The Issue Whether Respondent properly assessed a tourist development tax, penalty, and interest against Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact The Tax Collector is empowered to impose a tourist development tax (“TDT”) on the privilege of renting, leasing, or letting “for consideration of any living or accommodations in any hotel, apartment hotel, motel, [or] resort motel.” § 125.0104(3)(a)1., Fla. Stat. The Tax Collector is the entity operating pursuant to Palm Beach County Ordinance, Chapter 17, Article III, Section 17-111 through 116, and is authorized to impose TDT at a six percent rate on taxpayers. See also § 125.0104(4)(a), Fla. Stat. As part of its duties, Respondent audits taxpayers and attempts to recover TDT owed. At all times material to this case, Homing Inn was a 103-room hotel located in Boynton Beach, Florida. As a taxpayer and operator of a hotel that rents rooms, Homing Inn was subject to audit of its revenues by Respondent. Respondent initiated an audit against Petitioner for the period of July 1, 2016, through June 30, 2019 (“audit period”), to determine if Petitioner had properly remitted TDT, as reflected on Petitioner’s TDT returns. In July 2019, Suzanne Englhardt (“Englhardt” or “Auditor”), revenue auditor, was assigned to conduct Homing Inn’s audit. Englhardt started the audit of Homing Inn by conducting pre-audit research, which included her looking up Petitioner on Sunbiz, the property appraisers’ website, and preparing an audit notice. On or about July 3, 2019, Englhardt sent Homing Inn a certified notice informing Petitioner that their account had been selected for a Tourist Development Audit (“audit”) of Petitioner’s books and records. In the notice, Respondent requested Homing Inn “make available all records, receipts, invoices, and related documentation” to review for the audit. Petitioner complied with Respondent’s request for records and provided bank statements for November 2017 through June 2019; federal income tax returns for years 2016, 2017, and 2018; and room revenue reports, which were typed pages of purported revenue reported by Petitioner on its TDT returns. After Homing Inn provided the records, Englhardt reviewed the submitted documentation and found that Homing Inn failed to maintain records of sales at the hotel. As a result, Englhardt used the best information supplied and available to conduct the audit, Petitioner’s federal tax returns and bank statements. She did not utilize Petitioner’s revenue reports during the audit because no source documents were provided to support or back up any of the listed numbers typed on the revenue reports. 2018 Englhardt started the audit by reviewing Petitioner’s 2018 gross income reported on its supplied federal income tax return in the amount of $1,122,076.00. Englhardt compared the supplied 2018 bank deposits on the bank statements that amounted to $1,122,048.73 to the federal income tax return. Englhardt also reviewed Petitioner’s 2018 TDT returns, which amounted to $653,202.13. Homing Inn did not provide Respondent any documentation to account for the difference in reported income. Next, Englhardt decided that since the gross revenues on the federal income tax return and the bank deposit statements balanced, she presumed TDT and sales tax were included. After she backed out the six percent TDT and seven percent sales tax, the Auditor ultimately calculated and arrived at the adjusted income of $992,963.48 that she utilized to calculate the additional TDT. Englhardt calculated the additional TDT by subtracting the income reported by Petitioner on the TDT returns, $653,202.13, from the gross adjusted amount she established, $992,963.48, and determined that the total unreported income was $339,761.85. She then charged a six percent rate of TDT, which lead to the additional TDT of $20,385.68 for 2018. Englhardt calculated the remaining years of the audit with the same methodology. 2016 When auditing 2016, Englhardt reviewed Homing Inn’s 2016 federal income tax return provided and determined that Petitioner’s gross income was $1,042,188.00. However, when the Auditor looked at the income reported on the 2016 TDT returns, the amount differed, and the reported income on the TDT returns was $724,929.42. Englhardt backed out the TDT and sales tax from the income reported on the federal tax return and ultimately calculated and arrived at the adjusted income of $922,290.27. Next, Englhardt subtracted the reported income on the TDT return from the adjusted income and determined the total 2016 unreported income was $197,360.85. To determine the additional TDT taxes Homing Inn owed, Englhardt charged the six percent rate by $197,360.85 for an additional $11,841.53 owed. 2017 Englhardt reviewed Homing Inn’s 2017 federal income tax return and determined the gross income reported was $1,032,331.00. Englhardt also reviewed Petitioner’s 2017 TDT returns, which amounted to $658,435.37. Englhardt backed out TDT and sales tax from the income reported on the federal tax return and ultimately calculated and arrived at the adjusted income of $913,567.26. Next, Englhardt subtracted the reported income on the TDT return from the adjusted income to determine the total 2017 unreported income was $255,131.89. To determine the additional TDT taxes Homing Inn owed, Englhardt charged the unreported income of $255,131.89 by the six percent rate for an additional $15,307.91 owed. 2019 Englhardt reviewed Homing Inn’s bank statements from January 2019 to June 2019 to determine the 2019 gross income. The total deposits reported were $614,992.28. Englhardt also reviewed Petitioner’s 2019 TDT returns, which amounted to $350,925.07. Englhardt backed out TDT and sales tax from the income reported from the deposits on the bank statements, and ultimately calculated and arrived at the adjusted income of $544,240.96. Next, Englhardt subtracted the reported income on the TDT return from the adjusted income and determined the total 2019 unreported income was $193,315.89. To determine the additional TDT taxes Homing Inn owed for 2019, Englhardt charged the unreported income of $193,315.89 by the six percent rate for an additional $11,598.95 owed. After completing the audit, Englhardt added the unreported income for each year and the TDT amounts owed. She found that Homing Inn had a total unreported income of $985,569.97 and owed an additional TDT of $59,134.20 from the audit period. On or about September 27, 2019, the Tax Collector issued a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes to Petitioner (“Notice of Intent”) and advised Petitioner of the additional TDT in the amount of $59,134.20 owed. The Notice of Intent also notified Homing Inn that Respondent also sought a penalty and interest and provided, in pertinent part: The $59,134.20 total tax due was carried over from the Summary of Tax Due scheduled to the Calculation of Tax Penalty and Interest spreadsheet. The floating rate of interest on tax due is based on the applicable rates established by the Florida Department of Revenue, which is currently an annual rate of 9%. As also prescribed by the State due to findings previously identified in a prior audit, penalty is assessed at 100% of tax due per Florida Statute 212.07(3)(b). As of 09/30/2019, Mata Chorwadi Inc., d/b/a: Homing Inn, currently owes a total of $125,460.97 in tax, penalty and interest. On or about December 16, 2019, Respondent issued a Notice of Proposed Assessment (“NOPA”). Petitioner requested and was granted an extension until April 14, 2020, to respond to the NOPA. On or about April 11, 2020, Petitioner timely protested Respondent’s audit findings. Petitioner’s protest letter claimed that the unreported revenue was made up of Homing Inn’s snack sales sold for $1.00 each; coins collected from a laundromat; proceeds from additional room cleaning services; and proceeds from charges for lost room keys. Petitioner informed Respondent in the protest letter that all the unreported revenue was deposited in the hotel’s bank account. Petitioner requested that Respondent fully abate the penalties and interest for reasonable cause and not willful neglect pursuant to section 213.21(3)(a), Florida Statutes. To support its position in the protest, Petitioner produced purchase receipts from Sam’s Club, which included purchases for snacks and cleaning supplies, and produced a laundry room collection log allegedly showing the coins collected from the laundromat at Homing Inn. Homing Inn did not produce any documents to show any revenue allegedly earned for additional cleaning services or lost room keys. On or about May 4, 2020, Respondent issued the Notice of Decision denying Homing Inn’s protest letter and sustaining the assessment. The Tax Collector considered Homing Inn’s argument and documents, but determined that Petitioner did not provide any proof that the snacks, coins listed on the collection log, or other expenses accounted for the unreported revenue since the Tax Collector was not provided any documents from Homing Inn relating to alleged revenue for additional cleaning services or lost room keys, sales receipts, or bank deposit slips that correspond to verify the amounts listed on the collection log. On June 3, 2020, Petitioner timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration (“Motion”). Homing Inn disputed the assessment and penalty and asked that it be reevaluated. Homing Inn again asserted in its Motion that the unreported revenue consisted of snack sales, revenue from the laundromat, revenue from additional cleaning services, and revenue from lost room keys. However, Petitioner did not provide any additional documents to support its position. On June 9, 2020, Respondent issued a Notice of Reconsideration-Final Assessment (“Notice of Reconsideration”) denying the Motion and sustaining the assessment since no new information was provided by Petitioner. The Tax Collector also notified Petitioner in the Notice of Reconsideration how to appeal the Tax Collector’s decision if Homing Inn was not in agreement with the tax