Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent, Richard Tortora (Tortora), held pari-mutuel wagering occupational license number 0066650, as a thoroughbred trainer. Tortora has been licensed since 1979, and has not previously been the subject of a disciplinary proceeding. Tortora was a participating trainer during the 1956 thoroughbred meet at Calder Race Course, an association authorized to conduct thoroughbred racing in the State of Florida. On August 2, 1986, Tortora was the trainer of the horse "Chief Again," the winner of the fourth race at Calder Race Course that day. Immediately following the race, the Division, consistent with its standard practice, took a urine sample from "Chief Again" for analysis by the Division's laboratory. The parties have stipulated that the chain of custody of the urine sample was not breached, and that the urine sample was properly taken, packaged and delivered to the Division's laboratory for testing. The parties have further stipulated that a portion of the urine sample was delivered to Dr. Richard Sams, Equine Testing Laboratory, College of Veterinary Medicine, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, for testing on behalf of Tortora, and that such sample was properly taken, packaged, and delivered. Upon analysis, the urin sample taken from "chief Again" proved positive for the presence of the drug butorphanol, a schedule 3 narcotic. Butorphanol is a potent analgesic, traditionally used to control the intestinal pain associated with equine colic. In therapeutic dosage, butorphanol renders the animal immobile, however, at low dosages it will act as a stimulant. In reaching the conclusion that "Chief Again" was shown to have raced with the narcotic butorphanol in his system, the evidence offered on behalf of Tortora, through Drs. Sams and Maylin, has not been overlooked. Such evidence failed, however to detract from the credible and compelling nature of the Division's proof. The Division's analysis was composed of sequential screening procedures designed to initially identify the presence of an unusual substance and ultimately identify the compound. Throughout the Division's initial procedures, the urine taken from "Chief Again" was consistently identified as containing an opiate with characteristics consistent with those of butorphanol. Ultimately the Division subjected the sample to gas chromatographic/mass spectral analysis. This refined analysis confirmed the presence of butorphonal. The consistency of the Division's findings at all levels of its testing provides compelling evidence that the urine sample taken from "Chief Again" did contain the narcotic butorphonal. Following the Division's testing, Tortora requested that it furnish the balance of the urine sample taken from "Chief Again", approximately 2om1, to Dr. Richard Sams for analysis. Dr. Sams subjected the sample to gas chromatographic/mass spectral analysis and found no evidence of butorphanol. While finding no evidence of butorphanol, Dr. Sams did not conclude that the sample did not contain the narcotic, but merely that he was unable to detect its presence. According to Dr. Sams, the limited volume of urine available for testing compromised his ability to detect the presence of butorphanol. He affirmatively concluded, however, that the Division's data was properly prepared and adequate to support a positive finding of butorphanol in the sample. Dr. Maylin's testimony was premised on a review of Dr. Sams' and the Division's written test reports, he undertook no independent analysis, and was not privy to any testimony offered at hearing. Dr. Maylin opined that if butorphanol were present Dr. Sams should have detected it and, based on certain assumptions, that the Division reported a false finding because of laboratory contamination. Dr. Maylin's opinions are rejected. Dr. Sams is familiar with the equipment and procedures he utilized. He of all people is most familiar with the capabilities and reliability of that analysis. Dr. Maylin's opinion that the analysis ran by Dr. Sams had more import than Dr. Sams ascribed to it is not credible. Dr. Maylin's opinion that the Division reported a false finding is likewise not credited. Dr. Maylin's opinion was predicated on the assumption that proper testing procedures were not followed. Dr. Maylin's assumptions were incorrect. While "Chief Again's" urine was found to test positive for butorphanol, Tortora denies any knowledge of how the narcotic could have been introduced into the horse's system. According to Tortora he was unfamiliar with this narcotic until these charges were brought, and "Chief Again" was not under any medical treatment. Tortora offered no evidence, however, of what provisions he took, if any, to supervise or otherwise protect "Chief Again's" integrity.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioners own and operate a farm in St. Johns County, Florida. During the 1991 potato-growing season, they grew atlantic chipping potatoes on their 400-acre farm, as well as on approximately 30 acres leased from another party by their daughter and son-in-law. The Petitioners' business is known as Pacetti Farms. Rubin is an Illinois corporation licensed to do business in Florida as a broker or dealer in agricultural products. Rubin customarily purchases potatoes from growers throughout the country at the appropriate season for resale, typically to various potato chip manufacturing companies. Mr. Rubin appeared at the hearing and testified on behalf of Rubin and as an adverse witness on behalf of the Petitioners. Rubin is licensed and bonded with a surety bond from Continental in accordance with the statutory authority cited below, enforced and regulated by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services ("Department"). On December 22, 1990, the Petitioners and Rubin entered into a written contract for the sale and purchase of 50,000 CWT of Florida atlantic chipping potatoes. That contract is in evidence as Exhibit 3 and is also known as the "set price contract". The contract called for shipment of the potatoes at a stated price of $6.35 per CWT, although the parties have stipulated and agreed that the actual contract price was intended as $6.00 per CWT. That figure is not in dispute in this proceeding. Shipment was to be made during the harvesting season between the dates of April 27, 1991 and June 15, 1991. The contract contained an escape clause or exception for "acts of God", with an explanatory parenthetic clause indicating that that was intended to mean circumstances beyond the control of the parties, such as flood, freeze, hail, etc. On or about February 15, 1991, severe cold weather struck the potato- growing area of St. Johns County, Florida. Temperatures ranged from 25 degrees to 19 degrees on that day, with a high wind blowing and very dry conditions. This resulted in soil being blown away from the newly-set potatoes under very cold temperatures. Because of this, the Petitioners had to work with tractors and cultivators far into the night to turn the blown-away soil back into the potato "sets". The Petitioners feared that this would cause some "dry eyes" and, therefore, lowered potato plant and potato production. In fact, however, upon observing the maturing plants during April of 1991, it appeared that the Petitioners would have a healthy, normal crop. The prior year the Petitioners had grown 133,000 CWT of potatoes on their 400 acres (excluding the Kirkers' 30 acres). With this background of an apparently-healthy crop in mind, the Petitioners were approached by Rubin on April 25, 1991 and negotiations ensued which resulted in the sale and purchase from Petitioners to Rubin of six additional loads of potatoes at the open market price of $19.50 per CWT. The six additional loads were in addition to the 50,000 CWT of potatoes agreed upon in the main contract entered into on December 22, 1990. This separate oral agreement for the six loads of potatoes at the market price of $19.50 per CWT was entered into prior to the Petitioners initiating delivery under the terms of the written contract of December 22, 1990. The parties thus agreed for the sale and purchase of six loads of potatoes at that market price to be delivered on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday of the following week, April 29th, April 30th, and May 1, 1991. Part of the consideration for that oral contract was the Petitioners' ability to furnish the six truckloads of potatoes on short notice, on the dates that Rubin required them. In other words, Rubin needed them in a hurry; and it was apparently worth $19.50 per CWT for him to get the potatoes delivered immediately on the dates requested. In the process of negotiating this oral contract, the Petitioners assured Rubin that he would have sufficient potatoes to meet his 50,000 CWT obligation under the written contract of December 22, 1990. This was not a misrepresentation on the part of the Petitioners, at this time, because the Petitioners, in good faith, believed they would be able to meet the 50,000 CWT set price contract and the oral contract for six additional truckloads, because of their belief concerning their crop estimate. This belief was based upon their observance of an apparently healthy crop and their knowledge that on their 400 acres, the year before, they had grown 133,000 CWT, as well as upon their knowledge that a normal crop estimate for the entire 430 acres at this location, under all of the prevailing circumstances, was 120,400 