams per injection. Prednisolone tebutate, another form of injectable steroid, should be given in doses of four to forty milligrams. Dr. Henson did not, however, give Ms. Ashton prednisolone tebutate. Dr. Henson noted in his medical records concerning Ms. Ashton that he had given her an injection of "Pred." Identifying the injections as "Pred" was insufficient to inform others of how Ms. Ashton was treated with steroids. Dr. Henson indicated that he gave Ms. Ashton steroid injections for the following problems: Acute synovitis and osteoarthritis of the lumbar and cervical spine, acute contact dermatitis, acute allergic rhinitis and acute polyposis. Steroids can be used to treat bursitis and tendinitis. Usually, an injection of steroids for this type of treatment is administered locally. Ms. Ashton's acute contact dermatitis was attributable to her repeated contact with poison ivy and the use of undiluted bleach which Ms. Ashton bathed in as a treatment of her poison ivy. Ms. Ashton also inhaled the fumes from the bleach. Occasional injections of steroids for the treatment of poison ivy, especially when the area affected has been bathed in undiluted bleach, is appropriate. The weight of the evidence concerning Dr. Henson's treatment of Ms. Ashton with steroids proved that generally, most physicians would have administered the injections locally or orally. The evidence did not prove that Dr. Henson's treatment of Ms. Ashton with steroids was not within acceptable standards of care. Dr. Henson also prescribed three injections of Mandol for Ms. Ashton over the 46 months at issue in this proceeding. Injections of Mandol were administered on March 13, 1980 and November 13 and 16, 1981. The injections of Mandol administered to Ms. Ashton were in doses of 250 milligrams. The recommended dose of Mandol is from 500 milligrams to one gram. A dose of 250 milligrams is sub-therapeutic. Mandol is a cephalosporin, which is a form of antibiotic. The March 13, 1980, injection of Mandol was given for acute bronchitis, acute pyelonephritis and acute cystitis. Ms. Ashton was also taking Ceclor, another cephalosporin, orally at the time the injection of Mandol was given. The November 13 and 16, 1981, injections of Mandol were given for acute bronchitis and acute generalized dermatitis due to poison ivy and exposure to bleach. Ms. Ashton was taking another cephalosporin orally at the time the injections of Mandol were given. If a lower dose of Mandol would be effective, it would be listed by the drug manufacturer as a recommended dose. Although there are possible side effects from treatments with Mandol, Dr. Henson did not establish that those side effects were present in Ms. Ashton's case. Dr. Henson's treatment of Ms. Ashton with Mandol during the period of time at issue in this proceeding deviated from the standard of medical care reasonably acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. Ms. Ashton subsequently filed a complaint concerning Dr. Henson with the Department. The Department investigated the complaint and found probable cause to formally charge Dr. Henson.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Dr. Henson be found guilty of failing to keep written medical records justifying his treatment of Ms. Ashton with injections of vitamin B-12, steroids and Mandol between December 1979, and September 1983. A fine of $500.00 should be imposed on Dr. Henson for his treatment of Ms. Ashton with excessive doses of vitamin B-12; a fine of $500.00 should be imposed on Dr. Henson for his failure to adequately document the type of steroid administered to Ms. Ashton; and a fine of $500.00 should be imposed on Dr. Henson for his treatment of Ms. Ashton with sub-therapeutic doses of Mandol. Dr. Henson should also receive a reprimand for these three violations of Section 459.015(1)(p), Florida Statutes (1987) It is further RECOMMENDED that Dr. Henson be found guilty of failing to practice osteopathic medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar osteopathic physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances with regard to his treatment of Ms. Ashton with injections of vitamin B-12 and Mandol between December 1979, and September 1983. Dr. Henson should be fined $1,000.00 for his violations of Section 459.015(1)(y), Florida Statutes (1987), placed on probation for ninety (90) days and required to successfully complete ten (10) hours of Category I continuing medical education in prescribing controlled substances during the twelve months following the issuance of a final order in this case. It is further RECOMMENDED that the charge that Dr. Henson's treatment of Ms. Ashton with steroids between December 1979, and September 1983, constitutes a violation of Section 459.015(1)(y), Florida Statutes (1987), be dismissed. It is further RECOMMENDED that the charge that Dr. Henson's treatment of Ms. Ashton with vitamin B-12, steroids and Mandol between December, 1979, and September, 1983, constitutes a violation of Section 459.015(1)(u), Florida Statutes (1987), be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of June, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this day of June, 1988. APPENDIX Case Number 86-3336 The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Department's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1-2 1. 3-6 Hereby accepted. 7 4. 8 15-16. 9 19. 10 25-26. 11-13 Not relevant to the charges contained in the Administrative Complaint against Dr. Henson in this case. 14 2. 15-25 & 27 Not relevant to the charges contained in the Administrative Complaint against Dr. Henson in this case. 26 33. Dr. Henson's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1-2 1. 3 Not relevant to this case. 4 2-3. 5 Not relevant to this case or not supported by the weight of the evidence. 6 4-5. 7 5. 8 4-5. 9 Summary of testimony and events which took place during the formal hearing. The facts this testimony supports were not supported by the weight of the evidence. 10 15-19. 11 20. 12-13 22. Not relevant to this case. Summary of testimony. The facts this testimony supports were not supported by the weight of the evidence. 16 25 and 28. 17 26 and 28. The last three sentences are not supported by the weight of the evidence. 18 29. 19 Summary of testimony. The facts this testimony supports were not supported by the weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Theodore Doran, Esquire James J. Kearn, Esquire DOPAN & DANIELS, P.A. P. O. Drawer 1231 Daytona Beach, Florida 32015 James W. Smith, Esquire Kim D. Bouck, Esquire SMITH, SCHODER & ROUSE, P.A. 605 S. Ridgewood Avenue Daytona, Florida 32014 Rod Presnell Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 William O'Neil General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Lee Sims Staff Attorney Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 =================================================================
The Issue The issue to be determined in this proceeding is whether Petitioner is entitled to a refund of the costs paid for prescriptions for compound Midrin.
Findings Of Fact The Division of State Group Insurance (Division) is the executive agency within the Department of Management Services (Department) that is responsible for the administration of the State Group Insurance Program (Program). Petitioner is retired and receives medical benefits through the State Employees’ HMO Standard Medical Plan (the Plan), which is administered by Capital Health Plan (CHP). The State Employees’ Prescription Drug Program is administered by CVS Caremark. Respondent is the state agency responsible for resolving appeals of medical claims denied by Caremark. Background Mr. Abele was employed with the State of Florida until he retired. He was covered by the Plan and his coverage has remained since his retirement. For the past three years, Mr. Abele has filled a prescription for generic Midrin to treat migraine headaches. The medication was prescribed by his primary care physician, John Ness, M.D. The evidence offered at hearing includes a total of 18 claims2 for prescriptions for compound Midrin that Mr. Abele submitted to Caremark for reimbursement. Mr. Abele submitted claims for prescriptions filled in 2018 dated: July 12 and 25, 2018; August 2, 2018; September 7, 2018; October 5 and 22, 2018; November 6 and 26, 2018; December 12, 2018. Mr. Abele also submitted claims for prescriptions filled in 2019 dated: January 9 and 30, 2019; February 12, 2019; March 6, 18, and 29, 2019; April 10 and 25, 2019; and May 10, 2019. Each of the 18 claims was for reimbursement of $105 for a total of $1,890. Relevant Definitions The Plan Booklet and Benefit Document (“Plan”) includes definitions, relevant in part here, as follows: "Covered Services and Supplies" means those health care services and supplies, including pharmaceuticals as described in Section VIII, for which reimbursement is covered under this Plan. "Exclusions" is defined as any provision of the Plan whereby coverage for a specific hazard or condition is entirely eliminated. “Medically Necessary” is defined as any appropriate medical treatment ... as provided by a physician ... which is necessary for the diagnosis, care and/or treatment of a Health Plan Member’s illness or injury, and which is: Consistent with the symptom, diagnosis, and treatment of the Health Member’s condition; The most appropriate level of supply and/or service for the diagnosis and treatment of the Health Plan Member’s condition; In accordance with standards of acceptable community practice; Not