The Issue The issue in this case is whether Kenneth D. Stahl, M.D. ("Dr. Stahl" or "Petitioner"), is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs to be paid by the Department of Health, Board of Medicine ("Department" or "Respondent"), pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2014).1/
Findings Of Fact Review of the record indicates that, at the time the Administrative Complaint was filed at DOAH, the following facts were known by Respondent, as later stated in the Findings of Fact of the Final Order of the underlying case: In February 2011, Patient C.C., a 52-year-old female, was admitted to Jackson Memorial Hospital ("JMH") with a diagnosis of perforated appendicitis. She also had a perirectal abscess. Her records indicate that she was treated with percutaneous drainage and a course of intravenous antibiotics. She was discharged on March 4, 2011. On June 22, 2011, Patient C.C. presented to the JMH Emergency Department complaining of 12 hours of abdominal pain in her right lower quadrant with associated nausea and vomiting. Shortly after her arrival, she described her pain to a nurse as "10" on a scale of one to ten. A computed tomography ("CT") scan of Patient C.C.'s abdomen was conducted. The CT report noted that the "the uterus is surgically absent," and "the ovaries are not identified." It noted that "the perirectal abscess that was drained previously is no longer visualized" and that the "appendix appears inflamed and dilated." No other inflamed organs were noted. The radiologist's impression was that the findings of the CT scan were consistent with non-perforated appendicitis. Patient C.C.'s pre-operative history listed a "total abdominal hysterectomy" on May 4, 2005. Patient C.C.'s prior surgeries and earlier infections had resulted in extensive scar tissue in her abdomen. Patient C.C. was scheduled for an emergency appendectomy and signed a "Consent to Operations or Procedures" form for performance of a laparoscopic appendectomy, possible open appendectomy, and other indicated procedures. Patient C.C. was taken to surgery at approximately 1:00 a.m. on June 23, 2011. Dr. Stahl was the attending physician, and notes indicate that he was present throughout the critical steps of the procedure. The Operative Report was dictated by Dr. Eddie Manning after the surgery and electronically signed by Dr. Stahl on June 23, 2011. The report documents the post-operative diagnosis as "acute on chronic appendicitis" and describes the dissected and removed organ as the appendix. Progress notes completed by the nursing staff record that, on June 23, 2011, at 8:00 a.m., Patient C.C. "denies pain" and that the laparoscopic incision is intact. Similar notes indicate that at 5:00 p.m. on June 23, 2011, Patient C.C. "tolerated well reg diet" and was waiting for approval for discharge. Patient C.C. was discharged on June 24, 2011, a little after noon, in stable condition. On June 24, 2011, the Surgical Pathology Report indicated that the specimen removed from Patient C.C. was not an appendix, but instead was an ovary and a portion of a fallopian tube. The report noted that inflammatory cells were seen. Surgery to remove an ovary is an oophorectomy and surgery to remove a fallopian tube is a salpingectomy. On Friday, June 24, 2011, Dr. Nicholas Namias, chief of the Division of Acute Care Surgery, Trauma, and Critical Care, was notified by the pathologist of the results of the pathology report, because Dr. Stahl had left on vacation. Dr. Namias arranged a meeting with Patient C.C. in the clinic the following Monday. At the meeting, Patient C.C. made statements to Dr. Namias regarding her then-existing physical condition, including that she was not in pain, was tolerating her diet, and had no complaints. Dr. Namias explained to Patient C.C. that her pain may have been caused by the inflamed ovary and fallopian tube or may have been caused by appendicitis that resolved medically, and she might have appendicitis again. He explained that her options were to undergo a second operation at that time and search for the appendix or wait and see if appendicitis recurred. He advised against the immediate surgery option because she was "asymptomatic." The Second Amended Administrative Complaint alleged that Dr. Stahl performed a wrong procedure when he performed an appendectomy which resulted in the removal of Patient C.C.'s ovary and a portion of her fallopian tube instead. The Final Order concluded that the evidence did not clearly show that the wrong procedure was performed. It concluded that it was more likely that exactly the right procedure was performed on Patient C.C. That is, it was likely that an oophorectomy and salpingectomy were the right procedures to remove the inflamed organs and address the abdominal pain that caused Patient C.C. to present at the JMH emergency room, but that the right procedure was initially denominated incorrectly as an "appendectomy," as a result of patient history and erroneous interpretation of the CT scan.