The Issue Whether Petitioner has shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that she is rehabilitated from her disqualifying offense; and, if so, whether the denial of her request for an exemption from disqualification from employment would constitute an abuse of discretion.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner is a 49-year-old female who has requested that Respondent grant her an exemption from disqualification from employment pursuant to section 435.07, Florida Statutes, so that she can become employed as a caretaker for developmentally disabled individuals. Respondent is the state agency charged under chapter 393, Florida Statutes, with meeting the needs of children and adults having developmental disabilities. These disabilities include intellectual disabilities, autism, Down syndrome, cerebral palsy, spinal bifida, Phelan-McDermid syndrome, and Prader-Willi syndrome. Developmentally disabled persons have cognitive impairments and physical limitations that render them extremely vulnerable and highly dependent on their caregivers. Respondent fulfills its mission, in part, through direct service providers, who provide nursing, personal care assistance, transportation, companionship, in-home support, and a range of other caregiving services to persons having developmental disabilities. Because developmentally disabled individuals are extremely vulnerable, they are susceptible to potential harm or exploitation by persons providing care or other services. Therefore, such service providers are subject to level 2 employment screening pursuant to chapter 435. See § 393.0655, Fla. Stat. Petitioner's Disqualifying Offense and Other Offenses Petitioner committed her disqualifying offense on or about March 11, 2001——over 17 years ago.3/ According to the complaint/arrest affidavit that was included as part of Respondent's Exhibit 2, the file on Petitioner's request for an exemption, Petitioner assaulted and battered a 14-year-old girl during an altercation that had escalated from verbal to physical. Petitioner was charged with aggravated child abuse. According to the Finding of Guilt and Order Withholding Adjudication/Special Conditions entered by the Circuit Court for the Eleventh Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida, Petitioner was found guilty of aggravated abuse of a child, a first-degree felony. Adjudication was withheld and Petitioner was sentenced to one year of probation. As a condition of her probation, Petitioner was required to participate in an anger management program. She completed this requirement. In December 2002, Petitioner violated her probation by using marijuana. For this violation, her probation was extended another six months. On or about October 11, 2011, Petitioner was detained for retail theft and was charged with petit theft. The only official document in the record, other than Petitioner's application, is a comprehensive case information system record entry stating that the court withheld adjudication on this charge.4/ The record does not show that Petitioner pled guilty or nolo contendere to this offense. Evidence Adduced at the Final Hearing Petitioner testified regarding her disqualifying offense. According to Petitioner, she had a disagreement with her neighbor and her neighbor's daughter. A few days later, when she went to the store, her neighbor and her neighbor's daughter accosted her in the parking lot and physically attacked her, so she defended herself. She acknowledged in her testimony at the final hearing that the physical altercation had occurred and that she had been arrested and charged with aggravated child abuse. However, she claimed that her public defender had agreed to a guilty plea without her concurrence, and that adjudication had been withheld for that charge. She insisted that had she understood that "withholding adjudication" entailed entering a guilty plea, she would not have agreed to that course of action. Due to having committed the disqualifying offense, Petitioner lost her employment. She testified that she became depressed and used marijuana. She acknowledged that in doing so, she had violated her probation. She testified, credibly, that she has not used drugs since 2003. There is no evidence to the contrary in the record. Petitioner acknowledged that she was arrested for petit theft in 2011, but she testified, credibly, that she did not steal anything. She explained, persuasively, that she had gone to the store with her neighbor and that when they arrived, they went their separate ways. As they left the store together, the store's security personnel detained them and accused them of shoplifting. Petitioner's neighbor, had, in fact, shoplifted items, and ultimately was required to pay restitution; however, Petitioner was not so required. The undersigned finds Petitioner's testimony regarding the 2011 petit theft incident credible. Petitioner has completed formal training in specialized types of medical care. She is a certified phlebotomist, a certified medical assistant, and a patient care technician. She is also certified or has taken courses in Basic First Aid/CPR/AED for adults and children, recognizing and reporting elder abuse, patients' rights, medical documentation, and American Heart Association Basic Life Support. In 2015, Petitioner received an exemption from disqualification from employment from the Agency for Health Care Administration ("AHCA"), and currently is eligible to be employed as a direct or indirect service provider for programs for vulnerable persons administered by that agency. However, she is seeking an exemption in this proceeding specifically so that she can be employed in a position working with disabled individuals. Petitioner testified, credibly, that she has not had any additional encounters with the criminal justice system since receiving the exemption from AHCA, and there is no evidence to the contrary in the record. Jacqueline Snyder testified regarding Petitioner's character, compassion, and competence in caring for her (Snyder). Snyder met Petitioner when she nursed Snyder's husband. After Snyder's husband passed away, Snyder was able to procure Petitioner's services through a home health agency, and then through a private contract arrangement. In that role, Petitioner helped care for Snyder during an illness, and assisted Snyder in performing a range of daily life activities, including bathing, cleaning house, and performing other life-related activities. Snyder spoke glowingly of Petitioner's character and compassion in caring for her. On cross-examination, Snyder acknowledged that she was aware of Petitioner's disqualifying offense, but testified that she believed Petitioner's version of the event and observed that, in any case, AHCA would not have granted Petitioner an exemption if she posed a threat to vulnerable individuals. Allison Scott, Petitioner's neighbor, also testified on her behalf. Scott testified, credibly, that Petitioner is actively engaged in community and church activities, such as conducting clothing drives for children, and that she has a passion for caring for the elderly and disabled. Scott was aware of Petitioner's disqualifying offense, but believes that she deserves a second chance, particularly since that offense happened so long ago. Petitioner's neighbor, Julia Mendez, also testified on Petitioner's behalf. Mendez has been Petitioner's neighbor for over eight years. Mendez testified, credibly, that Petitioner tries to counsel, and serve as a role model for, neighborhood children. She credibly testified that she had never seen Petitioner exhibit the type of behavior with which she was charged in 2001, and that, in her view, Petitioner deserves a second chance. As part of her application for the exemption, Petitioner submitted several letters of support which supplement, explain, and support the testimony presented by Snyder, Scott, and Mendez. The letters from persons for whom Petitioner has previously cared for described her as a competent, organized, compassionate, reliable, and trustworthy caregiver. A letter from Worldwide Support Services Corporation, a Medicaid waiver provider, through whom Petitioner provided services, described Petitioner as understanding, helpful, compassionate, caring, efficient, detail-oriented, extremely competent, and an asset to the industry. Tom Rice testified on behalf of Respondent. Rice has been employed by Respondent for approximately 15 years and currently serves as a program administrator over regional supports within Respondent's Division of Operations. In this position, he oversees, among other things, the processing of background screening exemption requests. Rice explained that in reviewing an application for exemption to determine whether the applicant is rehabilitated, Respondent considers the applicant's version of events and considers whether the applicant has accepted responsibility for, and is remorseful, honest, and forthright regarding, the disqualifying offense and any subsequent offenses; and whether, since the disqualifying offense, the applicant has been a good, law-abiding citizen. Respondent also reviews the applicant's arrest reports, court records, letters of recommendation, confidential investigative summaries prepared by the Department of Children and Families investigators ("CIS reports"), and traffic records. After reviewing Petitioner's application, Respondent determined that Petitioner's request for an exemption should be denied. Rice explained that Respondent's decision was based on several factors. First, Respondent was concerned about the nature of the disqualifying offense because it entailed a crime of physical violence.5/ Rice noted that many of Respondent's clients may be prone to physically violent behavior, or may themselves be vulnerable to physically violent caretakers. Second, Rice testified that in Respondent's view, Petitioner's versions of her disqualifying offense and the 2011 petit theft offense,6/ as described in the application, were different from the descriptions in the complaint/arrest affidavits in her criminal record. Rice testified that in Respondent's view, these differences indicated that Petitioner did not take responsibility for her actions in having committed these offenses. Rice also noted the existence of "multiple" CIS reports discovered during the background screening of Petitioner, including one CIS report that showed "some indicator" of financial exploitation of vulnerable adults.7/ Rice stated that these reports caused Respondent concern that Petitioner may be physically violent toward, or exploitive of, Respondent's developmentally disabled clients. Rice noted that Petitioner's background screening also showed that Petitioner had a traffic infraction involving driving on a suspended license, which, in Respondent's view, indicated Petitioner's failure to abide by the law. Rice stated that Respondent did not give any significant weight to the letters of reference that Petitioner submitted as part of her exemption application because none of those letters was from an employer, and all of them were from friends or family members. However, on redirect examination, Rice acknowledged that the record did, in fact, contain letters of reference from persons and entities other than friends and family. He did not testify, however, that Respondent duly considered these letters of reference in evaluating Petitioner's application for an exemption. In response to a question from Respondent's counsel, Rice testified that he was concerned about Petitioner's behavior exhibited during the final hearing——specifically, that Petitioner vehemently denied having voluntarily pled guilty to the disqualifying offense, vehemently denied having engaged in any kind of abusive behavior giving rise to the CIS reports, and vehemently denied that she herself had engaged in shoplifting that led to the petit theft charge. Rice noted that dealing with developmentally disabled persons is often stressful and that he would be concerned that because of her display of emotion at the final hearing, Petitioner would not be able to exhibit a calm demeanor when dealing with developmentally disabled clients. Findings of Ultimate Fact Upon a careful and considered review of the competent substantial evidence in the record of this proceeding, the undersigned determines that Petitioner has shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that she is rehabilitated from her disqualifying offense. The undersigned recognizes that Petitioner's disqualifying offense was a crime involving physical violence. However, as noted above, over 17 years have elapsed since Petitioner committed her disqualifying offense, and she has not been arrested for, or charged with, any crimes involving physical violence since that time. The undersigned finds that Petitioner's non-violent conduct for the past 17-plus years——which included periods during which she cared for elderly persons who were limited in their life activities——constitutes strong evidence that she can be trusted to deal with vulnerable persons in a non-violent manner. The undersigned does not find Petitioner's version of the disqualifying offense presented at the final hearing inconsistent with the applicable complaint/arrest affidavit in the exemption application file. To the contrary, Petitioner acknowledged that she had engaged in a physical altercation with her neighbor's daughter and expressed regret at having done so. However, as she was entitled to do, she also sought to explain the circumstances surrounding her disqualifying offense and to further explain that she did not intend to plead guilty and would not have done so had she understood that such plea was being entered by her attorney. Additionally, as noted above, the undersigned finds credible Petitioner's version of the circumstances surrounding her arrest in 2011 for petit theft. The undersigned does not agree that Petitioner's attempt to explain the circumstances surrounding this arrest as failing to take responsibility for her actions. To this point, as discussed above, the "police report" to which Rice referred in his testimony was not part of Petitioner's application file. Rather, the document to which Rice referred concerned an arrest that occurred on July 28, 1989.8/ That document does not support the position that Petitioner failed to take responsibility for her 2011 offense. The undersigned finds Petitioner's explanation of her 2011 offense credible, and finds Rice's testimony unpersuasive because it is not supported by other evidence in the record. Additionally, the CIS reports in Respondent's Exhibit 2 do not constitute competent substantial evidence of Petitioner's lack of rehabilitation in this proceeding. Those reports are hearsay that does not fall within any exception to the hearsay rule, so they cannot be used as the sole basis for finding that any of the events specifically addressed in the reports happened or that any of the statements contained in those reports is true.9/ § 120.57(1)(c), Fla. Stat. Because Respondent did not present any other evidence independently establishing the occurrence or truth of any of the matters addressed in the CIS reports included in Respondent's Exhibit 2, neither they nor Rice's testimony about them are afforded any weight in this proceeding. It is further noted that in 2015, Petitioner received an exemption from AHCA, which also conducts level 2 background screening to determine whether an applicant would constitute a danger to children and vulnerable adults. AHCA's determination that Petitioner would not pose a danger to such vulnerable persons, while not determinative in this case, is probative and is persuasive evidence that Petitioner is rehabilitated from her disqualifying offense. Finally, it is noted that at the final hearing, Petitioner vehemently denied that she had engaged in any conduct addressed in the CIS reports, and she displayed strong emotion while explaining the circumstances surrounding her disqualifying offense and the 2011 petit theft arrest. The undersigned does not find Petitioner's conduct at the final hearing indicates that she would engage in physically or emotionally violent conduct while working with Respondent's clients. Rather, the undersigned finds Petitioner's non-violent conduct over the past 17-plus years to be far more indicative of her future behavior than her emotional responses to cross-examination10/ during the final hearing. In sum, the competent, substantial, and persuasive evidence in the record of this proceeding establishes that Petitioner is rehabilitated from her disqualifying offense, and that she will not present a danger to developmentally disabled individuals if her request for an exemption from disqualification from employment is granted. Because the evidence establishes that Petitioner is rehabilitated from her disqualifying offense, the undersigned determines that denial of her request for an exemption would constitute an abuse of Respondent's discretion.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Agency for Persons with Disabilities, enter a final order granting Petitioner's request for an exemption from disqualification from employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of May, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of May, 2018.