assessment and stated, in pertinent part: If the taxpayer is not in agreement with the assessment, pursuant to Florida Statute 72.011, Mata Chorwadi Inc. may contest the assessment by “filing an action in circuit court; or, alternatively, the taxpayer may file a petition under the applicable provisions of chapter 120.” As a settlement offer, Petitioner remitted a $28,000.00 check to Respondent dated June 8, 2020, that had “paid in full” on the memo line. Respondent returned the check to Homing Inn since the amount was not for the assessment due. Afterwards, Petitioner remitted a second check in the amount of $28,000.00. Respondent applied the $28,000.00 to the total outstanding balance of Homing Inn’s tax. On July 17, 2020, Petitioner timely filed a Petition for Chapter 120 Hearing contesting tax, penalty, and interest from the Tax Collector’s assessment in the Notice of Reconsideration and requested a hearing. Audit History In 2007, Homing Inn had been audited by the Tax Collector. The first audit resulted in Petitioner owing additional TDT based on unreported revenue. The current audit is the second audit of Homing Inn for TDT. Hearing At hearing, Englhardt testified that at the beginning of the audit, Petitioner informed her that all records before November 2017 were destroyed in a flood and could not be provided. Englhardt testified that snack sales, laundry coins, key card replacement monies, and room cleaning proceeds were not revenues subject to TDT. However, she explained during the hearing, that Homing Inn failed to provide any documents to demonstrate sales or revenue for the items they were asserting, so she was not able to make any of the revenue deductions Petitioner requested. At hearing, Englhardt addressed in detail each item Petitioner was contesting and all of the documentation Homing Inn provided the Tax Collector requesting a reduction of the assessment amount determined from the audit. Englhardt started with Homing Inn’s purchase receipts for the snacks supplied. On the point of snacks, Englhardt testified that she asked Homing Inn for sales receipts during the conference they had so that she could adjust for the snacks. However, Homing Inn never provided any sales receipts. Englhardt explained that the receipts supplied by Homing Inn demonstrated expenses, not revenue, so she could not use the documents supplied for the audit. Englhardt also explained that she did not use the coin laundry log because Homing Inn did not provide any deposit slips to back up those alleged deposits. She needed additional source documentation to delineate that particular revenue stream, and Petitioner failed to provide documentation to substantiate any of the items on the log. Englhardt explained further that she was not able to use the alleged extra cleaning charge proceeds for the audit because there was nothing to quantify it. There was no audit trail, folios, sales receipts, or anything to demonstrate any such payments. Englhardt also explained that the alleged charge of $5 per lost key was considered. She testified that she saw the purchase receipt for the room keys but could not use it because nothing showed revenue for lost keys. There were no customer bills, folios, or credit card receipts. Englhardt testified she had to conduct the audit following section 212.12(5)(b), Florida Statutes, because if records were unavailable, she was to make an assessment from an estimate based on the best information available, which for Homing Inn were the federal income tax returns, TDT reports, and bank statements that she used. Englhardt also testified that she considered Homing Inn’s request to reduce the assessment amount, but denied it, because there was no documentation to make any reductions or adjustments. At hearing, Englhardt also addressed the interest and penalty the Tax Collector was imposing. She explained that the penalty is 100 percent, according to the statute, if there is a previous audit finding as there had been with Homing Inn. She also testified that interest is “never compromised.” Englhardt also testified that she applied the $28,000.00 remitted by Homing Inn to the tax, which reduced their TDT of $59,134.20 to $31,134.20, but the penalty amount was still the $59,134.20, and $7.66 per day interest. At hearing, Homing Inn produced purchase receipts for snacks and cleaning supplies, Exhibit 3; a laundromat collection log, Exhibit 4; purchase receipts for key cards, Exhibit 5; a list showing charges for room damages and a list of additional cleaning services, Exhibit 7; and a copy of a check that represented repayment for a loan, Exhibit 6. Homing Inn used its corporate representative, Dipika Shah (“Shah”), to testify at hearing. Shah explained that her husband owns Homing Inn, and she works at the desk occasionally, but mainly runs errands and purchases items needed for the hotel. Shah testified that all income collected from the snacks, key cards, and other revenues are deposited in one bank, PNC Bank. Shah explained that the computer system checks guests in and out. There are four or five people that work at the desk. She testified there are weekly customers, and the weekly rental comes with one cleaning. If a customer wants an additional cleaning, it is an additional $20.00 per room cleaning. Shah also testified that there is an additional charge for any room damage, but often times the damage amount is not paid. Shah described the Homing Inn’s coin-operated laundromat on the hotel premises contained four washers and four dryers. She explained that her husband pulls the coins out of the machines, logs the amount collected, rolls up the coins, and makes laundromat deposits in the Homing Inn general bank account. Shah admitted that she has no personal knowledge of what her husband has collected. Shah verified the purchase of 5,800 room key cards at hearing. However, she admitted there was no receipts for sales of lost keys in the amount of $5.00 each to customers. Shah also explained that Homing Inn has snacks for purchase. Shah testified that Homing Inn does not keep records of snacks sales and most of the snack purchases are cash. Shah testified that their accountant prepares the TDT returns monthly. Shah testified that she is unsure if the business maintains a general ledger and has never seen a profit and loss statement for the business. Findings of Ultimate Fact In this case, the Tax Collector established that the audit giving rise to this proceeding was properly conducted. After reviewing the records Homing Inn submitted for the audit, the Auditor determined that the amounts on the bank statements and federal tax returns matched, but the amounts listed in Homing Inn’s TDT returns were underreported. Homing Inn failed to provide the Auditor with any records to account for the difference between the federal income tax and TDT returns. The Auditor correctly performed Homing Inn’s audit using an acceptable methodology of assessing unreported revenue based on the federal income tax returns, bank statements, and income reflected in the TDT returns. During the audit, Petitioner failed to supply requested records to the Tax Collector that accurately reflected sales at the hotel or source documentation that explains any of the contested unreported revenue. Therefore, the Auditor could not use Petitioner’s supplied documentation as part of the calculations for the audit to reduce the assessment amount. Additionally, the record is void of any evidence to support reducing the assessment amount for any snack sales, laundromat revenue, cleaning revenue, key sale monies, and room damage proceeds. Shah’s limited involvement and knowledge in the daily operations of Homing Inn did not allow her to present relevant firsthand testimony or competent evidence to support Petitioner’s assertions. Therefore, the Auditor properly determined Petitioner’s TDT liability utilizing the method in section 212.12(5)(b), which allows the Auditor to rely on an estimation for the assessment when the taxpayer fails to provide records for the audit, and the Tax Collector’s assessment of $59,134.20 tax is proper.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Palm Beach County Tax Collector, enter a final order directing Mata Chorwadi, Inc., d/b/a Homing Inn, to pay the Tax Collector’s assessment for $31,134.20 of TDT; $59,134.20 of penalty; and $12,444.95 of interest, accruing at $7.66 per day. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of May, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. MCKINNEY Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of May, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Orfelia Mayor, General Counsel Palm Beach County Tax Collector 301 North Olive Avenue Post Office Box 3715 West Palm Beach, Florida 33402-3715 Rex D. Ware, Esquire Moffa, Sutton & Donnini, P.A. 3500 Financial Plaza, Suite 330 Tallahassee, Florida 32312 Joseph C. Moffa, Esquire Moffa, Sutton & Donnini, P.A. Trade Center South, Suite 930 100 West Cypress Creek Road Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33309 Manshi Shah, Esquire 6525 Jessy Court Lake Worth, Florida 33467 Jonathan W. Taylor, Esquire Moffa, Sutton & Donnini, P.A. Trade Center South, Suite 930 100 West Cypress Creek Road Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33309 Hampton C. Peterson, General Counsel Palm Beach County Tax Collector 301 North Olive Avenue Post Office Box 3715 West Palm Beach, Florida 33402-3715
