The Issue Whether Respondents committed the offenses as alleged in the Administrative Complaint and the penalties, if any, which should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a regulatory agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility of investigating and prosecuting complaints against real estate professionals, including real estate brokers and their qualified corporations. Respondent Edward J. Zibro is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0359349 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent Ed Zibro Realty, Inc. is now and was at all times material hereto a corporation registered as a real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0251315 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent Edward J. Zibro is now and was at all times material hereto an officer of and qualifying broker for Respondent Ed Zibro Realty, Inc. The Respondents' offices are now and were at all times material hereto located at 2803 East Commercial Boulevard, Suite 202, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Respondents and Pamela L. Mereider, d/b/a/ Earthrise Realty, Inc. (Mereider) submitted to arbitration through the Fort Lauderdale Area Board of Realtors, Inc. a dispute involving the right of Mereider to share in a commission check which had been deposited in Respondents' escrow account. By an award entered December 4, 1987, Respondents were ordered by the arbitration board to pay Mereider the sum of $1,800.00 within ten days of the date of the award. Respondents had not paid the award at the time of the final hearing. On February 15, 1989, the County Court in and for Broward County, Florida, issued a final judgment ordering the Respondents to pay to Mereider the sum of $1,800.00 plus arbitration costs of $100.00 and court costs of $58.00. This final judgment was based on the arbitration award dated December 4, 1987, which the Court found to be binding on the parties. Respondents had not satisfied the final judgment at the time of the final hearing in this proceeding. On November 13, 1987, Respondents, as agents for the seller, obtained a contract for the purchase of Crystal Lakes Chevron Station by Werner Hatzelhoffer (Hatzelhoffer). Hatzelhoffer, as buyer, placed an $11,000.00 deposit in trust with Respondents. On or about March 16, 1988 Hatzelhoffer's bank was notified that his application for financing this transaction through the Small Business Administration had been rejected. Hatzelhoffer did not obtain financing and the transaction did not close. On August 17, 1988, Hatzelhoffer requested in writing that Respondents return the $11,000.00 deposit with interest. Based on the terms of the contract executed by the parties, Respondents and the seller of the property disputed that Hatzelhoffer was entitled to a refund of the deposit. Hatzelhoffer later requested the return of the deposit money by telephone and went to Respondent's office in person to demand the refund of the deposit. On October 25, 1988, Hatzelhoffer's attorney made written demand of Respondents for the return of Hatzelhoffer's deposit. On April 21, 1989, Respondent Edward J. Zibro advised Petitioner for the first time of the conflicting demands on the escrow deposit and requested an escrow disbursement order from Petitioner. Petitioner opened an escrow disbursement case and, on May 2, 1989, Gerri E. Barnoske, a complaint analyst for Petitioner, requested in a letter certain information from Respondents relating to the escrow dispute. Respondents did not receive this letter. On June 2, 1989, Ms. Barnoske wrote to Respondents a second time. This second letter advised that the previously requested information had not been received and that failure to cooperate could result in disciplinary proceedings being brought. The second letter also advised Respondents to let Petitioner know if the matter had been settled. The dispute involving Mr. Hatzelhoffer's deposit was amicably resolved on May 30, 1989. On May 8, 1989, the seller and his wife executed an agreement which released any claim they may have had to the escrowed funds and which authorized Respondents to negotiate a settlement with Hatzelhoffer. Respondents were also authorized by the release instrument executed by the seller on May 8, 1989, to retain as their commission for the failed transaction any sums they could get Hatzelhoffer to agree was due the seller. As a result of the settlement, Hatzelhoffer was reimbursed $6,500.00 and Respondents retained $4,500.00. Upon receiving Ms. Barnoske's letter dated June 2, 1989, Respondent Edward J. Zibro advised Ms. Barnoske that he had not received her letter dated May 2, 1989. He further advised that the escrow dispute had been settled and enclosed a statement signed by Mr. Hatzelhoffer on May 30, 1989, which acknowledged that the matter had been resolved. On June 22, 1989, Petitioner filed an Administrative Complaint against Respondents which contained four counts. Count I and Count II charged Respondent Edward J. Zibro and Respondent Ed Zibro Realty, Inc., respectively, with having failed to account and deliver a share of a commission in violation of Section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes, based on the dealings with Mereider. Count III and Count IV charged Respondent Edward J. Zibro and Respondent Ed Zibro Realty, Inc., respectively, with having failed to account and deliver a deposit in violation of Section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes, based on the dealings with Hatzelhoffer. Respondents denied the allegations of the Administrative Complaint and timely requested a formal hearing. This proceeding followed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law it is RECOMMENDED that Department of Professional Regulation, Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order which finds as follows: Respondent Edward J. Zibro guilty of violating the provisions of Section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count I of the Administrative Complaint; Respondent Ed Zibro Realty, Inc. guilty of violating the provisions of Section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count II of the Administrative Complaint; Respondent Edward J. Zibro guilty of violating the provisions of Section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count III of the Administrative Complaint; and Respondent Ed Zibro Realty, Inc. guilty of violating the provisions of Section 475,25(1)(d), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count IV of the Administrative Complaint. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the final order entered by Petitioner assess administrative fines against Respondents as follows: Against Edward J. Zibro in the amount of $500.00 for the violation of Count I of the Administrative Complaint. Against Ed Zibro Realty, Inc. in the amount of $500.00 for the violation of Count II of the Administrative Complaint. Against Edward J. Zibro in the amount of $500.00 for the violation of Count III of the Administrative Complaint. Against Ed Zibro Realty, Inc. in the amount of $500.00 for the violation of Count IV of the Administrative Complaint. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the final order entered by Petitioner suspend the licenses and registration of the Respondents for a period of six months or until such time as the administrative fines are paid and the final judgement in favor of Pamela L. Mereider, d/b/a Earthrise Realty, Inc. is satisfied, whichever occurs first. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of November, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of November, 1989. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE 89-4205 The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner: The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 1 are adopted in material part by paragraph 1 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 2 are adopted in material part by paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 3 are adopted in material part by paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 4 are adopted in material part by paragraph 3 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 5 are adopted in material part by paragraph 5 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 6 are adopted in material part by paragraph 5 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 7 are adopted in material part by paragraph 5 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 8 are adopted in material part by paragraph 6 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 9 are adopted in material part by paragraph 6 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 10 are adopted in material part by paragraph 7 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 11 are rejected as being unnecessary to the result reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 12 are adopted in material part by paragraph 7 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 13 are adopted in material part by paragraph 8 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 14 are adopted in material part by paragraph 8 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 15 are adopted in material part by paragraph 9 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 16 are adopted in material part by paragraph 9 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact contained in the first sentence of paragraph 17 are adopted in material part by paragraph 11 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact contained in the second sentence of paragraph 17 are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made in Paragraph 11 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 18 are adopted in material part by paragraphs 10 and 12 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of paragraph 19 are rejected as being unnecessary to the results reached. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Edward Zibro Ed Zibro Realty, Inc. 2803 East Commercial Boulevard Suite 202 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33308 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Kenneth E. Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue is whether Respondents' real estate licenses should be disciplined on the ground that Respondents allegedly violated a rule and various provisions within Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, as charged in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: When the events herein occurred, Respondents, Edward D. Armbruster and Colleen Michele Armbruster, were licensed real estate brokers having been issued license numbers 0002159 and 0362890, respectively, by Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Division). Respondents served as qualifying brokers and officers of Respondent, Armbruster Realty, Inc., a corporation registered as a real estate broker and located at 1031 West Nelson Avenue, DeFuniak Springs, Florida. The corporation holds license number 0211855, also issued by the Division. On July 10, 1996, Gerald and Joyce Singleton, who had just relocated to California, entered into a contract with James B. and Joyce Patten to sell their single-family residence located on Madison Street in the City of Freeport, Florida, for a price of $78,000.00. The contract called for the Pattens to pay $1,000.00 as an earnest money deposit, to be held in escrow by Respondents. The contract further provided that "[c]losing shall be within 30 days (more or less) after acceptance of this contract," and that "[i]n the event that buyer defaults and deposit is forfeited, it is agreed said deposit shall be divided equally between seller and broker." The transaction was handled by Geraldine Dillon (Dillon), a salesperson in Respondents' office, who is now retired. Because the Pattens had recently moved to Walton County from Washington State, and they were temporarily living with a relative in a mobile home, the time for closing was of the essence. Accordingly, the Pattens inserted into the contract a provision requiring that a closing be held within "30 days (more or less)." This meant that a closing should be held on or about August 10, 1996, give or take a few days. The parties acknowledge that property boundary problems were somewhat common in certain areas of Freeport, including the area where the subject property was located. To satisfy the bank and title company, a surveyor was engaged to prepare a survey of the property. However, the parties agree that the surveyor noted problems with the boundaries of the lot. When a second surveyor would not undertake the survey because of similar boundary problems, Joyce Patten, who was the principal negotiator for the couple, notified Dillon that they did not wish to close because of potential title problems and wanted a refund of their deposit. Notwithstanding this concern, Dillon advised Joyce Patten that a third surveyor would be hired, at the seller's expense, and he could "certify" the property. Although Joyce Patten expressed concern that the bank might not accept a third survey after two earlier ones had failed, and she did not want to pay for another survey, she did not instruct Dillon to stop the process. Accordingly, Dillon engaged the services of Tommy Jenkins, a local surveyor, to perform another survey. After a certified survey was obtained by Jenkins on August 12, 1996, which Respondents represent without contradiction satisfied the lender and title company, a closing was scheduled within the next few days. This closing date generally conformed to the requirement that a closing be held by August 10, 1996, "more or less." The seller, who by now had relocated to California, flew to Florida for the closing, and the title company prepared a closing statement and package. Just before the closing, however, Respondents learned through a representative of the title company that the Pattens were "cancelling the closing," apparently in violation of the contract. Shortly after the aborted closing, Joyce Patten requested that Dillon return their deposit. By this time, the Pattens had already entered into a second contract to buy another home in the same area and closed on that property before the end of August. Respondents were never informed of this fact by the Pattens. On August 21, 1996, Colleen Armbruster prepared a rather lengthy letter to the Pattens (with a copy to the sellers) in which she acknowledged that they had orally requested from Dillon that their escrow deposit be returned. The letter has been received in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 4. Armbruster stated that she was "perplexed" that they were demanding a refund of their earnest money deposit, given the fact that the seller had "met the terms and conditions of the sale." Armbruster outlined the three reasons in the contract which would allow the Pattens to withdraw without forfeiting their deposit, but noted that none were applicable here. Accordingly, she advised them that the seller would be consulted as to his wishes regarding the deposit, and that the Pattens should contact her if they had any questions. Through oversight, however, she did not include a notice to the Pattens that they must respond to her letter within a stated period of time reaffirming their demand for the trust funds, or the deposit thereafter would be disbursed pursuant to the contract. By failing to include this specific language, and sending the letter by regular rather than certified mail, return receipt requested, Respondents committed a technical, albeit minor, violation of an agency rule. Even so, the Pattens acknowledged receiving the letter, and there is no reason to believe that they did not understand its import, especially the requirement that they contact the broker if they disagreed with the proposed disbursement of the money. It can be reasonably inferred that the Pattens did not respond because they "figured [they weren't] going to be able to get [their] money back" due to their failure to perform. On September 13, 1996, the seller's attorney advised the Pattens by letter that the seller considered the deposit forfeited pursuant to paragraph 15(a) of the contract, which pertains to the "Default" provisions. The Pattens never responded to either letter, and they also failed to respond to telephone calls made by Respondents or their agents regarding this matter. In view of the Pattens' lack of response or reaffirmance of their demand, and the fact that they had already closed on another property, Respondents logically and fairly assumed that the Pattens were in agreement with the disbursement procedures outlined in Coleen Armbruster's letter of August 21. Accordingly, on September 17, 1996, Edward Armbruster, who had not been involved in this transaction to date, in good faith signed two disbursement checks giving $697.50 to the seller and retaining the balance for his firm. This division was consistent with the terms of the contract. In making this disbursement, there was no intent on the part of Respondents to trick, deceive, breach their trust, or in any way unlawfully deprive the Pattens of their deposit. Respondents did not notify the Florida Real Estate Commission (Commission) that they had received conflicting demands for a deposit, nor institute any other procedures regarding the deposit, since they no longer had any good faith doubt as to whom was entitled to their trust funds. This was because the Pattens had failed to respond to letters and telephone calls regarding the sellers' claim to the deposit. There is no evidence that Respondents have ever been the subject of prior disciplinary action during their lengthy tenure as licensees. At the same time, it is noted that Respondents acted in good faith throughout the process and genuinely believed that there was no dispute. It should also be recognized that, for at least part of the time, the Pattens were working two contracts simultaneously without advising the realtors.