The Issue Whether the Agency for Persons with Disabilities’ (Agency) intended action to deny Petitioner’s application for exemption from disqualification for employment is an abuse of the Agency’s discretion.
Findings Of Fact Parties and Background Petitioner is a 41-year-old male residing in Gainesville, Florida. For the last four months Petitioner has been employed by Plane Techs, where he has been contracted out to Haeco Aviation for repair of interior aviation mechanics. Petitioner wishes to become employed by Successful Living II, an Agency provider which operates residential treatment group homes serving people with both moderate and severe behavioral disabilities. Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating the employment of persons in positions of special trust. Specifically, the Agency’s mission includes serving and protecting vulnerable populations, including children and adults with developmental disabilities. Disqualifying Offenses Petitioner’s record contains two felony offenses which automatically disqualify him from employment in any position of special trust with children or vulnerable adults. The first offense is the armed robbery of an Arby’s restaurant in Lake City, Florida, in May 1998. Petitioner conspired with his two male cousins, then employees of the subject Arby’s, to rob the restaurant. A first attempt was scrapped due to the number of customers in the restaurant, but Petitioner returned and finished the job just prior to closing. Petitioner was tried and convicted by a jury of both armed robbery and burglary of an occupied structure. He was sentenced to 32 months in prison, followed by eight months of probation. In the second offense the same month as the first, Petitioner and the same two cousins robbed a man in the parking lot of a hotel in Gainesville. The trio held up the man at gunpoint and deprived him of a duffle bag containing a computer and other valuables, as well as his wallet containing cash and credit cards. Petitioner was tried and convicted by a jury of aiding and abetting robbery while armed with a deadly weapon. He was sentenced to 64 months in prison, to be served concurrently with the sentence from the first offense. Petitioner was 22-years old at the time of the disqualifying offenses. Petitioner served 64 months (approximately five years) in a state correctional facility and eight months’ probation. The Department of Corrections terminated his supervision on December 13, 2010. At hearing, Petitioner denied that he and his co- conspirators used a gun during the Arby’s robbery. He failed to appreciate that adjudication of the offense had established a weapon was utilized. At hearing, Petitioner downplayed his involvement in the robbery of the man in the hotel parking lot. Petitioner insisted that he had no idea his cousin was going to rob the man until the robbery was underway. However, Petitioner admitted that he participated in the robbery by ordering the victim to kick over his duffle bag, while his cousin threatened the victim at gunpoint. Subsequent Non-Disqualifying Offenses Petitioner’s background screening revealed several non- disqualifying offenses subsequent to Petitioner’s incarceration.1/ Respondent alleges Petitioner had three probation violations: (1) driving with a suspended license on October 14, 1998; (2) an unspecified violation on March 23, 2004; and (3) failure to appear on May 26, 2004.2/ No court records concerning these alleged probation violations were offered in evidence. According to a letter from the Columbia County Clerk’s office, no records of the alleged violations could be located. Respondent submitted no evidence of the source of information for the alleged probation violations. The record does contain an Affidavit of Probation Violation dated March 3, 2004, in which Probation Officer Aaron Robert attested to Petitioner’s violation of a condition of his probation requiring Petitioner to complete 100 hours of community service within one year of his release from prison. The affidavit states that, as of that date, Petitioner had submitted proof of completion of only 28 hours. The record also contains an Order of Modification of Probation entered on July 8, 2004, finding Petitioner admitted to the violation, was found in violation, and adjudicated guilty of the violation. However, the same terms of probation were reinstated. The record supports a finding that Petitioner is guilty of only one probation violation subsequent to commitment of the disqualifying offenses. 20. (DWLS) in Petitioner was cited for driving with license November and December 2006; October 2009; and suspended February, July, and August 2011. 21. With regard to the November and December 2006 DWLS adjudications, Petitioner’s license had been suspended for lack of insurance. Petitioner claimed not to have known his license had been suspended when he was first stopped in November 2006. For the November 2006 DWLS charge, Petitioner pled guilty and was sentenced to serve 12 months’ probation and ordered to pay court costs, fines, and fees. Columbia County Court Judge Tom Coleman presided over Petitioner’s case, and terminated Petitioner’s probation on January 31, 2008, finding Petitioner had satisfied all conditions of probation. Petitioner likewise plead guilty to the December 2006 DWLS charge, was placed on 12 months’ probation, and ordered by Judge Coleman to complete 50 hours of community service and produce a valid driver’s license within 10 months. Judge Coleman allowed the probation to run concurrent with the November sentence. Judge Coleman terminated Petitioner’s probation on January 31, 2008, finding Petitioner had satisfied all conditions of probation. On October 4, 2008, Petitioner was cited for violating a municipal open container ordinance, and ordered to appear in Columbia County Court on October 30, 2008. Although the citation was admitted in evidence, no court record of the violation was produced in response to Petitioner’s records request. Again in 2009, Petitioner’s automobile insurance was canceled for nonpayment, leading to the suspension of his driver’s license. On October 27, 2009, Petitioner was again charged with DWLS and ordered to appear in county court on November 10, 2009. On March 11, 2010,3/ Petitioner was ordered to pay court costs, fines, and fees in the amount of $373.50 by September 9, 2010, or return to court on that date. On November 16, 2010, Petitioner appeared before Judge Coleman on the October 27, 2009 DWLS charge. Judge Coleman withheld adjudication and again sentenced Petitioner to 12 months’ probation and payment of court costs (of which $343.50 was remaining from the partial payment plan), allowing for early termination within six months, if all conditions were met. In 2011, Petitioner became employed at Target and assumed the risk of driving to and from work without a valid license in order to earn an income. Petitioner was stopped by police three separate times that year and cited for driving with a suspended license.4/ During the February 2011 traffic stop, Petitioner falsely identified himself as his cousin, and gave his cousin’s address, in an effort to avoid another citation. However, the police officer discovered Petitioner’s Target employee badge which revealed his correct identity. Petitioner was charged with both giving a false name to law enforcement (Count I) and DWLS (Count II). On March 29, 2011, Judge Coleman entered an order withholding adjudication on Count I, but adjudicating Petitioner guilty on Count II. As to Count I, Judge Coleman sentenced Petitioner to 12 months’ probation and ordered Petitioner to write a letter of apology to the arresting officer, pay court costs and fees, complete 15 community service hours per month until Petitioner either became employed or completed 150 hours, and produce a valid driver’s license within 10 months. As to Count II, Petitioner was also sentenced to 12 months’ probation to run concurrently with the sentence for Count I. Unfortunately for Petitioner, the March 29, 2011, adjudication constituted a violation of the probation order entered on September 16, 2010. On January 24, 2012, Judge Coleman entered a new judgement on the 2009 DWLS violation, sentencing Petitioner to 20 days in county jail, but allowing him to serve the sentence in consecutive weekly installments of 48 hours from 5 a.m. Sundays to 5 a.m. Tuesdays. On June 5, 2012, Judge Coleman terminated Petitioner’s probation under the September 16, 2010, judgement as Petitioner had satisfied all conditions of probation. On April 30, 2013, Judge Coleman terminated Petitioner’s probation under the March 29, 2011, judgement as Petitioner had satisfied all conditions of probation. For Petitioner’s subsequent July 12, 2011, DWLS charge, and August 27, 2011, DWLS charge, he was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to two consecutive jail terms of 30 days, probation of 12 months, and ordered to pay court costs and fees. Judge Coleman allowed Petitioner to serve the jail time on subsequently designated weekends. Petitioner was released from probation on those charges on January 29 and March 31, 2015, respectively. Petitioner has subsequently obtained a restricted license which allows him to drive to and from work, as well as to pick up his children from school and other activities. Subsequent Employment History Petitioner has had varied employment since his release from prison. He worked for Hunter Panels in Lake City on the insulation assembly line for approximately two years, then Accurate Car Care as Assistant Manager of the detail shop for another year. Petitioner’s last job in Lake City was with Target, where he was terminated for tardiness. After his relocation to Gainesville, Petitioner worked for the Florida Farm Bureau in maintenance before becoming employed by Plane Techs. Petitioner anticipates being laid off by Plane Techs at the conclusion of the current contract with Haeco, due to lack of contract opportunities. In the summer of 2014, Petitioner was certified as a basketball referee by the Mid-Florida Officials’ Association. Petitioner officiates basketball games three to four times a week during basketball season, as well as post-season tournaments. Petitioner had to undergo background screening with Mid-Florida Officials’ Association, and was originally denied certification due to his criminal record. However, the association allowed him to proceed with certification following an exemption review. Subsequent Personal History Petitioner was divorced in late 2015. Petitioner has joint custody of his five children, who reside with him every other weekend, portions of each summer, and certain holidays. For the last ten years, Petitioner has volunteered as a football coach in Lake City (commuting from Gainesville) to remain involved in his son’s life. Additionally, Petitioner has volunteered as a coach for Columbia County little league football for approximately four years. In this capacity, he has worked with children ages five, six, and seven. Petitioner has completed some of his required community service by sharing his experiences with high school students, and encouraging them to make better life choices. Petitioner remarried on November 12, 2016. The couple met approximately four and a half years earlier. Petitioner revealed his criminal history to his new wife on their third date, approximately three years earlier. Petitioner met Diyonne McGraw a little over two years ago through her husband, who is also a volunteer football coach. Ms. McGraw became more familiar with Petitioner through his wife, who is Ms. McGraw’s hairdresser. Ms. McGraw owns Successful Living II, under which she operates three group homes and is working to license a fourth. She specializes in “intensive behavior focus,” meaning she serves clients with mental health issues, sexual issues, and physical and verbal aggression, some of whom have dual and triple diagnoses, and many of whom were recently released from incarceration. Ms. McGraw is a former probation officer. She testified, credibly, that, based on her observation of Petitioner’s interaction with her own children, as well as many other children involved in recreational sports, he has the patience to effectively deal with her clients. Further, she testified that Petitioner has demonstrated a commitment to her agency and a passion for the work it entails. Petitioner’s Exemption Request In his exemption request, in response to the question regarding the “degree of harm to victim or property (permanent or temporary), damage, or injuries,” Petitioner answered, “[n]one.” In response to the question regarding any stressors in his life at the time of the disqualifying offenses, Petitioner also stated, “[n]one.” Petitioner achieved a Graduate Equivalency Diploma (GED) while incarcerated. Petitioner reported no further educational pursuits. In his exemption request, Petitioner accepted responsibility for “poor and wrong decision[s] [he] chose early in [his] life.” He admitted that he is embarrassed by his charges, but is not ashamed to talk about his history and advise young people that such mistakes can change the course of your life. Petitioner’s request also demonstrates a dedication to providing life lessons for his children and preventing them from going down the path he chose. In the employment history section, Petitioner listed only his employment with Target in Lake City. Petitioner’s exemption request included two personal reference letters--one from his wife, then Dawn Teasley, and one from Matthew Dillard, a teacher at Lake City Middle School in Columbia County. The letter from Petitioner’s wife described Petitioner as “reliable, honest and responsible” both in his capacity as maintenance and groundskeeper for her salon and as a head coach for her nephew’s football team in Lake City. She also commented on Petitioner’s “ability, patience and genuine concern and care for youth” and his ability to “bring out the very best of every youth he coaches regardless of their skill set of level.” His wife further described Petitioner as an “enthusiastic leader,” as well as “reliable, honest and responsible.” Mr. Dillard’s letter was brief. In the letter, he stated that he has known Petitioner for ten years, has played recreational basketball with Petitioner, and has worked with Petitioner at a local community center volunteering with youth. He noted that he “has never seen [Petitioner] become overwhelmed by a given task or assignment.” Along with his exemption application, Petitioner also submitted a personal letter from Judge Coleman. Petitioner received the unsolicited letter in April 2015 following Petitioner’s release from court supervision. In the letter, Judge Coleman acknowledged that he “cannot remember writing a letter like this before” but wanted to congratulate Petitioner. The letter reads, as follows: As you know, I made several decisions to give you additional time and chances to succeed despite the opposition of others. I had faith in you because I saw something in you - a determination and focus. By your actions you have justified my faith in you and I admire you for that. I am very proud of you and I know that you will go on to accomplish great things with your life. As you know, I see many people daily and I cannot always remember faces, so I request this of you. If you see me somewhere and recognize me, come and see me so I can congratulate you in person. I wish you all the best life has to offer. Keep working hard. Ultimate Facts Many of Petitioner’s recent decisions and pursuits demonstrate a commitment to a life of responsibility to family and community, concern and respect for others, and the importance of steady and reliable work. Petitioner’s volunteerism is commendable, as well as his remarriage and support of his children. Judge Coleman’s letter is evidence of Petitioner’s determination to better himself and to overcome his prior poor decisions. However, many of the facts established about Petitioner are grounds for the Agency to question his fitness to work with the most vulnerable clients. Petitioner’s attempts to downplay his involvement in the 1998 felonies evidence a lack of true remorse for his actions. His willingness to lie to a police officer, as recently as 2011, evidence a lack of respect for law enforcement, and his lack of separation from his cousins, who have been a bad influence in his past, supports the Agency’s uneasiness concerning Petitioner’s future decisions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying Petitioner’s request for an exemption from disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of January, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of January, 2017.