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Mark L. Klugman, was licensed as an optometrist having been issued license number OP 1758 by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Optometry (Board). He currently resides at 16021 Villa Drive, Hudson, Florida. On or about August 15, 1987 respondent had an occasion to examine Sandra J. Dinkins for the purpose of diagnosing her eyes and to prescribe and furnish contact lenses. She had never previously warn contact lenses. Dinkins selected respondent at random from the telephone directory because his office was nearby and open on Saturdays. At that time, respondent had an office in Tampa, Florida. After being given contact lenses, and making a total of six office visits, Dinkins was unhappy with the lenses and eventually went to another optometrist. A complaint was later filed with the Board, and this culminated in the issuance of an administrative complaint charging respondent with incompetence, gross or repeated malpractice and violating a Board rule. Respondent requested a hearing to contest these charges. According to Dinkins, the contact lenses prescribed by Dr. Klugman caused "total blurriness" and "hurt her eyes." After Dinkins complained about this condition, respondent told her to "wear them for a week and come back." Because she could not see with the lenses, Dinkins was forced to take them out after the first day. On her next appointment, respondent ordered a new left lens. When this did not correct the problem, Dinkins complained again. Respondent told her to keep wearing them and return in a week. This process continued for several weeks until she gave up and went to another optometrist. By this time, Dr. Klugman had ordered another set of lens, but these were never dispensed since the patient did not return. Doctor Klugman suspected that Dinkins' problems were due to the type of lenses he had prescribed rather than the prescription. He acknowledged at hearing, however, that although his suspicion was "logical," it was not correct. He now agrees the patient needed a corrected prescription for astigmatism to resolve her problem. After Dinkins' complaint was filed with the Board, she was examined by a DPR consultant, Dr. John R. Walesby, who has been in the practice of optometry for over thirty years. Doctor Walesby found that respondent's prescription for Dinkins' left eye was in error by 1.00 diopter of cylinder. After obtaining a corrected prescription and new contact lenses, Dinkins' vision measurably improved although she acknowledged she still has a few problems with her left eye. By failing to properly diagnose her acuity, Dr. Walesby concluded that, while respondent exerted a considerable amount of time and effort in trying to fit the patient, he had failed to conform with the minimum standards of optometry in the community. By rule 21Q-3.007 the Board has mandated that, at a minimum, certain procedures be performed by an optometrist while conducting a visual analysis of a patient, and that evidence of the performance of these procedures be recorded on the patient's records. A copy of Dinkins' patient records has been received in evidence as petitioner's exhibit 1. While the Board's complaint charged that respondent violated the foregoing rule in seven respects, at hearing its expert conceded that he had overlooked or misinterpreted certain entries. While the record is less than a model of clarity as to which procedures were performed and recorded on the records, it is found that procedures regarding the family medical history, family ocular history, and visual field testing were not performed or recorded on the records and therefore such deficiencies constitute a violation of the rule. Respondent pointed out that Dinkins could only visit his office on Saturdays and this made reexaminations difficult. However, his principal defense is that the customer wanted a refund and he did not give one, and this prompted the complaint. According to Dr. Klugman, he would not give a refund because the final set of lenses ordered for Dinkins was nonexchangeable and he could not return them to the manufacturer. In addition, he offered various financial records to show that he is heavily burdened with college loans and credit card bills and did not have the financial ability to make a refund. Even so, this does not excuse respondent from complying with Board rules and statutory requirements.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of violating Subsections 463.016(1)(g) and (h), Florida Statutes (1987), that he be fined $1000, and that his license be placed on probation for twelve months under such conditions as the Board may deem appropriate. The remaining charge should be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of March, 1989 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of March, 1989. APPENDIX Petitioner: Covered in finding of fact 1. Covered in finding of fact 2. Covered in finding of fact 6. Covered in finding of fact 4. Covered in finding of fact 3. Covered in finding of fact 5. 7-8. Covered in finding of fact 8 to the extent they are consistent with the evidence. Covered in finding of fact 9. Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Laura P. Gaffney, Esquire 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Mark L. Klugman, O.D. 3611-49th Street North St. Petersburg, Florida 33710 Pat Guilford Executive Director Board of Optometry 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 =================================================================
