The Issue This is a license discipline case in which the Petitioner seeks to take disciplinary action against the Respondent on the basis of charges set forth in a three-count Administrative Complaint. The Administrative Complaint charges the Respondent with two violations of Section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes, and one violation of Section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Background facts At all times material to this case, the Respondent, Rene A. Munecas, M.D., has been licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida. Dr. Munecas is board-certified in Obstetrics. As of the date of the events from which the charges in this case arise, Dr. Munecas had practiced obstetrics for approximately 45 years. Dr. Munecas has practiced obstetrics in the State of Florida since 1970. Dr. Munecas was born in Cuba, and he attended medical school in that country. He graduated from the Havana University, School of Medicine, in 1950. He then did a two-year internship in obstetrics at the University Hospital, Havana, Cuba, followed by a two-year residency in obstetrics at the same hospital. Dr. Munecas practiced obstetrics in Cuba until 1961, at which time he moved to the United States. In this country he did a one-year rotating internship at the Highland Park General Hospital, Highland Park, Michigan, followed by a two-residency in obstetrics/gynecology (OB/GYN) at Jackson Memorial Hospital in Miami, Florida. He completed his OB/GYN residency training at Orange Memorial Hospital in Orlando, Florida. Upon completion of his residency training in this country, he practiced in Michigan until 1970, when he moved to Florida. During the many years Dr. Munecas has practiced in Florida, there has been only one prior instance of disciplinary action concerning his practice of medicine. 1/ The prior disciplinary proceeding did not arise from any misconduct by Dr. Munecas, but from concerns as to whether he was "unable to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety to patients by reason of illness . . . or as a result of any mental or physical condition." 2/ By the time of the final hearing in the prior disciplinary proceeding, all of the medical experts were of the view that Dr. Munecas was able to practice with reasonable skill and safety so long as he continued to be monitored by his treating psychiatrist. The final order in that case (dated August 27, 1984) concluded as follows: ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Respondent be placed on probation for a period of two (2) years during which time Respondent shall appear semi-annually before the Board and shall continue to be monitored by his treating psychiatrist, Dr. DeJesus who shall submit quarterly reports concerning Respondent to the Board during the two year probation period. No appearances by the treating psychiatrist, Dr. DeJesus, before the Board are required. Facts regarding patient A. B. There is very little evidence in the record of this proceeding concerning the quality or sufficiency of the written medical records kept by Dr. Munecas regarding his treatment of Patient A. B. 3/ There is no clear and convincing evidence that Dr. Munecas failed to keep written medical records justifying the course of treatment of patient A. B. Patient A. B., born July 4, 1965, was seen by Dr. Munecas on August 11, 1994, in the outpatient obstetrical clinic of Baptist Hospital of Miami. She was pregnant with twins. The hospital record indicates periodic visits to the clinic from August 11 through November 17, 1994. Her weight at the initial visit of August 11 was 210 pounds. She was 5 feet, 2 inches, tall. An outpatient ultrasound performed on November 3, 1994, indicated that both twins were in breech position. The results of that ultrasound were reported on November 4, 1994, and were known to Dr. Munecas prior to November 18, 1994, when another outpatient ultrasound was performed on patient A. B. At approximately 6:30 a.m. on November 19, 1994, patient A. B.'s membranes ruptured, and she was taken to the hospital. Dr. Munecas ordered an x-ray of the patient's abdomen for the purpose of ascertaining fetal position. An x-ray of A. B.'s abdomen was taken at about 8:15 a.m. For reasons not clear in the evidence in this case, a second x-ray of A. B.'s abdomen was taken about 10 minutes later. The two x-ray films did not provide any useful information about the position of either of the twins. A few minutes later, Dr. Munecas performed a pelvic examination of patient A. B., for the purpose of trying to determine the positions of the twins. On the basis of that examination Dr. Munecas was of the opinion that twin "A" was in a vertex position, and twin "B" was in a breech position. Later in the day, this opinion was shown to be incorrect. 4/ Dr. Munecas decided it was appropriate to deliver the twins vaginally, and began to take steps to implement that plan of treatment. Among other things, Dr. Munecas attempted to induce labor by administration of Pitocin, which induces labor by increasing uterine contractions. At approximately 5:00 p.m. on November 19, 1994, Dr. Munecas ordered a portable ultrasound examination of patient A. B.'s abdomen. 5/ The ultrasound examination was promptly performed, and by approximately 6:00 p.m. Dr. Munecas received the examination report. The report revealed that both twins were in a breech position. At some point after receiving the report of the ultrasound examination, Dr. Munecas changed his plan of treatment and decided that patient A. B. should be delivered by cesarean section. For reasons not clear from the record in this case, the cesarean section was not done until approximately 10:00 p.m. Twin "A" was delivered at 10:16 p.m., and twin "B" was delivered at 10:19 p.m. Both twins were healthy. Facts regarding current practice of obstetrics Ultrasound imaging is the procedure of choice for obtaining images to show fetal status. Ultrasound is superior to x-ray for such purposes for a number of reasons. Ultrasound produces fetal images that show more details than can be obtained by x-ray. The use of ultrasound also avoids certain potential fetal health risks that are associated with x-rays. Accordingly, except in the most unusual of circumstances, x-rays should not be used to obtain images of fetal status. Under the circumstances presented by patient A. B. on November 19, 1994, a reasonably prudent similar physician would have ordered an ultrasound. If for some reason an ultrasound was not available on the morning of November 19, 1994, a reasonably prudent similar physician would have relied on the results of the ultrasound that was performed on November 3, 1994. Pitocin is a drug that is commonly used by obstetricians to induce and enforce labor. The effect of Pitocin is to increase uterine contractions. Pitocin should only be used when it is desirable to induce labor. The obvious corollary is that Pitocin should never be administered to a patient in which vaginal delivery is contraindicated. Vaginal delivery was contraindicated for patient A. B. because of risks to fetal safety inherent in a situation when twins are both in a breech position. Those risks can be avoided by cesarean section delivery. In circumstances like those presented by patient A. B., with both twins in a breech position, a reasonably prudent similar physician would find it unacceptable to attempt a vaginal delivery. The only acceptable course of treatment under such circumstances would be a cesarean section. 6/ Therefore, it was a departure from standards of care, skill, and treatment acceptable to a reasonably prudent similar physician for Dr. Munecas to attempt to induce labor by patient A. B. Facts regarding patient M. E. Patient M. E., born November 28, 1963, was seen by Dr. Munecas on May 2, 1995, in the outpatient obstetrical clinic of Baptist Hospital of Miami. The hospital record indicates periodic visits to the clinic from May 2 through June 21, 1995. The record also indicates that lab tests had been performed prior to May 2. Dr. Munecas' note for the visit of June 2 indicates his belief that the fetus may have had intrauterine growth retardation. The visits of June 14 and June 21 indicate increases in patient M. E.'s systolic and diastolic blood pressure, and increased protein in her urinalysis. Pre-eclampsia is a term used to describe a form of pregnancy-induced hypertension. Symptoms of pre-eclampsia include elevated blood pressure, presence of protein in the urine and/or the presence of swelling or edema of the hands and feet. A patient exhibiting symptoms of severe pre-eclampsia is at risk for three circumstances of extreme urgency. One is the possibility of a brain hemorrhage, which can be fatal. Second is the possibility of heart failure and pulmonary edema. Third is the possibility of liver hemorrhage, which can cause the liver to swell and burst. This third possibility manifests itself by right upper quadrant abdominal pain. In the early morning hours of June 22, 1995, patient M. E. awoke with severe right upper quadrant abdominal pain. When the pain continued, she called Dr. Munecas at home and described her pain to him. Dr. Munecas instructed her to go to the hospital. At