The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner has just cause to terminate the employment of Respondent as a school bus driver.
Findings Of Fact At all times material here, Petitioner employed Respondent as a school bus driver. Respondent worked in that capacity for approximately 15 years. Respondent received 40 hours of initial training and eight hours of update training each year. The training included safety procedures. One of the safety procedures was a requirement for the bus driver and/or bus aide to walk from the back to the front of the bus at the completion of each run. During the walk, the driver and/or aide were supposed to observe each seat and the floor to ensure that no children were left on the bus. Leaving a child unsupervised on a bus, intentionally or through omission, is a very serious matter. Such misconduct by a bus driver creates an unacceptable risk of harm to a child. In February 2005, Petitioner suspended Respondent without pay for ten days. Petitioner based the suspension on Respondent's failure to follow safety procedures to ensure that a child was not left unattended on a bus. In May 2008, Respondent was one of two school bus operators assigned to deliver parents and children to an adult education and parenting program known as Family Resource Activity Model for Early Education (FRAME). The program was located at the McMillian Learning Center in Pensacola, Florida. On April 14, 2008, Respondent drove a bus, including adults and children to the learning center. Upon arrival, Respondent hurried to the restroom without first inspecting the bus to insure that no children remained on the bus. After exiting the bus and utilizing the restroom inside a building, Respondent remained in a sitting area for several more minutes. While Respondent and other bus drivers discussed future school bus operations, a four-year-old child was sleeping unattended on Respondent's bus. The child's parent arrived at the school by another means of transportation. The parent immediately began to look for the young child. The parent inquired but received no response about the location of the child from Respondent. The parent continued her search in the school building. Next, Respondent decided to accompany another school bus driver for an additional run. Respondent requested Carolyn Scott, a bus aide, to go to Respondent's bus and retrieve her purse so that she could take it with her. Pursuant to Respondent's request, Ms. Scott boarded Respondent's bus and found the child asleep on the bus. Ms. Scott awakened and removed the child from the bus. The child was then placed in the proper classroom. Linda Harris, FRAME's program director, learned about the incident and reported the facts to Petitioner's Transportation Department. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Respondent left the child on the bus and failed to perform the required safety check before or after she used the restroom. Respondent was not aware the child was sleeping behind her seat when she left the bus. Respondent's testimony to the contrary is not persuasive.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a final order terminating Respondent's employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of December, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph L. Hammons, Esquire Hammons, Longoria & Whittaker, P.A. 17 West Cervantes Street Pensacola, Florida 32501-3125 Lula Williams 1604 West Scott Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 Jim Paul, Superintendent Escambia County School District 215 West Garden Street Pensacola, Florida 32502 Dr. Eric J. Smith Commissioner of Education Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Deborah K. Kearney, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue Whether Respondent has committed a discriminatory employment practice against Petitioner by virtue of Petitioner's race. (In deference to Petitioner’s preference, his race will be referred-to as "Black.")
Findings Of Fact Lenore Kimmons is an adult "White" female. She was initially hired in July 2004, in Milton, Santa Rosa County, Florida, by Laidlaw Education Services (Laidlaw) as a school bus driver. At that time, Laidlaw had the contract for driving and repairing Santa Rosa County school buses. (Stipulations 13, 14, and 15.) Effective April 1, 2005, Laidlaw and Amalgamated Transit Union (Local 1395/AFL-CIO), a mechanics’/maintenance union, entered into a collective bargaining agreement. (Stipulation 8.) This collective bargaining agreement (mechanics’ union contract) continued to be in effect when Petitioner was initially hired by Laidlaw, and by the use of executed “successor clauses,” continued in effect through the period of alleged discrimination. (Stipulation 8.) In the absence of any persuasive evidence to the contrary, the undersigned takes the “effective date” of the mechanics’ union contract to constitute its “ratification” date, as well. Petitioner is an adult “Black” male. Laidlaw initially hired him in Milton, Florida, on September 18, 2006, as a "B Mechanic.” At that time, Laidlaw still had the contract for driving and repairing Santa Rosa County school buses. (Stipulations 1, 2, 3, and 7.) Petitioner was subject to the mechanics’ union contract, beginning with his September 18, 2006, date of hire and continuing past the alleged date of discrimination in 2008. Petitioner has had extensive heavy vehicle mechanical experience since 1989. He has worked for the United States Air Force and Department of Defense in Europe, and he supervised two vehicle maintenance shops prior to being hired by Laidlaw. He holds an Associate degree in automotive technology. Upon being hired in July 2004, Ms. Kimmons had begun work as a school bus driver (Stipulation 14) and shortly thereafter began to train as a mechanic. When she began training as a mechanic, she was reclassified into a “C Mechanic” position. As a “C Mechanic,” Ms. Kimmons ceased to be subject to the bus drivers’ union’s collective bargaining agreement and became subject to the mechanics’ union contract that eventually governed Petitioner. Sometime in 2006, Ms. Kimmons began to clerk in the office, but she continued to be classified as a “C Mechanic” and continued to be subject to the mechanics’ union contract. The mechanics’ union contract makes a distinction between employees hired before its ratification on April 1, 2005, such as Ms. Kimmons, and employees hired afterwards, such as Petitioner. It does not make a distinction based upon when one became a mechanic. The mechanics’ union contract provides, in pertinent part: MAINTENANCE DEPARTMENT JOB DESCRIPTIONS/CLASSIFICATIONS ARTICLE 28 Section 1 only applies to current employees who are already employed prior to the ratification of this labor agreement. * * * “A” Mechanic – required to have a minimum of 2 years experience Is defined as maintenance employee(s) who hold a Florida State Certification for School Bus Inspections. Required to work with limited supervision. The employee should have good skills and who is capable of repairing bus and white fleet including brake inspections and repair. The employee is capable of assisting and instructing lower classification mechanics. Must have and maintain a Florida CDL including “S” endorsement. “B” Mechanic – required to have a minimum of 3 years experience Is defined as maintenance employee(s) who assist higher classification mechanics. Work with supervision when required. Assists with inspection including all necessary repairs. Must have and maintain a Florida CDL including “S” endorsement. “C” Mechanic – entry level employee(s) Is defined as maintenance employee(s) who shuttle, clean, fuel, and as otherwise directed by management. Also responsible for minor cosmetics around shop such as crush oil filters, sweep areas in need, empty trash, dip tanks, and assist mechanics if necessary with full supervision by other Management personnel. Must have and maintain a Florida CDL including “S” endorsement. * * * Section 5 As of the ratification of this AGREEMENT the job descriptions for all new hires will be as follows: * * * “A” Mechanic Is defined as a maintenance employee who holds a minimum of three (3) ASE School Bus Certifications to include at least a) Air Brake, b) Steering and Suspensions, c) Diesel Engines and a Florida State Certification for School Bus Inspections. The employee is required to have a minimum of 3 years of “medium/heavy duty” technician experience (“B” Mechanic level). The employee must have good skills, is capable of diagnosing and repairing school buses and white fleet including brake inspections and repair in a reasonable length of time, in a professional manner and be able to work with limited supervision. The employee is also capable of assisting and instructing lower classification mechanics. The employee must have and maintain a Florida Commercial Drivers License with an “S” Endorsement. “B” Mechanic Is defined as a maintenance employee who holds a minimum of two (2) ASE School Bus Certifications to include at least a) Air Brake[1] and b) any of the other six (6) ASE School Bus Certifications. The employee is required to have a minimum of 2 years of “medium/heavy duty technician experience. The employee must also have good working skills, be able to assist with any inspection and all repairs as well as work with supervision when required. The employee must have and maintain a Florida Commercial Drivers License with an “S” Endorsement. “C” Mechanic Is defined as a maintenance employee who is capable of shuttling, cleaning fueling and as otherwise directed by Management. The employee is responsible for minor cosmetics around the shop such as crush oil filters, sweep areas in need, empty trash, dip tanks and assist mechanics if necessary with supervision by other maintenance personnel. The employee must have and maintain a Florida Commercial Drivers License with an “S” Endorsement. (Emphasis supplied) At no time material has either Petitioner or Ms. Kimmons ever been a member of the mechanics’ union, but from its inception, the collective bargaining agreement between Laidlaw and the mechanics’ union applied to all mechanical employees, regardless of any employee’s union membership or lack of union membership. Petitioner has been outspoken in his refusal to join the mechanics’ union. Laidlaw was purchased by First Student, Inc., on October 1, 2007. (Stipulation 9.) Upon First Student, Inc.’s purchase of Laidlaw, Petitioner and Ms. Kimmons became employees of First Student, Inc. (Stipulation 10.) First Student, Inc., is the only Respondent in this cause. Upon First Student, Inc.’s purchase of Laidlaw, the mechanics’ union contract then in existence was carried over to bind First Student, Inc. At no time material has either Petitioner or Ms. Kimmons possessed an ASE School Bus Certification in Air Brake, an ASE School Bus Certification in Steering and Suspensions, or an ASE School Bus Certification in Diesel Engines. (Stipulations 4, 5, and 6.) Petitioner and Ms. Kimmons took the examination for the Florida State Certification for School Bus Inspections in February 2008. (Stipulations 11 and 12.) Petitioner could not demonstrate that Ms. Kimmons did not have the prerequisite number of years of experience or other qualifications to sit for the examination. Petitioner’s testimony, that in February 2008, and up to the date of hearing herein, he was Respondent's only “Black” mechanic in Mechanic Classes A, B, and C, was not refuted. In February 2008, Petitioner and Ms. Kimmons both passed the Florida State Certification for School Bus Inspections examination. At that time, both of them believed that successful completion of the examination would entitle them to be appointed as Class A mechanics, to a rise in pay grade, and to a $1.00/per hour raise in pay. (Stipulations 16, 17, and 18.) Lenore Kimmons requested an increase in pay and an increase in grade from “C Mechanic” to “B Mechanic” after she completed her Florida State Certification for School Bus Inspections. (Stipulation 16.) Petitioner requested an increase in pay and an increase in grade from “B Mechanic” to “A Mechanic,” after he completed his Florida State Certification for School Bus Inspections. (Stipulation 18.) In February 2008, Ron Kramer was the immediate supervisor of both Ms. Kimmons and Petitioner. He notified his superiors, up the line of command, that Ms. Kimmons and Petitioner had passed their February examination and that he, Mr. Kramer, believed that each of them was entitled to a rise in grade and to a commensurate raise in pay. (Stipulations 16, 17, and 18.) Approximately two months passed after the February 2008, examination, and Ms. Kimmons did not receive her requested rise in grade or raise in pay. Petitioner, likewise, did not receive any rise in grade or raise in pay. The union filed grievances on behalf of Petitioner and on behalf of Ms. Kimmons, resulting in an increase in pay and a rise to "B Mechanic" for Ms. Kimmons, but no raise and rise to “A Mechanic” for Petitioner. (Stipulations 17 and 20.) Pursuant to the union contract and Ms. Kimmons’ hire prior to its ratification, the raise/rise from Class C to Class B did not require any ASEs, but a raise/rise from Class B to Class A would have required Petitioner, who was hired after contract ratification, to have three specific ASEs that he did not possess. These ASEs were in Air Brake, Steering and Suspensions, and Diesel Engines. Ms. Kimmons had been hired in 2004, before the 2005, effective date of the collective bargaining contract for mechanics. Petitioner had been hired in 2006, after the 2005, effective date of the collective bargaining agreement for mechanics. Petitioner's rate of compensation was $12.99/hour, when his request for a raise in pay and rise in grade was denied. Had his grievance been successful, he would have received $1.00 more per each hour worked as an "A Mechanic." (Stipulation 19.) First Student, Inc., ceased all operations in Santa Rosa County, effective June 30, 2008. (Stipulation 21.) Petitioner has not been employed by First Student, Inc., since June 30, 2008. (Stipulation 22.) Most, if not all, of First Student, Inc.’s employees in Santa Rosa County, including Petitioner, were hired by Durham School Services in July 2008, at the same respective pay and grade at which they were employed by First Student, Inc., on June 30, 2008. (Stipulation 24.) Petitioner is currently employed by Durham School Services and has been so employed since July 1, 2008. (Stipulation 23.) Had Petitioner received his raise in pay and rise in grade in February 2008, under First Student, Inc., he would have continued to have received pay and all emoluments at that higher grade and rate after Durham School Services took over in July 2008.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Complaint of Discrimination and the Petition for Relief herein. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of February, 2009.
