The Issue The issue is whether the site plan for the Evergreens project should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, including the stipulation of counsel, the following findings of fact are determined: Background In this land use dispute, Petitioners, Meadowbrook Neighborhood Association, Inc.; Lynn Hill; A.A. Sulkes; Philip Bennett; Vera Harper; and Carlos McDonald (Petitioners), have contested a decision by the Developmental Review Committee (DRC) of Respondent, City of Tallahassee (City), to approve a Type B site review application for a project known as Evergreens at Mahan (Evergreens). In its decision, the DRC exempted the project from the consistency and concurrency requirements of the City's Comprehensive Plan based upon a 1991 agreement by the City and the property owner which conferred vested rights on the property. Thus, the project was never reviewed for compliance with the concurrency and consistency requirements of the City's Comprehensive Plan. If the application is approved, the applicant will be authorized to commence the process for constructing 416 apartment units in ten three-story buildings on approximately 24.56 acres of land located just south of the intersection at East Mahan Drive and Riggins Road in Tallahassee, Florida. The apartment complex will be one of the largest in the City. The application was filed by Respondent, Genesis Group (Genesis), acting as an agent for the owner of the property, Respondent, George K. Walker, Trustee (Walker). After the application is approved, Walker is contractually obligated to sell the property to Respondent, TTK, L.L.C. (TTK), a New Hampshire developer, who will actually construct the complex. In response to the DRC's decision, on August 9, 2000, Petitioners filed a Notice of Intent to File Petition for Formal Proceedings. On August 28, 2000, Petitioners filed their Petition for Formal Administrative Proceedings. As grounds for denying the application, Petitioners contended that a Stipulation and Final Settlement Agreement (Settlement Agreement) entered into by Walker and the City on August 6, 1991, in DOAH Case No. 91-4109VR determining that the property was presumptively vested violated in a number of respects the City's Vested Rights Review Ordinance (Ordinance); that any vested rights acquired on the property have expired under Section 18-104(1)(c), Code of Ordinances; and the site plan is inconsistent with the City's Comprehensive Plan and Land Development Code. As to the latter ground, the parties have agreed that this issue need not be addressed now, but rather it can be considered by the DRC in the event Petitioners prevail on the merits of this action. Other than the vesting status, no issues have been raised regarding the site plan itself. On September 11, 2000, the Commission entered its Determination of Standing. Pursuant to the Bylaws of the Commission, the matter was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) on September 20, 2000, for an evidentiary hearing. The parties Meadowbrook Neighborhood Association, Inc. (Association) is a not-for-profit corporation organized on February 18, 2000, and existing under the laws of the State of Florida. The Association represents approximately 200 of the 279 homeowners who reside in the Meadowbrook neighborhood. The Meadowbrook neighborhood is zoned for Residential Preservation-1 and has a residential density of less than three units per acre. A portion of the Meadowbrook neigborhood is adjacent to the proposed project. Lynn Hill, A.A. Sulkes, Philip Bennett, Vera Harper, and Carlos McDonald reside and own property in the Meadowbrook neighborhood. Their property either abuts, or is close to, the location of the proposed Evergreens project. All are members of the Association and bring this action in their individual capacity and as a member of the Association. During the course of the hearing, Respondents stipulated to the standing of all Petitioners. The City is a municipal corporation of the State of Florida. It has authority to review proposed site plans for real property located within the City's geographic boundaries. Genesis is a Tallahassee consulting firm which prepared the application for Walker and acted as his agent in seeking approval of the site plan for the Evergreens project. TTK, a New Hampshire limited liability corporation, is a developer and builder of real property, and has a contract to purchase the site of the Evergreens project pending final approval of the site plan by the City. Walker is the owner of the approximately 30-acre parcel (the subject property) which is at issue in this proceeding, and is the applicant for the Evergreens site plan. The Evergreens project will be located on 24.56 acres of this 30-acre parcel. The property and its history The subject property has been owned by the Walker family, either as a part of a consortium of investors or in trust, for more than 70 years. Since the mid-1960's, Walker has controlled the property as trustee for himself and his brother. The site of the apartment complex lies a few hundred feet south of the intersection of East Mahan Drive (U.S. 90) and Riggins Road. Approximately 11.738 acres of the land sit on the eastern side of Riggins Road while the remaining 12.821 acres sit on the western side. The remainder of the property, which consists of around 7 or 8 acres, is situated just north of the apartment site, fronts on East Mahan Drive, and is currently zoned commercial. The Meadowbrook neighborhood begins approximately 1,250 feet or so south of Mahan Drive and sits on around 100 acres. The boundaries of the neighborhood abut the southern and southeastern ends of the project site. The relevant history of the property goes back to January 9, 1926, when the original plat of Glenwood Estates was recorded in Leon County (County). The property was located in the County, but not within the City, and was owned by a group that included Walker's father. The subject property was identified in the plat as Blocks L and M. The Glenwood Estates plat did not contain any statements establishing use or density for the subject property. On April 7, 1943, Glenwood Estates was replatted for taxation purposes. Walker's mother, a widow and the heir of Walker's father, was among the owners of the property. The 1943 replat reconfigured the subject property as a single, large acre parcel. The replat does not contain any statements establishing uses or densities for the platted parcels. Prior to 1967, Glenwood Estates became the sole property of Walker's mother. Upon her death, the property was placed in trust for the benefit of Walker and his brother. George K. Walker is the named trustee of the property. On March 22, 1989, the remaining property owned by Walker was subdivided into three parcels; two of the small parcels on the southwestern corner of Riggins Road and Mahan Drive were sold, thereby reducing the size of the subject property by approximately 1.56 acres. By 1991, the 1943 replat of Glenwood Estates had been resubdivided a minimum of seven times which changed the replat substantially from its original configuration. Five of the resubdivisions involved the Meadowbrook tract. Since 1989, the subject property has been configured as a large parcel of approximately 30 acres. Since 1991, the subject property is the only property in the replat that Walker has owned. In addition to his ownership of the subject property, until 1971 Walker owned approximately 69 acres of land that presently constitute a large part of the Meadowbrook