The Issue Whether the City of Ocala (the City or Respondent), violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, sections 760.01- 760.11, Florida Statutes,1/ by discriminating against Nyleah Jackson (Petitioner) because of her race.
Findings Of Fact On May 2, 2016, Petitioner, who is an African-American female, was hired by the City as an Administrative Specialist II in its Electric Utility Department. On October 10, 2016, Petitioner moved to a lateral Administrative Specialist II position with the City’s Public Works Department to perform generally the same type of duties in that department’s sanitation division. An Administrative Specialist II is expected to regularly and competently prepare correspondence, maintain records, provide customer service, compile reports, and prepare schedules and payroll. As an Administrative Specialist II, Petitioner received mostly satisfactory, although never exceptional, ratings in her performance evaluation reviews in both the City’s Electric and Public Works Departments. In each of Petitioner’s performance evaluation reviews, her rater or supervisor was tasked with assigning a 1, 2, or 3 rating for each of 10 different tasks, examples of which include “Quality of Work,” “Efficiency,” “Responsibility,” and “Customer Focus.” A rating of 1 means that the employee performed a task below the standard. A rating of means that the employee meets task requirements. A rating of means the employee exceeds standards. Petitioner received a rating of 2 (Meets Standard) for every task on every review produced by the City, except for her April 19, 2017, evaluation on which Petitioner received a 1 in the category of “Responsibility” due to alleged problems related to tardiness and failure to properly notify her supervisors of absences. During January 2017, an Administrative Specialist III position became available within the City’s sanitation division because the person previously filling that position moved into another position. In accordance with the City’s hiring process governed by its City Employee Handbook, the City’s Human Resources Department (HR) reviewed the vacant Administrative Specialist III position, confirmed that it was budgeted and set to be filled, and evaluated whether it was governed by any collective bargaining agreements. Upon determining that the position was governed by the City’s collective bargaining agreement with the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, on January 13, 2017, the City posted the job internally for five days to allow existing City employees to apply for the position before allowing external applications. Similar to the Administrative Specialist II position, the City’s Administrative Specialist III position is required to regularly and competently prepare correspondence, maintain records, provide customer service, compile reports, and prepare schedules and payroll. An Administrative Specialist III, however, has expanded duties and responsibilities. While all administrative specialists throughout the City perform similar tasks, each division in the City may have a different distribution of duties for its employees due to the kind of work required for that division’s services. These differences would not be reflected in the listing for an open Administrative Specialist III position. Such listings were drafted by an outside consultant to generally describe the Administrative Specialist III position for all departments throughout the City. For the sanitation division, the Administrative Specialist III position has a substantial customer service component. Specifically, the Administrative Specialist III position in the sanitation division is required to answer a large volume of phone calls from angry citizens for various sanitation complaints. For that reason, the hiring managers placed importance on the applicants’ people skills, patience, and ability to maintain a calm, customer-friendly demeanor when dealing with angry citizens. Petitioner testified that the director of the City’s Public Works Department, Darren Park, suggested that she apply for the open Administrative Specialist III position due to Mr. Park’s belief that she had performed well in a previous interview. Therefore, Petitioner explained, on January 23, 2017, she applied for the City’s vacant Administrative Specialist III position in the sanitation division. In accordance with City policy, HR reviewed all of the internal applications for the position to preliminarily screen applicants who did not meet the minimal qualifications. Petitioner’s application and three other internal candidates’ applications were found to have met the minimal qualifications and were forwarded to the department’s hiring managers for interviews. Of the four internal applicants forwarded by HR to the hiring managers, the only other minority applicant was a Hispanic male. Shortly after the internal applications were submitted, the two hiring managers, Dwayne Drake and Cloretha McReynolds, reviewed the applications and interviewed the City’s internal applicants. Dwayne Drake, a Caucasian male, was the division head of sanitation. Cloretha McReynolds, an African-American female, was a supervisor in the sanitation division. A few days after the City received Petitioner’s application, Mr. Drake and Ms. McReynolds interviewed Petitioner for the open position. During Petitioner’s interview, as well as in all of the other interviews for the position, the hiring managers used a list of prepared questions, entitled “Sanitation Administrative Specialist III Behavioral Interview Questions.” The questions were designed to allow the hiring managers to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of an applicant’s personality traits, people skills, and behavioral characteristics. During her interview for the position, Petitioner admitted that one of her weaknesses was that her assertiveness could sometimes be mistaken for aggressiveness. This comment by Petitioner concerned Mr. Drake because the sanitation division has many callers already upset when they call. Mr. Drake felt that Petitioner’s comment was a “big hurdle” that Petitioner would have to overcome in order to be selected for the Administrative Specialist III position. Similarly, Ms. McReynolds testified that Petitioner’s response that her assertiveness could be misinterpreted as aggressiveness concerned her because “we were looking for a specific – we were looking for someone with a great personality.” When further pressed by Petitioner why customer service was valued so highly for the Administrative Specialist III position, Ms. McReynolds testified: Q. Okay. Are there different weights that you hold for one question than the other? For example, someone said they don’t have experience in payroll, but they also said that they are very well with handling customers, is there a system for you that you say: “Hey, well, this is more important than the other one? This one holds more weight than the other one”? A. Anyone can be taught to do payroll. Q. Right. A. Anyone can’t be taught to be respectful on the phone and customer friendly. I can teach someone how to do payroll, I can teach someone to do billing. I can teach someone how to do that position, but I can’t teach someone to be nice to the customers. And I needed a nice person, a person who is going to be able to, when they get yelled at, better keep calm and deal with it, calm the customer down. And that’s what I was looking for. After the internal interviews, and as provided for by the City Employee Handbook and its collective bargaining agreements, the hiring managers decided to list the available Administrative Specialist III position externally. Petitioner testified that, following her interview, Mr. Drake came to her office and told her that the hiring managers were looking for a “better fit” for the vacant Administrative Specialist III position and that the City would advertise the position externally. Petitioner testified that, based on this statement, she inferred that the hiring managers had already determined that the City would not hire any of the internal applicants for the vacant Administrative Specialist III position because they had already determined that none of the internal applicants were qualified. In his testimony, Mr. Drake confirmed that he spoke with Petitioner following her interview, but denied that he told Petitioner, or any other City employee applicant, that they were already disqualified. Instead, Mr. Drake explained that, following the internal applicant interviews, he spoke to Petitioner because she was a Public Works employee and he wanted to tell her in person that they were going to look for external applicants. Mr. Drake’s testimony is credited. After the open Administrative Specialist III position was listed externally, three external applications were forwarded to the hiring managers, who interviewed those candidates consistent with City policy, using the same prepared questions as used in the internal interviews. After completing the external interviews, the managers both decided Jenna Hylkema, a Caucasian female and external applicant, to be the best applicant, and she was hired for the position. Ms. Hylkema had a high school diploma, a bachelor degree in criminal justice and had previously worked for the City as a dispatcher for the Ocala Police Department. At the time she was hired for the Administrative Specialist III position, Ms. Hylkema was working at the Department of Children and Families investigating child abuse cases and related issues. Both of the hiring managers agreed that Ms. Hylkema’s employment history and performance in her interview made her the strongest candidate for the vacant Administrative Specialist III position. Notably, Ms. McReynolds testified that Ms. Hylkema “was a call – a 911 call person [at the police department], and she was able to deal with - I thought she would be better to deal with the stress level, as far as – and also her personality in accepting calls.” Both Mr. Drake and Ms. McReynolds confirmed that their ranking preference was informal and not reduced to writing, but that, after all of the interviews, they discussed each of their orders of preference out of the seven applicants. According to both hiring managers, Petitioner ranked third or fourth of the seven applicants. Although they believed Petitioner was qualified, the hiring managers thought that Jenna Hylkema’s work experience and performance in her interview made her the most qualified applicant for the position. Also notable, Ms. Hylkema performed better on the objective components of the interview process. Petitioner herself confirmed that Ms. Hylkema performed better than she had in the objective portions of the interview, including scoring twice as high in an objective typing speed test. Both hiring managers credibly testified that neither Petitioner’s race, Jenna Hylkema’s race, nor anyone else’s race influenced their decision to hire Ms. Hylkema for the vacant Administrative Specialist III position. A few months after Ms. Hylkema was hired for the vacant Administrative Specialist III position, another Administrative Specialist III position opened in the Public Works Street Division, which was filled by Erica Wilson, an African-American woman who, like Petitioner, was working as an Administrative Specialist II when she applied. Petitioner did not apply for this position. Petitioner confirmed this, but failed to provide any explanation as to why the City’s policies discriminated against her, as an African-American woman, but apparently did not discriminate against Erica Wilson in their decision to hire her for another open Administrative Specialist III only a few months later. When asked why she did not apply for the other Administrative Specialist III position, Petitioner testified that she wanted the Administrative Specialist III position in the sanitation division. Despite evidence indicating that there was no illegal discrimination in the City’s process of filling the position for which Petitioner had applied, Petitioner alleged that there were irregularities in the selection process. For example, Petitioner contends that Ms. Hylkema was not qualified because Ms. Hylkema held a criminal justice degree that did not include advanced business or secretarial classes in college. The evidence, however, demonstrated that the City’s hiring process was flexible enough to allow certain criteria to be waived in favor of other experience, and that all applicants who were interviewed met the minimal qualifications for the position. Petitioner also alleged improprieties in the hiring process on the grounds that the City’s hiring managers did not use a formal numerical scoring in their evaluations and failed to keep complete notes during their interviews to confirm that each question was asked to every candidate. The City’s hiring process for vacant positions, however, does not require any specific numerical scoring system or prescribed notation process. Rather, the evidence demonstrated that the hiring managers appropriately weighed their impressions of the candidates through their interviews and the other materials provided to determine who would be best to respond to angry phone calls that the City’s sanitation department would receive. Throughout that process, and with no evidence of illegal discrimination, the managers appropriately ranked Petitioner as the third or fourth best candidate for the Administrative Specialist III position. The evidence at the hearing did not reasonably suggest that the process used during the selection process was suspicious, vulnerable to arbitrariness, or indicative of illegal discrimination. When asked about the City’s interview procedure, Petitioner said that she had no objection to the City asking questions to discern whether or not, subjectively, the interviewers thought an applicant was a good fit for the job. In sum, the evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner was not hired for the open position for which she applied because of her race, or that the City otherwise engaged in illegal discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s Complaint and Petition for Relief consistent with the terms of this Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of December, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of December, 2018.