The Issue Whether just cause exists to terminate Ms. Ivey from her employment with the Pinellas County School Board.
Findings Of Fact In 2005, Ms. Ivey was hired by the School Board to work as a school bus driver (bus driver). The position of school bus driver is covered by the 2012-2015 Collective Bargaining Agreement between the School Board of Pinellas County, Florida, and SEIU/Florida Public Services Union, CTW-CLC (Collective Bargaining Agreement). One of the many requirements to operate a Pinellas County school bus is to undergo a medical/physical examination every year. Among the physical requirements, bus drivers are to maintain at least 20/40 vision in each eye (with or without corrective lenses). On Wednesday, January 23, 2013, Ms. Ivey underwent her yearly physical examination (exam). As a result of this exam, Ms. Ivey's "Work Status" was "PE on hold," meaning Ms. Ivey was not able to work as a bus driver until some corrective measures involving her eyesight were obtained. Ms. Ivey completed her morning bus routes prior to her exam on January 23. After her exam, Ms. Ivey called in sick and did not complete her afternoon school bus routes. On January 24, Ms. Ivey completed both her morning and afternoon bus routes without incident. However, she took sick leave for the remainder of January 2013 (five work days). Ms. Ivey's first day back from her sick leave was February 4, 2013. Each school bus is equipped with a global positioning system (GPS) monitoring device. Once the school bus is turned on the GPS automatically records the school bus position every 30 seconds. The GPS also records other activities that the school bus performs, e.g., when the amber caution lights are turned on or off, when the red stop lights are turned on or off, when the entrance door opens or closes, etc. Because of the cost of fuel, the School Board's policy is that no school bus idles for more than five minutes. If a bus must idle for more than five minutes, the bus driver is required to turn off the bus until it needs to move. Each school bus is required to stop at each assigned bus stop whether or not a student is present. This is to maintain the published schedule for subsequent school bus riders. Each school bus is also equipped with a two-way radio for constant communication with Petitioner's transportation dispatchers. In the event of an incident (or accident), there is an additional emergency channel for use by the dispatcher and the affected school bus driver. Prior to each school year, school bus drivers are provided training in how to handle an incident (or accident). When an incident occurs, the driver is to immediately contact the transportation dispatcher, remain at the scene of the incident, ensure the safety of the students, and cooperate fully with the investigation. The bus driver is to complete an incident report and turn it in to the transportation division before the end of the incident day. The school bus that Ms. Ivey drove on February 4, 2013, was equipped with the two-way radio and the GPS. Ms. Ivey's published/authorized school bus route (for the middle school pick-up) started at 8:15 a.m. each morning when she was to pick up her riding assistant, Courtney McClendon,3/ at 102nd Avenue and Seminole Boulevard. This stop was in a large parking lot, close to a Little Caesar's restaurant (restaurant). The second bus stop, where the first student was to be picked up, was located at 97th Street North and Lake Seminole Drive East (corner location). Without the School Board's permission or authorization, Ms. Ivey unilaterally changed her school bus route to begin with the student pick-up at the corner location. On February 4, Ms. Ivey began her middle school bus route at the corner location. According to the GPS, Ms. Ivey entered the corner location neighborhood at 8:32 a.m., and could not have been at the designated corner location bus stop at 8:18 a.m. The student rider was not at the corner location when the school bus arrived. There was no indication, via the GPS, that either the amber caution or red stop lights were activated for this stop, or that the entrance door opened or closed to allow a student to enter the bus. Ms. Ivey turned the school bus onto 97th Street and stopped at the red light at 102nd Avenue (stop light corner). As Ms. Ivey was looking left (in order to turn right), she heard a knock on the school bus door, but did not see the student. Ms. Ivey completed the right-turn onto 102nd Avenue West and then, in her right rear-view mirror noticed a student falling down. Ms. Ivey did not immediately stop the school bus, but drove to the restaurant approximately two minutes away. There, Ms. Ivey turned on her amber lights and opened the door for Ms. McClendon to board the school bus. While at the restaurant, Ms. Ivey radioed Petitioner's transportation dispatcher that she might have hit a student. Ms. Ivey left the restaurant and drove back to the corner location. Despite having a two-way radio on board the school bus and repeated attempts by the dispatcher to contact her, Ms. Ivey and the dispatcher failed to communicate again for over 45 minutes. Upon notification of the incident, the transportation dispatcher switched to the emergency frequency; however, Ms. Ivey stayed on the regular two-way radio frequency. Two transportation supervisors were immediately dispatched to investigate the incident at the restaurant, as this was the location where the incident was reported. Once they arrived, the supervisors were unable to locate the school bus, Ms. Ivey, or Ms. McClendon (the trio) at or near the restaurant. In an effort to locate the trio, the supervisors traveled to several more school bus stops, but only found students waiting for the school bus.4/ After searching for over 45 minutes, the supervisors finally located the trio at the corner location. At that time the transportation supervisors determined that the stop light corner location was where the incident actually occurred. One week after the incident, on February 11, Ms. Ivey completed and turned in the "DRIVER'S REPORT OF INCIDENT." Petitioner's field operations supervisor, Ms. Cross had to make repeated requests to Ms. Ivey to get her to turn in the report. On three separate occasions, Ms. Ivey was noticed to appear at the Office of Professional Standards to answer questions regarding the January medical issue and the February 4th incident. At the meeting on February 20, 2013, Ms. Ivey refused to answer questions about either matter. During the second meeting on February 28, shortly after the meeting began, Ms. Ivey asked to use the restroom, left the room, and never returned to complete the meeting. Although she was noticed for the third meeting to begin at 7:30 a.m. on March 4, Ms. Ivey did not arrive for that meeting until after 3:00 p.m. During this third meeting, Ms. Ivey again refused to answer questions about either matter. Ms. Ivey's employment disciplinary history with the School Board is as follows: 02/08/10 Ms. Ivey received a "Conference Summary" for failing to correct performance deficiencies; 02/18/10 Ms. Ivey received a Conference Summary" for failing to comply with board policy, state law, or appropriate contractual agreement; 10/20/11 Ms. Ivey received a "Caution" for failing to comply with board policy, state law, or the appropriate contractual agreement and misconduct; 05/23/12 Ms. Ivey received a "Reprimand" for failing to perform the duties of the position and failing to correct performance deficiencies; 12/15/12 Ms. Ivey received a "Reprimand" for failing to perform the duties of the position and failing to correct performance deficiencies; and 02/20/13 Ms. Ivey received a "Conference Summary" for failing to perform the duties of the position and failing to correct performance deficiencies. Despite repeated opportunities to provide her version of the events, Ms. Ivey declined to present her case in a manner that would warrant serious consideration.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner terminate Ms. Ivey's employment as a school bus driver as a consequence of her repeated violations of School Board Policies 4140 A.9, A.9a., A.19., A.20., A.22., and A.24. The violation of any one of these subsections, standing alone, is sufficiently severe so as to warrant Ms. Ivey's termination from employment as a school bus driver. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of August, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of August, 2013.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner began employment with Respondent as a school bus driver in December, 1975. School bus drivers are part of the bargaining unit with the International Brotherhood of Firemen and Oilers, and at all times material hereto, the collective bargaining agreement between this union and the Respondent provided that employees who had not returned to work for one year following an on the job injury could be terminated without prejudice. During 1981, Petitioner was injured on the job when he twisted his back falling off a school bus, and thereafter he was determined to be disabled, and received worker's compensation benefits. Because he felt he would never be able to return to his job as a school bus driver due to his injury, Petitioner settled his claim against Respondent resulting from his 1981 injury for a lump sum payment of $15,000. In 1983, Petitioner was released by his treating physician, and applied for reinstatement with Respondent. When Respondent did not initially reinstate him, Petitioner filed a handicap discrimination complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. Ultimately, Respondent did rehire Petitioner during 1983 as a school bus driver, but his salary was set at the beginning level without credit for his prior experience. Petitioner continued to work as a school bus driver after he was rehired in 1983, receiving excellent performance evaluations, until April, 1985, when the bus he was driving was hit by a truck that ran a red light. In attempting to get the bus under control after it was hit, Petitioner twisted and reinjured his back. He was not at fault in this accident. Thereafter, Petitioner was again determined to be disabled, and received worker's compensation benefits. One month after his second accident, Petitioner was released by his treating physician, Dr. Patrick J. Logue, and was allowed to return to work with Respondent in May, 1985. However, after attempting to drive a school bus, and perform the other duties of a driver, Petitioner decided he could not continue working. He determined he was not physically able to do his job. Thereupon, he was referred by worker's compensation to two additional physicians, Drs. Charles D. Nach and H. G. Siek, orthopedic surgeons licensed to practice in this State. Dr. Nach prepared a medical absence report after examining Petitioner on July 5, 1985, and concluded that Petitioner would be able to return to work on that date, July 5, 1985. Petitioner did not return to work, however, and began seeing Dr. Siek in August, 1985, as well as Dr. J. Baird, a physician at the Martha Stetson Health Center, on referral by the Respondent. Respondent's Rule 6Gx52-7.05, Florida Administrative Code, authorizes the examination of injured employees at this Health Center. Dr. Baird filed a report dated October 22, 1985, indicating Petitioner could return to work, but could not lift, bend, stoop, squat, pull or push. Dr. Siek concluded that Petitioner could return to work on November 5, 1985, but with no heavy lifting. On November 14, 1985, Respondent's Assistant Transportation Director, Walter Allison, prepared a detailed description of duties a school bus driver must perform, and requested that Petitioner allow his treating physician to review this description, and provide written verification of the fact that he could, in fact, perform these duties. The parties took, and introduced in evidence, the deposition of Dr. Siek wherein Dr. Siek testified that he had reviewed Allison's letter with Petitioner on November 18, 1985, and determined that he "didn't find that these prerequisites are too strenuous if he (Petitioner) felt they were within his capabilities." There is no evidence in the record, however, that Dr. Siek's conclusion on November 18 was ever conveyed to Walter Allison or any other representative of Respondent. In late November, 1985, Petition was referred to a "work hardening" program administered by Physical Capacities, Inc. This program is used by Respondent and other employers to prepare employees who have been off the job for some time for the physical demands of their jobs, and to avoid aggravating their conditions while increasing mobility and strength. It consists of a physical assessment, training and work simulation exercises. However, after only two days in the work hardening program, Petitioner quit the program, and refused to return. He felt the exercises were aggravating his condition. Thereafter, Petitioner resumed seeing Dr. Siek, and in April, 1986, Dr. Siek concluded that Petitioner could return to work, with light duty. However, Petitioner never insured that Dr. Siek provide Respondent with a response to Walter Allison's letter of November 14, 1985, which had clearly stated that once written verifications were received from Dr. Siek and Dr. Baird that Petitioner could perform the duties of a school bus driver, he would be permitted to return to work. Petitioner completed and filed Statements of Continuing Disability from January through June, 1986, on which he indicated he was unable to return to work due to his back and hip condition. In August, 1986, Petitioner began employment with the Upper Pinellas Association for Retarded Citizens (UPARC) as a bus driver, and has been continuously employed with UPARC to the present. On December 5, 1986, Petitioner and Respondent executed a Stipulation and Joint Petition for Lump Sum Payment of his worker's compensation claim arising from the April, 1985 accident. Under the terms of this agreement, Respondent released a lien which it had against Petitioner's recovery against the driver of the truck which hit the school bus. The lien was in the amount of $21,845.71, resulting from worker's compensation benefits paid by Respondent to Petitioner, which Respondent could have collected against the $40,000 recovery Petitioner received from the tortfeasor. The parties also stipulated that maximum medical improvement was reached on April 14, 1986. The Stipulation and Agreement was approved by the Deputy Commissioner for worker's compensation. On January 16, 1987, Petitioner filed a complaint of discrimination against Respondent alleging that since April, 1986, he had been denied reemployment by the Respondent due to retaliation for his filing of an earlier complaint of handicap discrimination in 1983. After investigation, the Executive Director of the Commission made a determination of "no cause" concerning Petitioner's complaint, and Petitioner timely filed a Petition for Relief, resulting in this hearing.