primarily intended for the personal comfort or convenience of the Health Plan Member, the Health Plan Member’s family, the physician or other health care providers; Approved by the appropriate medical body or health care specialty involved as effective, 2 The claims at issue are those claims submitted by Mr. Abele in support of his request for reimbursement. appropriate and essential for the care and treatment of the Health Plan Member’s condition; and Not Experimental or investigational. Medical Necessity Dr. Ness, a family practice physician with 30 years of experience, prescribed generic Midrin for Mr. Abele to treat migraine headaches. Dr. Ness prescribed generic Midrin to treat Mr. Abele based on his assessment that other medications were contraindicated for Mr. Abele due to Mr. Abele’s risk for cardiovascular adverse effects if he uses other medications. Dr. Ness credibly testified that Midrin is medically necessary to treat Mr. Abele’s migraine headaches. Anthony Arnett, M.D., the physician for Caremark responsible for reviewing claims for coverage, determined that Midrin was not medically necessary to treat Mr. Abele’s migraine headaches. However, Dr. Arnett conceded that his decision was based on his general determination that there are other options available for migraine headaches. The undersigned finds Dr. Ness’ testimony more persuasive concerning the determination that Midrin was medically necessary to treat Mr. Abele for migraines. Midrin History At the time Dr. Ness prescribed generic Midrin to Mr. Abele, it was an FDA-approved drug. In fact, Midrin was approved for use in 1948 based on safety and effectiveness. However, in 2017, the United States Food and Drug Administration (the “FDA”) determined that Midrin was no longer safe and effective. On October 12, 2017, the FDA notified manufacturers of prescription drugs containing isometheptene mucate that they should immediately cease distribution of the product. On June 13, 2018, the FDA issued a subsequent notice listing the drugs that were no longer approved by the FDA and that manufacturing companies were required to stop producing. The drug combination for Mr. Abele’s prescription for compound Midrin (acetaminophen, dichloralphenazone, and isometheptene mucate) is on the FDA non-approved list. Midrin Prescription/Coverage Denial In January 2018, Mr. Abele presented his prescription for generic Midrin to his local CVS Pharmacy to be filled but the prescription was refused. Mr. Abele indicated that the pharmacist told him that the manufacturer had stopped producing the drug and suggested that he could have the drug compounded. Since generic Midrin was no longer available, Dr. Ness issued a prescription for the compound Midrin, in capsule form, with a 10-day supply for each prescription. The medication name was listed as “Midrin (ALTERNATE) 325MG/100MG/65MG Capsule,” and the ingredients were listed as acetaminophen, dichloralphenazone, isometheptene mucate, and microcrystalline cellulose3. Mr. Abele filled the prescriptions at a local in- network compounding pharmacy. On January 14, 2018, Mr. Abele contacted Caremark about his compound Midrin prescription and Mr. Abele was told that he would need to submit a claim to determine whether the compound drug ingredients would be covered. There is no evidence that the Caremark representative made any false or misleading representation that Mr. Abele’s compound prescription would be approved. On December 14, 2018, Mr. Abele submitted claims to Caremark for reimbursement for compound Midrin. On December 17, 2018, Caremark notified Mr. Abele by letter that the claims he submitted were not allowed. The reason provided for disallowance was because the drug was not on the plan’s formulary. The letter also notified Mr. Abele that his request for exception did not include the information necessary to approve the request. On February 1, 2019, Dr. Ness, on behalf of Mr. Abele, submitted a non-covered drug formulary exception request seeking approval for compound Midrin. He requested the drug in capsule form for the treatment of Mr. Abele’s migraines. However, the request form did not include a copy of the prescription for the compound formula for Midrin. The form also did not describe the drug as the compound alternative. Dr. Ness testified that it is a common medical practice to use “cap” to refer to the capsule form, even for the compound formula. The Caremark appeals department faxed a response to Dr. Ness as follows: “In researching your fax request, the member’s prescription benefit coverage indicates a [p]rior [a]uthorization is NOT required. For additional questions regarding the medication’s coverage under the member’s plan, please contact Customer Service using the number on the back of the member’s prescription benefit card.” Dr. Anthony Arnett testified that he interpreted the exception request as being for Midrin capsules, rather than the compound form. Based on that interpretation, the response to the exception request was that prior authorization was not necessary. The undersigned finds that even if prior authorization was not required for the prescription, it does not amount to an approval for coverage of the claims. Appeal of Coverage Denial On February 5, 2019, Mr. Abele appealed the denial of reimbursement for compound Midrin. On February 13, 2019, Caremark responded to Mr. Abele instructing him to submit additional information for his claims to be processed. On February 18, 2019, he submitted the requested information and materials. On March 30, 2019, Caremark notified Mr. Abele by letter that his drug coverage request was denied. The basis for the denial was that the 3 Microcrystalline cellulose may be used as a bulking agent in pharmaceutical products. prescription was for a compound drug containing, as relevant here, bulk powder. Mr. Abele then submitted a Level I appeal, also referred to as a clinical appeal4, on April 18, 2019. Dr. Arnett reviewed Mr. Abele’s claims for the Level I appeal. While Dr. Arnett acknowledged that compounding could be approved if no other drug is available for treatment of migraines, he concluded that Mr. Abele’s exception request could not be approved because the compound formula included bulk powder. Caremark denied Mr. Abele’s Level I appeal and notified Mr. Abele by letter of their decision on April 22, 2019. In the letter, Caremark stated that “petitioner’s appeal for Dichloralphenazone Powder Compound has been determined as not medically necessary; and, ‘the plan criteria does not allow coverage of dichloralphenazone Powder Compound’ if the compound contained ‘bulk powder’ as an ingredient.” On May 8, 2019, dissatisfied with the outcome of the Level I appeal, Mr. Abele requested a Level II appeal. The Department denied the Level II appeal on the basis that the compound Midrin “did not meet the medical necessity criteria and non-FDA approved compounds are excluded from the plan.” Limitations and Exclusions The Department's concurrence of Caremark’s decision that coverage for the compound Midrin prescription should be denied was based on the Plan’s general Limitations and Exclusions section, which applies to the Prescription Drug Program. The Prescription Drug Program also outlines specific exclusions related to medications. The Prescription Drug Program, described in Part VIII, provides that covered drugs shall include, but are not limited to, any drug, medicine, medication, or communication that is consumed, administered, or provided at 4 Level I appeals are handled by Caremark by a specific group that focuses on prescriptions appeals. the place where the prescription is given at the medical provider’s office or healthcare facility. The Plan’s limitations and exclusions section provides, “the following services and supplies are excluded from coverage under this Plan unless a specific exception is noted. Exceptions may be subject to certain coverage Limitations.” Under the Plan, the exclusions include “any non-prescription medicine, remedy, biological product, pharmaceutical or chemical compound, vitamins, mineral supplements, fluoride products, health foods, or blood pressure kits, except as specifically provided for in the covered benefits section under prescription drugs.” The Additional Exclusions section provides that bulk powders, bulk chemicals, and proprietary bases used in compound medications and over-the- counter (“OTC”) products used in compound medications are excluded from coverage. Further, the plan excludes services or supplies not medically necessary as determined by the Plan and/or the Prescription Drug Program clinical staff and the state. The Prescription Drug Program provides that the Prescription Drug Program does not cover non-federal legend or OTC products, and bulk powders, bulk chemicals, and proprietary bases used in compounded medications.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division of State Group Insurance, Department of Management Services, enter a final order denying Lawrence Abele’s request for reimbursement for the claims submitted for his compound Midrin prescription. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of May, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S YOLONDA Y. GREEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of May, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Lawrence Abele 841 Maderia Circle Tallahassee, Florida 32312 (eServed) Erica D. Moore, Esquire Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Jacob Koffsky, Esquire Foley & Lardner LLP 2 South Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 1900 Miami, Florida 33131 (eServed) Gayla Grant, Esquire Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) William Chorba, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