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the Petitioner owes sales, use, intangible taxes, penalties and interest; and, if so, the amount.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Allor, Inc., performs accounting services through the individual, Allan Steinberg. Subsequent to an audit of one of Mr. Steinberg's clients, the Department directed Curt Horton, a tax auditor, to perform an audit of Allor, Inc. In furtherance of the audit, Mr. Horton requested records necessary to complete the review. He discussed the audit with Mr. Steinberg and advised him of all records needed. When Mr. Steinberg produced no records the audit was estimated based on the federal tax return. Later, Mr. Horton adjusted the estimate based on actual deposits for sales. For purchases, a one year period was selected and, again, the federal tax return was reviewed. The audit was performed in this manner as the records offered by the taxpayer were insufficient to perform the audit in the more conventional format. Mr. Horton made numerous requests to the taxpayer for documentation. Mr. Horton extended the time to provide records so that the taxpayer had additional opportunity to document the audit. Credit was given for invoices that the taxpayer was able to produce and, for the remainder of the period, the amounts were averaged to determine the tax amount owed. The sales and use tax audit covered the period December 1, 1985, through November 30, 1990. The amount of the tax owed was calculated at $4,933.35. The amount of the penalty was $1,099.92. The interest owed through October 11, 1991, was $2,026.61. Based upon the foregoing, the total assessment for this audit was $8,059.88 with interest continuing to accrue at the rate of $1.62 per day. With regard to the intangible tax assessment for the period 1984 through 1991, Mr. Horton computed the accounts receivable and estimated that $2,000.00 per year would be the amount for this category. Since this taxpayer filed no intangible tax returns at all, the penalty owed was high relative to the tax amount owed. Based upon the foregoing computation, the intangible tax owed calculated to be $33.33 whereas the penalty for not filing was $2,763.55. The interest through September 20, 1991, was $14.76. Based upon the foregoing, the total assessment for the intangible tax owed was $2,811.64 with interest continuing to accrue at the rate of $.01 per day. Following the audit, the results of which were made available to the taxpayer on or about March 20, 1992, the Department issued a notice of decision on April 23, 1993, which responded to a protest letter filed by Petitioner on May 15, 1992. In substance, that notice sustained the results of the audit and noted that the taxpayer had not presented any additional documentation to support a conclusion to the contrary. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed another letter of protest and the Department issued a notice of reconsideration on February 7, 1994. That notice provided that upon further review, the proposed sustained amount for the sales and use tax was $6,945.63 and the amount owed for the intangible audit assessment was $48.09. This latter amount was reduced because the Department proposed to compromise the penalty in full. All of the acts of the auditor in this case were in keeping with the standard audit practices of the Department. None of the documents marked for identification as Petitioner's composite 2, which have not been received into evidence, were made available to the Department at any time during the audit. The Department afforded the Petitioner approximately three years after the audit to produce relevant documentation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Revenue enter a final order sustaining the proposed sustained amounts set forth in the notice of reconsideration dated February 7, 1994. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 28th day of September, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-1892 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner: 1. None submitted. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: 1. Paragraphs 1 through 11 are accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Allan D. Steinberg Tax Accountant Allor, Inc. Suite 14-B 4953 North University Drive Lauderhill, Florida 33351 Mark T. Aliff Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General The Capitol-Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Linda Lettera General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs Executive Director 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent's certificates of registration should be revoked for an alleged failure to file tax returns and to remit taxes to the Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the state agency responsible for collection of sales and use taxes in Florida, pursuant to chapter 212, Florida Statutes (2011).1/ The Respondent is a Florida company doing business at 7810 U.S. Highway 19, Port Richey, Florida, and is a "dealer" as defined at section 212.06(2). The Respondent holds two certificates of registration issued by the Petitioner (Certificate No. 61-8012297146-3 and Certificate No. 61-8012297147-0) and is statutorily required to file tax returns and remit taxes to the Petitioner. As set forth herein, the Respondent has failed to file tax returns or has filed returns that were not accompanied by the appropriate tax payments. During the time the Respondent has held the certificates, the Petitioner has filed 15 separate warrants against the Respondent related to unpaid taxes, fees, penalties, and interest. The Petitioner is authorized to cancel a dealer's certificate of registration for failure of a dealer to comply with state tax laws. Prior to such cancellation, the Petitioner is required by statute to convene a conference with a dealer. On June 24, 2011, the Petitioner issued a Notice of Conference on Revocation of Certificate of Registration (Notice). The conference was scheduled for July 27, 2011. The Respondent received the Notice and attended the conference. Certificate of Registration No. 61-8012297146-3 The Respondent failed to file tax returns related to Certificate No. 61-8012297146-3 for the period of August through December 2001. The Petitioner assessed estimated taxes of $587.50, fees of $110.95, and a penalty of $285.00. As of the date of the Notice, the accrued interest due was $633.79. Additionally, the Respondent failed to remit taxes of $5,623.63 related to Certificate No. 61-8012297146-3 that were due according to his filed tax returns. Based thereon, the Respondent assessed fees of $994.58 and a penalty of $2,478.26. As of the date of the Notice, the accrued interest due was $4,702.27. As of the date of the Notice, the Respondent's total unpaid obligation on Certificate No. 61-8012297146-3 was $15,415.98, including taxes of $6,211.13, fees of $1,105.53, penalties of $2,763.26, and accrued interest of $5,336.06. Certificate of Registration No. 61-8012297147-0 The Respondent failed to file tax returns related to Certificate No. 61-8012297147-0 for the months of June 2000, September 2000, May 2001, and August 2001. The Petitioner assessed estimated taxes of $619.00 and fees of $202.00. As of the date of the Notice, the accrued interest due was $782.56. Additionally, the Respondent failed to remit taxes related to Certificate No. 61-8012297147-0 of $4,332.48 that were due according to his filed tax returns. Based thereon, the Respondent assessed fees of $771.71 and a penalty of $1,576.87. As of the date of the Notice, the accrued interest due was $4,725.27. As of the date of the Notice, the Respondent's total unpaid obligation related to Certificate No. 61-8012297147-0 was $13,009.89, including taxes of $4,951.48, fees of $973.71, penalties of $1,576.87, and accrued interest of $5,507.83. The Audit A separate audit of the Respondent's business records for the period of February 2004 through January 2007 resulted in an additional assessment totaling $9,314.07, including taxes of $5,048.23, fees of $661.76, and a penalty of $252.42. As of the date of the Notice, the accrued interest due was $3,351.66. At the July 27, 2011, conference, the parties negotiated a compliance agreement under which the Respondent would have retained the certificates of registration. The agreement required the Respondent to make an initial deposit of $2,000.00 by August 15, 2011, and then to make periodic payments towards satisfying the unpaid obligation. The Respondent failed to pay the $2,000.00 deposit, and the Petitioner subsequently filed the Complaint at issue in this proceeding. As of the date that the Complaint was filed, the Respondent owed a total of $37,797.66 to the State of Florida, including taxes of $15,004.34, estimated taxes of $1,206.50, fees of $2,741.00, penalties of $4,592.55, and accrued interest of $14,253.27.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue issue a final order revoking the certificates of registration held by the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of May, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of May, 2012.
Findings Of Fact During the discovery phase of this proceeding, the Department ascertained from Echo Artz that $4,070 (the "Uncontested Amount") of the assessed tax was not contested. That is, Echo Artz agreed that it owed at least that amount of the total tax assessment of $67,757.46 set forth in the Notice. Of the total amount set forth in the Notice, $54,626.25 was the tax portion and the remainder was interest. No penalties were imposed as of the date of the Notice of Proposed Assessment. The Uncontested Amount was approximately 7.5 percent of the tax portion and approximately 5.9 percent of the total assessment. At the final hearing, during discussion of the Department's Motion to Dismiss, Echo Artz stated that the Uncontested Amount was erroneous. Instead, it stated that $23,135 of the total tax assessment was actually uncontested. The total tax portion of the assessment should be, according to Echo Artz, $57,730. The revised uncontested amount was approximately 40 percent of the total tax portion. Echo Artz did not pay any of the Uncontested Amount or any of the revised uncontested amount pursuant to its own calculations. The Department asserts that inasmuch as Echo Artz failed to pay the Uncontested Amount prior to filing its request for formal hearing, the case must be dismissed as required by law.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Revenue, enter a final order of dismissal. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of May, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of May, 2012.