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that Petitioner's charge of discrimination against Respondent be DISMISSED. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of March 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of March, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-5285 The Petitioner did not file a Proposed Recommended Order with Proposed Findings of Fact. Rulings on the Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 2-3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. 4-5. Rejected as unnecessary. 6-7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 8-9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. 10-12. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. 14-15. Rejected in Finding of Fact 5. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. 18-20. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. 21. Rejected as simply a summation of testimony. 22-24. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. 25. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. 26-27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. 30-31. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted and Rejected in part in Finding of Fact 8. Rejected as unnecessary. 34-35. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Rejected as irrelevant and not based on competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. 38-49. Rejected as irrelevant, unnecessary and not based on competent substantial evidence. Adopted and Rejected in part in Finding of Fact 12. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6, but otherwise rejected as a conclusion of law. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted and Rejected in part in Findings of Fact 10, 11. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Gary Moore, Esquire Gulf Coast Legal Services, Inc. 6 South Ft. Harrison Avenue Second Floor Clearwater, Florida 34616 Bruce P. Taylor, Esquire Post Office Box 4688 Clearwater, Florida 34618 Scott N. Rose, Ed.D. Superintendent Post Office Box 4688 Clearwater, Florida 34618 Margaret Agerton, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925
The Issue Whether respondent is guilty of the acts charged in the specific notice of charges dated September 11, 1990, and, if so, whether petitioner should discharge him from his job as a school bus driver or take other disciplinary action?
Findings Of Fact After orientation and instruction beginning with his employment as a school bus driver trainee in September of 1987, respondent "was given [his] first bus" (T.383) on December 9, 1987. Formerly a truck driver, he became a permanent or non-probationary school bus driver in March of 1988. 1987-1988 After respondent drove his first route, No. 131, for two days, a supervisor shifted him to route No. 94, telling him "what a troubled bus it was." T.386. The supervisor told him the middle school students had already had plenty of warnings and exhorted him, "'Quit warning them. Write them up.'" Id. The rest of the 1987-1988 school year, respondent drove route No. 94, which entailed two separate runs, one for kindergarteners and one for middle schoolers. On the middle school run, "90 percent of the children wouldn't mind at all." T.392. The first of March or the end of February of 1988 (T.64), respondent Henderson told Rosalyn Brown, at the time the only black student on the bus, "to sit [her] black ass down in the seat." T.269. On other occasions, he told students to "[s]hut the hell up," (T.270) and said, "I won't put up with this bullshit." Id. He used the word "[f]uck . . . sometimes." T.256. Petitioner's official school board policies, a copy of which respondent received at or about the time he began work, state: Drivers shall at all times set good examples for the students riding their buses. Do not do on your bus that which students are not permitted to do. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, No. 6.44.9. Hernando County School Bus Rules, Instructions for Pupils Riding Buses provides, "Pupils must not use any abusive or profane language to other pupils, the driver, or pedestrians." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4, No. 10(b). On May 23, 1988, middle school girls were seated on the right hand side of the bus and boys on the left, as usual. As the bus, with respondent at the wheel, passed prisoners at work on a shoulder of the road, "the girls started leaning out the window hollering." (T.396) Mr. Henderson had hardly told them to close their windows when, while waiting for a traffic light to change, a "car pulled up beside [him, and the driver] complained that the boys w[ere] throwing paper out the windows at the back," (T.397) so he "informed the boys to close their windows," (id.) too. When, windows closed (except for respondent's), the bus began to resound with the sound of "stomping . . . feet" (T.397), Mr. Henderson pulled the bus over and parked by the side of the road. Unable to restore order, he drove the bus back to middle school. There respondent allowed the students to lower their windows, and the "duty teacher" urged them to behave. To respondent, the duty teacher said "if they didn't quiet down, take them on into Brooksville," (T.398) to the bus barn. Because the students were still unruly five minutes later, respondent drove them from the school to the transportation compound, where a mechanic boarded the bus to help maintain order, while respondent drove the children home. No violation of school board policy on Mr. Henderson's part was proven, in connection with the events of May 23, 1988. Limbs protruding and various missiles leaving through open windows justified his directing that the windows be closed. The radio in respondent's bus at the time was not in working order. Petitioner's official policies require that each "bus driver shall be responsible for being familiar with all state and local laws and regulations in regard to safety and see that these are properly carried out." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, 6.44.4. At stop signs, respondent would "slow down, but he wouldn't come to a complete stop" (T.271) every time. When he failed to come to a complete stop, "the students would always yell at him about it." T.277. 1988-1989 Respondent resumed driving route No. 94 when school started in the fall of 1988. One day the first week back two fights broke out before the bus left middle school, and the new principal had to intervene. Later in the week, Joan Gear, petitioner's transportation coordinator told Mr. Henderson, "'Ray, we're going to prove a point to this principal. I want you to take another bus for a while.'" T.402 (Discipline problems persisted under respondent's successor on bus No. 94.) Mr. Henderson began the second week of the new school year driving route No. 108. After a week on route No. 108, he was transferred, without explanation, to route No. 73, one of the routes he had been on as a trainee and a less remunerative assignment than either No. 94 or No. 108. Only after the first Monday morning's run did he receive the No. 73 route report or route sheet, which listed twelve regularly scheduled stops. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 12B. The tenth morning stop was listed as "White House on Right," Petitioner's Exhibit No. 12B, on Ft. Dade Street. The white house meant stands north of Ft. Dade and slightly east of Little People's Day Care, which is on the south side of the street. Brandy Huntley, a niece of the day care center's proprietress, and two other middle schoolers were picked up mornings directly across the street from the white house, at the end of the day care center driveway. The first afternoon he drove, respondent stopped directly in front of the white house, and Brandy and the other middle schoolers disembarked there. But two afternoons that week (not in succession) he failed to stop in front of the white house (or across the street from Little People's Day Care.) Instead he stopped after turning left at the next intersection. Respondent's claim that a ditch made it necessary to stop in the middle of the road, if the bus stopped in front of the white house or across from the nursery afternoons, went unrebutted; but letting children out around the corner created other hazards. Nor was the spot respondent chose a "regularly scheduled stop" for any student. School board policy provides that "[a] driver shall not let any student off the bus at other than the student's regularly scheduled stop, unless permission has been given in writing by the child's parent." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, 6.44.18. No such permission had been given here. Under school board policy, bus drivers may never let students off between regularly scheduled stops. After a discussion about where to stop on Ft. Dade Street in the afternoons and before his first week on route No. 73 was out, respondent took a leave of absence through November 22, 1988. Once the leave was over, petitioner's initial refusal to put him back to work resulted in respondent's filing an unfair labor practice charge. On January 18, 1989, he returned to work. For the remainder of the school year, he drove route No. 75, without incident. Two Minutes Time allotted for regular routes includes a half hour for cleaning and paper work, but drivers on field trips are paid based on the time actually required to do the job. On July 18, 1989, Mr. Henderson drove on a field trip. Ordinarily, a field trip driver completes and submits a form showing how long he has worked, only after making the trip and cleaning the bus. Petitioner's Exhibits Nos. 11 and 13; T. 423. Rain made for an early end to the field trip. At five minutes after noon on the 18th, Mr. Henderson set out for the restroom in the transportation compound offices. He took with him a form on which he had written 12:30, his estimate of when he would finish cleaning the bus. Leaving the form on Miss Looper's desk, he returned to the bus and began cleaning. After he had cleaned the bus, he returned to the compound office, which he reached at 12:28. Petitioner's Exhibits Nos. 11, 13, T. 423. When Ms. Gear asked him to substitute 12:28 for 12:30 on the form, he responded, "Joan, if you want the time changed, change it." (T.424) When she said, "I won't pay you if you don't change it," Id., he replied, "Don't pay me." Id. A month later, the unaltered form was processed and respondent was paid. Whether two minutes made any difference in his compensation for the field trip the evidence did not show. 1989-1990 When the next school year began, Mr. Henderson drove route No. 200. One October afternoon after students had boarded, Mr. Henderson prepared to pull away from the high school. Before moving forward, the bus rolled back a few inches into the bus driven by Jose Santiago. Without respondent's knowing, a tail light lens struck (without damaging) a mirror on Santiago's bus, leaving a hole in the lens two inches across. T. 287-291, 376, 429. Accidents of this kind are not uncommon. To prevent students' walking in front of buses, the drivers park them tightly one behind another before school lets out. T. 287-291, 342, 376, 377, 426, 530. By the time Mr. Santiago finished his route and reached the transportation compound, Mr. Henderson had already left. Mr. Santiago reported the accident to the office staff and to one of the mechanics, who brought the bus respondent had driven to the garage to replace the lens. But Mark Tallent told the mechanic to return the bus unrepaired to its regular parking place, setting a "trap" he had never set for any other driver. T. 24, 58, 59, 288, 378. Bus drivers are required to perform a "pre-trip inspection" of their buses, and make records of the inspections by completing forms. Petitioner requires that all exterior lights be checked. The next morning respondent indicated that everything was in working order on his pre-trip inspection form. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7; T. 39. Ken Schill, petitioner's safety officer, followed respondent's bus in another vehicle and pulled him over. Together they inspected the broken lens. Petitioner suspended Henderson for three days and required him to take eight hours of in-service training, on account of the inspection form's inaccuracy. T. 40-41, 95-96, 428-429. In January or February, Mr. Henderson's bus was following bus No. 149 on a dusty rock or gravel road. After bus No. 149 made a newly scheduled stop, Mr. Henderson braked suddenly and steered his bus to the left to avoid hitting bus No. 149. By the time he came to a stop, the buses overlapped. T. 454, 498, 502. On the afternoon of February 28, 1990, Mr. Henderson had driven the school bus to the crest of a hill on Weatherley Road, when state trooper Lee Frye, who was sitting in his car at the bottom of (the other side of) the hill "clocked Mr. Henderson speeding." T.151. He was exceeding the 35-mile-per hour speed limit by at least ten miles per hour, although he told the trooper the speedometer had not indicated this. T. 151, 157, 430-433; Respondent's Exhibit No. 7A. Trooper Frye did not give Mr. Henderson a citation, but he told the Board's transportation department that the bus was going 52 miles per hour. Although not consistently enforced, school Board Policy 6.44(23) states: "Any bus driver guilty of a traffic violation involving a school bus will be dismissed." After Mr. Tallent checked Henderson's speedometer, he recommended and the School Board approved a suspension of ten days plus fifteen hours' retraining on account of this incident. T. 44-45, 151-157, 430-436. One afternoon on Willow Street respondent veered to avoid a car and knocked over at least two empty, lidless, rubber trashcans standing approximately one foot from the right edge of the road. When, back at the compound, Mr. Henderson told Mark Tallent about the accident, Mr. Tallent said to forget about it. T. 437-444, 496. On another afternoon, Scott Robinson, a student who had just gotten off bus No. 200, was approximately 6 or 7 feet in front of the bus when he heard the engine revving. Although Scott did not see the bus move forward, he was frightened, and the bus in fact "jerked." T. 133-148. The next morning, Mr. Henderson inquired "You really didn't think I was going to hit you, did you?" T.134. Another time the bus lurched forward while Kathy Black "was still in front of the bus" (T.252) "and about hit her." Id. Tom Ferris complained that Henderson almost hit another bus. Cathy Smith, a parent of a student on route No. 200 filed a complaint on April 30, 1990, claiming that he failed to stop for her daughter at her regularly scheduled stop. On May 3, 1990, petitioner received a three-page list of 21 complaints against Mr. Henderson, accompanied by a petition with 20 names on it, both written by Kim Lowe, a student on route No. 200 whom respondent had frequently disciplined. On May 4, 1990, another parent, Mr. Burris, complained to Mr. Tallent that he had observed respondent speeding and driving recklessly. T. 46-51, Petitioner's Exhibit 8. Earlier during the 1989-90 school year, petitioner's Department of Transportation had received still other complaints about Mr. Henderson. On May 3 or 4, 1990, without offering any explanation, Mr. Tallent told respondent he need no longer report for work. He did not tell Mr. Henderson of the complaints Ms. Smith and Messers. Burris and Ferris had made or give him an opportunity to refute their allegations prior to the filing of formal charges.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That petitioner dismiss respondent as a school bus driver. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of September, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of August, 1991. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18 through 45, 47, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 63, 66, 67 and 68 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 6, the school year was 1987-1988. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 7, the complaint included the words "god damn." With respect to petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 16 and 17, the evidence showed things were being thrown out of the bus. With respect to petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 46, 48, 49 and 50, it was not proven that other drivers reported every accident, however minor, or did so before leaving the scene, and respondent did report hitting the trashcans. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 64 refers to a complaint that was not proven at hearing. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 65 is not supported by citation to the record. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 69, the evidence did not show what she thought other than that she was "stunned looking." Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1 through 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37 and 39 through 44 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 7 is a proposed conclusion of law. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 12, she testified she was the only black. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 17, a "duty teacher" boarded the bus and spoke to the children. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 24, the morning stop was across the street from the white house. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 31, students calling out alerted him the buses had collided. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 38, the policy has not been enforced consistently. COPIES FURNISHED: John T. Jaszczak, Esquire Hogg, Allen, North & Blue, P.A. Hyde Park Plaza, Suite 350 324 S. Hyde Park Avenue Tampa, FL 33606 Sally C. Gertz, Esquire 118 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1700 Dr. Daniel L. McIntyre, Superintendent Hernando County School Board 919 U.S. 41 North Brooksville, FL 34601
Findings Of Fact The School Board of Pasco County ("Respondent") is an "employer" for purposes of the Florida Human Rights Act of 1977 ("Act"). At all times material to this case, the Respondent has had a nondiscrimination policy and a policy prohibiting sexual harassment in effect. The policies are provided to all employees, including the Petitioner, upon hiring, and are posted throughout the workplace. Denise E. Hoedt ("Petitioner") at all times material to this case was a bus driver employed by the Respondent. As of the date of the hearing, the Petitioner was on worker's compensation leave. There is no evidence that the worker's compensation leave is related to the allegations at issue in this case. When the Petitioner was initially employed by the Respondent she was assigned to a regular bus route and was stationed in the "Northwest Garage" unit of the Respondent's transportation system. After having been employed for a sufficient period of time, she was provided with a contractual right to choose her route. She chose to transport exceptional education (ESE) students. As an ESE driver, the Petitioner's immediate supervisor was Jacqueline Dennis. Ms. Dennis did not work in the same garage from which the Petitioner was based. The Petitioner has been involved in a continuing series of grievances against Mr. Valentine Gallas, a "Route Specialist" for the Respondent. The grievances, filed prior to the complaint to the Florida Commission on Human Relations at issue in this proceeding, have been directed towards her discontent with work assigned to her by Mr. Gallas. Although Mr. Gallas was not the Petitioner's immediate supervisor, as a Route Specialist located in the Northwest Garage, he had supervisory authority over the Petitioner, as did Joanne Snodgrass, another Route Specialist in the same facility. One of the prior grievances was directed towards his request that she assume responsibility for opening a large metal gate at the entrance of the bus storage compound. The complaint was resolved by an agreement that she would not be asked to open the gate. Upon being requested by a different official to drive a later route and take responsibility to close the gate, the Petitioner complied with the request. Although she did not continue to drive the later route, there is no evidence that her decision was related to the request regarding gate closure. Another grievance centered on Mr. Gallas' directive that she drive a second bus run after she had completed her initial run. Mr. Gallas apparently did not provide the Petitioner with an opportunity to use the rest room prior to the second run. The Petitioner filed a grievance about the matter which was resolved by an agreement that, prior to being asked to take an additional route, she would be provided with a rest room break. The Petitioner asserted that because Mr. Gallas assigned her to a bus with a poor driver's seat, her back was injured. There is no credible evidence to establish that the seat caused or contributed to the claimed back injury. The Petitioner suggested that the clock in the bus driver's lounge was tampered with and resulted in her being reprimanded for tardiness. There is no credible evidence that the clock was intentionally tampered with to cause the Petitioner to be reprimanded. There is no evidence that any of the prior disputes between the Petitioner and Mr. Gallas were related to the Petitioner's gender or national origin, or were a form of sexual harassment of the Petitioner. When the Petitioner was driving a regular bus route, Mr. Gallas was responsible for her work assignments. When she began to drive an ESE route, she was no longer directly responsible to Mr. Gallas. In January 1993, the Petitioner, via a union representative, contacted school board officials and voiced her dissatisfaction with Mr. Gallas' alleged behavior. Late in January 1993, the Petitioner, accompanied by the union representative, met in an interview with the school board's personnel investigator. At the interview, the Petitioner stated that she believed she had been discriminated against on account of her gender and ethnic origin, and that she had been subjected to sexual harassment by Mr. Gallas. During the interview, the investigator attempted to obtain allegations of specific conduct, but other than as stated herein, the Petitioner was unable to offer such allegations. Although during the interview, the Petitioner alleged that Mr. Gallas had made derogatory comments regarding her ethnic origin and her weight, the only specific incident of which the Petitioner spoke was Mr. Gallas' alleged remark to her, "Oh, a Cuban." She offered no context for the remark. There was no specific remark regarding weight disclosed during the interview. The Petitioner also alleged that subsequent to Mr. Gallas' purchase of beverages for a group of bus drivers, he had repeatedly said she "owed him one" in a manner which the Petitioner interpreted as sexual. The remark continued until such time as the Petitioner purchased a beverage for Mr. Gallas. Further, the Petitioner alleged that in November 1992, Mr. Gallas came into the bus drivers' lounge and handed her an offensive written statement regarding intercourse which she interpreted as a request for sex. The investigator inquired as to whether Mr. Gallas had touched the Petitioner. She replied he had not. There was no mention of any other alleged inappropriate activity by Mr. Gallas towards the Petitioner. At the conclusion of the interview, the investigator expressed her concern about the serious nature of the charges. She assured the Petitioner that there would be no retaliation for the report of the complaints. She noted that the findings of the investigation would be confidential and requested that the Petitioner refrain from discussing the allegations pending the investigation. The investigator began her inquiry the day after meeting with the Petitioner. A meeting was scheduled with Mr. Gallas and with other persons who were aware of Mr. Gallas and the operation of the Northwest Garage. As to the investigator's request that the Respondent refrain from discussing the matter, the Petitioner failed to comply with this request. The matter became fodder for discussion in the workplace. A petition was initiated by several employees on Mr. Gallas' behalf. The Petitioner attempted to initiate her own petition drive without success. The matter was viewed by some coworkers as an attempt by the Petitioner to have Mr. Gallas' employment terminated. The investigator for the Respondent viewed the Petitioner's allegations with skepticism due to the "vagueness" of the specifics. The failure of the Petitioner to comply with the request to keep the matter confidential during the investigation did little to alleviate the investigator's initial concerns about the Petitioner's credibility. Despite the continuing controversy, the school board attempted to complete its investigation of the matters about which the Petitioner had complained. In an interview with the investigator, Mr. Gallas denied the charges. He stated that the remark regarding her origin occurred in the context of a discussion between the Petitioner and another driver overheard by Mr. Gallas, at which time the remark was made. He denied making any reference to her weight. Although acknowledging that he had seen the "intercourse" card in the garage, he denied having handed it to her. He denied any sexual intent in the "owe me one" remark. Other interviews were conducted with other persons who are knowledgeable about the operations of the Northwest Garage and Mr. Gallas' employment there. The investigator was unable to substantiate the allegations. Based on a review of the Petitioner's interview and allegations, Mr. Gallas' denial, and the inability to find further substantiation for the complaints, the investigator determined that there was no reasonable cause to believe that the complaints were credible. After the investigation and determination were completed, there was a time delay in providing notification of the determination to the Petitioner. The evidence establishes that the delay was not an attempt to deprive the Petitioner of any contractual or legal right but was due to nothing more than clerical error on the part of the personnel investigator. There is no evidence that there was any harm to the Petitioner related to the delay. In May 1993, the Petitioner filed the complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) which is at issue in this proceeding. As identified in the FCHR complaint, the Petitioner's allegations are addressed as follows: The November 1992 "intercourse" card incident-- The Petitioner asserts that in November 1992, as she was