The Issue Whether petitioner should take disciplinary action against respondent for the reasons alleged in the administrative complaint?
Findings Of Fact At all pertinent times, respondent Manuel P. Villaflor, M.D., held a Florida license as a physician, No. ME 0020072. He practices in Daytona Beach, where he has an office on Ridgewood Avenue. UNTIMELY DEATH K.D., a white male, was pronounced dead at 3:59 P.M. on October 19, 1985, a few days shy of his 34th birthday. The autopsy disclosed superficial abrasions, acute blunt trauma to K.D.'s face, scalp and right hand, and acute, diffuse subdural hemorrhage. A paper bag full of prescriptidn medicine containers accompanied the body to the autopsy. Apparently because the labels indicated that Dr. Villaflor had written pain killing prescriptions for K.D., the medical examiner's office notified DPR. Some four months later, analysis of samples of K.D.'s blood and urine revealed that codeine, oxycodone, amitriptyline, also known as Elavil, nortriptyline, also known as Pamelor, and chlordiazepoxide, also known as Librium, had been present in the corpse in quantities "beyond the reference range for therapeutic use." Botting deposition, p. 6. The pathologist amended his initial conclusion that head injuries resulting from "multi-focal blunt trauma," id., p. 7, had caused R.D.'s death, by adding "multiple drug intoxication," id., as another cause of death. As far as the record shows, Dr. Villaflor never prescribed Elavil, Pamelor, Librium or their chemical equivalents for K.D. An osteopath whom K.D. saw toward the end of his life prescribed at least two of these medications, as well as medicine containing oxycodone. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES UNCONTROLLED On November 15, 1985, Diane Rabideau, an investigator for DPR, called on Dr. Villaflor at his office. He was polite and cooperative. Ms. Rabideau had some difficulty understanding him; he is not a native English speaker, and he had recently suffered a stroke. But she understood well enough Dr. Villaflor's assertions that he did not believe K.D. to have been addicted to any drugs, and that he had not over-prescribed any medicine. Ms. Rabideau inspected the controlled substances kept in Dr. Villaflor's office. She found Tenuate Dospan, Restoril, Darvocet, Valium, Tylenol No. 4, Fiorinal No. 3, Xanax, Vicodin, Tylenol with codeine elixir, Dalmane, Anexsia, Centrax, "Tussend Ex. 1/2 oz.," Limbitrol, Equagesic, Phrenilin with codeine, Novahistine, Naldecon, Ativan, Nucofed, and "P.V. Tussin." When she saw them, they were not under lock and key. No inventory records reflected what was on hand and what had been dispensed. The parties stipulated that Dr. Villaflor "failed to maintain records of the[se] schedule controlled substances . . . as required by Section 893.07, Florida Statutes"; and that he "failed to keep the[se] drugs . . . under lock and key as required by 21 C.F.R. Section 1301.72." When Ms. Rabideau pointed out these omissions, Dr. Villaflor and his wife, who works with him in the office, said they would comply in the future. Mrs. Villaflor said she had not known of these requirements. A subsequent inspection by a DPR investigation found Dr. Villaflor in full compliance with reporting requirements governing controlled substances. K.D.'s PAIN On July 8, 1981, Dr. Villaflor saw K.D., apparently for the first time, at the Halifax Hospital Medical Center emergency room, and admitted him to the hospital. K.D. had sustained an electrical shock when he struck a high voltage power line with an aluminum ladder, as he was hurrying for shelter from a sudden rain. He lost consciousness "surrounded by a bluish flame." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 12. The elecricity burned his feet and made his lower legs tender, as well. Discharged from the hospital, he visited Dr. Villaflor's office on July 15, 1981. In these proceedings, DPR does not question Dr. Villaflor's prescription of Percocet, a combination of Tylenol and oxycodone, for pain on that visit. As a teenager, K.D. had broken his collar bone in falls from motorcycles on two separate occasions. One accident involved a ride over a waterfall. When he was 2l years old, he "was smashed between a construction vehicle and a bulldozer," Petitioner's Exhibit No. 12, suffering "a severe crushing injury to his chest." Some ten years later he "still ha[d] very mobile ribs secondary to this injury," and persistent pain in his back and legs. In November of 1981, Dr. Kolin, a psychiatrist in Orlando, admitted K.D. to Orlando Regional Medical Center. A myelogram "revealed a mild L5 radicular lesion on the left, consistent with chronic myofascial pain and left L5 radiculitis." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 11. During this hospital stay, K.D.'s "narcotic medications were tapered and discontinued." Id. Dr. Villaflor sent copies of his records to Dr. Kolin, to whom Dr. Gillespie in Nashua, New Hampshire, had referred K.D. Apparently Dr. Villaflor never asked and Dr. Kolin never volunteered to forward Dr. Kolin's records to Dr. Villaflor. Gary G. Parsons, a vocation rehabilitation counselor, met K.D. on February 8, 1982. After K.D. made a perfect score on an aptitude test, a state agency subsidized his vocational training at the American Computer Institute. When K.D.'s training there concluded on January 4, 1983, Mr. Parsons tried to assist him in obtaining employment, but eventually concluded that K.D. could not hold a job because "his pain, and his limitation was greater than" (T. 283) Mr. Parsons had originally realized. K.D.'s pain or his physical condition "was primary in his conversation almost every time" (T. 283-4) he and Mr. Parsons spoke. Even after the vocational rehabilitation file was closed on June 26, 1984, he came by Mr. Parsons' office twice. Both times K.D. seemed depressed to Mr. Parsons, who had recommended he go for counseling to the Human Resources Center, a community mental health center. Mr. Parsons saw K.D. for the last time on March 22, 1985. At least as early as August of 1984, K.D. mentioned suicide to Mr. Parsons as a possibility. In March of 1985, K.D. began weekly counselling sessions with Dr. Rafael Parlade, a clinical psychologist at the Human Resources Center. In these sessions "the two issues . . . were his suicidal ideation combination with the depression, and the departure of his live-in girlfriend." (T. 273) He "still had a lot of pain." (T. 274) Dr. Parlade hoped K.D. would "increase his activities," (T. 276) so that with . . . activity in his life more, he would focus away from his pain. Because for a period of time that was all he was living with. (T. 276) Dr. Parlade viewed decreasing the amount of pain medication as a secondary goal (T. 275), a result he hoped would flow from K.D.'s being less preoccupied with the pain he experienced continually. PAIN REMEDIES On January 31, 1983, K.D. visited Dr. Villaflor's office. Dr. Villaflor's notes for that day mentioned K.D.'s "Electrocution High Voltage in 7/81" and reflect a prescription for 50 tablets of Talwin. K.D.'s blood pressure, 120 over 70, is noted, and reference is made to a TENS unit, or transcutaneous nerve stimulator. Somebody at the Orlando Pain Clinic K.D. had visited had recommended one of these electrical devices to K.D., but it had proved ineffective against his pain. At one time or other, K.D. resorted to acupuncture and resumed wearing a corset of the kind originally prescribed for the back pain he experienced in the wake of the cascading motorcycle accident. Dr. Villaflor's office notes of April 15, 1983, record "Back Pain," a second prescription for 50 tablets of Talwin and another prescription for Xanax. On May 11, 1983, Dr. Villaflor's records again note K.D.'s "Back Pain" and indicate prescriptions for Xanax and Percocet. Nothing suggests Dr. Villaflor knew that Talwin had been dispensed to K.D. five days earlier, when K.D. appeared at his office on May 26, 1983. Essentially illegible, Dr. Villaflor's office notes for May 26, 1983, reflect prescriptions for Percocet and Xanax tablets, with which K.D. obtained 30 quarter milligram Xanax tablets on June 6, 1983, and 35 Percocet tablets on June 8, 1983. Xanax, a tranquilizer, is taken three or four times daily. Since Percocet may be taken every four to six hours, it was "very much within reason" (T. 239) for Dr. Villaflor to prescribe more on June 9, 1983. When this prescription was filled on June 22, 1983, K.D. received 45 tablets. On July 7, 1983, Dr. Villaflor saw K.D. at his office for the first time in almost a month, and prescribed 35 more tablets of Percocet, also known as oxycodone with acetaminophen. The same day K.D. had the prescription filled, obtaining 35 tablets. Some three weeks later, on July 29, 1983, Dr. Villaflor again prescribed and K.D. again obtained 35 Percocet tablets. On the same day two other prescriptions Dr. Villaflor wrote for K.D. were filled, one for Atarax, an antihistamine sometimes prescribed in lieu of a tranquilizer, and one for Tylenol with codeine. This 35-tablet Tylenol prescription was refilled on September 7, 1983. With more and less potent pain medications, K.D. could take one or the other, as appropriate, depending upon the intensity of the pain. Since no other prescription for pain killing