The Issue The issues in this bid protest proceeding are whether the bid of Professional Leasing & Development Corporation on state project, job number 48020-3543, was properly rejected for failure to prequalify to bid on the project; and whether the Department properly rejected the bid failure to: meet disadvantaged business enterprise ("DBE") requirements in soliciting minority subcontractors to work on the project, or make a good faith effort to meet the DBE goals set for this project?
Findings Of Fact Professional Leasing & Development Corporation ("Professional") filed a bid on state project, job number 4802 0-3543, which was opened on January 22, 1986 for work on an intersection in Escambia County. The only other bidder was Edward M. Chadbourne, Inc., which the Department declared the lowest responsible bidder, and which declined to participate in these proceedings after notice. The parties stipulated at the hearing that the bids submitted by both bidders were in due form and were submitted in a timely fashion. The parties also stipulated that the Department posted its bid tabulation on March 3, 1986, designating Chadbourne as the lowest responsible bidder, and a timely protest was filed by Professional following that posting. This job is the first Department of Transportation job on which Professional has submitted a bid. It had not prequalified to bid on the job. Warnings appear on pages one and seven of the bid blank that if the bid amount is greater than $150,000, the contractor must be prequalified. The bid blank clearly states in large print on page 7 that if the contractor is not prequalified and the bid is in excess of $150,000, the bid will be rejected. The bid package submitted by Professional was for a total contract amount of $149,973.68. This amount contained errors in the prices for certain items in the bid. These resulted from Professional's errors in the extension of the unit price for items 300 1 3, tack coat; 5331 2, type s asphaltic concrete; and 5337 1 5, asphaltic concrete friction course. The errors are small, aggregating $76.32. The total amount of the bid, as corrected by the unit prices given by Professional in its bid blank, is $150,050. The bid was rejected by the Department for failure to prequalify. When preparing its bid, Professional made efforts to meet the DBE goal set by the Department of Transportation of 8 percent of the contract amount. It sought bids from two minority businesses for striping, and for guardrail and paved ditches,the second of which was a bid from a women's business enterprise which is not considered in meeting the DBE goal. Additional efforts might have been made to obtain DBE subcontract bids by the other principal in the corporation, William Stubstad, but the testimony at the final hearing did not indicate what those efforts may have been. Neither are they reflected in the bid documents. On the DBE/WBE utilization form number 1 submitted with the bid, Professional listed eight potential subcontractors; the striping subcontractor had been certified by the Department of Transportation as a DBE. Written by hand at the bottom of the form was the statement "no other local DBEs in area." Professional's bid reflected only a 3.2 percent utilization of DBE subcontractors, while the goal set by the Department was 8 percent of the contract amount. Based on this submittal, the Department found inadequate documentation of a good faith effort to meet the DBE goal and rejected the bid. Many other subcontractors are certified as DBEs by the Department for work such as signs, guardrails, landscaping and paved ditches. Professional's bid documents give no evidence that these other firms had been solicited to submit bids.
Recommendation It is recommended that the protest of Professional Leasing and Development Corporation be rejected, and the contract be awarded to Edward M. Chadbourne, Inc. DONE AND ORDERED this 2nd day of April 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of April, 1986. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 86-0788BID The following constitute my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1985) on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner: No proposed findings of fact were submitted. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent: Covered in Findings of Fact 1 and 5. First sentence is covered in Findings of Fact 3 and 5; the remainder of the proposed finding is covered in Conclusion of Law 1. Generally covered in Finding of Fact 4. The portion of the proposal dealing with Standard Specifi- cation 2-1, 1986 Edition, is rejected because that section was not placed in evidence at the hearing, nor was leave requested to file that specification after the hearing. Covered in Finding of Fact 5. Covered generally in Conclusions of Law 2 and 3. Covered in Conclusion of Law 6. Rejected on the grounds that Section 2-5.3.2 of the Supplemental Special Provision of the Bid Specifications was not proven at the final hearing, nor was leave requested to file them as an exhibit after the hearing. Covered in Finding of Fact 7. Covered in Finding of Fact 7. The portion of proposal 10 found on page 4 is covered in Finding of Fact 7; the remainder is rejected as cumulative. Covered in Finding of Fact 7. Rejected because there is no evidence in the record concerning the consistency with which the Department requires full compliance with DBE goals, and because no issue was raised in this proceeding by Professional with respect to inconsistency in Department policy, making the finding irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas E. Drawdy Secretary Department of Transportation Hayden Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 A. J. Spalla, Esquire General Counsel Department of Transportation Hayden Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Transportation Hayden Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harold Pridgen President Professional Leasing & Development Corp. 25 East Nine Mile Road Pensacola, Florida 32514 Edward M. Chadbourne, Inc. 4375 McCoy Drive Pensacola, Florida 32503
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether the Department of Environmental Protection's decision to reject all bids submitted for the project entitled BDRS 52-01/02 was illegal, arbitrary, dishonest, or fraudulent.
Findings Of Fact Parties Petitioner, All America Homes of Gainesville, Inc. (All America), is a corporation doing business in the State of Florida. All America submitted a timely written bid in response to the Department's ITB and filed timely protests to the Department's actions. The Respondent, the Department of Environmental Protection, is an agency of the State of Florida which manages and operates state parks under its jurisdiction, and solicits construction projects in state parks, pursuant to Chapter 258, Part I, Florida Statutes, through its Division of Recreation and Parks, Bureau of Design and Recreation Services. The ITB In November, 2001, the Department issued an ITB on a construction project entitled Hillsborough River State Park Concession Building, project number BDRS 52-01/02. The ITB included the Bid Specifications for the project. Bids were required to be submitted no later than 3:30 p.m. on Tuesday, December 18, 2001, at the Bureau's Tallahassee, Florida, office. The written Specifications define several terms, including, but not limited, to the following: ADDENDUM: A written explanation, interpretation, change, correction, addition, deletion, or modification, affecting the contract documents, including drawings and specifications issued by the OWNER [Department] and distributed to the prospective Bidders prior to the bid opening. ALTERNATE BID: Separate optional bid item for more or less project requirement used for tailoring project to available funding. Also may consist of alternate construction techniques. BASE BID: Formal bid exclusive of any alternate bids. BID FORM: The official form on which the OWNER requires formal bids to be prepared and submitted. ORAL STATEMENTS: Verbal instruction. NOTE: No oral statement of any person, whomever shall in any manner or degree modify or otherwise affect the provisions of the contract documents.[1] SEALED BID: The formal written offer of the Bidder for the proposed work when submitted on the prescribed bid form, properly signed and guaranteed. The Bid Specifications also contained the following relevant sections: Alternatives If the OWNER wishes to learn the relative or additional construction cost of an alternative method of construction, an alternative use of type of material or an increase or decrease in scope of the project, these items will be defined as alternates and will be specifically indicated and referenced to the drawings and specifications. Alternates will be listed in the bid form in such a manner that the Bidder shall be able to clearly indicate what sums he will add to (or deduct from) his Base Bid. The OWNER will judge for himself that such alternates are of comparable character and quality to the specified items. The Order of the alternate may be selected by the Department in any sequence so long as such acceptance out of order does not alter the designation of the low bidder. ADDENDA If the Consultant[2] finds it would be expedient to supplement, modify or interpret any portion of the bidding documents during the bidding period, such procedure will be accomplished by the issuance of written Addenda to the bidding documents which will be delivered or mailed by the OWNER'S Contracts section to all bidders who have requested bidding documents. Interpretation No interpretation of the meaning of the drawings, specifications or other bidding documents and no correction of any apparent ambiguity, inconsistency or error therein will be made to any Bidder orally. Every request for such interpretation or correction should be in writing, addressed to the Consultant. All such interpretations and supplemental instructions will be in the form of written Addenda to the bidding documents. Only the interpretation or correction so given by the Consultant in writing and approved by the OWNER shall be binding, and prospective Bidders are advised that no other source is authorized to give information concerning, or to explain or interpret, the bidding documents. B-16 Bid Modification Bid modification will be accepted from Bidders, if addressed as indicated in Advertisement for Bids and if received prior to the opening of bids. No bid modification will be accepted after the close of bidding has been announced. Modifications will only be accepted if addressed in written or printed form submitted with the bid in sealed envelopes. Telegrams, facsimiles, separate sealed envelopes, written on printed modifications on the outside of the sealed envelopes will not be accepted. All bid modifications must be signed by an authorized representative of the Bidder. Modification will be read by the OWNER at the opening of formal bids. B-21 Rejection of Bids The OWNER reserves the right to reject any and all bids when such rejection is in the interest of the State of Florida, and to reject the bid of a bidder who the OWNER determines is not in a position to perform the work. B-23 Award of Bid . . .The qualified Bidder submitting the lowest bid will be that Bidder who has submitted the lowest base bid plus any selected alternates. . . . The OWNER reserves the right to waive any minor irregularities in bids received when such waiver is in the interest of the OWNER. The Award of Bid will be issued by the OWNER only with responsible Bidders, found to meet all requirements for Award of Bid, qualified by experience and in a financial position to do the work specified. Each bidder shall, if so requested by the OWNER, present additional evidence of his experience, qualifications and ability to carry out the terms of the Agreement. (Emphasis in original, except for Section B-10.) The Bid Form is included with the Specifications and provides in part: Base Bid: Furnish labor, equipment, Lump Sum $ supervision and material to construct a new concession building of 2940 square feet located at the Hillsborough River State Park along with the alteration of the existing concession building according to plans and specifications. Alternate #1: Furnish labor, equipment, Add Amt.$__ supervision and material to renovate the existing concession building according to plans and specifications. There is a separate section for "Allowances," i.e., Section 01210, for the Hillsborough State Park. This section provides in part: SECTION 01210 – ALLOWANCES * * * 1.2 SUMMARY This Section includes administrative and procedural requirements governing allowances. Certain materials and equipment are specified in the Contract Documents and are defined by this [sic] specifications as material and labor to be provided against a pre-determined allowance. Allowances have been established in lieu of additional requirements and to defer selection of actual materials and equipment to a later date when additional information is available for evaluation. If necessary, additional requirements will be issued by Change Order. * * * 3.3 SCHEDULE OF ALLOWANCES A. Allowance #1: Include in the base bid an allowance for the purchase and installation of. . . kitchen equipment. . . . The total dollar amount of the allowance to be included shall be $12,000.00. There is also a separate section for "Alternates," i.e., section 01230, for Hillsborough River State Park, which provides in part: SECTION 01230 – ALTERNATES * * * 1.3 DEFINITIONS Alternate: An amount proposed by bidders and stated on the Bid Form for certain work defined in the Bidding Requirements that may be added to or deducted from the Base Bid amount if OWNER decides to accept a corresponding change either in the amount of construction to be completed or in the products, materials, equipment, systems, or installation methods described in the Contract Documents. The cost or credit for each alternate is the net addition to or deduction from the Contract Sum to incorporate alternate into the Work. No other adjustments are made to the Contract Sum. . . . . 