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Jerry O. Bryan began working for the State Road Department in 1968. In 1983, he started his most recent assignment with the agency, now called the Florida Department of Transportation, as an engineering technician III, in a career service position. An employee handbook respondent was furnished in 1983 had this to say about "JOB ABANDONMENT": After an unauthorized leave of absence for three consecutive workdays, the Department will consider you to have abandoned your position and resigned from the Career Service. It is very important that you coordinate any personal absences with your immediate supervisor, in accordance with our current leave policy. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, at page 43. Perhaps with this in mind, respondent requested leave without pay when he learned he faced six months' incarceration, as a result of his criminal conviction for cultivating marijuana on federal property. Respondent's supervisor, Robert Edward Minchin, Jr. denied his request for leave without pay, in accordance with a DOT policy against granting leave to DOT employees who are incarcerated. Mr. Bryan did not request annual leave, although some 220 hours' entitlement had accumulated. Asked whether he would have granted Mr. Bryan's leave request absent "a policy of not authorizing leave while someone was incarcerated," Mr. Minchin answered in the negative, saying Mr. Bryan "was going to be needed during ... [the time] he would be out. T.22. At no time did petitioner ever take disciplinary action against respondent, who received satisfactory or higher job performance ratings, the whole time he worked for petitioner. Aware that Mr. Bryan did not desire or intend to resign, relinquish or abandon his career service position, Mr. Minchin took steps to remove him from the payroll solely on grounds that he was absent without authorized leave for three consecutive workdays.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That petitioner reinstate respondent and award back pay, but without prejudice to instituting any appropriate proceedings before the Public Employees Relations Commission. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of November, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of November, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry O. Bryan Federal Prison Camp Post Office Box 600 Eglin AFB, Florida 32542-7606 William A. Frieder, Esquire Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Robert Scanlon, Esquire Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
The Issue Whether or not Respondent, Seminole County Public Schools, discriminated against Petitioner, Juanita O. Jones, in employment by reason of race, in violation of Subsection 760.10(1), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses, and documentary evidence, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a black female, who has been employed by Respondent since 1991. She has served Respondent as an Executive Secretary, Elementary Education; Executive Secretary to the Administrative Assistant to the Superintendent; and a Technical Assistant, Media Center, Sanford Middle School. Prior to her employment by Respondent, Petitioner was employed as a word processing systems operator by the Florida Department of Corrections. In late 1999 or early 2000, Petitioner applied for the advertised position of Specialist, Applications Software. Respondent had advertised three separate Specialist, Applications Software, position vacancies during a two-month period. Although interviewed for the vacancies for the first two positions, Petitioner was not selected for the first two advertised vacancies. Petitioner does not contend that her non- selection for the first two positions was a result of unlawful discrimination. Applicants for the three Specialist, Applications Software, positions were interviewed by a two-person panel: Regina Klaers and John Davis. Ms. Klaers is Supervisor, Student Support; Mr. Davis is Manager, Student Support and Information Services. These individuals supervised the Specialist, Applications Software, position and were intimately familiar with the job requirements. Thirteen individuals applied for the third Specialist, Applications Software, position. Of the thirteen, ten met the minimum qualifications. Three applicants were interviewed. Applicants who had been previously interviewed, Petitioner among them, were not interviewed an additional time as the interviewers felt they had sufficient knowledge from the previous interviews. Petitioner had been interviewed twice previously. The interviews focused on three areas: (1) school- based experience with student data; (2) customer service experience; and (3) "people skills." These were critical areas for the position. The interviews were particularly important in assessing an applicant's "people skills." It was the opinion of the interviewers that one applicant's qualifications in these critical areas exceeded the other applicants', including Petitioner's. Based on the interviews, Elizabeth Jean Smith, a white female, was selected for the position. Ms. Smith had significantly greater school-based "data-entry" experience with the student data systems, WANG and SASI, than did Petitioner. Immediately prior to being selected for the position in question, Ms. Smith's position was Clerk/Receptionist-Customer Service. Both interviewers agreed that Ms. Smith demonstrated better "people skills." Credible evidence supported the selection of Ms. Smith based on her extensive school-based experience with student data systems and her customer service experience. While "people skills" are less empirically quantifiable than the other critical areas of the interviewers' focus, nothing revealed during the final hearing led the undersigned to believe that Petitioner had better "people skills" than did the individual selected for the position. Respondent selected Elizabeth Jean Smith for the Specialist, Applications Software, position because she was more qualified for the position than other applicants, including Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of September, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of September, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ned N. Julian, Jr., Esquire Seminole County School Board 400 East Lake Mary Boulevard Sanford, Florida 32773-7127 Alberto E. Lugo-Janer, Esquire 3501 West Vine Street, Suite 281 Kissimmee, Florida 34741-4673 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues in this matter are whether Petitioner was a supervisory employee as defined by Subsection 110.205(2)(x), Florida Statutes (2001), and was, therefore, properly reclassified from Career Service to Selected Exempt Service effective July 1, 2001.
Findings Of Fact The 2001 Florida Legislature enacted a substantial revision of the Florida Civil Service system referred to as the "Service First" initiative. (See Chapter 2001-43, Laws of Florida). This revision, which became effective on July 1, 2001, substantially expanded the parameters of the Selected Exempt Service classification to include many positions which had previously been identified as Career Service positions. Generally, Selected Exempt Service employees serve at the pleasure of the agency head and are considered at-will employees; whereas, Career Service employees have greater employment rights and job security. Petitioner was employed by Respondent at the Pinellas Maintenance Yard from December 15, 1997, to September 19, 2002. Initially, Petitioner held the position of Office Support III, but was eventually promoted to Office Support V in June 2001, both Career Service classifications. Following the enactment of the Service First initiative, Respondent reclassified Petitioner's Career Service position to Selected Exempt Service status in July 2001. On September 19, 2002, Petitioner was terminated from employment without explanation. His annual salary was $32,500. Following the decision in Reinshuttle v. Agency for Health Care Administration, 849 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), Respondent notified Petitioner of his rights to seek an administrative hearing and challenge the reclassification. Petitioner timely challenged Respondent's action. During his tenure working for Respondent, Petitioner, pursuant to his written position description, was responsible for various administrative functions, including personnel, records, and fiscal matters, as well as supervisory responsibilities, including the supervision of a few administrative staff. Specifically, his position description provides in part: 20% of time: Supervises and/or participates in the daily administrative activities . . . . Ensuring the reception telephone and radio are fully staffed at all times. . . 15% of time: Supervises and/or participates in the personnel activities for Pinellas Maintenance Office. Counsels employees in matters of retirements, benefits, grievances, discipline and other personnel and work related problems. . . 15% of time: Supervises and/or participates in the fiscal activities for the Pinellas Maintenance Office. Supervises the maintenance of ledgers and Journals associated with local Purchase Orders, local Charge Accounts and Purchase Requisitions, Utility Invoice Transmittals, Contract Invoice transmittals, Partial Payments, etc. . . 10% of time: Directs purchasing for the Pinellas Maintenance Office. . . 10% of time: Serves as representative of the Pinellas Maintenance Engineer at meetings. . . 10% of time: Receives incoming mail, reviews and distributes to appropriate personnel. . . 5% of time: Participates in the selection process for entry level Field Operations Unit positions. . . 5% of time: Directs and coordinates the maintenance and use of records storage. . . 5% of time: Trains employees in methods for performing an efficient and effective job. 5% of time: Performs other related duties as required. Petitioner admits that he was responsible for and routinely engaged in many activities that were supervisory in nature. The evidence supports the fact that Petitioner performed these duties, and his performance evaluations reflect his activity. Petitioner's position description allocated specific time frames to the written duties and responsibilities. Upon careful review, the position description provides that the Office Support, Level V position employee shall "supervise and/or participate" in administrative, personnel, and fiscal matters 50 percent of the work-time. The remaining 50 percent of work-time is allocated to other duties, including purchasing, attending meetings, mail distribution and inquiries, assisting with the selection process of certain entry level positions, coordinating records storage, training certain employees, and performing other "related duties as required." While Petitioner admits that he performed supervisory activity, he contends that it consumed a small percentage of his work-time. He further argues that he was authorized and required to spend 50 percent of his time "supervising and/or participating in" certain activities. Petitioner alleges that he spent little time "supervising" and most of his time "participating" and actually performing the activities. The evidence demonstrates that among the 80 to 100 people employed at the yard, Petitioner supervised a personnel technician, a financial clerk, a clerical employee, and a receptionist, all of whom required limited supervision. Petitioner primarily served as the personnel liaison for all of the employees, maintained their files, researched personnel matters, and responded to inquiries. He handled the personnel paperwork related to hiring and firing, leave, pay adjustments, travel reimbursements, and employee benefits. In addition, Petitioner investigated and processed workers' compensation claims and handled the yard's safety and training records. He worked on special projects including ferreting out overtime abuse, installing a security system, and handling certain maintenance issues. In addition to his administrative personnel responsibilities, Petitioner admittedly supervised, trained, directed, and evaluated four subordinates and was responsible for improving their performance via counseling and corrective action. He initiated disciplinary action and issued a written reprimand to one employee with poor attendance. On occasion, Petitioner conducted staff meetings with his subordinates and also met with them individually. He managed attendance and approved leave for his staff of four. He participated in interviewing and selecting candidates for open positions under his supervision and determined the appropriate criteria, created the interview questions, and was a member of the interview panel. Petitioner was evaluated, in part, upon his supervision of subordinates. One evaluation noted that he needed to improve follow-up with assignments made to others and another indicated that he capably initiated change, but occasionally required assistance to effectuate it. Petitioner's evaluations also assessed his leadership and delegation skills, and one noted that he delegated well, but needed to work to regain better control of his areas. Although some of Petitioner's time was spent supervising, the evidence demonstrates that the vast majority of his work-time was spent performing non-supervisory activities. The facts show that Petitioner actually performed the noted activities the majority of the time and supervised those activities on occasion. Furthermore, Mr. Nawab, who periodically served as Petitioner's supervisor, provided credible evidence that Petitioner's primary responsibilities and the majority of his work-time involved non-supervisory activities. While Petitioner, during his testimony, diminished the time he spent engaged in supervisory work, the credible evidence demonstrates that he spent the minority of his work-time communicating with, motivating, training, and evaluating employees and planning and directing employees' work. Although Petitioner may have demonstrated mediocre supervisory skills, which does not make the position any less supervisory, neither Petitioner's supervisor nor his position description required him to spend the majority of his work time engaged in those supervisory activities.