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues contained herein, the Respondent was a licensed medical doctor in Florida having been issued license number ME 0041256. Respondent was awarded his medical degree by the University of Tennessee in 1977. He came to southwest Florida in January, 1983 starting his practice in August of that year. He thereafter applied for and was granted privileges at Lee Memorial Hospital and practiced in Lee County until January, 1985 when he moved to Collier County. In January, 1985, Dr. Heiss notified Lee Memorial Hospital that he was moving his practice and that he no longer needed privileges at that facility. This was partly in response to a letter from the hospital asking him to resign which was, at least in part, based on his failure to keep his medical records current. He admits that prior to that time, he had received some notices involving incomplete records at the hospital and went in to work on them as best he could. However, due to his own medical problem which involved a prolonged throat infection that left him tired and weak, he could not accomplish much. This medical problem lasted for several months and when he was feeling better, he tried, to the best of his ability, he claims, during the summer of 1985, to complete the incomplete records. He went to the hospital and worked on some of them, but in late 1986, when he checked with clerical personnel in the medical records section, he was told his records were complete, and coincidentally, he stopped getting delinquency notices. Under the procedure in effect at Lee Memorial Hospital for correcting incomplete records in 1984, once a week, Ms. Lindahl, the assistant manager of the records section, would go through the files to determine which records were delinquent. If dictation was needed, the chart would be declared delinquent in 15 days. If only the signature was missing, the doctor was give 45 days to correct it. When the record was declared delinquent, medical records personnel would send a weekly reminder letter to the physician setting a one week suspense for correction and indicating that if the correction was not made, the doctor's hospital privileges could be suspended. These temporary suspensions, however, were not being enforced. According to Ms. Lindahl, in 1985, Dr. Heiss was identified and placed on the delinquent list 35 times. Because of this, he would have been sent 35 letters. In January, 1985, at the time Respondent left Lee Memorial Hospital, he left incomplete 84 charts. Because of the volume of incomplete records left by Respondent, the hospital Medical Records Committee, on May 2, 1985, authorized Ms. Lindahl to transfer these incomplete records to the permanent records section of the archives, a procedure that would not normally have been done with incomplete records. This transfer was accomplished in August, 1985. After Respondent left the hospital, in January, 1985, up to March, 1985, Ms. Lindahl contacted him both at home and at his new office both by phone and by letter on several occasions, and asked him to come in and complete his records. Each of the letters sent indicated those charts, by name, which needed completion. After the charts were transferred to permanent records in August, 1985, until February, 1987, Ms. Lindahl did not make any further effort to contact Dr. Heiss, nor did he contact her. However, she was informed by the Hospital Administrator that Dr. Heiss was to come in and work on the records. Therefore, she pulled these records for him and, in fact, the Respondent did, on some occasions, come in at night to work on them. Ms. Lindahl agreed to pull records for him as needed but advised him that she could not and would not pull all his incomplete records at one time. Charts are placed on microfilm after a period of years. Some of Respondent's charts were microfilmed before he completed them. However, the hospital made arrangements for him to complete these records as well in an effort to accommodate him. Once the records were placed on microfilm, it was more difficult for Dr. Heiss to complete them since, initially, there was no dictating equipment available in the microfilm reading area. However, it could have been done by Respondent taking notes from the film and thereafter dictating those notes in the records room where dictating equipment was available. However, that was not necessary, since the hospital set up a booth with dictating capability in it for him in the microfilm reading area. An Administrative Complaint was filed against Dr. Heiss in October, 1985, because of his incomplete files. The matter was referred to the Board of Medicine in February, 1987, after a stipulated settlement was reached between the Respondent and Counsel for the Board. On February 11, 1987, the Board of Medicine entered a Final Order which approved and adopted the stipulation entered into between Respondent and counsel for the Board on December 23, 1986. Paragraph 4 of the stipulated Disposition in this case provided that prior to the stipulation being presented to the Board, Respondent would complete all incomplete hospital records that he was responsible for at Lee Memorial Hospital. Dr. Heiss contends that at that time, he understood his medical records to be complete, based upon his inquiry to personnel in the medical records section at the hospital. He indicates he made several inquiries of at least two separate employees who told him they could find no record of any incomplete files charged to him. Once his incomplete records were transferred to permanent storage, they were deleted from the computer and a routine inquiry would not have disclosed them. However, Ms. Lindahl had in her possession a complete list of his still incomplete records and a simple inquiry to her, the person in charge, would have given him the correct information. Dr. Heiss did not check with Ms. Lindahl, who worked days even though he admits he may have been in the hospital for other reasons on several occasions during the day. He would usually come in during the evenings, and on one occasion, spoke with Mr. Shuler, the night records custodian, who checked the computer and found no record of the doctor's delinquency. Mr. Shuler, however, advised Dr. Heiss to check with Ms. Lindahl. Dr. Heiss states he believed that the Stipulation he worked out with counsel for the Board in response to the initial Complaint, took care of the problem. When he went before the Board in February, 1987, he had checked with medical records at the hospital and had been told his status was clear. This check was not with Ms. Lindahl, however. When he did so, he found he did have unfinished records. It was at that time, after the stipulation was signed, that he began to bring the records current. Dr. Heiss admits that during the period 1985 - 1986, believed there were some medical records that were incomplete but because they had been filed in the permanent records section, he believed his responsibility for them was fulfilled. As a practicing physician, he relies upon the medical records section to tell him what records need to be completed. When he was advised by that agency that he was no longer delinquent, he felt satisfied. This argument is specious and without merit. Respondent admits he did not make any attempt to work on the records from January to July, 1986. He contends that from July, 1986 to January, 1987, he called the hospital several times to check on his records but could get no indication he had files undone. It was not until after the Board meeting in February, 1987, when Mr. Shuler told him to speak with Ms. Lindahl, that he determined he did have some medical records incomplete. Notwithstanding, he knew he had some dictation that was incomplete and some matters were unsigned and in his opinion, it is more a question of semantics, (what the term, "incomplete" meant), and not knowing what he had to do. He contends he dealt in good faith with the hospital and with the Board of Medicine and was surprised to find out that he was not in good standing. This argument as well, is unbelievable. Dr. Heiss contends he relied on what he was told by the people at medical records but at no time until after he entered into the Stipulation with the Board of Medicine in 1987 did he contact Ms. Lindahl even though he knew she was the one who was in charge of delinquencies and was still employed by the hospital. It was incumbent upon him as the physician to contact the person in charge, especially in light of his suspicion that certain records were incomplete, and not rely on phone calls to anyone who answered. This does not constitute reasonably prudent action or the actions of a reasonable man. It cannot reasonably be claimed that Dr. Heiss' actions were based on an honest and reasonable mistake of fact. As a physician, he should have assumed that the Board wanted and required all records to be completed and it was his responsibility to insure that the records were, in fact completed. This he failed to do. On March 20, 1987, Respondent still had 53 charts incomplete of the 84 charts he had left incomplete when he departed the staff of Lee Memorial Hospital. These 53 charts were completed by November, 1987.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Respondent's license as a medical doctor in Florida be suspended for ninety days and that he pay an administrative fine of $1,000.00. RECOMMENDED this 29th day of January, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-2674 The following constituted my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in this case. BY THE PETITIONER 1 & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. 3. Accepted 4 - 8 Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected as contra to the evidence. 11 - 13. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. 17 - 19. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. 23 & 24. Accepted and incorporated herein. 25. Argument rather than Finding of Fact. 26 & 27. Accepted and incorporated herein. BY THE RESPONDENT No submittal. COPIES FURNISHED: Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director DPR, Board of Medical Examiners 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Susan Branson, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Dan E. Batchelor, Esquire Post Office Box 1899 Bonita Springs, Florida 33923
The Issue The issues in this matter are whether Petitioner has shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that she is rehabilitated from her disqualifying offense, and, if so, whether Respondent’s action to deny Petitioner's request for exemption from disqualification constitutes an abuse of discretion.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner seeks employment as a direct service provider for persons with developmental disabilities. Petitioner desires to work with Project Choice, LLC, a service provider the Agency regulates. The Agency is the state agency responsible for regulating the employment of persons in positions of special trust as direct service providers. See § 393.0655(1), Fla. Stat. A “direct service provider” is a person who has direct contact with and provides services to an Agency client. See § 393.063(11), Fla. Stat. The Agency's clients are a vulnerable population consisting of those persons who are eligible for services and support for developmental disabilities. See § 393.063, Fla. Stat. Agency clients often have severe deficits in their ability to complete self-care tasks and communicate their wants and needs. Agency clients are at a heightened risk of abuse, exploitation, and neglect because of their developmental disabilities and inability to self-preserve. Consequently, employment as a direct service provider is regarded as a position of special trust. The Agency relies on the Department of Children and Families, Background Screening Unit (the “Department”), to initially receive and screen requests for exemption from disqualification from individuals seeking employment as direct service providers. On June 28, 2015, Petitioner submitted a Request for Exemption, with attachments, to the Department. The Department subsequently forwarded Petitioner’s application to the Agency for review. To qualify as a direct service provider, Petitioner must comply with the employment screening requirement established in chapter 435. See § 393.0655(1), Fla. Stat. Petitioner's background screening revealed a criminal offense. In September 1978, Petitioner was arrested for felony possession of marijuana in the State of Texas. Petitioner pled guilty and was given a suspended sentence. The court deferred adjudication of guilt and placed Petitioner on two years of probation. At the final hearing, the Agency also produced evidence of several non-disqualifying criminal offenses Petitioner committed subsequent to her 1978 drug arrest. Petitioner was arrested for or convicted of the following crimes: 1) a misdemeanor conviction for Possession of Marijuana in 2005; 2) Bail Jumping and Failure to Appear in 2008; 3) Bail Jumping and Failure to Appear in 2010; and 4) Failure to Appear in 2013. In accordance with section 435.04(2), Petitioner’s criminal misconduct, as a “disqualifying offense,” disqualified her from working as a direct service provider for persons with developmental disabilities. Consequently, in order to be employed in such a capacity, Petitioner was required to seek an exemption from disqualification from the Agency. Therefore, Petitioner submitted to the Agency a Request for Exemption from her disqualifying offenses as provided in section 435.07. On February 4, 2016, the Agency issued a letter notifying Petitioner that it denied her Request for Exemption. The Agency denied Petitioner’s application because it did not believe Petitioner submitted clear and convincing evidence of her rehabilitation. At the final hearing, Petitioner testified on her own behalf. Petitioner expressed her desire to work as a caregiver for disabled persons. Petitioner described herself as a giving, helpful, and responsible person. Petitioner further explained that she is seeking a change in her career in light of her recent health challenges. She is also the sole supporter of her family. Petitioner believes that a job as a health care assistant for persons with developmental disabilities will allow her to