medication was written or filled until October 4, 1983, these prescriptions were, according to one of the Department's witnesses, "[w]ithin reason." (T. 243) On the October 4 visit, Dr. Villaflor noted "Back Pain from Electrocution" and recorded K.D.'s blood pressure as 138 over 70 or 80, before prescribing 45 Percocet tablets. That day, K.D. obtained the Percocet. He returned to Dr. Villaflor's office on October 13, 1983, complaining not only of back pain, but also of nausea and vomiting. Dr. Villaflor prescribed an additional 30 Percocet tablets. On October 15, 1983, K.D. acquired 50 tablets of the antihistamine Dr. Villaflor had been prescribing for him, "hydroxizine pam." On November 3, 1983, he obtained 60 Percocet tablets and 50 Tylenol No. 3 tablets. On November 12, 1983, the antihistamine prescripton was refilled as was, on November 16, the Tylenol No. 3 prescription. Perhaps Dr. Villaflor wrote the antihistamine prescription two days before it was first filled. The office notes are difficult to decipher. He wrote the Percocet and Tylenol prescriptions when he saw K.D. on November 3, 1983, at which time he recorded his blood pressure (132 over 70) and noted "back injury." On December 2, 1983, Dr. Villaflor's office notes reflect a visit and prescriptions for Tylenol No. 3, Percocet and the antihistamine. With respect to prescriptions filled on and after November 3, 1983, but before December 2, 1983, DPR's witness testified that the amount of medication was "a little high, but it's still, you know, again, acceptable for a person in pain." (T. 246) On December 2, 1983, K.D. obtained 60 Percocet tablets and 50 Tylenol No. 3 tablets, the latter by virtue of a prescription that was refilled on December 14, 1983. On January 3, 1984, K.D. returned to Dr. Villaflor's office where he obtained prescriptions for Percocet and Tylenol No. 3. In March, Dr. Villaflor began prescribing a tranquilizer, Dalmane, instead of the antihistamine, but the new year progressed much as the old year had, in terms of Dr. Villaflor's prescriptions and documentation, and, apparently, of K.D.'s pain, as well, until early August. On August 3, 1984, Dr. Villaflor prescribed for K.D., 200 "Sk- Oxycodone w/Apap" tablets, 200 Tylenol No. 4 tablets and 180 Dalmane capsules. K.D. had asked for them to take along to New England, where he travelled for an extended visit with his parents and others. This represented more than a two months' supply, and the prescriptions inspired a pharmacist, Paul Douglas, to telephone Dr. Villaflor's office before filling them. Mr. Douglas had called once before in the spring of the year, when he noticed that a total of 100 Tylenol (acetaminophen with codeine) No. 3 tablets and 60 tablets of Percocet (or the generic equivalent) had been dispensed to K.D. for use over a 24-day (April 2 to April 26, 1984) period. The pharmacist was concerned on that occasion because K.D. would have needed only 144, not 160, tablets during that period, if he had been taking no more than one every four hours. Back in Daytona Beach, K.D. presented himself at Dr. Villaflor's office on November 5, 1984, and received prescriptions for 45 tablets of Percocet, 55 tablets of Tylenol No. 3 and a quantity of Dalmane. All three prescriptions were filled the same day, and the prescription for Tylenol No. 3 was refilled on November 19, 1984. After his last telephone call to Dr. Villaflor's office, the pharmacist talked to K.D., telling him he would "not fill these medications again . . . until the prescribed number of days." (T. 222). On December 5, 1984, K.D. appeared a second time after his return from up north, and Dr. Villaflor again prescribed all three drugs, this time specifying 50 tablets of Percocet and 50 tablets of Tylenol No. 3. K.D. caused these prescriptions to be filled the day he got them. The office notes for both these visits mention only electrical shock by way of explanation for the prescriptions. On December 19, 1984, Dr. Villaflor suffered a stroke and was hospitalized. Two days later prescriptions he had purportedly written for K.D. were filled, but their authenticity, like that of the prescriptions filled on November 21, 1984, is not certain. While Dr. Villaflor was indisposed on account of the stroke, Dr. Wagid F. Guirgis filled in for him. The day he began, K.D. came in complaining of severe pain in his lower back and legs. Dr. Guirgis prescribed Dalmane, 50 Percocet tablets and 50 Tylenol No. 3 tablets, the latter prescription being twice refillable. Dr. Guirgis suggested to R.D. that he see an orthopedist or a neurologist, and, on January 21, 1985, refused K.D.'s request to prescribe more Percocet. At no time did Dr. Guirgis and Dr. Villaflor discuss K.D. or his treatment. Later the same day K.D. went to Dr. M.H. Ledbetter's office. This osteopath prescribed 30 Percocet tablets to be taken twice daily, as well as Elavil and Tranxene. On February 4, 1985, Dr. Ledbetter prescribed the same medicines. On February 28, 1985, Dr. Ledbetter prescribed Elavil, Librium and 50 tablets of Percocet. On March 22, 1985, he prescribed the same things. On April 19, 1985, K.D. again visited Dr. Ledbetter. The same day he purchased Librium and 60 Percocet tablets at Walgreen's. Dr. Ledbetter prescribed Librium, Elavil and 60 tablets of Percocet, to be taken twice daily, when he saw K.D. on May 16, 1985. In May Dr. Villaflor returned to his office, and K.D. appeared on May 21, 1985, five days after he had seen Dr. Ledbetter. Dr. Villaflor prescribed 60 Percocet and 50 Tylenol No. 3 tablets for K.D., along with Dalmane and a vitamin (Bl2) injection. K.D. weighed 142 pounds that day and his blood pressure was also noted. The office notes report "same complaints." On June 18, 1985, Dr. Villaflor prescribed 60 Percocet tablets, ten fewer than he prescribed on K.D.'s next visit, on July 17, 1985 , when K.D. limped "on left foot." In July, Dr. Villaflor also prescribed Dalmane and 50 Tylenol No. 3 tablets. On both visits K.D.'s weight (142 then 138) and blood pressure (122 then 120 over 80) were noted. On August 19, 1985, K.D.'s weight had fallen to 132 pounds but his blood pressure remained 120 over 80. Sixty Percocet tablets - one every four hours - were prescribed, as were 50 Tylenol No. 3 tablets. The diagnosis indicated in Dr. Villaflor's office notes was "electrocution." On September 16, 1985, Dr. Villaflor again prescribed Dalmane, Tylenol and 60 Percocet tablets. On October 17, 1985, K.D. limped to his last visit to Dr. Villaflor's office. His face bruised, K.D. complained that both feet were swollen, and reported that he had lost his balance and fallen down four stairs and over a concrete wall. For the last time, Dr. Villaflor prescribed Tylenol No. 3 and Percocet for K.D., 30 and 60 tablets respectively. Unbeknownst to Dr. Villaflor, K.D. had continued to visit Dr. Ledbetter, himself unaware of Dr. Villaflor's renewed involvement with K.D. On June 7, July 5, July 26, August 27, September 16 and October 10, 1985, Dr. Ledbetter prescribed Librium, Elavil and Percocet. Dr. Ledbetter's office notes also reflect K.D.'s fall. REQUIRED PRACTICE Keeping complete medical records is important not only as a mnemonic aid for the treating physician, but also to make the patient's history available to other physicians who may succeed or assist the recordkeeper. Although each is "a moderate type of analgesic," (T. 324), both codeine and oxycodone are "narcotic derivatives . . . [and] addictive in nature." Id. Dalmane "can be" (T. 221) "potentially addictive." Id. Because of his depression, K.D. "was not a good candidate" to entrust with several hundred pills at once. A physician who suspects addiction should limit prescriptions to "around ten to fifteen" (T.326) tablets and "start checking with other pharmacies to make sure if a patient is getting drugs from any other source . . . ." Id. He should perform "very close and repeated physical exams" (T. 327) and be alert for "overdose side effects," id., such as dizziness, slurred speech, or staggering. The evidence here fell short of a clear and convincing showing that Dr. Villaflor was remiss in failing to suspect addiction, however, Dr. Ledbetter, who had similar, albeit similarly incomplete, information apparently did not suspect. The evidence did not prove the existence of side effects from the drugs Dr. Villaflor prescribed. Although, on his last visit to Dr. Villaflor's office, K.D. reported dizziness, the cause is unknown. On the other hand, his office records do not suggest that Dr. Villaflor took any steps to determine the cause of K.D.'s dizziness or of his swollen feet. Dr. Villaflor's treatment of K.D. fell below acceptable levels, if he failed to refer K.D. for periodic reevaluations of the underlying orthopedic or neurological problem, which his records suggest he did not do. His treatment was also inadequate for failure periodically to "get the medicine . . . out of the system . . . for a limited time" (T. 337) in an effort to learn what side effects, if any, the drugs he prescribed caused, either singly or in combination. This is so, even though the effort might have been frustrated, if K.D. had acquired the same medicines from other sources.