The Issue The issues in this case for determination are whether Respondent James C. Dozier, M.D., committed the violations of Chapter 458, Florida Statutes (2003), as alleged in an Administrative Complaint filed by the Department of Health on October 3, 2006; and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against his license to practice medicine in Florida.
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Petitioner, the Department of Health (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility for the investigation and prosecution of complaints involving physicians licensed to practice medicine in Florida. § 20.43 and Chs. 456 and 458, Fla. Stat. Respondent, James C. Dozier, M.D., is, and was at the times material to this matter, a physician licensed to practice medicine in Florida, having been issued license number ME 47971. Dr. Dozier’s mailing address of record at all times relevant to this matter is Indian River Memorial Hospital Department of Emergency Medicine, 1000 36th Street, Vero Beach, Florida 32960. Dr. Dozier is board-certified in Emergency Medicine. Dr. Dozier has previously been subject to license discipline in Agency for Health Care Administration Case Number 93-20295. Patient D.C. On September 3, 2003, Patient D.C. was 49 years of age and obese. He was living a largely sedentary lifestyle, having suffered a work-related spinal injury several years before 2003. D.C. did not work. He was taking methadone, a powerful narcotic painkiller used for long-term, chronic pain relief, daily. As a result of his spinal injury, D.C. spent most of his time at home and did not engage in significant physical activity. On September 3, 2003, D.C. experienced an episode of hard coughing, during which he produced brown sputum. At approximately 9:15 a.m., September 4, 2003, D.C. awoke with sharp, left-sided chest and shoulder pain, and shortness of breath. The pain in his chest was excruciating and he had difficulty breathing. Consequently, his wife, S.C., telephoned 911 and requested emergency assistance at approximately 9:19 a.m. Transport of Patient D.C. to the Hospital. Emergency medical services personnel (hereinafter referred to as “EMS Personnel”), arrived at D.C.’s house at approximately 9:25 a.m., September 4, 2003. What transpired beginning with the arrival of EMS Personnel and their delivery of D.C. to Indian River Memorial Hospital (hereinafter referred to as “Memorial Hospital”), was documented in an Indian River County EMS report, Incident # 014509 (hereinafter referred to as the EMS Report). A copy of the EMS Report was admitted as Petitioner’s Exhibit 3. As alleged in the Administrative Complaint, the EMS Report indicates the following: D.C.’s lung sounds were decreased on the left side with wheezes in several fields bilaterally and during transport to the hospital there was no change in his pain, although there was a decrease in the wheezing; At 9:27 a.m. D.C.’s pulse rate was 110, respiratory rate was 24 and oxygen saturation level was 92 percent by pulse oximetry; At 9:39 a.m. D.C.’s pulse rate was 116, respiratory rate was 24, and oxygen saturation level was 97 percent after the administration of oxygen by nasal cannula. A copy of the EMS Report was not provided to Memorial Hospital until after the events relevant to this case. While the EMS Report notes that EMS Personnel “[t]ransferred care to ER nurse with report,” the nature of the “report” was not proved during the hearing of this matter. Dr. Dozier was not made aware of the contents of the EMS Report or the “report” purportedly made by EMS Personnel to the emergency room nurse. Nor did he make any effort to inquire about D.C.’s condition during the time he was in the care of EMS Personnel. While the evidence presented at hearing proved that Dr. Dozier should have made an effort to inquire about D.C.’s condition during the time he was in the care of EMS Personnel, the charges in this case are limited to Dr. Dozier’s actions after D.C.’s arrival at Memorial Hospital; there is no allegation in the Administrative Complaint relating to any failure on the part of Dr. Dozier to determine what data EMS Personnel were aware of or ultimately reported. Most importantly, while there are allegations of fact concerning what EMS Personnel determined about D.C.’s condition, the Administrative Complaint does not inform