CWT. In fact, the Petitioners only contracted for 116,650 CWT of potatoes which, based upon a reasonable and appropriate crop estimate for this site and circumstances, would have allowed them to meet all their contracts, including the 50,000 CWT contract between the Petitioners and Rubin, although not all of the market sales for the Kirkers. After having thus assured Mr. Rubin that they could meet the contract of December 22, 1990 and still perform the oral contract for the six truckloads at market price, the Petitioners proceeded to carry out that oral agreement. It was a separate and distinct contract from the written contract dated December 22, 1990. Under the separate oral contract, they delivered the six truckloads of potatoes requested by Rubin. Rubin received them and paid $19.50 per CWT for them. On May 2, 1990, the Petitioners began delivering potatoes to Rubin under the terms and conditions of the written contract of December 22, 1990 and continued the deliveries throughout the remainder of the harvesting season. The first was shipped from Pacetti Farms on May 2, 1991 and the last load delivered to Rubin on that contract was shipped on June 1, 1991. During the 1991 growing and harvesting season, the area, including St. Johns County, experienced substantial crop damage due to excessive frost, rain, hail, and wind, which occurred during February of 1991 and then after April 25, 1991, with particular regard to excessive rainfall in May of 1991. This resulted in the area being declared an agricultural disaster area by the United States Department of Agriculture for that growing season. The Petitioners suffered damage to their crop as a result of these elements in February of 1991, as described above, and by excessive rainfall during May of 1991. Excessive rainfall caused root damage to their crop, which resulted in a lowered yield even though the plants viewed above ground appeared to be normal. This was aggravated by the fact that the Petitioners and other growers were legally unable to use the pesticide "Temik", for control of nematodes, during that growing season. Because of the nature of the crop involved, which grows underground, the potato yield is difficult to estimate at any given point in harvesting. The exact nature and extent of damage caused by weather conditions to a single crop is hard to estimate in advance. This difficulty is further compounded by differing soil types and climate conditions present within a particular growing area, especially with regard to farmers such as the Petitioners, who have their crops spread over multiple fields and farms. In mid-May of 1991, the Petitioners realized that there would be a crop shortage. The crop was damaged due to the weather-related factors mentioned above. The Petitioners notified Rubin that they expected their potato crop to fall short of expectations and that they would probably be unable to completely fill the contract with Rubin for the entire 50,000 CWT contracted for on December 22, 1990. In the meantime, before the 1991 planting season began, the Petitioners and Renee and Keith Kirker had entered into an agreement, whereby the Kirkers initiated their own farming operation on 30 acres of potato-growing land. The Kirkers leased that acreage from Diane Ross and received operating assistance from the Petitioners in the form of advances of all their operating costs, pursuant to an agreement between the Petitioners and the Kirkers, whereby the Petitioners would be repaid the estimated production costs for that 30-acre crop in the amount of $1,776.85 per acre, upon the sale of those 30 acres of potatoes. Potatoes are planted and harvested in the same sequence. Since the Petitioners assisted the Kirkers in planting their potatoes prior to the planting and completion of their own fields, the Petitioners borrowed some of the Kirkers' potatoes to fill their own contracts because those potatoes matured earlier, with the understanding that the Kirkers would be repaid in kind from the Petitioners' own fields during the remainder of the harvesting season. This is a common practice according to Ronald Brown, who testified for the Petitioners as an expert witness on farming practices. However, after the heavy rains in May of 1991, the Petitioners discovered that it would be necessary, in their view, to retain a portion of their last acreage in order to have potatoes to pay back the Kirkers for the potatoes borrowed. These potatoes would be sold by the Petitioners at market price, as agreed with the Kirkers. Upon discovering that their crop would not meet their contract obligations, the Petitioners attempted to prorate their remaining potatoes between their remaining contract customers in what they considered a fair and reasonable manner. On behalf of the Kirkers, the potatoes allocated for repayment to them were offered to Rubin, who, through its President, Mr. Rubin, declined to purchase them at the market price at which they were offered (higher than the contract price). The Petitioners' expert, Ronald Brown, established that, based upon accepted growers practices and his experience in the Hastings area, the Petitioners should have anticipated the yield for their 1991 crop at no more than 280 CWT per acre for the Petitioners' 430 acres (30 acres of which was the Kirkers' land). It is customary farming practice in the area, according to Brown, to enter into contracts for no more than 80% of the maximum anticipated yield of potatoes. The anticipated yield on the entire 430 acres of the Petitioners' and the Kirkers' land was, therefore, 120,400 CWT of potatoes. The principle of contracting no more than 80% of a maximum anticipated yield is designed to protect contracting parties in the event a smaller than anticipated yield occurs. A 280 CWT per acre yield is the generally-accepted yield amount under good growing conditions, according to Mr. Brown. The year before, the Petitioners had produced a total yield of 133,000 CWT on only 400 acres. The Petitioners entered into a total of six separate contracts for delivery of a total of 116,650 CWT of potatoes out of a reasonably anticipated maximum yield for the 430 acres of only 120,400 CWT. Thus, the Petitioners contracted 97% of the customary, accepted, anticipated maximum yield for the 430 acres for 1991. Thirty (30) of those acres, however, represent the potatoes which the Petitioners were obligated to the Kirkers to sell on their behalf at market price, rather than contract price. In spite of the fact that the Petitioners contracted 97% of the accepted, projected crop yield for 430 acres, the Petitioners, in fact, produced 117,000 CWT (approximate) on those 430 acres. Therefore, had they not diverted a certain amount of the crop to open market sales, they could have met their 116,650 CWT contractual obligations to the six contracting parties, including Rubin. It is also true, however, that that 117,000 CWT actual yield included the 30 acres of potatoes which the Petitioners were separately obligated to sell at open market price to repay the Kirkers. Notwithstanding the fact that the Petitioners had contracted 97% of the commonly-accepted, projected maximum yield, the Petitioners diverted 10,301.6 CWT of the 1991 crop on the entire 430 acres from contract sales to open market sales at much higher prices. Of those open market sales, 2,789.5 CWT were sold at market price after the last contract sales were made to Rubin. Had the Petitioners sold the entire 10,301.6 CWT of potatoes on contract, instead of at open market, all of the Petitioners' contractual requirements could have been met, including the contract with Rubin, although they would not then have been able to meet their obligations to the Kirkers. Based upon the above Findings of Fact supported by competent evidence, it is found that the preponderant evidence in this case does not support the Petitioners' contention that the Petitioners were unable to fulfill their contract obligation to Rubin due to an act of God. Although it is true that the Petitioners established that poor weather conditions, coupled with the absence of the ability to use the pesticide "Temik", had a deleterious effect on their crop production. The record shows that in spite of this, the Petitioners had the ability to fulfill their contract with Rubin if only approximately 5,000 CWT of the 10,301.6 CWT of potatoes sold on the open market had instead been allocated to the Petitioners' contract with Rubin to fill out the difference between the approximately 45,000 CWT honored under the contract and the contractual obligation to supply 50,000 CWT. The Petitioners produced on their own 400 acres 108,000 CWT. The remainder of the 117,582.5 CWT of potatoes from the total crop represented the potatoes grown on the Kirkers' 30 acres. Thus, the Kirkers' land produced approximately 8,600 CWT. The Petitioners supplied approximately 3,000 CWT under the separate, oral contract at market price and which were delivered to Rubin on April 29th, 30th, and May 1st (six loads at approximately 500 CWT per load). Then, the Petitioners sold the remainder of the total of 10,301.6 CWT of the entire Pacetti/Kirker crop or approximately 7,301.6 CWT on open market sales to others. The remainder of the 108,000 CWT grown on the Petitioners' own 400 acres, not sold to Rubin under the contract of December 22, 1990 or under the oral contract of April 25, 1991 (the six loads at market), were contracted out to other buyers. The ultimate effect of these contracts was that the Petitioners