seated with two other bus drivers in the driver's lounge, Mr. Gallas entered the lounge, walked to the table where the Petitioner and her coworkers sat, and handed a card titled "intercourse" to the Petitioner. The card was an offensive attempt at humor and included a sexual invitation. Of the two coworkers at the table, only one saw the card. The Petitioner refused to permit the other coworker to see the card. All of the women testified at the hearing. Although the Respondent presented the investigator's recollection of Mr. Gallas' denial of the incident, Mr. Gallas was not called by either party to testify at the hearing. The testimony of the two drivers who were at the table when the incident occurred and who testified at the hearing substantiates the Petitioner's allegation. There is no credible evidence that prior to her January 1993 complaint about the incident, the Petitioner discussed the matter with any other person. The evidence fails to establish that Mr. Gallas' behavior regarding the "intercourse" card incident, although offensive and inappropriate, caused the Petitioner difficulty in performing her job duties or any other harm or injury. Offensive touching of the Petitioner by Mr. Gallas-- The Petitioner asserts that Mr. Gallas occasionally would stand too close to her and that on one occasion, he brushed against her breasts in passing her. There is no evidence that, prior to the filing of the FCHR complaint, the Petitioner had ever complained about unwarranted or offensive touching by Mr. Gallas. Upon direct inquiry by the school board's personnel investigator, the Petitioner denied that she had been touched by Mr. Gallas. The assertion is not supported by credible evidence. Mr. Gallas' sexual requests of the Petitioner-- There is no credible evidence that Mr. Gallas made any verbal sexual requests of the Petitioner. The only incident which may be viewed as a sexual invitation relates to the "intercourse" card addressed previously in this Recommended Order. The Petitioner "owed" Mr. Gallas-- The evidence establishes that at a luncheon attended by coworkers, Mr. Gallas purchased beverages for the group and made a statement to the effect that the recipients "owed him one." Mr. Gallas would occasionally repeat his "you owe me one" statement to the Petitioner. There is no evidence that the statement was made in a sexual manner or that such was intended by Mr. Gallas. Eventually, the Petitioner purchased a beverage for Mr. Gallas, stating "now I don't owe you one." After being bought a drink, Mr. Gallas no longer made the remark. Verbal slurs about the Petitioner's national origin-- The Petitioner is of Mexican, Spanish and Cuban origin. The Petitioner asserts that on one occasion, she became embroiled in an argument with Mr. Gallas during which he remarked, "Oh, You're nothing but a Cuban." There is no other evidence to support her assertion. The evidence is insufficient to establish that Mr. Gallas made such remarks to other employees or that such conversation was typical of him. The assertion is not credible. Terms and conditions of her employment-- The Petitioner asserts that the "terms and conditions' of her employment were different from other bus drivers with responsibilities similar to hers. The evidence fails to support the assertion. Drivers transporting ESE students generally have fewer students to transport than drivers of regular routes. It is possible that an ESE driver may transport only one or two children. ESE drivers often complete their routes before drivers of regular routes. Because the Petitioner was responsible for transportation of ESE students, her route was often completed earlier than other bus drivers. ESE drivers who have completed their routes may "stay on the clock" in which case they may be asked to provide assistance in clerical tasks or to complete other bus routes. In the alternative, drivers may "punch out" and leave. Additional work is assigned to drivers by the Route Specialist in the garage from which the drivers are based. Mr. Gallas was the Route Specialist in the garage from which the Petitioner was based. The Petitioner frequently remained on the clock and was accordingly assigned additional work to do. There is no evidence that any drivers who remained "on the clock" were treated any differently that was the Petitioner. On one afternoon, the Petitioner, suffering from back pain, returned from her route and laid down in her bus. Mr. Gallas came onto the vehicle and told her that she needed to be working. He suggested that she could be made to sweep the bus compound if she did not find other duties to complete. The evidence fails to establish that the Petitioner, who was on the payroll at the time she was resting in her bus, informed Mr. Gallas that she was not feeling well. The evidence fails to establish that Mr. Gallas' actions upon discovering the Petitioner at rest in her bus were related to her gender, national origin, or were a form of sexual harassment. There is no evidence that other drivers were permitted, while on duty, to rest in their busses. As previously addressed, on one occasion, Mr. Gallas directed the Petitioner, immediately upon her return from her normal bus run, to perform additional transportation duties. Mr. Gallas did not provide the Petitioner with an opportunity to use the rest room before beginning her second run. Subsequent to her complaint to appropriate authorities, Mr. Gallas was directed to permit the Petitioner to use the rest room before assigning additional responsibilities to her. Although Mr. Gallas' lack of concern about the Petitioner's personal needs was inconsiderate, the evidence fails to establish that the incident was related to gender, national origin, or were a form of sexual harassment. The Petitioner also asserts that other drivers or their spouses are permitted to bring personal vehicles into the bus compound and that she was not. The evidence fails to establish that other drivers or their spouses are routinely permitted to bring personal vehicles into the compound. The Petitioner complained that during a heavy storm one day, her husband came into the compound to pick her up and was asked to take his vehicle back outside the compound. On that day, Mr. Gallas offered to walk the Petitioner with an umbrella to her car but she declined. The Respondent's inquiry into the January 1993 grievance-- The Petitioner asserts that the school board's inquiry into her January 1993 grievance was incomplete and that the determination that the grievance was unfounded was inappropriate. The evidence fails to support the assertion. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that the Petitioner's complaints, as they were communicated to the school board, were as fully investigated as was possible. The Petitioner's complaints to the Board did not include allegations related to unwarranted touching, according such allegations were not investigated. Further, the investigation was hampered by the spread of rumor and innuendo throughout the workplace regarding the Petitioner's sexual harassment allegations. Although the evidence is not entirely clear as to where responsibility lies for the generation of the rumor and internal bickering, school board personnel involved in the investigation specifically directed the Petitioner to refrain from discussing the allegations pending the board's investigation. As previously stated, she failed to comply with this request. Coworkers of the Petitioner were also involved in discussion about the pending investigation. At that point, the workplace appears to have become divided into factions and the board's investigation was compromised. The evidence establishes that the board's investigation of the Petitioner's grievance was conducted appropriately and that persons with direct knowledge related to the allegations (including Mr. Gallas who was inexplicably not called by either party to testify at the hearing) were contacted and interviewed. Although the investigation became compromised and was completed prematurely, there is no evidence that based on the information obtained by board personnel, the board's determination that the grievance was unfounded was outside the authority of the board or unsupported by the information which the board had obtained The Petitioner seeks to be "reimbursed for all the pain and suffering I have endured...." The evidence fails to establish that such an award is appropriate. The Petitioner offered no evidence related to "pain and suffering" or which would establish that such injury, if present, is related to employment conditions. The Petitioner also seeks to be reimbursed "for any and all money which was used to seek legal consultation." There is no evidence that the Petitioner, who has represented herself throughout this proceeding, has incurred any expenses related to legal consultation regarding this complaint; therefore such an award is not appropriate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the complaint filed in this case. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 9th of June, 1994 in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of June, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-6652 The following constitute rulings on proposed findings of facts submitted by the parties. Petitioner The Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: Rejected, subordinate. Rejected, not supported by the greater weight of credible and persuasive evidence. Rejected, immaterial. Rejected, not supported by the greater weight of credible and persuasive evidence. Proposed finding of fact paragraph six continues for approximately seven pages and consists largely of recitation of conflicting testimony. The testimony has been reconciled as indicated in this Recommended Order. The proposed finding is rejected as subordinate, unnecessary, immaterial and not supported by the greater weight of credible and persuasive evidence. Rejected, not supported by the greater weight of credible and persuasive evidence. 8-9. Rejected, subordinate. 10-16. Rejected, unnecessary. This unnumbered proposed finding consists of "examples of inappropriate sexual behavior" by Mr. Gallas and is treated as follows: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of credible and persuasive testimony: a. Rejected as irrelevant: c, b, e. Rejected as immaterial: d, f, g, h. This proposed finding consists of "examples of inappropriate sexual behavior involving Mr. Valentine Gallas and Ms. Denise Hoedt" and is treated as follows: Rejected, there is no credible evidence that the offer of an umbrella was "inappropriate sexual behavior b, k. Rejected, immaterial l, m, n, o. Accepted as modified. Remainder is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of credible and persuasive evidence. Rejected as not supported by greater weight of credible and persuasive evidence: a, g. Rejected, subordinate: d, h, i. Rejected, irrelevant: f. Rejected, not supported by the greater weight of credible and persuasive evidence. There is no credible evidence that the Petitioner or her husband have been subjected to restrictions regarding personal cars within the bus compound which are not generally applicable to all drivers, except when specific circumstances require otherwise. Respondent The Respondent's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: Rejected as to Pyles' attendance at meeting, unnecessary. Rejected as to note taking by the investigator, unnecessary. 12-13. Rejected, unnecessary. 16-18. Rejected, subordinate. 23-33. Rejected, subordinate, unnecessary. 34. Rejected as to ulterior motives of Petitioner, unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas E. Weightman, Superintendent Pasco County School System 7227 Land O' Lakes Blvd. Land O' Lakes, Florida 34639-2805 Denise E. Hoedt 11605 U. S. Highway 41 Spring Hill, Florida 34610 Mark Graves, Esquire 205 Brush Street Post Office Box 1427 Tampa, Florida 33601 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4113