approximately 4:50 a.m. on June 22, 1995, patient M. E. arrived at the hospital. Her blood pressure was taken in the supine position and read 196/111. Patient M. E. complained of continuous severe right upper quadrant abdominal pain. Dr. Munecas was called at home and advised of the patient's status. At that time, Dr. Munecas gave no orders, but indicated his desire for a perinatal consultation. At about 5:00 a.m., the hospital nursing staff called Dr. Lai. Dr. Lai gave no orders, but said that Dr. Munecas should call him at home. Hospital nursing staff called Dr. Munecas a second time at approximately 5:15 a.m. They requested his presence at the hospital to evaluate the patient. At about 6:00 a.m. on June 22, 1995, the hospital nursing staff again called Dr. Munecas and again requested his presence at the hospital. At this time the nursing staff also requested that Dr. Munecas prescribe medication to lower the patient's blood pressure. Dr. Munecas did not prescribe any medications for the patient. Instead, he ordered that an abdominal ultrasound be performed on the patient immediately to see if the patient had gallbladder problems. The ultrasound was promptly performed. It did not reveal any gallbladder problems. At approximately 6:05 a.m., a nurse manager called Dr. Munecas at home, and again requested his presence at the hospital. Dr. Munecas thereupon embarked for the hospital. He arrived at approximately 7:00 a.m. He promptly examined the patient and found her cervix to be dilated up to 2 centimeters. Dr. Munecas' impressions following the examination included "severe pre-eclampsia." Following the examination of patient M. E., Dr. Munecas performed an amniotomy on the patient. Amniotomy is a technique for the induction of labor. It is accomplished by manual rupture of the patient's membranes. An amniotomy should only be performed when it is desirable to induce labor. The obvious corollary is that an amniotomy should never be performed on a patient in which vaginal delivery is contraindicated. Vaginal delivery was contraindicated for patient M. E. for two main reasons. First, following examination of patient M. E., it should have been obvious to any obstetrician that the patient was suffering from severe pre-eclampsia and that prompt action was necessary to minimize the risk of severe harm to the patient's health. Under the circumstances presented by patient M. E., on June 22, 1995, urgent delivery of the baby was the only acceptable course of patient treatment. Under the circumstances presented that day by patient M. E., there was no prospect for her to have an urgent vaginal delivery. A cesarean section was the only prospect for an urgent delivery of patient M. E. The second reason for which vaginal delivery was contraindicated for patient M. E., was the fact that the fetus appeared to have intrauterine growth retardation. Such a fetus is less able than a normal fetus to withstand the rigors of labor. Therefore, such a fetus is at greater risk for possible brain damage or death during vaginal delivery. Such risks are avoided by a cesarean section delivery. By inducing labor in patient M. E., Dr. Munecas exposed both patient M. E. and her fetus to unreasonable dangers which could be avoided by cesarean section delivery. A reasonably prudent similar physician faced with the circumstances presented by patient M. E. on June 22, 1995, would have gone to the hospital as quickly as possible following the first call from the hospital nursing staff describing the patient's status. Dr. Munecas' failure to do so was a departure from acceptable standards of treatment recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician. A reasonably prudent similar physician faced with the circumstances presented by patient M. E. on June 22, 1995, in view of the obvious need for urgent relief of the severe pre- eclampsia, would have promptly made arrangements for a cesarean section delivery at the earliest possible time. Dr. Munecas' failure to do so was a departure from acceptable standards of treatment recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician. Dr. Munecas appears to have voluntarily limited the scope of his medical practice since the incidents which gave rise to this proceeding. He limits his medical practice to gynecology and obstetrics in the office. He no longer performs major surgery or vaginal deliveries.
Recommendation On the basis of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued in this case to the following effect: Dismissing Count Two of the Administrative Complaint; Concluding that the Respondent is guilty of having violated Section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes, as charged in Count One of the Administrative Complaint and as charged in two of the three paragraphs of Count Three of the Administrative Complaint; and Imposing a penalty consisting of a permanent restriction on the scope of the Respondent's medical practice to the following extent: the Respondent is restricted from all hospital-based obstetrical practice and is barred from performing or assisting in the labor or delivery of any hospital obstetrical patient. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of February, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of February, 2000.
The Issue The administrative complaint charged Respondent in Count I with violating Section 458.331(1)(t), F.S., failure to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances, and in Count II with violating Section 458.331(1)(m), F.S., failure to keep written medical records justifying the course of treatment of the patient, including but not limited to, patient histories, examination results, and test results.
Findings Of Fact At all times material, Respondent was a licensed medical physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME004552. On October 24, 1988, Patient #1, a 67 year old female, presented by wheelchair at the Physicians Referral Center (PRC) emergency room of the Marion Community Hospital in Ocala, Florida. Respondent was on duty there at that time. Patient #1, arrived at the emergency room at approximately 1:50 a.m. complaining of gas, no bowel movements for three days, feeling weak, and a highly elevated blood sugar of 412 as of 5:00 p.m. the evening before. Patient #1 was accompanied by her husband, who provided some of the foregoing information. Alicia Ables, R.N., attended Patient #1 when she arrived, took her vital signs which appeared to be within normal limits, and noted in the patient medical records, at the bottom of the nurse's notes, that the patient had heart problems, diabetes, kidney problems, and was taking medications. The nurse attached to the patient's medical records a list of the patient's current medications which had been provided by the husband. These medications included Isordil, Trental, Ascriptin, Lasix, Lanoxin, Depyridamole, Capoten, Riopan Plus, Mylicon 800, Pilocarpine eye drops, Tylenol and Humulin N-100, 30 units in the morning and 6 units in the evening. Humulin N-100 is a low level prescription for insulin diabetic maintenance. Mylicon is an anti-gas preparation. The foregoing history was on the patient chart when Respondent saw the patient a few minutes later. Respondent saw the patient at approximately 2:10 a.m. At that time, only the patient, her husband, and Respondent were present in the examining room. No nurse was present in the examining room with them, but Ms. Ables testified that the absence of a nurse during a rectal examination of a female patient occurred occasionally if not regularly at PRC. Nurse Ables was not present in the examination room at the time of the examination and is without knowledge of the extent of Respondent's examination of Patient #1. The patient, who is now deceased, did not testify. The patient's husband did not testify. The only person who was present in the examining room on October 24, 1988 who did testify was Respondent, and his testimony is unrefuted that he performed a routine examination of the patient's chest, abdomen, and skin, that he also performed a rectal examination during which he found the patient's rectal vault "empty," and that he concluded that there was no fecal impaction but some retention of gas. He concluded that a soap suds enema was not warranted, given the patient's condition. He stated that despite believing that the patient had some retention of gas, he considered her to be "fixated" in her mind on the gas problem. When the Respondent examined the patient on October 24, 1988, he contemporaneously noted on her chart that her chief complaint was accumulation of gas, that she wanted a soap suds enema, and that she had spoken earlier with Dr. Sunkavalli, who had referred her to the emergency room. Dr. Sunkavalli was the patient's primary treating physician. Respondent also noted on the chart at 2:25 a.m. on October 24, 1988 that Dr. Sunkavalli would follow the patient as an outpatient. He also wrote down that he diagnosed her as having "gas retention fixation." He ordered Mylicon 80 to be administered to her. She was not given a soap suds enema, was not admitted to the hospital, and was not transferred to another hospital. Respondent did not order any laboratory