neighborhood. On October 6, 1971, Walker entered into a contract for the sale of that land. Among the conditions of the sale was a requirement that the property consisting of the Meadowbrook neighborhood be rezoned R-3; that the property that is the proposed apartment site be rezoned RM-2; and that the property fronting Mahan Drive be rezoned C-1. Costs of the rezoning were to be shared equally by the buyer and seller. At the time of this sale, the subject property and the Meadowbrook tract were undeveloped. In 1972, the County rezoned the property consisting of the Meadowbrook neighborhood as R-2 for single-family residential development; rezoned the approximately 25-acre portion of the subject property north of the Meadowbrook tract as RM-2, for multi-family residential development; and rezoned the property fronting Mahan Drive as C-1 for commercial development. The multi-family zoning on the property that is the proposed location for the Evergreen project authorized a range of dwelling units from single-family to two-family to multi-family up to a maximum of 17.4 units per acre. One of the conditions of the 1971 sale was the granting of an easement by Walker to the buyer (Collins Brothers) to extend Riggins Road south from Mahan Drive to the northern boundary of the Meadowbrook tract. At the time of the sale, there was no direct access from the Meadowbrook tract north to Mahan Drive. On an undisclosed date, Collins Brothers was forced into receivership. Therefore, between 1971 and 1980, there was no development on the Meadowbrook tract or the subject property, other than the roughing-out of the location of what was to become Riggins Road. In 1980, Guardian Mortgage Investors (Guardian) took over the previous buyer's interest. At that time, Walker entered into a road construction agreement with Guardian in which he agreed to pay one-half of the road construction costs to extend Riggins Road south from Mahan Drive to the Meadowbrook subdivision. Guardian agreed to pay one-half of the road construction costs as well as all of the cost for the installation of the main water and sewer trunk lines, except for laterals which were to be installed at Walker's expense. In 1981, the construction of Riggins Road and the main water and sewer trunk lines were completed. The minimum allowable width of Riggins Road from Mahan Drive to the northern boundary of the Meadowbrook tract was 30 feet. However, it was constructed 36 feet wide so that it could serve not only the Meadowbrooks neighborhood, but also Walker's future development. For the same reason, even though the minimum right-of-way for this section of Riggins Road was 60 feet, an extra 20 feet (or 80 feet in all) were dedicated for the right-of-way. No development has occurred on the subject property since this dedication. The sewer main serving the Meadowbrook neighborhood is a gravity feed system flowing into a pump station within the Meadowbrook neighborhood. From there, it is pumped into a force main to a point under or adjacent to Riggins Road approximately 50 feet into the property that is zoned RM-2. From there, the system is again a gravity feed system flowing north under Mahan Drive to another pump station. If the sewer system had been installed to serve only the Meadowbrook neighborhood, it could have consisted only of a forced main system between the two pump stations. However, because further development was anticipated, the developer installed a gravity feed system that flowed through the RM-2 property, through the C-1 property, and under Mahan Drive at considerably more expense than a forced main system. Both the water and sewer systems have the capacity to serve 670 domestic equivalent units in the RM-2 and C-1 portions of the subject property. Following their completion, the water and sewer facilities, and Riggins Road, were dedicated to the City. Since 1983 or 1984, the City has owned, operated, and maintained Riggins Road and the water and sewer lines from Mahan to the Meadowbrook neighborhood. On April 14, 1983, Walker petitioned the City to annex his property. By Ordinance No. 83-0-2185 adopted on December 30, 1983, the Walker property, the Meadowbrook neighborhood, and considerable other properties were annexed into the City. Prior to annexation, Walker received assurance from the City that the annexation would not affect his ability to develop the RM-2 and C-1 portions of his property. The City's vesting process On July 16, 1990, the City adopted its 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Concurrent with its adoption, the City adopted a Vested Development Rights Review Ordinance (Ordinance), which established "the sole administrative procedures and standards by which a property owner" could assert that he had acquired certain property rights and obtain a vested rights determination from the City. The Ordinance is codified as Article VII of Chapter 18 of the City's Code of Ordinances. The Ordinance established the administrative procedures and standards for common law or statutory vesting. A property that was determined to be vested under the Ordinance was exempt from the application of the consistency and concurrency requirements of the City's 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Once a property is found to be exempt, or vested, it retains that status in perpetuity. In order to claim vested development rights under the Ordinance, a property owner was required to apply for a vested rights determination with the City's Planning Department within 120 days of July 16, 1990. A failure to timely file an application constituted a waiver of any vested rights claim. However, a property owner whose property was located within a recorded subdivision, or unrecorded subdivision which the City determined had satisfied the City's infrastructure requirements, did not have to submit an application for a vested rights determination. In those cases, vested rights were "presumed," based upon the infrastructure requirements being satisfied, and the property was "presumptively" vested from the concurrency and consistency requirements of the City's Comprehensive Plan pursuant to Section III.1.a. of the Ordinance. The right of a property owner to assert that his property is presumptively vested can be made at any time, even today. After reviewing its land development records, on July 25, 1990, the City published in the Tallahassee Democrat a lengthy list of recorded and unrecorded subdivisions it had determined were presumptively vested from the concurrency and consistency requirements of the City's Comprehensive Plan. The subject property, identified on the City's tax rolls by Tax I.D. #11-28-20-071-000-0, was included within the City's list of presumptively vested recorded subdivisions. The notice stated that it was the City's intent to only exempt subdivisions for which streets, stormwater management facilities, utilities, and other infrastructure required for development had been completed by July 16, 1990. Recorded subdivisions included on the list of exempt subdivisions were presumed to have satisfied the infrastructure requirements. The City did not inspect recorded subdivisions to ensure compliance with the infrastructure requirements, but presumed the existence of the requisite infrastructure. Any recorded subdivision subsequently determined not to be in compliance with the infrastructure requirements could be removed from the exempt list. Unrecorded subdivisions were not included on the exempt list unless they had first been physically inspected