had contracted for 116,650 CWT. Thus, the Petitioners had imprudently contracted approximately 97% of the accepted, projected crop yield of 120,400 CWT, knowing that they were obligated to sell the Kirkers 8,600 or so CWT at market price and not on contract. Thus, the Petitioners clearly over- contracted the crop yield which they reasonably should have expected on the total 430 acres under the generally-accepted method of calculation of crop yield, under good growing conditions, of 280 CWT per acre, established by expert witness, Brown. This over-contracting practice, together with selling an excess amount of potatoes at market price (over and above those sold at market by the separate, oral contract with Rubin at the initial part of the harvesting season), is what actually prevented the Petitioners from fulfilling Rubin's contract of 50,000 CWT, rather than an act of God, predetermined condition for claiming impossibility of performance on that contract due to the above- described weather conditions. Even though the Petitioners were obligated to sell the Kirkers' entire 30 acres of yield, approximately 8,600 CWT, at market price, the Petitioners would still have had enough potatoes, even with their less-than-expected yield of 108,000 CWT represented by their own 400 acres, to have filled out the Rubin contract if they had not contracted out so many potatoes to other contracting buyers and had not sold as many potatoes at market price off contract as, indeed, they sold. Since the act of God condition is not what prevented the Petitioners from filling the written contract with Rubin for 50,000 CWT, it is clear that the Petitioners thus breached that contract. In this connection, it should be pointed out that the written contract with Rubin was entered into before any of the other contracts for the potato crop in question. The two contracts with Rubin are, however, separate contracts. The Petitioners established that there was a separate oral agreement entered into on April 25th between the Petitioners and Rubin and that the consideration flowing from the Petitioners to Mr. Rubin was that he needed the six loads of potatoes on short notice delivered on specific dates, April 29th, 30th, and May 1st, for which he was willing, therefore, to pay the $19.50 market price, knowing that it was for other potatoes that he contracted at $6.00. The Petitioners performed by providing the loads of potatoes when he wanted them and he paid for them in full. Thus, that contract was executed by consideration passing from each party to the other, and the contract was completed. The written contract with Rubin dated December 22, 1990 for the 50,000 CWT was the contract which the Petitioners breached for the above-found reasons. Rubin would, therefore, be entitled to damages for that breach based upon the facts proven in this case. There is no counterclaim or other action pending in this forum by Rubin against the Petitioners, however. Consequently, any damages proven by the breach of the written contract can only, at best, be applied against the amount due and owing the Petitioners for the billed, but unpaid, loads; that is, against the amount in controversy of $40,015.20. Rubin, however, has not produced any evidence to show what his damages might be. The record establishes, as found above, that, of the 48,361 CWT of potatoes delivered to Rubin, approximately 3,000 of which were delivered under the separate oral contract for six loads, Rubin only received approximately 45,000 CWT under the 50,000 CWT written contract. Thus, Rubin would appear to be entitled to damages caused by failing to get the last approximately 5,000 CWT of potatoes. The record, however, does not establish what those damages might be because it is not established whether Rubin had to purchase potatoes from another source at a higher price to meet the remainder of the 50,000 CWT amount, or, conversely, whether Rubin was able to purchase them from another source at a lower price than the $6.00 per CWT contract price, so that Rubin would actually benefit by the Petitioners' breach of that contract. Neither does the record reflect another possible scenario whereby Rubin might have simply accepted the approximate 5,000 CWT shortage and simply lost customers and potential profits represented by that amount of potatoes, or, finally, whether he simply did not purchase the shortage of 5,000 CWT from another source and had no missed sales for that amount of potatoes anyway and, therefore, no loss and no damage. The record simply does not reflect what Rubin's damages might have been because of the shortage under the written contract deliveries. In any event, the record evidence establishes that the oral contract was fully performed, with consideration flowing to each of the parties and that those potatoes were fully paid for at the market price. Then, the Petitioners delivered the written contract loads at $6.00 per CWT to Rubin represented by the claimed $40,015.00. That remains unpaid by Rubin. Rubin is obligated to pay that amount because Rubin was obligated to, and received those potatoes at the $6.00 contract price. Rubin would then appear to be entitled to claim damages if, indeed, any were suffered, for the breach of that written contract by the Petitioners' failure to supply the last (approximate) 5,000 CWT due Rubin under that contract. That resolution of their dispute, however, cannot be performed in this forum because of insufficient evidence, as delineated above, and remains to be resolved by another action by Rubin in another forum.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Respondents, Jack Rubin & Son, Inc. and Continental Casualty Co., Inc. be found jointly and severally liable for payment of $40,015.20 to the Petitioners for potatoes delivered to the Respondent, Jack Rubin & Son, Inc., for which payment has not yet been made. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of November, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of November, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-548A Petitioners' Proposed Findings of Fact 1-16. Accepted. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1. Accepted, in part, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter because the evidence establishes that 30 acres of potatoes belonged to the Kirkers even though Pacetti Farms was responsible for all operations with regard to planting and harvesting those 30 acres, furnishing costs, operational expertise, equipment and labor as an advance against the Kirkers' crop sale. 2-5. Accepted, except that it is not found that the entire 430 acres of potatoes were the Petitioners' potatoes. 30 acres of potatoes belonged to the Kirkers. Rejected, as not entirely in accordance with the preponderant weight of the evidence and subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and not entirely in accordance with the preponderant weight of the evidence, to the extent that the 97% of the accepted projected crop yield contracted for by the Petitioners represents an inclusion of the 30 acres of the Kirkers' potatoes in that percentage of crop yield projection. This is erroneous because the 30 acres were the Kirkers' potatoes which the Petitioners were handling for them. Accepted in concept, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and not entirely in accordance with the preponderant evidence of record. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as not entirely in accordance with the preponderant weight of the evidence and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, Esq. General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 John Michael Traynor, Esquire Charles E. Pellicer, Esquire 28 Cordova Street St. Augustine, Florida 32084 C. Holt Smith, III, Esquire 3100 University Boulevard So. Suite 101 Jacksonville, FL 32016
The Issue Whether or not the agency may, pursuant to Section 525.06, F.S. enter an assessment for sale of substandard product due to a violation of the petroleum inspection laws and also set off that amount against Respondent's bond.
Findings Of Fact Frank Hampton, d/b/a Hampton's Gulf Station, has operated at 2610 North Myrtle Avenue, Jacksonville, for many years and has had no prior complaints against it by the Petitioner. Respondent is in the business of selling kerosene, among other petroleum products. The facts in this case are largely undisputed. On November 28, 1990, Bill Ford, an inspector employed with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, visited the Respondent's premises to conduct an inspection of the petroleum products being offered for sale to the public. Ford drew a sample of "1-K" kerosene being offered for sale, sealed it, and forwarded it to the agency laboratory in Tallahassee where John Anderson, under the supervision of Nancy Fischer, an agency chemist, tested it to determine whether the sample met agency standards. The testing revealed that the sampled kerosene contained .21% by weight of sulfur. This in excess of the percentage by weight permitted by Rule 5F- 2.001(2) F.A.C. for this product, but it would qualify as "2-K" kerosene. A "Stop Sale Notice" was issued, and on the date of that notice (November 30, 1990) the tank from which the test sample had been drawn contained 3887 gallons of product. It was determined from Respondent's records that 4392 gallons had been sold to the public since the last delivery of 5500 gallons on November 16, 1990. The product was sold at $1.58 per gallon. The calculated retail value of the product sold was determined to be in excess of $1,000.00, and the agency permitted the seller to post a bond for $1,000.00 (the maximum legal penalty/bond) on December 3, 1990. The assessment is reasonable and conforms to the amount of assessments imposed in similar cases. On this occasion, Respondent had purchased the kerosene in question from a supplier which is not its usual wholesale supplier. This was the first time Respondent had ever ordered from this supplier and it is possible there was some miscommunication in the order, but Respondent intended to order pure "1-K" kerosene. Respondent only purchased from this supplier due to the desperate need in the community for kerosene during the unusually cold weather that occurred during the fall of 1990. Respondent ordered "1-K" kerosene and believed that "1-K" had been delivered to it by the new wholesale supplier up until the agency inspector sampled Respondent's tank. After posting bond, Respondent originally intended to send the unused portion of "2-K" kerosene back to its supplier, but instead was granted permission by the agency to relabel the remaining product so that the label would correctly reflect that the product was "2-K." Respondent accordingly charged only the lesser rate appropriate to "2-K" kerosene for sale of the remaining 3887 gallons.