The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent is guilty of violating a lawful order of the Florida Real Estate Commission and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact On August 18, 1992, the Florida Real Estate Commission issued a final order following an administrative hearing and recommended order from a hearing officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings. The final order, which was filed September 2, 1992, concerned Respondent and several other individuals who were also named respondents. The final order suspends Respondent's license for 90 days, places her license on suspension for two years thereafter, requires continuing education, and requires Respondent to pay a fine of $1000. Unlike the case with respect to another respondent required to pay a fine, the final order does not provide a time within which the fine is to be paid. Respondent testified that she never received a copy of the final order when it was issued. She testified that, when she received the administrative complaint, she did not receive the sole exhibit attached to the complaint, which was the final order. She also testified that she does not have the money to pay the fine. Respondent's testimony that she has been unaware of her obligation to pay the $1000 fine is discredited.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order suspending Respondent's license for a period of five years, commencing 90 days from the date of the final order; provided, however, that Respondent may avoid the suspension by paying the $1000 fine from the previous case in its entirety within 90 days from the date of the final order in the subject case. ENTERED on March 16, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on March 16, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802-1900 James H. Gillis, Senior Attorney Division of Real Estate Legal Section Hurston Bldg.--North Tower Suite N-308 400 W. Robinson St. Orlando, FL 32801-1772 Linda Futch, pro se P.O. Box 051025 Ft. Myers, FL 33905
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to receive survivor benefits from a joint and survivor annuity, under Option 3 of the Florida Retirement System (FRS) defined benefit plan, following the death of her spouse, Anne M. Birch, who, as an FRS member, elected Option 1 in 2012 when Florida law would not allow Ms. Birch to elect Option 3 or 4 and designate the joint annuitant as Petitioner, whom she lawfully married after electing Option 1.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Birch, who was born on September 12, 1950, and Petitioner, who was born on August 26, 1956, fell in love and began to live together in 1992. They jointly owned all significant property, including their primary residence, with a right of survivorship and were jointly liable for household expenses and debt, including the mortgage note on their primary residence. On January 31, 2001, Ms. Birch executed a will that left any remaining property to Petitioner and named her as the personal representative of the estate.1/ Ms. Birch designated Petitioner as her primary beneficiary for employee benefits that authorized such designations. On October 11, 2002, Ms. Birch and Petitioner signed an Amended Declaration of Domestic Partnership, pursuant to the Broward County Domestic Partnership Act of 1999, to register themselves as domestic partners under Broward County Ordinance 1999-18. Fully vested and having accrued substantial benefits from having worked for Broward County in an FRS-covered position for nearly 30 years, on October 23, 2012, Ms. Birch entered DROP, effective October 1, 2012. At that time, Ms. Birch elected Option 1 for the payment of her benefits, checking the "no" box in response to the question of whether she was married. As described in the Conclusions of Law, Option 1 is the maximum benefit and is payable for the life of the retiree. Ms. Birch's monthly Option 1 benefit was $3039.25. The monthly Option 3 benefit, which, as described below, is payable until the latter death of the FRS member or her surviving spouse,2/ would have been nearly $1000 less than the monthly Option 1 benefit.3/ Respondent implemented Ms. Birch's election by paying Ms. Birch's Option 1 benefits into her DROP account. In August 2013, Ms. Birch became ill with cancer. She eventually had to quit working and terminated DROP, at which point Respondent paid Ms. Birch her Option 1 benefits directly. On June 16, 2014, Ms. Birch and Petitioner were lawfully married in Massachusetts. Almost two years later, on May 24, 2016, Ms. Birch died, at which time all payments under Option 1 ended. When Ms. Birch and Petitioner registered as domestic partners in Broward County, no state allowed or recognized same- sex marriage, often pursuant to a "Defense of Marriage Act" (DOMA). Continuously since 1997, Florida law banned the allowance and recognition of same-sex marriage, even if performed in a jurisdiction where such a marriage were legal, and restricted "marriage" to a legal union between a man and a woman and "spouse" to a member of such a union. § 741.212(1) and (3); Ch. 97-268, § 1, at 4957, Laws of Fla. (Florida DOMA).4/ Massachusetts was the first state to allow and recognize same-sex marriage, effective in 2004. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (decision stayed 180 days to allow legislature to enact law consistent with the court's ruling). Three or four years after Goodridge, Ms. Birch and Petitioner visited Massachusetts, but did not exercise their right to enter into a lawful marriage at that time. A series of court decisions invalidated the federal and state DOMAs, including the Florida DOMA. On June 26, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), held that the federal DOMA, as applied to federal tax law, was unconstitutional. By order entered August 21, 2014, in Brenner v. Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (N.D. Fla. 2014) (Brenner I), Respondent was enjoined from enforcing or applying the Florida DOMA, although the court stayed its injunction. The U.S. Supreme Court lifted the stay,5/ as reported by the district court in Brenner v. Scott¸ 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91969 (N.D. Fla. 2016) (Brenner II), in which, on March 30, 2016, the court issued a summary judgment on its injunction in Brenner I. Between Brenner I and Brenner II, on June 26, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court held that state DOMAs were unconstitutional in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). Petitioner testified that she and Ms. Birch would have been lawfully married by October 2012, when Ms. Birch retired, but for the Florida DOMA. This testimony is credited. Long prior to 2012, Ms. Birch and Petitioner organized their financial affairs as though they were lawfully married, sharing assets and liabilities equally. Petitioner testified credibly that she and Ms. Birch always "played by the rules": thus, Ms. Birch and Petitioner would have been deterred from getting married prior to Ms. Birch's retirement, such as when they were visiting Massachusetts in 2007, due to the legal futility of attempting to obtain recognition in Florida of a marriage lawfully performed elsewhere. Less persuasive is Petitioner's testimony that, in October 2012, Ms. Birch would have elected Option 3, if this option had been available