3.1 SCHEDULE OF ALTERNATES A. Alternate No. 1: Renovate the existing concession building in its entirety as shown in the drawings and specified herein. (emphasis added.) At this stage of the bidding documents, the contractor/bidder is requested to provide a Base Bid/Lump Sum on the Bid Form to "[f]urnish labor, equipment,. . .to construct a new concession building," and to provide an additional and separate amount for Alternate No. 1 to "[f]urnish labor, equipment, . . . to renovate the existing concession building." On December 13, 2001, the Bureau issued "Addendum No. One (1)" (written by the architect) to the ITB on the "Hillsborough River State Park – Concession Building." The Addendum contained the following relevant sections: Specification Section 01210: Allowances Add the following new paragraph 3.3.B: ”Allowance #2: Include in the base bid an allowance for the renovations of the existing concession building; renovations shall be defined by the Owner. The total dollar amount of the allowance to be included shall be $25,000." Specification Section 01230: Alternates Modify paragraph 3.1.A. as follows: "Alternate No. 1: Renovate the existing concession building as defined by the Owner, and as provided for under Section 01210, Allowances." (emphasis added.) Each contractor was required to sign the Addendum and attach it to the bid. By definition, and pertinent here, an addendum is an additional written instruction to a contractor during the bidding process. Based on the weight of the evidence, the purpose of this Addendum was to require the contractor to include a $25,000.00 Allowance (for Allowance # 2) in the Base Bid, for the work which might be performed if the Department requested the work to be performed for Alternate No. 1, i.e., for the renovation of the existing concession building.3 (The Department's architect decided it would cost approximately $25,000.00 to renovate the existing concession building, hence Allowance # 2.) In other words, the Addendum does not have a specific dollar amount to be included for Alternate No. 1. Rather, the $25,000.00 is an Allowance for the work described as Alternate No. 1, but the amount is to be included in the Base Bid and not as a separate line item, dollar amount. But, importantly, the Addendum did not delete the potential work to be performed as described in Alternate No. 1, although Mr. Bowman and others believed that the Addendum deleted Alternate No. 1. It deleted the necessity to place a specific dollar amount on the Bid Form for Alternate No. 1. (Mr. Bowman is a registered Professional Engineer and a licensed contractor. He has worked for the Department for 15 years and has served as Bureau Chief for two years. He supervises the contract section and the design section, which was responsible for preparing the technical plans and specifications and bidding out the job.) Mr. Bowman offered the following explanation why he believed the Addendum was confusing: Okay. I think the confusion that was created, you know, I think the addendum in itself, you know, said add $25,000 to the base bid, but then on the bid form, it still had the space down there for alternate number one, which alternate number one, which alternate number one had become $25,000 that was to be allowed for the concession building, and I think that's where the confusion came in because I think they were still confused, that they weren't really sure that they should not put that 25 down there but they knew they had been told in the addendum to do it and I think that's the reason for the notes and we got to the correspondence on the bid form, was they wanted to make sure that that's what we were wanting to do. And I think that's where the confusion came in. Like I said, it's always, if you could go back and do it again, it would be much wiser just to issue a whole new bid form and then we wouldn't be here today. But, we didn't do that. Okay. So, that's why we are here. The language in this Addendum, when read with the original Bid Specifications, apparently caused confusion with some of the bidders on the project. Several bidders called Marvin Allen (an architect and project manager for the Department's Bureau of Design and Recreation Services) prior to the submission of the bids, to clarify how the $25,000.00 Allowance should be shown on the Bid Form. (Mr. Allen did not author any of the specifications, including the Addendum.) He was listed as a contact person. He did not contact any bidders. But, Mr. Allen recalled telling each bidder who asked that the Allowance of $25,000.00 should be included in the Base Bid. But, he does not recall the names or numbers of the bidders who called, "possibly" three, four or five. Mr. Allen believed the Addendum was clear. According to Mr. Allen, the bidders who called him found the Addendum confusing. The oral responses to the bidders can be construed as interpretations of the Addendum. However, pursuant to Section B- 10 of the Specifications, any such interpretations were required to "be in the form of written Addenda to the bidding documents." Also, any such questions should have been in writing. If Section B-10 were complied with, all bidders would have been potentially on the same footing, or, at the very least, would have had access to a written clarifying document. Opening of the Bids On December 18, 2001, the bids were opened by Mike Renard, Contracts Manager with the Bureau of Design and Recreation Services, and Susan Maynard, Administrative Assistant. Mr. Dwight Fitzpatrick, a representative of All America, also attended the bid opening. The Bid Form submitted by Nelco showed a Base Bid of $355,478.00 (Lump Sum $355,478.00), and also showed an amount of $25,000.00 on the Alternate # 1 line (Add Amt. $25,000.00). See Finding of Fact 6. (It was clear to Mr. Renard that the $25,000.00 should have been included on Nelco's Base Bid. But Mr. Renard believed that Nelco submitted a responsive bid because the Department only accepted the Base Bid. Mr. Bowman agreed.) Nelco was the only one of five bidders to have a dollar amount in the Alternate #1 line under "Add Amt. $ ." All America submitted the second lowest Base Bid of $362,000.00. There was also a hand-written note on the All- America Bid Form that stated: "Addenda # 1 instruction to place $25,000 allowance in both Base Bid and as alternate # 1." Another hand written note was located below the "Add Amt. $-0-" line: "amount added in Base Bid with $25,000 allowance per Marvin Allen." The Department considered All America's bid responsive. It is a fair inference that three out of five of the other Bid Forms contained language indicating that the bidders were relying on Addendum No. One by placing the $25,000.00 Allowance in the Base Bid.4 It is uncertain whether they did so in light of the instructions of Mr. Allen concerning how to complete the Bids Forms. However, given the nature of the calls to Mr. Allen, there is a reasonable inference that there was some confusion among some of the bidders. The Department determined that Nelco submitted the lowest Base Bid, but the Department's staff had a question as to whether Nelco had included the $25,000.00 in its Base Bid. After conferring with his superiors, Mr. Renard was instructed to call Nelco to make certain that its Base Bid included the Allowance amount ($25,000.00). Mr. Renard spoke with Steve Cleveland, Nelco's Project Manager, "to verify the fact that [Nelco] had the allowance in their base bid." Mr. Cleveland orally confirmed that Nelco's Base Bid included the $25,000.00 Allowance. Mr. Renard asked Mr. Cleveland to send him a letter verifying this statement. Mr. Renard viewed this inquiry as a request for clarification or verification, not an opportunity for Nelco to modify its bid. Mr. Bowman agreed. (Mr. Renard did not believe Addendum No. 1 was confusing.) In a letter dated December 20, 2001, Mr. Cleveland confirmed that Nelco’s Base Bid of $355,478.00 included the Allowance amount and that Nelco could still perform the contract if the $25,000 Allowance was removed from its Base Bid pursuant to the ITB, i.e., that Nelco would perform the contract for $355,478.00 less $25,000.00, or $330,478.00, if the Department did not accept Alternate # 1 and the Allowance. (An alternate does not have to be accepted by the Department.) According to Mr. Renard, Mr. Cleveland never mentioned modifying, changing, or altering Nelco's bid. The Department only accepted the Base Bid for each bid. Mr. Renard did not consider it unusual to call a bidder or contractor to verify information to determine whether they can or cannot perform the work at the stipulated price. He considered it common to make this inquiry. Also, it was common in Mr. Bowman's experience to call a bidder to get clarification. Mr. Renard was not aware of any statute or rule which authorizes the Department to request clarification from a bidder after the bids are opened. Mr. Renard was more familiar with the bid forms than Mr. Allen. After receiving Mr. Cleveland's letter, the Department determined that Nelco submitted the lowest Base Bid and that the $25,000.00 amount that Nelco wrote on the Bid Form Alternate # 1 line, was a minor irregularity in the bid which the Department, as the Owner, could waive pursuant to the ITB. On December 20, 2001, the Department posted the Tabulation of Bids showing the anticipated award of the contract to Nelco. At the hearing, an unsigned letter on Department letterhead was introduced, which was addressed to Nelco and stated that Nelco submitted the apparent low bid. However, Mr. Renard testified that these letters are prepared routinely, but not mailed out without his signature. Mr. Renard did not recall signing the letter or ever sending out such a letter to Nelco. On December 21, 2001, the Department received a Notice of Intent to Protest letter from Allen E. Stine, the President of All America. In his letter, Mr. Stine stated that Nelco’s bid should have been rejected for failure to follow the specified format as per Addendum No. 1, or adjusted to have the $25,000.00 amount added to their Base Bid. Bid Protests All America filed a written formal bid protest on January 4, 2001. On January 9, 2001, Cindy Otero of All America, notified Mr. Renard by letter, and stated that Mr. Stine was available for a hearing regarding the bid protest. On January 28, 2002, Mr. Renard returned All America's check for the bond, stating that it was unnecessary. Mr. Stine recounted a number of unanswered telephone calls after the first protest was filed. During one conversation, Mr. Renard recalled Mr. Stine saying to him, "You can't do this, you can't do this." After receiving the first formal protest, the Department staff consulted with legal staff and reviewed the documents and bid procedures. Based on the number of questions received concerning the Addendum and the hand-written notes on several of the bid forms, Mr. Bowman, Bureau Chief, determined that the bid documents were confusing and ambiguous. (Mr. Bowman stated that this was their first bid protest in his 15 years with the Department.) Therefore, Mr. Bowman decided that it would in the best interest of the State of Florida to reject all of the bids pursuant to the Bid Specifications. Mr. Bowman felt that the ITB should be re-written in order to make it clearer and allowing all of the bidders to re-bid the project without any confusion or ambiguity. Mr. Stine stated that his "senior estimator" told him that the bid language "could be confusing." He and his "senior estimator" had a discussion about whether the Allowance should have been placed in the Base Bid or not. At the time of submission of All America's bid, Mr. Stine was clear that the Allowance should be placed in the Base Bid, especially after calling Mr. Allen. But, his senior estimator was not so clear. In order to appease him, Mr. Stine placed the hand-written note on All America’s proposal. Mr. Stine essentially, "cleaned" up his proposal. At the hearing, Mr. Bowman testified Rule 60D-5.0071, Florida Administrative Code, see Conclusion of Law 59, does not list "confusing or ambiguous bid specifications" as one of the circumstances allowing for the rejection of all bids. However, Mr. Bowman later stated during the hearing that he believed the circumstances listed in Rule 60D-5.0071 were not the only circumstances authorizing the Department to reject all bids. Mr. Bowman testified that he believed that general confusion among the bidders caused by the ambiguous ITB constituted sufficient grounds for rejecting all bids. Mr. Bowman was advised by legal counsel that rejecting all of the bids would probably result in another bid protest by Nelco, All America, or both. Thus, the Department decided to delay addressing All American’s first protest until after posting the rejection of all bids and receiving the subsequent protests, so that all of the protests could be resolved at once in an efficient and economical manner. Notwithstanding the Department's justifications for rejecting all bids and not proceeding on All America's initial protest, the record is unclear why the Department waited several months to reject all bids. On May 13, 2002, the Department posted the rejection of all bids. On May 16, 2002, the Department received a formal written protest of the rejection of all bids filed by All America. On May 17, 2002, Jerome I. Johnson, attorney for the Department, contacted Mr. Robert A. Lash, All America's counsel at the time, concerning the resolution of All America’s formal protest. (Before the final hearing, Mr. Lash, with All America's consent, withdrew as counsel for All America.) The parties agreed to suspend formal bid protest procedures until a meeting could be held between the parties in an attempt to resolve the protests. Mr. Johnson sent a letter dated May 21, 2002, to Mr. Lash confirming this conversation. On June 26, 2002, a meeting was held among the Department staff, legal staff, and Mr. Lash and Mr. Stine, representing All America. The parties were unable to resolve the protests. At the conclusion of the meeting, the parties agreed that formal protest procedures would not be implemented until Mr. Stine could confer further with his counsel. In a letter dated July 5, 2002, Mr. Lash stated that his client wished to proceed with formal protest procedures and requested an administrative hearing on the protests. Are the Specifications and Bid Documents Ambiguous and Was There Confusion? The parties stipulated that "[t]he Addendum language was confusing," notwithstanding the testimony of several witnesses that they were not confused. The Department's determination that the bid Specifications, including the Addendum, and the Bid Form, which remained unchanged after the Addendum was issued, were confusing and ambiguous, is supported by the weight of the evidence. This is particularly true regarding the Bid Form. The Addendum required the bidder to include an Allowance of $25,000.00 in the Base Bid for work described as Alternate # 1. But the Bid Form was unchanged to reflect the Addendum changes. The Bid Form retained a line for the bidder to submit an additional amount for Alternate # 1. Further, it appears that several bidders were confused, including, Mr. Stine, who spoke with Mr. Allen and requested and received clarification. Further, it is unclear whether all of the bidders, including Nelco, were aware of the oral interpretations or clarifications of the Addendum rendered to some of the bidders. Rejection of All Bids Based upon the foregoing, given the standard of review in this proceeding discussed in the Conclusions of Law, the weight of the evidence indicates that the Department's action, in rejecting all bids, was not illegal, arbitrary, dishonest, or fraudulent. The Department's staff was well-intended and made some mistakes along the way, e.g., by not changing the Bid Form, which they readily admit. But there was a rationale for rejecting all bids under the circumstances.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department issue a final order dismissing All America’s Petition to Prevent Rejection of Bids and Award Contract to Petitioner and denying All America's request for attorney’s fees and costs. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of September 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES A. STAMPELOS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of September 2002.