take care of her family, as well as accommodate her physical limitations. Regarding her disqualifying offense, Petitioner explained that her 1978 felony arrest for marijuana possession occurred when she was only 19 years old. She explained that she had little life experience after growing up in a small town, and she had just started college in Houston. Her boyfriend asked her to carry a suitcase for him in her car on a drive back to college. Unfortunately for Petitioner, a state trooper stopped her car for speeding. Even more unfortunately for Petitioner, the state trooper searched her trunk. The state trooper found her boyfriend’s suitcase. And, inside it, the state trooper found marijuana. Petitioner claimed that she had no knowledge of the contents of her boyfriend’s suitcase. Despite her lack of knowledge, Petitioner pled guilty to the charge. Regarding her four non-disqualifying offenses, Petitioner explained that her 2005 conviction for marijuana possession also involved a car trip near Houston. She disclosed that a friend asked her to carry some Christmas presents in her car. In a lamentable case of déjà vu, a state trooper stopped her car for speeding. The state trooper searched her trunk. The state trooper found her friend’s Christmas presents. And, inside a present, the state trooper found marijuana. Once again, Petitioner stated that she had no knowledge of the contents of her friend’s presents. Despite her lack of knowledge, Petitioner pled guilty to the charge. Regarding the multiple bail jumping and failure to appear convictions, Petitioner explained that she had problems knowing when her court dates were scheduled. In expressing that she has rehabilitated from her disqualifying offense, Petitioner asserts that she has moved past her criminal misconduct, and her record is now clear. She has satisfied all fees, fines, and sentences from her criminal charges. Petitioner stated that she has learned not to expose herself to these bad situations. Furthermore, her crimes did not result in harm to any victims or property. Petitioner testified that there are no present stressors in her life, and she relies on her faith for inner guidance and strength. Petitioner has had a stable work history for the past six years. Petitioner also represented that she has taken several Agency training courses in order to become better prepared to work with disabled persons. Additionally, at the final hearing, Petitioner produced evidence that she voluntarily attended a faith-based, alcohol rehabilitation program in 2006. She sought assist from the rehabilitation program based on her concerns with her alcohol consumption. Petitioner asserted that the rehabilitation program was very helpful and successful. Petitioner also provided four letters of reference attesting to her good character. The letters were written by various individuals, including some in notable positions, who have known Petitioner for several years. The letters describe Petitioner as hard-working, caring, and nurturing. At the final hearing, the Agency presented the testimony of Jeffrey Smith, regional operations manager for the Suncoast Region. Mr. Smith oversees all services to persons with developmental disabilities in his jurisdiction. Mr. Smith’s responsibilities include reviewing requests for exemption from disqualifying offenses. Mr. Smith explained that the Agency serves vulnerable individuals who are highly susceptible to abuse, exploitation, and neglect due to their developmental disabilities. Many of the tasks direct service providers offer Agency clients involve financial, personal, and/or social necessities. Therefore, the Agency must ensure that direct service providers are detail- oriented and trustworthy. When considering a request for an exemption, the Agency must weigh the benefit against the risk of endangerment to its clients. Mr. Smith described the Agency’s process when reviewing a request for exemption from disqualification. Mr. Smith relayed that the Agency considers the disqualifying offense itself, the circumstances surrounding the offense, the nature of any harm caused to a victim, the history of the employee since the incident and, finally, any other evidence indicating that the individual will present a danger if employment is allowed. Specifically regarding Petitioner’s application, Mr. Smith explained that the Agency reviewed all of the documentation Petitioner provided in her Request for Exemption, including the various records documenting Petitioner's criminal history, her work experience, and her character reference letters. In addition to her criminal records, the Agency reviewed Petitioner’s driving record. Mr. Smith advised that a direct service provider will often be tasked to transport clients. Mr. Smith noted that Petitioner's driving record included several traffic related violations. He commented that these records show a pattern of questionable judgment by Petitioner. Mr. Smith further testified that the Agency considered Petitioner’s evidence of rehabilitation, including Petitioner’s statements submitted with her Request for Exemption and the letters of recommendation supporting her application. Mr. Smith explained that, based on its review, the Agency determined that Petitioner's criminal history indicates a pattern of poor judgment and a lack of acceptance of full responsibility for her actions. Petitioner’s repeated involvement with the criminal court system reflects a lack of remorse for her misconduct. In addition, the Agency found that Petitioner failed to disclose the full and complete details of her criminal offenses in her application. Mr. Smith testified that inconsistencies in Petitioner’s Exemption Questionnaire, including her unreported attendance at the alcohol rehabilitation program, called her truthfulness into question. Finally, Mr. Smith was concerned about the nature of Petitioner’s offenses (disqualifying and non-disqualifying), as well their close proximity in time with Petitioner’s application. Upon careful consideration of the record evidence, the undersigned finds that Petitioner did not demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that she is rehabilitated from her disqualifying offense from 1978. While Petitioner has made commendable strides to change her life, her repeated criminal proceedings since 1978 raise serious concerns, and some hesitancy, in finding that she has sufficiently established that she should be employed in a position of special trust with persons with developmental disabilities. Despite the fact that Petitioner's disqualifying and non-disqualifying offenses did not result in harm to another, they do demonstrate a failure to exercise good judgment and responsibility that cannot be discounted. Therefore, based on the evidence set forth, Petitioner has not met her burden of demonstrating that she has rehabilitated from her past disqualifying offense or proven that the Agency should grant her request for exemption from disqualification under sections 393.0655 and 435.07.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Agency for Persons with Disabilities, enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for an exemption from disqualification from employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of June, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. BRUCE CULPEPPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of June, 2016.
The Issue There are seven alleged violations at issue, six of which are related to alleged financial disclosure violations. As stipulated by the parties, at issue is whether Respondent violated: Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes,1/ by requesting and/or accepting State reimbursement for travel expenses that were paid by campaign accounts and/or State office expense accounts; Article II, section 8, Florida Constitution, by failing to or not properly reporting income; and/or stocks and bonds; and/or secondary source income on his 2005 CE Form 6, Full and Public Disclosure of Financial Interest; Article II, section 8, Florida Constitution, by failing to or not properly reporting income; and/or stocks and bonds; and/or bank accounts; and/or real property; and/or secondary source income on his 2006 CE Form 6, Full and Public Disclosure of Financial Interest; Article II, section 8, Florida Constitution, by failing to or not properly reporting income; and/or stocks and bonds; and/or bank accounts; and/or real property; and/or secondary source income on his 2007 CE Form 6, Full and Public Disclosure of Financial Interest; Article II, section 8, Florida Constitution, by failing to or not properly reporting income; and/or stocks and bonds; and/or bank accounts; and/or real property; and/or secondary source income on his 2008 CE Form 6, Full and Public Disclosure of Financial Interest; Article II, section 8, Florida Constitution, by failing to or not properly reporting income; and/or stocks and bonds; and/or bank accounts; and/or real property; and/or secondary source income on his 2009 CE Form 6, Full and Public Disclosure of Financial Interest; and Section 112.3144, Florida Statutes, by failing to file a CE Form 6F “Final Full and Public Disclosure of Financial Interests” within 60 days of leaving his position with the Florida House of Representatives.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony and documentary evidence presented at hearing, the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Background At all times material to the Complaint, Respondent was a public officer. Respondent no longer holds public office. Respondent successfully ran for the Florida House of Representatives in 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008. Respondent briefly ran for election to the Florida Senate in 2010 and opened a campaign account for that purpose. Respondent successfully ran for U.S. House of Representatives in 2010, but was defeated in 2012 for re- election. Respondent also ran for State Committeeman, a private, political party office of the Republican Party of Florida, in 2003, 2004, and 2008, and opened campaign accounts for that purpose. State Reimbursement for Travel Expenses that were Paid from Respondent's Campaign Accounts or State Office Expense Accounts The State of Florida allows reimbursement to employees and elected officials for travel and related expenses incurred during the conduct of official state business. Such expenses include, among other things, airfare, rental cars, hotels, and meals while travelling. The Florida House of Representatives' Office of Legislative Services is responsible for reviewing and approving expense reimbursements for members of the Florida House of Representatives. Respondent's state travel expenses were reimbursed by the Office of Legislative Services when he served as a member of the Florida House of Representatives from 2002- 2010. Kelly Kimsey, at the time a Senior Crime Intelligence Analyst II with the Public Corruption Unit of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE), testified that she conducted the forensic analysis for this case utilizing financial records subpoenaed from financial institutions. In doing so, Ms. Kimsey analyzed Respondent's personal bank accounts, as well as his campaign accounts, and compared them against his campaign records. Ms. Kimsey created a summary showing Respondent's Bank of America campaign accounts ending in 1626, 9269, and 0856. The account statements, as well as the actual cancelled checks, reflect payments directly from the campaign accounts to Respondent’s credit card accounts, in payment of the full balance due on Respondent's personal credit cards. Notwithstanding the fact that Respondent had several credit cards, including a Chase Visa, American Express, and U.S. Senate Federal Credit Union Visa Gold, Respondent did not pay for expenses relating to his official duties as a state representative on a designated credit card. Rather, Respondent testified that his personal expenses, political party expenses, state house campaign expenses, and state house official expenses were all comingled among all of his credit cards “because the Florida House of Representatives does not issue credit cards.” On twenty-nine separate occasions throughout the period at issue, Respondent requested and received State of Florida direct-deposit reimbursement into his personal bank account for travel that was paid for by one of his campaign accounts, either his official campaign account or his committeeman account. The total reimbursement Respondent improperly received in this manner totaled tens of thousands of dollars. Three such examples follow. Respondent requested reimbursement of $622.90 for official state travel in March of 2006. Respondent's travel expenses were charged to his Chase credit card. The Chase credit card balance, which included the travel expenses, was paid for by Respondent's Campaign account numbered 1626. The State paid $622.90 for that travel into Respondent's personal bank account. Respondent requested reimbursement of $738.59, also for travel in March of 2006. Respondent's travel expenses were charged to his U.S. Senate Federal Credit Union credit card. The U.S. Senate Federal Credit Union credit card balance, which included the travel expenses, was paid by Respondent's Campaign accounts numbered 9269 and 1626. The state paid $738.59 for that travel into Respondent's personal bank account. Respondent requested reimbursement of $1,692.32 for official state travel in December of 2008. Respondent's travel expenses were charged to his American Express credit card. The American Express credit card balance, which included the travel expenses, was paid by Respondent's Campaign account numbered 9269. The state paid $1,692.32 for that travel into Respondent's personal bank account.2/ The Advocate established by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent received State of Florida reimbursement for travel and related expenses that were in fact paid for by one of his campaign accounts. Thus, Respondent was reimbursed for tens of thousands of dollars of expenses which he did not “incur.” The evidence also clearly and convincingly established that this double-reimbursement was knowing and intentional, since Respondent himself authorized the travel-related credit card charges, and then subsequently personally drafted the campaign account checks used to pay off the credit card balances. He also personally signed and submitted the State of Florida reimbursement requests. The amounts reimbursed by the State of Florida for travel-related expenses that were paid by Respondent’s campaign accounts represent income to Respondent. Respondent characterized the “double-reimbursement” allegation as an “accounting dispute.” Respondent testified that he had loaned his campaigns personal funds, and that the payments made from his campaign accounts directly to his credit card accounts should be considered repayments of his loans to his campaign accounts. However, Respondent provided no corroborative evidence to substantiate personal loans to his campaign accounts, and his testimony in this regard is rejected as not credible. Additional Sources of Income Millennium Marketing, Inc. (Millennium) and Southwest Florida Enterprises entered into a Consulting Agreement (Agreement) effective November 1, 2006. Pursuant to that agreement, Millennium (Consultant) was to provide consulting and strategic advice relative to a Miami-Dade County referendum campaign for approval of slot machine gaming. Respondent