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a Final Order finding Respondents guilty of a technical violation of Rule 61J2-10.032(1), Florida Administrative Code, and Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes, and that they be given a reprimand. All other charges should be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of July, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of July, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Henry M. Solares, Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Christine M. Ryall, Esquire 400 West Robinson Street Suite N-308 Orlando, Florida 32801-1772 Edward D. Armbruster Colleen M. Armbruster Post Office Box 635 DeFuniak Springs, Florida 32433 Lynda L. Goodgame, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Notice to Show Cause and, if so, what action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating yacht and ship brokers and salespersons pursuant to Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. At all times material hereto, Respondent was a licensed yacht and ship broker salesman. He has been licensed since 1990. In December 1990, Respondent was issued license number 1322, as a yacht and ship broker salesman for Seafarer Brokerage, Inc. (Seafarer). In October 1998, he renewed his license, which had an expiration date of October 28, 2000. On July 31, 1997, Lorraine Woods, the President of Seafarer, wrote to Peter Butler, section head of the yacht and ship section of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, notifying him that Respondent was the broker of record for Seafarer. Ms. Woods' license had been suspended, and Respondent knew that her license had been suspended prior to his becoming broker of record for Seafarer. As the broker of record, Respondent knew that he was solely responsible for safeguarding the money of all clients in the brokerage's escrow account. Respondent did not know the details involving the suspension of Ms. Woods' license. He was not aware that Ms. Woods had abused the control of Seafarer's escrow account for her own benefit by taking client funds from the escrow account to pay for Seafarer's operating expenses. Mr. Butler was very concerned with the abuse of Seafarer's escrow account committed by Ms. Woods. He demanded assurance from Respondent that Ms. Woods would not have access to the escrow account, and Respondent provided that assurance. On August 4, 1997, Respondent wrote to Mr. Butler confirming that he (Respondent) was the broker of record for Seafarer. In his written communication, Respondent confirmed certain details of the escrow account of Seafarer, including that he was broker of record and that the account was located at First Union National Bank of Florida, with the address and account number listed. Moreover, Respondent indicated that, as of July 30, 1997, he became the sole signatory on the account. Respondent personally provided the signatory card, showing that he was the sole signatory on the account, to the bank. Even though the bank did not have a record of such a signatory card, the undersigned is persuaded that Respondent's testimony is credible and that he provided the signatory card to the bank. Even though Respondent was the broker of record for Seafarer, Respondent looked upon Ms. Woods as the employer and himself as the employee, resulting in an employer-employee relationship. Seafarer consisted of two persons, Respondent and Ms. Woods. If Respondent was unavailable for a situation in which a check had to be written and executed, he would prepare a blank check with his signature on it and give it to Ms. Woods. She continued to maintain the business records. Ms. Woods maintained all the operating and escrow records, checks, and bank statements in a locked drawer for which she had the only key; Respondent did not have free and unobstructed access to these documents even though he was Seafarer's broker of record. Respondent and Ms. Woods continued this procedure for over a year without incident. On April 2, 1999, Warren Scott made an offer on a 1974 CAL2-46, a 46-foot yacht, with Seafarer. He placed a $6,000.00 deposit on the yacht. Mr. Scott's dealings, regarding the yacht, were with Ms. Woods. He had dealt with Seafarer and Ms. Woods on a prior occasion, had made a deposit, and had his deposit refunded. As a result, Mr. Scott felt comfortable dealing with Seafarer and Ms. Woods even though he had not purchased a yacht from Seafarer. On April 5, 1999, Mr. Scott's check was deposited in Seafarer's escrow account. On April 5, 1999, check numbered 1144, made payable to cash for $4,305.00, bearing Respondent's signature was written. The check bore the notation at the bottom left corner at the "FOR" space: "CAL2-46 (illegible) Enterprises." This check cleared Seafarer's escrow account on April 7, 1999, leaving a balance of $2,512.34. Respondent had signed the check and left it for Ms. Woods to fill-in the details. The check was signed by Respondent in March 1999 for a closing that was taking place at the end of March, but the check was not used at the closing in March. Ms. Woods had written the check to pay the rent for Seafarer. Even though Respondent had signed the check, the undersigned is persuaded that he did not know that Ms. Woods was going to use the check for a purpose other than for what it was written. On April 27, 1999, Respondent signed a check for $100.00, payable to Complete Yacht Service for engine repair to the CAL2-46. This check cleared Seafarer's escrow account on April 30, 1999, leaving a balance of $5,796.36. After a sea trial and survey, Mr. Scott wrote to Ms. Woods on April 30, 1999, indicating that he had decided not to purchase the 1974 CAL2-46 pursuant to their arrangement of April 2, 1999. On May 3, 1999, Mr. Scott again wrote to Ms. Woods that his offer to purchase the 1974 CAL2-46 for $55,000.00 in the conditional acceptance of vessel agreement, dated April 29, 1999, was expiring on May 3, 1999, at 9:00 p.m. Mr. Scott went to Seafarer on May 4, 1999, to obtain a refund of his deposit from Ms. Woods. Respondent informed him that Ms. Woods was out and that they would have to wait for her return, which was going to be in about an hour. Mr. Scott was unable to wait. He left Fort Lauderdale, returning to Nevada, with the understanding that his deposit, less $100.00 for the engine survey, would be returned to him. Mr. Scott expected the monies within a week to ten days. On May 5, 1999, a deposit of $4,700.00 was made to Seafarer's escrow account, leaving a balance of $9,136.36. On May 5, 1999, Seafarer's escrow account contained sufficient monies to give Mr. Scott a full refund of his deposit, less the $100.00. Respondent left for a vacation to the United Kingdom on May 17, 1999, with his return on June 15, 1999. Prior to his leaving, Respondent signed two blank checks, numbered 1153 and 1154, from Seafarer's escrow account. The checks were written for an upcoming business transaction during his absence, regarding a closing and Respondent's commission on the closing. On May 18, 1999, Seafarer's escrow account balance fell to $5,192.21, after three checks cleared the account. Two of the three checks, signed by Respondent, were payable to Seafarer in the amount of $1,360.00 for "comm.-37'Irwin." During May 1999, checks totaling $6,900.00, which were signed by Respondent, cleared Seafarer's escrow account. Mr. Scott made several telephone calls to Seafarer regarding the return of his deposit. Each time Mr. Scott spoke with Ms. Woods and he was not provided with a satisfactory response from her. On June 16, 1999, Mr. Scott received a check, check numbered 1153, for $5,900.00 from Seafarer. He also received a telephone call that same day from Ms. Woods requesting him not to deposit the check until the end of the month; Mr. Scott agreed. Respondent was not aware that check numbered 1153 was going to be used to refund Mr. Scott's deposit. Respondent was unaware that the check was used for a purpose other than for what it was intended. On June 17, 1999, check numbered 1154, made payable to Seafarer for $1,000.00 for "petty cash" cleared Seafarer's escrow account. The check was used by Ms. Woods to pay Seafarer's telephone and utility bills. Respondent was unaware that check numbered 1154 was going to be used for a purpose other than for what it was written. When Respondent returned from his vacation, he was contacted by Mr. Scott who advised Respondent of the problem with the return of his refund. Respondent checked the bank statements for Seafarer's escrow account and discovered that Ms. Woods had not used the checks for their intended purpose and that she had used funds from the escrow account for improper purposes. On June 25, 1999, Mr. Scott deposited the check that he received from Seafarer. The check, payable to Mr. Scott, was posted to Seafarer's escrow account on June 29, 1999, leaving a negative balance of $2,667.22. For 67 days, between April 5, 1999, when Mr. Scott's deposit of $6,000.00 was deposited in Seafarer's escrow account, and June 29, 1999, the date Mr. Scott's refund of $5,900.00 cleared, Seafarer's escrow account did not have sufficient funds to pay the refund. The period between May 5, 1999, and May 17, 1999, was the only time period, during the 67-day period, that Seafarer's escrow account had sufficient funds to pay the refund. Mr. Scott indicates that his refund was received in his account in July 1999. Respondent remained with Seafarer long enough to ensure that Mr. Scott received his refund. On July 8, 1999, Respondent notified Mr. Butler that he was no longer the broker for Seafarer. Respondent has no prior disciplinary action.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes, enter a final order: Sustaining the Notice to Show Cause and finding that John Scales violated Subsections 326.002(1) and 326.005(1), Florida Statutes (1997). Suspending Respondent's license for three years. Imposing a civil penalty of $5,000.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of February, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of February, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Janis Sue Richardson, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Tracy J. Sumner, Esquire 1307 Leewood Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32312 Ross Fleetwood, Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Barbara D. Auger, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue to be resolved is whether the Respondent's license as a real estate broker should be disciplined because he violated a lawful order of the Florida Real Estate Commission and because he failed to timely account for and deliver an escrowed real estate deposit.