tests or x-rays. Administration of the Mylicon 80 was noted on the patient's chart by a nurse other than Ms. Ables at 2:40 a.m. That nurse also noted on the patient records that Patient #1 was discharged home at 3:00 a.m., in stable condition. None of the typically observable symptoms of ketoacidosis in the patient were observed or noted by Respondent or by Ms. Ables while the patient was at PRC. Patient #1 was admitted to Citrus Memorial Hospital six and one-half hours after being discharged from Respondent's care. Three hours after her admission to Citrus Memorial, the patient died. After autopsy, the principal pathologic diagnosis and cause of death was listed as "marked three vessel artherosclerosis with large, old myocardial infarction." The gross summary reads, "Death of this 67-year old, white female was due to marked three vessel arteriosclerosis secondary to arteriosclerotic heart disease. A contributing factor was diabetic acidosis." There was also evidence of a gastro-intestinal bleed. When Patient #1's death became an issue the next day, Respondent was unable to recall the patient or his examination and treatment of her. The Respondent reviewed the emergency room records and spoke with Ms. Ables in order to recall the care he had rendered to the patient. Respondent prepared an addendum to the patient's medical records three days after he actually examined Patient #1. Only at that late date, October 27, 1988, did Respondent document a history, document that he had made a physical examination, and document that he had had a telephone consultation with Dr. Sunkavalli on October 24, 1988 while the patient was in the emergency room, and further document that he and Dr. Sunkavalli had concurred at that time in treating the patient with Mylicon. Adding the addendum was deemed appropriate under the circumstances by Marion Community Hospital personnel, and Petitioner's expert did not specifically find that adding it was inappropriate or improper. Respondent had not documented the telephone consultation with Dr. Sunkavalli or a history or physical examination of Patient #1 at the time he examined her on October 24, 1988. Neither on the date of examination/treatment nor in his later addendum did Respondent ever document that he had performed a rectal examination on Patient #1. In his testimony at formal hearing, Respondent explained and supplemented his October 27, 1988 addendum notation of a telephone conversation with Dr. Sunkavalli on October 24, 1988 to add that Dr. Sunkavalli was aware at that time of Patient #1's elevated blood sugar reading the previous evening but, hearing Respondent's examination results, Dr. Sunkavalli had recommended no further tests and had said nothing to disagree with Respondent's assessment and treatment of the patient and that while Respondent had not deferred to Dr. Sunkavalli, he had relied on the consultation. Dr. Sunkavalli was not called to corroborate or refute Respondent's testimony on this score. Jack Kareff, M.D., was accepted as an expert in emergency room medicine. He opined that, under similar circumstances, and particularly with an elderly diabetic patient, the minimal acceptable level of care, skill, and treatment of a reasonably prudent similar physician would have been to examine Patient #1's abdomen, perform a rectal examination, and perform a dipstick of urine for both glucose (sugar) and acetone. Dr. Kareff also expressed the opinion that the rectal examination should have been made to eliminate the chance of fecal impaction and that such rectal examination should have included treating a sample of fecal matter found in the rectal vault with a paper reagent to determine if there were occult blood in the patient's stool so as to rule out gastro-intestinal bleeding. Dr. Kareff testified that there is sufficient fecal matter for such a test in the rectal vault 99% of the time. He conceded that an enema might not be warranted and could be potentially traumatic, given such a patient's condition. Dr. Kareff indicated that the urine dipstick test should be done to ensure that the patient was not headed for diabetic ketoacidosis. The urine dipstick test proposed as a minimal requirement by Dr. Kareff was also described by him as actually "problematic" in that he admitted that such a dipstick test can "fool you" occasionally because not enough aceto acetate is formed to tell the patient's true condition. According to Dr. Kareff, ketoacidosis may take anywhere from 2 hours to several weeks to develop in a diabetic. On the foregoing information, the efficacy of a dipstick test was not established. Because he believed that Respondent had not done the abdominal examination, rectal examination with stool testing, and urine dipstick test, Dr. Kareff further opined that Respondent had fallen below the acceptable level of care, skill and treatment as recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician under similar conditions and circumstances. In forming his foregoing opinions, Dr. Kareff had not had the benefit of hearing Respondent's unrefuted testimony that Respondent had, in fact, performed a rectal examination, determined that there was no fecal impaction, and found the patient's rectal vault empty. Accordingly, the record is devoid of Dr. Kareff's opinion, if any, as to what should have or could have been done as regards a fecal test when the patient's rectal vault is "empty." Dr. Kareff's opinions assumed and relied on some material contrary to the facts established in this proceeding. Dr. Kareff's opinion also relied upon much uncorroborated hearsay evidence, such as the agency's investigative report. These reliances and assumptions on Dr. Kareff's part detract from the weight and credibility of his opinion on minimal professional treatment, and therefore that opinion is not persuasive. The parties have stipulated that Respondent's medical records were inadequate. This stipulation and Dr. Kareff's opinion that Respondent failed to keep written medical records justifying the course of treatment are accepted.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order: Finding that Respondent is not guilty of violating Section 458.33(1)(t), F.S. and dismissing Count I of the Administrative Complaint; Finding that Respondent is guilty under Count II of the Administrative Complaint of violating Section 458.331(1)(m), F.S., failure to keep written medical records justifying the course of treatment of the patient, including but not limited to, patient histories, examination results, and test results; and Reprimanding Respondent for the single violation, fining him $1000.00, and requiring him to complete one basic level continuing medical education course in record keeping responsibilities and techniques within one year of the entry of the final order. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of April, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of April, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 90-5014 The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Petitioner's PFOF: 1-12 Except as to subordinate, unnecessary or cumulative material, accepted. 13-14 Rejected because it is largely subordinate to the facts as found in FOF 18-21. 15 Rejected as a conclusion of law but also for the reasons set forth in FOF 18-19. Respondent's PFOF: 1 Covered in the preliminary statement, the FOF, or the Conclusions of Law. Accepted as covered in the rulings on Petitioner's PFOF. Rejected as legal argument. 4-6, 20-21, 37-38, 44, 46-48 Accepted but subordinate to the facts as found. 7-8 Covered in FOF 3-4. 9 Accepted with time adjustment per greater weight of the evidence. 10-11, 13-18, 22-24, 39-40, 45, 49-63, 66 Except as to subordinate, unnecessary, or cumulative material, accepted. 12 Accepted, except as to characterization "necessary". 19 Covered in FOF 17. 25 Covered in FOF 8. 26-28 Covered in FOF 18-21. 41-42 Covered in FOF 18-21. 29, 31 Rejected as irrelevant. 30 Covered in FOF 15. 32-36, 67 These proposals are irrelevant, out of context, or misleading as stated, since Dr. Kareff did not specifically advocate a soap suds enema and Respondent did not feel it was warranted. To the extent necessary, the subject matter is covered in FOF 7-9, 14-17, and 18-22. 43 Covered in FOF 7. 