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Cnsumer Services enter a final order approving the $1,000.00 maximum penalty and offsetting the bond against it. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of June, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED TO: FRANK HAMPTON HAMPTON VILLA APARTMENTS 3190 WEST EDGEWOOD AVENUE JACKSONVILLE, FL 32209 CLINTON COULTER, JR. ESQUIRE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES (LEGAL) MAYO BUILDING, ROOM 510 TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-0800 HONORABLE BOB CRAWFORD COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE THE CAPITOL, PL-10 TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-0810 RICHARD TRITSCHLER, GENERAL COUNSEL DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES 515 MAYO BUILDING TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-0800
The Issue Whether Respondent Employer is guilty of an unlawful employment practice by discrimination in its failure to promote Petitioner on the basis of her race and/or gender.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female. Respondent is a constitutional office of local government that appraises property for tax purposes. At hearing, Petitioner claimed to have sent a written narrative of her concerns to FCHR on December 20, 2005, although she did not file her formal Charge of Discrimination until December 28, 2005.1/ At the commencement of the disputed-fact hearing, Petitioner indicated that the only issue to be determined was her entitlement to a promotion, and that no other discrimination claims were at issue in this case. Petitioner also indicated that she was challenging only two alleged promotional decisions: (1) a front counter position awarded to Valencia Scott; and (2) a sales qualifier position awarded to Mike Nichols.2/ Prior to being employed by Respondent, Petitioner had received a B.S. in criminal justice, with a minor in business administration, from Troy State University. Prior to being employed by Respondent, Petitioner worked as a substance abuse counselor with Corrections Corporation of America; as a regulatory specialist with the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation; as an evaluation specialist with Disc Village; as a drug treatment counselor with the Alabama Department of Corrections; and as a mental health associate with Tallahassee Memorial Hospital. During her employment with Respondent, Petitioner also worked part-time in a cleaning job. Petitioner was initially hired by Respondent approximately January 2003, as an “Other Personal Services” (OPS) employee. (Stipulated Fact). While serving as an OPS employee between January 2003, and October 2003, Petitioner was not entitled to, and did not receive, the usual benefits and emoluments of a regular, full-time employee, including but not limited to, membership in the Florida Retirement System, paid annual and sick leave, and health insurance. While employed as an OPS employee, Petitioner answered Respondent’s telephone switchboard and performed data entry duties. In approximately October 2003, Petitioner was employed in a full-time position at a higher rate of pay and full benefits. (Stipulated Fact.) In October 2003, Respondent promoted Petitioner into a newly-created full-time position of "switchboard operator." Prior to the creation of this switchboard operator position, various employees had worked the switchboard in the equivalent of four-hour shifts, because working the switchboard non-stop was monotonous in good times and was hectic and stressful due to the number of phone calls received during two peak periods each year. On some occasions prior to October 2003, part-time students also had been used for this purpose. Petitioner was offered the promotion on October 8, 2003, with an effective starting date of October 16, 2003. Upon this starting date, Petitioner was employed by Respondent in a full-time position at a higher rate of pay than she had received as an OPS employee, and began to receive retirement benefits, annual and sick leave, and health insurance. In 2003, Respondent promoted five employees. Four of the five promoted were African-American and/or female. Petitioner was one of the four African-American females promoted that year. From December 28, 2004, through December 28, 2005, none of Respondent’s employees were promoted. During this same period, Respondent had no promotional opportunities of any kind available to any employee. There also were no promotions between December 20, 2004, and December 28, 2005. (See Exhibit P-4 and Finding of Fact 11.) Petitioner received raises throughout her employment with Respondent. During busy times, she was provided additional assistance with her phone duties upon her request, because management agreed with her that the switchboard position was stressful. Petitioner consistently received excellent performance reviews. In September 2005, Petitioner asked her immediate supervisor, Shirley Eaton-Marks, where Respondent would advertise a front-counter position that was expected to become vacant. Petitioner testified that Ms. Eaton-Marks “vaguely” responded, "I am not sure. Sometimes on the Internet or in the [Tallahassee] Democrat."3/ In or about September 2005, Petitioner was provided an extended period of leave for back surgery and recovery. (Stipulated Fact.) Petitioner was on sick leave from September 28, 2005, through November 14, 2005. Respondent provided Petitioner as much leave as she needed for her surgery and recovery. When she ran out of her own accrued paid leave, sick leave was donated to Petitioner by a co-employee. During her leave of absence, food drop-offs to Petitioner’s home were coordinated by her co-employees. Hot meals were provided by co-employees to Petitioner and her family, as well as groceries. During one of these deliveries, Petitioner remarked to Michele Weathersby, Respondent's Chief Financial Officer, that Petitioner was appreciative of her co- workers’ efforts and gifts. Petitioner seemed genuinely overwhelmed by their generosity. While on sick leave, Petitioner spoke with Kathy Doolin, Assistant Property Appraiser, about working at the front counter. A sales qualifier position was not available at that time, and by all accounts, even Petitioner’s account, Petitioner never applied for, or made anyone in Respondent's office aware that she was interested in the sales qualifier position. Petitioner claims she was wrongfully denied a front- counter position. She also claims that the front counter position and sales qualifier positions constituted promotional positions for her. Petitioner’s definition of a “promotion” is moving into a position with greater job responsibility and more authority. However, she did not demonstrate what the job responsibilities and authority of the front-counter or sales qualifier positions were. Therefore, the respective responsibility and authority of the three positions cannot be compared. Petitioner has never specifically applied for any promotion while employed by Respondent. The front-counter position was filled by Valencia Scott. Ms. Scott, like Petitioner, is an African-American female. According to Michelle Weathersby, Respondent’s Chief Financial Officer, Respondent defines a “promotion” as moving an employee to a position with an increase in salary and perhaps an increase in benefits, such as a different benefits classification like “senior management” class, instead of “regular employee” class. By these standards, neither the front desk position nor the sales qualifier position would have constituted a promotion for Petitioner, and moving from a front desk position to the sales qualifier position would not have constituted a promotion for anyone. Petitioner returned from sick leave on November 14, 2005. On December 19, 2005, Petitioner requested to speak to the incumbent property appraiser. Petitioner testified that on December 20, 2005, she approached the incumbent property appraiser in his office and asked if he were aware that she was interested in promotion. She further testified that the Incumbent then stated that he was aware Petitioner was interested in promotion, but that "Speaking