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility to prosecute Administrative Complaints pursuant to Section 20.30, Florida Statutes, Chapters 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant to those statutes. Respondent Richard F. Gallo was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0029993 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued the Respondent, as of November 7, 1990, was as a broker-salesman % Bucek & Bucek, Inc., in Port St. Lucie, Florida, with a home address of 2664 West End Road, West Palm Beach, Florida 33406. That is the same address Respondent placed on the request for hearing he filed in this case. On or about March 20, 1989, an Escrow Disbursement Order was issued by the Florida Real Estate Commission and received by the Respondent whereby the Respondent, as a broker, was ordered to disburse a $300 earnest money deposit to the buyers, Eugene and Dorothy McCrory, as a refund in accordance with the terms of a sales contract. The escrow funds were to be disbursed to the buyers in accord with the terms of their offer. As of March 22, 1990, the Respondent and not disbursed the $300 earnest money deposit to the buyer, Eugene McCrory. On April 11, 1990, almost one year after the filing of the Administrative Complaint, a stale-dated check for $300 was delivered to Eugene McCrory. From January 3, 1990 through January 22, 1990, Petitioner's Investigator Terry Giles made a diligent effort to locate the Respondent at his business address and listed home address, but could not contact him at either place. Investigator Giles has been unable to locate and interview the R Respondent and no response from the Respondent was made to Investigator Giles. The only statement received from Mr. Gallo was the letter addressed to counsel for the Commission in this case on July 9, 1990. (Exhibit 2) No proof of the contentions made in that letter was offered at the final hearing. The contentions are rejected as unsupported. The Respondent was aware that a Division of Administrative Hearing's case number had been assigned and therefore that the proceeding were forthcoming. (See, Exhibit 2.)
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered by the Florida Real Estate Commission finding the Respondent: guilty of failing to account for or deliver money which has come into his hands and which is not his property or which he is not in law or equity entitled to retain under the circumstances, as prohibited by Subsection 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes, as charged in Count I of the Administrative Complaint; and guilty of having violated the provisions of a lawful escrow disbursement order as prohibited by Subsection 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes, as charged in Count II of the Administrative Complaint. It is further recommended that the Final Order suspend all real estate certifications, licenses, permits and registrations of the Respondent as to Counts II of the Administrative Complaint, for a period of 2 years and that he be fined $1,000 and that such real estate certifications, licenses, permits and registrations of the Respondent also be suspended concurrently for a period of one (1) year as to Count I of the Administrative Complaint, and that he be fined an additional $1,000 for a total fine of $2,000. RECOMMENDED this 15th day of January, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of January, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Richard F. Gallo 2664 West End Road West Palm Beach, Florida 33406 Darlene F. Keller, Director Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Kenneth E. Easley, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue In this disciplinary proceeding, the issues are whether Respondents, who are licensed real estate brokers, failed to reconcile their brokerage escrow account properly; failed to maintain trust funds in an escrow account as required; filed a false report or record; obstructed or hindered Petitioner’s investigator in an official investigation; failed to account for and deliver trust funds; committed various acts of fraud, misrepresentation, dishonest dealing, or culpable negligence in any business transaction; or committed any of these enumerated offenses, as alleged by Petitioner in its Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Respondent Rudolph Dyer (“Dyer”) is a licensed real estate broker subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Florida Real Estate Commission (“Commission”). Respondent Golden Key Realty, Inc. (“Golden Key”) is and was at all times material hereto a corporation registered as a Florida real estate broker subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Commission. Dyer is the president and a director of Golden Key, and at all times relevant to this case he had substantial, if not exclusive, control of the corporation. Indeed, the evidence does not establish that Golden Key engaged in any conduct distinct from Dyer’s in connection with the transactions at issue. Therefore, Respondents will generally be referred to collectively as “Dyer” except when a need to distinguish between them arises. Petitioner Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, has jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings for the Commission. At the Commission’s direction, Petitioner is authorized to prosecute administrative complaints against licensees within the Commission’s jurisdiction. Escrow Account Irregularities and Related Misconduct On or about November 14, 2001, Petitioner conducted a routine audit of Dyer’s records. Pursuant to the audit, Catherine Rivera (“Rivera”), Petitioner’s investigator, determined that as of October 31, 2001, the balance in Dyer’s escrow account was $127. Rivera determined further that Dyer’s trust liability, i.e. the total amount of money that Dyer should have been holding in escrow on his clients’ behalf, was $2,870. Thus, there existed a shortfall of $2,743 in Dyer’s escrow account. In light of this discovery, Rivera requested that Dyer provide additional records, including previous bank statements and the reconciliation statements that licensed brokers must prepare each month showing either that their trust liabilities and bank balances are in agreement or explaining why they are not. Dyer was unable to produce these records, whereupon Rivera advised him that Petitioner would initiate disciplinary proceedings. On or about April 26, 2002, after being formally notified of pending administrative charges arising from the aforementioned deficiencies concerning his escrow account and associated records, Dyer sent Rivera a letter in which he a) admitted having failed to reconcile his bank balances and trust liabilities and b) informed Rivera that “immediately after the audit [on November 14, 2001,] steps were taken to close out all escrow deposit accounts being held by the company.” In fact, Dyer continued to use his escrow account to hold funds in trust through June 2002; as it happened, the escrow account would not be completely closed until July 29, 2002. The undersigned is not convinced, however, that Dyer lied to Petitioner about closing the escrow account, as Petitioner here contends. Rather, given the ambiguity of the language used (“steps were taken”), the undersigned accepts Dyer’s explanation that what he intended to communicate was that activity in the escrow account was being allowed to wind down in an orderly fashion——which was substantially true. Continuing to investigate the matter, Rivera arranged to meet with Dyer at his office on June 19, 2002, to review the previously requested bank records and files. When Rivera arrived on that date, however, Dyer again failed to provide the desired documents. As a result, Rivera scheduled yet another appointment to inspect records at Dyer’s office. The next such meeting would take place on July 29, 2002. In the meantime, Petitioner served a subpoena duces tecum on Dyer’s bank and obtained a complete set of bank records, including canceled checks, pertaining to Dyer’s escrow account. On July 29, 2002, Dyer finally provided reconciliation statements for his escrow account pursuant to Rivera’s longstanding request. These statements were self-contradictory and woefully inadequate, but, if nothing else, they clearly demonstrated (and the undersigned finds) that the escrow account balance fell significantly short of Dyer’s total trust liability during the months of May through August 2001, inclusive. Indeed, there is no dispute (for Dyer admitted at final hearing), and it is hereby found, that at all times relevant to this case, Dyer was commingling trust funds with other funds, to the point that the escrow account effectively became an operating account of Golden Key. Dyer also produced documents purporting to be copies of checks drawn on his escrow account. At least seven of these copies were not genuine reproductions of the respective originals but were, instead, fakes.1 Specifically, in five instances, the payee of an escrow-account check was, according to the copies that Dyer produced, an individual whom, the inference is clear, Dyer owed escrowed funds. In reality, each such check actually had been made payable to and been uttered by Golden Key, which latter facts are irrefutably established by the bank-produced records.2 Dyer admitted that the above-described copies of checks he had produced to Petitioner were fakes, but he denied having personally altered the underlying documents to create the false copies, blaming an unnamed accountant for that misdeed, and he disclaimed advance knowledge of the tampering. The undersigned, however, does not fully believe Dyer’s explanation. Dyer had exclusive authority over