The Issue The issues in this bid protest are whether Intervenor's bid was nonresponsive because Intervenor, a corporation formed in 2005, lacks the required five years' experience in the tree trimming business; and, if so, whether Respondent's preliminary decision to award Intervenor the contract at issue was clearly erroneous, arbitrary or capricious, or contrary to competition.
Findings Of Fact Pursuant to Invitation to Bid No. 27-054X (the "ITB"), which was issued on August 10, 2006, Respondent Broward County School Board ("School Board") solicited bids for "Tree Trimming, Planting, Hurricane Cleanup, and Removal Service." Interested vendors were instructed to bid prices on numerous items of service. The items were sorted into two groups, Group A and Group B. The School Board intended to designate a "primary vendor" for each group, who in the ordinary course of events would receive the largest volume of work, but it reserved the right to procure services from the second and third lowest bidders in each group should it become necessary or desirable to do so. Bids were due on September 13, 2006. Section 4 of the ITB contained "Special Conditions" applicable to this procurement. Of interest in this case is Special Condition No. 11, which specified the qualifications a vendor needed to be considered for an award: BIDDER'S QUALIFICATIONS: Bidder must have at least five years experience in tree trimming services within the Miami-Dade, Broward and Palm Beach tri-county area. Bidder must submit, with the bid or uponrequest, the attached Bidder's Profile form. This report must include a minimum of three references from commercial jobs. Each reference should include the address of the actual job, work accomplished and a phone number and contact person. (Emphasis in original.) The Bidder Profile form to which Special Condition 11 referred was located in Section 7 of the ITB as Attachment 1. At the top of the Bidder Profile appeared the following direction and warning: THIS INFORMATION MUST BE SUBMITTED WITH THE BID. FAILURE TO COMPLETE THIS SECTION WILLDISQUALIFY THE SUBMITTED BID. (Emphasis in original.) Paragraph 12 of the Bidder Profile form stated as follows: References Required. Contractor to provide a list of three references. Three references from jobs completed in each of the past three years. More than one dozen vendors timely submitted bids, which the School Board opened on September 13, 2006. Among the bidders were Petitioner Phil's Expert Tree Service, Inc. ("Expert") and Intervenor Innovative Environmental Services, Inc. ("Innovative"). After tabulating the bids, the School Board determined that Innovative was the lowest and best bid from a responsive, responsible bidder with regard to Group A, followed by Expert and All County Tree & Landscape Co., Inc. ("All County"), in that order. Thus, when the award recommendations were posted on September 27, 2006, Innovative was named the intended primary awardee for Group A, Expert the first alternate, and All County the second alternate.1 Innovative is a family business whose principals are Craig and Deborah Conway, husband and wife. In the year 2000, the Conways moved to South Florida from Pennsylvania, where, for more than 20 years, they had operated a tree trimming and land clearing business. After arriving in Florida, the Conways entered into a business arrangement with Donald Richter, a certified arborist, whereby they jointly provided tree trimming services under the name "ASAP Tree Service" or "Don Richter's ASAP Tree Service." In October 2002, the Conways formed a corporation called Independent Equipment South, Inc. ("Independent"). Independent operated an equipment sales and rental business whose inventory consisted of equipment that was not being used in the family's tree trimming operations. Eventually, the Conways' tree trimming service become part of Independent's business portfolio as well. In February 2005, Innovative was incorporated. At all times relevant to this procurement, Mrs. Conway has been the sole corporate officer, Mr. Conway the company's Director of Operations. In addition, at all relevant times, Innovative has employed or otherwise retained Mr. Richter as its certified arborist. Although Innovative and Independent are separate corporate entities, the two businesses operate out of the same location, have the same employees, and use the same equipment. The Conways commonly refer to their businesses as "IES," using that acronym interchangeably to mean either Innovative or Independent (or both). Innovative's Bidder Profile, which was submitted together with its bid, referred to——and incorporated——an attachment entitled, "Brief Company History." The Brief Company History provided background information on Innovative's provenance, albeit from a layperson's perspective. Written by nonlawyers, the summary was not always technically precise, from a legal standpoint, in its descriptions of the various business associations in which the Conways have been involved. Seizing on the least artful phrases, Expert contends that some of the statements in the Brief Company History were false and perhaps even fraudulent. The undersigned, however, finds otherwise. To the point, the Brief Company History reflects an honest attempt truthfully to describe the Conways' family businesses, which is reasonably accurate when read and understood from the perspective of the small-business owners who prepared it. That said, the undersigned finds and determines that Innovative——as distinct from its principals and/or personnel—— did not have five years' experience in the tree trimming business when it bid on the contract at hand, notwithstanding the wealth of tree trimming experience at its disposal. Indeed, having been in existence for fewer than two years at the time it submitted its bid, Innovative, as a separate legal entity, could not possibly have garnered, in its own right, five years' experience doing anything. For the same reason, though Innovative provided plenty of references, the ones that stemmed from jobs completed before February 2005 necessarily related to providers other than Innovative, such as ASAP Tree Service, who actually existed then. To be sure, the providers who earned the references from earlier jobs upon which Innovative relied either were predecessor business associations or individuals who would become personnel of Innovative——but they were not Innovative. Innovative simply could not have performed or completed any jobs before its creation. It is determined, therefore, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Innovative's bid did not strictly conform to the plain language of Special Condition No. 11. Like Innovative, Expert is a family-owned business. Founded in 1985 by Philip Simeone, Expert was incorporated in 1992. Though Expert clearly possesses the length of experience for which Special Condition No. 11 called, Expert failed in its Bidder Profile to provide three references "from jobs completed in each of the past three years," as instructed in paragraph 12 of the ITB's Section 7, Attachment 1. Instead, Expert gave two references from jobs completed in 2006 plus another from a job completed in 2004. Expert's bid did not contain a reference from a job completed in 2005. Expert contends that the School Board should have rejected Innovative's bid as materially nonresponsive (for lacking the requisite five years' experience) and awarded the contract to Expert as the lowest responsive bidder. The School Board and Innovative take the position that the School Board's decision to treat Innovative's bid as responsive was not clearly erroneous, arbitrary, or capricious. Turning the tables, the School Board and Innovative argue that Expert's own bid deviated from Special Condition No. 11, in that Expert failed to provide a reference from a job completed in 2005.2 Yet both assert that "it was reasonable for [the School Board] to waive the requirement of the Bidder Profile form that one . . . reference[] be [from] a job completed in the year 2005." Somewhat inconsistently, however, Innovative argues further that Expert's "bid proposal cannot be sustained"——evidently due to its material nonresponsiveness. This apparent inconsistency follows from Innovative's attempt to play down its alternative position, which is that if "a contrary conclusion [had] been reached as to [Innovative's] experience"—— meaning that if the School Board had chosen not to waive any irregularity concerning Innovative's length of corporate experience——then the "same analysis would apply to" Expert—— meaning that Expert's bid too should have been disqualified. Thus, even though Innovative maintains that the School Board reasonably waived any irregularities in Expert's bid, Innovative is unwilling to concede that the School Board did not err in determining that Expert's bid was responsive, evidently out of concern that such an admission might compromise its fallback position. Innovative's bottom line is that if Innovative's bid were to be disqualified as materially nonresponsive, then Expert's bid would need to be rejected, too.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board enter a Final Order that (a) declares Innovative's bid to be materially nonresponsive and, accordingly, rescinds the proposed award to Innovative; and (b) declares Expert's bid to be materially nonresponsive and, accordingly, rejects the same. Because the choice of remedies for invalid procurement actions is ultimately within the agency's discretion, the undersigned declines to make a recommendation as to whether the School Board should award the contract to All County (which was the putative "second alternate") or reject all bids and start over. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of March, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of March, 2007.
The Issue Whether Respondent's action to reject all bids submitted in response to ITB 13-803-206, relating to the removal and replacement of the public address system at Pinellas Park High School, is illegal, arbitrary, dishonest, or fraudulent, as alleged in the Amended Petition.