to her, and it is impossible to find on this record that she would have done so. There is no evidence that Ms. Birch and Petitioner rearranged their financial affairs to achieve, to the extent possible, an Option 3 election. Household income was $1000 per month greater under Option 1 than Option 3, so life insurance on Ms. Birch or an annuity for Petitioner could have mitigated Ms. Birch's inability to choose Option 3 when she retired. Prior to retiring, Ms. Birch did not attempt to elect Option 3 in writing or orally. Even after retiring, as noted below, Ms. Birch displayed ambivalence about whether she wanted to change her election. As a named defendant in Brenner I, on April 14, 2015, Respondent responded to the injunction against its enforcement or application of the Florida DOMA by issuing Information Release #2015-184 (Release). Sent to FRS members who retired prior to January 2, 2015, and elected Option 1 or 2, the Release states: . . . FRS retirees and . . . DROP participants who were in legally-recognized same-sex marriages at the time they retired or began DROP participation and chose Option 1 or Option 2 will have an opportunity to change benefit payment options in light of . . . Brennan. These retirees will be able to change their retirement payment option from their current selection to Option 3 or Option 4 to provide a continuing monthly benefit to their spouse. The retirees impacted by this change have an effective retirement date or DROP begin date on or before January 1, 2015. The Release provides that an eligible retiree interested in a second election must contact Respondent in writing, identify the retiree's spouse, and certify that the retiree and spouse were married in a state or country that allowed same-sex marriage when the FRS member retired. The Release states that Respondent will respond with an estimate of the new benefit payment under the option that the retiree intends to select and provide the retiree with the paperwork necessary to make the second election. Available on Respondent's website,6/ the Release provides the opportunity of a second election of Option 3 or 4 to any FRS member7/ who retired prior to January 2, 2015; chose Option 1 or 2 when she retired; and was in a same-sex marriage when she retired. The Release places no limit on how far in the past the retirement took place.8/ The thrust of Petitioner's case is directed toward backdating her lawful marriage to Ms. Birch to a point prior to Ms. Birch's retirement. As noted above, the timing of the lawful marriage is a problem under the Release, which requires a lawful marriage at the time of retirement, but another problem under the Release is the fact that the Release provides to the FRS retiree, not her surviving spouse, the opportunity for a second election, nor, as discussed immediately below, is this a technical requirement that can be overcome by Petitioner's serving as a representative of Ms. Birch--the second election is extended only to living FRS retirees. The virtue of the Release for Petitioner is that it confers the opportunity of a second election without any proof that, at the time of the first election, the FRS member would have elected Option 3 or 4. If Petitioner does not rely on the Release, she must also prove that Ms. Birch would have elected Option 3 or 4, which, as noted above, she has failed to prove. By limiting the second election to the FRS retiree, the Release limits the potential of adverse selection in allowing a second election, possibly years after the first election.9/ There are three possibilities at the time of the second election: both spouses are alive, only the FRS retiree is alive, and only the surviving spouse is alive. The Release's restriction of the right to make the second election to the FRS retiree means that the second and third possibilities do not result in second elections: respectively the FRS retiree would not reduce her payment to provide an annuity to a spouse who is already deceased10/ and a surviving spouse has no right to make an election under the Release. The couple may gain a minor financial advantage by the opportunity to revisit the payment option several years after the retirement of the FRS member, so that they may be better informed of the health of each of them. But the surviving spouse would gain a significant financial advantage by the opportunity to revisit the payment option after the death of the FRS member. Shortly after Respondent issued the Release, Ms. Birch filed with Respondent a Spousal Acknowledgement Form that she had signed on May 8, 2015. This form indicates that Ms. Birch is married, but nothing else. At about the same time, though, Ms. Birch contacted Respondent by telephone to discuss the Release and any choices that she may now have under the Release. By letter dated May 26, 2015, Respondent calculated monthly benefit amounts under Options 1 through 4, but the letter warns: "Your benefit option will not be changed unless you complete and return the required forms noted in this letter" and indicate a choice of repaying in a single payment or installments the excess benefits of Option 1 over the smaller benefits paid under Option 3 or 4. The May 26 letter requires further action on Ms. Birch's part and predicates any right to a second election upon a lawful marriage at the time of retirement. The record provides no basis for finding that any of Respondent's representatives misstated the lawful-marriage condition. To the contrary, in at least one conversation with Ms. Birch, Respondent's representative insisted on verification of a lawful marriage as of October 2012. Additionally, Ms. Birch was not requesting a right to make a second election; at most, she was gathering information to prepare to decide whether to ask to change her election. By June 26, 2015, pursuant to a note documenting a telephone conversation between Ms. Birch and a representative of Respondent, Ms. Birch decided to keep Option 1 rather than make a second election of Option 3.11/ In May 2016, Ms. Birch finally made a clear attempt to change her election to Option 3. By letter dated May 12, 2016, Ms. Birch stated that she was lawfully married to Petitioner on June 12, 2012, and asked for "the change in beneficiary for my pension, due to the one time option given" in the Release. Even at this late date, Ms. Birch was not yet ready to elect Option 3 because the letter concludes: "I would like to see the breakdown of monetary options to make an informed decision." However, on May 20, 2016, during a telephone call with a representative of Respondent, Ms. Birch provided the date of birth of Petitioner and asked Respondent to expedite her request because she did not have long to live. On the same date, Ms. Birch signed an Option Selection form electing Option 3. By letter dated July 18, 2016, Respondent acknowledged the death of Ms. Birch and informed Petitioner that all pension benefits ended at that time. By letter dated September 22, 2016, Petitioner asked for reconsideration and supplied copies of various documents, the relevant provisions of which have been referenced above. By letter dated October 20, 2016, Respondent denied the request for reconsideration.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for benefits under Option 3 from Ms. Birch's FRS account and dismissing Petitioner's Request for Administrative Hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of January, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of January, 2018.