to ensure compliance with the infrastructure requirements. Walker's application for vested rights On October 17, 1990, the City's Director of Growth Management instructed that Walker's property be removed from the list of exempt subdivisions due to the resubdivision of the original plat and because all of the infrastructure was not in place. At that time, however, there was no provision in the Ordinance that made resubdivision a factor in the determination of an exemption or vesting. On the other hand, the issue of infrastructure was a valid consideration. On November 13, 1990, Walker timely submitted an application for a vested rights determination on the basis that his property was entitled to vesting under the common law. The City assigned Number V.R.0195T to the application. On January 8, 1991, in accordance with Section III.3.b. of the Ordinance, the City Planning Department determined that the subject property was not vested and notified Walker that Application Number V.R. 0195T was denied. No reason was given. The letter of denial advised him of his rights to contest the planning staff's denial of his vested rights. On January 22, 1991, Walker notified the City of his decision to challenge planning staff's denial of his vested rights application. He elected to waive his right to a hearing before the City Staff Committee, and he requested a hearing before DOAH pursuant to Section III.3.c. of the Ordinance. On July 3, 1991, the City referred Walker's request for an administrative hearing to DOAH on the planning staff's denial of Application Number V.R.0195T. The request was assigned DOAH Case Number 91-004109VR. On July 9, 1991, the case was scheduled for a hearing on August 29, 1991. During the pendency of the DOAH case, and at the request of the City, Walker and his counsel met with representatives of the City, including a Planning Department staffer and an assistant city attorney. Before the meeting, Walker reconfirmed with City officials that his property had been rezoned to C-1, RM-2, and R-2 in 1972, and that the necessary water and sewer lines were in place to serve his property. After learning at the meeting that infrastructure for the property had already been built, the City agreed to find Walker's property vested to the extent that the infrastructure was in place. In other words, Walker would be allowed to develop as many units as the existing infrastructure would accommodate. After the meeting, Walker secured an affidavit from Wayne Colony, the engineer who designed the water and sewer system for the property and the southern extension of Riggins Road. In his affidavit dated August 6, 1991, Coloney attested that the sewer line between Mahan Drive and the Meadowbrook neighborhood was designed to serve the single-family residences, the RM-2 property and the C-1 property; that the sewer line had the capacity to serve 670 residential equivalent units in the RM-2 and C-1 portions of that property; and that the sewer had sufficient capacity for the maximum density of development on the RM-2 and C-1 portions of the property. A letter from the City's Water and Sewer Department dated August 1, 1991, also confirmed that the City had "the necessary water and sewer lines to serve the property." Finally, Riggins Road and the stormwater drain to serve the property had been completed in the early 1980's. With this information in hand, counsel for the City agreed that the property was presumptively vested. On August 6, 1991, or just prior to the scheduled administrative hearing, counsel for Walker and the City executed the Settlement Agreement which declared the subject property an exempt subdivision based upon Section III.1.a.1. of the Ordinance, and presumptively vested the property from the consistency and concurrency requirements of the City's 2010 Comprehensive Plan. The Settlement Agreement authorized the development of the subject property for up to 670 residential equivalent units. The Settlement Agreement also stated that there was no time frame in which the Walker property was required to commence or complete development, and that the property was vested in perpetuity. On August 7, 1991, the Settlement Agreement was filed with DOAH. On August 8, 1991, an Order Approving Stipulation and Final Settlement Agreement was entered. Therefore, an administrative hearing was never held on Application V.R.0195T. Walker's application was one of hundreds of vested rights applications being processed by the City at that time. Although many of the specific details underlying the City's decision to approve the settlement are not known now because of the passage of time, the subsequent loss by the City of Walker's application file, and the sheer number of applications then being processed, the City Attorney is certain that he would have known about the petition and the underlying facts before he authorized the Assistant City Attorney to execute the agreement. Based on the information then available, the City Attorney now says that Walker clearly qualified for either common law or presumptive vesting. Petitioners contend that the Assistant City Attorney (and/or City Attorney) lacked authority to settle the case without obtaining specific prior authority from the City Commission; however, the more credible and persuasive evidence shows otherwise. This is true even though the Ordinance does not specifically address the settlement of vested rights cases. The City Attorney's policy is and has been to involve the affected City staff in settlement negotiations rather than negotiating without the consent of his client. Moreover, the present City Attorney, and his two predecessors, have always considered it a part of their inherent authority to settle litigation on the City's behalf when it is in the best interest of the City to do so. The only exception to this inherent authority is when there is a budgetary impact; in those cases, prior approval must be obtained before committing the City to spending money. Here, however, there was no fiscal impact resulting from the Walker settlement. Further, at no time after the Settlement Agreement was signed has the City Commission ever expressed its disagreement with the City Attorney's interpretation of the Ordinance, taken steps to curtail his inherent authority, or acted to vacate the Settlement Agreement. Therefore, in the absence of any credible evidence to the contrary, it is found that the Assistant City Attorney, after consultation with the City Attorney and appropriate City staff, had the authority to execute the Settlement Agreement on behalf of the City without prior City Commission approval. Petitioners also contend that based upon the language in Section III.3.e.7. of the Ordinance, there was no authority for the hearing officer to approve the Settlement Agreement until a substantive review of the information which formed the basis for the agreement had been made. The cited provision sets forth the criteria upon which the decision of the hearing officer in a vested rights case must be based. They include an evidentiary presentation by the parties at a formal hearing, adherence to certain land use guidelines and relevant case law, and a recommended order at the conclusion of the proceeding. The City points out, however, that under its interpretation of the Ordinance, once the parties learned that the property was exempt and the dispute had been settled, the criteria in Section III.3.e.7. did not apply. In those situations, no useful purpose would be served in requiring the parties to