Findings Of Fact On March 4, 2013, ITB was issued by Respondent for work related to the removal and replacement of the public address system at Pinellas Park High School in Largo, Florida. According to the Special Conditions portions of the ITB, the "scope" of the project is to "[p]rovide labor and materials to remove and replace the auditorium sound system as per plans and specifications by Keane Acoustics, Inc." The ITB was assigned bid number 13-803-206 by Respondent. Bids for the contract were to be submitted to Respondent by 3:00 p.m., April 11, 2013. Bids for the project were timely received from two companies. The first company, Becker Communications, Inc., d/b/a BCI Integrated Solutions (BCI), submitted a bid in the amount of $130,756.66. Petitioner submitted a bid in the amount of $116,000.00. There is a section of the ITB titled "special conditions." The special conditions provide in part that "[t]his is an ALL or NONE bid [and] [t]he entire contract shall be awarded to the lowest responsive and responsible bidder meeting the specifications." On April 22, 2013, Respondent posted a notice advising of its intent to award the contract to BCI. Although Petitioner submitted the lowest bid, Respondent determined that Petitioner's bid was non-responsive because the bid failed to include "proof of 5 years [of] experience with this type of work" as required by the special conditions of the ITB. Petitioner interpreted this provision as requiring five years of experience as a certain type of general contractor, which Petitioner had, whereas Respondent intended for the ITB to convey that five years of experience related to the removal and installation of audio equipment was the desired type of experience. Petitioner's failure to respond to the ITB in the manner contemplated by Respondent was a technical, nonmaterial irregularity.1/ Numbered paragraph six of the General Terms & Conditions of the ITB provides in part that Respondent "expressly reserves the right to reject any bid proposal if it determines that the . . . experience of the bidder, compared to work proposed, justifies such rejection." On April 24, 2013, Petitioner provided to Respondent a notice advising of its intent to protest the award of the contract to BCI. On May 3, 2013, Petitioner filed its formal protest challenging Respondent's intended action of awarding the contract to BCI. Petitioner's formal protest enumerated several grounds. Of particular concern to Respondent were Petitioner's assertions that the ITB was "inconsistent with Florida law since bidders [were] not required to submit a List of Subcontractors by the time of opening bid"2/ and that provisions of the ITB were ambiguous with respect to the type of experience required to qualify for bidding.3/ Prior to receiving Petitioner's protest, Respondent was unaware of the fact that its bid specifications governing the disclosure of subcontractors did not comply with Florida law. Upon consideration of Petitioner's grounds for protest, Respondent determined that the ITB, as alleged by Petitioner, failed to comply with section 255.0515, Florida Statutes (2012),4/ and that there was ambiguity in the language regarding the experience requirements for bidders.5/ Respondent refers to the problems with the ITB as "procedural errors." These procedural errors will be referred to herein as "irregularities" as this term is more in keeping with the nomenclature of this area of jurisprudence. Given the ITB's irregularities, Respondent decided to reject all bids. In explaining Respondent's rationale for rejecting all bids, Michael Hewett, Respondent's Director of Maintenance,6/ testified that "the [irregularities] were such that [they] potentially could give an unfair advantage to one bidder over another." As for the issue related to the requirements of section 255.0515, Mr. Hewett explained that neither of the two bidders submitted a listing of subcontractors. It would have been competitively disadvantageous to BCI if Petitioner were able to successfully argue that BCI should be disqualified for failing to provide a listing of subcontractors when Petitioner also failed to provide such listing. During the same approximate time that the ITB in the present case was issued, Respondent issued an ITB for nearly identical work to be performed at one of its other facilities (Palm Harbor). In all material respects, the Palm Harbor ITB was identical to the one at issue herein. Unlike the present case, BCI was the sole bidder for the Palm Harbor project and this distinguishing fact reasonably explains why Respondent did not reject BCI's bid for the Palm Harbor Project even though the ITB therein was plagued with the same irregularities found in the present case.7/
Recommendation Upon consideration of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Pinellas County School Board enter a final order finding that the rejection of all bids submitted in response to ITB 13-803-206 was not illegal, arbitrary, dishonest, or fraudulent, and dismissing Tamco Electric, Inc.'s instant protest. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of October, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of October, 2013.
The Issue The issue in this cause is whether costs and attorney's fees are due Petitioner, hereinafter PROCTOR, from Respondent, hereinafter HRS, pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, as a result of Division of Administrative Hearings Case Number 91-5963-BID, and, if so, the amount of costs and fees.
Findings Of Fact The petition for fees and costs herein is brought exclusively under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, and relates back to a bid protest wherein PROCTOR and TCC #3 LTD., INC., hereafter TCC, were the only bidders on HRS lease 590.236. PROCTOR was the protestant/Petitioner and TCC was the apparent successful bidder/Intervenor in Derick Proctor v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, DOAH Case No. 91-5963BID. HRS' Invitation to Bid (ITB) for lease 590:236 required bidders to submit evidence of control of the property being offered, including the parking areas. Evidence of control could take the form of a deed for the property, an option to purchase the property, or a lease or option to lease showing a right to sublease. TCC did not submit a document labelled "deed," "option to purchase," "lease," or "option to lease" with its bid. TCC submitted as its evidence of control a contract for sale and purchase of the property with Hernando Plaza, Ltd., executed by Edward M. Strawgate and Harold Brown representing themselves to be general partners of the limited partnership. At all times material, the actual record title of the property submitted by TCC for the bid was in the Victor and Lillian Brown Foundation. At the times of the bid opening, evaluation, and August 27, 1991 notice of intended award, HRS had no reliable information as to what entity actually owned the property offered by TCC, and TCC had not disclosed to HRS that its contract to purchase the property was with an entity other than the record owner. Up to then, at least, Hernando Plaza, Ltd. had represented itself to TCC as being the owner of the property. The ITB did not require an abstract of title to be submitted with the bid. HRS normally does not require an abstract from successful bidders, although the ITB contained provisions for future disclosures from successful bidders. Absent some reason to "go behind" facial evidence of control, HRS' ITB attempted at the time to protect HRS by requiring successful bidders to post an irrevocable letter of credit to be forfeited in the event a successful bidder could not perform and for future disclosures concerning the chain of title. (See the recommended order in the underlying case). HRS accepted the contract to purchase the property from Hernando Plaza, Ltd. as TCC's required evidence of control, believing it to constitute an option to purchase. (See Findings of Fact 15-17 infra, this final order). On August 27, 1991, PROCTOR received from HRS a notice of intent to award the bid to TCC. This notice constituted the "window" for protests, if any, to be filed. PROCTOR then timely filed a notice of intent to protest and a formal written protest of the award to TCC. The filing of this protest resulted in an automatic suspension of the bid solicitation and contract award process and referral of the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to Section 120.53(5)(c), Florida Statutes. This protest formed the basis of the underlying bid case, DOAH Case No. 91-5963BID. No later than the time of the Prehearing Order of September 23, 1991 in Case No. 91-5963BID, the law firm of Gibbs and Rudzik had made known to the hearing officer and counsel for both PROCTOR and HRS its retention as counsel for TCC. TCC moved for leave to intervene in a motion filed September 30, 1991, which was granted in an order of October 4, 1991. In a letter of October 10, 1991, counsel for PROCTOR made counsel for HRS aware of a question of whether TCC could obtain good title to the property. Counsel for PROCTOR proposed in a letter of October 14, 1991 to counsel for HRS that HRS reject both PROCTOR's and TCC's bids and rebid the lease, but this letter was primarily devoted to determining if HRS wished to interpose a new defense that PROCTOR's bid was unresponsive. In the instant fees and costs case, PROCTOR relies on its October 14, 1991 letter as the point from which HRS should have acted to avoid incurring attorney's fees and costs. After the receipt of the two letters, HRS did not reject both bids and rebid the contract but proceeded to formal hearing on October 30, 1991. PROCTOR and HRS share the mutual impression that had HRS accepted PROCTOR's proposal to reject both bids, HRS would have to have allowed TCC an opportunity to protest that decision. At the final hearing in Case No. 91-5963BID, evidence was offered that Hernando Plaza, Ltd. had a conditional option to purchase the property from the record title owner, the Brown Foundation. However, it was not established at the hearing that the conditions of the option had been fulfilled or that TCC or Hernando Plaza, Ltd. could otherwise gain good title to the property through a valid option. It was concluded as a matter of law in Case No. 91-5963BID, that on its face, the ITB stated that control could be evidenced merely by attachment of an "option to purchase," that the ITB stated no further requirements concerning the internal provisions of the option to purchase, and that TCC's conditional contract for purchase constituted a conditional option to purchase. The conditions of the option to purchase and the chain of title, among myriad other matters were subjects of proof at the formal hearing. The conditions of the option to purchase and various complicated real property concepts arising from recorded and unrecorded parts of the chain of title constituted the thrust of the recommended order's assessment that TCC's "control" was speculative only. It is here noted that the totality of the "chain" of title might have been unavailable even by "abstract" due to the lack of recordation of some documents. The lengthy formal hearing adduced evidence concerning the factual issue of whether or not the conditional option to purchase was between TCC and an entity which had such a sufficiently unequivocal interest in the proposed property that it could convey title to TCC in time for TCC to fulfill its obligations under its proposed lease to HRS. There is no evidence that HRS knew of these problems on August 27, 1991, when it gave notice of its intent to award the bid to TCC. Hernando Plaza, Ltd. was the entity with which TCC had contracted. At formal hearing, TCC relied on the legal concept that all interests in the property had merged in the non-title holder, Hernando Plaza, Ltd. This concept, together with recorded and unrecorded elements in the chain of title which were presented at formal hearing, were determined in the recommended order to be too "speculative" on the issue of TCC's control. However, it was also found, upon evidence submitted at formal hearing, that TCC's bid contained no other material deviations from the requirements of the ITB, that the signator of TCC's bid had sufficient status to submit the bid for the TCC corporation, and that TCC's signator could not submit the bid as an agent of the owners of the real property. TCC and its bid signator had never purported to have submitted the bid on behalf of the owners of the real property. (See the recommended order of the underlying bid case.) These issues were raised by PROCTOR and they addressed more than just the facial compliance of TCC's original bid documents which was all HRS had to consider when it made its initial decision in favor of TCC and against PROCTOR. However, the recommended order found HRS to have materially deviated in a number of ways from the bid process in its initial evaluation of PROCTOR's bid, not the least of which was determining that PROCTOR had complied with the ITB requirements for demonstrating control. All such evaluation flaws had been committed by HRS in favor of PROCTOR. Both TCC's and PROCTOR's bids were ultimately found to be unresponsive in the recommended order entered on December 20, 1991. The recommended order also found both had standing to be involved in the bid protest and formal hearing. The recommended order recommended rejecting both bids and readvertising the ITB. The Final Order of HRS entered on January 20, 1992 dismissed PROCTOR's protest on the basis that he lacked standing to protest, as his bid was unresponsive, and awarded the bid to TCC. HRS did not give PROCTOR notice that his bid was not responsive until it issued its Final Order. The Final Order of HRS was appealed to the First District Court of Appeals by PROCTOR. The First District Court of Appeals entered an order on June 22, 1992 finding PROCTOR had standing and remanding the case back to HRS for the purpose of a decision of the issue of whether TCC's bid was also unresponsive. On July 27, 1992, HRS entered its Amended Final Order determining both bids to be unresponsive and that the lease should be relet for bids. The First District Court of Appeals affirmed the Amended Final Order of HRS in a per curiam opinion without discussion on October 13, 1992. HRS did not reject both bids and rebid the contract until after this per curiam opinion. No motion for rehearing was filed with respect to either of the First District Court of Appeals' orders entered June 22 or October 13, 1992, nor was any notice to invoke the discretionary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court filed. PROCTOR did file a motion for rehearing solely on the court's denial of PROCTOR's motion for appellate fees. Mandate was issued by the Clerk of the First District Court of Appeals on December 3, 1992. HRS entered an Order Directing Release of Bid Protest Cost Bond on December 18, 1992, in which HRS stated: Petitioner, Derick Proctor, has prevailed in the above styled bid protest. Petitioner's domicile and principal place of business is Vero Beach, Florida. Petitioner has one employee. Petitioner is a sole proprietorship. Petitioner's net worth does not exceed $2,000,000.00. HRS was not a nominal party in the underlying bid case. HRS did not initially challenge PROCTOR's "small business party" status in this instant fees and costs proceeding. Therefore, that allegation of the fees and costs petition is not at issue. Also, Petitioner's "small business party" status is now stipulated to exist. The parties have stipulated that the maximum statutory fee is $15,000.00 and that $15,000.00 is a reasonable fee if an award of attorney's fees is due. HRS has not protested or objected to the amount of costs claimed, $411.25, if costs are due.