The Issue Whether the "Additional Payment" made by Hernando HMA, Inc., d/b/a Brooksville Regional Hospital to Hernando County pursuant to a document entitled Lease Agreement, as amended, constitutes "rent" subject to sales tax under section 212.031, Florida Statutes.1/
Findings Of Fact Hernando HMA, Inc. (HMA) is a for-profit entity which operates Brooksville Regional Hospital, Spring Hill Regional Hospital, and other entities, as successor to an entity that was in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings from 1993 to 1998, Regional Healthcare, Inc. (RHI). The Department is an agency of the State of Florida that has been delegated the responsibility to collect sales and use taxes imposed by chapter 212, Florida Statutes. In 1998, as part of RHI's bankruptcy plan, HMA and the County entered into various agreements, including a lease agreement (1998 Lease), regarding the use and operation of several RHI hospital properties and improvements owned by the County, and leased back to RHI. Under the 1998 Lease and other agreements, HMA agreed to continue to operate the hospital facilities for 30 years with possession of the real property and improvements to be returned to the County at the end of the lease term. Section 1.2W. of the 1998 Lease defined "Rental Payment" as follows: "Rental Payment" means all payments due from Lessee to Lessor or otherwise required to be paid by Lessee pursuant to the terms of this lease. The 1998 Lease further provided in section 3.3 under the heading "Rent": The annual rental payment of the Leased Premises for each year of the Lease Term (the "Rental Payment") shall be in the amount of Three Hundred Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($300,000). This Rental Payment shall be paid to Lessor by Lessee on the Commencement Date and on each anniversary date of the Commencement Date during the Lease Term. The 1998 Lease also provided that HMA, as Lessee, would pay "all taxes, if any, prior to delinquency." Under the 1998 Lease, the County agreed to lease the premises in consideration of HMA’s timely payment of rent and timely performance of the other covenants and agreements required under the lease. It was an “event of default” under the lease if HMA failed to observe and perform any covenant, condition, or agreement on its part which could be cured by a payment of money. Remedies for default under the 1998 Lease included termination of the lease by the County and exclusion of HMA from possession of the leased premises. Even though the leased premises under the 1998 Lease were not subject to ad valorem taxes because they were owned by the County, during public discussions of the proposed 1998 Lease, an issue arose about HMA's responsibility for payment of fire assessments that would have been paid if the property was not immune or exempt from ad valorem taxes. HMA agreed, by separate agreement, to pay the fire assessments and buy a new ambulance to serve the community. The fire assessment agreement was by separate document that was included as part of the closing of the 1998 Lease and other agreements involving the hospital facilities in June 1998. The 1998 Lease was dated June 1, 1998. The 1998 Lease terms included a merger clause in section 15.6 entitled “ENTIRE AGREEMENT,” which provided: This lease may not be modified, amended or otherwise changed orally, but may only be modified, amended or otherwise changed by an agreement in writing signed by both parties. This Lease Agreement and its accompanying guaranty constitute the entire agreement between the parties affecting this Lease. This Lease Agreement supersedes and cancels any and all previous negotiations, arrangements, agreements, and understandings between the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter thereof, and no such outside or prior agreements shall be used to interpret or to construe this Lease. There are no promises, covenants, representations or inducements in addition to, or at variance with any of the terms of this Lease Agreement except the Guaranty. In 2001, the County and HMA began negotiations for relocation of the Brooksville Regional Hospital which was part of the leased premises described in the 1998 Lease. During the negotiations, HMA, through its attorney, Steven Mitchell, prepared a proposed comprehensive relocation agreement in consultation with former County Attorney Bruce Snow. Section 7.3 of the proposed relocation agreement contemplated revising the 1998 Lease and suggested the following preliminarily negotiated language for rental payments under a revised 1998 Lease: Rental Payments The Lessee shall pay to Lessor on the due date therefore as set forth in the Lease Agreement, the sum of Three Hundred Thousand and no/100 Dollars ($300,000.00) per annum. The Lessee shall pay to Lessor on an annual basis, either as rent or by virtue of a payment to Hernando County of the same sum to be used by Hernando County as it deems appropriate, an amount equal to the ad valorem taxes that would have been paid on the New Facility Site as improved with the New Facility if the New Facility Site were not owned by Hernando County but owned by a for-profit entity. In the event the New Facility Site and the New Facility located thereon are subsequently required by law to pay ad valorem taxes then the obligation to pay the amount described in Section 7.3(b) herein shall immediately terminate and Lessee shall be responsible for the payment of the appropriate ad valorem tax. The proposed comprehensive relocation agreement was discussed at public meetings held by the Hernando County Board of Commissioners on September 17 and September 25, 2001. The minutes of the September 25, 2001, meeting indicate that the County Administrator advised that the proposed relocation agreement contemplated that HMA would continue to pay $300,000 annually as rent, and “would make a payment-in-lieu of taxes annually to the County . . . .” The minutes also reflect that, in responding to a question from a commissioner regarding whether there should be language in the agreement that would protect the “payment-in-lieu of taxes” provision in the event the law changed: [Former County Attorney] Snow replied that it was his recommendation that there should be a provision that to the extent that the organic law of the State provided that facilities, such as the new hospital or other hospital under the lease, were taxable for ad valorem tax purposes, that that provision of the organic law would apply to ensure that that provision superseded. He explained that the lease provision to provide for an ad valorem tax payment was only to the extent that the organic law did not otherwise compel it so that the County would be receiving ad valorem tax under either scenario. The minutes from the September 25, 2001, meeting further state: Mr. Snow replied to County Attorney Garth Coller that there had been recent Supreme Court decisions which may have a bearing on the organic law to the extent that a decision of that nature indicated that the facilities were subject to ad valorem tax, notwithstanding the ownership issue, then they were subject to ad valorem tax and the lease would need to clarify that. He suggested that if the FS or Constitution should change, even in the absence of an interpretation of the Supreme Court decision, the change would obligate the payment of ad valorem taxes pursuant to the constitutional or statutory provisions. He explained that organic law pertained to provisions of FS or the Constitution as opposed to a Court decision. Mr. Snow’s reported reference to recent “Supreme Court decisions” regarding ad valorem taxes undoubtedly was referring the decision, among others, in Sebring Airport Authority v. McIntyre, 718 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1998). In that decision, rendered a few months after the County entered into the 1998 Lease, the Supreme Court of Florida stated with regard to municipal (as opposed to county) property: [T]here is nothing in article VII, section 3 that allows the legislature to exempt from ad valorem taxation municipally owned property or any other property that is being used primarily for a proprietary purpose or for any purpose other than a governmental, municipal or public purpose. To the extent section 196.012(6) attempts to exempt from taxation municipal property used for a proprietary purpose, the statute is unconstitutional. Id. at 298. The Sebring case did not address tax immunity of county property as distinguished from the issue of tax exemptions for the proprietary use of municipal property. The proposed “Rental Payments” language for revisions to the 1998 Lease, however, demonstrates that the drafters of the comprehensive relocation agreement were aware of the possibility that the Sebring rationale could be expanded and applied to county property. The comprehensive relocation agreement was approved by the County, and executed in late 2001. Attached as to that relocation agreement as Schedule C was an unsigned document entitled “First Amendment to Lease Agreement” that was not to be executed until the new facility was completed and transferred to the County. Subsection 3.3 of the First Amendment to Lease Agreement entitled “Rental Payments” provided: Rental Payments The Lessee shall pay to the Lessor on the due date therefore as set forth in the Lease Agreement, the sum of Three Hundred Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($300,000.00) per annum. The Lessee shall pay to the Lessor on an annual basis, either as rent or by virtue of a payment to Hernando County of an amount (“Additional Payment”) equal to the sum of the following: An amount equal to that portion of the ad valorem taxes that would have been paid to Hernando County on the Leased Premises (as modified by the substitution of the New Facility Site for the Current Hospital Site) if the Leased Premises were not owned by Hernando County but owned by a for profit entity; and An amount equal to that portion of the ad valorem taxes that would have been paid to the Spring Hill Fire and Rescue District, the Township 22 Fire District and/or any other special taxing district that may be established pursuant to law; and An amount equal to all special assessments levied by Hernando County through any Municipal Service Benefit Unit created by Hernando County pursuant to the provisions of Section 125.01, Florida Statutes; and An amount equal to all ad valorem tax levied by Hernando County through any Municipal Service Taxing Unit created by Hernando County pursuant to the provisions of Section 125.01, Florida Statutes. In no event shall the Additional Payments exceed an amount equal to a full ad valorem tax assessment on the New Facility Site as determined annually by the Hernando County Property Appraiser. In the event the Lessee and/or Lessor is required by law to pay ad valorem taxes on the Leased Premises or any portion thereof, the obligation to pay to Lessor the Additional Payment described in this Section 3.3 shall immediately terminate (and/or be adjusted, whichever is applicable), and Lessee shall be responsible for payment of the appropriate ad valorem tax. The First