from the hardhat point of view, you were hired as a favor to my friend. I did not hire you to be promoted or trained in any other position." At hearing, the Property Appraiser emphatically denied making this statement or any similar statement. However, he acknowledged that he had hired Petitioner upon the recommendation of a mutual friend and that on December 20, 2005, Petitioner had come to speak to him about the stress she was feeling in her position as a switchboard operator and about her health problems. Kathy Doolin, who was present for most, but not all, of the December 20, 2005, meeting, also denied under oath that the comment described by the Petitioner had been made by the Incumbent while she was in the room. Further, she confirmed that the thrust of Petitioner's remarks in her presence were not about any promotion but were about the stress Petitioner was experiencing in her switchboard operator job. The testimony of Ms. Doolin, together with the respective narratives written by herself and Petitioner (Exhibits P-2 and P-5) immediately after the December 20, 2005, meeting strongly suggest that the incumbent property appraiser said he had done all he could to relieve Petitioner's job stress and could not transfer Petitioner to another position just because her current position was stressful, and that Petitioner heard these statements as a refusal to promote her at any future date and a lack of appreciation for Petitioner’s college degree and excellent work history. The Incumbent’s and Petitioner’s respective versions of the December 20, 2005, conversation amount to an equipoise of testimony. In other words, one says "yes," and one says "no." This type of evidence is insufficient to tip the balance of weight and credibility to Petitioner's version of events. Moreover, even if Petitioner's version of the Incumbent's December 20, 2005, statement to her, allegedly made outside Ms. Doolin’s presence, were the more credible version, which it is not, Petitioner’s version of what the Incumbent allegedly said expressed no racial or gender bias. Petitioner testified that she believed that what the incumbent property appraiser had said on December 20, 2005, and how he had said it, created a hostile work environment. However, Petitioner never filed any internal complaints with Respondent alleging that she had been subjected to a hostile work environment. In fact, she filed no internal discrimination complaints of any kind concerning the December 20, 2005, meeting, and the term "hostile work environment" did not appear until her July 6, 2006, Petition for Relief, which was filed after FCHR's "Determination: No Cause." On her lunch hour, either December 20 or 21, 2005, Petitioner telephoned her physician, because she was still upset by her perception of the December 20, 2005, meeting. Petitioner never returned to work after December 21, 2005. On December 23, 2005, Petitioner's doctor wrote a note for her to be off work from December 22, 2005, until January 2, 2006, due to undefined "significant health problems." On or about December 23, 2005, three days after the December 20, 2005 meeting, when Petitioner was no longer on the job, Mike Nichols, a Caucasian male, was transferred from the front counter into a sales qualifier position. Mr. Nichols had previously worked in Respondent's Deed Section and in its Mapping Section and had recently received his law degree from the University of Florida. Respondent considered Mr. Nichols to be a suitable candidate for the sales qualifier position. Upon transfer, Mr. Nichols did not receive a raise in his rate of pay. Petitioner never applied for the sales qualifier position (see Finding of Fact 18) and was not on the job when that position was filled. (See Finding of Fact 29.) While the duties of a sales qualifier were not developed at hearing, the job title “sales qualifier” suggests that Petitioner was arguably not as good a fit for the sales qualifier position, as was Mr. Nichols. Petitioner’s education was primarily in criminal justice, and her job experience was primarily in drug rehabilitation and answering a switchboard. Mr. Nichols’ legal education and training and his office experience with Respondent may have made him a superior candidate for the sales qualifier position. When contacted by her superiors, Petitioner gave no reason for leaving work, except that it would be "best under the circumstances." On January 4, 2006, Petitioner voluntarily resigned her employment with Respondent. (Stipulated Fact.)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief and its subordinate Charge of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of November, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November, 2006.
Findings Of Fact On March 14, 1984, an inspector for the Petitioner, examined gasoline storage facilities from which Respondent, Zippy Mart #145 was dispensing gasoline. This store is found at 12524 San Juan Boulevard, Jacksonville, Duval County, Florida, (This product that was being dispensed by the Respondent at this location was the subject of consumer complaint.) Subsequent testing of the product known as Zippy Unleaded, as taken from the storage tank, revealed a 90 percent evaporated temperature of 376 degrees Fahrenheit and an end point of 493 degrees Fahrenheit. This was in keeping with laboratory procedures of the Petitioner. These matters were retested showing 90 percent evaporated temperature of 379 degrees and a 489 degree Fahrenheit end point. In lieu of the confiscation of the three thousand gallons which remained in the subject tank, related to the unleaded fuel at the store location, Respondent was allowed to post a bond in the amount of a thousand dollars and to remove the product from the premises and place new product in the tank. The reason for the values as shown in the sample pertaining to the 90 percent evaporated temperature and end point was due to the presence of diesel fuel within the tank designated for unleaded gasoline. The product as dispensed from that tank would cause engine damage to the automobile using that fuel, as evidenced by knocking and poor acceleration.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Vernon Thomas, who is black, began working at the Tampa plant of the Respondent, Davies Can Company, in 1971. By 1990, he was working as a mechanic in the production department. In April, 1990, the Respondent's three-year labor union contract with the United Steelworkers of America covering its plant in Tampa, Florida, was due to expire. Knowing it was opening three new plants closer to its new sources of supply of raw material (tin plate), the Respondent was unsure how long it would continue to operate the Tampa plant and would only agree to extend the union contract for one year. During quarterly profit-sharing meetings with the union and the Tampa plant employees, the Respondent kept the union and the employees apprised of the company's plans. All were aware of the distinct possibility that the Tampa plant would be closed at the expiration of the extended union contract in April, 1991. Some employees at the Tampa plant, primarily supervisory and office personnel, were transferred to one of the new plants during the course of the year. When office personnel ceased employment, they were replaced by temporary employees. Other positions in the new plants were being filled by new employees who applied directly to the new plants. At some point before the quarterly meeting on February 25, 1991, the Respondent made a decision to close the Tampa plant. At the quarterly meeting, the Respondent's director of employee relations, Joseph Frabotta, announced that the Tampa plant was being closed and that all Tampa employees were being permanently laid off. He stated that most would be laid off as of March 8, and the rest as of March 15, 1991. In response to questions regarding the availability of work at one of the Respondent's new plants, he also stated that he knew of no positions available at that time but that if anyone interested left an application for employment with him by the time he left Tampa on or about February 28, 1991, he would transmit the applications to the managers of those plants. After the general announcement at the meeting on February 25, 1991, individual interviews were scheduled to discuss the particulars of the benefits due individual employees. The Petitioner's interview was on February 27, 1991. As the senior hourly employee at the Tampa plant, the Petitioner was told that he would work until March 15, 1991. He also was told the particulars of the benefits due him. Finally, he again was told that there were no positions at the new plants available for the Petitioner at that time but that, if he was interested, he should leave a completed application for employment with Frabotta by the time he left Tampa on or about February 28, 1991, and it would be transmitted to the managers of those plants. During the Petitioner's individual interview on February 27, 1991, the Petitioner also raised the subject of a problem he was having with disability insurance benefits for a period of disability the Petitioner had suffered from approximately November 12, 1990, through January 1, 1991. The disability insurance policy provided by the Respondent for its eligible employees is provided through an insurance company, not by the Respondent itself directly. However, in order to insure proper follow up on behalf of its employees, the Respondent has a policy of having all claims forms mailed