Findings Of Fact Exception No. 1 - That portion of Findings of Fact No. 15, which finds that "(t)he Division has consistently denied Petitioners the right to purchase their service with the Pawley companies", is clearly erroneous and not substantiated by the evidence of record. Petitioners are correct in that the Division has advised them by letter (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, #17B) that they were able to buy their prior service with Pawley at full actuarial cost. However, that was not an issue nor the subject of this proceeding, and the finding of fact must be considered in the context of the ultimate issue in this case, that being whether or not the Petitioners were entitled to purchase their prior service at the reduced rates provided in Section 121.081(1)(g), Florida Statutes. ,with respect to that issue, the Division has consistently denied Petitioners the right to purchase their prior service. The Report of Proceedings of the Dade County Independent Review Panel (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, #10) contains a similar statement. That statement appears to be based on statements of Mr. Stone and Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, #17B, above. The Report of Proceedings is hearsay and duplicates the facts and exhibits presented at the hearing. In the context of the issue in this case, the Proposed Finding of Fact No. 15 is correct, and Petitioners' exception is rejected being without factual basis in the record. Exception No. 2 - That portion of Findings of Fact No. 17, which finds that "the IRP de- termined what the "Cut-Off" date of March 27, 1962, was a "reasonable decision" to end the "period of solicitation", is irrelevant and immaterial, unless it is considered together with whether the Petitioners were given ade- cuate notice of that "reasonable decision". Petitioners claim that the above finding is irrelevant and immaterial unless considered together with the "issue" of adequate notice. The only question the Division may consider is whether or not the finding of fact was based on competent substantial evidence in the record. Since there is no evidence in record to contradict the proposed finding of fact, it is the only finding that the Hearing Officer or the Division could have reached. It is based on competent, substantial evidence in the record. The proposed finding of fact was made based on the finding of the Independent Review Panel in its Report of Proceedings. Petitioners accepted the report of the Panel and placed the Report into evidence at the hearing. They are not attempting a collateral attack on the report. Such an attack should not be a-lowed In the absence of good and sufficient reason. The question of relevancy and materiality raised by Petitioners is an appropriate objection at the time the evidence is introduced at the hearing but is inappropriate in attacking a finding of fact In a recommended order. Petitioners' objection is rejected. Exception No. 3 - That portion of Findings of Faction 20 which finds that "(i)t is under- standable that Dade County gassed a resolution simply supporting Petitioners in their claims, rather than placing Petitioners in their claims situation as any other Pawley employee who came to work for Dade County before 3/27/62, since the latter position would cost Dade County $104,696 for retroactive benefits. Petitioners claim the above finding 15 clearly erroneous and misleading, and not supported by substantial and competent evidence In the record. Petitioners discuss certain amounts necessary to purchase employee benefits and other amounts needed to purchase creditable service in the Florida Retirement System. By discussing the two amounts as if they were one amount, Petitioners clearly show their understanding of the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing. The Division advised Petitioners that it would cost Petitioner Stone $18,997.12 and Petitioner Wilson $11,657.23 to purchase their prior service should they prevail in the case at bar. In the event Dade County had considered all three petitioners to be continuously employed from the date of the strike to the respective dates of their reemployment the cost to the County to pay retroactive benefits would have been 5104.E95. Since the County and not consider Petitioners to be employees during this period, it did not pay for the normal employees fringe benefits. The payment of those benefits (albeit, retroactively) is represented by the $104,695 amount. Thus, the two amounts discussed by Petitioners represent two different funds; one to be paid by Petitioners for prior service, and one to be paid by Dade County for fringe benefits, but not including Petitioners' prior service. Contrary to Petitioners' assertion that their employment percentent and payroll status from the date of the strike to the respective dates of reemployment was not the issue in this case, the Division believes that that issue is at the very heart of this case. In order to purchase their prior service at the rates permitted by Section 121.081(1)(g) , Florida Statutes, Petitioners had to be employees of the County on March 2, 1962. If they were employees, then they are due the appropriate employee benefits for that period of time. However, since the County did not pay those benefits, then Petitioners were obviously not employees during the period at issue and, therefore, not eligible to purchase the creditable service under Section 121.06.1(1)(g), Florida Statutes. Petitioners' objection is rejected. Exception No. 4 - That portion of Findings or Fact No. 22 which finds that "/i/n addition to the obvious fact that petitioners were par- ticipating in an illegal strike and were in violation of the restraining order of the cir- cuit court, they voluntarily abandoned their right to employment by not commencing their jobs by March 27, 1962", is not supported by substantial and competent evidence. In reviewing this proceeding to determine the legality vel non of the strike, It seems obvious that the strike was illegal under one or both of two principles (see Finding of Fact No. 4). First, it was illegal under existing state law; and second, it was illegal for being in violation of the injunction issued by the circuit court. Respondent's Exhibit No. 4, pg. 271. The union in which Petitioners ware members, Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric, Railway and Motor Coach Employee of America ("Union") was involved in labor negotiations concerning the future status of the Union after the transfer. The County filed a declaratory judgment action in circuit court (Respondent's Exhibits 4 against the Union. In its final decree, the circuit court stated in part that: "2. plaintiffs are not require by law to offer employment to members of the defendant union, . . . plaintiffs are not authorized by law to enter into a collective bargaining agreement with defendants and would not be authorized to do so upon consummation of the contractual transaction evidenced by the record in this cause. plaintiffs are not authorized to recog- nized as lawful any strike directed against them and would not be authorized to do so upon consummation of the con- tractual transaction evidenced by-the record in this cause." (Respondent's Exhibit 4, numbered pages 199-200) Notwithstanding the above provisions the Union went on strike on January 29, 1962 (Respondent's Exhibit.4, numbered pg. 256); the Court, after issuing an order to show cause (id. numbered pg. 259), ordered that the Union was "enjoined and restrained from striking or continuing any strike for the purpose of covering the plaintiffs (county) or any other governmental agency to engage in collective bargaining". (Id, numbered pg. 271) However, the Union continued on strike. The case was appealed to the Third District Court of Appeal. The illegality of the strike under state law was affirmed by that court in Dade County v. Amalgamated Assn. of S.E.R. of M.C. Employees, et al, 157 So.2d 176, 183 (Fla. 3rd DC. 1963). The second issue concerning the violation of the injunction was never appealed, and the Union and its members were in continued violation of the injunction by remaining on strike. Accordingly, petitioners' objection is rejected. Exception No. 5 - That portion of Findings of Fact No. 23, which finds that "/p/etitioners claim that any returning strikers employed more than "one day" after the takeover, had a in service", is not supported by substantial and competent evidence. Petitioners claim that absence from employment of "one calendar month" constitutes a "break in continuous service". In reviewing the exhibits, we note that petitioners' Exhibit No. 2, 12, listed 33 individuals who were prior employees of the Pawley companies, went on strike and returned to work by March 27, 1962. These individuals were given retroactive benefits by Dade County and, therefore, the right to purchase the prior service under Section 121.081(1), Florida Statutes. Some of those individuals were hired by the County before the end of "one calendar month" (that is to say, before March 9, 1962) and others were hired after that date. Petitioners originally argued that an absence of one day constituted a break in service. Apparently, they have changed their position since the hearing and now argue that "one calendar month" constitutes a "break in continuous service". However, based on the facts shown and the arguments bade at the hearing the Hearing Officer's finding of fact is correct and is based on competent substantial evidence. Even if Petitioners were correct, the change from "one day" to "one calendar month" would not change the fact that they did not become employees of the County as a result of the transfer or merger of the private bus company. Petitioners' objection is rejected. EXCEPTIONS TO CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Exception No. E - Conclusion of Law No. 4. Petitioners' claim that Dade County recognized and credited them with their past service with Pawley. The evidence and testimony given at the hearing does not substantiate their claim. While the transmittal letter of Mr. Talbert (Petitioners' Exhibit No.2,#14) states that the "County Commission instructed the County Manager that the above subject employees shall be considered by Dade County to have an original employment date reflecting their employment with the Pawley companies", the actual motion by Commissioner Shack was "that Hodowud, Stone and Wilson be permitted to purchase their past services from the Satate of Florida at the reduced rate." Further, the testimony of Mr. Richard Jay Weiss, Assistant Dade County Attorney, and his exhibit (Petitioners' Exhibit 3) do not support Petitioners' position. The Exhibit states in part as follows: ". . .the County Commission has gone on record by motion to urge the State Retirement System to allow the three present claimants to receive their back time at the reduced rate". Thus, the County merely urged the Division to allow Petitioners to purchase their prior service and did not itself credit them with their past service with retroactive fringe benefits. The bearing Officer's conclusion of law is supported by competent, substantial evidence. Petitioners' objection is rejected. Exception No.7 - Conclusion of Law No. 5 Petitioners' claim that the Hearing Officers' conclusion that they did not enjoy an employee/employer relationship at the time of takeover is not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Section 11 of Ordinance 60-23 of Dade County (petitioners' Exhibit 2, item 1) states that: "whenever the County acquires existing transit systems or facilities from a publicly or pri- vately owned public utility, to the extent necessary or feasible for the economical opera- tion of such facilities, all of the employees of such acquired transit system whose duties pertain to the facilities acquired shall be employed In comparable positions in the County service and the pay status, seniority, vacation and sick leave rights shall be preserved and maintained to the fullest possible extent. All employees of the Authority shall be deemed, con- sidered or construed as County employees and shall be entitled to all the rights, privileges and benefits of County employees." Since the County cannot force any person to work or it the words "all of the employees" and "shall be employed" can logically only refer to those employees who decide to go to work for the County and conversely do not include those employees who voluntarily decide not to work for the County. In addition to the fact that the Hearing Officer found that Petitioners were participating in an illegal strike and were in violation of the restraining order of the circuit court, Petitioners voluntarily abandoned their right to employment by not returning to their jobs by March 27, 1962. Later, when they finally did commence employment with MTA, they were hired as new employees rather than previous employees who were being given reemployment. The hearing officer's conclusion of law is supported by competent, substantial evidence, and Petitioners' objection is rejected. Exception No. 8 - Conclusion of Law No. 7 Petitioners argue that the met their burden of proving that they were entitled to purchase their service under Section 121.081(1)(g), Florida Statutes; however, they offer no basis in law or fact would allow the Division to conclude the Hearing Officer was in error. In the absence of an adequate legal basis or contrary evidence in the record, the Division rejects Petitioners' objection. By motion prior to the hearing, Petitioners Wilson and Stone moved to add Metropolitan Dade County as a art Respondent. The motion was denied by the bearing Officer, and the Division hereby adopts that ruling as part of this final order. The Recommended Order is corrected at page 8, paragraph 20, line 6, wherein the month of "January" is changed to read "February". WHEREFORE based upon the foregoing findings, holdings and rulings or the Division as to Petitioners' exceptions to the Hearing Officer's Recommended Order, it is, ORDERED AND DIRECTED that each and every exception of the Petitioners' to the Recommended Order be and the same are OVERRULED and REJECTED. It is further, ORDERED AND DIRECTED that copy of said Recommended Order is attached hereto and incorporated as part of this final order. It is further, ORDERED AND DIRECTED that Petitioners' requests to purchase in the Florida Retirement System their prior service with the Pawley companies at the rates allowed in Section 121.081(1)(g), Florida Statutes, are denied. DONE AND ORDERED this 20th day of October, 1983. J. MULLIAN, III State Retirement Director Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Retirement this 21st day of October, 1983. Edna E. Canino, Esquire 1609 NW 14th Avenue Miami, Florida 33125 Edward F. Hodowud 8874 Emerson Avenue Surfside, Florida 33154 Linda M. Rigot, Hearing Officer Dan Brown, Esquire Division of Administrative Hearings John Finney, Esquire The Oakland Building Paul McMahon 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Petitioners' requests to purchase in the Florida Retirement System their prior service with the Pawley companies at a reduced rate pursuant to Section 121.081(1)(g), Florida Statutes. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 31st day of August, 1983, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Edna E Canino, Esquire 1609 NW 14th Avenue Miami, Florida 33125 Mr. Edward F. Hodowud 8874 Emerson Avenue Surfside, Florida 33154 Stanley M. Danek, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C - Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Nevin G. Smith, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION DIVISION OF RETIREMENT NORMA WILSON, EDWARD F. HODOWUD, and, WESLEY E. STONE, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 81-3192 STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, Respondent. /