Amendment to Lease Agreement further provided, “[e]xcept as expressly modified herein, all other terms and conditions set forth in the [1998] Lease Agreement are hereby ratified and confirmed.” The new hospital facility was completed and transferred to the County in 2005. On November 15, 2005, the County commission approved documents related to the transfer, including the First Amendment to Lease Agreement in the precise form as attached to the relocation agreement approved in 2001. The approval was obtained on a consent agenda, and the minutes reflect no further discussion by the commission or the public on the documents that were approved. In 2009, the Hernando County School District sued the County Property Appraiser, alleging that the properties subject to the 1998 Lease as amended by the First Amendment to Lease Agreement should not be exempt from ad valorem taxation. In a 13-page Order dismissing the School District’s action, Circuit Judge Daniel B. Merritt, Jr., distinguished the cases disallowing statutory ad valorem tax exemptions for properties owned by special tax districts or cities from the sovereign immunity against ad valorem taxes enjoyed by real estate owned by the State of Florida and its counties. In his ruling, Judge Merritt noted that Florida law specifically makes leasehold interests in governmental property subject to taxation, noting: The Legislature defines leasehold interests as intangible personal property and, hence, assessed by the Florida Department of Revenue, when: (1) rent is due; (2) the property is used for commercial purposes; (3) is not used for agriculture; (4) not financed with revenue bonds, and; (5) the lease is for an initial term of less than 100 years; §§196.199(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2008), 199.023(1)(d), Florida Statutes (2005), specifically preserved in Chapter 2006-312, Laws of Florida (2006). However, see below for further analysis with regard to presumed ownership of property leased for 100 years or more as set forth in §196.199(7), Florida Statutes. Judge Merritt also discussed those instances where “leased” property might not qualify as State or county property where lessees are the “equitable owners,” such as leaseholds of 100 years or more or where properties do not revert to the State until the end of a lease term. In his order, however, Judge Merritt noted that the tax immunity of the County was a fundamental attribute of county property and held that “under the terms of the Lease Agreements the Court concludes that HMA has merely the right to use and possession and is not the beneficial owner as a matter of law Hernando County’s immune property and improvements.” Judge Merritt’s Order was affirmed on appeal. School Board of Hernando County v. Mazourek, Case No. H-27-CA-2009-549 (5th Cir. 2009), per curiam aff’d, 2010 WL 4323055 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) In December, 2010, the Department notified the County it had been selected for a tax compliance audit under chapter 212, Florida Statutes, Sales and Use Tax. The audit period was from January 1, 2007, through December 31, 2009. The County’s personnel were cordial and receptive during the audit process and the Department’s auditor determined that the books and records kept by the County had adequate internal accounting controls in place and sufficient data integrity. Out of the approximately 19 tax registration accounts the County has with the Department, the Department’s auditor found exception with only tax account #12445797, the tax collected and remitted under its lease with HMA. In her record review, the Department’s auditor noticed invoices and worksheets from the County to HMA, titled “Payment in lieu of taxes.” In examining the First Amendment to the Lease Agreement, Section 3.3 “Rental Payments,” the Department’s auditor determined that the County was not collecting sales tax on a portion of the rent received under that section. The monthly tax return filed by the County under account # 12445797 reflected that it was collecting and remitting the sales tax calculated on the $300,000.00 annual rent payment, but was not collecting and remitting sales tax calculated on the additional payments in lieu of taxes. The Department’s auditor determined the additional payments, required under the lease and made as a condition of occupancy, constituted a taxable transaction as additional rent consideration. The amount of the additional payments, made January 2007 and March 2008, as revealed on the County’s “Payment in lieu of taxes worksheets,” was multiplied by 6.5 percent to arrive at the additional tax amount due of $78,710.17. On December 9, 2010, the Department issued a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes, Form DR 1215, advising the County of its audit findings, which included $78,710.17 in taxes due, $14,526.37 in accrued interest through December 9, 2010, and a $19,677.55 late payment penalty. On December 21, 2010, the Department issued its Notice of Proposed Assessment, Form DR 831, showing an assessment of $78,710.17 in tax and $14,707.51 in accrued interest, for a total of $93,417.68 through December 21, 2010, with interest accruing thereafter at the rate of $15.10 per diem. All penalty amounts were waived. At the final hearing, the County argued that the additional payments from HMA under the First Amendment to Lease Agreement were not rent, but rather separate payments to pay for County services. While the actual language used in the First Amendment to Lease Agreement appears to unambiguously indicate that the additional payments were rent, the County offered additional evidence of facts and circumstances beyond the terms of the lease itself in support of its argument that the additional payments were not rent. That evidence was admitted, without objection, and has been considered in determining the intention of the parties to the lease with regard to the additional payments. In addition to evidence that the lease drafters were aware of certain cases decided on the issue of whether the leased premises would be subject to ad valorem taxes, the County offered the testimony of Mr. Mitchell regarding the “Rental Payments” language found in the First Amendment to Lease Agreement. When asked whether there had been much negotiation over the format or wording of the First Amendment to Lease Agreement, Mr. Mitchell recalled: No, there really wasn’t other than, you know, the concept – what this amendment does is what we had agreed to pay rental payment. The rental payment was $300,000. And then, we also had agreed independently just to go ahead and pay the County for certain services that they were providing to us. And then we specified those. Those were independent payments, not part of the rental payment. Mr. Mitchell further testified: [B]asically, this property is free of ad valorem tax. That is why the school board filed their lawsuit because, of course, they were not getting any of the ad valorem taxes. So, the property is free of payment of ad valorem taxes. We’re paying our 300,000. It was very, very clear. However, HMA felt that the County was providing certain services, the fire districts and whatnot. So, independent of the rent, we paid this amount. If you read the section dealing – it’s 3.3.[2], or whatever it is, which I’ll read it to you, it talks about, at the very end – and they did it for whatever reason the property became taxable, you know, it effectively became taxable and we had to pay full ad valorem taxes on the property, then the specialties – these additional payments we called, you know, would go away and they, effectively, be part of rent. That's why it talks about it as such, and it was either additional payment and/or rent. Contrary to Mr. Mitchell’s recollection, section 3.3.2 of the First Amendment to Lease Agreement does not speak in terms of “additional payment and/or rent” but rather states that another payment would be made “either as rent or by virtue of a payment to Hernando County of an amount ('Additional Payment') . . .". Mr. Mitchell makes a valid point regarding the fact that HMA was concerned about having to pay both the additional payment and ad valorem taxes. Consistent with this concern, the lease amendment made it clear that HMA would not have to pay the additional amount if the property ever became subject to ad valorem taxes. Mr. Mitchell’s testimony in support of the County’s contention that HMA’s payment in lieu of taxes under the First Amendment to Lease Agreement was not rent, however, is unpersuasive. Considering the extrinsic evidence offered by the County, especially evidence of the parties concern that the subject County property might someday be subject to ad valorem taxes, together with the 1998 Lease, language negotiated for the proposed relocation agreement, and the actual terms of the First Amendment to Lease Agreement, it is found that the parties intended the language under the "Rental Payments" section to assure that HMA did not have to pay the additional amount twice. The extrinsic evidence offered by the County, however, was insufficient to support a finding that the parties intended to differentiate between “rent” and the “additional payment” or that, however characterized, the payment in lieu of taxes was not rent subject to assessment by the Department. If the parties had wanted to provide language that designated the payment in lieu of taxes as a payment for services instead of rent they could have, as they did in the Second Amendment to Lease Agreement entered into on September 13, 2011, just ten days prior to the final hearing in this case.2/ That Second Amendment to Lease Agreement changed the name of section 3.3 from “Rental Payments,” as found in the First Amendment, to “Rent and Additional Payment for County Services.” Pertinent subsections of the Second Amendment further provided: 3.3.2 Additional Payment for County Services. The Lessee shall pay to Lessor on an annual basis, as an additional payment (“Additional Payment”) for services provided by Hernando County [in its role as a service provider and local taxing authority], . . . * * * The Additional Payment is not intended to constitute “rent” and is not intended to create an event subject to Florida sales tax – but rather is intended to constitute a separate payment for the provision of services, payable to the local taxing authority, as provided in § 212.031(1)(c), Florida Statutes (which allow parties by contractual arrangement to distinguish between payments which are intended to be taxable and payments which are intended to be nontaxable), as this section may be amended or renumbered from time to time.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that, consistent with the Notice of Proposed Assessment dated December 21, 2010, and this Recommended Order, the Department of Revenue enter a final order finding that Petitioner owes tax and interest due totaling $93,417.68 through December 21, 2010, with interest accruing thereafter at the rate of $15.10 per diem, without penalties. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of December, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of December, 2011.