the escrow account and substantial control over Golden Key’s operations. The undersigned finds it inconceivable that a stranger to the subject transactions could have knowingly falsified these particular checks, in the manner shown, without Dyer’s active assistance. Therefore, while acknowledging the possibility that Dyer himself might not have altered the documents in question, the undersigned finds that he was, at the very least, aware of and knowingly complicit in the attempted deception. The Fanfan Transactions On or about June 13, 2001, Dyer facilitated a contract between Herinslake, as seller, and Francique Fanfan (“Fanfan”), as buyer, for the purchase and sale of real property commonly known as 5435 Northwest Tenth Street, Plantation, Florida. The contract called for an initial deposit of $500 and an additional deposit of $500 to be placed with Dyer within ten days after the buyer’s acceptance. Dyer received $500 from Fanfan on June 19, 2001. In evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit 9 is a $500 money order dated June 18, 2001, which names the sender (maker) as “Fan Fan” and lists as his address “601 W Oakland Pk Blvd, Ft Lauderdale 33311.” The undersigned infers that Petitioner’s Exhibit 9 is, in fact, a copy of the money order that Fanfan tendered to Dyer on June 19, 2001, as a deposit on the contract to purchase property from Herinslake. Petitioner alleges (and Dyer disputes) that some time after June 19, 2001, Dyer collected the agreed-upon second $500 deposit from Fanfan, making a total of $1,000 being held in escrow on Fanfan’s behalf. Petitioner asserts that Petitioner’s Exhibit 7, which is a $500 money order dated July 9, 2001, payable to Golden Key, is proof of the second deposit. Petitioner further alleges that after the contract between Herinslake and Fanfan failed to close (which is undisputed), Dyer returned $500 to Fanfan and kept $500 (which is disputed). Taken together, the testimony of Dyer and that of his former salesman, Elysee Joseph, is imprecise, confusing, and somewhat in conflict as it relates to Fanfan. They agree, however, that when the Herinslake-Fanfan transaction fell apart, Dyer returned Fanfan’s entire deposit——of $500. Dyer also points out that months later he assisted Fanfan in the purchase of a condominium unit located at 2800 Northwest Fifty-Sixth Avenue, Lauderhill, Florida. His testimony is corroborated by the settlement statement from that transaction, which is in evidence as part of Petitioner’s Exhibit 11. The settlement statement identifies the seller as Evelyn Goodison; names Francique Fanfan, “a single man,” as buyer; and indicates that the transaction closed on April 10, 2002. According to the settlement statement, Fanfan had placed a $1,000 deposit against the purchase price, and the testimony at final hearing established that Dyer had held this sum in escrow pending the closing. The undersigned finds that Petitioner has failed to prove, clearly and convincingly, that Dyer retained $500 belonging to Fanfan in connection with the aborted contract between Herinslake and Fanfan, for several reasons. First, the money order dated July 9, 2001, a copy of which is in evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit 7, appears not to have been tendered by Francique Fanfan, the alleged victim here. This particular money order identifies the sender as “Michelle Fanfan” and gives as her address “2076 Kimberly Blvd, N Lauderdale, Fl 33068.” There is no evidence whatsoever in the record regarding Michelle Fanfan, and hence no finding can be made that she was in any way related to Francique Fanfan, who (the evidence shows) was a single man. Moreover, Michelle Fanfan’s address does not match Francique Fanfan’s address as reported in Petitioner’s Exhibit 9. Second, the undersigned believes that it is highly unlikely Fanfan would have continued to do business with Dyer if, as Petitioner alleges, Dyer had cheated him out of $500 on an earlier deal. Thus, the very fact that Fanfan purchased the Goodison property through Dyer tends to refute Petitioner’s charge. Finally, Fanfan, the alleged victim, did not testify at the final hearing, and consequently there is no direct evidence that Dyer took $500 from Fanfan. The Charges In counts I and VII of its Administrative Complaint, Petitioner accuses Respondents of having failed to properly prepare monthly escrow-reconciliation statements. Petitioner’s position is that in maintaining records showing significant shortages in the escrow account for a period of approximately six months, and by failing to take corrective action regarding the shortages, Respondents failed to comply with Rule 61J2- 14.012, Florida Administrative Code, and hence violated Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes. In counts II and VIII, Petitioner alleges that Respondents committed fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in any business transaction, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Petitioner’s position is that Respondents committed fraud or misrepresentation when they tendered false or forged documents to Rivera during the course of her official investigation. In addition, Petitioner asserts that Respondents committed culpable negligence towards the individuals who placed their funds in trust with Respondents. In counts III and IX, Petitioner asserts that Respondents obstructed or hindered the enforcement of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, in violation of Section 475.42(1)(i), Florida Statutes, and therefore in violation of Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes. Petitioner’s position is that Respondents willfully interfered with Rivera’s investigation by submitting fraudulent documents to the investigator. In counts IV and X, Petitioner accuses Respondents of having made or filed a report or record which the licensee knew to be false, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(l), Florida Statutes. Petitioner’s position is that Respondents knowingly tendered false copies of canceled checks to Rivera. In counts V and XI, Petitioner charges Respondents with failing to account for and deliver trust funds, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(d)1., Florida Statutes. Petitioner’s position is that Respondents failed to account for and deliver the second deposit allegedly received from Fanfan in connection with the Herinslake-Fanfan transaction. In counts VI and XII, Petitioner accuses Respondents of having failed to maintain trust funds in the real estate brokerage escrow account until disbursement was properly authorized, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(k), Florida Statutes. Petitioner’s position is that during the six months of concern, Respondents’ escrow account funds were regularly several thousand dollars less than the trust liability. Ultimate Factual Determinations Dyer failed to prepare written monthly reconciliation statements as required by Rule 61J2-14.012, Florida Administrative Code, and thus he violated Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes. Petitioner therefore has established the charges set forth in counts I and VII of its Administrative Complaint, by clear and convincing evidence. The evidence does not establish that Dyer committed fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in any business transaction. There is no persuasive evidence that Dyer intended to harm (or actually harmed) any of his clients. While Dyer did participate in a dishonest scheme to deceive Rivera by producing false copies of his canceled checks, this particular wrongdoing occurred, not in a business transaction, but rather in connection with a regulatory investigation. Thus, Dyer did not violate Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Counts II and VIII were not proved. Dyer attempted to obstruct or hinder Rivera’s investigation by producing copies of canceled checks that he knew were false and misleading. Petitioner has clearly established that Dyer violated Section 475.42(1)(i), Florida Statutes, which in turn constitutes a violation of Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes, as charged in counts III and IX of the Administrative Complaint. The evidence does not support the charge that Dyer violated Section 475.25(1)(l), Florida Statutes, which prohibits the filing false reports and records, because the altered documents that Dyer produced to Rivera were not signed by Dyer—— at least not in the sense contemplated by the statute, which specifies that “such reports or records shall include only those which are signed in the capacity of a licensed broker or salesperson.” Counts IV and X thus were not proved. The evidence does not clearly establish that Dyer failed to return a deposit of $500 to Fanfan after his deal with Herinslake fell through. Thus, counts V and XI, which allege violations of Section 475.25(1)(d)1., Florida Statutes, were not proved. Dyer failed to maintain trust funds in a segregated escrow account, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(k), Florida Statutes. Petitioner therefore has established the charges set forth in counts VI and XII of its Administrative Complaint, by clear and convincing evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order that: (a) finds Respondents guilty as charged in counts I, III, VI, VII, IX, and XII of the Administrative Complaint; (b) revokes Respondents’ respective real estate licenses; and (c) imposes an administrative fine of $3,000 against Respondents, jointly and severally. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of June, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of June, 2003.