64-65, 68 Rejected as unnecessary and/or unproven. COPIES FURNIISHED: Louis Kwall, Esquire Gross and Kwall, P.A. 133 North Ft. Harrison Avenue Clearwater, Florida 34615 Susan E. Lindgard, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact At all times material, Respondent was licensed as an osteopathic physician in the state of Florida, having been issued license number 050004170. Respondent practices in the field of general surgery, and at all times material to this action, Respondent was on staff as Chief of Surgery at the University Hospital, Holly Hill, Florida. The incident which gave rise to the charges herein arose on August 5, 1987 when Respondent inserted a chest tube into patient W.T.'s right chest wall so as to relieve a pneumothorax which had actually occurred in W.T.'s left lung. A pneumothorax is a pocket of air in the cavity surrounding the lung which causes the lung to contract upon itself. At all times material, Patient W.T. had a subcutaneous pacemaker on the left side of her chest. However, the evidence from all credible witnesses is consistent that pacemakers are routinely placed on either the right or left side and that there is no reasonable medical presumption that pacemakers are always placed in someone's left chest area. The subcutaneous pacemaker did not enter significantly into W.T.'s case management at University Hospital. It operated on "automatic" and since it did its job, none of the University Hospital physicians involved in W.T.'s care paid much attention to it. W.T. was admitted to University Hospital for treatment of a drug overdose on July 9, 1987. As a part of her treatment, an Ewald tube was inserted into her stomach by a physician other than the Respondent. Patient W.T. was discharged from the hospital on July 18, 1987 with a portion of the tube inadvertently left in her stomach and her esophagus. On July 21, 1987, W.T. was readmitted to University Hospital. She was suffering from septicemia and bilateral pneumonia. X-rays revealed that a portion of the tubing had not been removed. This tubing was removed by the Respondent via successful gastroesophagoscopy on July 23, 1987. At Respondent's order, W.T. was placed in the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) following the removal of the tube. Dr. Desai was called in as a pulmonologist. When W.T. had been admitted to University Hospital on July 21, 1987, she already had been in a "guarded" condition. Despite successful removal of the Ewald tube, W.T.'s overall condition continued to deteriorate. Prior to the night of August 4, 1987, W.T. had developed adult respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) which involves a breakdown in the capillary barriers within the lung itself, resulting in a diffuse leakage of fluid throughout all of the air space of the patient's lung. Because of the patient's serious lung condition, Dr. Desai placed her on a volume respirator, and the respirator pressure (PEEP) was progressively increased during her admission until it was set at 20 PEEP at the time of the incident. Twenty PEEP is an unusually high level of respirator pressure which was necessary in this case because of the patient's severe lung problem. The volume respirator essentially breathed for the patient and involved a tube being secured in her mouth. Often, between her admission to the ICU and the date of the incident, W.T. had torn the respirator tube out of her mouth, so she had been continuously restrained and sedated to keep this from happening again. Each time W.T. had extubated herself she had been "blue coded," meaning she had suffered either cardiac arrest or shock. Whether or not W.T. weighed between 225 and 250 pounds or weighed 350- plus pounds cannot be determined with any reasonable degree of accuracy since there is equally credible evidence over the entire foregoing range of poundage. It is material, however, that by all accounts of all witnesses, W.T. was markedly and grossly obese to the extent that her size, shape, and weight contributed to her several health problems and rendered her a patient more difficult to diagnose, more difficult to x-ray, more difficult to move, and more difficult to nurse and medically attend than she would have been otherwise. The evidence as to whether W.T.'s obesity impeded medical personnel from correctly interpreting her breath sounds on August 5, 1987, the date of the incident, is divided, as is the evidence as to whether or not on that date W.T.'s pacemaker was visible to the naked eye, but upon the greater weight of the credible evidence as a whole, it is found that on August 5, 1987, W.T.'s obesity, generally deteriorated condition, and left pneumothorax rendered the presence, volume, and location of breath in each lung subject to interpretation and "judgment call," and that unless one were specifically looking and feeling for a pacemaker, one would not necessarily have been able to detect the pacemaker in W.T.'s left chest due to the extraordinarily heavy pad of fat and the absence of scarring in that location. The foregoing finding of fact has been reached because with the exception of the complaining witness, Nurse Counihan, all factual witnesses either testified that they did not notice a pacemaker scar or they specifically noticed there was no scarring on W.T.'s chest. Also, with regard to breath sounds, both Mr. Starr and Respondent listened for W.T.'s breath sounds on the morning of the incident and within a very few minutes of each other. Mr. Starr described W.T.'s breath sounds when he entered her room as decreased on the right and absent on the left. His findings were consistent with a left pneumothorax but he never informed Respondent what he had found. Respondent arrived only a few minutes later and could not get any breath sounds from either side. Dr. O'Leary, accepted as an expert in pulmonology and the insertion of chest tubes, opined persuasively that one could not rely on breath sounds to locate which side the pneumothorax was on in the face of a recent x-ray. Also, the use of the respirator could have been misleading to either or both Mr. Starr or Respondent. X-rays taken of W.T.'s chest at least ten times between July 23, 1987 and July 31, 1987 clearly depict that the pacemaker was on the left side of W.T.'s chest. These x-rays were reviewed by Respondent with a radiologist the day before the events which are the focus of these charges took place. The radiology reports of W.T.'s chest x-rays dated July 25, 1987, July 28, 1987, and July 31, 1987 specifically mention the pacemaker but only the report dated July 28, 1987 states that the pacemaker overlies the left thorax. Respondent did not review any narrative reports when he and the radiologist were reviewing the actual x-rays together. There is no evidence that this procedure was outside the appropriate standard of care. Dr. Dworkin, expert in radiology and quality assurance and review, Dr. O'Leary, and Dr. Rosin, Petitioner's internal medicine expert, all testified that it is not below the professional standard of care for a treating physician to forget within a day after such an x-ray review which side a pacemaker is on unless the pacemaker enters significantly into his treatment of the patient, which in this case it did not. By the early morning hours of August 5, 1987, W.T. had become even more critically ill with multiple system failures, including a failure in the cardiopulmonary systems, a neurological deficit, and failure of her renal functions. The mortality rate of a patient suffering from ARDS, without considering the other conditions from which W.T. was suffering, exceeds 50%, and responsible medical retrospective estimates made at formal hearing of W.T.'s specific survival chances in the early morning hours of August 5, 1987 fall in the 10-50% range. During the early morning hours of August 5, 1987, the nurses on duty in ICU were having trouble maintaining W.T.'s blood pressure. They began telephoning Dr. Desai and Respondent at approximately 4:00 a.m. One of those doctors, most probably Dr. Desai, ordered a portable chest x-ray of W.T., which was accomplished at 6:30 a.m. by Josephine Christnagel, R.T., who is a registered x-ray technologist. At the time this x-ray was performed, W.T. was already in critical condition and could not speak or respond. W.T.'s condition was such that she probably was not salvageable when Respondent arrived on the scene at 7:00 a.m. on August 5, 1987. Unbeknownst to anyone at this point in time, the 6:30 a.m. x-ray had been inadvertently mislabeled by Ms. Christnagel so that the left side of the patient's chest appeared on the x-ray with a lead marker, "R" (for "right") , on it. This chest x-ray revealed that W.T. had a pneumothorax, and because it was mislabeled, the pneumothorax appeared to be on the right side. If a chest tube is properly inserted from the outside chest wall on the side of the pneumothorax, into the chest cavity, the air can be released and the lung can re-expand, delivering oxygen to the patient and raising blood pressure to normal. At all times material on August 4-5, 1987, the ranking ICU nurse on W.T.'s case was Carey Beninger ne' Counihan, R.N. The ICU nurses notified Dr. Desai by phone of the pneumothorax and he, in turn, notified Respondent. Because Respondent was more nearly ready to go to the hospital, Respondent rushed to the hospital to insert a chest tube into W.T., treatment which he and Dr. Desai, the attending pulmonologist, had agreed was the appropriate treatment for W.T.'s pneumothorax. For the reasons given infra with regard to the time the nurses' notes were compiled and Nurse Counihan's confusion over the x-ray itself, the evidence is not clear and convincing that Respondent was ever told by Dr. Desai or by the nurses by phone that the pneumothorax was on W.T.'s left side (the correct side). Even if Respondent had been so informed by Dr. Desai, since Dr. Desai had never seen the x-ray, it still would have been appropriate for Respondent to rely on the x-ray itself once he got to the hospital, unless at the hospital, something or someone clearly alerted him to the fact that the pneumothorax was actually on