Dr. Dozier of how those facts related to his care of D.C. What was in the EMS Report is, therefore, ultimately not relevant in deciding whether the allegations of the Administrative Complaint have been proved. Counsel for the Department has accurately reported parts of the EMS Report in paragraphs 23 through 32 of Petitioner’s Proposed Recommended Order and counsel for Dr. Dozier have accurately summarized some of the information contained in the EMS Report in their proposed finding of fact 8. Those proposed findings of fact, although accurate, have not been included in this Recommended Order because they relate to information which Dr. Dozier never had at the times relevant to this case. Dr. Dozier’s Treatment of Patient D.C. EMS personnel delivered D.C. at Memorial Hospital at approximately 9:54 a.m., September 4, 2003. It was documented in the Emergency Room (hereinafter referred to as the “ER”), nurse’s notes, that D.C., upon arrival, reported that he had suffered a severe coughing spell the night before, experienced increased shortness of breath, coughed up dark brown sputum, and had felt sharp left-side chest pain. It was also documented that D.C.’s oxygen saturation was 94 percent on supplemental oxygen; he was experiencing the highest level of left-sided chest pain, pain that increased with deep breaths; he was awake, alert, and oriented; his complexion was normal in color; his pulse rate was 99 beats per minute; and his respiratory rate was 22 breaths per minute. An ER nurse noted that D.C. had a history of spinal surgery and was taking methadone. Another ER nurse saw D.C. at approximately 10:00 a.m. The nurse noted in the record that D.C. was suffering sharp pain on inspiration, his oxygen saturation had increased to 97 percent on two liters of supplemental oxygen, and that he had decreased breath sounds on the left side of his chest. One of the nurses who saw D.C. ordered blood tests, including a complete blood count, cardiac markers, a differential, and a complete metabolic panel. The blood tests were subsequently cancelled. The only documentation in D.C.’s medical records at Memorial Hospital indicates that the tests were cancelled at 10:15 a.m. with a notation “Cancelled Requested by Nurse/MD PER DR DOZIER,” although Dr. Dozier did not first see D.C. until approximately 10:15 a.m. Dr. Dozier testified at final hearing that the tests had been cancelled at D.C.’s request. There are no medical notes to substantiate this testimony. Dr. Dozier documented his care of D.C. in an “Any Complaint Template” form with a time stamp of 10:17:33 a.m. Dr. Dozier noted in the Any Complaint Template that D.C. was suffering from sharp, left-sided chest pain of several hours duration with splinting (stiffening of the body to avoid pain caused by movement) and decreased breath sounds on the left side. Dr. Dozier also documented that D.C.’s past medical history included chronic pain that was being treated by methadone. Dr. Dozier ordered a chest X-ray and an EKG. He also started D.C. on Toradol, a non-steroidal, anti-inflammatory drug used for pain relief, and Levaquin, an antibiotic. The chest X- ray and EKG were documented in the Any Complaint Template. The EKG performed on D.C. was normal. His chest X-ray was interpreted by the radiologist as normal, except that he was exhibiting poor inspiratory effort. Dr. Dozier, under “differential diagnosis,” listed pleurisy (an inflammation of the lining of the chest wall and lungs marked by chest pain that increases on inspiration) first and pneumonia (an infection of the lungs marked by a severe cough, chest pain, and fever) second. A “differential diagnosis” was explained by Dr. Murray: Differential diagnosis is when you have a patient that comes into the emergency room and he has this constellation of signs and symptoms and risk factors. You try to put it together, you make a list, here’s all the possible things that could be wrong with this guy. So that’s your differential diagnosis. What are the possibilities here with what I have to look at. So you list our differential diagnosis. Transcript, page 39, lines 22-25, and page 40, Lines 1-4. Based upon the information which Dr. Dozier had concerning D.C., while pleurisy and pneumonia were reasonably included in his differential diagnosis, he should have also considered myocardial infarction, bronchitis, and, most significantly, pulmonary embolus. Of significance in this case, is Dr. Dozier’s failure to include pulmonary embolus in his differential diagnosis. Pulmonary embolus is a condition whereby the arteries in the lungs are blocked by one or more blood clots. A pulmonary embolism usually occurs when blood clots that have formed in the veins of a person’s extremities dislodge and are transported by the blood stream to the lungs where they become trapped by smaller arteries. The formation of blood clots in the extremities is called deep vein thrombosis (hereinafter referred to as the “DVT”). When blood clots