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the allegations of the Administrative Complaints are correct and, if so, what penalties should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, Respondent Tailormade Management, Inc. ("Tailormade"), was a corporation registered as a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, license #0259180, located at 12811 Kenwood Lane, #218, Fort Myers, FL 33907. The president of Tailormade was R. C. Hendrickson ("Hendrickson"), an unlicensed person. At all times material to this case, Respondent Comprehensive Management, Inc. ("Comprehensive"), was a corporation registered as a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, license #0268646, located at 12811 Kenwood Lane, #218, Fort Myers, FL 33907. Until approximately January 30, 1991, the president of Comprehensive was Hendrickson. On or about January 30, 1991, Hendrickson resigned and relinquished her ownership and control to her son, Jay Coffing, an unlicensed person. The rental escrow account for each company was maintained by Hendrickson and the company bookkeeper. On direction of Hendrickson, the bookkeeper did not disclose information regarding rental escrow accounts to the licensed broker-salespersons. All accounts were reconciled by the bookkeeper who would provide the reconciliation data to the broker. The licensed broker- salespersons did not actually reconcile any accounts, but relied on the bookkeeper's data. At all times material to this case, Linda Futch ("Futch") was a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, license #0334770. The most recent license issued to Futch was as a broker-salesperson for Rawlings Realty, Inc., 1642 Colonial Boulevard, Fort Myers, FL 33907-1150. From approximately February 20, 1989 through approximately November 16, 1989, Futch was licensed and operating as qualifying broker and officer for Tailormade. On October 10, 1989, Hendrickson issued check #RE-1895 in the amount of $10,000 from the Tailormade rental escrow account to the Tailormade operating account. A check notation indicated that the funds were "advance management fees". Hendrickson admitted to the company bookkeeper that the funds were to be used to pay the outstanding balance owed to the previous co-owner of Tailormade, from whom Hendrickson had purchased the business. At no time during the period Futch acted as qualifying broker and officer for Tailormade did Futch prepare or sign written monthly escrow account statement reconciliations. Futch did not balance escrow liabilities with the escrow assets. Futch failed to make appropriate entries in monthly reconciliation statements which would note whether a shortage existed and whether corrective action had been taken. Futch maintained no records and was unable to provide any account documentation to the Petitioner's investigator. Futch resigned as Tailormade broker-salesperson effective November 16, 1989. Futch was apparently succeeded by Bette K. Potts. In November of 1990, Jeffrey C. Cooner met with a representative of Tailormade and leased a condominium unit, providing a deposit totaling $1,125 of which $350 was a pet and security deposit. Cooner eventually vacated the unit, 2/ and attempted to obtain a refund of the security deposit. By such time, the Tailormade office was vacant and closed. Cooner has received neither an accounting nor a refund of all or part of the security deposit paid to Tailormade. According to the bookkeeper, as of December, 1990, approximately $35,000 of rental escrow funds had been removed from the Tailormade rental escrow account by Hendrickson and had not been replaced. At all times material to this case, Janet Lynn Coffing ("Coffing"), Jay Coffing's wife, was a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, license #0268647. Coffing's most recent license was as a broker in limbo, listing her home address as 5410 Ashton Circle, Fort Myers, Florida, 33907-7828. From approximately February 21, 1991 through approximately May 28, 1991, Coffing was licensed and operating as qualifying broker and officer for Tailormade. From approximately February 14, 1991 through approximately June 14, 1991, Coffing was licensed and operating as qualifying broker and officer for Comprehensive. Coffing was aware, almost immediately after taking over as qualifying broker and officer for the companies that the escrow funds were short. She spoke to Hendrickson (her mother-in-law) and Jay Coffing about the situation, but apparently received no assistance from them. Coffing utilized operating funds to cover escrow shortages when escrow refunds were necessary, and continued to do so until all funds were depleted. On March 18, 1991, Charles W. Pease met with a representative of Comprehensive and leased a condominium unit at 13040 Tall Pine Circle in Fort Myers, Florida, providing two checks totaling $1,650 of which $500 was a security deposit. Upon vacating the unit, 3/ Pease attempted to obtain a refund of the security deposit but the Comprehensive office was vacant and closed. Pease has received neither an accounting nor a refund of all or part of the security deposit paid to Comprehensive. At some time in 1991, 4/ Debra and Kevin Campbell met with Coffing and leased a condominium unit located at 5418 Harbor Castle Drive. At the time the lease agreement was signed, the Campbells paid a $500 security deposit to Tailormade through Coffing. Upon vacating the unit, the Campbells attempted to obtain a refund of the security deposit but were unable to locate Coffing, and the Tailormade office was vacant and closed. The Campbells have received neither an accounting nor a refund of all or part of the security deposit paid to Tailormade. At no time during the period Coffing acted as qualifying broker and officer for either Tailormade or Comprehensive, did Coffing prepare or sign written monthly escrow account statement reconciliations. Coffing did not balance escrow liabilities with the escrow assets. Coffing failed to make appropriate entries in monthly reconciliation statements which would note whether a shortage existed and whether corrective action had been taken. Coffing maintained no records and was unable to provide account documentation to the Petitioner's investigator. On several occasions beginning on July 2, 1991, an investigator from the Department of Professional Regulation visited office location identified as the registered offices of the Respondent Tailormade and Comprehensive companies. The offices were vacant and closed. The investigator contacted Hendrickson and Jay Coffing, and attempted to obtain information from them, but was unable to maintain contact with them. The companies are apparently not operational.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, enter a Final Order determining Linda Futch guilty of the violations set forth herein and providing for a fine of $1,000, and a suspension of 90 days, to be followed by a probationary period of two years. During the probationary period, Futch shall complete 60 hours of continuing education, including a 30 hour management course for real estate brokers, and shall provide to the Florida Division of Real Estate all written monthly escrow account reconciliation statements for which she is responsible. That the Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, enter a Final Order determining Janet Lynn Coffing guilty of the violations set forth herein and providing for a fine of $1,000, and a suspension of 180 days to be followed by a probationary period of three years. During the probationary period Coffing shall complete 60 hours of continuing education, including a 30 hour management course for real estate brokers, and shall provide to the Florida Division of Real Estate all written monthly escrow account reconciliation statements for which she is responsible. That the Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate enter a Final Order revoking the licensure of Respondents Tailormade Management, Inc., and Comprehensive Management, Inc. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of July, 1992.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the real estate license issued to the Respondent, James P. Hudson, should be revoked or otherwise disciplined based upon the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I make the following findings of fact: At all pertinent times, Respondent, James P. Hudson, was a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued license No. 0148841 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent has been operating as a broker from an office at 413 South Federal Highway, Boynton Beach, Florida 33435. Respondent maintains an escrow account No. 018200602689 at Sun Bank in Boynton Beach, Florida into which he deposits trusts funds received in his capacity as a real estate broker. Sometime in the early part of September 1989, Petitioner initiated a random audit of Respondent's business. Prior to the audit, Petitioner's investigator advised the Respondent that he would need to produce all the records related to his escrow account. An investigator for Petitioner visited Respondent's office on or about September 18, 1989 to conduct an audit of Respondent's escrow accounts. Based upon the investigator's review of the records, five different transactions were identified as allegedly involving delays or mishandling of escrow funds by Respondent. Those transactions are the basis for several of the allegations in the Administrative Complaint. Each transaction is addressed separately below. The first transaction