the left side. At approximately 7:00 a.m., just prior to the arrival of Respondent, Dr. Michael Danzig, D.O., who was the day-shift emergency room doctor, and Wesley Starr, R.P.T., a respiratory therapist, arrived at ICU and entered W.T.'s room. At approximately the time they arrived, the night-shift emergency room doctor, Dr. Haas, left the room. By all accounts, there was a continuing "commotion," a "ruckus," or "an emergency situation" in progress with at least two nurses, including Nurse Counihan, and other personnel providing various therapies to W.T. who had no palpable blood pressure and was in shock. This atmosphere continued after Respondent arrived shortly thereafter, with the nurses' and Mr. Starr's attention directed to care of the patient. When Respondent arrived, Dr. Danzig became, essentially, an observer. Upon arrival at W.T.'s room, Respondent examined the 6:30 a.m. x-ray against a window with daylight showing through. The x-ray, as it was mismarked, showed a massive tension pneumothorax on W.T.'s right side and a pacemaker on the same side, the right. After review of the x-ray, Respondent examined W.T., including listening for breath sounds. He heard nothing significant from either lung. Dr. O'Leary's opinion that such a finding was not unusual and that Respondent could not rely on either his own examination of breath sounds or that of Mr. Starr (had he even known of Mr. Starr's hearing breath sounds on the right but not the left) at that point is persuasive. Under these circumstances, breath sounds would not have alerted Respondent to a mislabeled x-ray. Respondent relied on the mislabeled x-ray and began to prep the right side of the patient for the chest tube. As Respondent began to prep W.T.'s right side, a dispute arose between himself and Nurse Counihan. Having weighed and evaluated all the testimony and the documentary evidence and exhibits, having reconciled that evidence which can be reconciled, and having eliminated that evidence which is not credible, it is found that the most credible version of this dispute is that Nurse Counihan asked Respondent why he was prepping the right side if W.T. had a left pneumothorax, and Respondent replied, "No, it isn't. Look at the x-ray." To this, Nurse Counihan said, "Yes, it is. I'm sure of it," and pointed to the lung on the x-ray which did not show a pneumothorax (the side next to the nameplate and the side without either a pacemaker or a pneumothorax). Respondent said, "No, it isn't. Look at the damn x-ray!" Respondent then proceeded to intubate on the right side while referring frequently to the mislabeled x-ray. In making the foregoing finding, it is noted that there were significant differences between the testimony of Nurse Counihan and all other witnesses, both factual and expert. Nurse Counihan deposed/testified that both she and another nurse had pointed out to Respondent that the patient's pacemaker was on the patient's left side and so was the pneumothorax. The other three factual witnesses, Starr, Danzig, and Respondent, all testified that they have no recollection whatsoever of anyone mentioning a pacemaker. Even Wesley Starr, called by the Petitioner, and who was present in W.T.'s room at the head of the patient's bed throughout the time of these discussions, testified that, to the best of his recollection, no one mentioned a pacemaker and that he did not recall anyone except Nurse Counihan challenging the Respondent's prepping W.T.'s right side. Also, Dr. Danzig, who was present in the room during the argument, and who testified that he had placed over 200 chest tubes during the course of his medical residency training, testified that if Nurse Counihan had, indeed, mentioned a pacemaker, he would have intervened in order to assist Respondent in determining the correct side of the pneumothorax. Although Petitioner asserted that Dr. Danzig is not credible due to his friendship with Respondent, that argument is not persuasive both due to the remoteness and degree of the friendship and Dr. Danzig's insistence that if Respondent should say that Nurse Counihan pointed to the side of the x-ray showing the pacemaker, then Respondent would be wrong. Respondent apparently did not review W.T.'s records either before or after the dispute with Nurse Counihan. These records were either in her room or elsewhere in the ICU unit, but since, at that point, the nurses' notes had not been compiled from their scratch pads to the patient's chart since before 4:00 a.m., there was nothing in W.T.'s chart/records to alert Respondent that the x- ray was mislabeled or that the patient had a pneumothorax on the left side even if he had reviewed the record. Also, he would have had to go back to the July 31 x-ray or the July 28 radiology narrative before he could have discovered that the pacemaker was on the left. This would have been very time consuming. Also, Dr. Danzig, who actually had made a cursory review of the patient's records when he first arrived in the room, was not alerted by Nurse Counihan's words or her pointing to the x-ray to any reason to search the records for information about the pacemaker. In further assessing Nurse Counihan's testimony, the undersigned has weighed in her favor the consistency of her recent deposition testimony with her notes and the incident report which she completed within five hours after the intubation incident on August 5, 1987. However, weighing against her credibility with regard to her statements then and now that she told Respondent that the pacemaker was on W.T.'s left side is the fact that even her August 5, 1987 report and notes were prepared in the glow of a hindsight favorable to her position and that her deposition shows that she is confused about how a pneumothorax appears on an x-ray. Reconciling all the testimony one can, it is remotely possible that Nurse Counihan said, "It is a left pneumothorax," while pointing to the lung shown on the x-ray as not having a pneumothorax and which, due to the "R" marker on the other lung could be inferred to be the left lung. It is even remotely possible (although not probable or persuasive given the three other factual witnesses' testimony that she had never mentioned a pacemaker) that Nurse Counihan could have told the Respondent, "The pneumothorax is on the same side as the pacemaker," which also was consistent with the x-ray as mislabeled. However, upon the credible evidence as a whole, the only reasonable conclusion is that if Nurse Counihan did mention a pacemaker at the time of her dispute with Respondent, she was ineffective in clearly conveying to Respondent or to anyone else in the room that the pacemaker and the pneumothorax were on the patient's left side or that there was any reason to further search the records or the patient's body to resolve the dispute. It is uncontroverted that, prior to the insertion of the chest tube in W.T.'s right side, absolutely no one, including Nurse Counihan, was aware that the x-ray was reversed, and that Ms. Counihan never informed the Respondent that the x-ray was reversed. Respondent's testimony is accepted that upon placement of the chest tube in W.T.'s right side (the side without the pneumothorax) he heard an immediate audible gush of air. That others in the room did not hear this rush of air is understandable due to the noise and confusion in the room, particularly the respirator sounds. Also, it is uncontroverted that upon placement of the chest tube in W.T.'s right side, the patient's blood pressure, which had been zero, immediately rose into normal range. A dramatic and rapid reestablishment of the patient's blood pressure is the expected result of a proper placement of a chest tube with a tension pneumothorax. All health care personnel present seem to have regarded the blood pressure stabilization as proof that the Respondent had placed the chest tube on the correct side of the patient, because no one, including Nurse Counihan, thereafter protested that a misplacement had occurred. Release of pressure and a return in blood pressure is not normally associated with placement of a chest tube in the wrong side of a patient and there is no definitive medical explanation of why it occurred in this instance, despite Dr. O'Leary's speculation that the gush of air could have been a leak of air across the Mediastrum. After placement of the chest tube in the patient's right side, Respondent ordered an immediate repeat chest x-ray to be certain the tube was placed in the correct lung and was placed correctly. After the patient's blood pressure had been reestablished, Dr. Danzig left the intensive care unit because he believed that the pneumothorax had been relieved completely and because the patient was now stable. If W.T. had not been stable, Dr. Danzig would have remained in the room since he was the day- shift emergency room doctor and he did not know if any physicians other than Respondent and himself were even in the hospital yet. After securing the chest tube and dressing the chest, Respondent left the floor and went to the operating room (OR) to notify the OR staff that there would be a delay before he could begin previously scheduled surgery. Thereafter, on his way to check the new x-ray he had