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The position of Office Support V for the Pinellas Maintenance Yard for the State of Florida Department of Transportation was not exempt from Career Service classification as defined in Subsection 110.205(2)(x), Florida Statutes (2001); Respondent improperly reclassified the position as Selected Exempt Service; and Petitioner should be reinstated with the full benefits accrued since his termination on September 19, 2002. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of May, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM R. PFEIFFER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of May, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert M. Burdick, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Mary F. Aspros, Esquire Meyer and Brooks, P.A. 2544 Blairstone Pines Drive Post Office Box 1547 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Maria N. Sorolis, Esquire Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A. Hyde Park Plaza, Suite 350 324 South Hyde Park Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33606 James C. Myers, Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice by discriminating against Petitioner based on her disability and by retaliating against her, and if so, what, if any, relief is Petitioner entitled to receive.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is Respondent's former employee who began working for Respondent in 1993. Petitioner was most recently assigned to the warehouse in eastern Jacksonville, Florida, where she worked from October 2000 until September 2007. When she first transferred to the warehouse, Petitioner worked as the Return-to-Vendor (“RTV”) Clerk. As the RTV Clerk, Petitioner was responsible for shipping out returned merchandise to vendors and shipping salvaged items to the salvage companies. In 2004, Petitioner transferred to the Receiving Clerk position. Petitioner remained in the Receiving Clerk position until September 19, 2007, when she began a medical leave of absence. Jason Zook became the manager of the warehouse in May 2005. As the Warehouse Manager, Mr. Zook is responsible for overseeing the entire warehouse, including the Receiving Department. Mr. Zook is familiar with the requirements of the Receiving Clerk position because he previously worked in that position at another warehouse. Michael Sinanian is one of the Assistant Warehouse Managers. Mr. Sinanian transferred to the warehouse as an Assistant Warehouse Manager in 2002. Prior to becoming an Assistant Warehouse Manager, Mr. Sinanian worked in the Receiving Department at other warehouses for a little over two and a half years. During that time, Mr. Sinanian worked as a Receiving Manager, a Receiving Supervisor, an RTV Clerk, and a Receiving Clerk. The Receiving Department is located at the back of the warehouse. The warehouse is approximately the length of a football field from front to back. At all times material here, the Receiving Department at the warehouse had four positions: Receiving Manager, Receiving Clerk, Receiving Secretary, and Forklift Driver. In 2007, Deborah Lenox was the Receiving Manager, an employee named Sonya was the Receiving Secretary, Petitioner was the Receiving Clerk, and an employee named Valdean was the Forklift Driver. The Receiving Secretary and the Receiving Clerk have different job responsibilities. The Receiving Secretary is responsible for answering the phone, making vendor appointments, logging the appointments, dealing with paperwork, creating and printing out receiving tags, and logging shipment information into Respondent's computer system. The Receiving Clerk is responsible for counting and checking merchandise against freight bills, opening boxes and cartons with a box knife to verify and count the product, stacking bed-loaded merchandise or merchandise from damaged or unacceptable pallets onto approved pallets, separating mixed items from pallets for checking, wrapping pallets with plastic wrap in preparation for movement onto the warehouse floor, loading merchandise and emptying pallets onto trucks using a manual pallet jack or hand cart, and cleaning and clearing the receiving dock of any debris and trip hazards. Each of these essential job functions requires standing, which is consistent with the job analysis for this position. Respondent has written job analyses, which identify the essential functions of each job and are used to assist the Company, the employee, and the employee’s doctor in determining if the employee can perform the essential functions of his/her job with or without reasonable accommodations. Respondent does not remove or eliminate essential job functions, but will sometimes modify the manner in which the function is to be completed. Respondent will not displace another employee from his position in order to accommodate a disabled employee. A pallet of merchandise can be as much as 60 inches high. A typical pallet coming in the warehouse is a 60-inch cube. An electric pallet jack is a double pallet jack and is approximately 18 feet long. In order to operate an electric pallet jack, an employee has to stand and lean in the direction that she wants the machine to go and turn the handle. There is no seat on an electric pallet jack. Petitioner’s original foot condition was due to osteomyelitis, an infection of the bone. Between 1998 and 1999, Petitioner had four surgeries to address her foot condition. A surgeon placed an artificial plastic bone in Petitioner's foot in July 1999. In September 1999, Petitioner returned to work with medical restrictions that prevented her from standing for long periods of time and from lifting more than 25 or 35 pounds. At some point thereafter, while Petitioner was working at one of Respondent’s warehouses in Memphis, Tennessee, her podiatrist changed her restrictions to add limitations against cashiering, stocking, and inventory. Petitioner understood that the reason for these additional restrictions was that she was not able to do these tasks to the extent they required her to stand for a prolonged period of time. Petitioner’s medical notes stated that she was able to use her discretion as to her limitations, which Petitioner understood to mean that she could sit and rest her foot as needed. Each of these restrictions was permanent. Mr. Zook, Ms. Lenox, and Mr. Sinanian were all aware that Petitioner had medical restrictions relating to her foot condition that prevented her from standing for prolonged periods of time. They were aware that Respondent had agreed to allow Petitioner to sit down when she felt it was necessary, without first having to ask for permission. Despite her restrictions, Petitioner is able to ride her bike, go the grocery store, and work out at the gym. During the relevant time period, Petitioner worked out at the gym approximately four days a week. Her work-out routine included warming up on an elliptical machine for approximately 15-to-20 minutes or walking approximately one mile on the treadmill and using a leg press machine. Respondent performs inventory twice a year. It takes an inventory at all warehouses in February and August. The inventory process begins on Friday night and continues until the following Wednesday. The back-stock is counted on Friday night after closing and the stock on the sales floor is counted on Saturday night after closing. The post- audit process begins on Sunday morning before the warehouse opens to its members and continues on Monday morning. The Saturday night inventory count is more labor- intensive and is considered “all hands on deck.” The Saturday night inventory requires the staff to count approximately $9 million worth of inventory during roughly a five-hour period. On Saturday, Respondent assigns two employees to count the items in each aisle at the same time. The employees double- check each other’s counts. If there is a discrepancy between the employees’ counts, both will recount the items until their counts agree. If there are discrepancies after the Saturday counts between the physical counts and the computer records, the items are recounted during the Sunday post-audit. If variances still remain after the three counts, then the variances are researched during the Monday post-audit. For the Monday post-audit, Respondent only focuses on the larger-quantity, higher-dollar discrepancies. When researching the discrepancies from the variance reports, employees have to perform the following tasks: (a) count items on the floor or up in the steel racks; (b) verify bin tags; (c) research billing, shipment, and return-to-vendor records on Respondent’s computer system; and (d) check the receiving paperwork in an effort to locate and correct the source of the discrepancy. Some items will have been sold between the Saturday night count and the Monday post-audit process. Therefore, the Monday post-audit team also may have to research the sales history on a computer and back out the Sunday sales from the total count. The variance reports reflect the aisle where the item is located, the item count from the inventory count, the computer system count, and the amount of the variance. Employees are typically assigned to work in one department of the warehouse, which may require them to walk from aisle to aisle within that department. In order to assist the Monday post-audit team, the team is permitted to use computers throughout the warehouse. Employees can sit down at the computers when they are researching the variances in item counts. It can take anywhere from 15-to-30 minutes to research one item. The duties involved in the inventory post-audit process are similar to the job duties of the Receiving Clerk position. However, the post-audit does not require as much standing and is less physically demanding because the focus during post-audit is on researching the sources of the variances, rather than simply receiving, counting, and checking- in shipments. In selecting employees to work on the Monday post- audit team, Respondent prefers to schedule people who are familiar with Respondent’s return-to-vendor and receiving processes. Respondent also selects employees who are knowledgeable about Respondent’s AS-400 computer system. In February 2007, Petitioner worked the Saturday night inventory. During that time, she counted the bread then worked at the control desk. Petitioner's job at the control desk was to key-in inventory count sheets into Respondent’s computer system. Petitioner did not view this assignment as inconsistent with her restrictions against working inventory because she was seated for most of the time. In August 2007, Mr. Sinanian was responsible for the post-audit processes, including the scheduling of employees to work post-audit. Due to the requirements of post-audit, Mr. Sinanian selected people who, like Petitioner, were familiar with Respondent’s AS-400 computer system. Approximately 20 employees worked during the Monday post-audit. Mr. Sinanian and Ms. Lenox knew that Petitioner could use her discretion to sit down whenever she felt it was necessary. They had no reason to believe that the post-audit process was inconsistent with Petitioner’s medical restrictions. Therefore, she was selected to work the Monday post-audit. On Saturday, August 25, 2007, Petitioner was again assigned to count bread and then assist with keying inventory count sheets into the system. Petitioner was able to sit down while she was working at the control desk keying the inventory count sheets. Petitioner did not consider her Saturday assignments inconsistent with her restrictions. Petitioner did not work or perform any inventory or post-audit, inventory-related duties on Sunday, August 26, 2007. On Monday, August 27, 2007, the post-audit process lasted from approximately 5:00 a.m. until 10:00 a.m. Petitioner’s shift began at 5:00 a.m. After Petitioner clocked in, she reported to the control desk, where Mr. Sinanian assigned her to check variances for approximately 6 items in Department 14, the sundries department. The sundries department runs along the back right side of the building near the Receiving Department. The sundries department includes items like paper towels, cleaning chemicals, laundry detergent, water, juice, and soda. Petitioner was assigned to research variances between the physical counts and the computer system’s counts for Swiffers, dog bones, dog beds, water, soda, and paper towels. During the August 2007 post-audit process there were at least 18 computers for the employees to use. The computers were located in the Receiving Department, the front office, at the membership desk, and at the podium on the front-end. Employees were free to use any available computer and were able to sit down at most of the computers while researching items. Petitioner never had to wait to use a computer. Petitioner went to whichever computer was closest to her at the time to verify items. After she finished researching all of the items on her variance sheet, Petitioner, like all of the other employees who worked post-audit, met with Mr. Sinanian at the control desk at the front of the store to explain her findings. There was a chair at the control desk for Petitioner to sit in while meeting with Sinanian. The process of meeting with Mr. Sinanian took anywhere from 10-to-30 minutes. Other than discussing her assignment for the day and the post-audit research results, Mr. Sinanian did not have any other discussions with Petitioner on August 27, 2007. Petitioner was able to use her discretion to sit down during post-audit. She was never told that she could not sit down nor was she reprimanded for sitting down. Petitioner admits that she used her discretion to sit down at least twice during post-audit and to kneel down a couple of times. Petitioner also took a 15-minute break during the post-audit process, during which she sat down. After Petitioner finished working post-audit at approximately 10:00 a.m. on August 27, 2007, she returned to the Receiving Department, but left shortly thereafter to take her lunch break. Petitioner’s lunch break lasted for approximately a half-hour. Petitioner walked from the back of the warehouse, where the Receiving Department is located, to the front of the warehouse, where the break room is located, to take her lunch and walked all the way back after the end of her break to return to work. After returning from lunch, Petitioner began working on the UPS shipment. It was a busy day in the Receiving Department, as the UPS shipment had arrived with approximately 72 packages stacked on one pallet that was taller than Petitioner. Because Petitioner felt unable to stand, she could