go through the formality of a de novo hearing. Otherwise, the parties (including the taxpayers) would be required to expend time, resources, and energy to litigate a matter in which no material facts were in issue. Accordingly, the City's interpretation of the Ordinance is found to be the most logical and reasonable, and it is found that the DOAH hearing officer had the authority to accept the parties' settlement without conducting a hearing. Petitioners next contend that when the Settlement Agreement was executed, the City lacked sufficient evidence to show that Walker had installed the infrastructure necessary for presumptive vesting. More specifically, they assert that except for Wayne Colony's affidavit, and the letter from the City, there was no evidence to support that determination. Petitioners go on to contend that not only must the primary roadways and water and sewer lines be built before the vesting cut-off date, but the "on-site" water and sewer lines, stormwater facilities, and other facilities necessary to begin vertical construction on each apartment building must also be in place. This contention is based on Section III.1.a.1. of the Ordinance which requires that in order for a subdivision to attain exempt status, the "streets, stormwater management facilities, utilities, and other infrastructure required for the development must have been completed as of July 16, 1990." The City Attorney's testimony on this issue is found to be the most persuasive. According to his interpretation of the Ordinance, only that infrastructure necessary to serve the subdivision must be completed in order to qualify for vesting. Conversely, on-site or private infrastructure does not have to be completed in order to satisfy the terms of the Ordinance. Therefore, on-site infrastructure is not a factor in determining whether a property qualifies for an exempt status. Indeed, as the City Attorney points out, if Petitioners' interpretation of the Ordinance were accepted, there would be "no vested lots in the City" since infrastructure is never extended from the public street to the lot prior to its development. Finally, Petitioners contend that the Settlement Agreement is invalid because Walker's application in DOAH Case No. 91-4109VR was for common law vesting while the Settlement Agreement made a determination that the property was presumptively vested. As a practical matter, there is no difference between property being exempt or being vested. Under either category, the property would not have to meet the requirements of the Comprehensive Plan. Here, the evidence shows that Walker's property qualified for both common law and presumptive vesting. Since the two types of vesting have the same practical effect, the validity of the Settlement Agreement has not been impaired. Expiration of vested rights Sections II.5.a., d., and i. of the Ordinance provide, respectively, that for purposes of a vested rights determination, an "[e]xempt subdivision," "[f]inal subdivision plat approval," or "[a]ny other development order which approved the development of land for a particular use or uses at a specified intensity of use and which allowed development activity on the land for which the development order was issued" shall be deemed a final development order. Section IV.1.c. of the Ordinance provides that "[a]ll final development orders shall expire in one year or such shorter time as may be adopted unless it is determined that substantial development has occurred and is continuing in good faith." Petitioners argue that the Settlement Agreement constitutes a "development order" within the meaning of the foregoing provisions of the Ordinance, and because no activity has occurred on the land since the Settlement Agreement was approved in 1991, the development order has expired by operation of the law. For the following reasons, this contention has been rejected. The Settlement Agreement did not approve "the development of land for a particular use or uses at a specified intensity of use" and did not allow "development activity on the land." Further, it did not allow the owner to pull building permits and commence development on his land. Rather, it simply determined which set of rules and regulations (pre-1990 or post-1990) Walker had to comply with in order to develop his property. Therefore, it cannot be "[a]ny other development order which approved the development of land for a particular use or uses at a specified intensity of use and which allowed development activity on the land for which the development order was issued." At the same time, a recorded subdivision such as Glenwood Estates is "complete" since all necessary infrastructure is in place. It has no expiration date, and no further development remains to be done to show "continuing good faith," as that term is used in the Ordinance. Therefore, even if the Walker property technically meets the definitions of an "exempt subdivision" or a "final subdivision plat approval," the expiration provisions of the Ordinance still do not apply. Finally, the City has never applied the expiration provisions of the cited provision to terminate the exempt status of a recorded subdivision, nor has it construed a vested rights determination as being a "final development order" within the meaning of the Ordinance. This interpretation of the Ordinance is found to be reasonable, and it is hereby accepted. Equitable estoppel As noted earlier, when Walker sold the Meadowbrook tract (69 acres) to Collins Brothers in 1972, he made the sale contingent on his obtaining not only residential zoning for the Meadowbrook tract, but also upon obtaining commercial and multi-family zoning on the remainder of the tract. Thus, he sold the site in reliance on his ability to develop the remainder of the tract in conformance with his master plan. As a part of that sale, Walker gave the purchasers credit towards the purchase price to defray one-half of the cost of installing the infrastructure for the entire 100-acre parcel, again in reliance on his ability to develop the property. When Collins Brothers defaulted, he paid the successor developer (Guardian) the money necessary to defray one-half of the cost of the communal infrastructure, and he paid additional funds for water and sewer taps and a storm drain, again in reliance on his ability to develop the property. Walker also petitioned the City to annex his property in the early 1980's based on a representation by the City that the annexation would not affect his ability to develop his property. After the annexation, Walker has continued to pay property taxes to the City based upon the value of the property to be developed under the property's C-1 and RM-2 zoning. In addition, Walker encumbered his property to secure loans in reliance on his ability to develop it in accordance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. After the Settlement Agreement was approved, the City adopted a site-specific zoning plan which impacted Walker's property. Walker agreed to reduce the maximum density he might otherwise have obtained through litigation in reliance upon the City's representation that the Settlement Agreement remained in effect and that his rights under that Agreement would survive in perpetuity. Finally, Walker has entered into an option contract for the sale of his property to TTK based upon the validity of the Settlement Agreement. He has also expended substantial monies to further that sale and to develop his site plan. Other contentions Petitioners have also contended in their Proposed Recommended Order that "[t]he creation of new lots through the re-subdivision of the parent parcel [in 1989] subjects the property under review to the consistency and concurrency provisions in the City's 2010 Comprehensive Plan." Because this contention was not raised in the initial pleading or in the parties' Joint Pretrial Statement, it has been disregarded. Finally, the Association points out that multiple three-story apartment buildings will be constructed immediately adjacent to single-family homes in the Association with only an 8-foot fence and a 30-foot setback dividing the two areas. In addition, its members logically fear that the project will generate additional traffic, crime, and pollution and result in the lowering of property values in the neighborhood. It also asserts that the developer has never been willing to sit down with neighborhood members and attempt to compromise on any design aspect of the apartment complex. While these concerns are obviously legitimate and well- intended, they are not relevant to the narrow issues raised in this appeal.