to its corporate offices in Solon, Ohio, for processing. During his period of disability, the Petitioner had asked the Tampa plant manager for the appropriate claims form. The plant manager said he would furnish the Petitioner one but never did. When the Petitioner returned to work on January 2, 1991, he again asked for the claims form. Again, the Petitioner was promised that one would be provided but none ever was provided. At his February 27, 1991, interview, the Petitioner reported all of this to Frabotta, whose investigation verified the Petitioner's information. Frabotta promptly arranged for the Petitioner's claims form to be submitted for processing, and in May, 1991, the Petitioner received the disability benefits to which he was due. One other black employee was not given disability claims forms, for a disability in June, 1990, because the supervisor of the personnel office at the Tampa plant told the employee that he was not eligible. When the Petitioner told his fellow employee about his individual interview with Frabotta on February 27, 1991, the fellow employee told the Petitioner about his June, 1990, disability. The Petitioner recommended that the fellow employee ask Frabotta about it during his individual interview. Frabotta investigated the matter, and the benefits eventually were paid. The Petitioner understands that, most of the time, disability benefits are paid within a two to three weeks after submission of a claim, and he is aware of some whites who timely received disability benefits. With all the claims forms the Respondent's corporate headquarters processes for employees, errors occasionally are made, having nothing to do with race, and Frabotta has to become involved in correcting errors, just as he did in the case of the Petitioner and his fellow black employee. The Petitioner did not prove that the delay he and his fellow black employee experienced in receiving disability benefits was the result of racial discrimination. The Petitioner did not give Frabotta an application for employment with one of the new plants before Frabotta left Tampa to return to Ohio. Instead, he mailed an application on or about March 25, which Frabotta did not receive until early April, 1991. On March 15, 1991, the Petitioner was asked to work one more day to prepare the equipment for shipment the following day to the new plant in Georgia. His last day at work was March 16, 1991. Soon after his last day at work, the Petitioner came under the belief that white hourly employees from the Tampa plant had been transferred to the new plant in Georgia. As the senior hourly employee at the Tampa plant, the Petitioner believed he was entitled to the work under the union contract. But the union contract did not apply at any plant other than Tampa, and it expired in April, 1991. The employees hired at the Georgia plant had given applications to Frabotta before February 28, 1991, and were hired by the Georgia plant manager when a need arose for their services on or about March 18, 1991, at a point in time before the Petitioner submitted his application. In addition to the two white hourly employees, a black hourly employee also was hired in that fashion at the Georgia plant. Later, the Petitioner learned that two white hourly employees were continued on the payroll for a certain period of time. The Petitioner believed that, if any work was available for hourly employees in Tampa, he should have gotten it under the terms of the union contract since he had seniority. But there was another provision in the union contract, known as the "super seniority" provision, under which the president and chief steward of the local union were to be kept on the payroll in the event of a reduction in the work force at the Tampa plant. These union officials were white. The local union insisted that these two people be kept on the payroll after March 16, 1991. (They were not paid after the expiration of the extended union contract in April, 1991.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case. RECOMMENDED this 29th day of April, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1992.
Findings Of Fact In May, 1983, DOT advertised for bids to separately lease the 11 service stations on the Florida Turnpike. Prospective bidders were prequalified before being allowed to submit bids. Bids were to be awarded to the bidder submitting the highest responsible bid and based solely on the amount per gallon to be paid to DOT on each gallon of motor fuel sold at the service plaza. The existing leases were all due to expire and an attempt to get bids in 1982 had been dropped after litigation delayed completion of the bid process. Turnpike prices for motor fuels are regulated somewhat by DOT, in that the Turnpike prices must be comparable to prices at off-Turnpike stations in the vicinity which offer similar services. Those stations selected for comparative prices must be acceptable to the Turnpike station operator and DOT. Equipment at the existing service plazas has been in use for many years and in the bid offering in May, 1983, several new provisions were included, as were many provisions of the expiring leases. To insure competent and qualified service to motorists on the Turnpike, retained lease provisions require the stations to be open 24 hours per day, to provide wrecker service, and to have a mechanic on duty. Few off-Turnpike stations meet these requirements. Accordingly, "comparable" stations within SD miles east-west of the Turnpike and in the vicinity of a specific service plaza may not be readily available. The bid offering provided that these "comparable" stations will be selected by mutual agreement of the parties but makes no provision for settling a dispute between the lessor (DOT) and the lessee. This is significant because another of the lease provisions contained in the bid offering is that the prices at which the service plazas sell fuel must not exceed by more than two cents per gallon the prices at these selected comparable stations. New provisions in this bid offering required the successful bidder to replace all dispensing equipment (gas pumps) with modern equipment, and to provide for sale of motor fuels at self-service pumps. The bid offering contained no specifics as to where the self-service pumps are to be located with respect the existing service islands, whether self-service motor fuels are to be available by credit card or cash only sale, or whether there could be a different price for cash sales than for credit card sales. The bid offering provided that no one entity could be awarded the lease of more than five service stations on the Turnpike, and no bond was required to be posted by any bidder. DOT expected the successful high bidders to submit bids in the vicinity of eight cents per gallon. This was based on DOT's knowledge from surveys taken at frequent intervals over a long period of time, of the price motor fuels was selling bat comparable stations off the Turnpike; of the tank wagon costs of motor fuels to the station operators; of the sales of tires, batteries and accessories historically made by these stations, the profits from which are not included in the lease price; of the uncertainties inherent in the profits engendered by the to-be-offered self-service sales; other changes which increased the field of bidders; and the expected stability of motor fuel prices. When the bids were opened on September 12, 1953, the first, second, and third highest bids received for each of the 11 service plazas are as follows: Service Plaza First Second Third (Number) Highest Highest Highest Bid Bid Bid Snapper Creek (601) 13.51 12.34 5.40 Crocco, Inc. Gus Crocco William Crocco Pompano (611) 14.35 Crocco, Inc. 14.33 Gus Crocco 9.75 William Crocco Pompano (612) 14.33 Crocco, Inc. 12.76 Gus Crocco 9.20 Super Service West Palm Beach (623) 15.67 15.67 11.55 Gus Crocco Crocco, Inc. William Crocco West Palm Beach (624) 15.67 14.53 11.55 Gus Crocco Crocco, Inc. William Crocco Ft. Pierce (635) 15.67 14.83 13.90 Gus Crocco Crocco, Inc. Super Service Ft. Pierce (636) 15.67 14.53 12.40 Gus Crocco Crocco, Inc. WMG, Inc. Ft. Drum (647) 16.20 Super Service 15.67 Gus Crocco 14.53 Crocco, Inc. Canoe Creek (658) 15.67 Gus Crocco 14.90 Super Service 14.53 Crocco, Inc. Turkey Lake (669) 14.34 Gus Crocco 14.20 Super Service 13.43 Crocco, Inc. Okahumpka (670) 14.34 13.25 5.67 Crocco, Inc. Gus Crocco Gulf Oil Although Crocco, Inc., and Gus Crocco were the apparent high bidders for 10 of the 11 Turnpike service station leases, DOT, with only 20 days to award or reject bids, on October 3, 1983, issued a notice of intent to enter into leases with the high bidders. Before such leases could be executed, a petition to protest the award of these bids was filed by parities who are the intervenors herein, the case was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings and was assigned DOAH Case No. 83-3539. Gus Crocco and William Crocco are brothers, are shareholders in Crocco, Inc., are shareholders in WMG, Inc., and have operated service stations on the Florida Turnpike for the past several years. All entities named in the above sentence submitted bids for Turnpike leases at this offering. Super Service General Partnership, the high bidder for the lease at Ft. Drum service plaza, is composed of a partnership consisting of Ralph Girvin and two other partners. Girvin prepared the bid submitted by Super Service General Partnership which, at 16.02 cents per gallon of motor fuel sold, was the highest bid