not check in the entire UPS shipment. As a result, Petitioner took it upon herself to take the UPS invoices and input the invoices into Respondent’s computer system, which is one of the Receiving Secretary’s job responsibilities. At some point thereafter, Ms. Lenox asked Petitioner why she was logging in items into Respondent’s computer system, rather than receiving the UPS shipment. Petitioner told Ms. Lenox that her foot was hurting and that she could not stand. Ms. Lenox told Petitioner to take her break and, when she returned from break, they would see how Petitioner’s foot was feeling. Petitioner walked to the front of the warehouse, where she took her second 15-minute break in the break room. Petitioner was able to sit with her foot up during her break. After returning from her break, Petitioner reported to the Receiving Department and told Ms. Lenox that she did not feel she could not stand any longer that day. Petitioner asked if there was something she could do other than her receiving duties. Ms. Lenox told Petitioner that if she could not stand, then Ms. Lenox did not have any more work for her and told her that she should go home. Accordingly, Petitioner went home approximately one hour before her shift ended. Petitioner reported to work the following day, Tuesday, August 28, 2007, at 5:00 a.m. and worked her entire shift. At some point after her shift started that day, Petitioner told Mr. Sinanian that Ms. Lenox would not allow her to take a break during post-audit. Petitioner also told Mr. Sinanian that her foot was swollen and hurting. She took off her shoe to show him her foot. Mr. Sinanian did not see anything unusual about Petitioner’s foot. He did not see any swelling, graying, or a red bump. From the conversation with Petitioner, Mr. Sinanian did not understand that her foot was hurting due to a new injury. Therefore, Mr. Sinanian did not fill out an incident report. Petitioner’s and Mr. Sinanian’s conversation lasted approximately two minutes. At some point after speaking with Petitioner, Mr. Sinanian asked Ms. Lenox if, at any point during post-audit, she told Petitioner that Petitioner could not take a break. Ms. Lenox denied Petitioner’s allegation. Mr. Sinanian had no reason to doubt Ms. Lenox. Petitioner continued to work her job as Receiving Clerk after August 28, 2007. She continued to use her discretion to rest her foot on an as-needed basis. When possible she would sit in a chair to work. She used the electric pallet, letting her foot hang off the platform. Petitioner waited three weeks to seek medical treatment from her podiatrist in West Palm Beach, Florida. She finally saw her doctor on Monday, September 17, 2007. At her appointment, Petitioner’s podiatrist gave her a note that stated, “DUE TO ARTHRITIC CONDITION, CYNTHIA IS UNABLE TO STAND FOR LONG PERIODS OF TIME AND IT IS MEDICALLY NECESSARY FOR HER TO BE OFF HER FOOT FOR 3 WEEKS. DUE TO THE FLARE UP.” Petitioner understood that her podiatrist wanted her to stay off her foot for a few weeks and to be in a sedentary position during that time. Petitioner also understood that these temporary restrictions were more limiting than her prior permanent restrictions. Petitioner reported to work on September 18, 2007, and told Ms. Lenox that her doctor did not want her standing. Ms. Lenox told Petitioner that they would need to speak with Mr. Zook about her restrictions when he arrived at work that day. In the meantime, Ms. Lenox permitted Petitioner to sit down and work on summary sheets. After returning from lunch, Petitioner met with Mr. Zook about her new temporary restrictions. The meeting lasted about an hour or more. Based on Mr. Zook’s prior experience working as a Receiving Clerk, his understanding of the essential job functions of that position, and Petitioner’s podiatrist’s statement that she needed to be off her foot for three weeks, he did not believe that Petitioner could perform the essential functions of that position without violating her doctor’s restrictions. Mr. Zook, nevertheless, asked Petitioner how she thought she could do her job from a seated position. Petitioner did not have any suggestions. There were no available sedentary positions in the warehouse at that time that could have accommodated Petitioner’s no-standing restrictions. As a result, Mr. Zook explained to Petitioner that based on her doctor’s restrictions, which required her to be in a sedentary position, he did not have any work for her at that time. Mr. Zook did not believe that Petitioner’s temporary no-standing restrictions prevented her from working in any capacity. Mr. Zook explained to Petitioner that she could take a leave of absence and return to work after her temporary restrictions expired. Because Petitioner’s restrictions were temporary, Mr. Zook did not contact Respondent’s Human Resources Department to schedule a job accommodation meeting. Despite Mr. Zook’s statement, Petitioner returned to work the following day and performed some work for a period of time. After Mr. Zook arrived at the warehouse, he went back to the Receiving Department and asked Petitioner why she was at work. Mr. Zook reminded Petitioner that he did not have any work for her to do at that time and that he could not allow her to work in violation of her doctor’s restrictions. After speaking with Mr. Zook, Petitioner clocked out, signed some paperwork, and left the building. Petitioner did not return to work after September 19, 2007. On October 15, 2007, Petitioner saw her podiatrist again. Petitioner’s podiatrist extended her temporary no- standing restriction for another six weeks. Petitioner understood, however, that her no-standing restrictions remained temporary at that time. Petitioner applied for and received short-term disability (“STD”) benefits beginning around the end of September 2007. Petitioner used paid time off until the STD period benefits began.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter an order dismissing the Petitions for Relief in these consolidated cases. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of November, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Hnin N. Khaing, Esquire Henrichsen Siegel, PLLC 1648 Osceola Street Jacksonville, Florida 32204 Kathleen Mones, Esquire Seyfarth Shaw LLP 1545 Peachtree Street Northeast, Suite 700 Atlanta, Georgia 30309 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is entitled to recover attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, and Rule 60Q-2.035, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Hitchcock and Driver Enterprises, Inc., is a court reporting firm in Pensacola, Florida, employing less than 25 people and earning less than one million dollars. At the time relevant to this proceeding, the company is owned by Patricia Hitchcock and Denise Driver. Respondent, Department of Labor and Employment Security, pursuant to Chapter 443, Florida Statutes, is the agency responsible for collecting unemployment compensation taxes from employers and administering the payment of those taxes to unemployed persons qualified to receive unemployment compensation. Additionally, the Department is responsible for establishing a system for determining tax liability of employers. The program established by the Department for payment of claims must meet federal requirements which mandates that claims be paid to eligible claimants as fast as administratively feasible. Compliance with the federal standard has been established to require that, over a twelve month period, an average of 87 percent of all claims be paid within fourteen days after the claim is filed and 93 percent within 35 days after the claim is filed. In light of the fast payment requirements established by the federal government, Respondent has established a system which simultaneously determines the payment of an employment claim and an employer's tax liability on written responses to a claimant's claim form, the database of employer reports maintained by Respondent, the Request for Reconsideration of Monetary determination, the Employee's Independent Contractor Questionnaire, the Employer's Independent Contractor Questionnaire and various other forms not relevant to this proceeding. Of necessity, these forms are generic in order to cover as many employment positions and businesses as possible. The underlying proceedings in this case began on September 5, 1991, when Sarah Dukes, a former court reporter performing court reporter services for Petitioner, filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits on form UCS-310 with the Pensacola office of Respondent. In order to determine if Ms. Dukes was entitled to unemployment compensation, the Department reviewed its database to determine Ms. Dukes' employment history. The history is a compilation of employment reports filed by employers, as well as the taxes paid by each employer on behalf of each employee. The history is a factor in determining the amount of compensation to which Ms. Dukes' would be entitled. The review revealed a discrepancy in the work history reported by Ms. Dukes' former employers and that claimed by Ms. Dukes. In general, Ms. Dukes' employer reports on the Department's database did not reflect her alleged employment by Petitioner. In light of the discrepancy, Respondent requested Ms. Dukes to complete form UCB-13, which is a Request for Reconsideration of Monetary Determination, and form UCS-61, which is the Employee Independent Contractor Questionnaire. In response to Dukes' claim, the Pensacola claims office of the Respondent began to investigate Dukes' claim and sent the UCB-13, Request for Reconsideration, via computer to its central office in Tallahassee. The central office designated Ms. Jessica Bruner, a field auditor in its Pensacola office, to investigate the employer and collect information which would enable the Respondent to determine whether Dukes was an employee or an independent contractor. Sometime between September 12th through 15th of, 1991, Auditor Bruner mailed form UCS-60, Employer Independent Contractor Questionnaire, to the Petitioner at its office. At some point, Auditor Bruner visited Petitioner's office but was told by an employee of the Petitioner that Petitioner's owners did not have time to meet and complete the form because the owners were pressed by various court deadlines for transcripts. Petitioner's owners were unaware of the auditor's visit. Mailing the employer questionnaire to Petitioner was not the preferred procedure for handling presenting the employer questionnaire to an employer. The preferred procedure which is not mandated by rule is to hand deliver the questionnaire to the employer. However, given the auditor's later visit, this departure from a preferred procedure is not material in this case. The instructions on the UCS-60, Employer Independent Contractor Questionnaire, state in part: [This form should be completed for ONE individual who is representative of the class of workers whose status is in question]. When a written determination is desired for more than one class of workers, a separate Form UCS-60 should be completed for one worker from each class whose status is typical of that class. A written determination for any worker will be applicable to other workers of the same class, provided the facts are not materially different from those of the worker whose status was ruled upon. You will need to answer these items that do not have a 'Y' (Yes) or 'N' (No) to circle in comments with paragraphs numbered to correspond with the related items. [If any item does not apply to the services performed, enter the letters 'N/A' for 'not applicable' in the margin beside the item]. Responses should contain sufficient detail to explain the circumstances under which the worker performs services. [emphasis supplied]. After receiving the UCS-60, Employer Independent Contractor Questionnaire, Patricia Hitchcock completed the questionnaire on behalf of Petitioner. Neither she nor Ms. Driver attempted to contact any representative of the Respondent for any additional information or clarification of the questions posed by the Respondent on the questionnaire. Similarly, neither of Petitioner's owners consulted with the company's accountant before filling out the employer questionnaire. Around September 17, 1991, the completed employer questionnaire was signed and returned to the Respondent with an employment agreement attached to the UCS-60. The employment agreement was entered into between Sarah Dukes and the Petitioner on July 22, 1991, approximately 45 days prior to Sarah Dukes' claim for unemployment benefits. Throughout the employment agreement Sarah Dukes is referred to as an employee. The agreement uses the term "employee" fourteen times. The agreement does not use the term "independent contractor." Petitioner's employment agreement was drafted by another employee of Petitioner from computer forms without the assistance of either an attorney or accountant. The computer program allegedly designated the form as one for hiring an independent contractor. However, the Respondent was unaware of the origins of the employment agreement utilized by Petitioner at the initiation of the underlying proceeding. Just above Patricia Hitchcock's signature appears the following attestation: I have examined this questionnaire including accompanying documents, and to the best of my knowledge and belief, the facts presented are true, correct, and complete. I fully understand that the purpose of this question- naire is to secure the facts to render a determination on whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor. Even though the form indicates otherwise, Petitioner's owners did not realize that the questionnaire would be the only opportunity to present Petitioner's side of the case before Respondent made a determination of Ms. Dukes' right to benefits and Petitioner's tax liability. Petitioner's owners assumed that there would be further contact from the Department. The UCS-60 and the attached employment agreement were transmitted to the Respondent, Employer Status Section, Block Claims Unit, in Tallahassee for determination of Dukes' status as an employee or independent contractor, claim for benefits and tax liability of Petitioner. In Tallahassee, Unemployment Compensation Examiner, Millie C. Gresham, reviewed the information from Ms. Dukes and Petitioner and on October 8, 1991, determined that Dukes was an employee of Petitioner. Petitioner was notified by mail of Respondent's determination. As indicated earlier, the UCS-60 questionnaire is generic and some of the questions are more applicable to Petitioner's business than other questions. While most of Petitioner's answers to questions posed by the UCS-60 allowed the examiner to make inferences of equal weight, i.e. that Dukes was an employee or an independent contractor, questions from section II, numbers 1.