acted as the chief strategist and primary provider of services under the Agreement. Indeed, the Agreement expressly stated that Respondent was to be the person primarily responsible for leading the strategic effort to win approval of the referendum: The Consultant agrees, as a condition precedent to this Agreement, that it shall engage David Rivera as the key person to act as the primary provider of service pursuant to the terms and conditions of this Agreement and to act as the intermediary on behalf of the Consultant with the Company for all purposes, and that the failure of David Rivera to act in these capacities shall be grounds to terminate immediately this Agreement, without notice and without the Company's being required to pay any further amounts or damages, except for accrued, payable and incurred amounts due and previously invoiced as the date of termination. The Agreement provided for a base compensation to Millennium of $250,000.00, with an additional bonus of $750,000.00 should the gaming referendum prove successful. The officers of Millennium were Respondent's mother, Daisy Magarino-Rivera, and Ileana Medina. On October 13, 2010, a Miami Herald article was published in which Respondent’s income was questioned. In response to the article, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) immediately began a criminal investigation of Respondent’s sources of income and financial reporting. A subpoena was issued to Millennium on December 2, 2010, requesting any and all financial records from the inception of Millennium to the present concerning any and all payments made to or received from David Rivera and/or Interamerican Government Relations. Millennium supplied documents pursuant to the subpoena in two separate productions. FDLE received the first group of documents on December 17, 2010, and a second group on January 24, 2011. The first response included 11 checks made payable to Respondent, totaling $132,000. The checks have no notation on the “For” line, whether loan, contingent loan, compensation, or otherwise. The following checks were drafted by Millennium, made payable to David M. Rivera, and deposited into Respondent's personal bank account: Check No. 1006, dated January 8, 2007, $25,000 deposited January 10, 2007; Check No. 1007, dated February 20, 2007, $10,000 deposited February 22, 2007; Check No. 1024, dated February 26, 2008, $10,000 deposited March 11, 2009; Check No. 1015, dated June 12, 2008, $20,000 deposited July 10, 2008; Check No. 1025, dated October 2, 2009, $18,000 deposited October 6, 2009; Check No. 1026, dated October 3, 2009, $12,000 deposited October 6, 2009; Check No. 1031, dated February 12, 2010, $10,000 deposited March 16, 2010; Check No. 1032, dated February 26, 2010, $8,000 deposited March 16, 2010; Check No. 1033, dated March 10, 2010, $7,000 deposited March 18, 2010; Check No. 1036, dated August 10, 2010, $8,000 deposited August 16, 2010; Check No. 1038, dated August 12, 2010, $4,000 deposited August 16, 2010. As can be seen, Check No. 1024 is out of check number sequence for the date, and was not deposited until March 11, 2009, more than a year after it is dated. While it is possible that this check was intentionally pulled from the back of the checkbook and drafted, such seems extremely unlikely given that the rest of the check numbers are in numerical order for the dates of issuance. Rather, the more plausible explanation for this anomaly is that the check was actually drafted shortly before it was deposited by Respondent in March 2009, and for some reason intentionally backdated to February 26, 2008. This inference is supported by the fact that with one exception, all of the other checks were deposited by Respondent within 30 days, and most within just a few days, of the check date.3/ Given this inference, the promissory note purporting to correspond to the February 26, 2008, loan was, in all likelihood, also inaccurately dated. Respondent contends that the above payments represent the proceeds of loans made to him by Millennium. In support of this contention, Respondent introduced 11 promissory notes whose dates correspond exactly to the dates of the 11 checks above. Copies of the promissory notes were not included in Millennium’s first document production to FDLE, but rather were included with the second group of documents provided by Millennium on or about January 24, 2011. The promissory note dated February 26, 2008, corresponds directly with check number 1024. As noted, the corresponding proceeds of that purported loan ($10,000) were not actually received by Respondent until the following year when check number 1024 was deposited on March 11, 2009. Respondent testified that he repaid the Millennium loans in November 2010 with two checks from his personal account in the amounts of $29,760.27 and $11,845.21, and the conveyance of ownership of the condominium unit identified as collateral in the promissory notes. Ileana Medina of Millennium and Respondent's mother (Ms. Magarino-Rivera) loaned Respondent the cash to timely repay the loans to Millennium. Specifically, on October 29, 2010, Respondent's personal account received a deposit of $49,000 from Ileana Medina's Bank of America Home Equity Line of Credit (HELOC). The deposit raised his balance to $55,418. That deposit allowed Respondent to clear two checks to Millennium on November 24, 2010, totaling $41,605.48, both checks identified as “loan repayment.” Between December 21 and 24, 2010, Respondent deposited $19,714.72 from his mother's savings bonds into his personal account. On December 22, 2010, Respondent deposited $10,000 into his personal bank account from his Charles Schwab account. These two deposits allowed Respondent to repay nearly $30,000 towards Ms. Medina's HELOC on December 28, 2010. On January 6, 2011, Respondent deposited $20,000 from his inactive campaign account number 92694/ into his personal account. The $20,000 had been deposited into Account No. 9269 by cashier's check, remitter Daisy Rivera. That deposit allowed Respondent to pay off the remaining $18,286 of Ms. Medina's HELOC. Respondent testified that he secured the $49,000 HELOC loan from Ms. Medina for his congressional campaign in case he needed more money than what had been budgeted for media time. However, as of October 2010 (the time of the loan from Ms. Medina), Respondent's congressional campaign account had a balance of $96,645.19. Notably, the campaign had donated $87,000 to charitable organizations just the month before. Brett Lycett was the lead investigator for the FDLE criminal investigation of Respondent. Being skeptical of the legitimacy of the promissory notes, Inspector Lycett asked Millennium for the original promissory notes and the computer on which the promissory notes were prepared in order to conduct a forensic analysis. A forensic analysis of the computer and the original documents would have helped identify when the actual documents were created and/or signed. Ms. Magarino-Rivera (Respondent’s mother) told Investigator Lycett that the computer on which the promissory notes were created had been discarded. Ms. Magarino-Rivera also advised Investigator Lycett that the original promissory notes had been given to Respondent once he had repaid the loans. The Advocate propounded discovery to Respondent in this case requesting the original promissory notes. In response, Respondent stated “[O]nly copies of such promissory notes are in Respondent's possession.” The greater weight of the evidence supports the conclusion that the $132,000 in payments made to Respondent from 2007 through 2010 were compensation paid to Respondent for his consulting work on the gaming referendum, rather than the proceeds of loans from Millennium. This evidence includes: the absence of any notation on the actual checks that they represented a loan to Respondent; the Check No. 1024 anomaly discussed in Finding of Fact 25 above; and the absence of the computer and original promissory notes upon which a forensic analysis could be performed to determine the legitimacy of the dating. That having been said, the evidence of record does not rise to the “clear and convincing standard” required in this proceeding. Respondent testified that repayment of the $132,000 in Millennium loans was contingent on whether Respondent consummated a business relationship with or joined Millennium by January 15, 2011. Thus, for financial disclosure purposes, Respondent treated the loans he received from Millennium as “contingent liabilities,” and did not report the loans on his CE Form 6's for the years 2007-2010. Respondent offered no evidence to support his contention that Millennium considered the loans to Respondent to be contingent on whether Respondent consummated a business relationship with or joined the company. Moreover, Respondent’s contention is belied by the express language of the promissory notes themselves, which make no mention of Respondent’s repayment obligation being contingent on any future event. Respondent’s assertion that the loans from Millennium were contingent liabilities is rejected. Rather, the best evidence of Respondent’s obligation to repay the loans are the promissory notes, which clearly state that Respondent’s obligation to repay the loans was unconditional. Respondent’s Form 6 Financial Disclosures for 2005 through 2009. On his 2005 CE Form 6, Respondent disclosed only his State of Florida, House of Representatives' salary of $29,916. However, review of Respondent's personal bank account records reflects income of approximately $52,473 in 2005, and personal expenditures of approximately $75,000. On his 2006 CE Form 6, Respondent disclosed only his State of Florida, House of Representatives' salary of $30,576. However, review of Respondent's personal bank account records reflects income of approximately $44,968 in 2006, and personal expenditures of approximately $54,000. On his 2007 CE Form 6, Respondent disclosed only his State of Florida, House of Representatives' salary of $31,932. However, review of Respondent's personal bank account records reflects income of approximately $101,000 in 2007, and personal expenditures of approximately $128,000. On his 2008 CE Form 6, Respondent disclosed only his State of Florida, House of Representatives' salary of $30,336. However, review of Respondent's personal bank account records reflects income of approximately $79,789 in 2008, and personal expenditures of approximately $88,000. On his 2009 CE Form 6, Respondent disclosed only his State of Florida, House of Representatives' salary of $29,697. However, review of Respondent's personal bank account records reflects income of approximately $93,000 in 2009, and personal expenditures of approximately $113,000. The Advocate clearly and convincingly established that for reporting years 2005 through 2009, Respondent had income well in excess of what he reported on his CE Forms 6 for those years. Even assuming the $95,000 received from Millennium during 2007, 2008, and 2009 was a loan, not income, Respondent’s other income still exceeded by tens of thousands of dollars the amounts that he reported on his CE Form 6’s for the years at issue. No loans, contingent or otherwise, were disclosed as liabilities in Respondent's 2006, 2007, 2008, or 2009 CE Forms 6. CE Form 6 requires a specific description of each asset valued over $1,000. On his 2005 through 2009 CE Forms 6, Respondent listed “real estate,” “401K,” “stocks and bonds” and “bank accounts.” In his Proposed Recommended Order, Respondent conceded that he did not list certain assets with the level of detail required by the Commission for the years 2006-2009. CE Form 6 asks for major clients under section D as Secondary Sources of Income. For purposes of the CE Form 6, “Secondary Sources” are not second jobs. Rather, the reporter is required to disclose major customers, clients and other sources of income to business entities of which they have an interest. Under “Secondary Sources of Income,” Respondent listed Interamerican Government Relations as a “business entity” with the U.S. Agency for International Development as a “major client” on his 2005-2009 CE Form 6's. According to Respondent, while serving in the Florida House, Respondent was engaged in international democracy building programs with the U.S. Government. Funds paid to the Respondent under these grant programs were nominal and intended to pay only for expenses incurred while Respondent participated in the programs. Respondent also disclosed Millennium as a secondary source of income on his 2005 CE Form 6, but not on his 2006 through 2009 CE Form 6’s. Respondent filed the first set of CE Form 6X, Amendment to Full and Public Disclosure of Financial Interests, on October 15, 2010. These amendments delete the secondary source of income disclosed for 2003 through 2009, but make no other changes. Respondent filed a second set of CE Form 6X on January 4, 2011, for the years 2006 through 2009, which specifically identifies parcels of real estate, provides the address for Respondent's bank account with Bank of America, and lists stocks and bonds with particularity. The amendments for 2007, 2008, and 2009 also list contingent loans from Ileana Medina and/or Millennium for those years. A CE Form 6F, “Final Full and Public Disclosure of Financial Interest” was required to be filed within 60 days from November 2, 2010, the date Respondent left office as a state representative. The significant difference between a CE Form 6 and a CE Form 6X is that the CE Form 6 asks for the financial information as of December 31, or a more current date. The CE Form 6X asks for financial information as of the date the discloser left office. On March 25, 2011, Respondent filed CE Form 6 which refers to an attachment under liabilities. Attached is a United States House of Representatives' Disclosure Statement which lists a “contingent liability/loan” from Ileana Medina and/or Millennium as paid in full in 2010. On August 7, 2012, and August 24, 2012, Respondent filed two CE Forms 6X. The accompanying cover letter refers to the forms as amendments to Respondent's CE Form 6F filed for 2010. The Form filed on August 24, 2012, lists Millennium as a contingent liability and also lists a loan from Ileana Medina for $49,000. Respondent testified that he was not aware that he was required to file a CE Form 6F in January 2011. He stated that he thought the report was due in May or June of the following year. He also testified that he filed the report in March 2011, because he received a call from the Florida House counsel advising him that the report was overdue.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Ethics issue a Final Order finding that Respondent: Violated section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, by requesting and accepting State of Florida reimbursement for travel expenses that were not incurred by him, but rather were paid by his campaign fund accounts; Violated Article II, section 8, Florida Constitution, by failing to or not properly reporting income and/or stocks and bonds; and/or secondary source income on his 2005 through 2009 CE Form 6, Full and Public Disclosure of Financial Interest; Violated section 112.3144, Florida Statutes, by failing to file a CE Form 6F “Final Full and Public Disclosure of Financial Interests” within 60 days of leaving his position with the Florida House of Representatives. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of June, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 2014.