become lodged in the lungs, the lungs can be damaged or, if blood flow becomes too constricted, the person can die. Pulmonary embolisms are encountered in emergency rooms with some frequency. In determining whether a person is suffering from pulmonary embolus, the common risk factors must be considered. Those risk factors include a history of previous pulmonary embolus or DVT; immobilization (the person is confined to bed, sedentary, or has recently taken a long trip); smoking; obesity; hypercoagulablity (increased tendency of the blood to clot); and cancer. The most common signs of pulmonary embolus are chest pain, usually of sudden onset and which becomes worse with deep breathing or coughing; shortness of breath, again of a sudden nature; sweating; nausea; rapid breathing or tachypnea; increased heart rate or tachycardia; low oxygen saturation; and hemotysis or coughing up blood. Making it difficult to diagnose, a patient with a pulmonary embolism may present with various combinations of symptoms, and the symptoms are often similar to those of other ailments, such as heart attack, bronchitis, pleurisy, pneumothorax, acid reflux, dissecting thoracic anerurysm, and pneumonia. Tests which can assist a physician in the either confirming or ruling out a pulmonary embolism, include ventilation/perfusion scanning (hereinafter referred to as “V/Q Scanning”), d-dimer testing, spiral computerized axial tomography, pulmonary angiography, and Doppler ultrasound. While not all of these tests were available to Dr. Dozier, V/Q Scanning was. Pulmonary embolus should have been included in Dr. Dozier’s differential diagnosis of D.C. because D.C. arrived at the ER with a chief complaint of chest pain and, as explained by Dr. Murray because of the following: Now, what would even make [pulmonary embolus] more likely, and perhaps having to pursue a little bit more, is the type of pain that he had, which is important to tell the difference between a lot of those conditions. He had pleuritic pain. That’s the classic type of chest pain that somebody with a pulmonary embolus has as classically described as pleuritic sharp chest pain. That’s what this patient had. Then what was the onset? Was this gradual onset or sudden? P[ulmonary] E[mbolism]s are sudden onset. As far as I can tell, when it says in timing, it says symptoms for, now I can’t read that, how many that is, but he had circled hours. So I can just assume that he told Dr. Dozier that he was having these symptoms just for however many hours that stands for. So I was worried about the chest pain, the nature of the chest pain, the short duration of it, that I think it says brownish – or I’m not even – I would cough brownish sputum. I think that’s what it says, but I couldn’t say for sure under history of present illness, which would make me worry about that. Transcript, page 85, lines 3-23. D.C.’s history of acute onset shortness of breath and severe left-side pleuritic chest pain, his possible hemoptysis the night before his arrival at Memorial Hospital, and his elevated pulse and respiratory rates, all facts that were documented in the medical records for D.C. at Memorial Hospital, should have caused Dr. Dozier to include pulmonary embolus in his differential diagnosis. As a result of the fact that he did not consider pulmonary embolus as a possible ailment, Dr. Dozier failed to order tests which could have helped him to rule out pulmonary embolus or led him to conclude that D.C. was suffering from the ailment. In particular, he failed to order a V/Q scan. Ultimately, Dr. Dozier released D.C., listing as his final diagnoses pleurisy and bronchitis (inflammation of the bronchial tubes marked by painful cough and fever). Dr. Dozier prescribed Vioxx, a non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug, Levaquin, and Flexeril (a central nervous system depressant, commonly referred to as a “muscle relaxer”). Cancellation of the Blood Tests. As noted in Findings of Fact 19, blood tests ordered for D.C. were ultimately cancelled. According to Dr. Dozier, they were cancelled because D.C. refused the tests, a suggestion that was not documented by Dr. Dozier in D.C.’s medical records, despite the seriousness of a patient refusing tests which a physician prescribes. Given the significance of the consequences of such a refusal, Dr. Dozier’s testimony on this point is questionable and rejected as not convincing. Other facts also raise concerns about the credibility of Dr. Dozier’s testimony concerning the cancellation of the blood tests. For example, S.C. saw D.C. approximately an hour after his arrival at the hospital and found him quiet, pale, and looking very ill. At no time did D.C. or Dr. Dozier, whom she had spoken with, inform S.C. that D.C. had refused blood tests. It is also noted that D.C. did not refuse other tests, including the chest X-ray and EKG ordered by Dr. Dozier. Ultimately, Dr. Dozier’s explanation concerning the cancellation of the blood tests