(h), 1.(h)(3), 2.(e), 2.(f) and 2.(l), of the questionnaire carry more weight than other questions. Petitioner's answers to these more critical questions indicate that Sarah Dukes was an employee and not an independent contractor. Moreover, the employment agreement indicates that Sarah Dukes was an employee of Petitioner. Paragraph 5 of the employment agreement states that Sarah Dukes could not directly or indirectly or in any capacity be employed by or work on behalf of any firm in competition with Petitioner. A reasonable interpretation of the language of paragraph 5 is that Sarah Dukes contractually agreed to give up her right to be an independent contractor. On the other hand, Ms. Dukes' claim for unemployment compensation benefits and her answers to questions posed by the form UCS-61, Workers Independent Contractor Questionnaire, consistently indicate that she was an employee of the Petitioner and not an independent contractor. There was some discrepancy between the answers given by Ms. Dukes on her questionnaire and Petitioner on its questionnaire. However, under the Department's system of administration this discrepancy was to be resolved by the Hearing examiner in her review of the evidence, its relative weight and the credibility given the claiming and responding parties. There was no evidence which demonstrated this system did not comply with Chapter 443, Florida Statutes, and or federal law governing resolution of claims and tax liability. Based upon the UCS-60, UCS-61 and the employment agreement, Examiner Gresham's determination had a reasonable basis in fact and in law. Examiner Gresham followed the procedures established by the Department under its authority pursuant to Chapter 443, Florida Statutes, in rendering her determination and weighing the evidence before her. The determination, to the extent it determined Respondent's tax liability, initiated the tax liability/protest portion of this case. On this part of the case, as opposed to the claims determination portions of the case, the Department is not a nominal party since it has determined that Petitioner owes the State unemployment taxes and begins to assess those taxes. It is peculiarity of unemployment taxation that the tax is due per employee once the employer is required by statute to pay such taxes. On or about October 25, 1991, Petitioner submitted a letter dated October 22, 1991 protesting its liability for unemployment compensation taxes as determined by Respondent. Petitioner's letter amended its answers to the previously submitted UCS-60 and states: It is our understanding that your determination was based on the information contained on Form UCS-60 which we completed and mailed to your office at the request of local officials. Since submitting the UCS-60, we have had more time to consider the accuracy of our initial responses to some of the questions contained on the form. We ask that you consider the following responses to the specific questions indicated, as our official response. We believe them to be more accurate and thus more indicative of the real relationship between us and our independent contractors. Preceding the signatures of Patricia D. Hitchcock and Denise B. Driver, Petitioner also expresses apologies: We wish to express our apologies for our initial hasty response, especially in view of the fact that it has caused your determination to be made on the basis of incorrect data. Most importantly the letter attempts to change or more fully explain Petitioner's answers to the critical questions under section II, number 1.(h), 2.(e), and 2.(l). Respondent assigned Special Deputy Rose O'Leary to resolve Petitioner's Protest of Liability. On February 12, 1993, Special Deputy O'Leary held a hearing on the Petitioner's protest of its unemployment compensation tax liability. Ms. Dukes did not appear at the hearing and has not been heard from since her initial claim. The Department appeared at the hearing through its representative. Petitioner appeared through its owners, Ms. Hitchcock and Ms. Driver. Ms. Hitchcock and Ms. Driver testified about the Petitioner's questionnaire and amending letter. Additionally, testimony was offered about court reporting employment practices in general, as well as testimony from Petitioner's accountant. The accountant's testimony appeared to be beneficial to the case. Because Ms. Dukes was not present at the hearing no evidence was offered on her side of the case other than the documents she originally filed. The Department attempted to support its determination of liability. On May 6, 1993, Special Deputy O'Leary reversed Examiner Gresham's determination and in doing so found: Consideration was given to an apparent inconsistency between the Petitioner's initial answers to a questionnaire and testimony presented at the hearing. [The demeanor of the witnesses at the hearing was such that the Special Deputy accepts the Petitioner's position that it was confused and did not understand the questions or the significance of their answers at the time of completion of the questionnaire]. The testimony of the Petitioner's witnesses is accepted as an accurate depiction of the working relationship between the Petitioner and the workers. [emphasis supplied]. On August 18, 1993, Respondent issued its Final Order adopting the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Special Deputy. Upon the decision becoming final, Petitioner became the prevailing party in the underlying action. After the entry of the Final Order, Petitioner hired Lawrence Kaden, Esquire, as its attorney to represent it on a pro bono basis contingent upon its winning the derivative Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, fee case to collect Petitioner's costs in litigating Ms. Dukes' claim and Petitioner's tax liability. Attached to the Petition in this case was an affidavit from Petitioner outlining various time and expenses incurred by Petitioner in litigating the underlying action. That affidavit reflects an expenditure for the accountant who testified at the underlying hearing in this matter. The fee charged by the accountant in the amount of $846.53 was for the accountant's preparation and testimony at what was a five hour hearing. The amount was not shown to be unreasonable and the testimony was useful to the Special Deputy. Therefore, the expense is a compensable cost of this proceeding should Petitioner be entitled to reimbursement for such costs. The other items on Petitioner's affidavit were for costs associated with travel, hours (at $40.00 per hour) spent by Petitioner's owners in preparing for the initial determination and the eventual hearing in this matter. However, these items are not normally items for which costs or fees may be assessed and, in this case, the equities on either side do not warrant a special award of these items. The Petitioner also seeks reimbursement for costs of $309.57 for the appellate filing fee and travel costs associated with this appeal. The appellate court did not award costs of the appeal in its earlier decision in this case. Moreover, the travel costs claimed by Petitioner are not normally awarded and the equities in this case doe not militate in favor of such an award. Neither of these costs should be awarded in this case. The Petitioner did not contain an affidavit of attorney's fees from Mr. Kaden which itemized the number of hours or services rendered by him once he was retained by Petitioner. The affidavit was produced for the first time at the final hearing in this matter. The Petition did contain two affidavits from local attorneys attesting to the fact that an attorney's fee of $150.00 an hour was a reasonable fee in this case. At the hearing, Petitioner's expert testified that $150.00 per hour was a reasonable fee in this matter. The evidence supported a reasonable fee of $150.00 an hour. The evidence did not support an award of a multiplier under the Lodestar factors. However, the lack of an itemized affidavit from Mr. Kaden causes the Petition to not meet the requirements of Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, for an award of attorney's fees. More importantly, however, Petitioner is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs because Respondent's actions and determinations were substantially justified in this case. The Department established a procedure pursuant to Section 443.141(2)(b), Florida Statutes, which provided for a process of determining employer liability and for appealing such determinations. That process was substantially followed and the Respondent's examiner reviewed and weighed the evidence which was before her resolving any issues of credibility. Indeed, much of the basis of the Department's initial determination was a direct result of Petitioner's inaccurate responses to the Employer's Independent Contractor Questionnaire. Given these facts, Petitioner is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees or costs under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes.
The Issue Whether City of Belleair Beach Treasurer Robert K. Hebden was an independent contractor or an employee of the city.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner City of Belleair Beach (City) is a participating local agency of the Florida Retirement System (FRS) and is subject to the laws applicable to the FRS. The City began participating in the FRS through the adoption of City Ordinance 99 in 1973. The Respondent Division of Retirement (Division) is the state agency charged by statute with the administration of the FRS. On a date unspecified, the Division's Management Review Section audited the City as required by statute. Based on the audit, the Division concluded that Mr. Hebden was not an independent contractor, but was a part time employee of the City. The Division communicated this information to the City by letter of May 27, 1992. The Division's Enrollment Section, responsible for enrolling employees in the FRS, conducted an analysis of the materials obtained by the Management Review Section, and concurred in the initial employment status determination. By letter of October 11, 1993, the Director of the State Division of Retirement notified the City that the Division had determined Mr. Hebden to be have been an employee in a regularly established position for purposes of the FRS from July 1979 through February 1991, and that FRS contributions were due for that period. On October 15, 1993, Mr. Hebden signed an FRS application for service retirement. The application was filed with the FRS. Mr. Hebden completed the application on the suggestion of the Enrollment Section Administrator. Mr. Hebden considers himself to have worked for the City as an independent contractor and would not have filed an FRS application without the request by the enrollment administrator. In concluding that Mr. Hebden was an employee, the Division reviewed all materials furnished by the City. Such materials included copies of contracts, billing statements and IRS forms. At all times, the Division has been amenable to reviewing any additional documents submitted by the City. Beginning in 1972, and continuing to February of 1991, Robert K. Hebden provided various services to the City. Beginning in July 1979, Mr. Hebden served as the City Treasurer. The position of Belleair Beach City Treasurer is established by city ordinance. The position description for the City Treasurer sets forth duties as follows: The treasurer works on a daily basis primarily under the mayor's supervision but is ultimately accountable to the city council. Compiles operating and capital expense estimates for annual budget. Forecasts problem areas of income and expense and proposes possible solutions. Maintains general accounting system and appropriate operating cash balances. Submits to council a monthly detailed statement of revenue and disbursements in contrast with annual budget. Prepares for submission to council a detailed financial statement as of the end of each fiscal year. Invests surplus General Government Funds in conjunction with the Mayor or Deputy Mayor and recommends investment of Sewer Trust Funds in conjunction with the approved Trustee. Provides for payment of bonds and interest and maintains files for cancelled coupons and bonds. Maintains capital assets inventory including acquisition and disposition. Between July 1, 1979 and February 12, 1991, Mr. Hebden was the Belleair Beach City Treasurer. He performed the duties of the position description and such additional duties as were assigned at the discretion of the Mayor and Council. In February 1983, Mr. Hebden and the City entered into a written contract regarding his service as Treasurer. The initial contract was retroactive to October 1, 1982. Prior to this point, Mr. Hebden acted as City Treasurer under an oral agreement with the City officials. The February 2, 1983 contract identifies Mr. Hebden as "the Contractor." The contract is for the one year period of October 1, 1982 to September 30, 1983 and provides as follows: The Contractor will be allowed twelve (12) days of paid sick leave and at times mutually agreeable fifteen (15) days of vacation without adjustment to the monthly fee. Absence in excess of this amount will be adjusted on a prorata basis. The work week will be 8:30 A. M. to 12:30 P. M. daily, Monday through Friday, except for legal holidays recognized by the City. In addition, attendance will be required at Council meetings, work sessions and committee meetings, as may be determined by the Mayor. Services will be reimbursed on a monthly basis at the rate of SEVEN HUNDRED DOLLARS ($700.00) per month, plus an allowance of SEVENTY DOLLARS ($70.00) for expenses upon receipt of a statement. This agreement may be extended beyond the original term of One (1) year upon such terms and conditions as the parties shall mutually agree between them. Beginning with the subsequent agreement dated July 14, 1983, all contracts identify Mr. Hebden as "the City Treasurer" rather than "the