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is a licensed physician in the state of Florida, and holds license number ME 0034710. Respondent's last known address is 1430 Mason Avenue, Daytona Beach, Florida, 32117-4551. At all times material to these proceedings, Respondent, who is both a neurologist and a psychiatrist, specialized in the diagnosis and treatment of headaches in his medical practice with Daytona Neurological Associates in Daytona Beach, Florida. At various times from approximately May 18, 1984, through December 23, 1988, Respondent rendered neurological care to Patient C.R., a female born on November 14, 1963. On May 18, 1984, when C.R. initially came to Respondent's office complaining of severe headaches, Respondent noted in his medical records that the patient had been on birth control pills for three years and had ceased taking them two months prior to this visit. C.R. was also a cigarette smoker. From approximately May 18, 1984, until September 12, 1986, C.R. was prescribed a variety of medications at various times by Respondent for the patient's headaches. The medications included Asendin, Phrenilin Forte, Norpramin, and Tylenol #3. Medrol, Prednisone, and Decadron are legend drugs as defined in Section 465.003, Florida Statutes, and contain both natural and synthetic adrenocortical steroids (glucocorticoids). On September l2, 1986, Respondent prescribed a Medrol Dosepak unit to C.R. A Medrol Dosepak is a corticosteroid specific package that is tapered over six days from the first dose down to the last dose and contains a total of 84 mg of methylprednisolone (105 mg Prednisone equivalent). The medication was concluded on or about September 17, 1986. On October 30, 1986, Respondent prescribed another Medrol Dosepak unit to C.R. The patient took the Medrol tablets beginning on this date, in decreasing dosages, starting at 24 mg and ending at 4 mg six days later, for a total of another 84 mg of methylprednisolone (105 mg Prednisone equivalent). Both prescriptions of Medrol (September 12, 1986 and October 30, 1986) were short courses and treatment was not inappropriate. On November 7, 1986, C.R. went to a hospital emergency room where she was prescribed Prednisone 40 mg for three days and 20 mg for four days and referred back to the Respondent for follow-up care. During this hospitalization, C.R. received approximately 200 mg of Prednisone. On November 14, 1986, Respondent saw C.R. in his office and indicated in his records that the patient seemed to be doing better on Prednisone and "[w]e will keep her on this medication and re-evaluate her in one month. She is to . . . decrease the Prednisone and come off this in about a week or two." On November 25, 1986, Respondent saw C.R. in his office. Respondent indicated in his records that he would keep C.R. on Prednisone l0 mg daily for "another week or so." From November 7, 1986 until November 30, 1986, C.R. received a total of 465 mg of Prednisone. Appropriateness of corticosteroid use varies with both amount and duration. The amount initiated in the Emergency Room on November 7, 1986, was not excessive, but Respondent's rationale for continuation of the drug, or whether the November 14, 1986 dosage was tapered or less than that previously prescribed for C.R. in the emergency room, is not documented in Respondent's patient records. On January 20, 1987, Respondent saw C.R. in his office and documented that he was going to give the patient another "short course" of Prednisone. Respondent saw C.R. again in his office on January 30, 1987, and documented further prescription of Prednisone. The documentation for the above two visits does not indicate the dosage details nor suggest what circumstances of the patient's condition justify again prescribing prednisone other than the remark dated January 20, 1987, that "[p]atient is having some headaches again." For the period of January 20, 1987 through February 9, 1987, C.R. was prescribed a total of 510 mg of Prednisone. Petitioner's Exhibit 5 is a calendar prepared by C.R. which allegedly documents the patient's receipts for prescriptions which she purchased upon Respondent's authorization. C.R. has no independent recollection of amounts or times when she took the medications. On the basis of information reflected on the calendar, Petitioner seeks to establish that Respondent prescribed corticosteroids for C.R. in excess of that otherwise established by the evidence in this case. In view of the lack of C.R.'s independent recollection of when she took the medications, the lack of corroborating original receipts, C.R.'s lack of detail recall concerning her treatment by Respondent, her inability to remember when she prepared the calendar other than in preparation for civil litigation against Respondent following her treatment, and lack of other direct evidence corroborating the document's veracity, the calendar standing alone is not credited for the purpose of establishing amounts and times of medication prescribed for C.R. by Respondent. C.R. had an office visit on March 18, 1988 but there is no reference to any Prednisone prescription in the medical record. A handwritten note for the date of April 6, 1988 in the Respondent's medical record states that the patient was "told to stay on Prednisone." Respondent conceded in testimony that he apparently failed to document prescribing 60 mg Prednisone in April of 1988. From April 27, 1988 through May 8, 1988, Respondent had C.R. admitted to Halifax Medical Center in Daytona Beach, Florida. During that period, she received 909 mg. Prednisone equivalent (Decadron). Respondent discharged the patient with a diagnosis of severe vascular migraine headaches under control with a combination of Mellaril and Procardia. At the time of the April, 1988 admission, C.R. was suffering from crescendo migraine with numbness, blurring, and an episode of loss of consciousness. As established by testimony of Thomas M. Zizic, M.D., Respondent's expert in avascular necrosis, corticosteroid use, and treatment of headache, patients with the symptoms displayed by C.R., when she was hospitalized in April of 1988, are at risk for transient ischemic attacks and strokes. As opined by Dr. Zizic, and corroborated by testimony of Victor B. Robert, M.D., the short course of less than two weeks of high dose steroids in the course of the April, 1988 hospitalization was not inappropriate. Zizic also opined that the other courses of steroids prescribed previously for C.R. were not inappropriate. As established by Zizic, steroid medications in the amounts and duration prescribed for C.R. are not causative of avascular or aseptic necrosis. Dosage amounts of these drugs have to be much greater and for longer periods of time to occasion such side effects. Even assuming C.R.'s calendar of medications and the resultant supposition that she ingested more steroid medication than is established by the credible evidence, Zizic opined that the likelihood that such medication amounts and duration resulted in C.R.'s development of aseptic necrosis is less than five percent. Zizic also testified that he would not have felt it necessary to warn C.R. of the potential for avascular or aseptic necrosis in view of the remoteness of such a possibility at dosages prescribed for her. Dr. Jacob Green, an expert witness presented by Respondent, is a neurologist who provided insight into the clinical management of the difficult headache patient, noting that there is no standard treatment for such patients, "[y]ou just have to use what works . . . Its a matter of trial and error in a lot of cases." Green also noted that once a patient is treated with corticosteroids, the dosages must be tapered gradually, not stopped suddenly. Green concluded C.R.`s dosages were decreased appropriately, that duration of Medrol and Prednisone prescribed for the patient was appropriate, and that use and duration of Decadron during C.R.`s hospitalization in April, 1988, was also appropriate. While Green acknowledged that avascular necrosis of the hips is a known complication of steroid use, he testified that in 1986 or 1987 he would not have felt that failure to warn a patient about the potential for such a remote side effect constituted a breach of the standard of care and would not have warned the patient. In Green's opinion, Respondent did not prescribe Medrol, Prednisone or Decadron contrary to the best interests of C.R. In 1989, C.R. was diagnosed with aseptic necrosis of the femoral head of both her hips and underwent surgery in 1989 and 1990 resulting in total hip replacements. She has undergone surgery for "a revision on the left side" and continues to have problems. While differing expert testimony presented in this proceeding fails to clearly and convincingly establish a causal connection between the steroid medications given to C.R. and her resultant physical problems, the common consensus of those experts is that avascular necrosis is a complication that can arise from the use of steroids, given sufficient dosages and duration of such medication. Although Respondent did not inform C.R. of the potential of avascular necrosis from corticosteroid dosing by the prescribed medications and did not at any time during the course of his treatment discuss with CR the potential for such harmful side effects, the evidence fails to establish that the patient should have been informed in 1986 regarding the remote potential for harmful side effects of such medications. However, Respondent's medical records on the patient C.R. were inadequate. The records did not serve as an effective basis for planning patient care and providing for continuity in the evaluation of the patient's condition and treatment. The records did not furnish documentary evidence of the course of the patient's medical evaluation, treatment, and change in condition. Detail of the records was not sufficient to clearly demonstrate why one course of treatment was undertaken in preference to another course and would not have communicated sufficient information for any other practitioner who would have assumed the patient's care.