submitted for any lease. Gus Crocco, Crocco, Inc., William Crocco, and WMG, Inc., submitted the three highest bids for five of the 11 service station leases. During discovery in preparation for the hearing in Case No. 83-3539, it was disclosed that Gus Crocco prepared the bids submitted by Gus Crocco and Crocco, Inc.; that no market survey was taken by Gus Crocco or Ralph Girvin before establishing the selling prices for motor fuels upon which their bids were predicated; that the profit per gallon of motor fuel assumed by Crocco included a rebate from the supplier of approximately six cents per gallon even though no rebate has ever been given at a Turnpike service station for more than a short period of time; the profits to be made per gallon did not take into consideration county taxes that are applicable to some of the service plazas; that existing prices at stations accepted as comparable in the past were much lower than the sale prices which Gus Crocco and Ralph Girvin used to arrive at a bid price; that absent a requirement for the posting of a bond the high bidder could withdraw his bid without financial penalty or liability; that some communication between the Crocco brothers had taken place before the bids were submitted; that Ralph Girvin hand attempted to contact Gus and William Crocco before submitting his bid; that the data upon which Gus Crocco, Crocco, Inc., and Super Service General Partnership based their bids was insufficient to account for all expenses to be incurred; and that there was a high probability that the service station could not provide adequate service to the motorists while paying the price bid for the leases and selling motor fuels at a price comparable to that charged by off-Turnpike stations in the vicinity. This information was passed to DOT. Sam Roddenberry, Turnpike engineer for DOT, is the individual primarily responsible for the operation of the Turnpike in accordance with policies established by DOT. He was the DOT employee primarily responsible for the provisions of the bid proposals and lease, for the award of the lease to the highest qualified bidder, and for the policy changes, including the sale of motor fuel at self-service pumps. After receiving information discovered during trial preparation for Case No. 83-3539, Roddenberry compared Gus Crocco's projected selling price of $1.239 per gallon of regular leaded self-service gasoline with the 1983 average price in Jacksonville of $1.0991; compared the Crocco price estimate for unleaded self-service gasoline of $1.349 per gallon with the Jacksonville price of $1.1789; and the Crocco price estimate of $1.3996 for self-service super unleaded with the Jacksonville price of $1.2997. A similar comparison was made with respect to Super Service General Partnership's bid. These comparisons, the close relationship between the three high bidders at all stations (except for Super Service) and his knowledge that rebates, when given, are good only for short periods of time, led Roddenberry to conclude that all bids should be rejected. On October 1, 1984, Chapter 84-276, Laws of Florida, became effective. This discontinued the high-bid system upon which the bids here involved were solicited and substituted therefor a request for proposal (RFP) system upon which the Department selects the applicant deemed best qualified to satisfy the statutory criteria established by this statute. On June 25, 1984, each of the high bidders was notified by DOT that Respondent intended to withdraw its notice of intent to award leases and that it intended to reject all bids. These bidders at the same time were advised of their right to a Chapter 120.57 hearing, and the petitions for hearing, here involved, followed.
Findings Of Fact Puckett reported a discharge of used oil at its site when it filed an early detective incentive program notification application with DER. Puckett, thus, advised DER that it would clean up its site and apply for reimbursement of the costs of that cleanup in accordance with Section 376.3071(12), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1986). When it received Puckett's application, DER conducted an investigation of the site and determined that a discharge of used automotive crankcase oil had occurred there. DER was advised by Puckett that the discharge had occurred when used automotive crankcase oil was drained into a service bay floor drain. Puckett and the site operator placed the used oil in the drain in the belief that a storage tank was connected to the floor drain to receive and safely store the used oil. Unknown to Puckett, however, the storage tanks previously connected to that floor drain had been removed by a former site owner or operator. The Recommended Order entered by the Hearing Officer contains findings to the effect that Puckett was unaware that storage tanks did not any longer connect with the floor drain in question, in part, at least, because it is the custom and practice in the service station business that used oil collecting persons or entities collect from such storage tanks after the service station hours of operation. Therefore, it was customary for the operator of a service station not to be aware of when used oil was removed from storage tanks. Upon learning that used oil had been spilled at the site due to the lack of a storage tank, where formerly one had been in place, the subject application was filed. DER conducted its site investigation and after it was concluded, on April 16, 1987, issued an order denying reimbursement eligibility to Puckett. DER took this position because it opined that used oil is not "petroleum" or a "petroleum product", as those terms and substances are defined in Subsections 376.301(9)(10), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1986). Puckett then filed a timely petition for administrative hearing as a result of that denial of eligibility. The cause was duly transmitted to the undersigned Hearing Officer for conduct of a Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, formal proceeding. In the discovery phase of that proceeding, requests for admissions were served by Puckett upon DER, in response to which DER admitted that the sole basis for denial of reimbursement eligibility was the fact that the substance discharged was used oil, which, DER contended was not "petroleum" or a "petroleum product". DER, thus, took the position that the used oil in question was beyond the scope of reimbursement eligibility allowed by the "Super Act," the statutory provisions cited above. The cause was duly scheduled for hearing for September 9-10, 1987. Shortly prior to the hearing, on August 31, 1987, DER filed a motion for continuance seeking an opportunity thereby to have time to explore the question of whether Puckett was "grossly negligent" in the maintenance of its facility, which is a ground for disqualification from Super Act reimbursement eligibility. This was an issue which had not theretofore been raised in the proceeding. See Section 376.3071(9)(b)3., Florida Statutes (Supp. 1986). That motion for continuance was denied, as found and discussed in the Recommended Order in the underlying proceeding. The cause then came on for hearing as scheduled on September 9-10, 1987. A motion in limine filed by Puckett was granted at the hearing so as to preclude DER from raising any issue concerning "gross negligence" at hearing. The basis for the ruling was that DER had known of the circumstances surrounding the discharge for nearly one year, but that during the discovery process, DER assured Puckett that its position was that gross negligence would not be an issue in the proceedings and that the sole basis for its denial of the reimbursement application was that the substance discharged, being used oil, was not, in its view, "petroleum" or a "petroleum product". Following the hearing, the Hearing Officer issued the Recommended Order in question finding that used crankcase oil was, indeed, "petroleum", as well as being a "petroleum product", for the purposes of the definitions in the above- cited statutory provisions. It was thus recommended that Puckett be determined to be eligible to apply to DER for reimbursement of the cleanup costs involved. Puckett, 10 FALR at 5540. Certain findings and conclusions made in the Recommended Order are germane to the question of whether DER's actions with respect to the initial and final denial of Super Act eligibility had a reasonable basis in law and fact at the time the agency action was initiated and finally taken in the Final Order. Those findings include the findings in the Recommended Order that used crankcase oil consists of "petroleum", as that term is defined by Section 376.301(9), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1986), with particular emphasis on those findings and conclusions in the Recommended Order, incorporated by reference herein, concerning crankcase oil coming within the definition of "other hydrocarbons" for the reasons delineated in the Recommended Order. Further, DER's own expert witness admitted, and it was found by the Hearing Officer, that the predominant use of used oil is as a fuel, just as is gasoline, diesel, kerosene and certain other grades of fuel oil, which are specifically included in the statutory definition of "petroleum product". See page 20 of the Recommended Order and the transcript of the proceeding below, pages 362-363. It was also established without question that used oil is a "liquid," a "commodity" and a liquid fuel commodity for the