Contractor." The July 14, 1983 contract provides as follows: That Robert K. Hebden shall serve the City of Belleair Beach as the City Treasurer, appointed by the City Council. The services of the City Treasurer shall be performed between the hours of 8:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. daily, Monday through Friday, except for legal holidays recognized by the City. In addition, attendance will be required at Council meetings, work sessions and committee meetings, as may be determined by the Mayor. The duties of the City Treasurer shall include but not be limited to: -compilation of current and capital expense estimates for the annual budget -maintenance of a general accounting system -submission to the city council of a monthly detailed statement of revenue and disbursements in contrast with the annual budget -preparation for submission to council of a detailed financial statement as to the end of each fiscal year A RETAINER fee shall be paid by the City of Belleair Beach to the City Treasurer for the above service which shall be EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY DOLLARS AND NO/100 ($830.00) per month. THIS AGREEMENT shall be reviewed annually by the Personnel Committee of the City Council, the Mayor and the City Treasurer. THIS AGREEMENT shall expire on September 30 of each year unless renewed by Council prior to that time. THIS AGREEMENT shall be cancelled by either party upon a thirty (30) day notice of intent to do so. The September 10, 1984 contract for the one year period to September 30, 1985 is identical to the agreement of July 14, 1983 except that the retainer fee was increased to $900.00 monthly. The July 15, 1985 contract for the one year period to September 30, 1986 is similar to the agreement of September 10, 1984. The retainer fee was increased to $1100.00 monthly and paid leave was again included. The agreement provides as follows: ....In addition, the City Treasurer shall receive three work-weeks vacation annually (allowing for a base figure of 3 work-weeks for the current fiscal year) and twelve work-days sick leave annually (allowing for twelve work-days for the current fiscal year). THIS AGREEMENT shall be reviewed annually by the Personnel Committee of the City Council, the Mayor and the City Treasurer. THIS AGREEMENT shall commence October 1, 1985, and shall expire on September 30 of each year unless renewed by Council prior to that time. THIS AGREEMENT shall be cancelled by either party upon a thirty (30) day notice of intent to do so. The September 23, 1986 contract for the one year period to September 30, 1987 is substantially similar to the preceding contract, however, an amendment was made to the paid leave provisions. The agreement provides as follows: That Robert K. Hebden shall serve the City of Belleair Beach as the City Treasurer, appointed by the City Council. The services of the City Treasurer shall be performed between the hours of 8:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. daily, Monday through Friday, except for legal holidays recognized by the City. In addition, attendance will be required at Council meetings, work sessions and committee meetings, as may be determined by the Council or Mayor. The duties of the City Treasurer shall include but not be limited to: compilation of current and capital expense estimates for the annual budget maintenance of a general accounting system submission to the city council of a monthly detailed statement of revenue and disbursements in contrast with the annual budget preparation for submission to council of a detailed financial statement as to the end of each fiscal year A RETAINER fee shall be paid by the City of Belleair Beach to the City Treasurer for the above service which shall be ELEVEN HUNDRED THIRTY DOLLARS AND NO/100 ($1100.00) per month. In addition, the City Treasurer shall receive three work-weeks vacation annually and twelve work-days sick leave annually. Annual leave, which will only be applied against working days, and shall be taken in not less than four (4) hour increments, may accrue to a maximum of fifteen (15) days. Annual leave in excess of fifteen (15) days will be forfeited on the following anniversary date after the year in which earned. The August 3, 1987 contract for the one year period of October 1, 1987 to September 30, 1988 is substantially similar to the preceding contract except that the work hours were amended to 8:00 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and monthly payment was increased to $1300.00. The September 12, 1988 contract for the one year period of October 1, 1988 to September 30, 1989 is substantially similar to the preceding contract except that monthly payment was increased to $1350.00. In 1989, some Council members questioned Mr. Hebden's performance and considered termination of his contract. The September 25, 1989 contract for the one year period of October 1, 1989 to September 30, 1990 is substantially similar to the preceding contract except that the agreement provides "for a six months performance evaluation." Apparently, the concerned Council members were satisfied with the review and the contract was again renewed. The September 10, 1990 contract reflected Mr. Hebden's intention to leave his position. The contract provides as follows: That Robert K. Hebden shall serve the City of Belleair Beach as the City Treasurer, appointed by the City Council. The services of the City Treasurer shall be performed between the hours of 8:00 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. daily, Monday through Friday, except for legal holidays recognized by the City. In addition, attendance will be required at Council meetings, work sessions and committee meetings, as may be determined by the Council or Mayor. The duties of the City Treasurer shall include but not be limited to: compilation of current and capital expense estimates for the annual budget maintenance of a general accounting system submission to the city council of a monthly detailed statement of revenue and disbursements in contrast with the annual budget preparation for submission to council of a detailed financial statement as to the end of each fiscal year * A RETAINER fee shall be paid by the City of Belleair Beach to the City Treasurer for the above service which shall be [[THIRTEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY DOLLARS AND NO/100 ($1350.00)]] <<FOURTEEN HUNDRED FIFTY DOLLARS AND NO/100 ($1450.00)>> per month. In addition, the City Treasurer shall receive [[three work-weeks vacation annually and twelve]] <<three>> work-days sick leave [[annually. Annual leave, which will only be applied against working days, and shall be taken in not less than four (4) hour increments, may accrue to a maximum of fifteen (15) days. Annual leave in excess of fifteen (15) days will be forfeited on the following anniversary date after the year in which earned.]] <<Annual leave earned through September 30, 1990 and not taken will be paid on completion of this contract.>> [[THIS AGREEMENT shall provide for a six months performance evaluation.]] [[THIS AGREEMENT shall be reviewed annually by the personnel committee of the City Council, the Mayor and the City Treasurer.]] THIS AGREEMENT shall commence October 1, 1985, and shall expire on <<December 31, 1990>> [[September 30 of each year unless renewed by Council prior to that time.]] THIS AGREEMENT shall be cancelled by either party upon a thirty (30) day notice of intent to do so. * Note: In the above quotation, language which has been added is within the <<>>; deleted language is within the [[]]. All the contracts identified herein were between the City and Mr. Hebden personally. Mr. Hebden signed the contracts. Except as otherwise stated herein, the terms of the contracts were negotiated between Mr. Hebden and the City. Mr. Hebden performed all the responsibilities of the contract personally. For a brief period, he was assisted by a man identified as "Mr. Denman," a person employed by the City. He hired no assistants. Mr. Hebden performed his responsibilities according to practices and procedures he created. He was not provided instructions by the City on how to perform his tasks. The City provided no training to Mr. Hebden. Prior to terminating his tenure as City Treasurer, Mr. Hebden trained his successor in the practices and procedures Mr. Hebden had developed. At all times during Mr. Hebden's employment with the City, he worked the hours specified by the contracts in his office at City Hall. Mr. Hebden testified that he could not recall how his office hours had been determined. The space was provided by the City. The responsibilities of Mr. Hebden's position required utilization of city records, and it was therefore appropriate for such tasks to be performed in an office at City Hall. All furnishings for the office and materials used in performing his tasks were provided by the City. During the period between July 1979 and February 1991, Mr. Hebden submitted to the City statements for payment. Generally, the statements were submitted on a monthly basis. Mr. Hebden had no risk of profit or loss based on any actions of the City. He had no personal investment in the City. Mr. Hebden was paid according to the terms of the contract. He did not receive additional remuneration for his appearance at or participation in Council meetings, work sessions or committee meetings as directed by the Council or Mayor. In the first written contract, Mr. Hebden received a payment for "expenses" in addition to the monthly remuneration. Additionally, Mr. Hebden was reimbursed for personal expenses related to City business use of his car and his boat. Although only one formal performance evaluation was completed during his service, the contracts provide for annual review, except for the final contract which terminated Mr. Hebden's service to the City. Upon said termination, Mr. Hebden was paid for the accrued annual leave. Under the terms of the contract, Mr. Hebden's services could be terminated without penalty upon thirty days notice by either party. Mr. Hebden did not advertise his services to the general public, because he was not interested in taking on additional work, however, for a time, he provided accounting consulting services to the Indian Rocks Fire Control District and was compensated for his work. He also provided volunteer services to the Church of the Isles. During the period relevant to this proceeding Mr. Hebden held no business or occupational licenses. For the years 1979 through 1982, the City reported Mr. Hebden's compensation to the Internal Revenue Service Form by using IRS Form 1099-NEC, the form used to report "Nonemployee Compensation." For the years 1983 through 1991, the City reported Mr. Hebden's compensation to the Internal Revenue Service Form by using IRS Form 1099-MISC, the form used to report "Miscellaneous Compensation." The City did not provide health or life insurance coverage to Mr. Hebden. The City did not pay federal social security or withholding taxes for Mr. Hebden. The City did not provide or pay workers compensation benefits or unemployment benefits for Mr. Hebden. The City did not pay retirement contributions to the FRS for Mr. Hebden.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a Final Order determining that as City Treasurer of the City of Belleair Beach from July 1979 through February 1991, Robert K. Hebden was an employee of the City, and as such was a compulsory member of the Florida Retirement System for which contributions from the City are due. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 21st day of March, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of March, 1994. APPENDIX TO CASE NO. 93-6518 The following constitute rulings on proposed findings of facts submitted by the parties. Petitioner The Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 3. Rejected, contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Mr. Hebden submitted invoices for payment as early as July, 1979. 11. Rejected, not supported by greater weight of the evidence. Because Mr. Hebden developed his own procedures for performing the duties of the City Treasurer, and trained his successor in performing the tasks of City Treasurer, it is not possible to conclude that Mr. Hebden's services were "not essential to the success or continuation of the City's operation." Rejected, irrelevant. Rejected, contrary to greater weight of evidence. Mr. Hebden testified on direct examination that he could not recall who chose the work hours set forth by contract. All contracts specify the hours to be worked. As to leave time, the first contract provided that such leave could be used only "at times mutually agreeable...." Subsequent contracts required annual leave to be used in four hour increments. Rejected, contrary to greater weight of evidence. Mr. Hebden testified that some auto and boat expenses had been reimbursed. First contract and invoices for payment through September 30, 1982 include payment of sums for "expenses." Rejected, contrary to greater weight of evidence. The contracts specify standard hours of employment and require attendance at meetings as directed by the Mayor and Council. The Respondent's assertion that Mr. Hebden "could make a profit or suffer a loss" is unsupported by credible evidence. Respondent The Respondent's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 5. Rejected, as to employment status of Mr. Hebden's predecessor or successor as City Treasurer, irrelevant. 28, 30. Rejected, as to employment status of Mr. Hebden's successor as City Treasurer, irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Bldg. C 2639 N. Monroe St. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 William H. Lindner, Secretary Knight Building, Suite 307 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Paul A. Rowell, General Counsel Knight Building, Suite 312 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-0950 Thomas J Trask, Esquire Frazer, Hubbard, Brandt & Trask 595 Main Street Dunedin, Florida 34698 Jodi B. Jennings, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner, Fredrick Bass, was subjected to employment discrimination by the Respondent, The University of West Florida, on account of his race or disability or as retaliation because of his past filing of an EEOC complaint against a former employer.