just ordered, Respondent met Ms. Christnagel, who was bringing it to him. Ms. Christnagel then informed Respondent that she had mislabeled the 6:30 a.m. preintubation x-ray. Respondent simultaneously reviewed the new, postintubation x-ray and discovered that he had placed the chest tube in the wrong side of W.T.'s chest. At approximately the same time, W.T.'s blood pressure again dropped and a "code blue" was called. Dr. Gloria Mikula, M.D., who happened to be in the ICU at the time W.T. coded, "ran the code" to attempt to reestablish the patient's blood pressure. Throughout the time in which Dr. Mikula was running the code on this patient, no one, including Nurse Counihan, said anything to the effect that W.T. may have had a chest tube placed in the wrong side. In fact, the nursing staff did not even inform Dr. Mikula that this patient had had a pneumothorax and chest tube insertion prior to the code being called. Such information would have been important from a medical standpoint because it would have allowed Dr. Mikula to act immediately to relieve the tension in the patient's chest. Immediately upon reviewing the repeat chest x-ray and upon hearing the announcement of the code blue at the same time, Respondent rushed back to W.T.'s room, placed a chest tube in the patient's left side, and the patient's blood pressure was again reestablished. However, some time later in her hospitalization, W.T. expired. Nurse Counihan's failure to say anything to Dr. Mikula about the pneumothorax is further indicative of her immediate satisfaction that Respondent's intubation on the right side had been acceptable and that it was only after he discovered his error through the new x-ray and correctly intubated W.T. on the left side that Nurse Counihan completed her notes and incident report describing his error for the chart. The notes were transposed from her scratch pad and memory at approximately noon, August 5, 1987. Dr. Rosin, Petitioner's expert in internal medicine, criticized Respondent's performance as below the professional standard of care because he felt that once Respondent was made aware in the patient's room by Nurse Counihan that the pneumothorax could be on the patient's left side, Respondent had an obligation to make further inquiry or investigation before inserting the chest tube in the patient's right side. In Dr. Rosin's opinion, Respondent's investigation could have taken several routes: review of earlier x-rays and the patient's record, further conversation with the nurse, further hands-on examination of the patient for signs of the pacemaker, and/or ordering a new x- ray. Although Dr. Rosin testified that Respondent should have ordered a repeat x-ray so as to resolve the dispute with Nurse Counihan before inserting the chest tube on W.T.'s right side, he also conceded that the only possible adverse effect of the decision Respondent made was the delay in relieving W.T.'s condition. The chest intubation involved is not a benign or casual procedure, but no actual harm occasioned by misplacement of the chest tube was demonstrated in this case, and the maximum amount of time which would have been saved, under Dr. Rosin's approach, would have been that short period of time it took for the Respondent to place the chest tube and dress the wound. Under the circumstances, if Respondent had delayed intubation, W.T. would probably have "coded blue" before the correctly labelled chest x-ray could have been performed anyway. In light of the confused state of the patient's breath sounds, obesity, and lack of scarring, the fact that no nurses' notes had been codified since before 4:00 a.m., Nurse Counihan's own confusion about the mismarked x-ray, and how far back in the patient's chart Respondent would have had to look before he would have been able to locate anything useful about the pacemaker, it is found that Respondent behaved reasonably in an emergency situation, and Dr. O'Leary's and Dr. Dworkin's expert opinions that he did not violate the professional standard of care in the first insertion of the chest tube are accepted. It is also found that the Respondent's procedure in ordering the new chest x-ray and leaving the room after the first intubation without further search of the records or further conversation in the room was reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Osteopathic Physicians enter a Final Order dismissing all charges against Respondent. DONE and ENTERED this 25th day of July, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of July, 1991.
The Issue At the hearing, DPR dismissed Count II, alleging a violation of subsection 458.331(1)(h) Florida Statutes. The remaining issues for resolution are whether, as alleged in Counts I, III, IV and V, Dr. Robinson violated subsections 458.331(1)(n),(q), and (t) Florida Statutes by failing to maintain adequate records, by inappropriately prescribing controlled substances, and by failing to properly evaluate and treat multiple medical problems.
Findings Of Fact Jerry Mason Robinson, M.D., has been continually licensed (license number ME 0011811) as a physician in the State of Florida since 1965. He was Board-certified in Family Practice in 1973 and was recertified in 1979 and 1985. He has continually practiced medicine since 1967 in Deltona, Florida, as a sole practitioner in family practice. Patient Fleming Dr. Robinson began treating Jesse Fleming when he came to his office on March 14, 1979, with complaints of being unable to breathe, a feeling of suffocation, and inability to sleep. The patient was found to be suffering from refractory heart failure and was admitted that same day to Seminole Memorial Hospital. Jesse Fleming was discharged as improved on March 23, 1979. His final diagnosis, reflected on the discharge summary, was: refractory heart failure, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and Pickwickian's syndrome. The notation "Pickwickian Syndrome" also appeared on the first clinical data sheet, dated March 14, 1979, in Dr. Robinson's office records for this patient. Pickwickian Syndrome, in lay terms, is a condition occurring in obese individuals wherein the abdominal fat presses on the diaphragm, cutting off the breathing and causing sleep at odd and inappropriate times. While Dr. Robinson initially felt that the condition was Pickwickian Syndrome, after the patient lost substantial weight in the hospital, he felt the proper diagnosis should be narcolepsy, a similar condition. He started him in the hospital on Dexedrine tablets, 5 mg. each morning, to increase his alertness. Narcolepsy is a very rare disease characterized by periods where the patient falls asleep uncontrollably many times during the day. The patient also has cataplexy, which is episodes of collapse that occur intermittently with emotional stress, laughing, giggling and fear. Another aspect of narcolepsy is called hypnagogic hallucinations, where an individual has vivid dreams. And the fourth part is called sleep paralysis where the patient cannot move on occasion without being touched. While there is no single test available to unconditionally diagnose a case of narcolepsy, the competent experts agree that a complete history and physical examination is required. The patient should be asked about sleeping patterns and about the symptoms described above. Testing through an electroencephalogram (EEG) and polysomnography is helpful. It is also important to specifically eliminate other causes of somnolence such as medications or other physical conditions, such as thyroid disorders or anemia. Dr. Robinson's records for Jesse Fleming are void of any documentation of the basis for his diagnosis of narcolepsy. The hospital discharge summary of his course in the hospital mentions only that the patient was found to be somnolent and sleeping all the time. He was on Valium in the hospital, 2 mg., 4 times a day to reduce anxiety. Valium is considered to be a central nervous system depressant and has drowsiness as one of its components. There is another notation on the records, on the occasion of an office visit, that the patient fell asleep in the office. This alone, does not indicate a case of narcolepsy. Although Dr. Robinson continued Mr. Fleming on Dexedrine or similar drug, Eskatrol, from the time that he was discharged from the hospital in March 1979, the first notation of a diagnosis of narcolepsy does not appear until March 20, 1981. The term appears intermittently as a diagnosis thereafter, but without description of any symptoms. Dexedrine is a Schedule II controlled substance. It is generally considered one of the amphetamines, a central nervous system stimulant. It has a high liability for habituation, or psychological dependence and overwhelming desire to continue to use the medication. It should not be used in those conditions in which it causes unnecessary stress on the vital organs of the body. It increases the demand of the heart for oxygen and can compromise an already failing heart. It is dangerous to give Dexedrine with thyroid hormones because the hormones make the heart more sensitive to Dexedrine and to the body's own form of Dexedrine, which is adrenalin. If given at all with Digoxin or Digitalis, Dexedrine should