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner, Close Construction, Inc. (Petitioner), (Close) was the lowest responsive and responsible bidder in the Request For Bid (RFB) Number 6000000262, whether the subject contract should be awarded to the Petitioner, and, concomitantly, whether the Respondent agency's decision to award the contract to the Intervener, Worth Contracting, Inc. (Worth) was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary or capricious.
Findings Of Fact The South Florida Water Management District is a public corporation authorized under Chapter 373, Florida Statutes. It issued a request for bids for the refurbishment and automation of certain facilities in Broward County, Florida. Close is a construction company duly authorized to do business in the state of Florida. It was one of the bidders on the procurement represented by the subject request for bids and is the Petitioner in this case. This dispute had its beginnings on June 5, 2009, when the Respondent issued RFB number 6000000262. The RFB solicited construction services for the refurbishment and automation of two facilities in Broward County. The procurement would involve the installation of new direct-drive electric pumps at the Respondent's G-123 Pump Station in Broward County, along with the construction of an equipment shelter and the replacement of a retaining wall with a poured concrete retaining wall, as well as refurbishment of "pump flap gates." The RFB also requested construction services for the replacement of gates at the Respondent's S-34 water-control structure in Broward County. Both facilities would thus be automated so that they can be remotely operated from the Respondent's headquarters in West Palm Beach. After issuance of the RFB, two addenda were supplied to vendors and were posted. The first addendum was posted on or about June 19, 2009, concerning a change in specifications for flap gates and is not the subject of this dispute. Addendum No. Two was electronically posted on or about June 30, 2009. It amended the technical specifications of the RFB by deleting Section 11212 regarding measurement of payment of electric motors/belt-driven axial flow pumps. That addendum also added a new measure and payment to Subpart 1.01 of the technical specifications to provide for an owner-directed allowance of $40,000.00 to provide for the potential need for certain electrical utility work to be done by FPL in order to complete the project. Addendum No. Two added an additional term to the RFB in providing that the $40,000.00 allowance price "Shall be added to the other costs to complete the bid." The second Addendum also stated, "The allowance price shall be used at the discretion of the District and, if not used, will be deducted from the final Contract Price." That addendum also directed bidders to replace the original Bid Form 00320-2, which had been enclosed with the RFB, with a new Bid Form, 00320R1-2. The new Bid Form is identical to the original form except that the schedule of bid prices contained in paragraph four, on page 003201-2, was altered to itemize the $40,000.00 discretionary cost allowance. The original form had contained a single line for the bidder's lump sum bid price, whereas the revised form provided for a lump sum bid amount to be itemized and a base bid amount, which required the bidder to enter on the form the amount of its bid, then add the discretionary cost amount and write the sum of those two numbers on a third line. In paragraph four of the new bid form there is re- printed language concerning the use of the discretionary allowance which appeared on the face of Addendum No. Two. Other than the change to paragraph four and the alteration of the page numbers to include an "R" in the page number, the revised bid form is identical to the original bid form. The other bid documents were not altered in any manner by Addendum No. Two. The deadline for bid submissions was Thursday, July 9, 2009, at 2:30 p.m. The Petitioner timely submitted its bid to the District. In submitting its bid however, the Petitioner used the original bid form which had been enclosed with the RFB. The bid form submitted was an exact copy of the bid form furnished by the District which Close had printed from the electronic copy of the RFB received from the District. The Petitioner did not substitute the revised bid form, attached to Addendum No. Two, for the original form in submitting its bid. The Petitioner's bid was deemed non-responsive by the District and was rejected on the basis that Close had failed to submit the bid on the revised form required by Addendum No. Two. Thereafter, the District, at its August 13, 2009, meeting, approved award of the bid to Worth. The intent to award was posted electronically on or about August 14, 2009. The persuasive evidence establishes that Close received both addenda to the bid documents. It was aware of the Addendum No. Two, and it accounted for all of the changes to the technical specifications made in both addenda in the preparation of its bid. The evidence shows that Close was aware of the $40,000.00, owner-directed cost allowance and that it incorporated it in the formulation of its total bid price. Thus, Close's final bid amount was $3,751,795.00. That number included the $40,000.00 cost allowance at issue, added to the bid documents by Addendum No. Two. The internal bid work sheets, prepared by personnel of Close, identified and itemized the $40,000.00 discretionary cost allowance as a component of the final bid price. The persuasive evidence thus establishes that Close's final bid amount did include the $40,000.00 cost allowance. Moreover, the written notes of witness Christopher Rossi, the estimator for Close, show the $40,000.00 amount as an "FPL Allowance." Both Mr. Rossi and Mr. Boromei, the Vice President for Close, who prepared the bid, explained that the $40,000.00 was understood by Close to be a cost allowance, that it would only be charged to the District to the extent that it was actually used, at the District's discretion. If it were not used, it was to be deducted from the overall contract price. Addendum Two specifically provides that the discretionary cost allowance was to be used only at the discretion of the District and that the unused portion would be deducted from the contract amount. When Close submitted its bid it mistakenly submitted it on the original bid form and failed to exchange the bid forms as directed in Item Two of Addendum No. 2. In paragraph one of both bid forms, however, the bidder is required to specifically fill out, acknowledge and identify all addenda. By doing so the bidder expressly agrees to build the project in conformance with all contract documents, including all addenda, for the price quoted in the bid. Close completed this paragraph, specifically identified both Addendum One and Addendum Two, and specifically agreed to strictly conform, in performance of the work to the plans, specifications and other contract documents, including Addendum Nos. One and Two. Paragraph one was not changed by the addition of Addendum No. Two and it is identical in both the original and the revised forms at issue. Paragraph one of the original and the revised bid forms constitutes an agreement by the bidder to perform and construct a project "in strict conformity with the plans, specifications and other Contract Documents. . . ." The addenda are part of the contract documents and are expressly referenced as such in this agreement. Both bid forms, the original and the revised, include paragraph eight, which clearly states that the bidder will post a bid bond to secure and guaranty that it will enter into a contract with the District, if its bid is selected. Paragraph eight was unchanged by Addendum No. Two and its terms are identical in both Bid forms at issue, including the form that Close signed and submitted as its bid. The persuasive evidence shows that in submitting its bid, whether on either form, Close committed itself to the identical terms as set forth in the identical contract documents agreed to by Worth and the other bidders. The evidence established that Close intended to bind itself to the terms of the RFB, and all terms of Addendum No. Two, including the discretionary cost allowance term. Close considered itself bound to enter into a contract for the price of its bid if selected by the District. It likewise considered that the price of its bid, would only include the cost allowance if the discretionary allowance was implemented by the District. Upon the opening of the bids, the firm of Cone and Graham, Inc., was identified as the lowest bidder. Cone and Graham's bid was in the amount of $2,690,000.00. Close was the second lowest bidder, with a bid of $3,751,795.00. The third lowest bidder was Worth Contracting, Inc., with a bid of $3,898,410.00. Cone and Graham was allowed to provide additional information and to even meet with some District staff following the opening of its bid. The additional information it was allowed to provide concerned technical specifications of the pumps proposed in its bid. Through this verification process conducted with the Agency, Cone and Graham ultimately convinced the District to permit them to withdraw its bid without forfeiting their bid bond. This left the Petitioner, Close, the lowest bidder, at $146,615.00 less than the bid submitted by Worth, the initially-awarded bidder. Close's bid, upon review, was rejected as non- responsive due to its failure to exchange the original Bid form with the revised Bid form, as indicated above, in spite of the fact that Close had also agreed to adhere to the entirety of Addendum No. Two on the face of the Bid form. Thus the recommended award to Worth for the above-referenced additional amount of bid price was adopted by the District, engendering this protest. James Reynolds, the Contracts Specialist for the District, conceded that it was apparent on the face of Close's bid that a mistake had been made in the use of the original form, rather than the revised form. He conceded there was an inconsistency between Close's clear acknowledgement of and agreement to the terms of the contract documents, which expressly included Addendum No. Two and Close's apparent mistaken use of the original Bid form. Under the express terms of Article 19.03 of the RFB, "The Bid shall be construed as though the addendum(a) have been received and acknowledged by the bidder." Mr. Reynolds admitted, however, that he did not apply the terms of Article 19.03 of the RFB in his review of Close's bid and did not construe the bid in the manner provided in the RFB to resolve the apparent inconsistency. He reasoned that Close had used the wrong bid form and looked no further. The District's Procurement Manual provides a procedure whereby a bidder may correct inadvertent mistakes in its bid. Under the terms of Chapter 5-5 of that manual, where the District knows or has reason to conclude, after unsealing of bids, that a mistake may have been made by a bidder, the District "shall request written verification of the bid." In such a circumstance the bidder "shall be permitted the opportunity to furnish information in support of the bid verification as long as it does not affect responsiveness, i.e., the bid substantially conforms to the requirements of the RFB as it relates to pricing, surety, insurance, specifications and any other matter unequivocally stated in the RFB as determinant of responsiveness." See Joint Exhibit 7,6 pages 61 and 62, in evidence. Mr. Reynolds admitted in his testimony that he did not follow the procedure set forth in the manual for verifying a bid because, in his view, that would be allowing an impermissible supplementation of Close's bid. Ms. Lavery, in her testimony, in essence agreed. The Procurement Manual expressly required the District, upon recognizing the mistake and an inconsistency apparent on the face of Close's bid, to verify that bid and to provide Close with the opportunity to furnish information in support of bid verification. Thus, by the express terms of the manual, a bidder must be given an opportunity to clarify mistakes. The Procurement Manual expressly permits a bidder under these circumstances to correct any "inadvertent, non- judgmental mistake" in its bid. Chapter 5 of the Manual provides that "a non-judgmental mistake" is a mistake not attributable to an error in judgment, such as mistakes in personal judgment or wrongful assumptions of contract obligations. Inadvertent technical errors, such as errors of form rather than substance, are considered non-judgmental errors." See Joint Exhibit 7, page 62, in evidence. It is patently apparent that Close's use of the original bid form, inadvertently, while also unequivocally acknowledging and agreeing