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Commission enter a final order granting the Type B site plan review application filed by George K. Walker which determined that his property is presumptively vested. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of February, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of February, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth D. Goldberg, Esquire 1725 Mahan Drive, Suite 201 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5201 Linda R. Hurst, Esquire City Hall, Second Floor 300 South Adams Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1731 Jay Adams, Esquire Broad and Cassel 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 400 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1804 Jean Gregory, Clerk Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Commission City Hall 300 South Adams Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1731
Findings Of Fact The Subject Property. During 1973, Mode, Inc., applied for and obtained approval of Planned Unit Development (hereinafter referred to as "PUD") zoning for approximately 620 acres of real property known as Ridaught Landing located on County Road 209 in Clay County. In December of 1986, Mode, Inc., sold approximately 470 acres of Ridaught Landing to Village of Fireside, Inc. This 470 acre parcel (hereinafter referred to as the "Property"), is the subject of this proceeding. Purchase money financing and construction financing for the purchase and development of the Property was provided by Barnett Bank of Jacksonville, N.A. (hereinafter referred to as "Barnett"). In November of 1988 Barnett assigned its interest in the Property to the Petitioner simultaneously with the closing of financing by the Petitioner on the Property to Villages of Fireside, Inc. Villages of Fireside, Inc., subsequently defaulted on its indebtedness to the Petitioner and in April, 1992, the Petitioner accepted a Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure for the Property. Development of the Property; Government Action Relied Upon by the Petitioner. In November of 1985, the PUD was amended. As a condition of the amendment, Clay County required that 212 acres of uplands and associated wetlands be dedicated to a homeowner's association associated with the Property. The 212 acres were to be used as preservation area and for the construction of nature walks, gazebos and recreational areas. In January of 1988 Villages of Fireside, Inc., applied for approval of a further amendment to the PUD. Among other things, approval of a separate entrance to the Property was requested. The amendment was approved. As a result of the January, 1988 amendment, the PUD properties are to be developed as two separate subdivisions, known as Ridaught Landing and the Villages of Fireside. Development of the Villages of Fireside subdivision was approved for up to 400 single-family dwelling units within the residential portion, (b) 16 acres of recreational and private services uses, including a day-care center and a private park, and (c) the 212 acre preservation area. Villages of Fireside, Inc., submitted a plat to Clay County for the Villages of Fireside subdivision Unit One in 1988. The final plat for Unit One was approved March 22, 1988. Clay County required that the entrance to Unit One be constructed with an 80 foot right of way to accommodate the development of the entire project as approved by the PUD, as amended. The Petitioner's Detrimental Reliance. In reliance upon Clay County's approval of the PUD and amendments thereto and approval of the final plat of Unit One Villages of Fireside, Inc.: Constructed master infrastructure improvements (water and sewer systems, master roads and an oversized drainage facility) for the project at a cost of approximately $706,427.00. These improvements were made between February and October of 1988. Constructed entry features for the project at a cost of approximately $21,465.00. These improvements were made between December of 1988 and June of 1989. Constructed a nature walk through the 212 acre preservation area at a cost of approximately $97,593.00. These improvements were made between November of 1988 and January of 1989. Upon the assignment of Barnett's interest in the Property to the Petitioner in November of 1988, financing by the Petitioner for the Property to Villages of Fireside, Inc., closed. The Petitioner, therefore, refinanced construction of improvements made by Villages of Fireside, Inc., in reliance on Clay County's approval of the PUD, with amendments, and the final plat for Unit One. The Petitioner refinanced the project in reliance upon Clay County's approval of the PUD, with amendments, and the final plat for Unit One. The Petitioner considered the PUD zoning to be true and correct at the time of refinancing and the Petitioner's loan officer believed that the Property was approved for development of at least 400 single-family residential units at the time of refinancing. In reliance on Clay County's actions, proceeds were distributed by the Petitioner for construction of the nature walk through the 212 acre preservation area. The Petitioner also released the 212 acre preservation area from the lien of its mortgage on the Property so that it could be conveyed to the homeowner's association as common area. This release was made in reliance on Clay County's actions. Rights That Will Be Destroyed. Development of the Property will impact County Road 220. Pursuant to the Clay County 2001 Comprehensive Plan, there is insufficient capacity on the portion of County Road 220 that will be impacted by development of the Property to accommodate traffic projected to be generated by the Property as approved. If the Petitioner must comply with the Clay County 2001 Comprehensive Plan it will be required to delay completion of the project until County Road 220 is improved. Such a delay will have a substantial adverse financial impact upon the Petitioner. Procedural Requirements. The parties stipulated that the procedural requirements of Vested Rights Review Process of Clay County, adopted by Clay County Ordinance 92-18, as amended, have been met.
The Issue Whether the Appellant, Devoe L. Moore, has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that development rights in certain real property he owns have vested against the provisions of the Tallahassee-Leon County 2010 Comprehensive Plan?