Recommendation ACCORDINGLY, it is recommended that a final order be entered finding the Respondent guilty of count two of the Administrative Complaint, violation of Section 458.331(l)(m), Florida Statutes; requiring as a penalty that Respondent's license to practice as a physician in the State of Florida be placed on probation for a period of one year upon conditions prescribed by the Board of Medicine; and further requiring that Respondent pay a fine in the amount of $5,000. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of February, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 1996. APPENDIX CASE NO. 94-2116 In accordance with requirements of Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, the following constitute my rulings with regard to proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Respondent's Proposed Findings. 1.-2. Accepted. Rejected, unnecessary. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. Accepted, but not verbatim. While the calendar was admitted, it may only be used to corroborate direct testimony. C.R. had no independent recollections which could be corroborated by the calendar. Respondent took issue with the calendar, consequently the calendar is not credited as a basis for fact finding with the exception of Dr. Zizic's opinion regarding dosage levels. Incorporated by reference. 7.-10. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. 11. Accepted, not verbatim. 12.-15. Incorporated by reference. 16.-18. Accepted. 19.-22. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. Petitioner's Proposed Findings. 1-4. Accepted. 5. Rejected, unnecessary. 6.-9. Accepted, not verbatim. 10. Accepted in part, remainder rejected as subordinate. 11.-12. Accepted. 13.-19. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. 20.-22. Accepted. 23.-25. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. COPIES FURNISHED: Albert Peacock, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Donna J. Torsney, Esquire Donald W. Weidner, P.A. 10161 Centurion Parkway North Suite 190 Jacksonville, Florida 32256 Jerome W. Hoffman, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Dr. Marm Harris, Executive Director Agency for Health Care Administration Division of Medical Quality Assurance 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent obtained Oxycontin by using a forged prescription, in violation of Section 464.018(1)(h), Florida Statutes, and Rule 64B9-8.005, Florida Administrative Code, which prohibit unprofessional conduct, and in violation of Section 464.018(1)(i), Florida Statutes, which prohibit the unauthorized possession, sale, or distribution of controlled substances; and whether Respondent's use of Oxycontin affects her ability to practice nursing with reasonable skill and safety, in violation of Section 464.018(1)(j), Florida Statutes, which prohibits the inability to practice nursing with reasonable skill and safety by reason of illness or use of alcohol, drugs, narcotics, or chemicals or as a result of any mental or physical condition. If so, an additional issue is what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a licensed registered nurse, holding license number RN 521142. She has been so licensed for 31 years. Respondent's long career in nursing has featured dedication, hard work, commitment, and competence. The record does not reveal any past discipline. For most of Respondent's professional career, starting in 1971, she has worked at Indian River Memorial Hospital in Vero Beach. Respondent has worked in various capacities at the hospital, including the emergency room and operating room. Respondent later helped develop a neurological unit at the hospital. Starting in 1980, she worked for a couple of years at Vero Orthopedics. Since 1997, Respondent has worked on a contract basis at the Indian River Memorial Hospital, although her present physical infirmities, partly described below, prevent her from working at present. In May 2000, Respondent injured her back while moving a heavy patient in the hospital. A couple of months later, Respondent underwent a laminectomy to relieve the pain from two herniated disks. Six weeks after the surgery, Respondent reinjured her back and had to undergo additional surgery. Six weeks after the second surgery, Respondent, who was not doing well, left her job at the orthopedic clinic and took a less strenuous job. One month after doing so, Respondent was still experiencing pain when she got into and out of cars. In June 2001, Respondent underwent a third operation, in which the surgeon fused two injured vertebrae. The surgery obtained access to the vertebrae by a posterior incision running from the breast to the pubis. The surgery also required a hip bone graft, thus necessitating an incision to the hip. The recovery from this excruciatingly painful surgery was difficult, and Respondent has not yet returned to work, although she is nearing the point at which she can perform some nursing-related work, such as teaching. At present, she still has difficulty walking or standing. When discharging Respondent from the hospital in late June 2001, Dr. Gomez prescribed her Oxycontin for pain. Dr. Gomez was covering for Respondent's neurosurgeon, Dr. Magana. Later, Dr. Cunningham, a pain management specialist and Respondent's family physician, resumed the care of Respondent. Dr. Cunningham continues to monitor Respondent and treat her pain. On direct examination, Respondent testified that she has not taken Oxycontin since December 2001. (However, on August 9, 2002, Respondent told her certified addictions professional that she had not taken any Oxycontin since March 2001.) Respondent testified that, after Oxycontin, she took no pain medication besides nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory medications and steroids. However, on cross-examination, Respondent admitted that she takes Methadose as needed, pursuant to a prescription from Dr. Cunningham. Respondent testified that he switched her from Oxycontin in July 2002. Respondent filled the Methadose prescription at a different drug store than the one that she has used for her other prescriptions. On October 5, 2001, Respondent presented a forged prescription to a different drug store than the one she has used for her other prescriptions. The prescription was for fifty 20- mg. Oxycontin tablets, which Respondent picked up two days later. Respondent fraudulently obtained the Oxycontin for her own use. Oxycontin is an analgesic opioid and a schedule II controlled substance. It is highly addictive and presently among the most commonly abused controlled substances. Oxycontin can produce a feeling of short-lived euphoria, as well as impaired cognitive functioning and impaired judgment. Methadose, a form of methadone, is a synthetic analgesic. It is also used in the detoxification process undergone by heroin addicts. Petitioner has proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent engaged in unprofessional conduct in her acquisition of the Oxycontin by using a forged prescription and that Respondent unlawfully possessed a controlled substance. Petitioner has not proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent's use of Oxycontin affects her ability to practice nursing with reasonable skill and safety. First, Petitioner did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent still uses Oxycontin. It appears likely that she may have substituted Methadose for Oxycontin to manage her pain. It is unclear from the present record whether Respondent's use of Methadose is also to assist her in overcoming an addiction to Oxycontin. But even if Petitioner had pleaded Methadose rather than Oxycontin, the record does not reveal the extent to which Respondent presently uses Methadose. For the reasons stated in the preceding paragraph, the relevance of the Methadose is not to prove the third count of the Administrative Complaint, but to underscore the risk that Respondent may pose if she practices nursing at present. Respondent was not candid at the hearing. She was not candid about the October 2001 incident. She was not candid about the recent use of Methadose and was evasive about the drug's properties. The two-hour evaluation that Respondent underwent by a certified addictions professional was cursory and curiously deferential to Respondent. This remarkable evaluation is entitled to absolutely no weight whatsoever. The opinion of the certified addictions professional that Respondent does not suffer from a drug abuse or dependency may or may not be true, but, if true, the result is a chance occurrence, rather than a professional conclusion following the comprehensive collection of relevant, reliable data and the careful, informed analysis of such data. The safeguards provided by the pretrial intervention program, into which Respondent entered after her arrest for the fraudulent acquisition of the Oxycontin, are inadequate. The random drug tests always occur on Tuesdays, just not every Tuesday. The assurances that ensue from Respondent's apparent compliance with the conditions of her probation, which include negative urinalyses, are meaningful, but not sufficiently rigorous to provide the necessary protection to a nurse's patients. On December 26, 2001, Petitioner entered an emergency suspension order in this case. The record amply demonstrates that Respondent will suffer considerable financial distress if denied the opportunity to practice her profession. However, Respondent's lack of candor precludes a detailed analysis of the safeguards in her current monitoring program and a detailed prescription of what, if any, additional safeguards would be required to permit any discipline short of a suspension. In its proposed recommended order, Petitioner seeks a suspension until lifted pursuant to, and subject to the conditions set by, an evaluation coordinated by the Intervention Project for Nurses (IPN); treatment as recommended by the IPN; probation for three years if no treatment is recommended by the IPN; an administrative fine of $750; a reprimand; and the assessment of costs of the investigation and prosecution.