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a black male with a disability involving a post- traumatic, arthritic condition of the left knee. In his past work history, the Petitioner had been a firefighter. When he was thus employed, on one occasion, he filed a discrimination complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against the fire department where he was employed. The Respondent is the University of West Florida, a state agency. It became embroiled in the disputes at issue when it first advertised for the filling of a vacancy for the position of Senior Custodial Supervisor and, after the advertising and interviewing process described below, hired another black male with a disability, instead of the Petitioner. The Respondent advertised to fill the vacancy for the position of Senior Custodial Supervisor because of the death of the person who had previously occupied that position. There was an insufficient response to the first advertisement of the vacancy, and Dan Simpler, the Director of Building Services for the Respondent, who would supervise the occupant of that position, requested that the position be re-advertised. The Petitioner had not responded to the first advertisement, in any event. The second advertisement was issued in August of 1993. This time, the Petitioner was one of the applicants who responded. Several applicants withdrew after learning that the salary for the position would be at the lower-end of the advertised salary range and was insufficient for their needs. This left the Respondent with only three remaining applicants, who appeared to meet the minimum qualifications for the position. One of the three applicants was the Petitioner. The Respondent, in the conduct of its application and selection process, inquired of former employers, concerning whether they would give an applicant a favorable recommendation. The Respondent so inquired of the Petitioner's former employers. The Respondent was unable to obtain a favorable recommendation from any of the Petitioner's former employers. In response to Mr. Simpler's inquiry, the Chief of the Fire Department at the Naval Air Station in Pensacola, Florida, the Petitioner's most recent former employer, informed Mr. Simpler that he would not rehire the Petitioner if given the opportunity to do so. The Petitioner had informed Mr. Simpler that he believed that the Chief of the Fire Department would not give him a favorable recommendation because the Petitioner had once filed a complaint with the EEOC against that employer. In any event, Mr. Simpler deemed that having a pool of only three applicants gave the Respondent insufficient choices for the position. Therefore, he requested that the position be advertised for a third time in order to obtain a larger pool of applicants. In response to the third advertisement, a number of other applications were received. One of them was that of James O. Rankins, who is a male, African-American, who also has a disability. See Respondent's Exhibit 6 in evidence. Mr. Rankins' application reflected considerable supervisory experience, both during his service with the United States Army and his position as a Site Manager for Service Master, Inc. at the Monsanto plant near Pensacola, Florida. He retired from the United States Army as a Sergeant Major, the highest non- commissioned rank. In the opinion of Mr. Simpler and others involved in the hiring at the University, this demonstrated a high level of leadership capability. Since his military retirement, in his capacity as the Site Manager for Service Master, Inc., the maintenance contractor, at the Monsanto chemical plant near Pensacola, Florida, he had supervised 45 custodial personnel. He was responsible for cleaning and maintenance of 150 buildings and shops, as well as over 250 offices and restrooms. The Petitioner was an applicant in the third pool of applications in response to the third advertisement. Mr. Simpler learned of a former employer, Lanyap Corporation, and questioned the former owner concerning the Petitioner's previous employment at that firm. Larry Wiggins, the former owner of Lanyap Corporation, told Mr. Simpler that he would not rehire the Petitioner if given the opportunity to do so. Mr. Wiggins advised Mr. Simpler that the Petitioner had not been employed as a Supervisor by Lanyap Corporation, although the Petitioner had indicated that to be the case on his application for employment filed with the Respondent. The five persons on the Respondent's selection committee, charged with hiring to fill the subject position, considered the qualifications and experience of all of the applicants. After evaluating all of the applicants, with the assistance of personal interviews, the committee recommended that James Rankins be employed as the Senior Custodial Supervisor. Members of the selection committee recommended Mr. Rankins for the position based upon his superior qualifications and experience, including his demonstrated leadership and supervisory abilities. The Petitioner's race and disability were not factors in the selection process. Indeed, Mr. Rankins is an African-American, also with a disability, as shown by the Respondent's Exhibit 6 in evidence. Ms. Bertha Mae Jones is the staff member at the University who interviewed the Petitioner, as well as Mr. Rankins. Ms. Jones is black and has been employed at the University for 27 years. She does not recall hearing the Petitioner mention his handicap or disability but stated that it would not have mattered if he had one, as long as he could do the job in question. She also interviewed Mr. Rankins and felt that Mr. Rankins had much superior qualifications and experience. He demonstrated that he had had a long-term ability for good supervision. Because of his superior qualifications, Ms. Jones recommended that Mr. Rankins be hired instead of the Petitioner. None of the members of the selection committee, other than the Director of Building Services, knew that the Petitioner had filed an EEOC complaint against one of his former employers. The filing of that complaint was shown to have had no effect on the hiring decision made by the Respondent's selection committee. The selection committee's recommendation that Mr. Rankins be employed to fill the position of Senior Custodial Supervisor was forwarded to the head of the department and to the Vice-President for Administrative Affairs. The recommendation was accepted. Mr. Rankins, a black male with a disability, was hired by the Respondent to fill the subject position.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a Final Order concluding that the Respondent, the University of West Florida, did not commit an unlawful employment practice, by employing James O. Rankins to fill the position of Senior Custodial Supervisor, instead of the Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of January, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of January, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-2450 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact The following numbers assigned to proposed findings of fact by the Petitioner do not correspond to any numbered paragraphs in the Petitioner's letter/proposed recommended order because there were no such numbered paragraphs. The Petitioner did prove that he belonged to a racial minority, and that proposed finding is accepted. The Petitioner's assertion that he was qualified for the position in question has not been proven, and that is rejected. The Petitioner's proposed finding that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected for the position, is rejected because he was found to be less qualified than the applicant chosen for the position. The Petitioner's proposed finding to the effect that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants with his qualifications, is rejected as not in accord with the preponderance of the evidence. The relevant advertisement and interviewing process was that after the third advertisement, when the Petitioner remained an applicant and Mr. Rankins' application was received, the position did not remain open, Mr. Rankins was hired at the conclusion of that third advertisement and interview selection process. The remainder of the Petitioner's "proposed findings", in essence, constitute argument concerning the weight of the testimony and evidence but to the extent that he attempts to assert that it has been proven factually that Mr. Simpler had not talked to the fire chief, the Petitioner's former employer, because the telephone numbers at the relevant fire station were not the same as the fire chief's actual telephone number, does not prove that Mr. Simpler did not talk to the fire chief. In fact, it is found that he did. This proposed finding, to the extent that it is one, is rejected. The apparent proposed finding that the five board members on the selection committee found the Petitioner qualified, subject to the fact that it had received bad recommendations from former employers, is rejected as not in accord with the preponderant weight of the evidence. In fact, the Petitioner was not the best qualified person for the position, Mr. Rankins was. These are the only proposed findings of fact that can be gleaned from the letter filed by the Petitioner. The remainder constitutes an attempt at legal and factual argument which do not constitute proposed findings of fact amenable to specific rulings. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-13. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Fredrick Bass 75 South Madison Drive Pensacola, Florida 32505 M. J. Menge, Esquire SHELL, FLEMING, DAVIS & MENGE Post Office Box 1831 Pensacola, Florida 32598 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana C. Baird, Esquire General Counsel Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner in September 1999.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this case, Petitioner, Ausbon Brown, Jr. (Petitioner), an African-American male born on April 25, 1943, contends that Respondent, Department of Environmental Protection (Department), unlawfully refused to hire him for any one of four positions he applied for on account of his race, gender, and age. The Department denies the allegation and contends that Petitioner did not meet all of the qualifications for the positions, and that it hired the most qualified employee in each instance. After a preliminary investigation was conducted by the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission), which took almost two years to complete, the Commission issued a Determination: No Cause on August 18, 1999. Although not specifically established at hearing, it can be reasonably inferred from the evidence that Respondent employed at least 15 employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year and thus is an employer within the meaning of the law. Petitioner received a Bachelor of Science degree in biology in 1965 from Florida A&M University, a Master of Science degree in wildlife and fisheries science in 1978 from Texas A&M University, and a doctorate in wildlife and fisheries science in 1991 from Texas A&M University. From June 1965 until April 1994, Petitioner worked in various positions for the U. S. Department of Commerce, National Marine Fisheries Service, including as a "survey statistician," "operations research analyst," "chief turtle headstart," "fishery biologist," "fishery technician, and "equal employment opportunity counselor." Petitioner then presumably retired from federal service. Beginning on July 28, 1995, and continuing for several years, he was employed as a child support enforcement case analyst with the Florida Department of Revenue (DOR). His current employment is not of record. After leaving federal service, Petitioner says he filed around 120 job applications with various state agencies, including the Department. When a position becomes vacant and is ready to be filled, all state agencies provide a short summary of information regarding that position to the Department of Management Services (DMS) so that potential job applicants are aware of the vacancy. The information provided by the agencies constitutes "the bare essentials" about a job and includes a brief description of the job duties, the minimum qualifications necessary for the position, and an agency contact person. That information is then placed by DMS into a computer program (COPES), which generates a document known as a vacancy announcement. The vacancy announcements can be accessed by other state agencies who have a COPES terminal. While employed by the DOR, which apparently had such access, Petitioner relied upon the vacancy announcements generated by COPES for filing various applications with the Department. During the relevant time period, and even continuing until today, whenever a vacant position occurs, the Department prepares a Job Opportunity Announcement (JOA) which lists, among other things, the position's minimum qualifications; class title; description of job duties; required entry-level knowledge, skills, and abilities; a contact person in the Department who can provide further information; and the deadline for submitting an application. It is fair to say that this document contains far more information regarding the position than the vacancy announcement generated by DMS. The Department also prepares a Selection Criteria Form for each vacancy which enumerates a number of essential and preferred selection criteria which the applicant must satisfy in order to be considered for employment. In addition, the form contains the name, address, and telephone number of a Department employee who can be contacted for further information on the position. Like the JOAs, this document is available to an applicant upon request, and the Department's general practice is to fax or mail this form to the applicant within 24 hours after a request is made. Although each job application form advises the applicant to "[l]ist the knowledge, skills, and abilities that you will bring to the job," and to refer to the JOA or listed contact person to determine those specific requirements, Petitioner did not have the JOA or the Selection Criteria Form when he prepared and filed his applications, nor did he speak with the contact person. After a position has been filled, the Department prepares a Recruitment Report, which identifies demographic information regarding all persons who filed an application, the name of the successful candidate, and the hiring person's justification