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent's Certificate of Registration 39-8011930243-9 should be revoked for the reasons stated in an Administrative Complaint for Revocation of Certificate of Registration (Administrative Complaint) issued by the Department of Revenue (Department) on June 5, 2014.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with administering and enforcing the state revenue laws, including the laws related to the imposition and collection of sales and use taxes pursuant to chapter 212. Respondent is a Florida limited liability corporation doing business as The Hyde Park Cafe at 1806 West Platt Street, Tampa, Florida. For purposes of collecting and remitting sales and use taxes, it is a dealer as defined in section 212.06(2) and is required to comply with chapter 212. Respondent holds Certificate of Registration number 39- 8011930243-9, which became effective on July 27, 2000. A certificate of registration is required in order to do business in the state and requires its holder to collect and remit sales tax pursuant to chapter 212. See § 212.05(1), Fla. Stat. Respondent is also an employing unit as defined in section 443.036(20) and is subject to the unemployment compensation tax (UCT) provisions of chapter 443, as provided in section 443.1215. Through an interagency agreement with the Department of Economic Opportunity, the Department provides collection services for UCTs. See § 443.1316(1), Fla. Stat. In doing so, the Department is considered to be administering a revenue law of the state. See § 443.1316(2), Fla. Stat. A dealer must file with the Department sales tax returns and remit the tax collected on a monthly basis. See § 212.15(1), Fla. Stat. Also, an employment unit must remit payment to the Department for UCTs due and owing on a quarterly basis. The Department is authorized to revoke a dealer's certificate of registration for failure to comply with state tax laws. See § 212.18(3)(e), Fla. Stat. If the Department files a warrant, notice of lien, or judgment lien certificate against the property of a dealer, it may also revoke a certificate of registration. See § 213.692(1), Fla. Stat. Before revoking a certificate of registration, the Department must convene an informal conference that the dealer is required to attend. See § 213.692(1)(a), Fla. Stat. At the conference, the dealer may either present evidence to refute the Department's allegations of noncompliance or enter into a compliance agreement with the Department to resolve the dealer's failure to comply with chapter 212. Id. After a compliance agreement is executed by the dealer, the Department may revoke the certificate of registration if the dealer fails to comply with its terms and conditions. See Pet'r Ex. 6, p. 2, ¶ E. If a breach occurs, the entire amount is due and payable immediately. Id. at ¶ G. An informal conference can be characterized as the Department's last administrative remedy to collect delinquent taxes before beginning revocation proceedings. A dealer can also enter into a diversion program with the State Attorney's Office to resolve liabilities, but the record shows that Respondent defaulted on that arrangement. According to the Department, collection problems with this dealer first began in 2003. Department records show that Respondent failed to remit required sales taxes for the months of January 2012, August through December 2012, January through December 2013, and January and February 2014. In addition, Respondent failed to remit UCTs for the calendar quarters ending September 2010, December 2010, March 2011, June 2011, September 2011, December 2011, March 2012, June 2012, September 2012, December 2012, and March 2013. Respondent does not dispute that it failed to timely remit and pay the foregoing taxes for the time periods listed above. For the purpose of collecting the delinquent taxes, the Department issued and filed against Respondent delinquent tax warrants, notices of lien, or judgment lien certificates in the Hillsborough County public records. See Pet'r Ex. 3. Before seeking revocation of Respondent's certificate of registration, on February 5, 2014, the Department's Tampa Service Center served on Respondent a Notice of Conference on Revocation of Certificate of Registration (Notice). See Pet'r Ex. 4. The Notice scheduled an informal conference on March 21, 2014. It listed 16 periods of sales and use tax noncompliance and 11 periods of re-employment tax noncompliance and provided the total tax liability as of that date. This number was necessarily fluid, as the taxes owed were accruing interest, penalties, and/or fees on a daily basis. The purpose of the informal conference was to give Respondent a final opportunity to make full payment of all delinquent taxes, or to demonstrate why the Department should not revoke its Certificate of Registration. As pointed out by the Department, an informal conference allows a dealer to bring up "any concerns" that it has regarding its obligations. Respondent's manager and registered agent, Christopher Scott, appeared at the conference on behalf of Respondent.1/ At the meeting, he acknowledged that the dealer had not timely paid the taxes listed in the Notice and that the money was used instead to keep the business afloat. However, Mr. Scott presented paperwork representing that sales and use tax returns and payments for the months of November 2013 through February 2014 had just been filed online, and checks in the amount of $8,101.41 and $9,493.99 were recently sent to Tallahassee. It takes 24 hours for online payments to show up in the system, and even more time for checks to be processed in Tallahassee. Accordingly, the Department agreed that Mr. Scott could have a few more days before signing a compliance agreement. This would allow the Department to verify that the payments were posted and recalculate the amount of taxes still owed. Also, before entering a compliance agreement, Respondent was required to make a down payment of around $20,000.00. Mr. Scott had insufficient cash, and a delay of a few days would hopefully allow him to secure the necessary money for a down payment. When none of the payments had posted by March 25, 2014, the Department calculated a total liability of $113,448.13, consisting of sales and use taxes and UCTs, penalties, interest, and fees. As of that date, none of the taxes listed in Finding of Fact 9 had been paid. On March 25, 2014, Respondent's controller, who did not attend the informal conference, sent an email to the Department requesting a breakdown on the new tax liability. In response to her request, the Department faxed a copy of the requested information. See Resp. Ex. 4. After getting this information, the controller continued to take the position that the Department's calculations overstate Respondent's tax liability. On March 31, 2014, Mr. Scott signed the compliance agreement. See Pet'r Ex. 6. Despite the controller testifying that she did not agree with the numbers, no question was raised by Mr. Scott when he signed the agreement. By then, the check in the amount of $8,101.41 had cleared and been credited to Respondent's account. Along with other funds, it was used towards the down payment of $20,000.00. The record does not show the status of the other payments that Mr. Scott claimed were mailed or filed online prior to the informal conference; however, on March 31, 2014, except for the one check, none had yet posted. The compliance agreement required scheduled payments for 12 months, with the final payment, a balloon payment in an undisclosed amount, being subject to renegotiation in the last month. Payments one and two were $1,500.00, while payments three through 11 were $2,900.00. The compliance agreement reflected a balance owed of $95,887.36, consisting of $60,504.34 in sales taxes and $35,347.02 in UCTs.2/ In return for the Department refraining from pursuing revocation proceedings, the compliance agreement required Respondent to "remit all past due amounts to the Department as stated in the attached payment agreement," "accurately complete and timely file all required tax returns and reports for the next 12 months," and "timely remit all taxes due for the next 12 months." Pet'r Ex. 1, p. 1. In other words, the compliance agreement addressed both delinquent taxes and current taxes that would be due during the following 12-month period, and it required that both categories of taxes be timely paid in the manner prescribed by the agreement. To summarize the salient points of the agreement, all taxes were to be timely paid; delinquent taxes were to be paid by certified check, money order, or cash and were to be mailed or hand delivered to the Tampa Service Center and not Tallahassee; and while not specifically addressed in the agreement, the dealer was instructed to pay all current obligations electronically, as required by law. Otherwise, Respondent was in violation of the compliance agreement. A Payment Agreement Schedule for past due taxes was incorporated into the compliance agreement and provided that the first payment was due April 30, 2014, payable to: Florida Department of Revenue, Tampa Service Center, 6302 East Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Boulevard, Suite 100, Tampa, Florida 33619. Payments 2 through 12 were to be mailed or hand delivered to the same address. This meant, with no ambiguity, that money should not be sent to Tallahassee. There is no credible evidence that these instructions were misunderstood. Unless a waiver is granted, Respondent is required by statute and rule to electronically file sales and use tax returns and UCT reports. See § 213.755, Fla. Stat.; Fla. Admin. Code R. 12-24.009 (where a taxpayer has paid its taxes in the prior state fiscal year in an amount of $20,000.00 or more, subsequent payments shall be made electronically). No waivers have been approved. In 2003, the Department notified Respondent of these requirements and Respondent complied with this directive until 2009. For reasons not disclosed, in 2009 Respondent voluntarily quit filing electronically. The record is silent on why this was allowed.3/ In any event, at the informal conference, Mr. Scott was specifically told that all current returns, reports, and taxes must be filed electronically, and not by mail, and that no money should be sent to Tallahassee. There is no credible evidence that he misunderstood these instructions. In its PRO, Respondent correctly points out that the requirement to file current returns electronically was not specifically addressed in the compliance agreement. This is because the compliance agreement does not set forth every statutory and rule requirement that applies to a dealer. If this amount of detail were required, a dealer could ignore any otherwise applicable rule or statute not found in the compliance agreement. This contention has no merit. Respondent failed to electronically file the current sales and use tax return and payment for the month of March 2014, due no later than April 21, 2014. Instead, it sent a paper check, which was returned by the bank for insufficient funds. This constituted a breach