The Issue Whether or not Petitioner is indebted to the State of Florida in the amount of $897.01 arising out of his receipt of overtime pay while in an "excluded position" with the Department of State.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is currently an employee of the State of Florida, Department of State ("State"). He has been continuously employed by "State" from March 1991 to date. Petitioner has consistently received his regular salary, annual leave, sick leave, special holidays, and retirement contributions as part of his employment package as a state government employee. Petitioner was employed by the Division of Elections of "State" as an Administrative Assistant II until April 1, 1991, at which time, he was promoted to an Administrative Assistant III. Petitioner went from an "included position" to an "excluded position" upon his promotion on April 1, 1991. Employees filling "included positions" may receive overtime compensation. Employees filling "excluded positions" may only receive compensatory leave on an hour-for-hour basis for those hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. "Compensatory leave" may be withdrawn from an employee's leave accumulation amount and utilized in the same way as annual leave for the employee's rest and relaxation or other personal purposes. Prior to Petitioner's promotion, "State's" Division of Elections had never had an employee move from an Administrative II, included position, to an Administrative III, excluded position. Neither "State's" administrative personnel nor Petitioner had any prior knowledge that upon his promotion Petitioner would/was no longer entitled to be paid money for the overtime he worked in the new position. "State's" March 27, 1991 appointment letter to Petitioner advising him of his promotion did not advise him that the promotion had the effect of moving him from an included to an excluded position for purposes of overtime pay. The April 10, 1991 Report of Personnel Action regarding Petitioner's promotion incorrectly indicated that he had moved from an Administrative II, "excluded," to an Administrative III, "excluded" position. The Department of Management Services (Management Services) is solely responsible for the designation of whether an employee is in an included or excluded position as it relates to a Report of Personnel Action. That agency's personnel were unable to explain why the April 10, 1991 Report of Personnel Action was incorrect. Due to the erroneous Report of Personnel Action, neither "State" nor Petitioner were on actual notice that Petitioner had moved from an included to an excluded position for purposes of overtime pay and that he was no longer entitled to be paid money for the overtime he worked in the excluded promotional position of Administrative Assistant III. However, all concerned had constructive notice by prior documents and designations that the Administrative Assistant II position was an "included" position. No agency deliberately misled the Petitioner concerning his promotion, and there is no evidence that he would have refused the promotion had he known of the change of status from "included" to "excluded." Petitioner's "State" supervisor who had authorized his April 1, 1991 promotion was without actual knowledge at the time of Petitioner's promotion that Petitioner had moved from an included to an excluded position for purposes of receiving overtime pay and did not advise him of his ineligibility for overtime pay after his promotion. Petitioner was paid $897.01 in overtime payments for overtime worked during April through July 1991, while in an excluded position, despite not being entitled to overtime pay after May 31, 1991 for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. (The May 31, 1991 date was stipulated by the parties, see appendix.) Petitioner's "State" supervisor erroneously authorized the overtime payments Petitioner received while in his excluded promotional position. The Respondent, Department of Banking and Finance's (Banking and Finance's) payroll system that is designed to detect errors such as occurred here upon receipt of an employee's authorized request for pay did not detect this error because the system was not on-line during the four months Petitioner worked and submitted authorized requests for overtime pay in the excluded promotional position. The fact that Petitioner had received overtime pay while in an excluded position was neither discovered nor conveyed to him until six months after his April 1, 1991 promotion. Banking and Finance initiated an investigation concerning the overtime payments received by Petitioner while in an excluded position after receiving an anonymous complaint on October 28, 1991. In a March 10, 1993 letter, Banking and Finance asserted that the overtime payments Petitioner received while in an excluded position constituted a monetary debt to the State of Florida which Petitioner must repay in money. Petitioner spent the $897.01 to pay bills associated with the vacation he had taken prior to his promotion. Petitioner would have been able to repay the overpayment in cash had the error been discovered after the first or second erroneous monthly overtime payments, but he was not able to repay that large an amount in cash after the third request was submitted. Petitioner's request for authorization for overtime pay after his promotion was not submitted fraudulently or mendaciously, but was submitted because neither Petitioner nor anyone in his agency ("State") understood that he was not legally entitled to overtime pay. After determining that Petitioner had received overpayments, "State" took steps to recoup the overpayments. "State" sought to work with Petitioner to alleviate this problem for which its personnel felt partially responsible. In fact, "State" permitted him to utilize one of its agency attorneys for purposes of the instant formal proceeding. Petitioner and "State", without consulting Banking and Finance, entered into a negotiated agreement by which Petitioner would remit the $897.01 in overpayments in the form of 78 annual leave hours, and on December 31, 1991, 78 hours were deducted from Petitioner's accrued annual leave balance. In calculating the repayment of the deducted 78 annual leave hours from Petitioner's annual leave balance, "State" multiplied his rate of pay at that time, with the number of annual leave hours necessary to equal the amount of the overpayments, equaling $897.01. Neither Petitioner nor any agency received a cash payment from the deduction of the 78 annual leave hours. "State" merely deducted the hours from Petitioner's annual leave balance. "State" represented to Petitioner that the deduction of an amount of annual leave hours equivalent to the overpayments would satisfy his debt to the State of Florida. However, "State" neither requested nor received written permission from the Department of Banking and Finance to enter into an agreement by which "State" could accept a non-monetary "repayment" from Petitioner. Charlene Wilson, Personnel Services Specialist, Benefits Division of Administrative Services, Department of State, testified that accrued paid leave is a dollar-for-dollar payment since each