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are made: At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner employed Respondent as a school bus driver pursuant to an annual contract. Said annual contract may be terminated for probable cause as set forth in Petitioner's local rule 3.27 (Exhibit P4). Respondent's employment was also subject to a union contract between the Petitioner and the International Brotherhood of Firemen and Oilers, Local 1227. Article 39 of said union contract provides for a formal hearing under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, when the Superintendent recommends termination of employment for any member of the bargaining unit. Upon employment, Respondent received training in the safe operation of school buses. As part of this training, Petitioner advised Respondent to exercise great caution at railroad crossings. Petitioner instructed Respondent on the correct procedures to follow when approaching and crossing a railroad track. During training, Petitioner provided Respondent with a copy of the Florida School Bus Drivers Handbook (Exhibit 4) which contains written procedures for bus drivers at railroad crossings. This handbook provides that the driver has the ultimate responsibility for the safe operation of the bus. It also contains a mirror provision of Section 316.1575, Florida Statutes, prohibiting anyone from driving through a railroad crossing when the crossing gate is closed or being opened or closed. Respondent's primary responsibility as a bus driver is to transport children to and from school. In the scope of his employment, he drives a bus through a railroad crossing on Forest Hill Boulevard near Interstate Highway 95 (I-95) everyday. On the morning of February 3, 1994, Respondent transported approximately sixty (60) children and two (2) teachers in a school bus on a field trip. Respondent exited I-95 and proceeded in a westerly direction along Forest Hill Boulevard. Respondent approached the railroad crossing on Forest Hill Boulevard near I-95 and stopped. After the bus came to a halt, the crossing lights started flashing and the crossing gate began to descend. Before Respondent proceeded across the railroad tracks, he did not: (a) open the school bus door to listen for the approaching train; (b) observe the signal lights as they started flashing; (c) observe the descent of the crossing gate; or (d) ensure that the passengers were quiet enough for him to hear the approaching train. As Respondent proceeded across the railroad track, the front of the bus struck the crossing gate, shattering it into several pieces. Respondent drove the bus to the other side of the crossing and stopped again before proceeding with the field trip. Two witnesses, concerned for the safety of the school bus passengers, immediately reported the incident to Petitioner's Transportation Department. Petitioner's employees must comply with school board policies and local rules which have been adopted in conformity with Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Respondent failed to comply with those policies on February 3, 1994, by: (a) failing to open the school bus door before crossing the track; (b) failing to heed the warnings of the flashing lights and descending crossing gate; (c) failing to maintain silence on the bus until it crossed the tracks; and (d) proceeding across the tracks before it was safe to do so. On July 20, 1994, the Superintendent recommended that Petitioner suspend Respondent without pay and terminate his employment for failure to adhere to state law and school board policies governing the safe operation of school buses. On July 20, 1994, Petitioner voted to suspend Respondent without pay and to terminate his employment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the undersigned recommends that Petitioner enter a Final Order suspending Respondent without pay and terminating his employment due to willful neglect of duty and misconduct in office by failing to follow proper procedures while operating a school bus at a railroad crossing. RECOMMENDED this 6th day of December, 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD, Hearing Officer Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER 94-4679 The following constitute specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statues, on the parties' proposed findings of facts. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in substance but modified in Finding of Fact (FOF) Number 1. Accepted in FOF Number 2. Accepted as modified in FOF Number 3 & Number 4. The Prehearing Stipulation references Article 39 of the Union Contract; however, there is no record evidence concerning a grievance procedure. Accepted in substance in FOF Number 5. Accepted in FOF Number 6. Accepted in FOF Number 6. Accepted in substance in FOF Number 7-Number 12. Respondent's testimony that he did not see flashing red warning lights while he was stopped at the crossing is not persuasive competent substantial evidence. Accepted in FOF Number 12. Accepted in FOF Number 12. Accepted; See FOF Number 13 and Conclusions of Law Number 24-27. Accepted in FOF Number 2. Accepted in FOF Number 15-16. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Respondent did not file proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Lee M. Rosenberg, Esquire Palm Beach County School District 3318 Forest Hill Boulevard West Palm Beach, FL 33406-5813 Wanda Stimpson, Business Agent Fireman & Oilers Local 1227 Post Office Box 449 Boynton Beach, FL 33435 Dr. Monica Uhlhorn Superintendant of Palm Beach County School District 3318 Forest Hill Boulevard West Palm Beach, FL 33406-5813
The Issue The issues in these cases are whether there is just cause to terminate the employment of Kasha Brunson, and whether there is just cause to terminate the employment of Maria Colina.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Brunson has been employed by the School District since August 20, 1996. She is currently a bus attendant in the School District's transportation department. During her tenure with the School District, Ms. Brunson has had excellent performance evaluations. Ms. Colina has been employed by the School District since February 9, 2000. She is currently a bus operator in the School District's transportation department. During her tenure with the School District, Ms. Colina has had excellent performance evaluations. Both Ms. Brunson and Ms. Colina are governed by the collective bargaining agreement between the Support Personnel Association of Lee County (SPLAC) and the School Board. Provision 7.10 of the SPLAC agreement provides: "Any discipline during the contract year, that constitutes a verbal warning, letter of warning, letter of reprimand, suspension, demotion or termination shall be for just cause." The SPLAC agreement does not specifically define just cause, but Provision 7.10 of the SPLAC agreement provides that allegations of misconduct and poor job performance, which could result in suspension without pay or termination of employment, could be investigated, and a recommendation for discipline could be made to the superintendent as a result of the investigation. Provision 7.11 of the SPLAC agreement provides: [D]isciplinary action(s) taken against SPLAC bargaining unit members shall be consistent with the concept and practice of the provisions of 7.10 of the collective bargaining agreement and that in all instances the degree of discipline shall be reasonably related to the seriousness of the offense and the employee's record. On December 7, 2010, Ms. Colina was the bus operator, and Ms. Brunson was the bus attendant on Bus 134. The bus was assigned to pick up exceptional education students on its morning route to East Lee County High School (East Lee County). The bus has approximately six rows of seats. On December 7, 2010, the bus had two stops for East Lee County and picked up students C.E., a female, and T.T., a male, for delivery to East Lee County. C.E. and T.T. are tenth-grade students; however, they are mentally delayed and function between a fourth and sixth-grade level. In late October 2010, Ms. Brunson and Ms. Colina had been advised to keep C.E. and T.T. separated. The students were not to speak to one another, and they were not to sit together. Ms. Brunson and Ms. Colina were not told the reason why they were to keep the students separated, and they both assumed the students had been involved in an argument. On December 7, 2010, the bus arrived at East Lee County approximately 15 minutes prior to the bell ringing. Ms. Brunson, Ms. Colina, and the two students remained on the bus while waiting for the school to open. T.T. was seated in a seat at the rear of the bus across from Ms. Brunson. C.E. was in a seat at the front of the bus directly behind Ms. Colina, five rows in front of Ms. Brunson. T.T. asked Ms. Brunson for permission to change the radio station. She gave permission, and T.T. got up and walked to the front of the bus where he changed the station on the on-board radio. In order to change the radio station, he had to reach across Ms. Colina. Instead of returning to his assigned seat, T.T. sat down next to C.E. in her seat. Neither Ms. Brunson nor Ms. Colina saw T.T. sit next to C.E. At some point, Ms. Brunson observed T.T. in the seat with C.E. She felt that something inappropriate was happening, and she called T.T. back to his seat. Ms. Brunson reported the incident to Dale Maybin (Mr. Maybin), her supervisor for that day, as soon as C.E. and T.T. left the bus. Later in the morning, she also advised Shannan Pugh (Ms. Pugh), who was the paraprofessional who was supervising C.E. and T.T. at their work site. She told Ms. Pugh that, when T.T. stood up from C.E.'s seat, she saw C.E.'s head "pop up." In addition to the East Lee County delivery, Bus 134 was assigned to a route for students at Manatee Elementary School (Manatee). The Manatee route began after the completion of the East Lee County route. On the morning of December 7, 2010, Ms. Brunson and Ms. Colina had been assigned two additional students to the Manatee route beginning on December 9, 2010. At the time of the incident involving T.T. and C.E., both Ms. Brunson and Ms. Colina claim that they were doing paperwork related to the assignment of two new students. Bus drivers are given 15 minutes each morning and 15 minutes each afternoon to do a pre-trip inspection and to do paperwork. The paperwork involved in adding the two students to the bus route was minimal. The students' names would be added to the seating chart, and the students' names and I.D. numbers would be added to a Medicaid form. Once the bus arrived at Manatee where the students were to be delivered, the driver would receive additional information from the school and fill out a TR-1 form and get an emergency information card, which was to be placed in the bus. At the time of the incident on December 7, 2010, the only paperwork that needed to be done would be to add the names of the new students to the seating chart and to place the students' names and I.D. numbers on the Medicaid form. Although Ms. Colina had the responsibility of completing the paperwork, she and Ms. Brunson divided the paperwork. The longest time that it should have taken each person to do the paperwork was a couple of minutes. Respondents claim that they were unable to adequately supervise the students because of attending to paperwork is not credible. The amount of time that it would have taken to do the paperwork was minimal and should not have precluded Respondents from keeping an eye on the students. Additionally, Respondents should not have been doing their paperwork at the same time. Obviously, if both Respondents are doing paperwork at the same time, no one is watching the students. Because Respondents were doing paperwork does not relieve them of the responsibility of adequately supervising the students and keeping the students separated. The reason that C.E. and T.T. were separated stemmed from an incident in October 2010, when C.E. and T.T. had engaged in inappropriate activity during a work study program. C.E., T.T., and five other students were assigned to work off-campus at a grocery store. The students were supervised by two paraprofessionals from East Lee County. C.E. and T.T. left the area in the grocery store where they were assigned and went into the men's restroom together. C.E. admitted having sexual contact with T.T. while in the men's restroom. School officials changed the classroom and work study schedules of the two students to eliminate contact between the students. Ms. Brunson and Ms. Colina were aware that C.E. and T.T. no longer went to the work site on the same days. No disciplinary actions were taken against the two paraprofessionals as a result of the incident at the grocery store. From late October 2010 to December 7, 2010, Ms. Brunson and Ms. Colina kept C.E. and T.T. separated while on the bus, and the students did not engage in any inappropriate contact on the bus until the incident at issue. Respondents claim that they would have been more diligent in supervising the students if they had known that the reason that the students were being separated was for previous sexual misconduct. This reasoning for failure to adequately supervise is no excuse. Respondents should have adhered to their charge of keeping the students separated no matter the reason for the students being separated.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that there is just cause to discipline Ms. Brunson and Ms. Colina and suspending Ms. Brunson and Ms. Colina without pay from March 8, 2011, to January 1, 2012. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of July, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of July, 2011.