of the compliance agreement. Despite repeated instructions on how and where to pay the delinquent taxes, payment 1, due on April 30, 2014, was paid by regular check and sent to Tallahassee, rather than the Tampa office. This contravened the compliance agreement. When payment was not timely received by the Tampa Service Center, Respondent was told that a check must be delivered to the Tampa office by May 9. Respondent hand delivered a second check, this one certified, to the Tampa Service Center on May 9, 2014, or after the April 30 due date. The second check was treated as payment 1. Respondent points out that on May 7 the Tampa Service Center granted its request for an extension of time until May 9 in which to deliver the certified check. While this is true, the extension was allowed in an effort to "work with" the Respondent on the condition that the account would be brought current by that date; otherwise, revocation proceedings would begin. Even if the extra ten days is construed as a grace period for payment 1, there were other violations of the compliance agreement set forth below. Payment 2 for delinquent taxes, due on May 30, 2014, was paid by regular check and sent by mail to Tallahassee rather than the Tampa Service Center.4/ This contravened the compliance agreement. After the May 30, 2014 payment, Respondent made no further payments pursuant to the Payment Agreement Schedule. This constituted a violation of the compliance agreement. Respondent did not remit payment with its current sales and use return for the month of August 2014. This contravened the compliance agreement. Respondent did not file any current sales and use tax returns or remit payment for the months of July 2014 or September through January 2015. This contravened the compliance agreement. Beginning in March 2014, Respondent filed current reemployment tax returns and payments using the incorrect tax rate on every return. This delayed their processing and resulted in penalties being imposed. In addition, even though Respondent was repeatedly told that such returns must be filed electronically, none were filed in that manner, as required by statute and rule. This contravened the compliance agreement. In its PRO, Respondent contends the compliance agreement cannot be enforced because there was no "meeting of the minds" by the parties on all essential terms of the agreement. Specifically, it argues that the total amount of taxes owed was still in dispute -- the dealer contended that it owed $23,000.00 less than was shown in the agreement; the Payment Schedule Agreement did not specify the amount of the final balloon payment; the compliance agreement failed to state when payments are due if the due date falls on a weekend or holiday; the compliance agreement did not specify how the dealer's payments would be allocated between UCTs and sales and use taxes; and the compliance agreement failed to address the issue of filing electronically. Although some of these issues were not raised in the parties' Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation, or even addressed by testimony at hearing, they are all found to be without merit for the reasons expressed below. First, Mr. Scott did not dispute the amount of taxes owed when he signed the agreement, and he brought no evidence to the conference to support a different amount. Second, as explained to Mr. Scott at the informal conference, the precise amount of the balloon payment can only be established in the 12th month. This is because the exact amount depends on the dealer's compliance with the agreement over the preceding 11 months, and the amount of interest, penalties, and/or other fees that may have accrued during the preceding year. Third, there is no evidence that the dealer was confused when a due date for a payment fell on a weekend or holiday. Even if it was confused, reference to section 212.11(1)(e) and (f) would answer this question. Fourth, there is no statute or rule that requires the Department to specify how the delinquent payments are allocated. Moreover, neither Mr. Scott nor the controller requested that such an allocation be incorporated into the agreement before it was signed. Finally, the issue of filing electronically already has been addressed in Finding of Fact 22 and Endnote 3. At hearing, Respondent's controller testified that she was out of town when the conference was held, suggesting that Mr. Scott, who is not an accountant, was at a disadvantage when he attended the informal conference. However, Respondent had six weeks' notice before the conference, and there is no evidence that Respondent requested that the meeting be rescheduled to a more convenient day. Also, Respondent does not dispute that Mr. Scott was authorized to represent its interests at the conference, or that he could have been briefed by the controller before attending the informal conference or signing the compliance agreement. See also Endnote 1. Notably, at hearing, the controller testified that she "was involved in actually negotiating the agreement both before and after it was actually signed" even though she did not attend the conference. Tr. at 89. Respondent also contends that after the Department considered the compliance agreement to be breached, the dealer had no further obligation to make payments pursuant to the agreement or state law until the parties negotiated a new agreement. Aside from Respondent's failure to cite any authority to support this proposition, nothing in the compliance agreement comports with this assertion. To the contrary, the compliance agreement specifically provides that if a breach occurs, the entire tax liability becomes due immediately. See Pet'r Ex. 6, p. 2, ¶ G. Thus, Respondent is obligated to pay the entire tax liability, which now exceeds $200,000.00. All other arguments raised by Respondent have been carefully considered and are rejected as being without merit.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order revoking Respondent's Certificate of Registration 39- 8011930243-9. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of June, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of June, 2015.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is qualified to be licensed as a Florida real estate sales associate.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has a Bachelor of Science degree in accounting from Florida State University. After receiving a Florida license as a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) in 1974, Petitioner worked as a CPA in private practice until 1978. He then returned to school at Trinity University, where he earned a Master of Science degree in Health Care Administration. Petitioner worked for the Hospital Corporation of America (HCA) for approximately 20 years. In the early 1980's, Petitioner's job with HCA involved the management of physician clinics. One of the physicians requested Petitioner to prepare some financial statements and to assist with the preparations of some federal income tax returns for a private client. At that time, Petitioner was living and working in two locations: Atlanta, Georgia, and Dothan, Alabama. Petitioner was not licensed to practice as a CPA in any state except Florida. For approximately two and one-half years, Petitioner helped the private client maintain her books. During this time, Petitioner corresponded with the client, sending her letters with CPA after his name. In 1986, Petitioner decided to discontinue his business relationship with the private client. The private client, who was upset, filed a complaint against Petitioner. In 1987, the private client's complaint resulted in Petitioner’s pleading no contest to the offense of identifying himself as a CPA when he was not a licensed CPA in Georgia. Petitioner subsequently satisfied all sanctions related to the Georgia offense. The Florida Board of Accountancy has not disciplined Petitioner's CPA license. At the time of the hearing, Petitioner's Florida CAP license was inactive. In 1991, Petitioner received a stock bonus from his employer, HCA, when it purchased a private hospital. The bonus consisted of stock certificates in a spin-off company known as Quorum Health Care. The stock was restricted and could not be sold for five years. Petitioner never received a Federal Income Tax Form 1099 related to the stock bonus. Petitioner placed the stock certificates in his safe. He did not include the stock bonus on his personal federal income tax return. In 1994, the Internal Revenue Service audited Petitioner's personal tax returns. During the audit, Petitioner disclosed the stock bonus and immediately filed an amended income tax return, paying all tax and interest due and all penalties. In 1996, Petitioner filed a whistleblower lawsuit against his employer for Medicare fraud. Because the lawsuit was filed in Alabama, the United States Attorney in Birmingham, Alabama, intervened in the case. The lawsuit resulted in the recovery of $180,000,000 from Quorum Health Care. Petitioner was entitled to a whistleblower award in the amount of $5,000,000. In 1999, before Petitioner received his financial reward from the lawsuit, the United States Attorney in Birmingham, Alabama, advised Petitioner that he would be charged with failure to file a correct federal income tax return for the years 1991 and 1992. Petitioner granted the government's request to extend the statute of limitations while the government investigated the tax fraud allegations against him. In 2000, Petitioner pled guilty to income tax fraud and agreed to forego any reward for his participation in the whistleblower lawsuit. Petitioner was sentenced to serve two years in a federal prison, followed by one year of supervised probation. Petitioner also paid a $50,000 fine. Petitioner was incarcerated for 367 days. He was released from federal prison in August 2002. His supervised probation terminated February 2004. In January 2006, Petitioner's civil rights were restored. In an effort to prove rehabilitation, Petitioner presented evidence to show his involvement and/or active participation with the following: (a) his church; (b) children's sports programs; (c) Habitat for Humanity; (d) neighborhood hurricane recovery; (e) and other activities beneficial to his friends and family. The following three witnesses testified on Petitioner's behalf at the hearing: (a) Mike Papantonio, an attorney and Petitioner's brother-in-law; (b) Randal Spencer, a Florida licensed real estate broker who, along with his partners, sold a commercial building to Petitioner's wife; and (c) Carl Collins, Petitioner's neighbor since 2000. Each witness testified that Petitioner is honest, trustworthy, and of good character. At the time of the hearing, Petitioner was owner/manager of CommStructure, a company that manufactures and installs cellular towers. Petitioner oversees all financial aspects of the company. Petitioner's wife owns a real estate brokerage company, Spencer Realty. If Petitioner becomes licensed as a real estate sales associate, he would assist his wife in her business. A real estate sales associate, like a CPA, is responsible for important financial transactions where accuracy is important. Therefore, a real estate sales associate must be trustworthy regarding financial matters.