was not convincing, based upon findings made in this Recommended Order and because of the troublesome aspects of his testimony as explained in paragraph 51 of Petitioner’s Proposed Recommended Order, which is incorporated by reference. Despite this conclusion, ultimately, it was the Department’s burden to prove why the blood tests were cancelled. This the Department simply did not do. Ultimately the evidence simply proved that the tests were ultimately cancelled. Regardless of why the blood tests were cancelled, Dr. Dozier violated the standard of care, as found, infra. Instructions on Discharge. On discharge, D.C. was given the following written instructions on a pre-printed form: The doctor thinks your symptoms may be due to: PLEURISY. Keep this in mind: DIAGNOSIS WITH 100% CERTAINTY IS NOT POSSIBLE in the Emergency Department. Therefore, if you find you are not getting better, another diagnosis is possible, and you must see your doctor or return here. After you leave, you must properly care for your problem and observe its progress. If you do not improve as expected, or are worse, do one of the following. Immediately: contact your doctor or follow up doctor or call here [the ER]. Contact your doctor, call, or return here if you experience any of the following: A) high fever or chills B) difficulty breathing C) difficulty; swallowing or drooling D) pain or tightness in chest or neck E) thick green or bloody sputum F) fast pulse (more than 100 a minute at rest) G) vomiting. Your symptoms should improve within 4-6 days and should not worsen. You should be able to breathe comfortably when sitting or lying down, and should not be struggling to breathe. You should be able to eat, drink, and swallow without pain or drooling. Rest, drink plenty of fluids, and eat regular well-balanced meals. Use Acteminophen (Tylenol, etc.) for pain or fever, and take any prescribed medications. A cool-mist vaporizer may help decrease cough and discomfort. DO NOT use a hot mist vaporizer of hot steam. DO NOT smoke during your illness; smoking will delay your recovery. The forgoing instructions were consistent with Dr. Dozier’s diagnosis of pleurisy or bronchitis. Having failed to consider pulmonary embolus, the instructions were inadequate in failing to address this possible condition. The Standard of Care. The Department's expert, John V. Murray, M.D., credibly opined that Dr. Dozier failed to practice medicine in accordance with the level of care, skill, and treatment recognized in general law related to health care licensure in violation of Section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (hereinafter referred to as the "Standard of Care"), in his treatment of D.C. In particular, it was Dr. Murray’s opinion that Dr. Dozier violated the Standard of Care by failing to recognize the possibility that D.C. was experiencing a pulmonary embolism and, as a consequence, by failing to include pulmonary embolus in his differential diagnosis; and by failing to order diagnostic tests, in particular V/Q Scanning, which may have either ruled out or confirmed the existence of a pulmonary embolism. Dr. Murray’s opinions are credited and accepted. The opinions to the contrary offered by Dr. Dozier and his expert witness are rejected as not convincing and as not addressing the issues precisely enough. Too much was made of facts which were not available to Dr. Dozier at the time he made his differential diagnosis and the consequences thereof, unlike Dr. Murray, who specifically testified, when asked whether he attempted “to put yourself in Dr. Dozier’s shoes on the day these events occurred,” as follows: A. Yes, sir. I think that’s necessary. If you’re going to make a finding that was the standard of care, I think the standard of care relates to what would the prudent physician in the same circumstances on the same day do. In order to do that, you put yourself in those shoes. Say if I was there what would I do and what would be the standard of care for that, the minimum. Transcript, page 33, lines 22-25, and page 34, lines 1-3. Dr. Murray went on to explain that, although he had learned from the documents presented to him, information that Dr. Dozier did not have available while caring for D.C., he was able to limit his opinions appropriately to the time of the actual events and the information which Dr. Dozier was presented with. The opinions offered on behalf of Dr. Dozier were not so precisely limited. Medical Records. Dr. Dozier failed to document in his medical records for D.C. whether D.C. was a smoker or had recently taken any long trips, both facts which are relevant bits of information when considering pulmonary embolus. Dr. Dozier’s medical records were, therefore, inadequate in this regard. Dr. Dozier also failed to give adequate follow-up instructions for pulmonary embolus upon discharge. Dr. Dozier’s actions, however, were the result, not of his failure to include pulmonary embolus in his differential diagnosis, but in the failure to accurately diagnosis D.C.’s condition, a failure for which Dr. Dozier has not been charged. I. D.C.’s Demise. On September 6, 2003, D.C. died in his sleep. A postmortem autopsy of D.C. revealed that he died of “massive pulmonary thromboembole due to phlebothromboses of lower extremities.” It was found that D.C. had an abdominal malignancy, a significant contributing factor in the death of D.C. What role, if any, that Dr. Dozier’s failures in his treatment of D.C. contributed to D.C.’s ultimate demise was not proved.