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Nursing enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 464.018(1)(i), Florida Statutes, and imposing a penalty of a $250 administrative fine, a suspension until lifted pursuant to, and subject to the conditions set by, an evaluation coordinated by the IPN; treatment as recommended by the Intervention Project for Nurses; probation for three years if no treatment is recommended by the Intervention Project for Nurses; and the assessment of costs of the investigation and prosecution, upon remand, if necessary. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of December, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of December, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Dan Coble, RN PhD CNAA C, BC Executive Director Board of Nursing Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3252 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Amy M. Pietrodangelo Assistant General Counsel Prosecution Services Unit Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 Suzanne H. Suarez Suzanne Hope Suarez, P.A. The Legal Building 447 3rd Avenue North, Suite 404 St. Petersburg, Florida 33701-3255
Findings Of Fact Rainbow (herein sometimes Respondent) began operations as a methadone treatment center (outpatient methadone program) on May 15, 1988, with a probationary license for 90 days granted by the Petitioner, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. All methadone treatment programs begin operations with a probationary license. Methadone is a classified Schedule II narcotic drug, a synthetic opiate, manufactured in a pharmaceutical laboratory. It is highly addictive and for that reason, it is closely monitored and controlled by the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration, can only be dispensed and administered by authorized medical personnel and the authorized dispensers of methadone are required to maintain strict security of access to methadone. Respondent's operation is a drug abuse treatment and prevention program (DATAP) and is defined as such and governed by Chapter 397, Florida Statutes. Respondent's program is designed to assist its clients, particularly the heroin addict or someone who is taking the synthetic opiate Dilaudid, a popular street drug, to take the client "off the street," and give them a stabilizing dose of methadone so that they can return to a more fully functional and responsible life style. That is accomplished by first stabilizing the client on a dose of methadone which is acceptable to them physically and provide treatment planning and auxillary services to assist them in restructuring their life style. The goal of the program is to reduce the methadone a client receives with the ultimate idea of making the addict drug free. On July 13-14, 1988, Petitioner dispatched a technical team to inspect Respondent's program. The inspection team consisted of Phil Highman, Sr., Human Services Program Specialist, Anton Krone, M. D., Mark Engelhardt, Program Supervisor - HRS District VI, and Gail Potter, Senior Human Services Program Analyst. Respondent's President, Angela Duncan, was present along with Lois Knoffler, R. N., Nursing Supervisor and Barbara Reszac, L. P. N. Following the inspection, an exit conference was held on July 14, at which time the inspection team advised Duncan of numerous clinical and medical standard deficiencies which were not being complied with. The inspection team found that Respondent's problems were due principally to a lack of knowledge regarding addiction and methadone treatment and a general laxness in implementing and documenting service provisions. On the clinical side there was no evidence to suggest that charts were being reviewed on a consistent, regular basis to ensure that specific treatment activities were in compliance with Chapter 10E-7, Florida Administrative Code, and on the medical side, the Medical Director exhibited little experience in the addiction field and the services provided were minimal at best. Also, the Medical Director was not spending adequate time at the clinic. The following programmatic elements were in noncompliance with regulations and required corrective action. In the clinical area these were: An absence of a psycho-social assessment including a clinical summary of each record within 10 days of admission to out-patient maintenance treatment as required by Section 10E-7.039 (a)(g), Florida Administrative Code. Respondent's failure to provide signed credentialed and dated, psycho-social assessments for each client as required by Section 10E-7.032(18)(g), Florida Administrative Code. An absence of individualized treatment plans developed for each patient within 30 days of admission to include measurable goals and objectives and the type and frequency of services required and properly signed, credentialed and dated. Sections 10E- 7.032(28)(b) and 10E-7.039(3)(j)2., Florida Administrative Code. An absence of recorded progress notes in the case records in accordance with the frequency of counseling. Sections 10E- 7.039(3)(j)1 and 3, Florida Administrative Code. A failure to place on phase one, all persons admitted, readmitted or transferred to maintenance treatment absent an authorized exception. Sections 10E-7.039(3)(d)6. and 10E-7.039(3)(e), Florida Administrative Code. Failure to document that clients who violated clinical rules such as illicit drug use and absenteeism had received disciplinary actions appropriate to the nature of the violation. Section 10E-7.039(3)(h), Florida Administrative Code and Sections 291.505 (d)(8)(v), (b) and (1), Code of Federal Regulations. In the medical area the following deficiencies were noted: A failure to document that the program physician conducted a physical exam prior to administration of the initial dose of methadone absent a documentable emergency. Section 10E-7.039(2)(f)2., Florida Administrative Code. A failure to document that all physical exams con formed to the medical services requirements prescribed under Sections 10E- 7.034(1)(a) and 10E-7.039(2)(F), Florida Administrative Code. A failure to provide results of a laboratory test which is required on each patient at the time of admission. Section 10E-7.039 (f)(1), Florida Administrative Code. Failure to document that the program physician thoroughly documented each patient's current addiction and history of addiction before administering the initial dose of methadone. Sections 10E-7.039(2)(f) 5.A. and 10E-7.039(3)(a)1.-3., Florida Administrative Code. Failure to document that each patient had signed the "consent to methadone treatment" form prior to being administered the initial methadone dose. Section 291.505(d)(1)(ii), Code of Federal Regulations. A failure to document that the program physician signed or countersigned, within 72 hours, all orders relative to medication and take-home privileges. Sections 10E- 7.039(2)(f)5.d-f, Florida Administrative Code. On August 15, 1988, Petitioner advised Respondent of the non- compliance of the above-referred clinical and medical standards and by that notification, extended Respondent's first probationary license 45 days through September 27, 1988 to allow Respondent an opportunity to correct the deficiencies; placed a moratorium on admissions of new clients beginning August 14, 1988, and advised of its serious concern with the deficiencies with Petitioner's then consideration of denying Respondent a regular license. Respondent was further advised that Petitioner would continue to monitor Respondent's activities during the probationary period. Petitioner's moratorium limited Respondent to 49 clients. On August 30, 1988, Petitioner again dispatched an inspection team to Respondent's facility to monitor compliance. Petitioner's attendees were the same attendees who made up the earlier inspection on July 13-14, 1988. Administrator Duncan was present along with clinical supervisor, Bob Brouck and Clifford Frost, counselor. On the day of inspection there were 49 clients in treatment in keeping with the moratorium and current staff/client ratio was within acceptable standards. In the clinical area, the team reviewed 14 clinical records and while there were psycho-social assessments available in all case records, in 11 of 14 cases assessments had not been completed within the required 10 days of admission. In the area of treatment plans, plans were available in 13 of 14 cases. In two cases, plans were not completed within the required 30 days of admission and in none of the cases reviewed, was the information provided delineating the type and frequency of services to be provided. In the area of progress notes, improvement was shown in terms of content but in 12 of 14 cases, notes were not recorded with the