The Issue Whether Respondent engaged in employment practices in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Euretha L. Davies, is a white female, who was first employed by Respondent, Laidlaw Educational Services (Laidlaw), in 1997 as a school bus driver. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of the Florida Civil Rights Act. Respondent provides pursuant to contract school bus transportation in Santa Rosa County School District. This includes all aspects of transportation: training drivers, maintaining vehicles, preparing routes and administering the system, and preparing reports to state and federal authorities. Petitioner had been an employee of the Santa Rosa County School District for nine years prior to Laidlaw contracting to provide these services in 1997. She transferred her employment to Laidlaw at that time, maintaining her senority and pay rate. On January 4, 2000, Petitioner contacted Jeffrey R. Capozzi, Driver Development and Safety Supervisor for Laidlaw at their office in Milton, Florida, about pain she was experiencing in both her wrists. She was sent to Immediate Care at West Florida Medical Center, Pensacola, Florida. There, she was seen by Kenneth Hill, M.D., an orthopedic specialist. Dr. Hill performed surgery to release the carpal tunnel in the right wrist on May 23, 2000. On August 24, 2000, a follow-up evaluation of the right had revealed that soft support of the wrist was needed, but Petitioner had reached maximum medical improvement with a one percent partial impairment. Petitioner was released to full duties. On May 2001, an annual check up was done in order to maintain Petitioner's entitlement to future workman's compensation medical treatment. This examination was performed by James St. Louis, M.D., who took over Petitioner's case when Dr. Hill moved. Dr. St. Louis ordered nerve conduction studies of the right upper extremity, which was performed on July 30, 2001, by Dr. Gerhard. Dr. Gerhard found that the transmittal of nerve impulses was normal in the right upper extremity and left median nerve. On May 2, 2002, approximately a year later and after Petitioner had had a nerve conduction study, she was sent to see Michael L. Shawbitz, M.D., a neurological specialist. Dr. Shawbitz concluded that she had tendonitis in her right wrist and recommended physical therapy. On May 15, 2002, Petitioner was given a Dexterity Test for School Bus Drivers by Lillian Barnes, which Petitioner passed. On June 5, 2002, Dr. T. F. Brown gave Petitioner a physical, which she passed. On August 6, 2002, Petitioner returned to work when school started, driving a school bus with an automatic door opener. On September 4-6, 2002, Petitioner began training to become a driver trainer. Her instructor was Zeke Zeigler, a training director for Laidlaw. From September 9 through 13, 2002, Petitioner attended classroom training presented by Stephanie Slaton, who was in charge of Driver Safety and Development at the Laidlaw office in Milton, Florida. At this time, Petitioner was driving her bus seven hours and 35 minutes each day on a regular schedule. On September 16 through 20, 2002, Petitioner completed the classroom training and was scheduled to go on the road training with the trainer who fit into her schedule. At this time, Dianne Hall, Head of Routing and Data Entry, requested that Petitioner be taken off her driving schedule to assist in preparation of the report prepared by Laidlaw for the State of Florida on bus schedules and routes for the children in the district. Petitioner was taken off her bus to assist with this report, and when it was completed, she was to continue coming into the office between the morning and afternoon bus routes to keep information in the data system updated and correct. This data entry amounted to several hours of light typing daily. On October 15, 2002, Petitioner was informed that she had an appointment to see Dr. Minoo Hollis, for Petitioner's annual checkup on her workman's compensation injury. This examination was conducted on October 17, 2002. Dr. Hollis determined that Petitioner had tenosynovitis of the right flexor, a ganglion cyst of the left wrist volar ganglion, and diffused chronic pain of the left forearm and wrist. Dr. Hollis prescribed medication and physical therapy for Petitioner and put her on light duty not driving a school bus. On October 23, 2002, Petitioner started physical therapy at Santa Rosa Medical Center three times per week for three weeks. Petitioner continued to work at the school office and to make entries into the computer system. Petitioner was assigned to the school office where she worked on various projects. She did light typing, copied documents for the school staff, and handled mail. There is a conflict in testimony regarding whether these assignments were in pursuit of assisting with the data entry or were the result of light duty because of Dr. Hollis' findings. It is found that at the point Petitioner ceased driving the bus, it was the result of the light duty assignment. These light duties continued until December 10, 2002, when Petitioner was assigned to Pace High School (PHS) where the assistant principal, Bradley Marcilliat, was delegated authority to assign her duties. Upon her assignment to PHS, Petitioner's hours per week were reduced to 30, and her typing was restricted further by her supervisors at Laidlaw. On December 12, 2002, Dr. Hollis did a follow-up examination of Petitioner after physical therapy and found that she had a two percent permanent partial impairment and prescribed the following restrictions as they relate to her bus driving duties: Can sit, stand, and walk without interruption for eight hours; Reach above shoulder level frequently Can use hands for repetitive actions such as: Simple grasping-both hands Pushing and pulling-right hand no; left hand yes Restrictions of activities involving: Unprotected heights-none Moving machinery-none Changes in temperature and humidity-none Driving automotive equipment-none Restrictions to automatic transmission-yes Fumes and gas-none On December 12, 2002, Jennifer Jack, MSN, RN, who was the case manager employed by Genex Services, Inc., for Crawford and Company, Respondent's workman's compensation insurer, reported to Stephanie Slaton that Petitioner could drive a vehicle with automatic transmission per Dr. Hollis. Ms. Jack opined, "I am not sure if driving the bus requires any repetitive pulling, but if it does not, then it looks like Ms. Davies can drive a school bus." A question existed about whether Petitioner could operate the automatic door opener on the school bus, which required the driver to pull a knob with the right hand. Ms. Jack queried Dr. Hollis, and was told Petitioner could drive a bus with an automatic door opener. On December 24, 2002, Crawford and Company informed Petitioner that she would be paid one percent as the difference between the one percent she had initially been paid, and her current permanent impairment of the body as a whole. Petitioner continued her duties at PHS until January 31, 2003. Nothing was said about her returning to her normal bus driving duties, although she had been released by her doctor to return to work with the limitations stated above. On January 31, 2003, Petitioner was advised by personnel at PHS to report to Bobbie Williams' office at Laidlaw at 10:30 that morning. When she reported to Williams, he gave her a dismissal letter, and stated that Laidlaw had been informed by the insurance company that she had reached maximum medical improvement with regard to her injury that had occurred on January 4, 2000, and that with her current restrictions she was no longer able to perform essential requirement necessary to drive a school bus. This determination was based upon the Laidlaw's determination that Petitioner could not operate the automatic door opener on the school bus. This conclusion is contrary to the evidence presented by Petitioner that she had operated the door without problem before she developed the tendonitis, and contrary to Dr. Hollis' reports and the information provided to Ms. Jack by the doctor. Although the record shows that Petitioner continued to improve as revealed in her May 2003 examination, the fact that the doctor indicated that Petitioner had a permanent impairment of two percent in December 2002 indicates that Petitioner had reached maximum medical improvement as of that date. The facts reveal that Petitioner was ready to return to work; was discharged by Respondent because of an alleged inability to open the door of the bus; that Petitioner was able to open the door of a bus equipped with an automatic door opener; and that the "inability to perform the duties of the job" asserted by Respondent were not supported by the medical restrictions communicated to Respondent's agent, who made that information known to Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that FCHR enter its final order directing that Respondent desist from discriminatory employment practices and directing Respondent to re-employ with appropriate accommodation Petitioner, promote her to a trainer-driver, and cease any further discriminatory practices. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of June, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Euretha Davies 3404 Oaktree Lane Pace, Florida 32571 Danny K. Guerdon Laidlaw Education Services 975 Cobb Place Boulevard, Suite 218 Kennesaw, Georgia 30144 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