involved a contract for the sale and purchase of real property between Fitz as buyer and Kerstin as seller (the "Fitz Contract"). Included in Respondent's files on this transaction was a copy of a contract for sale and purchase that was dated and signed by the buyer on September 6, 1989 and dated and signed by the seller on September 9, 1989. The buyer in the Fitz Contract gave Respondent a check for $1000 as a deposit to be held in escrow in connection with the transaction. The Respondent's written receipt for that check is dated September 7, 1989. The evidence established that this initial deposit check was delivered to Respondent on Thursday evening, September 7, 1989. Respondent was out of town on Friday, September 8 and returned on Monday evening, September 11. The check was deposited on the afternoon of September 12 and is reflected in the bank records as a deposit on September 13. The sellers (the Kerstins) signed the contract on September 9, 1989. However, in executing the contract, they crossed out the $900,000 sales price submitted by the buyer and increased the price to $1,400,000. In other words, the sellers made a counteroffer with respect to this contract. The initial deposit was timely returned to the sellers when the counteroffer was rejected. Petitioner's investigator erroneously assumed that Respondent did not timely collect the additional deposit required under this contract. While Petitioner's investigator considered this signed contract in Respondent's files to be a binding agreement on the parties, it is clear that the change in sales price was only initialed by the sellers and, therefore, there was no enforceable agreement. The parties to the Fitz Contract subsequently executed another written contract. This second agreement provided for a sales price of $1,100,000. That contract was executed by the buyer on September 20, 1989 and by the sellers on September 24, 1989. This second contract called for a $49,000.00 deposit upon acceptance. The buyers gave Respondent a check dated September 25, 1989 in the amount of $49,000.00. That check was deposited by Respondent in his escrow account on the afternoon of September 26, 1989. The $49,000 deposit is reflected in the bank records as being deposited on September 27, 1989. Under the circumstances, there was no undue delay by Respondent in collecting or depositing the funds into escrow. The second transaction identified by Petitioner's investigator involved a contract for the sale and purchase of real property between Campanis as buyer and Hoffman as seller. The buyer in this transaction gave Respondent a check dated September 6, 1990 to be held as a deposit for this contract. A photocopy of the check presented to Petitioner's investigator included a handwritten note that states "hold until Friday 9/8/89." The evidence did not establish who wrote this note. The evidence established that the check was received by one of Respondent's sales associates on September 7 and left on the Respondent's desk on September 8. Respondent is the only company employee authorized to deposit checks or otherwise handle transactions involving the escrow account. As indicated above, Respondent was out of town from September 8 through the evening of September 11. The check was deposited on the afternoon of September 12 and is reflected in the bank records as being credited to the escrow account on September 13. Under the circumstances, the Respondent was not delinquent in depositing these funds. The third transaction involved a contract for the purchase and sale of real property between White as buyer and Adkins as seller (the "White Contract.") The White Contract was executed by the buyer on July 26, 1989 and by one of the sellers on July 27 and by the other seller on Friday, July 28. The contract called for an initial deposit of $500.00 with an additional deposit of $1,700 upon acceptance. The initial deposit check was dated July 26, 1989. That deposit check was attached to the contract executed by the purchaser and presented to a cooperating real estate agent who was to present the proposed contract to the seller. The executed contract was not returned to Respondent until sometime during the weekend of July 29 and 30. The initial deposit check along with the additional deposit were then deposited into Respondent's escrow account on Monday, July 31, 1989. Under the circumstances, the evidence established that there was no undue delay in depositing the escrow money. The next transaction identified by Petitioner's investigator involved a contract for sale and purchase of real property between Milera as buyer and Twillie as seller (the "Milera Contract.") The Milera Contract provided for an additional deposit due upon acceptance. The contract was accepted by Twillie on August 23, 1989. The parties to the contract agreed that the time for making the additional deposit would be extended for two days. The check for the additional deposit was dated and received by Respondent on Friday, August 25, 1989. The check was deposited into Respondent's escrow account on Tuesday, August 29, 1989. Under the circumstances, there was no undue delay in depositing the escrow money. The final transaction involved a contract with the sale and purchase of real property between Gerrety as buyer and the estate of John Walsh as seller (the "Gerrety Contract.") The Gerrety Contract was executed by the purchaser on August 10, 1989. The deposit check was given to one of the Respondent's associates on that Thursday evening. The deposit check was not delivered to Respondent until after business hours on Friday, August 11. The check was deposited into Respondent's escrow account on Monday, August 14. Under the circumstances, there was no undue delay in depositing the escrow money on this transaction. During the audit, Petitioner's investigator determined that Respondent was holding deposits on two separate rental properties in his escrow account. At the time of the audit, Petitioner's investigator was not provided with any leases or other documentation regarding these transactions even though Respondent was supposed to produce records for all sums in the escrow account. Respondent contends that he did not realize he was supposed to produce his rental files, was never specifically asked to produce these files and did not know that Petitioner was questioning these transactions until he received the Administrative Complaint in this action. While there was apparently some miscommunication at the time of the audit, adequate documentation for these rental deposits was produced at the hearing. Therefore, Petitioner's allegation that Respondent did not maintain adequate documentation regarding these deposits is without merit. Petitioner has also charged that Respondent did not produce all of the deposit slips in connection with the escrow account and did not produce any evidence of reconciliation of the escrow account. The evidence at the hearing established that all deposit slips are available even though they were not all kept with the bank statements. Moreover, the evidence failed to substantiate the allegation that Respondent did not reconcile his escrow account. Thus, these charges were not substantiated. At the time of the audit, Respondent advised Petitioner's investigator that the escrow account included some commission money that had not yet been removed. In the past, Respondent would sometimes collect his commissions at the close of a transaction from the funds held in escrow. (Respondent no longer collects commissions in this manner.) In auditing Respondent's escrow account, Petitioner's investigator determined that there was an overage of approximately $8,178.17 in the account. Within thirty days of the completion of the audit, Respondent removed $7,500 of the overage which represented his commission on two previously closed transactions. While Respondent believed that the remaining amount of the overage was also his commission money, he refrained from removing any more money until completion of a year-end audit by his accountant. Respondent's records reflected a slight difference in the amount of the overage than the amount calculated by Petitioner during the audit. Respondent wanted to be absolutely certain that only the proper amount was removed from the escrow account. At the conclusion of the audit on September 18, 1989, Respondent signed an office inspection report form prepared by Petitioner which contained the following pre-printed statement: ...I certify that to the best of my knowledge all records pertaining to my sales escrow/trust account(s) and my rental property management account(s) have been provided to the investigator. The above violations are brought to my attention this date and thoroughly explained. I will take corrective action within thirty days and furnish photo/sketches of corrections and documents on the same... There is some confusion as to what additional documentation Respondent was expected to provide following the completion of the September, 1989 audit. Respondent did not believe he was required to provide any additional evidence to Petitioner or its investigator and no further documentation was provided by Respondent until Petitioner's investigator returned to his office in January of 1990. Petitioner's investigator returned to Respondent's office on January 17, 1990. At that time, $7500.00 of the overage had been removed from the escrow account. The remaining amount of the overage was removed later in January. It does not appear that Respondent provided Petitioner's investigator with copies of the rental agreements or the second contract in the Kerstin transaction during the January visit by Petitioner's investigator. Respondent contends that this information was never specifically requested. It is clear that communication between Respondent and Petitioner's investigator had deteriorated from bad to worse by the time of this January visit. There is no indication that Respondent ever used the escrow account for improper purposes or withdrew money from the escrow account for his own personal or business use. The Florida Real Estate Commission adopted new record keeping requirements regarding escrow accounts in July of 1989. The new rules require a written monthly reconciliation of a broker's escrow account. At the time of the audit, Respondent was not keeping the minimum written statement comparing broker's total liability with the reconciled bank balance of all trust accounts as required by the new rules. Even after the audit in September, Respondent did not keep the written reconciliations in the format required by the new rules. Respondent was reconciling the account on his computer.