hour of annual leave represents an hour of active employment and, therefore, are equal. William J. Schmitt, Chief, Bureau of Payrolls, Department of Banking and Finance, testified that an employee is paid for annual leave when authorized by an agency. However, these isolated pieces of evidence are not controlling. Further testimony was provided as to the historical application of the rules of the Department of Banking and Finance and the Department of Management Services. Robert W. Henley, Labor Specialist for Management Services, and William J. Schmitt each testified to the historical application and interpretation of their respective agency rules. Each testified that, as their agencies had interpreted and applied their own rules to date, employees who are continually employed by the State of Florida may not use annual leave to repay a debt in the manner Petitioner and the Department of State chose. Prior to the December 31, 1991 deduction of the annual leave hours, Petitioner had "banked" 109.097 annual leave hours. After the deduction of 78 hours to satisfy his agreement with "State," he had only 31.097 hours remaining. It took Petitioner 12 months to build his annual leave balance back to where it was prior to the December 31, 1991 deduction. During the 1991 year, but prior to the deduction of the 78 annual leave hours, Petitioner had taken a vacation to Innsbruck, Austria utilizing his annual leave accrued to that point in time and being paid his regular salary while he was on vacation. Petitioner did not take a vacation in 1992, the year following the deduction of the 78 annual leave hours, because of the lack of sufficient accrued annual leave hours left in his balance to take the length of vacation he wanted to take. In 1992 there were still low air-fare prices for trips abroad. In 1991, Petitioner utilized 80 annual leave hours while receiving regular pay. In 1992, Petitioner utilized 18.25 annual leave hours while receiving regular pay.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Banking and Finance enter a final order providing as follows: That Petitioner is indebted for salary overpayments to the Department of Banking and Finance for the amount of $897.01; That Petitioner shall repay the aforesaid amount within one year from date of this order in payment amounts of not less than $100.00 each or the total remaining balance of the debt in any single payment and that failure of Petitioner to repay the full amount in the year provided shall result in the Department of Banking and Finance debiting his salary for the unpaid balance at the end of the year's grace period, and That once full payment is completed, the Department of Banking and Finance shall coordinate, to the degree possible, with all other agencies the restoration of 78 hours annual leave to Petitioner's annual leave account balance and the crediting of Petitioner with the appropriate compensatory leave hours earned after his promotional date. RECOMMENDED this 28th day of February, 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of February, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER 93-1886 The following constitute specific rulings, pursuant to S120.59(2), F.S., upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF). Petitioner's PFOF: 1-5 Accepted in substance, but not adopted verbatim. 7-11 Accepted in substance, but not adopted verbatim. 6,12 Rejected as stated due to the legal words of art employed. See FOF 2 and 11 which more accurately conform to the record as a whole. 13-32 Not adopted verbatim. Accepted in substance except for unnecessary, subordinate or cumulative material. It is noted that PFOF 21 and 22 seem to be contradictory but were in fact stipulated as fact by the parties. Although a date of March 31 makes better sense, the hearing officer assumes that the parties' use of the May 31 date accounts for pre-earned payments of overtime delayed into a following pay period. This is not a dispositive issue and the parties' stipulation has been honored in FOF 13. 33-34 Rejected because these proposals are misleading as stated and are not dispositive. Covered in FOF 25-26. 35-36 Not adopted verbatim. Accepted in substance except for unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative material. Rejected as stated because it contains words of art and represents a proposed conclusion of law. See Conclusions of Law. Covered only as necessary in FOF 21-23. Otherwise rejected as a proposed conclusion of law or as cumulative to the facts as found. 39-40 Rejected as conclusions of law or legal argument and as unnecessary and non-dispositive. See FOF 21-23 and Conclusions of Law. 41-49 The interspersed conclusions of law, including but not limited to the "payment" of leave hours, are rejected as such. The interspersed and footnoted legal arguments also are rejected. See FOF 28-30 Conclusions of Law. Otherwise, the proposals are accepted in substance but not adopted verbatim to avoid subordinate, cumulative and verbose material. 50 Accepted. Respondent's PFOF: 1-2 Accepted, but some unnecessary, subordinate and cumulative material has been excised. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas D. Sunshine, Esquire Department of State The Capitol, LL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 Scott C. Wright, Esquire Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350 Honorable Gerald Lewis, Comptroller Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350 William G. Reeves Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol, Room 1302 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350
Findings Of Fact By Administrative Complaint issued August 13, 1990, Petitioner charged Respondent with violation of Chapter 400, Part II, Florida Statutes and provisions of Rule Chapter 10A-5, Florida Administrative Code, due to Respondent's failure to correct five Class III deficiencies cited during a survey of Respondent's premises by Petitioner's representative on March 6, 1990. Respondent holds license number 0005512, issued by Petitioner or its predecessor, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. Respondent's representative requested an administrative hearing on August 28, 1990. By joint stipulation between Respondent's representative and Petitioner's counsel, bearing a date stamp of February 13, 1991, the parties resolved their differences. As a result, the pending administrative proceeding before Hearing Officer Robert Benton, a duly designated representative of the Division of Administrative Hearings, was concluded. Under provisions of the stipulation between the parties, Respondent agreed to pay a fine of $937.50 through monthly payments to Petitioner of $156.25 for a period of six months beginning March 1, 1991. In the event of non-payment, Respondent agreed that it would be in default of a final order requiring payment of the entire fine amount. A final order incorporating the parties' stipulation was entered by Petitioner on March 16, 1991, directing the parties' compliance with the stipulation and its requirements that Respondent make the required monthly payments to prevent a default declaration. Respondent never made any payments, monthly or otherwise. On April 1, 1991, Respondent applied for a renewal of it's license to operate an adult congregate living facility. Thereafter the requested license renewal for the