Findings Of Fact The Property at Issue. On September 18, 1987, Devoe Moore acquired a tract of approximately 28 acres of real estate (hereinafter referred to as the "Property"), located on Lake Bradford Road just south of Gaines Street, in the City of Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. The Property was the former location of the Elberta Crate and Box Company. The Property was at the time of purchase, and still is, zoned M-2, Industrial. Development of the Property. Mr. Moore intended to develop the Property consistent with the Property's M-2, Industrial zoning. Mr. Moore intended to build a service/commercial/mini-storage development similar to another such development of Mr. Moore in the City. In December, 1987, Mr. Moore had his engineer prepare grading and drainage plans for the Property. On January 29, 1988, Mr. Moore had an application for an amendment to a stormwater permit, Environmental Management Permit 87-1087, filed with the Leon County Department of Public Works. At that time, Leon County issued such permits for property in unincorporated areas and inside the City's limits. The grading and drainage plans for the Property were filed with the application. Leon County had not been delegated any responsibility or authority to make land-use decisions for the City. The requested amendment to Permit 87-1087 was based on an assumption of Mr. Moore that the Property would consist of 80% coverage with impervious surface. Therefore, the City was aware or should have been aware that Mr. Moore intended to construct a major development on the Property. Such a development was consistent with the zoning on the Property at the time. Neither Leon County nor the City, however, approved or in anyway addressed the issue of whether 80% coverage of the Property with impervious surface was acceptable. Nor did the City or Leon County make any representation to Mr. Moore different from that made by the City's zoning of the Property. Mr. Moore filed a site plan showing a development of 80% coverage with the application for amendment to Permit 87-1087. These plans showed a development consisting of thirteen rectangular buildings, driveways and parking area. The indicated development, however, was not reviewed or in anyway approved by Leon County or the City. On May 6, 1988, a Stormwater Permit, amending Permit 87-1087, was issued to Mr. Moore. This permit only approved the construction of a holding pond and filling on the Property. The issuance of the permit did not constitute approval of any proposed development of the Property. In 1988, Mr. Moore began clearing the Property of buildings on the Property which the City had condemned. Mr. Moore also began filling and grading the Property in 1988, and has continued to do so to varying degrees through July 16, 1991. From January 1989, through August, 1990, SANDCO placed 1,174 loads of fill on the Property. Jimmy Crowder Construction Company has also performed filling and grading work on the Property since 1988. As of the date the City's vesting ordnance was adopted and as of the date of the hearing before the Division of Administrative Hearings Mr. Moore has not completed filling on the Property. Mr. Moore also has not completed filtration improvements to the storm water hold pond to be constructed on the Property. Additional water treatment facilities on the Property must be constructed to handle runoff from the Property. No roadways, water services, sewer services or electric services have been constructed on the Property. Site preparation on the Property has not been completed so that construction of vertical improvements can begin. At the time that Mr. Moore acquired the Property, only building permits were required for the development of the Property. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Moore obtained the required building permits. The law was changed, however, to require approval of a site plan. Mr. Moore decided not to submit a site plan at least in part because of the City's work on the sewer main. The weight of the evidence, however, failed to prove that Mr. Moore was prohibited by the City from obtaining site plan approval. The City has not approved or reviewed a site plan for the Property. At the time Mr. Moore purchased the Property, and continuing to the present, a City sewer main which runs along the southern border of the Property has been a problem. The sewer main is a health hazard because it is located in proximity to the surface of the ground and it has numerous leaks. The City indicated that it intended to build a new sewer main across the Property and Mr. Moore agreed to give the City an easement for the sewer main. After Mr. Moore purchased the Property and before February, 1989, Mr. Moore made a number of requests to the City that the City identify the easement it desired and prepare the easement grant so that the City could construct the new sewer main and Mr. Moore could proceed with his development. Requests were also made by some City employees of the City Attorney that the easement be prepared and executed because of the problem with the existing sewer main. In April, 1989, the easement grant was prepared and executed. On August 3, 1990, James S. Caldwell, Assistant Director of the City Water and Sewer Department, wrote the following letter to Mr. Moore: It has been brought to my attention that your are proceeding with construction of a stormwater holding pond on the referenced site [the Elberta Crate Site]. As discussed with you this date and as you are aware, the City has a sewer line on this property. The sewer line would be damaged by your construction activity. The City has designed a relocation and upgrade of the sewer line to be constructed on an easement previously acquired from you. Our schedule for the sewer line construction is completion by January 1, 1991. A review of your stormwater holding pond drawings and the proposed sewer line reveals a potential conflict between the proposed line and the holding pond. We shall have City staff stake out and flag the existing sewer line and the proposed sewer line. We are requesting that your construction activity stay away from the existing sewer line. After stakeout of the proposed sewer line, you may check your stormwater pond plans to assure that there is no conflict. [Emphasis added]. Mr. Moore was also told on other occasions to avoid interfering with the existing sewer line and the construction of the new sewer line. Construction of the new sewer main on the Property was not commenced until January, 1991. The construction had not been completed as of March, 1991. Part of the delay in completing the sewer main was caused by contemplated changes in the location of the sewer main and the possible need for a different easement. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that Mr. Moore was told to cease all activity on the Property. Costs Incurred by Mr. Moore. Mr. Moore paid approximately $1,000,000.00 for the Property. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that this cost was incurred in reliance upon any representation from the City as to the use the Property could be put other than the existing zoning of the Property. Mr. Moore spent approximately $247,541.22, for demolition of existing buildings, site clearing and grading, engineering costs, fill, permitting fees and partial construction of the stormwater management system for the Property. Mr. Moore also donated an easement to the City with a value of approximately $26,000.00. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that these expenditures were made in reliance upon any representation by the City as to the use to which the Property could be put other than the existing zoning of the Property and the stormwater management permit. Mr. Moore also incurred approximately $100,000.00 in expenditures similar to those addressed in the previous finding of fact for which Mr. Moore was unable to find documentation. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that these expenditures were made in reliance upon any representation by the City as to the use to which the Property could be put other than the zoning of the Property and the stormwater management permit. Development of the Property Under the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Mr. Moore's proposed development of the Property appears to meet the concurrency requirements of the Tallahassee-Leon County 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Mr. Moore's proposed development of the Property, however, appears to be inconsistent with the 2010 Plan because the Future Land Use Element district in which the Property is located does not permit industrial uses and the intended industrial use of the Property is incompatible with some of the uses to which adjacent property has been put. Procedure. Mr. Moore filed an Application for Vested Rights Determination prior to the filing of the application at issue in this proceeding. That application was denied by the City on October 16, 1991. In the first application Mr. Moore indicated that the Property was to be used for student housing. On or about November 13, 1991, Mr. Moore filed an Application for Vested Rights Determination (hereinafter referred to as the "Application") (Application VR0295T), with the City. "Devoe L. Moore" was listed as the owner/agent of the Property in the Application. It is indicated that the project at issue in the Application is "[i]ndustrial development of former Elberta Crate and Box Company site by Devoe L. Moore." "Progress . . . Toward Completion" is described as (1) Owner/contractor estimate; (2) Environmental Management Permit; (3) Site preparation from December, 1987, to the date the Application was filed; and (4) Construction of the stormwater system in 1990. In a letter dated February 6, 1991, Mr. Moore was informed that his Application was being denied. By letter dated February 18, 1991, Mr. Moore requested a hearing before a Staff Committee for review of the denial of his Application. On March 11, 1991, a hearing was held to consider the Application before the Staff Committee. The Staff Committee was comprised of Jim English, City Attorney, Mark Gumula, Director of the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department and Buddy Holshouser, Director for the City's Growth Management Department. At the conclusion of this hearing the Staff Committee voted 2 to 1 to deny the Application. By letter dated March 19, 1991, Mark Gumula, Director of Planning of the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department, informed Mr. Moore that the Application had been denied. By letter dated April 4, 1991, to Mr. Gumula, Mr. Moore appealed the decision to deny the Application. By letter dated July 3, 1991, the Division of Administrative Hearings was requested to provide a Hearing Officer to review this matter. By agreement of the parties, the undersigned allowed the parties to supplement the record in this matter on August 27, 1991. F. Other Projects Approved by the City. Mr. Moore submitted, without objection from the City, other vesting rights applications and final orders concerning such applications which were ultimately approved by the City. All of those cases are distinguishable from this matter. See the City's proposed finding of fact 30.
Findings Of Fact The Subject Property. The property at issue in this proceeding consists of approximately 92 acres of land located in Clay County, Florida. The subject property is known as "Ranch Acres." Ranch Acres was subdivided into 49 lots by an unrecorded subdivision plat. The lots range in size from approximately 1.1 to 2.9 acres. Roads, which are unpaved, and drainage for Ranch Acres are privately owned. A boundary survey of Ranch Acres was prepared and contains a surveyor's certification of April 20, 1982. Pre-1985 Subdivision Regulations of Clay County. Prior to September of 1985 Clay County did not require platting of subdivisions such as Ranch Acres. In September of 1985, Clay County adopted Ordinance 85-68 creating three types of subdivisions and providing regulations thereof. An exception to these requirements, however, was included in Ordinance 85-68: subdivisions shown on a certified survey prior to September of 1985 with lots and roads laid out would continue to not be subject to regulation so long as the lots continue to comport with the survey. Government Action Relied Upon Before the Applicant's Sale of the Property. The Applicant was aware that it could develop Ranch Acres as an unrecorded subdivision in Clay County. The development of Ranch Acres comes within the exception to Ordinance 85-58. In a letter dated December 19, 1988 the Administrator of the Clay County Planning & Zoning Department informed the Applicant that Ranch Acres' "appears to be a valid unrecorded subdivision." The Administrator went on to state, in relevant part, the following: As a result of this "loophole" the subdivision does not have to meet the minimum general design standards set forth in the county ordinance. In addition it does not have to meet other guarantees and criteria established in the ordinance. . . . . The land use and the size of the lots do conform with county regulations. . . . A similar letter was sent to the Applicant by the Director of Engineering of Clay County on or about June 18, 1990. The Applicant's Detrimental Reliance. The Applicant provided dirt roads and drainage to Ranch Acres. The roads were constructed during the early 1980's and the drainage was constructed in approximately 1986. The costs of improvements to Ranch Acres incurred by the Applicant was approximately $30,000.00. Rights That Will Be Destroyed. If the Applicant must comply with the Clay County comprehensive plan it will be required to pave the roads of the subdivision and improve drainage. The Applicant will not be able to continue to develop the property under the Clay County comprehensive plan because the plan allows development of land such as Ranch Acres on a minimum of ten acre lots. The Applicant cannot subdivide the remaining lots of Ranch Acres that have not been sold into ten acre lots. Procedural Requirements. The parties stipulated that the procedural requirements of Vested Rights Review Process of Clay County, adopted by Clay County Ordinance 92-18, as amended, have been met.
Conclusions An Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings has entered an Order Closing File. A copy of the Order is attached to this Final Order as Exhibit A.
Other Judicial Opinions OF THIS FINAL ORDER PURSUANT TO SECTION 120.68, FLORIDA STATUTES, AND FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.030(b)(1)(c) AND 9.110. TO INITIATE AN APPEAL OF THIS ORDER, A NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITH THE DEPARTMENT’S AGENCY CLERK, 2555 SHUMARD OAK BOULEVARD, TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-2100, WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE DAY THIS ORDER IS FILED WITH THE AGENCY CLERK. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE SUBSTANTIALLY IN THE FORM PRESCRIBED BY FLORIDA RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.900(a). A COPY OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITH THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL AND MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE FILING FEE SPECIFIED IN SECTION 35.22(3), FLORIDA STATUTES. YOU WAIVE YOUR RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW IF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL IS NOT TIMELY FILED WITH THE AGENCY CLERK AND THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL. MEDIATION UNDER SECTION 120.573, FLA. STAT., IS NOT AVAILABLE WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUES RESOLVED BY THIS ORDER. FINAL ORDER NO. DCA 10-GM-282 CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that the original of the foregoing has been filed with the undersigned designated Agency Clerk, and that true and correct copies have been furnished to the persons listed below in the manner described, on this ; dp 2-day of December, 2010. Paula Ford Agency Clerk U.S. Mail: The Honorable J. L. Johnston Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 John Foster Attorney for Leffler 200 S. Orange Ave., Suite 2300 PO Box 112 Orlando, Florida 32802-0112 Jamie Seaman Attorney for Volusia County 123 W. Indiana Avenue Deland, Florida 32720-4615 Hand Delivery Matthew Davis, Esq. Assistant General Counsel Department of Community Affairs
The Issue Whether Petitioner, the Charles J. Harris Trust, has demonstrated, pursuant to the Vested Rights Review Process of Clay County, Florida, that a vested rights certificate to undertake development of certain real property located in Clay County should be issued by Clay County, notwithstanding the fact that part of such development will not be in accordance with the requirements of the Clay County 2001 Comprehensive Plan?