to the entirety of Addendum No. Two, represented a non-judgmental mistake. Both of the District witnesses, however, testified that the policy regarding mistakes was not followed and Close was not given an opportunity under the District's policy to provide additional information to support verification of the bid. Although Close failed to substitute the revised Bid form for the original Bid form, as called for by Addendum No. Two, its bid was substantively responsive to the technical specifications and requirements of the RFB, and the irregularity is technical in nature. The parties stipulated that the use of the original form, rather than the revised bid form, was the sole basis for Close being determined to be non-responsive by the Agency. In accordance with Florida Administrative Code Rule 40E-7.301, in Chapter 5 of the District's Procurement Manual, the District reserves the right to waive minor irregularities in a bid. A material irregularity is defined by the District's policy as one which is not minor in that it: (a) affects the price, quality, time or manner of performance of the service such that it would deprive the District of an assurance that the contract will be entered into, performed and guaranteed according to the specified requirements; (b) provides an advantage or benefit to a bidder which is not enjoyed by other bidders; or (c) undermines the necessary common standards of competition. See Joint Exhibit 7, page 58, in evidence. The preponderant, persuasive evidence shows that the irregularity in Close's bid did not affect the price of the bid or truly deprive the District of assurance that the contract would be entered into and performed according to all the terms of the RFB, including addenda. The evidence established that Close actually included the $40,000.00 discretionary cost allowance in its final bid price. It merely did not show it as a separate itemization, because it did not use the revised form providing that itemization line. The fact that the discretionary allowance was itemized in the revised bid form, as part of the bid amount, does not equate to an effect on the contract price as a result of Close's using the original Bid form. Close's error, by mistakenly submitting its bid on the original bid form, did not alter the price of its bid. The evidence clearly established that the bid price for Close's bid would be the same regardless of which form it used. Moreover, the preponderant, persuasive evidence establishes that the use of the original Bid form by Close did not deprive the District of assurance that the contract would be performed in accordance with the all bid documents. Close's bid, secured by its bid bond, clearly acknowledged and agreed to the express terms of Addendum No. Two in their entirety, which included the terms under which the discretionary cost allowance could be applied. Close considered itself bound to the terms of the RFB and assured the Agency that it was so bound by the written acknowledgement and agreement it submitted to the Agency as part of its bid, concerning the elements of Addendum No. Two. The evidence demonstrated that Close understood that the $40,000.00 amount was a discretionary cost allowance and that Close would not be entitled to it unless the District decided to use it. Despite the opinion of Agency witnesses to the contrary, the error in Close's bid was a technical one and non- material because it did not confer a competitive advantage upon Close. Close's use of the wrong form did not alter the price of its bid. Its mistake in the use of the original bid form could only change the relative, competitive positions of Close and Worth if the amount of the discretionary cost allowance was greater or equal to the difference between those two bids, i.e., the $146,650.00 amount by which Worth's bid exceeded the bid of Close. 1/ The bid of Worth exceeds Close's bid by an amount far greater than the amount at issue in the discretionary cost allowance identified in Addendum No. Two and expressly itemized in the revised Bid form, i.e. $40,000.00. The District contends that Close gained some competitive economic advantage over other bidders by having the means by which it could optionally withdraw its bid, based upon alleged non-responsiveness, in not substituting the revised Bid form which would contain the itemization of the $40,000.00 cost allowance. It is difficult to see how it could gain a competitive advantage versus other bidders through some perceived ability to deem itself non-responsive, at its option, and withdraw its bid, thus denying itself the contract. The competitive bidding laws are designed to prevent a firm from gaining a competitive advantage in obtaining a contract versus the efforts of other bidders, not in depriving itself of the opportunity to get the work. Moreover, concerning the argument by the District that this may confer the advantage to Close of allowing it to withdraw its bid at its option and still obtain a refund of its bid bond; even if that occurred, it would not confer a competitive advantage vis-à-vis other bidders. It would merely involve a potential pecuniary advantage to Close's interest, versus that of the Agency itself, which obviously is not a bidder. Moreover, it should again be pointed out that Cone and Graham was allowed to provide additional information concerning its bid elements, and even to meet with the District staff, following the opening of the bids. It was then allowed to withdraw its bid without forfeiting its bid bond. If the District had inquired, by way of verification of Close's bid, as to whether the discretionary cost amount was included in it's bid, that inquiry does not equate to allowing Close to unlawfully supplement its bid. Indeed, if in response to such an inquiry, Close announced that the discretionary allowance was not included in its bid, its bid at that point would be materially non-responsive to the specifications. If Close was then allowed to supplement its bid by changing its price to add the allowance, such would indeed be an unfair competitive advantage and a violation of law on the part of Close and the Agency. The evidence does not show that such happened or was proposed by any party. If a verification inquiry had been made and Close announced that, indeed, its bid price did include the subject discretionary cost allowance, without further response to the specifications being added, then no competitive advantage would be afforded Close and no legal violation would occur. In fact, however, as pointed out above, the verification request, pursuant to the District's policy manual, was never made. This was despite the fact that the District's witness, Mr. Reynolds, acknowledged that the use of the original bid form was an apparent mistake on the face of the bid, when considered in conjunction with Close's express agreement to construct the project in strict conformance with all contract documents, and particularly with regard to Addenda Numbers One and Two. The non-judgmental mistake, involving use of the original bid form in lieu of the revised bid form, could have been easily clarified by a verification inquiry. That policy was not followed, based solely on the fact that the wrong bid form was used, even though the preponderant, persuasive evidence shows that in all material and substantive respects the bid was a conforming, responsive bid and included in its price the discretionary cost allowance. The preponderance of the evidence shows that the mistaken use of the original Bid form was a non- material irregularity under the District's policies and the terms of the RFB. The District's actions in failing to uniformly apply its own bid verification policy when, in fact, it had allowed verification to one of the other bidders, and when, according to its own witness, it perceived an apparent mistake, was clearly erroneous. It is true that Close may not supplement its bid by changing material terms, but it is permitted to verify whether, in light of the mistaken use of the original Bid form, its bid price, as submitted, included the $40,000.00 discretionary allowance or not. Providing such "yes or no" type of additional information in order to clarify, and only clarify, information already submitted in the bid, in response to an inquiry by the District does not constitute "supplementation" of the bid for purposes of Section 120.57(3)(f), Florida Statutes (2008). NCS Pearson, Inc. v. Dept of Education, 2005 WL 31776, at page 18 (DOAH, Feb. 8, 2005). Even without verification of the bid, the bid on its face agrees to compliance with all terms and specifications, including Addendum No. Two. It is thus determined that there is no material irregularity. The bid submitted by Close does not afford it any competitive advantage vis-à-vis the other bidders and it is responsive.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the South Florida Water Management District, awarding the subject contract for RFB 6000000262 to the Petitioner herein, Close Construction, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of January, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of January, 2010.
The Issue Whether the apparent low bid on contract No. SB 95C-66W should be disqualified on the grounds that the bidder does not meet the experience specifications contained in the Invitation to Bid.
Findings Of Fact On August 16, 1994, the School Board issued Invitation to Bid (ITB) No. SB 95C-66W, which was described as being a "term contract to provide and/or install rubberized coatings for sports surfaces." Among the bidders who responded to the ITB were the Petitioner, Papico Construction, Inc., and AAA Tennis Courts, Inc. On August 31, 1994, bids were tabulated and the School Board posted its intent to award the bid to Papico. Thereafter, the bid process was delayed as a result of a protest filed by another bidder. On December 12, 1994, Petitioner filed the formal bid protest that resulted in this proceeding. The School Board does not challenge the timeliness of Petitioner's protest. Among the special conditions of the ITB is the following pertaining the qualifications of the bidder: E. QUALIFICATIONS: The bidder shall have maintained continual work experience in coatings for running tracks for a period of three years prior to the bid date. Bidder must submit written documentation with bid or within three days upon request, substantiating experience requirement. The bidder shall have a place of business for contact by the owner during normal working days. Petitioner framed its challenge to the bid process by the following portion of its formal bid protest: . . . To award this project to Papico or AAA Tennis Courts is not only directly in contradiction to the 3 years of continuous work experience section of the specifications (Special Conditions - E), but also deprives the school system of our experience. . . . Papico timely submitted to the School Board written documentation that substantiated that it met the experience requirement contained in Special Condition - E. The evidence presented at the formal hearing established that Papico is an experienced contractor for recreational surfaces and has been involved in coatings for running tracks since 1989. Between 1989 and the time of the formal hearing, Papico had been involved as either the contractor or as a subcontractor for the surfacing or resurfacing of running tracks at Indiantown Middle School, Parkland High School, Hidden Oaks Middle School, J.D. Parker Elementary School, Florida Atlantic University, Martin County High School, South Plantation High School, and Deland High School. At the formal hearing, Petitioner asserted that Papico also did not meet the experience criteria contained in Special Condition - M. That provision is as follows: M. QUALIFICATIONS: The contractor will submit a list of five all-weather running tracks the firm has resurfaced during the past three years. The list shall contain: owner name, location, phone number, number of tracks, and year constructed or resurfaced. (The district reserves the right to contract these owners as references.) Notwithstanding the fact that this issue was not properly preserved by Petitioner, the evidence established that Papico provided this list to the School Board, thereby complying with Special Condition - M.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board of Palm Beach County enter a final order that adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained herein, dismisses the bid protest filed by Recreational Surfaces, Inc., and awards the subject contract to Papico Construction, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of February, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of February, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: James Petrucelli Recreational Surfaces, Inc. 2123 Oregon Street Orlando, Florida 32803 Robert A. Rosillo, Esquire Palm Beach County School Board 3318 Forest Hill Boulevard, Suite C-302 West Palm Beach, Florida 33406-5813 Dr. Monica Uhlhorn, Superintendent Palm Beach County School Board 3340 Forest Hill Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 33406-5869