period of July 2, 1991 through July 1, 1993, was erroneously granted by Petitioner's representatives, contrary to the prohibition against such a renewal contained in Section 400.417(1), Florida States, and without regard to Respondent's noncompliance with Petitioner's final order of March 16, 1991. Respondent was informed by certified mail letter dated July 2, 1991, from Petitioner's counsel that no payment had been made pursuant to the parties's stipulation or the March 16, 1991, final order of Petitioner directing the parties' compliance with the terms of the stipulation. Respondent was requested to respond within 30 days. Respondent's representative received the letter on July 8, 1991. Petitioner's counsel, by certified mail, again notified Respondent on August 19, 1991, that no payment had been received and requested a response within seven days. Respondent's representative received the letter on August 21, 1991. On May 6, 1992, Petitioner issued the Administrative Complaint which forms the basis of this proceeding and declares that Petitioner is in default of the requirements of the parties' stipulation and subsequent final order. As requested relief, Petitioner seeks the revocation of Respondent's license in lieu of payment of the stipulated fine. Respondent's representative received the Administrative Complaint on May 8, 1992. At the final hearing, Respondent's representative and corporate officer, candidly admitted that it was his signature, on behalf of Respondent, on the original stipulation between the parties. He further stated that he never intended to pay anything toward retirement of the stipulated fine amount and that his execution of the stipulation was purely for the purpose of delay. He was motivated to seek delay in this manner because his wife was eight months pregnant and his brother was a political candidate for city commissioner at the time.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered requiring Respondent to satisfy the March 16, 1991 final order by payment of the $937.50 fine by a date certain or suffer the immediate revocation of license number 0005512 without further proceedings. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of February, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 1993. APPENDIX The following constitutes my ruling pursuant to Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1.-11. Accepted. Respondent's Proposed Findings None submitted. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael O. Mathis, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration General Counsel's Office 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 103 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Mark K. Glaeser, Pro Se Collins Court 2924 SW 39th Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32608 Sam Power Agency Clerk Agency For Health Care Administration The Atrium, Ste. 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303 Harold D. Lewis, Esquire General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner is owed the sum of $4,787.00 representing 14 shipments of cucumbers supplied to the Respondent for which the Petitioner has allegedly not been paid. Consequently, it must be determined whether the Petitioner is entitled to recompense from the bond posted by the Respondent, through its surety, in accordance with the provisions of Sections 604.15-604.34, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Long & Scott Farms, Inc., is a grower of cucumbers for the commercial market. The Respondent, Mo-Bo Enterprises, Inc., is a buyer and broker of such agricultural produce. During the fall 1994 harvesting and shipping season for cucumbers, a problem arose in the business relationship between the Petitioner and the Respondent, which had not previously occurred. On October 21, 1994, the Petitioner sold and shipped to the Respondent, or to its consignee, a shipment of 84 crates of dill-pickle-sized cucumbers, at a price of $15.00 per crate. Thus, the invoice billing for that shipment was $1,260.00. The payment for that shipment was delayed for a long period of time; but finally, on February 15, 1994, a partial payment of $1,071.00 was made for that shipment and invoice. The Respondent's representatives assured the Petitioner that the remainder of that bill would be paid promptly, but no payment has ever been made. Between the dates of October 21, 1994 and November 8, 1994, some 13 other shipments of cucumbers were made on the order and purchase of the Respondent, sold and shipped by the Petitioner, for which the Respondent has never paid any amount to the Petitioner. The 14 shipments resulted in a balance due to the Petitioner from the Respondent of $4,787.00. That amount includes the deficiency in payment for the shipment of October 21, 1994, for which the above-referenced partial payment was made. The Petitioner and the Respondent had a business arrangement, whereby the Respondent would notify the Petitioner of any problem with any shipment, such as deficient quality, rot, or other deterioration, shortage in amount shipped, and the like. This arrangement, whereby notification of any problem with a shipment should be provided to the Petitioner within eight hours of the shipment's arrival, was printed on each invoice form, which forms were submitted to the Respondent upon the dispatch of each shipment. The Respondent never informed the Petitioner of any problems with any of the shipments involved in this proceeding. The shipments were all duly and timely made to the Respondent and received by it or its consignees. Moreover, in their prior discussions and negotiations concerning the relevant unpaid bill, the Respondent has never denied owing that amount. It simply has not paid the amount due, although it or its representatives have offered to negotiate some sort of payment arrangement. The unrefuted evidence thus shows that the Respondent and its surety company, Armor Insurance Company, are indebted to the Petitioner in the amount of $4,787.00 and that payment for that amount has not been made.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department ordering the Respondent to pay the above-referenced sum of $4,787.00 to the Petitioner and in the event of failure of the Respondent to remit such payment, that the Respondent, Armor Insurance Company, pay over to the Department the amount herein found to be due and owing from the bond posted by that surety company for the Respondent dealer, which sum should then be remitted over to the Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of October, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Frank D. Scott Post Office Box 1228 Zellwood, FL 32798 Charles D. Barnard, Esq. 200 S.E. 6th St., Ste. 205 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 Mark J. Albrechta, Esq. Armor Insurance Company Box 15250 Tampa, FL 33684-5250 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, Esq. General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810