be given only with great care because these drugs slow the heart rate, an opposite effect of Dexedrine. In the past amphetamines were widely used to assist in weight control. That use was restricted and the treatment of narcolepsy is one of the remaining legitimate uses. And at least one expert in this proceeding, Jacob Green, M.D. would designate Ritalin, or a similar sympathomimetic drug as the treatment of choice for narcolepsy. In late 1981, Eskatrol was no longer available and Dr. Robinson began prescribing Dexedrine spansules, 15 mg., 200 or 100 at a time, at approximately monthly intervals. The patient has continued on this medication through 1985 and up to the time of the hearing. Around June 1979, Dr. Robinson began to prescribe Synthroid, a thyroid hormone, for Fleming's hypothyroidism at the same time that the patient was taking the amphetamine. On one occasion when the patient complained that he could not sleep, Dalmane, a sleeping medication was prescribed. Dexadrine spansules are a time-release medication which allows the effects of the drug to remain in the body for a longer period, including night time, when sleep is appropriate. Also while Fleming was on Eskatrol or Dexedrine, Dr. Robinson intermittently prescribed Brethine (a stimulant) for his lung problems, and on an on-going basis, Digoxin, for his heart condition. Assuming without the medical record basis to substantiate it, that the narcolepsy diagnosis was accurate, the prescription of Dexedrine to Jesse Fleming was dangerous and inappropriate. The patient records for Fleming are replete with references to irregular heart beats. On some occasions the nurse recorded "very irregular" apical pulses. These irregularities are sometimes a harbinger of heart failure and can occur in, or be exacerbated by, amphetamine therapy, especially in combination with thyroid hormones. In his testimony at hearing, Dr. Robinson stated that when he observed the notation of an irregular pulse he would check the patient himself to assure that the patient was alright. However, these observations are not reflected in the chart, except on one occasion when an EKG was taken and was found to be within normal limits. Good medical record-keeping is an essential aspect of a reasonable prudent physician's practice. Records are the mainstay of communications between physicians and provide a reminder to the physician with a busy practice. The records should provide objective findings and, from the patient, subjective findings. They guide the physician into what he was thinking previously and what needs to be done in the future. In a mobile society, when patients move from doctor to doctor, when specialists are brought in for consultation, when a regular doctor is absent, it is essential that another physician be able to view what has happened in the case from the medical records. Everything that is done needs to be justified in and documented in the records. The absence of a notation leads to the justifiable conclusion that the treatment was not undertaken or the test was not performed. Dr. Robinson failed to maintain adequate records to support his treatment of Jesse Fleming. The bases for his diagnosis of narcolepsy was utterly lacking, as was the basis for the decision to persist in prescribing Dexedrine under dangerous and potentially life-threatening conditions. Patient Kipp Fred Kipp was first examined by Dr. Robinson on June 8, 1978. He came to the office to get some prescriptions for medication that he was already taking. He had angina and a bad cold and was getting ready to return to Ohio, his summer residence. The history given by the patient on that first visit indicated that he had undergone two hip operations and an operation on his cervical spine for fusion. He had two aneurysm operations on his aorta, he had a hemorrhoidectomy and an amputation of his left second finger. At various times in the past he had been treated for severe arthritis in his back and foot, angina, hypertension, diabetes, pneumonia and hepatitis. His medications were Naprosyn for arthritis, Isordil for angina, Diabinese for diabetes, Hydrodiural for his hypertension, Percodan for his pain in his back, and Nitroglycerin for his angina. Dr. Robinson examined the patient and refilled his Naprosyn and Isordil. He told him to come back to see him in the fall when he returned to Florida. Fred Kipp returned to Dr. Robinson's office on December 7, 1978, complaining of chest pain. He was admitted to Seminole Memorial Hospital for pre-infarction angina and was discharged on December 11, 1978, with diagnoses of angina pectoris and coronary artery disease. From December 1978, until present, Dr. Robinson has been Fred Kipp's regular family physician. During this time he has treated him for angina or coronary artery disease, arthritis, hip problems, diabetes, back pain, shingles, vascular problems and chronic severe pain associated with all of these conditions. During this period the patient was hospitalized at least six times, primarily with heart trouble, but also for uncontrolled diabetes and impending gangrene. During a September 1984 admission to Central Florida Regional Hospital (formerly known as Seminole Memorial Hospital), the patient was diagnosed as having severe ankylosing spondylitis, a progressive spinal disease where the vertebrae ultimately become fused. The initial diagnosis was based on the patient's statement of his prior history, but the diagnosis was later confirmed by Dr. Robinson with an x-ray and CAT scan. The condition is very painful. During the course of his treatment of Fred Kipp, Dr. Robinson has kept the patient on Percodan for pain, in addition to his various medications for his multiple problems. Percodan is a Schedule II controlled substance containing oxycodone and aspirin. It is an analgesic with opium-like properties and is useful for moderate to moderately-severe types of pain. Because of the nature of the drug it has a potential for habituation and dependency, particularly when used on a regular long-term basis for chronic, as opposed to acute (temporary) pain. In order to avoid the habituation and dependency, less-addictive modalities should be tried before Percodan is selected as the treatment of choice. Dr. Robinson's office records for Fred Kipp do not reflect the consideration of alternatives. However, Dr. Robinson was aware that alternatives such as non-steroidal and anti- inflammatory agents were tried by consulting physicians, including by Dr. Broderick with Seminole Orthopaedic Associates. Fred Kipp is a very large man, approximately six feet, eight inches tall and weighing from 247 to 281 pounds. The dosages of Percodan prescribed for him by Dr. Robinson were not excessive, given the patient's size and physical problems. He has received between 200 and 300 Percodan per month for the last six years. At no time did he ever claim to have lost his prescription in order to get more drugs. Although the use of a strong narcotic with a chronic pain patient is the last resort of a reasonable, prudent physician, the use of Percodan was necessary and appropriate in Fred Kipp's case to allow him to maintain a reasonable quality of life. This finding is based not upon Dr. Robinson's office records, but rather on the competent expert testimony of his witnesses, who examined the patient and his records, and on the hospital records and consulting physicians' records in this case. Dr. Robinson's office records are deficient as to documented analysis of the patient's pain (subjective and objective observation) and efforts with less addictive modalities. While Dr. Robinson claimed that he requested Fred Kipp's records from his prior treating physician, his own records do not reflect that fact, nor was the attempt repeated when the first request was unproductive.
The Issue This is a license discipline case in which the Petitioner seeks to take disciplinary action against the Respondent on the basis of alleged violations of paragraphs (m), (n), and (t) of Section 458.331(1), Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.). The violations charged relate to allegations that the Respondent failed to keep medical records justifying the course of treatment of a patient, that he exploited the patient for financial gain, and that in his treatment of the patient he failed to practice medicine with the appropriate level of care, skill, and treatment.