Findings Of Fact On March 1, 1984, Respondent gave notice to qualified contractors that it would receive sealed bids for State Project No. 72000-3541, referred to as Federal-Aid Project No. M 9041(10). This project involves the installation of a computerized traffic control system for the City of Jacksonville. In response to the opportunity to bid, the Department of Transportation received four bids. Petitioner, Winko-Matic Signal Company, was among the bidders. The other bidders were Georgia Electric Company, Traffic Control Devices, Inc., and Sperry Systems Management. The bids of Traffic Control Devices and Sperry Systems were rejected based upon an error in bid tabulations on the part of Traffic Control, a mistake on the quantities page, with the Sperry rejection being based upon a bid bond problem. Traffic Control had been the apparent low bidder with a bid of $1,964,115. Winko-Matic was the second apparent low bidder with a bid of $2,279,604.70. The Department of Transportation had estimated that the total cost of the Jacksonville project would be $ 2,024,680.61. Having discarded the bid of Traffic Control Devices, the Department of Transportation telegrammed Winko-Matic on April 4, 1984, advising Winko-Matic that it was the apparent low bidder for the Jacksonville project. Subsequently, the awards committee of the Department of Transportation met on April 18, 1984, and determined to reject all bids and re-advertise the job. In the course of this meeting the awards committee was told that there were erratic bids received on contract items, pointing to some perceived confusion among the contractors as to requirements of the contract. Discussion was also held on the possibility of establishing a pre-bid conference if the project was re advertised. The awards committee then voted to reject the bids on the basis that the apparent low bidder, Winko-Matic, had submitted a bid which-was 12.6 percent over the Department's estimate, instead of being within 7 percent of the Department of Transportation's pre-bid estimate, a point above which the Department of Transportation in its non-rule policy would call to question to the acceptability of the apparent low bid. In addition to deciding to reject all bids and re-advertise, it was determined that a pre-bid conference should be scheduled at least 30 days prior to the bid-letting date. Winko-Matic was advised that the Department of Transportation's decision to reject all bids by correspondence of May 4, 1984, in which it was indicated that all bids had been rejected based upon the fact that they were too high. In response to this notice of rejection, Winko-Matic, effective May 17, 1984, filed a written notice of protest. The case was subsequently referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings on June 20, 1984, and a final hearing date was established by Notice of Hearing of July 5, 1984. The hearing date in this cause was September 12, 1984. The Jacksonville project in question requires the utilization of what has been referred to "UTCS Enhanced" software. This software package is unique and has only been used in a limited number of locations within the country. Those locations are Los Angeles, California; San Diego, California; Broward County, Florida; and Birmingham, Alabama. Another unique feature within the project design is the use of an associated coaxial computer sys gem. Given the unique nature of this project and the fact that the Department of Transportation had never advertised for bids related to UTCS software, Department of Transportation obtained assistance from a consulting firm, Harland, Bartholomew & Associates. In fulfilling its function Harland gave estimates to include an estimate related to the projected cost of the software, Item 681-102. The Harland estimate for the overall project was $2,143,130 including a $100,000 estimate for the software system. That estimate relating to the software was subsequently adjusted by the Department of Transportation to depict a cost of $13,780. The Department of Transportation estimate was based upon information within its computer related to a system unlike the enhanced software contemplated by the plans and specifications. In other words, the stored information in the Department of Transportation computer was not the same as contemplated by the plans and specifications in the Jacksonville project. Moreover, the initial estimate of Harland was based upon the idea of an extended software system, as opposed to an enhanced software system. Winko-Matic had bid $389,500 for the software in Item 681-102. That estimate was premised upon figures obtained from JHK and Associates, the group which Winko-Matic intended to use as its subcontractor for the enhanced software portion of the project. JHK developed the software and was responsible for systems integration of the Los Angeles, California, project, one of the locations in which UTCS enhanced software has been utilized. JHK premised its estimate for the software hare upon experience in Los Angeles and an evaluation of the tasks to be performed related to the enhanced software. This included general software development activities, hardware innovation, installation costs during the period of acceptance and testing, and the preparation of data base. The JHK bid price was $339,500. Another $50,000 was added to that price related to what the Petitioner describes as its management costs for that item. By June 20, 1984, when a further meeting was held by the awards committee on the subject of the Jacksonville project, it was concluded that the estimate made by the Department of Transportation of $13,780 was not correct, on the topic of the enhanced software. A more reasonable estimate, according to the information imparted in this session, would be $200,000 for enhanced software as called for in this project, with a $100,000 amount being a reasonable estimate had they chosen to use extended software. Adjusting the initial price related to the UTCS enhanced software to reflect a corrected estimate of the Department of Transportation in its original advertised bid, that estimate becomes $2,210,900.61 and its consultant Harland's estimate becomes $2,243,130. With this adjustment, the differential in the estimate made by the Department of Transportation and the Petitioner approaches 3 percent and not the 12.6 percent originally found. The 3 percent is below the threshold of 7 percent used as the policy for determining whether a bid might be rejected as being far beyond the acceptable limits set forth in the Department of Transportation's estimate. In the aforementioned June 20, 1984, awards committee meeting, the Department of Transportation continued to hold the opinion that all bids in the Jacksonville project should be rejected and the matter re-advertised. Although the problem pertaining to the estimate of the cost of the enhanced software package had been addressed, the committee continued to feel that the prices received in the bid letting were erratic Reference was also made to revisions or modifications to the project plan which would be offered if the matter were re- advertised. It was also pointed out that the Federal Highway Administration would concur in the Department's decision to reject all bids and would accept modifications. The awards committee again voted to reject the bids. The matter was again considered by the awards committee on August 31, 1984. On that occasion, it was pointed out that the revisions contemplated by the Department of Transportation, should the matter be re-advertised, would not affect in a substantial way the cost estimate for the project with the exception of Item 680-101, the system control equipment (CPU), which would promote a lower price for the project. The committee determined in the August, 1984, meeting to reject all bids and re-advertise. While the initial notice of rejection of May 4, 1984, had suggested the basis for rejection as being the fact that Petitioner's bid far exceeded the 7 percent allowance for price above the Department of Transportation's estimate of costs, the meetings of the awards committee and the suggestion of the Respondent in the course of the final hearing in this case indicated that there were other reasons for the decision to reject. Those Were: (a) an apparent lack of clarity among bidders regarding specifications for the Jacksonville job, (b) the desire of the Respondent to revise specifications on the Jacksonville project; and (c) a lack of sufficient competition in the bids. In connection with the first of the additional reasons Respondent suggests that variations within the bid responses related to particular line items within the specifications point out a lack of clarity in the project's specifications or confusion by bidders related to those specifications. Respondent did not bring forth any of the bidders who might speak to the matter of possible confusion or misunderstanding concerning some of the bid items. By contrast, the Petitioner's president; the president of JHK & Associates and James Robinson, Harland's project manager for the Jacksonville job, did not find the specifications in the original documents to be confusing. In addition, the testimony of those individuals established the fact that bid variations related to particular line items are not extraordinary and do not establish any apparent confusion by the bidders as to the requirements of those line items. In effect, what the differentials demonstrate are variations related to the manufacture or in-house capabilities of the bidders and an effort to allocate discretionary costs in various places as to line items. Moreover, they might indicate last- minute adjustments in the bid quote prior to the opening and a possible effort by a contractor to enter into a new job market. Finally, they demonstrate offsetting which is the allocation of item prices by a contractor to maximize profits. To do this, a contractor submits high bids on items representing quantities which the contractor feels will increase after the contract is awarded and submits low bids on items representing quantities which are not likely to change. In summary, while the Department of Transportation in its presentation expressed some concern about the variations in the pricing in the bid quotations offered by the respective bidders in this project, its suspicions on the question of the possible clarity of its specifications were not confirmed and are not convincing. On the topic of revisions which the Department of Transportation would offer if the matter were re-advertised, with one exception those matters appear to be items that could be attended through change orders or supplemental agreements. They are not matters which necessarily must be addressed through a rejection of all bids and a re-advertising of the project. The lone exception to this is the possibility that the Department of Transportation may not be able to protect its proprietary rights in the enhanced software which is being developed for the project, under the terms of the present bid documents. Given that uncertainty, the Respondent would wish to re-advertise the project and make certain that its proprietary interests are protected. Finally, Respondent has alluded to the fact that the Jacksonville project should be re-advertised in view of the lack of competition in the initial letting. Only four bidders expressed an interest in this project at the time of the first letting. Of those, two bidders were found to be responsive. While this is a low number of bidders, there does not appear to be any agency practice on the part of' the Department of Transportation to the effect that this number of bidders would not be accepted. Moreover, no indication has been given that should the matter be re-advertised a greater number of bidders would express an interest than was the case in the first letting. Consequently, this reason for bid rejection is not acceptable. If Respondent did not reject the bids and re-advertise the project, Winko-Matic would be the successful bidder in the Jacksonville project.
The Issue This cause has been resolved upon Intervenor's Motion to Dismiss for Petitioner's failure to timely file the formal written protest required by Section 120.53(5) F.S. [1990 Supp.] to protest award of Respondent Alachua County School Board's BID 341 "Bid Proposal For Furnishing Monitoring Security Systems" to Intervenor.