for choosing that individual. During the initial screening of all applications, a Department personnel specialist reviews the applications to determine if an applicant meets all essential and preferred selection criteria listed on the Selection Criteria Form. If an applicant fails to meet any of these criteria, the applicant is automatically cut from the list. The applicant is also cut from the list if the application is filed after the deadline or is incomplete. In determining whether an applicant meets all selection criteria, the personnel specialist will attempt to "glean" from the applicant's work history whether he or she satisfies a particular criterion. If the subject matter is highly technical, the specialist will seek technical advice from other Department personnel to make that determination. It goes without saying that the applicant who has the JOA and the Selection Criteria Form can better tailor his or her work experience on the application to the specifics of the job being sought. For those applicants who do not meet all selection criteria, who have filed their application after the filing deadline, or who have filed an incomplete application, the Department sends out a standard form letter advising them that they have not been selected for the position. Petitioner received such a letter after each application was filed. There is no requirement that the rejection letter contain a detailed explanation of the reasons why a specific candidate was not selected. Although Petitioner applied for a number of positions with the Department since 1994, only four applications are in issue here. They are positions 11390; 20340; 10084; and 10301. The first three positions were classified as an Environmental Specialist II, while the last position was classified as an Environmental Specialist III. Positions 20340 and 10301 were processed by the Department's Tallahassee office while positions 11390 and 10084 were processed by the Department's Pensacola office. Petitioner submitted virtually identical applications for each of these positions. As to position 10301, an Environmental Specialist III, 76 applicants applied for the job, and 10 were ultimately given an interview. Although Petitioner met the minimum qualifications listed in the vacancy announcement, he was "cut" from the list during the initial screening process because the position was a "groundwater position," and he had "little experience in water supply plans and development and large scale water management projects." Thus, he could not meet all essential and preferred criteria. On the other hand, the successful applicant, a white male (age unknown), met all essential and preferred criteria; he also had 16 years experience in water management with specific experience "on such issues as water supply planning, establishing minimum flows and levels, establishing pollutant load reduction goals and total maximum daily loads, and watershed management." The evidence shows that a better qualified person was hired for this position, and Petitioner did not meet all essential or preferred criteria. Position 20340, an Environmental Specialist II, required that the successful applicant have knowledge of the Everglades ecosystem. Ninety-eight persons applied for the job, and only six were invited for an interview. Petitioner met all minimum qualifications, but like many other candidates, he failed to meet all of the essential qualifications. In addition, "[o]ther applicants provided information indicating better qualifications with regard to essential and preferred selection criteria." The successful applicant, a Department employee, was a white male (age unknown) who "[f]ully [met] all essential selection criteria" and "nearly fully [met] all preferred selection criteria." Further, the successful applicant had "much relevant experience with monitoring, sample analysis and data interpretation relevant to/taken from the Everglades." In this instance, the most qualified person was hired, and Petitioner again failed to meet all essential qualifications for the position. As to position 10084, an Environmental Specialist II, 50 persons submitted complete and timely applications, but only 14 were interviewed. In addition, 20 other applications were filed by persons who were either unqualified or filed their applications after the deadline; they were automatically cut from any further review. Because Petitioner's application was filed after the December 23, 1996, deadline, his application was not considered. Therefore, on this basis alone, Petitioner's claim must necessarily fail. As it turned out, a white male (age unknown) who met all essential and preferred selection criteria was selected for the position; that individual was found to exceed the education, experience, and knowledge requirements of the job. The evidence shows that the most qualified person was selected for the job. Finally, as to position 11390, also an Environmental Specialist II, 42 persons applied for the position, but only 8 were given an interview. Petitioner submitted no information on his application which indicated that he had knowledge of the Department's Pollution Control Program, or that he was versed in ecosystem management, both essential selection criteria for the job. Ultimately, the successful candidate was a white female (under age 40), who had "hands on" experience in ecosystem management and grant writing and displayed outstanding public speaking skills. She also led the State "in the indicator studies." While Petitioner argues that based on his education and work experience, he "matches the criteria better than the selected applicant," the more persuasive evidence supports a finding that the position was filled by the best qualified person and that Petitioner did not meet all preferred and essential selection criteria for the position. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Petitioner contended that without the Selection Criteria Form, there was no way he could accurately tailor his work experience to the specific criteria required for the job. However, the form was readily available to any applicant by simply calling the number given on the vacancy announcement and requesting that it be faxed or mailed the same day. Petitioner also contended that he had no time to request a JOA or Selection Criteria Form since applications generally were due within a matter of days. This time constraint, however, uniformly applied to all candidates. Further, the evidence shows that if an applicant telephoned the Department contact person before the deadline had run and advised that he wished to file an application but could not file it before the deadline, a short extension would normally be granted. Petitioner next contended that in several instances the Department violated a DMS rule by using a vacancy to promote an existing employee. As to this contention, Petitioner misconstrued the manner in which the rule is applied, and the evidence shows that the Department fully complied with all DMS personnel rules when it filled the questioned positions. Petitioner further contended that the investigation conducted by the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission) was flawed, and that the reason given by the Commission investigator for recommending a determination of no cause was not true. He also criticized the length of time it took to complete the investigation, saying this deprived him of an opportunity to seek redress in state courts. Since Petitioner was given a de novo hearing to challenge the Commission's preliminary determination, the investigator's conclusions are irrelevant. At the same time, the Department should not be faulted for the Commission's delay in processing the complaint. Finally, Petitioner contended that his educational background surpassed that of the successful applicants, and that his rejection is a clear indication of discrimination on the part of the Department. The positions in question, however, are highly technical in nature; besides the educational requirements, a candidate must also satisfy essential and preferred selection criteria that fit the duties of the job. In most cases, these can only be met through direct work experience in the specified areas, which the evidence shows that Petitioner lacked. On the other hand, all of the successful applicants satisfied these essential and preferred selection criteria. There was no credible evidence that the Department "chang[ed] classifications and var[ied] conditions of employment" in an effort to deny Petitioner employment, or that the Department's actions were a pretext for discrimination, as alleged in the Petition for Relief. Further, there is no evidence that the employment decisions were grounded on discriminatory animus in any respect, or that a discriminatory reason motivated the Department in its actions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing, with prejudice, the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of March, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (850) 488-9675, SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of March, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Ausbon Brown, Jr. Post Office Box 10946 Daytona Beach, Florida 32120-0946 Marshall G. Wiseheart, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times material to this proceeding, the Petitioner was an employee of the state of Florida employed by the Department. On May 10, 1991 the Petitioner was arrested and placed in isolation without any outside contact except in the evenings by phone. By letter dated May 15, 1991, mailed to Petitioner's home address, the Department advised Petitioner that having been absence from work for three consecutive days without authorized leave of absence the Department assumed that the Petitioner had abandoned his position and resigned from career services. Additionally, this letter advised the Petitioner that he had 20 calendar days from receipt of the notice to petition the State Personnel Director for a review of the facts to determine if the circumstances constituted abandonment of position. The return receipt for this letter appears to be signed by Vickie Carpenter but does not indicate the date it was signed by her. A copy of this same letter was mailed by the Department to the Petitioner at the jail but no return receipt was ever received by the Department. However, the Petitioner testified at having received the letter around May 23, 1991. On May 23, 1991 the Respondent was released from jail and was available for work beginning on May 24, 1991. However, the Department had already terminated the Petitioner based on abandonment of position. By letter dated June 6, 1991 the Petitioner requested the State Personnel Director to review his case. By letter dated June 12, 1991 and received by Petitioner on June 14, 1991, the Department again advised Petitioner that the Department assumed that he had abandoned his position and again outlined the review process. On June 20, 1991 the Secretary of the Department of Administration entered an Order Accepting Petition and Assignment to the Division of Administrative Hearings. By letter dated August 27, 1991 the Department advised Petitioner that it was withdrawing the action of abandonment of position, and that he was reinstated to his position effective August 30, 1991. However, by letter dated August 29, 1991 the Department advised Petitioner that he was to report for work on September 3, 1991 rather than August 30, 1991, and that he was to report to Ft. Myers rather than to his old job in Punta Gorda. Additionally, Mark M. Geisler, Subdistrict Administrator, the author of the letter, advised the Petitioner that since the issue of back pay had been discussed with DeLuccia it was best for Petitioner to contact him in that regard. Petitioner was reinstated by the Department on September 3, 1991. Petitioner did not at any time agree to forego any back pay in order for the Department to reinstate him. The Petitioner has never received any back pay for the period beginning Friday, May 24, 1991 (the day he was able and ready to return to work) through Monday, September 2, 1991 (the day before Petitioner returned to work). Petitioner's wife, Vickie L. Carpenter was, at all times material to this proceeding, employed by the state of Florida, and because she and Petitioner both were employed by the state of Florida their health insurance was furnished by the state of Florida at no cost to them. Upon the Department terminating the Petitioner his wife was required to pay for her health insurance until Petitioner was reinstated on September 3, 1991. Petitioner was unable to report to work during the period from May 10, 1991 through May 23, 1991, inclusive, due to being incarcerated, and was on unauthorized leave of absence during this period. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to any back pay for this period, and so stipulated at the hearing. However, Petitioner is entitled to receive back pay for the period from May 24, 1991 through September 2, 1991, inclusive. There is sufficient competent substantial evidence to establish that the Department was aware of Petitioner's incarceration and that it was not Petitioner's intent to abandon his position with the Department.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Administration enter a Final Order (1) confirming the action of the Department that Petitioner did not abandon his position with the Department, and (2) reimbursing Petitioner for back pay for the period from May 24, 1991 through September 2, 1991, inclusive, and for any other benefit that Petitioner was entitled to during this period, including, but not limited to, health insurance benefits. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of December, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of December, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas J. Carpenter 1669 Flamingo Blvd. Bradenton, FL 34207 Susan E. Vacca, Qualified Representative Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services P.O. Box 1415 Punta Gorda, FL 33951-1415 Augustus D. Aikens, General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 John A. Pieno, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Robert B. Williams, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Anthony N. DeLuccia, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services P.O. Box 06085 Fort Myers, FL 33906