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether the Petitioner is entitled to recover attorney's fees and costs incurred in this proceeding pursuant to the provisions of Section 112.317(8), Florida Statutes, and if so, the amount of such attorney's fees and costs.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Gordon Sands (Petitioner or Mayor Sands), is and at all times material to this proceeding was mayor of the Town of Welaka, Florida (Town or Town of Welaka), having served in that position for four years. Initially, Petitioner was appointed mayor in May 1996, after the then-mayor resigned. In 1997, Petitioner ran unopposed for mayor and, in March 1999, he was re-elected. Respondent, Caron Speas (Respondent), is and has been a resident of the Town of Welaka for two years. Respondent, who has practiced law since 1981, considers herself a "watchdog" of the actions of the Town's local government. She is chair of and has been active in a local "political committee" currently known as Concerned Citizens for Public Integrity, Inc. Respondent's brother, Rand Speas, is also a resident of the Town of Welaka. During January to March 1999, Mr. Speas was running for a position on the Town Council at the request of his sister, Respondent. Mr. Speas lost his election campaign on March 3, 1999. During Mr. Speas' unsuccessful 1999 election campaign, Mayor Sands was running for re-election. Respondent was opposed to Petitioner's re-election bid and had actively opposed many of the official actions taken by Mayor Sands. Moreover, Respondent had openly expressed her dislike and dissatisfaction with the manner in which the Town of Welaka was governed and her opposition to the administration of Mayor Sands. On April 9, 1999, Respondent filed an amended ethics complaint (Amended Complaint) against Mayor Sands alleging that the mayor violated Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, by orchestrating a willful and deliberate violation of the public records laws in order to aid his re-election campaign. After an investigation and consideration of the Complaint and the Amended Complaint, the Ethics Commission issued an order finding that there was no probable cause to believe that the mayor had violated the Code of Ethics as alleged by Respondent and dismissing both the Complaint and the Amended Complaint. In this case, Petitioner asserts a right to attorney's fees and costs by reason of Respondent's filing the Amended Complaint. In the Amended Complaint made against Mayor Sands, Respondent submitted an Amended Statement of Facts, which stated: AMENDED STATEMENT OF FACTS During the months from January 1999 to March 1999, said party [Mayor Sands] did violate Florida Statute [sic] 112.313(6) by orchestrating a willful and deliberate violation of the public records laws for the purpose of aiding his re-election campaign. Said party did use his position as Mayor of the Town of Welaka (population approximately 600) to instruct the town clerk not to provide his political opponents with public records that contained information relating to campaign issues. On January 13, 1999, The Concerned Citizen's Group, a political committee opposing Mayor Sands [sic] bid for re-election, requested copies of very specific public records. The town clerk produced records which were wholly incomplete--rather than producing the audited financial statements that were requested, she produced only the balance sheets taken from the audited financial statements. When the deficiency was pointed out to her, she wrote a letter on February 16, 1999, improperly requesting a $100.00 deposit for the "extensive labor" involved in locating the records. When it was pointed out that she had already located the records because she copied the balance sheets from them, she finally had to accede to copying the audited financial statements that day. Over one month after they were requested. [sic] On January 22, 1999, The Concerned Citizen's Group, served a second written request for copies of very specific public records, to wit: grant applications. On February 16, 1999, the town clerk wrote the above- referenced letter improperly requesting a $100.00 deposit but did not object to the public nature of the records requested. When the $100.00 deposit was paid under protest, the records were nevertheless not forthcoming. One day before the election, The Concerned Citizen's Group was contacted and told it could pick up the records that afternoon. The records consisted of 11 pages for which the Concerned Citizen's Group was charged $66.50, or $6.60 per page. On January 22, 1999 Philip J. Cobb, campaign manager for Rand Speas, requested a copy of the Absentee Ballot Voter's List for the last two Welaka elections and did not receive the requested document until one day before the election. It was three pages long and he was charged 45 cents. On January 28, 1999, Edna Moore, a political opponent of the mayor, made a request for public records, (specifically: two ordinances, a permit, a receipt for equipment purchase, Minutes of a town council meeting, and employee work sheets for 4 months). Ms. Moore also received a letter requesting a $100.00 deposit, which she was unable to pay. The day after the election, Ms. Moore was told that her public records were ready for pick up. She was charged $39.75 for 115 copies, or 35 cents per page. On February 15, 1999, May Nigh, a member of the Concerned Citizen's Group, made a request for specific public records. Ms. Nigh also received a letter requesting a $100.00 deposit, which she was unable to pay. Ms. Nigh received the requested records a week after the election. The records consisted of 19 pages for which she was charged $31.25, or $1.64 per page. The excuses and explanations given for the delays in producing the above records were totally lacking in plausibility. Each of the persons who requested public records were [sic] told that the requests were either voluminous or could not be located and that the town clerk would have to work on the weekends to provide the records. The records that were ultimately produced were not "voluminous" and a former town employee, Irene Perrins, (who has a lifetime of experience in office work) has indicated verbally to the complainant that there is not enough work at town hall to keep the town clerk busy for more than 3 hours a day, let alone on the weekends. The statute cited by Respondent and the facts alleged in support of her charges comprise a specific accusation by Respondent that Mayor Sands, a public officer of the Town of Welaka, corruptly used his official position by orchestrating a willful and deliberate violation of public records laws in order to secure a special privilege or benefit for himself by directing the Town Clerk not to provide his political opponents with requested records. At the time Respondent completed and filed the Amended Complaint, she had no personal knowledge that Mayor Sands had, in fact, "orchestrated a willful and deliberate violation of the public records laws for the purpose of aiding his re-election campaign." Respondent relied on statements of three individuals in making the charge against Mayor Sands contained in the Amended Complaint. First, according to Respondent, Grace Evans, a former member of the Town Council of the Town of Welaka, told Respondent that Mayor Sands totally controls and directs the activities of the Town Clerk, Renee Peterson. Next, Virgil Posetti, a political ally of Rand Speas and the political opponent of Mayor Sands in the 1999 election, allowed Respondent to tape a statement in which Posetti stated that Mayor Sands controls what goes on in Town Hall and supervises the Town Clerk. Finally, in a telephone conversation initiated by Respondent, Eileen Perrins, a former town employee who was fired, told Respondent that the Town Clerk had only three or four hours of work to do during the work day. Respondent put credence in Ms. Evans' statements because Respondent believed that Ms. Evans knew Mayor Sands well. Respondent testified that Ms. Evans had formerly served on the Town Council under Mayor Sands but resigned from the Council "saying that Mayor Sands violates the Sunshine Laws regularly." Respondent apparently believed the statements made by Posetti because he had been a former member of the Town Council. However, it is significant that at the time the public records requests were made to the Town Clerk, Posetti was not a member of the Town Council, was not active in Town Hall, and did not work in Town Hall. Moreover, prior to and at the time Respondent filed the Amended Complaint, she was aware that Posetti was running against Mayor Sands for mayor of the Town of Welaka. Lastly, Respondent apparently believed the statements of Ms. Perrins because Perrins had previously worked in Town Hall as an employee of the Town. Respondent relied on Ms. Perrins' statements although she knew or believed that Perrins had been fired from her job with the Town. Respondent's reliance on any statements made by Evans, Posetti, or Perrins was not well-founded. By her own testimony, Respondent was aware that the statements by these individuals should be weighed carefully in light of their likely biases against Mayor Sands. Moreover, there was no evidence that Evans, Posetti, or Perrins worked at Town Hall or were aware of or had any knowledge of what was going on in Town Hall at the time the subject public records request were made. Finally, Respondent acknowledged that none of the aforementioned individuals ever told her that Mayor Sands had orchestrated a willful and deliberate violation of the public records laws. Respondent also based the charges in the Complaint on the chronology--the dates the public requests were made; the information that was requested; the length of time she believed it reasonably should have taken to produce the documents; the time it actually took to produce the documents; and the dates that the records were actually produced. In summary, Respondent testified that the basis for the charges she made in the Amended Complaint was as follows: [W]hat I was hearing around town, what I was hearing from former council people, what I heard from Irene Perrins in the telephone conversation I had with her and the timing of the requests, the demands for $100 deposits, and the actual production of documents and what was produced. The totality of the circumstances is the reason this complaint was filed. (Transcript, pages 71-71). Respondent was "upset" and "outraged" when some of the public records requests were not responded to in the time frame and manner that she thought was reasonable. As a result, after the March 1999 election, she filed the Complaint against Mayor Sands. Respondent chose to file the Complaint against Mayor Sands although she knew that all the subject public records requests had been directed to the Town Clerk and/or the Town Custodian of Records. The only Town official with whom Respondent communicated regarding the subject public records requests was Renee Peterson. However, Respondent believed Mayor Sands was a "dictator" in that he "controls" and "runs everything" at Town Hall. In light thereof, Respondent believed that Ms. Peterson was delaying and withholding production of documents at the direction of Mayor Sands. Despite Respondent's belief that Mayor Sands controlled everything at Town Hall, including responses to public records requests, she never communicated with him about the delay in the Town Clerk's responding to the subject public records requests. In fact, Respondent has never had a conversation with Mayor Sands. At all times material to this proceeding, Renee Peterson was the Town Clerk and Custodian of Records for the Town of Welaka, having been employed in that position since September 1998. Among her various duties, Ms. Peterson was responsible for keeping and providing public records for review and copying such records upon request. In that connection, the Town of Welaka has a duly-adopted ordinance establishing a procedure for Ms. Peterson to follow. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Mayor Sands was charged with supervising the Town Clerk, Ms. Peterson. When Ms. Peterson was first employed, Mayor Sands instructed Ms. Peterson to refer any questions about public records to the Town's attorney or to use the "Sunshine Manual." However, the mayor was not involved in and did not direct the day-to-day work activities of Ms. Peterson. Ms. Peterson used her discretion in establishing and accomplishing her job priorities. Between approximately January 13 and March 9, 1999, Ms. Peterson received at least 13 public records requests from the Concerned Citizens Group and several individuals. Ten of the thirteen public records requests were made in January 1999 and some required research back to 1990. In January 1999, when ten of the public records requests were made, Ms. Peterson had been employed as Town Clerk for only three or four months. Given her varied responsibilities as Town Clerk, the number and the volume of the public records request, and the extensive research required to comply with some of the public records requests, Ms. Peterson took several weeks to respond to several of the public records requests. In instances when Ms Peterson determined that there would be some delay in fully responding to the requests, she wrote letters to the appropriate individuals and informed them of the status of their public records requests. Subsequently, with the help of two other people, Ms. Peterson worked seven hours one Saturday to satisfactorily respond to the public records requests. Respondent testified that the public records requests were relevant to campaign issues in the March 1999 election. However, none of the persons who had made the subject public records requests ever complained to Ms. Peterson about the time frame within which she responded to their public records requests. Furthermore, when the requests were made and after they received letters advising them of the status of their requests, none of the individuals advised Ms. Peterson that the requested records were needed by a date certain. Ms. Peterson did not think in terms of the subject public requests as related to the election. She simply thought of them as public records requests. Under all the circumstances, there was no unreasonable delay in her response to those public records requests. Ms. Peterson testified credibly that she never told Mayor Sands that the subject public records requests had been made; that Mayor Sands never orchestrated any willful or deliberate violation of the public records law; and that the mayor never instructed her not to provide his political opponents with public records that contained information relating to campaign issues or to delay providing such records to his political opponents. Mayor Sands' credible testimony was that Ms. Peterson never advised him that she had received the subject public records requests and that he never instructed her not to provide his political opponents with public records or to delay providing such records to his political opponents. Mayor Sands' credible testimony was that he first heard about problems concerning an individual's obtaining public records at a political rally two weeks before the March 1999 election. While at that rally, he heard Posetti, his opponent in the election, and Edna Moore, make statements that Ms. Moore could not get public records that she desired. Neither Posetti nor Ms. Moore accused Mayor Sands of interfering with Ms. Moore's getting the records. However, after hearing these complaints, Mayor Sands asked the former Town Clerk and a former Town Council member who had served as assistant records keeper to assist Ms. Peterson in responding to the public records requests. Soon thereafter, all records were produced. Respondent acknowledged that no one told her that Mayor Sands orchestrated a willful and deliberate violation of the public records law to assist his re-election campaign. Rather, in filing the Amended Complaint, Respondent relied on statements made to her by individuals who were obviously biased against Mayor Sands and whose statements, even if true, do not support the charge that the mayor orchestrated a willful and deliberate violation of the public records law for the purpose of aiding his re-election efforts. Respondent had no first-hand knowledge of any facts that would reasonably support the charge she made against Mayor Sands in the Amended Complaint. In absence of such knowledge, Respondent relied on the statements of Ms. Evans, Ms. Perrins, and Mr. Posetti and on Respondent's conclusion that the chronology of events related to the public records was evidence that Mayor Sands: (1) orchestrated a willful and deliberate violation of the public records law for the purpose of aiding his re-election campaign; and (2) instructed the Town Clerk not to provide his political opponents with public records that contained information relating to campaign issues. Contrary to Respondent's beliefs, the aforementioned statements and the chronology of events relative to the public records requests do not support or provide a reasonable basis for charges against Mayor Sands in the Amended Complaint. The allegations and statements of fact in the Amended Complaint are mere conjecture and surmise. Based on the foregoing, Respondent filed the Amended Complaint with a malicious intent to injure the reputation of Mayor Sands and with reckless disregard for whether said Amended Complaint contained false allegations material to a violation of the Code of Ethics. In defending himself against the allegations in the Complaint and in this proceeding, Petitioner has been represented by Allen C. D. Scott, II, Esquire. Mr. Scott's hourly rate is $125.00. Prior to the final hearing, Mr. Scott expended 43 hours on this matter and a related case, McGuire v. Speas, DOAH Case No. 00-0267FE, Recommended Order issued August 24, 2000. One- half of that time is attributable to the instant case. The hourly rate of $125.00 billed by Mr. Scott is reasonable. Likewise, the pretrial time of 21.80 hours expended in this matter is reasonable. Accordingly, the attorney's fee of $2,725.00 incurred is reasonable. Judith Ginn, Esquire, an attorney who has practiced law in the state of Florida since 1974, testified as an expert witness in this case. Ms. Ginn's hourly rate of $150.00 is reasonable. The reasonable cost of Ms. Ginn's expert witness services in this case and in the companion case is $650.00.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that: The Ethics Commission enter a final order finding that Respondent, Caron Speas, is liable for attorney's fees of $2,725.00 and costs of $325.00; and The Ethics Commission award fees and costs which were incurred on the day of and after the administrative hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of September, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of September, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Allen C. D. Scott, II, Esquire Scott & Scott 101 Orange Street St. Augustine, Florida 32084 Peter Ticktin, Esquire Scholl, Ticktin, Rosenberg, Glatter & Litz, P.A. Net First Plaza 5295 Town Center Road, Third Floor Boca Raton, Florida 33486-1080 Sheri L. Gerety, Complaint Coordinator and Clerk Commission on Ethics 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Bonnie J. Williams, Executive Director Commission on Ethics 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Philip C. Claypool, General Counsel Commission on Ethics 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Francisco Luis Inguanzo (Petitioner), is entitled to have his application for licensure approved.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Francisco Luis Inguanzo, is an applicant for licensure as a resident public all lines insurance adjuster. He filed an application with the Respondent on or about September 20, 2004. The Department is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating licensees and applicants for licensure such as the Petitioner. As such, the Respondent must interpret and administer the provisions of Chapter 626, Florida Statutes (2004). The application for licensure includes several questions that applicants must complete. More specifically, applicants must disclose law enforcement records and, to that end, the Department poses the following question: Have you ever been convicted, found guilty, or pled guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) to a felony or crime punishable by imprisonment of one (1) year or more under the laws of any municipality, county, state, territory or country, whether or not adjudication was withheld or a judgment of conviction was entered? Yes/No The response the Petitioner provided to the foregoing question was in the negative (that is “No”). When the Department reviewed the Petitioner’s criminal history, however, it was discovered that the Petitioner was arrested and pled guilty to carrying a concealed firearm, a third-degree felony. The Petitioner did not accurately disclose the foregoing arrest and conviction Moreover, the Petitioner did not provide a credible explanation for why he failed to accurately answer the application question. The criminal charges against this Petitioner were resolved on September 10, 2002. After pleading guilty, the Petitioner was placed on one-year probation with various terms to be completed. The Petitioner successfully completed the terms of his probation on May 30, 2003. At the time he filed the application in the instant matter, the Petitioner knew or should have known that he had been charged with a serious crime, that he had resolved the criminal case, and that he was no longer on probation. The Petitioner did not fully disclose his criminal record to the Department. The Department’s application form makes it clear that the applicant’s criminal history must be disclosed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a Final Order denying the Petitioner’s application for licensure. S DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of June, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Carlos G. Muniz, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dana M. Wiehle, Esquire Department of Financial Services 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Julio R. Ferrer-Roo, Esquire Julio R. Ferrer Roo, P.A. 8360 West Flagler Street, Suite 203A Miami, Florida 33144