The Issue The issue to be decided in this proceeding is whether the Reimbursement Dispute Dismissal issued by Respondent, Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation (the “Department”), should be reversed due to equitable tolling or some other recognized excuse for untimely submission of the reimbursement dispute.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a business operating in Daytona Beach, Florida. The nature of Petitioner’s business was not made part of the record. In approximately June 2017, Petitioner submitted a claim to the Department, claiming payment for certain (undisclosed) services or expenditures. The Department issued an Explanation of Bill Review (“EOBR”) in response to Petitioner’s claim. The EOBR set forth the amount of reimbursement the Department would allow for Petitioner’s claim. The EOBR was received by Petitioner on July 10, 2017. Upon receipt of the EOBR, Petitioner had 45 days, i.e., until August 24, 2017, to challenge the Department’s determination of the reimbursement amount. Not satisfied that the amount allowed by the Department was correct, Petitioner challenged the determination by submitting a Petition for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute (the “Petition”) on DFS Form 3160-0023. The Petition was signed on August 8, 2017. However, Petitioner did not immediately submit the Petition on that date, despite being aware of the 45-day time limit for submitting such forms for relief. Petitioner did not mail the Petition until August 25, 2017, one day after the deadline for doing so. The Certified Mail Receipt for Petitioner’s mailing is clear and unambiguous, clearly showing the date. Petitioner did not present any evidence as to factors which might excuse the late filing of its Petition. The only reasons cited were that Petitioner was awaiting information from two claims management services, Sedgwick and Foresight, before submitting its Petition. Petitioner, through its witness at final hearing, admitted its error in failing to timely file the Petition.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation, enter a Final Order upholding its Reimbursement Dispute Dismissal. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of January, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of January, 2018. COPIES FURNISHED: Taylor Anderson, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Barbara T. Hernandez East Coast Surgery Center 1871 LPGA Boulevard Daytona Beach, Florida 32117 (eServed) Thomas Nemecek, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Workers' Compensation 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Julie Jones, CP, FRP, Agency Clerk Division of Legal Services Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390 (eServed)
The Issue The issue is whether The Department of Financial Services properly imposed a Stop Work Order and Amended Order of Penalty Assessment pursuant to the requirements of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Division is charged with the regulation of workers' compensation insurance in the State of Florida. Respondent AFS, LLC. (AFS), is a corporation located in Jacksonville, Florida, and is involved in the construction industry, primarily framing houses. Braman Avery is the owner and manager of AFS. Lee Arsenault is a general contractor whose business is located in Jacksonville, Florida. Mr. Arsenault contracted with AFS to perform framing services at a construction site located at 1944 Copperstone Drive in Orange Park, Florida. At all times material to this proceeding, AFS maintained workers' compensation coverage for its employees through a licensed employee leasing company. AFS contracted with Greenleads Carpentry, Inc. (Greenleads) to perform work at the job site in question. Prior to subcontracting with Greenleads, Mr. Avery requested from Greenleads, among other things, a certificate of insurance showing that Greenleads had general liability coverage and workers' compensation insurance. Greenleads provided a certificate of insurance to Mr. Avery showing that Greenleads had workers' compensation coverage. The certificate of insurance contains a policy number, dollar limits, and effective and expiration dates of June 1, 2004 through June 1, 2005. Debra Cochran is office manager of Labor Finders, an employee leasing company. According to Ms. Cochran, Labor Finders' corporate office issued the certificate of insurance to Greenleads. At the time of issuance, the certificate of insurance was valid. Greenleads did not follow through on its obligations to Labor Finders in that Green Leads did not "run its workers through" Labor Finders. Consequently, Greenleads' workers were not covered by workers' compensation as indicated on the certificate of insurance. Labor Finders did not issue any document showing cancellation or voiding of the certificate of insurance previously issued. Mr. Avery relied upon the face of the certificate of insurance believing AFS to be in total compliance with statutory requirements regarding workers' compensation for subcontractors. That is, he believed that the Greenleads' workers were covered for workers' compensation as indicated on the face of the certificate of insurance. Mr. Avery was not informed by Labor Finders or Greenleads that Greenleads did not, after all, have workers' compensation coverage in place on the workers performing work under the contract between AFS and Greenleads on the worksite in question. Bobby Walton is president of Insure America and has been in the insurance business for 35 years. His company provides general liability insurance to AFS. According to Mr. Walton, Mr. Avery's reliance on Greenleads' presentation to him of a purportedly valid certificate of insurance is the industry standard. Further, Mr. Walton is of the opinion that there was no obligation on behalf of Mr. Avery to confirm coverage beyond receipt of the certificate of insurance provided by the subcontractor. That is, there is no duty on behalf of the contractor to confirm coverage beyond receipt of the certificate of insurance. Allen DiMaria is an investigator employed by the Division. His duties include investigating businesses to ensure that the employers in the state are in compliance with the requirements of the workers' compensation law and related rules. On January 5, 2005, Mr. DiMaria visited the job site in question and observed 13 workers engaged in construction activities. This visit was a random site check. Mr. DiMaria interviewed the owner of Greenleads and checked the Division's database. Mr. DiMaria determined that Greenleads did not have workers' compensation coverage. After conferring with his supervisor, Mr. DiMaria issued a stop-work order to Greenleads, along with a request for business records for the purpose of calculating a penalty for Greenleads. In response to the business records request, Greenleads submitted its check ledger along with an employee cash payment ledger, both of which were utilized in calculating a penalty for Greenleads. On January 11, 2005, Mr. DiMaria issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment to Greenleads for $45,623.34. Attached to the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued to Greenleads is a penalty worksheet with a list of names under the heading, "Employee Name", listing the names of the employees and amounts paid to each employee. During the investigation of Greenleads, Mr. DiMaria determined that Greenleads was performing subcontracting work for Respondent. This led to the Division's investigation of AFS. Mr. DiMaria spoke to Mr. Avery and determined that AFS paid remuneration to Greenleads for work performed at the worksite. He checked the Division's data base system and