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent not guilty of the allegations contained in Counts I and II of the Administrative Complaint, finding Respondent guilty of Counts III and IV and reprimanding him for minor and techinical violations of those counts and imposing a fine of $100.00. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 31st day of December, 1991. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-3589 Both parties have submitted Proposed Recommended Orders. The following constitutes my rulings on each of the parties' proposed findings of fact. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. Addressed in the preliminary statement. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. Adopted in pertinenet part in Findings of Fact 3. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 4. 7. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 5. 8. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 6. 9. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 7 and 8. 10. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 6. 11. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 6. 12. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 8 and 9. 13. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 8 and 9. 14. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 8 and 9. 15. Subordinate 23. to Findings of Fact 8, 9 and Subordinate to Findings of Fact 23. This subject is also addressed in paragraph 9 of the conclusions of law. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 10. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 10. 19. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 11. 20. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 13. 21. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 13. 22. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 13. 23. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 14. 24. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 14. 25. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 15. 26. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 15. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 16. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 17. Rejected as not established by competent susbstantial evidence. The subject matter is addressed in Findigns of Fact 17. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 19 and 20. Rejected as not established by competent substantial evidence. The subject matter is addressed to some degree in Findings of Fact 21. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 21 and 22. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 21 and 25. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 20. Rejected as irrelevant. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 21. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 21. The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact The Respondent's proposed findings of fact are not numbered. The numbers below refer to the numerical sections contained in the findings of fact section of Respondent's Proposed Recommended Order. Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. The first two sentences are adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 6-9. The second two sentences are rejected as irrelevant. This subject matter is addressed in some degree in Findings of Fact 21. The last sentence is rejected as constituting argument rather than a finding of fact. The first two sentencess are subordinate to Findings of Fact 10. The next two sentences are adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 11. The last sentence is rejected as constituting argument rather than a finding of fact. The first two sentence are adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 13. The third sentence is rejected as constituting argument rather than a finding of fact. The first three sentences are adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 14. The last sentence is rejected as constituting argument rather than a finding of fact. The first two sentences are adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 15. The last sentence is rejected as constituting argument rather than a finding of fact. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 16. The first sentence is adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 17. The second sentence is rejected as vague. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 17 and 25. The first three sentences are adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 18, 19 and 22. The fourth sentence is rejected as not established by competent substantial evidence. This subject matter is addressed in part in Findings of Fact 19. The fifth and sixth sentences are rejected as constituting argument rather than a finding of fact. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 25. COPIES FURNISHED: Janine B. Myrick, Esquire Senior Attorney Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 James P. Hudson 413 South Federal Highway Boynton Beach, Florida 33435 Darlene F. Keller Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, Respondent, Antonio Prado, has been a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, license no. 0138312. Respondent, Antonio Prado, is the President and qualifying broker for a real estate company called Bayside International Realty, Inc. Respondent, Bayside International Realty, Inc., has been issued real estate license no. 1001760. The Department is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating real estate licensees. On January 13, 1995, an investigator employed by the Department conducted an office inspection and audit of the Respondents' place of business. During the course of the audit, the investigator discovered that the escrow account for the business contained $1,000.00. None of the $1,000.00 was, in fact, "trust funds" owed or belonging to a third party as Respondents have not held "trust funds" since August, 1990. The investigator advised Respondent that he was not allowed to hold personal funds in excess of $200.00 in the company escrow account. Based upon that information, Respondent immediately, on January 13, 1995, removed $800.00 from the escrow account leaving a balance of $200.00. The purpose of holding $1,000.00 in the account related to a Barnett Bank policy which required the minimum balance of $1,000.00 to avoid service charges on the account. Respondent, Antonio Prado, has not been active in the real estate practice for several years and was unaware of changes to the escrow policy dating back to December, 1991, which prohibit more than $200.00 of personal funds in an escrow account. Respondent, Antonio Prado, has been licensed for 19 years and has never been disciplined for any violations of the real estate law.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order determining the Respondent, Antonio Prado, committed only a minor technical violation of Section 425.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes, and, in recognition of Respondent's exemplary record as a broker, which, along with his willing, immediate action to correct the error, demonstrates sound judgment, issue a letter of reprimand and guidance regarding escrow account rules and regulations. All other allegations against these Respondents should be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of May, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 96-0038 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner: None submitted. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent: Paragraphs 1 and 2 are rejected as statements of fact as they are restatement of argument or comment made at the hearing. Paragraphs 3 through 6 are accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Henry M. Solares Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Theodore R. Gay Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Rhode Building Phase II 401 Northwest Second Avenue N607 Miami, Florida 33128 Antonio Prado, pro se and as President of Bayside International Realty, Inc. 1390 Brickell Avenue, Suite 230 Miami, Florida 33131
Recommendation Based on the foregoing stipulated facts and conclusions of law as found above, I recommend that the Defendant be issued a private written reprimand. DONE and ENTERED this 25th day of February, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Robert J. Randolph, Esquire Randolph & Randolph P. O. Box 1546 209 West Ocean Boulevard Stuart, Florida 33494 Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789