proper frequency according to client phase level. Also, in 5 of 14 cases, urine drug screens indicated that the clients in question were involved in illicit drug use and no reference to these incidents were made in the progress notes. In the medical area, a total of 7 medical charts were reviewed. In the area of physical exams, in only 2 of 7 cases were physicals completed prior to administering the initial dose of methadone. In the remaining cases, physicals were either unavailable, undated or not completed within the required time frame. Laboratory tests were available in 6 of 7 cases. However, in only one of the six cases was the test completed upon admission. In one case the lab was unable to draw blood from the client because of difficulty in locating a vein. In all cases reviewed, there was adequate documentation of the client's current addiction. In the phasing and take-out privileges area, it was difficult to determine each client's phase level from the clinical records; however, an examination of dosing records indicated that patients were participating on the proper phase level according to time and treatment. Respondent's program was out of compliance in the following clinical areas: Psycho-social assessments were not completed within 10 days of admission as required. Individualized treatment plans were not developed within 30 days of admission and no reference was made to the type and frequency of services to be provided. Progress notes were not recorded in case records with proper frequency according to phase level and, Illicit drug use had not been addressed relative to appropriate disciplinary action. In the medical area, the following deficiencies were noted: Physical exams had not been conducted prior to the administration of the initial dose of methadone. Physical exams did not conform to the medical service requirements prescribed under Sections 10E-7.034(1)(a) and 10E-7.039(2)(f)1 Florida Administrative Code. Laboratory tests had not been conducted at the time of admission. See Section 10E- 7.039(2)(f)1, Florida Administrative Code. At that time, Petitioner extended Respondent's second probationary period for a full 90 days, i.e. from August 14, to November 11, 1988, to allow Respondent time to correct the noted program deficiencies and items of non- compliance with rules and regulations which were cited by the inspection team. On September 29, 1988, Petitioner's agents Emenheiser and Moffett again inspected Respondent's program to determine compliance with the moratorium on new clients. At approximately 9:30 a.m. on September 29, Emenheiser and Moffett went to Rainbow, knocked on the door and were admitted by Respondent's counselor, Clifford Frost whom Emenheiser met at the previous inspection visit. Respondent's operating hours were 6 o'clock a.m. to 2 o'clock p.m., seven days a week. Rainbow was open for business to administer and dispense methadone. At the time of their arrival, there was a client in Respondent's waiting area talking with Frost. Inspectors Emenheiser and Moffett asked Frost for entry into the methadone dispensing area and inquired as to the whereabouts of Administrator Duncan and the dispensing nurse. Neither were at the clinic. Frost left the area and obtained the key to the dispensing area and unlocked the dispensing room. At the time, there were no medical personnel in the facility. Counselor Frost is not a medical person nor is he authorized to enter the dispensing room or to dispense methadone. The inspectors, after gaining entry to the dispensing area by Frost, found the dispensing room safe open with a telephone cord draped between the safe door and the body of the safe. In the open safe they found a full bottle of methadone and a box with 4 full bottles next to it. On the dispensing room counter, the inspectors found a bottle with about two inches of methadone in it and a pipette dispenser in its top and a take-out bottle with a small amount of methadone. Emenheiser and Moffett observed the medication record which contained signed entries initial led in advance. While in the dispensing room, Inspectors Emenheiser and Moffett observed another client come into the facility and Frost administered the take- out bottle of methadone to the client in the dispensing room. The take-out bottle was prepared in advance by Frost. In this regard, Frost stated that he did not do that sort of thing very often. Based on the inspectors observance of the access by an unauthorized person to obtain entry into the storage area where the liquid methadone was stored, the absence of medical personnel at Respondent's premises during the period of time when the facility was open for business to dispense and administer methadone, the dispensing and administration of methadone to a patient by an unauthorized employee, and the general lack of security in the area where the methadone was stored, Petitioner's agents called the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to report their findings and the events they had witnessed. After confirming that these were security violations, the inspectors left the facility immediately to consult with their superiors. The inspectors later provided affidavits detailing their findings and provided assistance in drafting the administrative complaint and the emergency final order. Respondent was ordered to cease and desist all operations of its DATAP program effective at 5 o'clock p.m. on October 10, 1988. Clifford Frost, Respondent's counselor, gave testimony and maintained, via deposition, that he allowed Petitioner's agents access to the storage area where methadone was kept based on prior conversations that he had with Emenheiser to the effect that if he (Frost) would help him close down Respondent's program, he (Emenheiser) would help Frost get another job. Frost maintains that he was being led by Emenheiser to shut down Respondent's facility and that he did so in an effort to go along with Emenheiser's wishes. Emenheiser denied having any motivation to shut down Respondent's program and as a long term career veteran with Petitioner's DATAP programs, the absence of any bias having been shown by Respondent, Emenheiser's testimony is credited. Frost's testimony is not credited to the extent that his testimony differs from the versions of events found herein and as testified to by employees Phillip Emenheiser, Harry Moffett and Gail Potter.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order revoking Petitioner's probationary license to operate a methadone treatment center. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of July, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of July, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 88-5518 Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Paragraph 9, rejected as conclusionary. Paragraphs 10 and 11, adopted as modified, last sentence in paragraph 23, Recommended Order. Paragraph 12, adopted as modified, paragraphs 11 and 15, Recommended Order. Paragraph 13, adopted as modified, paragraph 23, Recommended Order. Paragraph 14, adopted as modified, paragraph 10, Recommended Order. Paragraphs 15, 16, 17 and 18, adopted as relevant, paragraphs 11-14 and 24, Recommended Order. The remainder rejected as irrelevant and/or unnecessary. Paragraph 19, adopted as modified, paragraph 14, Recommended Order. Paragraph 20, adopted as relevant, paragraphs 15-17, Recommended Order. Paragraph 21, rejected, irrelevant. Paragraph 22, adopted as modified, paragraphs 19 and 20, Recommended Order. Paragraph 28, rejected, irrelevant. Paragraph 29, adopted as modified, paragraph 23, lines 16-21, Recommended Order. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Paragraph 1, adopted, paragraph 1, stipulated facts and paragraphs 1 and 18, Recommended Order. Paragraph 2, adopted, paragraph 4, stipulated facts. Paragraph 3, adopted as modified, paragraph 19, Recommended Order. Paragraph 4, first sentence, adopted and second sentence rejected based on contrary findings in paragraph 20, Recommended Order. Paragraph 5, rejected based on contrary findings in paragraph 24, Recommended Order. Paragraph 6, rejected as unnecessary to resolve the issues posed. Paragraphs 8-12, rejected based on contrary credibility resolutions stated in paragraph 24, Recommended Order. Paragraph 13, adopted as modified, paragraph 23, Recommended Order. Paragraph 14, rejected based on contrary findings in paragraph 23 to the effect that Frost was unauthorized to dispense and administer methadone. Paragraph 15, rejected as argument. Paragraph 16, rejected as irrelevant based on the determination in paragraph 23 to the extent there was a general lack of security in the storage of methadone and that such lack of security was in violation of the security requirements of a scheduled, highly addictive drug. Paragraph 17, rejected as argument. Paragraph 18, rejected based on contrary findings in paragraph 23 and the general lack of security by Respondent at the treatment center. Paragraph 19, rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 21 through 23, rejected, irrelevant and not probative of the issues posed. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack Farley, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 400 W. Buffalo Avenue 5th Floor, Room 500 Tampa, Florida 3361 Amelia M. Park, Esquire and William M. Park, Esquire 8001 North Dale Mabry Highway Building 601, Suite B Tampa, Florida 33614 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Suite 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