found no workers' compensation coverage for AFS. He determined that AFS had secured workers' compensation coverage through Southeast Personnel Services, Inc. (SPLI), also a licensed employee leasing company. However, the policy with SPLI did not cover the employees of Greenleads performing work at the job site. Mr. DiMaria requested business records from Mr. Avery. Mr. Avery fully complied with this request. He examined AFS' check registry and certificates of insurance from AFS. Other than the situation involving Greenleads on this worksite, Mr. DiMaria found AFS to be in complete compliance. On January 10, 2005, after consulting with his supervisor, Robert Lambert, Mr. DiMaria issued a Stop Work Order to AFS. A Stop Work Order issued by the Division requires the recipient to cease operations on a job site because the recipient is believed to be not in compliance with the workers' compensation law. The Stop Work Order issued by Mr. DiMaria was site specific to the work site in question. Based upon the records provided by Mr. Avery, Mr. DiMaria calculated a fine. Penalties are calculated by determining the premium amount the employer would have paid based on his or her Florida payroll and multiplying by a factor of 1.5. Mr. DiMaria's calculation of the fine imposed on AFS was based solely on the Greenleads' employees not having workers' compensation coverage. On February 16, 2005, Mr. DiMaria issued an Amended Order of Penalty in the amount of $45,643.87, the identical amount imposed upon Greenleads. A penalty worksheet was attached to the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment. The penalty worksheet is identical to the penalty worksheet attached to Greenleads' penalty assessment, with the exception of the business name at the top of the worksheet and the Division's case number. Greenleads partially paid the penalty by entering into a penalty payment agreement with the Division. Greenleads then received an Order of Conditional Release. Similarly, AFS entered into a penalty payment agreement with the Division and received an Order of Conditional Release on February 16, 2005. Moreover, AFS terminated its contract with Greenleads. Lee Arsenault is the general contractor involved in the work site in question. AFS was the sole framing contractor on this project, which Mr. Arsenault described as a "pretty significant project." He has hired AFS to perform framing services over the years. However, because the Stop Work Order was issued to AFS, Mr. Arsenault had to hire another company to complete the framing work on the project. Mr. Avery estimates economic losses to AFS as a result of losing this job to be approximately $150,000, in addition to the fine. Mr. Arsenault, Ms. Cochran, as well as the Division's investigator, Mr. DiMaria, all agree with Mr. Walton's opinion, that it is customary practice in the construction industry for a contractor who is subcontracting work to rely on the face of an insurance certificate provided by a subcontractor. Robert Lambert is a workers' compensation district supervisor for the Division. When asked under what authority the Division may impose a penalty on both Greenleads and AFS for the same infraction, he replied that it was based on the Division's policy and its interpretation of Sections 440.02, 440.10, and 440.107, Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Division of Workers' Compensation rescind the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued February 16, 2005, and the Stop Work Order issued to Petitioner on January 10, 2005. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of August, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of August, 2005. Endnote 1/ While this Recommended Order does not rely upon the case cited by Respondent in its Notice of Supplemental Authority, Respondent was entitled to file it. COPIES FURNISHED: Colin M. Roopnarine, Esquire Douglas D. Dolin, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Workers' Compensation East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Mark K. Eckels, ESquire Boyd & Jenerette, P.A. North Hogan Street, Suite 400 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Carlos G. Muniz, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent failed to provide workers' compensation insurance coverage for employees and, if so, what penalty should be assessed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation ("Division") is the state agency responsible for enforcing the requirement within the state that employers cover employees with workers' compensation insurance. § 440.107, Fla. Stat. (2009). Respondent, Jurgenson Trading Corporation, is owned, in part, by Julio Raudsett, and operates a "Subway" sandwich restaurant franchise in Hialeah, Florida. It is a family-owned business with a total of five employees, three of whom are related. Cesar Tolentino, an investigator for the Division, conducted a field interview of Raudsett, who admitted that he did not carry workers' compensation insurance. Tolentino checked the database in the Coverage and Compliance Automated System ("CCAS"), and there were no records showing workers' compensation coverage for the Subway employees, nor any notices of applicable exemptions. Martha Aguilar, Tolentino's supervisor authorized the issuance of a Stop-Work Order that was personally served on Raudsett by Tolentino by hand-delivery on April 17, 2009. At the same time, Tolentino served a Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculation. Raudsett provided his business records, including payroll journals and unemployment tax returns. Based on Aguilar's review of the business records, the Division issued its Amended Order of Penalty Assessment ("Order") on June 8, 2009, with an assessed penalty of $19,873.79. Aguilar determined the amount of the penalty, using the following steps: (1) assigning each employee the National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI) class code that was applicable for restaurant workers; (2) determining how much the employee had been paid from April 2006 to April 2009 (the period of non-coverage); and (3) assigning the rate to the gross pay to calculate the insurance premium that should have been paid, then multiplying that by 1.5, as required by rule. The NCCI class codes for employees administrative staff as compared to restaurant workers are lower and, therefore, their workers' compensation insurance premiums would be lower. The business records available to Aguilar did not distinguish among employee's responsibilities. Absent that information, the penalty is, by law, calculated using the highest NCCI class code associated with that kind of business, and was correctly done in this case. Raudsett has entered into a payment plan with the Division. He objected only to that portion of the penalty that was based on his earnings, and those of his wife, Maribel Medina, who works part-time, and his father-in-law, Rolando Medina. He claims an exemption for the three of them as owners and managers of the corporation. Excluding their salaries and associated penalties, according to Joseph Cabanas, Respondent's accountant, would reduce the penalty by $10,267.67, to $9,606.12. Cabanas testified that Raudsett, an immigrant from Venezuela, was not aware of workers' compensation laws, and that was why the three owners/officers of the Respondent's corporation failed to file a Notice of Elections to be Exempt from coverage until after the Division's investigation began.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Petitioner, Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, that upholds the assessment of a penalty of $19,873.79. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of December, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Julie Jones, CP, FRP, Agency Clerk Department of Financial Services Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390 Benjamin Diamond, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307 Douglas D. Dolan, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Joseph Cabanas 10520 Northwest 26 Street, Suite C-201 Doral, Florida 33172