The Issue The issue for consideration in this hearing is whether Respondent's license as a real estate salesperson in Florida should be disciplined because of the matters alleged in the Administrative complaint filed herein.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Division of Real Estate was the state agency responsible for the licensing of real estate salespersons and the regulation of the real estate sales profession in Florida. Respondent, Mark T. West, was licensed by the Division as a real estate salesperson on March 3, 1997, upon passage of the salesperson examination, and held license number SL-0647923. Notwithstanding Respondent's testimony that he has not been actively engaged in the practice of real estate, licensure records maintained by the Division reflect that from March 11, 1997 through the present, he has been active as a salesperson with two broker corporations, TRI W Group, Inc., from March 11, 1997 through September 17, 2000, and TRI-W Brokerage Inc., from September 18, 2000 to the date of certification, February 22, 2001. On December 15, 1995, Respondent submitted an application for licensure to the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate. His application reflected he was born in St. Petersburg, Florida, on September 20, 1961. Question 9 on the application asks whether the applicant has ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of nolo contendere, even if adjudication was withheld. The question indicates it's applicability to any violation of the law of any municipality, county, state, or nation, including traffic offenses other than minor traffic offenses, and requires the applicant to provide details, including dates and outcomes, in full, on a separate sheet of paper. The time period of applicability is not limited. On his application, Respondent, in answer to question 9, indicated "Yes" and listed a violation of failure to yield to a fire engine. No other offenses were reflected on the form, nor was any separate sheet listing other offenses found in the records of the Division. After the application was filed, consistent with its usual practice, the Division conducted a criminal records background check on Respondent which revealed other offenses had been charged against him. On January 17, 1980, Respondent was charged with DWI in Pinellas County. His driver's license was suspended for 90 days, and he was fined. On September 11, 1982, Respondent was charged with a misdemeanor charge of obstructing a police officer in the performance of his duties. Though Respondent claims he did nothing wrong and the police officer was reprimanded for charging him, the fact remains that Respondent pleaded guilty to the charge on December 2, 1982, and adjudication was withheld. On January 13, 1986, Respondent was charged, in two separate cases, with obtaining property by worthless check. Both checks were for $81.90 and, according to Respondent, were given in payment for paint which he purchased to paint someone's home. He claims he was not paid for the job and, therefore, had no funds with which to satisfy the checks he wrote. Respondent pleaded guilty in both cases and was placed on probation in each case along with a requirement to make restitution and pay costs. He was discharged from probation after nine months. Respondent claims that as to all offenses to which he pleaded guilty, he did so upon advice of counsel. Respondent was interviewed regarding his application on January 13, 2000, by an investigator with the Division to whom he indicated at the time that he did not believe he was required to list any offense over ten years in the past. At hearing, however, Respondent modified that answer by indicating his belief the ten-year limitation related only to traffic offenses. Once the Administrative Complaint was served upon Respondent, in his election of rights, he claimed he had listed all the prior disciplinary actions on a separate sheet of paper which he enclosed with the application when it was submitted. He reiterated that claim in a letter to the Division on November 15, 2000, and he persists in that claim as of the date of this hearing. Review of the application in question reveals that Respondent had previously submitted application for licensure in September, 1994, and had failed the examination for licensure on November 11, 1994, and on January 1, April 3, and June 12, 1995. A review of Respondent's investigative file failed to disclose the prior application or whether Respondent had listed his other offenses on that application. He claims he did so, however. Respondent attended real estate school in preparation for taking the licensure exam. He cannot recall, however, whether, at the school, he was taught how to fill out the application and what was required to be on it. However, he admits to having read the application and realizes it had to be accurate and complete. He contends he believed he had complied with the disclosure requirements and signed the affidavit of completeness which appears on the application. Respondent admits that all his difficulties with the law are not listed on the application form itself. He also admits that there is no time limit listed on the application and that the application form, as he submitted it, does not reflect there is an attachment or continuation in any form. No explanation was given by the counsel for the Commission for the almost five-year delay between the filing of the application for examination by Respondent and the filing of the Administrative Complaint by the state.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of a violation of Subsections 475.25(1)(e) and (m), Florida Statutes, placing his license as a real estate sales person on probation for one year under such terms and conditions as the Commission may prescribe, and imposing an administrative fine of $1,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of May, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Juana C. Watkins, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Mark T. West 222 145th Avenue, East Madeira Beach, Florida 33708 Herbert S. Fecker, Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner’s request for exemption from disqualification should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for regulating the employment of persons in positions of special trust as direct service providers. Petitioner is seeking employment with Always Promoting Independence, LLC, and Supporting Independence/Honor Health Care Management, both service providers are regulated by Respondent. Petitioner wants to work as a direct service provider, which requires background screening. The results of Petitioner’s background screening revealed a history of criminal offenses. Respondent relies on the Department of Children and Families Background Screening Unit (“Department”) to initially receive exemption from disqualification requests and to compile documents related to such requests. On February 8, 2016, Petitioner submitted a Request for Exemption, Exemption Questionnaire (“Questionnaire”), various criminal records, character references, and other various documents (the “Exemption Packet”), to the Department seeking to demonstrate support for the granting of an exemption from employment disqualification. The Department subsequently forwarded the Exemption Packet to the Agency for review. To begin its exemption review, Respondent considered Petitioner’s disqualifying offense. In May 1991, Petitioner committed the disqualifying offense of “Fraudulent Use of Credit Card” (six counts). Petitioner pled nolo contendere to the disqualifying offense and adjudication was withheld. She was sentenced to 24 months’ probation and payment of fines and court costs. She completed her term of probation early. In its continued exemption review, Respondent considered the following non-disqualifying offenses, which Petitioner obtained subsequent to her May 1991 disqualifying offense: an arrest for “Aggravated Assault with a Firearm” in August 1997 (a violation of section 784.021, Florida Statutes); an arrest for “Driving While License Suspended with Knowledge” in October 2007 (a violation of section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes); an arrest for “Driving While License Suspended with Knowledge” in September 2008 (another violation of section 322.34(2)); an arrest for “Possession of Cannabis” in March 2012 (a violation of section 893.13(6)(b), Florida Statutes); and a conviction for “Possession of Drug Paraphernalia” in March 2012 (a violation of section 893.147(1)). Petitioner received notification by letters dated September 22, 2015, and January 12, 2016, from the Department, Respondent’s background screening entity, of her disqualification from employment due to criminal history. The specific disqualifying offense listed in both letters was “Fraud-Illegal Use of Credit Cards,” a violation of section 817.61, Florida Statutes. Petitioner provided details of the circumstances surrounding the disqualifying offense. In short, Petitioner indicated she gave three “associates” a ride to the mall in exchange for their promise to buy her a new pair of shoes. She left the Champs sports store with her shoes, expecting one of her companions to pay for them. She was in her car when her companions ran from the store with a security guard in pursuit. They told her to start the car which she refused because she believed she had not done anything wrong. Unfortunately for her, one of her companions had attempted to pay for her new shoes with a stolen credit card. She and her companions were arrested and charged with credit card fraud. Petitioner provided documentation of the charge, the disposition after her no contest plea, and the fact that her probation was terminated early. Petitioner provided explanations for all but one of the non-disqualifying offenses that ranged from the gun charge being at the end of a “bad relationship” (her then-girlfriend falsely accused her); to she was pulled over for a broken taillight, then charged with driving with a suspended license (she claimed she paid her tickets and the license was reinstated, although no records were provided on this point); to she was pulled over for having too dark a window tint in her car and cannabis was found (she testified it was not hers), but, since no one confessed to ownership, all were cited for possession; and finally to no explanation at all for the 2007 driving with a suspended license charge. Petitioner accepted little responsibility for her criminal offenses and concluded with the statement that she has no current involvement with any court system; she stated she is in “good standing.” Petitioner indicated on her Questionnaire that there was no harm to any victim or property, including damage or injury, in her past. Petitioner indicated on her Questionnaire that there were no stressors in her life at the time of the disqualifying offense. Regarding current stressors in her life, Petitioner testified she is unable to provide for her family and she is eager to obtain and keep steady employment. Petitioner listed her educational achievements as a diploma from Clearwater High School (1988), an Associate in Arts degree from Tampa Tech in computer engineering (1991), and an Associate in Science (“A.S.”) degree from St. Petersburg College in human services (2014). Petitioner indicated on her Questionnaire that she has received no counseling for any reason. Petitioner indicated on her Questionnaire that she has no history of alcohol and drug abuse. Petitioner indicated on her Questionnaire that she is involved with a community organization known as “Parents that Care.” As to expressing remorse or accepting responsibility for her actions, Petitioner testified she completed her probation early and that she no longer surrounds herself with negative influences and people. Petitioner’s recent work history has been stable. Her work history since 2009 indicates she has worked for two groups providing direct support/in-home support staff: Supporting Independence/Honor Health Care Management (2012-present) and Peaceful Dreams, Inc. (2009-2012). In addition to the criminal records submitted, Petitioner also offered affidavits of good moral character, written personal statements, IRS W-2 Forms, a copy of her A.S. degree from St. Petersburg College, and three letters of reference attesting to her character. The letters were written by people who have known Petitioner for many years and who believe her to be hard-working, reliable, and caring. Petitioner also submitted a copy of an exemption from disqualification she had received from the Agency for Health Care Administration (“AHCA”) dated May 27, 2014. Jeffrey Smith, regional operations manager for the Suncoast Region, testified that the Agency reviewed all the provided documentation provided by Petitioner, the information provided on the Exemption Questionnaire, the various records documenting Petitioner’s criminal history, her educational record, her character references, and her exemption from AHCA. Following a review of all the documentation included in the Exemption Packet, Agency Director Barbara Palmer advised Petitioner by a letter dated May 27, 2016, that her request for an exemption from her disqualifying offense was denied. The basis for the denial was that Petitioner failed to provide clear and convincing evidence of her rehabilitation. Mr. Smith testified the Agency considered all the documentation submitted by Petitioner in her Exemption Packet, as well as the additional documents provided prior to and at the hearing. He did not find that the documentation negated or refuted the official records of the disqualifying and non- disqualifying offenses. Further, the fact that the non-disqualifying offenses related to Petitioner’s driving is relevant to the position for which she seeks an exemption from disqualification. A direct service provider is often called upon to transport individuals entrusted to her care. Petitioner’s statement that her license was reinstated and that she received no more driving citations after the offenses described above was refuted by Mr. Smith, based upon subsequent driving records regarding Petitioner. Mr. Smith also noted two additional reports from the Department in which Petitioner was named the alleged perpetrator. One report showed some indicators of child abuse (cuts/punctures/bites/excessive corporal punishment), and the other report involved allegations of exploitation of a vulnerable adult, specifically, one with a developmental disability, but resulted in no official findings of exploitation. The Agency’s clients are a vulnerable population, consisting of individuals whose developmental disabilities are defined as intellectual disability, autism, spina bifida, Prader-Willi syndrome, cerebral palsy, Down syndrome, and/or Phelan-McDermid syndrome. Without the Agency’s services, these clients would require institutionalization. Petitioner testified passionately that she enjoys working with individuals with disabilities. Working in this field inspired her to return to school to earn a degree in human services. She testified that working with persons with disabilities is her long-term goal. She admitted she made some “foolish mistakes” when she was younger, but that she now accepts responsibility for her actions. She also testified that she believed her exemption should be granted because another agency, AHCA, had granted her an exemption from disqualification. Respondent countered with the fact that this vulnerable population requires being able to rely on the direct care provider’s good character and trustworthiness. Individuals entrusted with the care of the disabled are often called upon to make decisions of a financial, medical, and social nature. The Agency must weigh the benefit against the risk when considering granting an exemption. Petitioner’s history shows poor judgment on her part, and she provided testimony that was inconsistent with the documentation of her criminal history and the report and allegations of abuse or neglect from the Department. Petitioner admitted to use of a credit card of a vulnerable adult, which showed poor judgment on her part. Additionally, the close proximity of Petitioner’s most recent arrest (2012) to her request for exemption demonstrates her issues with the law are not limited to the distant past. Finally, Respondent, pursuant to section 435.07(5), Florida Statutes, considered the exemption given Petitioner by AHCA. The exemption from AHCA, however, is neither binding on the Agency nor does such exemption follow the same criteria or involve the same service population as the exemption sought from Respondent. The granting of an exemption from employment disqualification would allow Petitioner to be employed as a direct service provider to Agency clients. The undersigned appreciates Mr. Smith’s thoughtful and comprehensive assessment of Petitioner’s criminal history and fitness to hold a position of trust, and finds his testimony at hearing and reasons for recommending the denial to be credible and reasonable.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Persons with Disabilities enter a final order denying Petitioner’s request for an exemption from disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of October, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of October, 2016. COPIES FURNISHED: Rosemary Brinson 1010 Eldridge Street Clearwater, Florida 33755 Jeannette L. Estes, Esquire Agency for Persons with Disabilities 200 North Kentucky Avenue, Suite 422 Lakeland, Florida 33801 (eServed) Lori Oakley, Acting Agency Clerk Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Barbara Palmer, Director Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Petitioner's employment should be terminated on the grounds alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated June 3, 1998.