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the a final order be entered by the Board of Medicine finding that James C. Dozier, M.D., has violated Section 458.331(1)(m) and (t), Florida Statutes, as described in this Recommended Order; issuing a reprimand; imposing a fine of $10,000.00; requiring that he complete the Florida Medical Association’s “quality Medical Record Keeping for health Care Professionals” course or a Board-approved equivalent; and requiring that he complete five hours of continuing medical education in diagnosis and treatment of pulmonary embolus. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of September, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of September, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Don Freeman, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Prosecution Services Unit Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3250 Barry A. Postman, Esquire Lee Cohen, Esquire Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A. 1645 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard Second Floor West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Larry McPherson, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Josefina M. Tamayo, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Dr. Ana M. Viamonte Ros, Secretary Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
The Issue The question presented is whether Respondent violated Section 456.072(1)(bb), Florida Statutes (2006), or Section 458.331(1)(nn), Florida Statutes (2006), by means of violating Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.007(2)(b), and if so, what penalty should be imposed?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with the licensing and regulation of medical doctors pursuant to Section 20.43 and Chapters 456 and 458, Florida Statutes. At all times material to the Administrative Complaint, Respondent was a medical doctor licensed by the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 70981. Respondent is also certified by the American Board of Internal Medicine with a subspecialty in interventional cardiology. No evidence was presented to indicate that Respondent has ever been disciplined by the Florida Board of Medicine. On March 12, 2007, Dr. Elsakr was caring for two patients at Halifax Medical Center (Halifax). Patient M.D. was an 84-year-old Caucasian female born on March 22, 1922. F.E. was an 82-year-old Caucasian female born on February 5, 1925. Both women were scheduled for cardiac procedures to be performed on March 12, 2007, but only F.E. was scheduled for a cardiac catheterization. M.D. and F.E. shared the same semi-private room at Halifax. During the night before the scheduled procedures, one of the patients asked to be moved away from the window, and as a result, the two patients' bed locations were reversed. Halifax had procedures in place related to the transport of patients from one area of the hospital to another. The policy required that a staff member referred to as a transporter was required to check at least two patient identifiers on the patient's arm band to confirm a patient's identity. The arm band contains four identifiers: the patient's name, date of birth, a medical record number and a visit number. While any of the four may be used, the patient's name and date of birth are preferred. Patient M.D. was supposed to be transported for a heart catheterization the morning of March 12. However, the hospital policy regarding patient identification was not followed, and the wrong patient, M.D. as opposed to F.E., was transported to the catheterization lab (cath lab). Apparently, the transporter relied on the room and bed placement of the patient as opposed to following the protocol for affirmatively checking the patient identifiers. Once a patient was transported to the cath lab for a procedure, Halifax had a separate "pause" or "time out" protocol designed to ensure that the correct patient was present and the correct procedure was performed. The procedure was designed to be consistent with standards provided by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and the Joint Commission for Accreditation of Hospitals, and the practices used by other hospitals. After transport and before a sterile field was created, the patient would be prepared for the procedure. As part of that preparation, a nurse was supposed to verify the patient's identity and confirm with