Findings Of Fact Request for Bid 341 "Bid Proposal For Furnishing Monitoring Security Systems" dated June 14, 1991 was issued by Respondent Alachua County School Board and received by Petitioner/protestant Universal Network, Inc. on or about that date. The bid-closing date was 1:30 p.m. July 2, 1991. No one challenged or protested the specifications prior to the bid submittal date. Universal Network, Inc. and Crime Prevention Security Systems were the only bidders who timely filed bids on or before June 2, 1991. The request for bid accompanied by bid specifications had notified all potential bidders that School Board personnel also intended to open the bids on July 2, 1991, and stated that "Bid tabulations with recommended awards will be posted . . . on or about the Monday following bid opening, . . ." The request for bid also provided "Failure to file a protest within the time prescribed in Section 120.53(5) Florida Statutes, shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes." (HO Exhibit 6) The bids were opened July 2, 1991, and oral communications were made by Respondent's personnel to the effect that Crime Prevention Security Systems would probably be successful since it was low bidder. However, Respondent's personnel delayed posting a formal intent to award on Monday, July 8, 1991 because Petitioner orally announced itself aggrieved by the process. Eight days after the bid opening, on July 10, 1991, Respondent's personnel met with both bidders in an effort to resolve any issue that could result in a formal protest. This meeting was tape recorded by the Petitioner. After this meeting, Petitioner filed a letter dated July 11, 1991 stating that Petitioner "learned" through "verbal notification" as of the July 10 meeting that it would not be awarded the bid, outlining its own prior contract work for the Respondent School Board, attacking the bid specifications, and notifying the Respondent that Petitioner would cease to monitor security under the existing contract at midnight on July 31, 1991. At hearing, Petitioner acknowledged that it did not rely on this July 11, 1991 letter (HO Exhibit 1) as its notice of protest. Nothing was formally decided until, on July 16, 1991, Respondent, through its employee, David C. Hotary, formally posted its intent to award Bid 341 to Crime Prevention Security Systems. On that date, Respondent also wrote and hand-delivered a formal letter-notice of intent to Petitioner's president. That letter provided, in pertinent part: As follow-up to our meeting of July 10, and your letter of July 11, this is to advise that posting of the recommended bid award to crime prevention security systems occurred as of this date and will remain posted for a three day period. Failure to file a protest within the time prescribed in s. 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under chapter 120, Florida Statutes. (Emphasis supplied) (HO Exhibit 2) There is no dispute that Petitioner actually received this written notice of decision or intended decision on July 16, 1991. This procedure complied with Respondent's obligations to provide notice of the award and a window for Petitioner's bid protest under the provisions of Section 120.53(5)(a). F.S. [1990 Supp.] and Respondent's rule (HO Exhibit 5). On July 17, 1991, the Petitioner's president filed with the Respondent a letter bearing that date which provided, in pertinent part, This letter is to inform you that Universal Network, Inc. is now formally protesting BID 341 "Bid Proposal For Furnishing Monitoring Security Systems." We base our protest on unpublished bid variances. (HO Exhibit 3) There is no dispute that this letter was filed with the Respondent within 72 hours "after the posting of the bid tabulation or after receipt of the notice of agency decision or intended decision." It clearly constituted the "notice of protest" contemplated by Section 120.53(5)(b) F.S. [1990 Supp.] and is timely under that statute. Under that statute and pursuant to Respondent's rule, the 10 days for filing the required formal written protest would have run out on July 29, 1991, a Monday, allowing for Saturday and Sunday. On July 24, 1991, five days before the formal written protest was due, Respondent's personnel telephoned the Petitioner's president and a conversation ensued. Upon the representations at formal hearing of Petitioner's president Daniel Boudreau, it is found that this conversation encouraged him to file another letter to the Respondent on July 31, 1991. (HO Exhibit 4) Petitioner's president asserted that Respondent's July 24, 1991 phone call was only to urge him to file a letter setting out his grounds for protest more fully so that the issues between Petitioner and Respondent could be resolved informally. Filing a letter which sets out the grounds for a notice of protest is a fair description of what a formal written protest is supposed to do, and it was Respondent's position that the phone call was to urge Petitioner to file its formal written protest. Whether or not the filing of this July 31, 1991 letter could constitute a means of informal resolution of the bid dispute as asserted by Petitioner is a legal issue and is discussed in the Conclusions of Law, infra, but it is undisputed that Respondent's telephone call of July 24, 1991 actually encouraged Mr. Boudreau to file a more detailed letter and did nothing to discourage filing a formal written protest, which formal written protest is mandatory under the applicable statute and rule. Nonetheless, Petitioner filed nothing whatsoever in writing with the Respondent between July 17, 1991 (the date of the notice of protest) and July 31, 1991. On July 31, 1991, Petitioner filed with the Respondent its letter which provided, in pertinent part: This letter is to inform you that Universal Network, Inc. has formally protested BID 341 "Bid Proposal for Furnishing Monitoring Security Systems." We base our protest on unpublished bid variances. Universal Network, Inc. is now asking for a formal hearing and also will be willing to submit a new bid with the SBAC corrected bid specification. Petitioner's July 31, 1991 letter goes on to compare how Petitioner's bid would be altered as of July 31, 1991 if the original bid specifications had specified or clarified certain items or terms and to show that Petitioner's July 2, 1991 bid price would have been lower if that had been the case. (HO Exhibit 4) Petitioner's July 31, 1991 letter clearly constituted Petitioner's "formal written protest" as contemplated by Section 120.53(5)(b) F.S. [1990 Supp.] and the rule and is untimely under that statute and rule.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the School Board of Alachua County enter a Final Order dismissing the protest/petition of Universal Network, Inc. RECOMMENDED this 19th day of September, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of September, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Dale A. Boudreau, President Universal Network, Inc. 1031 NW 6 Street, Suite A-3 Gainesville, FL 32601 Thomas L. Wittmer, Staff Attorney School Board of Alachua County 620 E. University Avenue Gainesville, FL 32601 Robert E. Roundtree, Jr., Esquire 111 SE 1st Avenue Gainesville, FL 32602 Dr. Douglas Magann, Superintendent Alachua County School Board 620 East University Avenue Gainesville, FL 32601
Findings Of Fact By Invitation to Bid for Lease NO. 590:1944, Respondent invited lease proposals for approximately 15,206 square feet of office space "located within the following boundaries: On the North, Aloma Avenue/Fairbanks Avenue the East, Semoran Boulevard the South, Colonial Drive, and on the West, Mills Avenue." The geographic area includes as many as 100 office buildings, although the invitation only generated three bids. The Invitation to Bid announced a Pre-Bid Conference on December 22, 1987. Interested parties were directed to contact Linda N. Treml, whose telephone number was provided, for "bid specifications and information regarding the space." The Invitation to Bid stated that "[a]ny questions concerning this project are to be directed to [Ms. Treml]" and "prospective bidders are encouraged to consult with [Ms. Treml] beforehand in an attempt to enable as correct a bid submittal as possible." The Invitation to Bid required that certain attachments accompany the bid proposal and referred the prospective bidder to paragraph 9 of the Bid submittal Form. The required attachments included a scaled floorplan "showing present configurations with measurements," net rentable square footage calculations using floorplan measurements, and a preliminary site layout. The Invitation to Bid stated that Respondent reserved the right to waive any minor informalities or technicality and seek clarification" of bids received, when such is in the best interest of the state. Responding to Respondent's newspaper advertisement and direct-mail solicitation for bids, James W. Boyle, who is a real estate broker active in leasing and property management, requested from Ms. Treml an Invitation to Bid and Bid Submittal Form. Mr. Boyle regularly reviews announcements of forthcoming leasing activity by state agencies. If he is aware of a building that appears to meet the agency's requirements, he contacts the building's owner or manager and informs him or her that he may have a prospective tenant. After receiving the bid materials for Lease No. 590:1944, Mr. Boyle contacted Kathryn Doyle, who is the leasing manager of Petitioner, and learned that Petitioner could accommodate Respondent's space needs for the term sought in the Lakeview 436 office building. Mr. Boyle assisted Ms. Doyle in the preparation of the Bid Submittal Form for Petitioner. In his first conversation with Ms. Doyle, Mr. Boyle ascertained that Petitioner's building carried a Semoran Boulevard street address and in fact had direct access to Semoran Boulevard. Petitioner's building lies on the east side of Semoran Boulevard, which serves as the eastern boundary of the geographic area described in the Invitation to Bid. Three bids were submitted in response to the subject Invitation to Bid. When they were opened, Ms. Treml and her supervisor, George A. Smith, determined that bids of Petitioner and a third party were nonresponsive because their office buildings were outside the geographic area specified in the Invitation to Bid. These bids were not considered further. Mr. Boyle had previously represented the owners of the FARE building several months earlier in a bid for Lease No. 590:1895. The Invitation to Bid in that case, which was issued by Respondent and named Ms. Treml as the contact person, provided that the proposed office space must be located within the following boundaries: Beginning at the intersection of US 17-92 and Colonial Drive, then west on Colonial Drive to the intersection of Edgewater Drive, then north on Edgewater Drive to the intersection of Kennedy Blvd. . ., then east on Kennedy Blvd. . . . to the intersection of US 17-92, then south on US 17- 92 to the point of beginning." Although Mr. Boyle's client was not awarded Lease NO. 590:1895 for reasons not relevant here, his client's bid, as well as the bid of another unsuccessful bidder owning a building on the east side of the highway serving as the east boundary of the geographic area, were considered responsive and thus within the specified geographic area. Ms. Treml interpreted the boundary description in Lease NO. 590:1944 differently from the boundary description in Lease NO. 590:1895. The description for Lease NO. 590:1895 defined the boundaries by "beginning" at a certain intersection, then proceeding "on" a highway, and so on. The description for Lease NO. 590:1944 defined the boundaries by identifying landmarks "on the north," then the "east," and so on. At the time of assisting in the preparation of Petitioner's bid, Mr. Boyle was also aware of an Invitation to Bid issued by Respondent for Lease NO. 590:1875. In this case, Respondent specified office space "in the following area of Brevard County, Florida: Beginning at the intersection of U.S. Highway 1 and State Road 50, then West on SR-50 to the intersection of 1-95, then North on 1-95 to the intersection of SR-406 . . . then East on SR-406 to the intersection of U.S. 1, then South on U.S. 1 to the point of beginning." In the case of Lease NO. 590:1875, the bid contact person, Lynn Mobley, issued a clarification letter stating that any building located on either side of the boundary road with an address on the boundary road would be considered to be within the boundary. Ms. Mobley and her supervisor, Ernest Wilson, who are Respondent's District 7 Facilities Services Assistant Manager and Manager, respectively, have consistently advised potential bidders that a building located on a boundary highway is included in the geographic area even though it would be outside the area if the dividing line were the centerline of the highway. Mary Goodman, Chief, Bureau of Property Management of the Department of General Services, testified that, in the course of her review of leasing activities by various state agencies, she has historically guided agencies that, if a building abuts a boundary highway but is not, strictly speaking, within it, the agency "could waive that as a minor technicality and consider it a responsive bid." Neither Mr. Boyle, Ms. Doyle, or any other representative of Petitioner spoke to Ms. Goodman prior to submitting the subject bid proposal. Ms. Treml customarily waives minor irregularities in bid submittals. However, she does not treat the location of a building outside the geographic area as a minor irregularity. To do so would be unfair to owners of other buildings outside the geographic area who took the geographic description at its face value and never submitted bids. Ms. Doyle received the bid materials from Mr. Boyle after the Pre-Bid Conference had taken place. However, Mr. Boyle elected not to attend the Pre- Bid Conference at which Ms. Treml explained, among other things, her interpretation of the specific geographic area. He chose not to attend because he felt that he would not learn anything relevant at the conference, which was attended by a representative of Intervenor. Neither Mr. Boyle, Ms. Doyle, or any other representative of Petitioner contacted Ms. Treml prior to submitting Petitioner's bid. Mr. Boyle, whose compensation in this case is entirely contingent upon a successful bid, estimates that he spent about 20 hours working on Petitioner's bid. Ms. Doyle estimates that she spent about 40 hours working on the bid. Petitioner also spent $800 in obtaining an "as-built" drawing of the space that accompanied its proposal. By letter dated February 22, 1988, Respondent notified the bidders of its decision to award the lease contract to Intervenor. Petitioner filed a notice of intent to protest the award by letter dated February 24, 1988. Ms. Treml met Mr. Boyle and Ms. Doyle on March 1, 1988, and cited the location of Petitioner's building as the only reason for the determination of nonresponsiveness. The attempt at mediation having failed, Petitioner filed a formal written protest of the award by letter dated March 3, 1988. Petitioner attached to its bid proposal an "as-built" drawing. Although drawn to scale, the drawing did not bear the measurements of the then- present interior tenant improvements, mostly walls, nor did it disclose on its face any calculations showing how the rentable area was computed from the gross area. These omissions were due to Mr. Boyle's advice to Ms. Doyle that such information would be unnecessary in this case. The omissions from Petitioner's "as-built" drawing were rendered less critical by the fact that Respondent would have the right under the lease to require the landlord, at its expense, to remove the present improvements and re- configure the space to Respondent's demands. However, one purpose of the floorplan is to show where the space is located within the building. Another purpose is to verify the rentable area calculation by showing the measurements of items, such as restrooms, that should not be included in the rentable area for which Respondent is charged rent. The drawing is supposed to show the rentable area computation. Additionally, even though Respondent could insist on a total renovation of the premises, Respondent might wish to evaluate whether it could use a portion of the existing space in order to reduce the possibility of construction delays. George A. Smith, the Senior Management Analyst for Respondent who reviewed Ms. Treml's determination of nonresponsiveness prior to the award of the subject lease, testified that the deficiencies in Petitioner's "as-built" drawing were not a "minor irregularity."