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner a license as a real estate sales associate. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of April, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of April, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel R. Biggins, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Daniel Villazon, Esquire Daniel Villazon, P.A. 1020 Verona Street Kissimmee, Florida 34741 Nancy B. Hogan, Chairman Real Estate Commission Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 801N Orlando, Florida 32801 Josefina Tamayo, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact The parties agreed at the hearing that there were no issues of fact which remained to be determined. The parties stipulated that the relevant facts are as set out in paragraph 5 of the Petition for Administrative Hearing. The following findings are quoted directly from paragraph 5 of the Petition. Petitioner is a federally chartered savings and loan association. Petitioner initially employed the cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting for Federal Income Tax purposes. In a desire to more clearly reflect income, Petitioner applied for and received permission from the Internal Revenue Service allowing Petitioner to change its method of tax accounting from the cash to the accrual method, pursuant to Revenue Procedure 70-27. This change was to commence with the calendar year 1971. Consistent with this accounting method change, all net accrued income as of January 1, 1971, was recorded in its entirety in Petitioner's financial statements as of December 31, 1970. The total net adjustment required to convert to the accrual method was $758,911.00. Pursuant to an agreement entered into with the Internal Revenue Service, an annual adjustment of $75,891.00 was required. The annual adjustment spread the effect of the accounting change over a 10-year period, despite the fact that all the income was realized prior to January 1, 1971. On January 1, 1972, the Florida Income Tax Code became effective. Petitioner timely filed its 1970 and 1971 Florida Intangible Personal Property Tax Returns. Upon subsequent review of Petitioner's records, it became apparent that the intangible tax had been overpaid and a refund claim was submitted. The refund was issued to Petitioner by the State of Florida during the calendar year 1973 and reported in Petitioner's 1973 Federal Corporate Income Tax Return. On December 16, 1975, Respondent notified Petitioner that Petitioner was deficient in its payment of Florida Corporate Income Tax in the amount of $25,386.84. The total deficiency consisted of $3,267.00 for the year ended December 31, 1972; $19,202.00 for the year ended December 31, 1973; and $2,916.84 for the year ended December 31, 1974. Included in the alleged total deficiency of $25,386.84 is a tax in the amount of $14,696.70 for the year 1973. This tax is attributable to Petitioner's apportionment of a part of its 1973 income to sources outside of the State of Florida. Petitioner is no longer protesting this deficiency. On February 9, 1976, Petitioner filed its protest against Respondent's determination that a deficiency in tax existed. By letter dated March 9, 1976, Respondent denied Petitioner's protest filed on February 9, 1976.
Findings Of Fact Having listened to the testimony and considered the evidence presented in this cause, it is found as follows: Petitioner is a domestic corporation. Petitioner provided medicare services to patients in the 1969-70 fiscal year. An on-site audit by the medicare auditing team was concluded in December of 1971, and petitioner received $56,131.00 of medicare reimbursements in January of 1972, for the services provided in the 1969-70 fiscal year. The petitioner did not file an amended federal income tax return for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1979. The adjusted federal income reported on petitioner's federal income tax return for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1972, included the $56,131.00 of medicare reimbursements received by petitioner in January of 1972. On petitioner's Florida income tax return for its fiscal year ending September 30, 1972, petitioner did not include the $56,131.00 figure in its adjusted federal income. On March 31, 1975, the respondent notified petitioner of a proposed deficiency in the amount of $2,100.99 arising from the petitioner's omission of the medicare reimbursements from its adjusted federal income as shown on its Florida corporate income tax return for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1972. Further correspondence ensued between the petitioner and the Corporate Income Tax Bureau of the respondent and the petitioner filed the present petition requesting a hearing on the issue. The respondent requested the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct the hearing.
Recommendation Based upon the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is my recommendation that there is no legal basis for affording the petitioner any relief from the proposed deficiency and that said deficiency in the amount of $2,100.00 be sustained. Respectfully submitted and entered this 17th day of September, 1975, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: E. Wilson Crump, II, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Tax Division, Northwood Mall Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Homer E. Ward, N.H.A. Administrator/President University Park Convalescent Center 1818 E. Fletcher Avenue Tampa, Florida 33612
Findings Of Fact The facts in this cause are essentially undisputed. The Pen Haven Company was a Subchapter "S" corporation for federal income tax purposes and therefore incurred no State income tax liability. It was formed in 1960 and retained its Subchapter "S" status thorough 1976 for federal income tax purposes. In December of 1977, the capital stock of Pen Haven Sanitation Company was sold to the Board of County Commissioners of Escambia County. Inasmuch as the sole corporate stock holder then was no longer an individual, but rather a governmental entity, the corporation Subchapter "S" election for federal income tax purposes was terminated. Escambia County did not wish to own stock in a private corporation so it accordingly liquidated Pen Haven and its assets were distributed to the County's direct ownership. Thereafter the Corporation filed a final corporate income tax return for 1977 which reflected capital gains on the assets of the corporation which had been distributed. Some of those assets had tax bases which had been reduced to zero through reduction by depreciation, most of which had been charged off prior to January 1, 1972, the effective date of the Florida corporate income tax code. All of the depreciation deductions had been taken prior to the termination of the Subchapter "S" status of the Pen Haven Company. On disposition of the Pen Haven assets however, a gain was reported equal to the fair market value or salvage value, less the basis. This gain was accordingly reported on Pen Haven's federal income tax return, and on the 1977 Florida corporate income tax return, albeit under the protest as to the Florida tax return. Inasmuch as Pen Haven had previously deducted depreciation since its inception, and had the benefit thereof for federal tax purposes, it was required by the Internal Revenue Service to recapture the depreciation for federal tax purposes upon its sale and the filing of its tax return in 1977. The same recapture of depreciation treatment was required of West Florida Utilities. Thereafter an application was made by the Petitioner corporations for Florida Corporate Income Tax Refunds asserting that they should have not paid taxes on the amount of gains which represented a recapture of depreciation which had been taken as a deduction prior to the effective date of the Florida corporate income tax on January 1, 1972. In effect the Petitioner is contending that the so- called "income" which is the subject of the tax in question was not realized in 1977, but rather merely "recognized" in that year by the federal tax law and that it represented income actually "realized" during the years when the depreciation was taken as a deduction prior to January 1, 1972. The Petitioners contend that "realization" for federal income tax purposes occurs when the taxpayer actually receives an economic gain. "Recognition" on the other hand refers only to that time when the tax itself becomes actually due and payable. The Petitioners maintain that when the tax became due and payable in 1977 that was merely the point of "recognition" of the subject taxable gain and not "realization" in that the gain was actually realized prior to the Florida Jurisdictional date of January 1, 1972, in the form of the economic benefit derived from those depreciation deductions applied to federal tax liability prior to that date. The Petitioners cite SRG Corporation vs. Department of Revenue, 365 So2d 687 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), for the proposition that Florida could not tax those gains accruing to the taxpayer prior to Florida's having the constitutional and statutory power to impose a corporate income tax. The Respondent in essence agrees that the question of when the economic benefit to the Petitioners was received by them or was "realized" is the key question in this cause. The Respondent contends, however, that "realization" of a taxable gain occurred when the assets were disposed of by the Petitioners in 1977, well after the date when Florida's power to tax such a gain was enacted. The underlying facts in the case of West Florida Utilities are substantially similar. This corporation, however, was organized in 1962 and has never been clothed with Subchapter "S" corporate status. The only grounds upon which it can therefore claim a refund is its assertion that Florida does not have authority to tax that portion of the capital gains attributable to recapture of depreciation which was originally charged off as a deduction prior to January 1, 1972. The Department of Revenue and the Comptroller of the State of Florida both denied the refund claim made on behalf of the Petitioners, and thereafter they seasonably petitioned for a formal administrative hearing pursuant to Chapter 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence in the record, the candor and demeanor of the witness and pleadings and arguments of counsel it is, therefore RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of September, 1981, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of September, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Thurston A. Shell Post Office Box 1831 Pensacola, Florida 32578 Robert A. Pierce, Esquire General Counsel Department of Revenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Michael Basile, Esquire Deputy General Counsel Office of Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Wilson Crump, II, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32310