reasons delineated in the Recommended Order. It was established further by the record in the proceeding on the merits, and found in the Recommended Order that used oil has no meaningful similarity to the substances specifically, statutorily excluded from the definition of "petroleum product", and that DER has had a policy encouraging the collection and recycling of used oil as a fuel. This was well-known and accepted by DER's own experts before the "policy makers" at DER, who engendered the subject initial agency action, took the position that used oil did not constitute petroleum or a petroleum product. Used oil has not been otherwise regulated as a hazardous waste. DER's interpretation of the statutory definition of "petroleum product" to the effect that the product, as it was initially produced, must be sold or used as a fuel in order to meet that definition, in fact, imposes an additional inconsistent criteria for determining what types of substances are included within the meaning of the term, which criteria is not enunciated in the statute, either expressly or implicitly. DER's restrictive interpretation of the statute further disregards the language of the Super Act. Sections 376.3071(12)(a) and 376.315, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1986), which requires it to give "such liberal construction to the statute as will accomplish the purposes set forth in this subsection", in other words, to promote the cleanup of as many contamination sites as possible. Further, it was established by the record in the proceeding on the merits and concluded in the Recommended Order that the restrictive interpretation of the statute adopted by DER was inconsistent with existing agency policy which encourages used oil collection and recycling and that the interpretation "is clearly not one expressed or reasonably implied on the face of the statute" and "would frustrate the clear, legislative impetus of the Super Act" and is "illogical". More significantly, DER's policy makers responsible for the initial agency action and decision that used oil is not "petroleum" or a "petroleum product" did not take counsel with certain key expert personnel in DER's own used oil section concerning whether used oil is "petroleum" or a "petroleum product" prior to the initial denial of eligibility and the proceeding and hearing before the Hearing Officer. In fact, the policy makers were apparently unaware of facts critical to the subject determination and to the fact that DER's proposed (and, indeed, final) action was inconsistent with agency policy concerning treatment and definition of used oil, which DER's "in- house" experts had been aware of all along. These findings and conclusions in the Recommended Order demonstrate clearly and in detail why DER's initial agency action and position through the conclusion of the hearing, concerning rejection of Puckett's reimbursement eligibility, did not have a reasonable basis in law and fact. Those findings and conclusions appearing at pages 18-36 of the Recommended Order, which has been stipulated into the record of the instant proceeding, are incorporated by reference and adopted in the findings of fact and conclusions of law in this Final Order. Despite the findings and conclusions in the Recommended Order, DER, in its Final Order, ultimately denied reimbursement eligibility. Puckett at page 5505. DER found in its Final Order that Super Act coverage is limited to "incidents related to storage", as opposed to incidents where a contaminant is discarded. DER also found that because Puckett did not have a "petroleum storage system" at the site, the discharge was not "related to storage", despite the facility operator's proven and found intention and belief, when he dumped the product in the floor drain, that he was "storing" the used oil in question. DER acknowledged the Hearing Officer's granting of Puckett's motion in limine, which precluded denial of reimbursement eligibility on "gross negligence" grounds, but stated that it was not denying eligibility on this ground at page 18 of its Final Order. Although DER acknowledged in its Final Order that its denial of eligibility did not depend on a finding of gross negligence, this acknowledgment, which appears to re- state its position, taken in the discovery phase, that gross negligence would not be raised as an issue by DER, and is an apparent acknowledgment of the ruling on the motion in limine, is somewhat belied by the following language from the Final Order: Although my decision to deny eligibility for reimbursement to Puckett does not depend on a finding of gross negligence on the part of Puckett, any site owner who fails to ascertain whether an oil drain fitting on site is actually connected to an operational used oil system now has clear notice that it allows used oil discharges to that drain fitting only at its own peril. It is not appropriate that state funds be expended to remediate contamination caused by reckless disregard for elementary waste disposal regulations. In the future, the department will continue to deny eligibility to any site where contamination has resulted from used oil discharges to land in the complete absence of a used oil storage system. (emphasis supplied) See pages 18 and 19 of the Final Order. Puckett then appealed that denial of reimbursement eligibility. The District Court of Appeals reversed DER, finding as follows: DER's assertion that Puckett's eligibility for cleanup reimbursement of the used oil discharge was dependent on whether storage was involved and whether the used oil would be reused or recycled was never made until the final agency order was entered. These issues were not raised by the pleadings, were not litigated at the hearing, were not considered by the Hearing Officer, and were not considered by the Hearing Officer's Recommended Order. In addition, the pleadings reflect that DER was asked in a written request for admission to admit the following: 'The Department's only basis for denial of Super Act eligibility for Puckett is that the reported discharge was used oil.' DER admitted that statement. This was the only issue created by the pleadings, and it was the only issue tried and determined by the Hearing Officer. DER cannot raise and decide for the first time in the final agency order issues not previously raised or considered. See Puckett, 549 So.2d at 722 (emphasis in original). The Court then remanded the proceeding to DER for entry of an order determining Puckett to be eligible to apply for reimbursement. Puckett also petitioned the appellate court for appellate attorney's fees pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(b)5., Florida Statutes, arguing that the Final Order was a "gross abuse" of agency discretion, a standard for granting of appellate attorney's fees under that statutory provision. The Court denied that motion on the basis that gross abuse of agency discretion had not been demonstrated. Although reliance on issues improperly raised for the first time in the Final Order may not have been a "gross abuse" of agency discretion supportive of an award of appellate costs and fees pursuant to the above- referenced statutory provision, it is found that DER has not justified as reasonable its rejection of eligibility on additional non-litigated or properly raised grounds in the Final Order. Therefore, DER's reliance on the new issues in the Final Order to deny reimbursement eligibility was not "substantially justified". After issuance of the Court's mandate, Puckett filed a petition for costs and fees pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, initiating the instant proceeding. DER filed an untimely response conceding that Puckett was a "prevailing small business party" and the other criteria for award of fees and costs provided for in Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, with the exception that it did not concede that its denial of reimbursement eligibility in the related proceeding was not "substantially justified". DER did not dispute that the reasonable amount of costs and fees incurred by Puckett exceeded $15,000.00 nor did it assert that any special circumstances exist which would make an award of costs and fees unjust nor that it was a nominal party only. Since Puckett's petition was not timely responded to and since its Motion for Summary Final Order thereon was not answered by DER, the Hearing Officer issued a Summary Final Order awarding $15,000.00 in costs and fees to Puckett. DER appealed and the First District Court of Appeals reversed the award and remanded the proceedings to the Hearing Officer to consider DER's position on the issue of award of fees and costs, based generally upon the Court's view that DER's non- timely response to the petition for fees and costs should be excused, as more particularly delineated in the Court's opinion in Department of Environmental Regulation v. Puckett Oil Company, Inc., 16 FLW D.926 (Fla. 1st DCA April 3, 1991). The cause involving fees and costs, thus, became at issue before the Hearing Officer once again. In the prehearing filings, the parties limited the issues to that concerning whether DER's action on the reimbursement eligibility question was "substantially justified". On July 30, 1991, a hearing was held on this matter, during which the parties presented their arguments and stipulated that the record in this proceeding would be the record on appeal, including the Hearing Officer's Recommended Order in the reimbursement eligibility case.