another staff member that the patient's chart was the appropriate chart. The chart would then be provided to the person referred to as the recorder located in the adjacent control room outside the sterile field. The control room is separated from the sterile field by a plexi-glass wall, through which the recorder can observe everything taking place in the cath lab. The recorder would create a chronological log of the procedure, documenting the exact time when events took place. The physician performing the procedure would not necessarily be in the cath lab at the time the nurse verified the patient's identity. The chronological log for M.D. does not indicate that the patient's identity was confirmed or if it was confirmed, who confirmed it. Once a patient was prepped and draped, and the sterile field created, the recorder would call out the patient's name, procedure, procedure equipment, site and side of the procedure to be performed. The accuracy of the information was to be confirmed by a staff member saying "yes" or nodding his or her head. This procedure was considered by the hospital to be its "time out" procedure. The physician would be present but not actually participate in the time out, and would observe the time- out taking place. In this case, although the recorder called out F.E.'s name and the procedure she was scheduled to have, M.D. was actually present. Notwithstanding this error, an unidentified staff member either nodded or verbally confirmed that the information recited by the recorder was correct. Dr. Elsakr arrived at the cath lab after the patient was prepped but before the time out called by the recorder. He was present, but did not verbally participate, in the time out process. Before it took place, he met with the recorder in the control room to review the medical chart prior to the procedure. The medical chart reviewed was for F.E. After the time out, Dr. Elsakr approached the patient and stood near her head. By this time, the patient was fully draped, with blankets and surgical drapes covering all of her body except the surgical entry area (in this case her groin) and a portion of her face. Dr. Elsakr spoke to the patient, calling her by the first name of the patient F.E., and telling her, "[F.], this is Dr. Elsakr. I'm going to get started with your heart cath. Okay?" This interaction was consistent with his standard practice before he began a procedure, in order to give patients a level of comfort. M.D. did not initially respond to the name F., but said "yes" in response to Dr. Elsakr's question. He then moved down to the groin area, again called her by name (F.E.'s first name), and told her what she would feel as he started the procedure. She nodded her head and the procedure was begun. A catheterization was completed on the right side of the heart and begun on the left side. At that point, staff reported to Dr. Elsakr that the patient was the wrong patient. The procedure was immediately stopped. Dr. Elsakr immediately informed the patient, the patient's daughter, and the patient's primary care physician. He also noted the mistake on M.D.'s medical chart. Halifax Hospital undertook an investigation of the events leading to the procedure. The purpose of its investigation was to determine whether there was a breach in hospital safety protocols and to prevent any recurrence of the error. Dr. Donald Stoner, Halifax's Chief Medical Officer, testified that the fault lay with hospital staff, and not with Dr. Elsakr, and that if he had been the doctor involved, he likely would have done the same things as Dr. Elsakr. Halifax accepted full responsibility for the incident and independently compensated the patient for the incident. The hospital also determined that it would be inappropriate for Dr. Elsakr to be subject to any discipline for the incident by Halifax with respect to his privileges. Immediately after discovering that the wrong patient had the heart cath, Dr. Elsakr instructed that the patient should not be charged in any way for the procedure. While patient M.D. clearly could have been harmed by having to undergo the procedure, information about her condition was obtained that was actually a benefit to her.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Board of Medicine enter a Final Order finding that Respondent, Ashraf Elsakr, M.D., violated Section 456.072(1)(bb), Florida Statutes, and Section 458.331(nn), Florida Statutes by means of violating Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.007(2)(b). As a penalty, it is recommended that the Board issue a letter of concern, and impose a $5,000 fine. In addition, Respondent should be required to obtain five hours in continuing medical education in the area of risk management, perform 25 hours of community service, and give a one-hour lecture on performing procedures on the wrong patient. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of June, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 2010.