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to Section 20.30, Florida Statutes; Chapter 455, Florida Statutes; and Chapter 458, Florida Statutes. Respondent is and has been at all times material hereto a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 0013446. Respondent's last known address is Medical Service Center, 16751 North East 6th Avenue, North Miami Beach, Florida 33162. From on or about July 25, 1986, to on or about November 19, 1986, Respondent provided medical care and treatment to Patient # 1, who is also referred to herein as "Patient O.S." On July 25, 1986, Patient O.S., who was at that time a 39-year-old man, was involved in an automobile accident. Shortly after the accident, Patient O.S. went to the Respondent's office for medical attention related to the automobile accident. During his first visit to the Respondent's office, Patient O.S. told the Respondent that he had passed out during the automobile accident. During that visit Patient O.S. complained of pain in the left shoulder, pain in the neck, and pain in the back of the head. He also complained of a headache in the back of the head. The Respondent's initial physical examination of Patient O.S. revealed the following: 1/ [O]n physical examination, the left shoulder was swollen compared to the right and felt warm to touch and was tender. There was no deformity but pain was produced on motion of the left shoulder. There was bilateral 3+ cervical paravertebral muscle spasms (on a scale of from 0-4+). Lateral rotation of the neck was 90 degrees to the left but was limited to 60 degrees to the right. At the time of the Respondent's initial evaluation of Patient O.S., the Respondent did not order or take any x-rays of Patient O.S.'s skull, cervical spine, or left shoulder. The Respondent's initial plan for the medical care of Patient O.S. included, but was not limited to, scheduling Patient O.S. for bone and joint scans of the shoulders, cervical spine, and head. At the time of the Respondent's initial evaluation of the Patient O.S., he conducted an adequate examination of the patient. 2/ The Respondent did not, however, make an adequate medical record of his examination of Patient O.S., in that he failed to include any useful information about the extent of the patient's neurological condition. Specifically, the medical records fail to contain a description of the patient's motor reflexes and motor strength. The Respondent's medical records of his treatment of Patient O.S. also fail to contain important historical information relative to Patient O.S.'s loss of consciousness during the automobile accident. On or about July 29, 1986, at the Respondent's office, the Respondent took x-rays of Patient O.S.'s shoulders. On or about July 30, 1986, at the Respondent's office, the Respondent performed bone and joint scans and color computer image analysis of the scans, of Patient O.S.'s cervical spine, right shoulder, and left shoulder. Abnormal uptake of the radionuclide not seen easily in the conventional images was found in the cervical and thoracic spine and left shoulder. This information was neither necessary nor useful in the diagnosis or treatment of the patient. On or about July 31, 1986, at the Respondent's office, the Respondent performed a procedure on Patient O.S. which is described in the Respondent's records as "Echoflow Doppler Continuous Wave Imaging of the carotid arteries." The purpose of this procedure was to evaluate the integrity of the carotid artery system. Blood flow in the patient's carotid artery system was found to be normal. On or about September 3, 1986, at the Respondent's office, the Respondent repeated the procedure on Patient O.S. which is described in the Respondent's records as "Echoflow Doppler Continuous Wave Imaging of the carotid arteries." The purpose of this procedure was to evaluate the integrity of the carotid artery system. Blood flow in the patient's carotid artery system was again found to be normal. On or about November 19, 1986, at the Respondent's office, the Respondent performed repeat bone and joint scans and color computer image analysis of the scans, with essentially the same results as the bone scans that were done on Patient O.S. on July 30, 1986. On or about November 19, 1986, the Respondent discharged Patient O.S. from the Respondent's care, stating that as of that date Patient O.S. had reached maximum medical improvement for problems related to the patient's automobile accident. The standard of medical care applicable in this proceeding is "that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances." See Section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.). The Respondent failed to practice medicine with the level of care, skill, and treatment described above by failing to order or take x-rays of Patient O.S. during the patient's initial visit. Under conditions and circumstances similar to those presented by Patient O.S., a reasonably prudent primary care physician, at the time of the patient's first visit, at a minimum would have taken ordinary x-rays of the patient's cervical spine (AP and lateral views), as well as either a skull x-ray or a CT scan of the brain. In a patient with the signs, symptoms, and history presented by Patient O.S., these minimum x-rays are necessary to rule out the possibility of any serious injury to the cervical spine or to the skull or brain. The Respondent's failure at the first visit to take ordinary x-rays of the Patient O.S.'s cervical spine and to take a skull x-ray or a CT scan of his brain, was a failure to practice medicine with the required level of care, skill, and treatment. The Respondent failed to practice medicine with the required level of care, skill, and treatment by performing bone and joint scans and related color computer image analysis of the scans of Patient O.S.'s cervical spine, right shoulder, and left shoulder on two separate occasions. A reasonably prudent primary care physician under similar conditions and circumstances would not have performed any of these procedures because there was no medical justification for performing the bone and joint scans on either occasion, nor was there any medical justification for the related color computer image analysis of the scans. The performance of all of the bone and joint scans and the related color computer image analysis was a failure to practice medicine with the required level of skill, care, and treatment because those scans and analysis served no useful purpose in the diagnosis or treatment of the patient, resulted in additional financial expense to the patient for which the patient received no benefit, and exposed the patient on two occasions to the risk of unnecessary radioactive materials. The Respondent's performance of the bone and joint scans and the related color computer image analysis regarding Patient O.S. was an exploitation of the patient for the financial gain of the Respondent. In the treatment of Patient O.S. it is fairly debatable whether the first of the carotid artery flow studies performed by the Respondent on the Patient O.S. was within the applicable standard of care. Although the medical conditions presented by Patient O.S. did not clearly indicate a need for such a study, a reasonably prudent primary care physician presented with those circumstances might have ordered or performed an initial carotid artery flow study if he were being extra careful. The second carotid artery flow study performed on Patient O.S. is a very different matter. There was no medical justifi- cation for performing the second study. The performance of the second study was a failure to practice medicine with the required level of skill, care, and treatment because the second study served no useful purpose and it resulted in additional financial expense to the patient for which the patient received no benefit. The Respondent's performance of the second carotid artery flow study on Patient O.S. was an exploitation of the patient for the financial gain of the Respondent. 3/ On April 20, 1988, an investigator for the Department of Professional Regulation delivered to the Respondent an authorization for the release of medical information concerning the Patient O.S. On that same day the Respondent provided the investigator with copies of Patient O.S.'s complete medical records and insurance statements. 4/ Almost two years later, during March of 1990, a Department of Professional Regulation prosecutor (Ms. Gelmine), who was then prosecuting a chiropractor who had also seen Patient O.S., contacted the attorney who was then representing the Respondent and asked whether the attorney would provide the prosecutor with a copy of the Respondent's medical records regarding Patient O.S. The prosecutor requesting the records agreed orally that if the Respondent's records were furnished to her, the records would be used solely in the disposition of the case she was prosecuting against a chiropractor and would not be used to prosecute the Respondent in this case. The attorney for the Respondent provided Ms. Gelmine with another copy of the Respondent's medical records regarding the Patient O.S., even though the Department already had copies of those records.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered in this case to the following effect: Concluding that the Respondent has violated subsections (m), (n), and (t) of Section 458.331(1), Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.), as charged in Counts One, Two, and Three of the Administrative Complaint; and Imposing an administrative penalty consisting of an administrative fine in the amount of five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) for each of the three counts for a total fine in the amount of fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000.00) and revocation of the Respondent's license to practice medicine in the State of Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of January, 1993, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of January, 1993.