Findings Of Fact For the past seventeen years, Respondent has been employed by the Petitioner. At the time of the formal hearing, he held the position of a fire alarm foreman. He previously held the positions of a fire alarm technician and a trades helper. Respondent has been a good employee and has a good work record. Respondent is represented by the National Conference of Firemen and Oilers, AFL-CIO, Local 1227. Gary Mitten is the president of that union. Pursuant to its rule making authority and to implement Sections 231.02 and 230.23(5), Florida Statutes, the Petitioner revised its Rule 3.12, effective September 3,1997, to provide as follows: Definitions: For the purposes of this policy: "Prospective Employee" means an applicant who has received an offer of employment. "Conviction" means a determination of guilt that is the result of a plea or a trial regardless of adjudication of guilt. A prospective or current employee who is recommended to fill a non-instructional position shall, as a condition of employment, file a complete set of fingerprints taken by an authorized law enforcement officer or a designated employee of the District trained to take fingerprints. The prints will be processed pursuant to the requirements of Section 231.02(2)(a), Florida Statutes. * * * A prospective or current employee may be disqualified or may be terminated from continued employment if the prospective or current employee has been convicted of a crime classified as a felony or first degree misdemeanor directly related to the position of employment sought or convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude or any of the offenses enumerated in Chapter 435, Florida Statutes. * * * 6. Any provision of the law notwithstanding, all personnel currently required to be certified under Section 231.17, Florida Statutes, and by January 1, 1998, for all other personnel currently employed by the District who have not been fingerprinted and screened in the same manner outlined in Section (1) shall submit a complete set of fingerprints taken by an employee of the school or district who is trained to take fingerprints. The prints shall be processed according to Section 231.02(2)(a), Florida Statutes. Employees found through fingerprint processing to have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude shall not be employed in any position requiring direct contact with students. Such action shall be subject to appeal. . . . Section 231.02, Florida Statutes, pertains to the qualifications of school personnel and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: To be eligible for appointment in any position in any district school system, a person shall be of good moral character . . . (2)(a) Instructional and noninstructional personnel who are hired to fill positions requiring direct contact with students in any district school system or laboratory school shall, upon employment, file a complete set of fingerprints taken by an authorized law enforcement officer or an employee of the school or district who is trained to take fingerprints. These fingerprints shall be submitted to the Department of Law Enforcement for state processing and to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for federal processing. . . . Employees found through fingerprint processing to have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude shall not be employed in any position requiring direct contact with students. . . . Any provision of law notwithstanding, by January 1, 1997, . . . for all other personnel currently employed by any district school system or any other public school who have not been fingerprinted and screened in the same manner outlined in paragraph (a) shall submit a complete set of fingerprints taken by an authorized law enforcement officer or an employee of the school or district who is trained to take fingerprints. The fingerprints shall be submitted to the Department of Law Enforcement for state processing and the Federal Bureau of Investigation for federal processing. . . . Employees found through fingerprint processing to have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude shall not be employed in any position requiring direct contact with students. . . . Personnel who have been fingerprinted or screened pursuant to this subsection and who have not been unemployed for more than 90 days shall not be required to be refingerprinted or rescreened in order to comply with the requirements of this subsection.1 Section 435.03, Florida Statutes, provides, in pertinent part, as follows: All employees required by law to be screened shall be required to undergo background screening as a condition of employment and continued employment. For the purposes of this subsection, level 1 screenings shall include, but not be limited to, employment history checks and statewide criminal correspondence checks through the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, and may include local criminal records checks through local law enforcement agencies. Any person for whom employment screening is required by statute must not have been found guilty of, regardless of adjudication, or entered a plea of nolo contendere or guilty to, any offense prohibited under any of the following provisions of the Florida Statutes or under any similar statute of another jurisdiction: * * * (n) Chapter 796, relating to prostitution. Section 435.06, Florida Statutes, provides, in pertinent part, as follows: When an employer or licensing agency has reasonable cause to believe that grounds exist for the denial or termination of employment of any employee as a result of background screening, it shall notify the employee in writing, stating the specific record which indicates noncompliance with the standards in this section. It shall be the responsibility of the affected employee to contest his or her disqualification or to request exemption from disqualification. The only basis for contesting the disqualification shall be proof of mistaken identity. The employer must either terminate the employment of any of its personnel found to be in noncompliance with the minimum standards for good moral character contained in this section or place the employee in a position for which background screening is not required unless the employee is granted an exemption from disqualification pursuant to s. 435.07. Section 435.07, Florida Statutes, provides exemptions from disqualification, in pertinent part, as follows: Unless otherwise provided by law, the provisions of this section shall apply to exemptions from disqualification. The appropriate licensing agency may grant to any employee otherwise disqualified from employment an exemption from disqualification for: * * * (b) Misdemeanors prohibited under any of the Florida Statutes cited in this chapter or under similar statutes of other jurisdictions; * * * (3) In order for a licensing department to grant an exemption to any employee, the employee must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the employee should not be disqualified from employment. Employees seeking an exemption have the burden of setting forth sufficient evidence of rehabilitation, including, but not limited to, the circumstances surrounding the criminal incident for which an exemption is sought, the time period that has elapsed since the incident, the nature of the harm caused to the victim, and the history of the employee since the incident, or any other evidence or circumstances indicating that the employee will not present a danger if continued employment is allowed. The decision of the licensing department regarding an exemption may be contested through the hearing procedures set forth in chapter 120. . . . In December 1997, Respondent was fingerprinted pursuant to School Board Rule 3.12. The subsequent screening reflected that Respondent was arrested by the Riveria Beach Police Department on March 13, 1997, and charged with solicitation of prostitution, which is a misdemeanor offense pursuant to Section 796.07, Florida Statutes. This is also a disqualifying offense pursuant to Section 435.03(2)(n), Florida Statutes. Respondent subsequently entered a plea of nolo contendere; he was assessed a monetary fine, and adjudication of guilt was withheld. James P. Kelly is responsible for conducting background screenings of employees as Chief of the Petitioner's police department. Melinda Wong is the director of Petitioner's employee records and information services departments. Mr. Kelly and Ms. Wong serve as members of Petitioner's Criminal Background Check Committee, which was formed to consider the results of background screenings and to consider appeals of employees found to have a disqualifying conviction. By memorandum dated January 5, 1998, Respondent was notified as to the results of the background screening and advised, in pertinent part, as follows: This past year you were fingerprinted pursuant to Florida Statutes, Section 231.02. Based on the criminal history indicated below, the Criminal Background Check (CBC) Committee will recommend your termination from employment with the District. You have a right to appear before the CBC Committee to appeal that determination and request exemption from the requirement that you be disqualified from further employment. In order for an exemption to be granted, you must demonstrate sufficient evidence of rehabilitation, including, but not limited to, the circumstances surrounding the criminal incident for which exemption is sought; the time period that has elapsed since the incident; the nature of the harm caused to the victim; and any other evidence or circumstances indicating that you will not present a danger if continued employment is allowed. On March 13, 1997, in Riveria Beach, Florida, you were arrested for solicitation of prostitution for which you subsequently pled guilty. . . . Respondent appeared before the Committee accompanied by Mr. Mitten, his union representative. Respondent told the Committee that he had been drinking on the night in question and had let a friend, who he later identified as Billy Scott, drive his vehicle. Respondent further related that he had fallen asleep and that when he awakened, he and Mr. Scott were being arrested for solicitation of prostitution. Respondent asserted that his plea was one of convenience and entered only after the Public Defender told him the plea would not affect his employment.2 The Committee thereafter caused the School Police to investigate the circumstances surrounding Respondent's arrest. From that investigation, it was revealed that the supporting arrest documents do not reflect the presence of another person in Respondent's vehicle. Casting further doubt on Respondent's versions of the events was the fact that Respondent was cited as driving with an open container of alcohol. The citation indicates that Respondent was the driver of the vehicle, and not merely a passenger. Further, an interview of the arresting officer led the investigator to conclude that Respondent was in the car alone at the time of the incident. Based on the information that had been made available to it, the Committee concluded that Respondent's version of the events had not been confirmed. Respondent was invited to appear before the Committee to explain the discrepancies between his version of the events and the results of the investigation. Respondent, accompanied by Mr. Mitten, told the Committee that the person driving the car was Billy Scott, who was visiting from California. Respondent also said that Mr. Scott had told him that he (Scott) was not formally booked because he had a brother-in-law (Respondent was not certain as to the relationship) on the Riveria Beach Police Department who had interceded on his behalf. Respondent thereafter gave the investigator the telephone number and address of Mr. Scott's temporary residence. The investigator verified that the address was a valid address and called the telephone number, leaving a message on an answering machine. Later, a person claiming to be Mr. Scott telephoned the investigator and verified Respondent's version of the events. Subsequent to that call, the investigator received a call from a woman who stated that the investigator had left a message on her answering machine, that she had a son named Billy Scott, that Billy Scott had not been to California since he was an infant, and that Billy Scott did not have a relative who worked for the Riveria Beach Police Department. Based on the information before it, the Committee concluded that Respondent had committed a disqualifying offense and that the evidence offered by Respondent in mitigation of that offense was not credible. Because there was no mitigating evidence within the meaning of Section 435.07(3), Florida Statutes, the Respondent's work record was not considered.3 The Committee recommended to the Superintendent that Respondent's employment be terminated. The Superintendent accepted that recommendation and, in turn, recommended to the School Board that Respondent's employment be terminated. The School Board thereafter accepted the recommendation of termination from the Superintendent and voted to terminate Respondent's employment, subject to his right to contest the proposed action pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Respondent's testimony at the formal hearing was similar to the explanation of the events he gave the Committee. That self-serving, uncorroborated testimony is insufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to an exemption, as required by Section 435.07(3), Florida Statutes. Respondent asserts that the disqualification does not apply to his position because his position does not require direct contact with students. That assertion is rejected. The evidence is clear that Respondent's job duties require his presence at the various schools of the district at times the children are present. Although Respondent typically checks in at a school's office when he first comes on campus, he thereafter is not monitored or otherwise supervised while on the school campus. This opportunity to have contact with students provides the Petitioner with a sufficient basis to consider him to be an employee who has direct contact with students.4
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order that terminates Respondent's employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of October, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of October, 1998