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint (as amended at the final hearing)? If so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is a Florida-licensed real estate salesperson. He holds license number 0186760. Respondent passed the salesperson examination on November 6, 1995. From November 13, 1995, through February 26, 1997, Respondent was an active salesperson in association with Nicholas Chillemi, an individual broker trading as ReMax 100 (ReMax) and located at 10205 Southern Boulevard in Royal Palm Beach, Florida. From February 27, 1997, through June 24, 1998, Respondent was an active salesperson in association with Bowen Realty, Inc., a broker corporation trading as Bowen Realty and located in Jupiter, Florida. From June 25, 1998, through September 30, 1999, Respondent was an active salesperson in association with Forum Realty, Inc., a broker corporation trading as Realty Executives of the Palm Beaches and located in Lake Worth, Florida. On October 1, 1999, Respondent's salesperson license became involuntary inactive (which is its current status) due to non-renewal. At no time material to the instant case did Respondent hold a real estate broker license At all times material to the instant case, Javier and Maria Velilla owned residential property located at 1290 McDermott Lane in Royal Palm Beach, Florida (McDermott Lane Property). Respondent and Ms. Velilla have known each other for 16 or 17 years. They first met in Chicago, Illinois. Some time prior to September 1, 1996, not very long after he had moved from Chicago to Florida and had begun working as a real estate salesperson for Mr. Chillemi, Respondent returned to Chicago and visited Ms. Velilla. During his visit, Respondent agreed, as a representative of ReMax, 2/ to help the Velillas find a tenant for the McDermott Lane Property. Through the efforts of Respondent, a tenant was ultimately found for the property. The tenant was Belinda Vosatka. On or about August 28, 1996, the Velillas (as lessors) and Ms. Vosatka (as lessee) entered into a Residential Lease for Single Family Home and Duplex (McDermott Lane Property Lease). The McDermott Lane Property Lease covered the one-year period from September 1, 1996, to August 31, 1997, and required Ms. Vosatka to make a security deposit of $850.00 and lease payments of $850.00 a month. Paragraph VI of the McDermott Lane Property Lease provided as follows: NOTICES. Henry Saldana is Landlord's Agent. All notices to Landlord and all Lease Payments must be sent to Landlord's Agent at 10205 Southern BLVD, R.P.B., Fl 33411 unless Landlord gives Tenant written notice of a change. Landlord's Agent may perform inspections on behalf of Landlord. All notices to Landlord shall be given by certified mail, return receipt requested, or by hand delivery to Landlord or Landlord's Agent. Any notice to Tenant shall be given by certified mail, return receipt requested, or delivered to Tenant at the Premises. If Tenant is absent from the Premises, a notice to Tenant may be given by leaving a copy of the notice at the Premises. The Velillas agreed to pay Respondent $50.00 a month for acting as their "agent" under the McDermott Lane Property Lease ("Agent" Fee Arrangement). Respondent entered into this agreement with the Velillas in his individual capacity, not as a ReMax salesperson on behalf of Mr. Chillemi. (As Respondent was aware at the time he entered into the "Agent" Fee Arrangement, collecting lease payments from tenants and providing related property management functions were not among the services that ReMax provided its clients.) Respondent made Mr. Chillemi aware of the McDermott Lane Property Lease, but at no time did he inform Mr. Chillemi about the "Agent" Fee Arrangement, much less share with Mr. Chillemi the $50.00 payments he received from the Velillas for acting as their "agent." On September 1, 1996, Respondent received from Mr. Chillemi a $425.00 commission for his role in the leasing of the McDermott Lane Property. For approximately the first half of the lease period, the Velillas received from Respondent, within five days of the beginning of each month, money orders in the amount of the monthly lease payments Ms. Vosatka was required to make under the McDermott Lane Property Lease, and the Velillas, in turn, paid Respondent (by check payable to Respondent) $50.00 a month in accordance with the "Agent" Fee Arrangement." Thereafter, however, to the dissatisfaction of the Velillas, the money orders began arriving later in the month. Upon looking into the matter, Ms. Velilla discovered that, pursuant to Respondent's instructions (which he had given without the Velillas' express authorization), Ms. Vosatka had been making her monthly lease payments by sending Respondent personal checks payable to Respondent. Displeased with this arrangement, Ms. Velilla had Respondent draft the following Amendment to Lease, which she and her husband (as lessors) and Ms Vosatka (as lessee) signed: It is mutually agreed and understood by the parties [who] entered into a leasing agreement on August 26, 1996 for the property located at 1290 McDermott Ln. Royal Palm Beach, Fl 33411 and herein referred to as, Javier & Maria Victoria Velilla, as the Landlord, and Belinda Vosatka, as the Tenant, that the rent for the above named property shall be due and payable by way of Cashier's Check or Money Order and to the name of the above mentioned Landlord on the same dates as agreed on the original lease. In consideration to the rent being paid by Cashier's Check or Money Order, the Landlord agrees to allow Four D[o]ll[a]rs ($4.00) allowance to the Tenant for expenses incurred for issuance of the payment. Therefore, the actual rent due by the Tenant shall be in the amount of $846 per month. The rest of the terms of the lease stand as originally agreed. Ms. Vosatka paid her rent for two or three months following the execution of this Amendment to Lease with cashier's checks payable to the Velillas. She then stopped making payments. When Ms. Velilla contacted Respondent and inquired about the situation, Respondent told her that Ms. Vosatka had health problems and was not able to work. After not receiving any lease payments for approximately three months, the Velillas, at the urging of a friend, traveled to Florida to inspect the McDermott Lane Property. Upon arriving at the property, they found that Ms. Vosatka had vacated the premises, leaving it in deplorable condition.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint (as amended at the final hearing) in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of October, 2000.