Findings Of Fact The Property. The Applicant, Charles J. Harris Trust, is the owner of real property located in Clay County, Florida. The Applicant's property (hereinafter referred to as the "Property") is more fully described in Exhibit "A" of the documentation offered in support of the Applicant's application. The Property consists of approximately 29 acres located on Lake Geneva. The Property was purchased by Charles J. Harris and Bonnie Lee Harris, husband and wife, on January 14, 1970. On May 4, 1972, the Property was transferred by the Harris' to the Charles J. Harris Trust. The beneficiaries of the Applicant are the three adult children of the Harris'. One of those children, Becky Harris, is profoundly retarded and requires constant care. While room and board are provided for Becky, the Harris provide funds for other needs. Development of the Property; Government Action Relied Upon. On January 14, 1970, the Harris' entered into an contract to purchase the Property. See Exhibit B of the documentation in support of the Applicant's application for the specific terms of the purchase agreement. Prior to entering into the purchase contract, Winfred Crawford, a registered real estate broker, wrote a letter dated January 12, 1970, on behalf of the Harris' to George A. Gnann of the Zoning Board for Clay County, Florida. Ms. Crawford informed Mr. Gnann of the following: The property is being purchased with the thought of subdividing and the buyer has requested that we obtain for him the Clay County requirements, as to lot sizes, road sizes and etc., also please advise the zoning now on this property and what the requirements would be to change the zoning necessary to meet the County Requirements. All information that would be informative will be appreciated. By letter of January 14, 1970, Ms. Crawford wrote another letter to Mr. Gnann memorializing information provided by Mr. Gnann verbally in response to Ms. Crawford's letter of January 12, 1970. A copy of this letter was provided to the Harris' on January 14, 1970, prior to their purchase of the Property. In part, Ms. Crawford wrote the following: I understood the requirements and procedure as follows: The Clay County required lot size- 15,000 square feet, no lot to be less than 70 feet in width. The set back line from any street would be 25 feet, and set back from side lot lines 10 feet. . . . Proposed Plat would be submitted to you for your approval and signature. (This would be for approval of lot sizes and set back lines). Proposed Plat then would be submitted Louis McKee, Clay County Engineer, Orange Park, Florida, for his approval of width and location of streets. Proposed Plat would require his signature. Proposed Plat then would be submitted to Mr. Harry Riggs, County Health Department, Green Cove Springs, Florida, for his approval for sewerage disposal. Proposed Plat would require his signature. Proposed Plat would then be submitted for the approval and acceptance of the County Commissioners, requiring the Chairmans [sic] signature of acceptance before the Plat could be recorded. Based upon the foregoing, Clay County represented to the Harris' how the Property could be developed according to zoning and Clay County laws governing development of property in existence in 1970. Clay County also informed the Harris' of the steps that they needed to follow in order to plat the Property according to Clay County law in 1970. Detrimental Reliance. In reliance upon Clay County's representations, the Harris' purchased the Property. The Harris' paid $35,000.00 for the Property. The Harris' also paid interest of $29,380.00 to finance the purchase price for the Property. On July 18, 1972, the Clay County Zoning Commission gave notice that it would hold a public hearing on Thursday, August 3, 1972, to consider rezoning certain properties in Clay County. Among other things, the Clay County Zoning Commission gave notice that it planned to consider rezoning the Property from Agricultural, "A", to Single-Family Residential, "RA". The RA zoning category changed the minimum residential lot size allowed for the Property from 15,000 square feet to 20,000 square feet. Prior to the Harris' purchase of the Property, the shoreline of the Property had been modified. A natural cove along the shoreline of the Property was closed in with a spoil dike and island. After purchasing the Property the Harris' began seeking approval from the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation (now the Department of Environmental Protection)(hereinafter referred to as the "Department") of a permit to restore the shoreline to its original condition. In connection with the restoration of the Property's shoreline, costs were incurred by the Applicant for the services of engineers and surveyors. A "Study of Proposed Reconnection of Pond to Lake Geneva" was prepared by Barry A. Benedict, Ph.D., and plans for the restoration of the shoreline were prepared. On March 26, 1982, the Department approved a permit for the restoration of the shoreline. The evidence failed to prove that Clay County made any representations to the Applicant as a result of the process of obtaining the permit. The restoration of the shoreline of the Property was completed by the Applicant in 1982. The costs of the restoration project incurred by the Applicant was approximately $11,940.00. During the early 1980's the Applicant incurred costs of $22,319.00 to clear a dirt road from the western boundary of the Property to most of the lots along the shoreline, including four lots subsequently sold by the Applicant. The four lots sold by the Applicant were sold Between approximately 1983 and 1984. The lots were sold to unrelated third parties. Non-exclusive easements of ingress and egress were also conveyed to the owners of the sold lots. All of the sold lots are located along the shoreline of the Property. One of the sold lots, Lot 1-L (1.163 acres), is located along the northern boundary of the Property and has ingress/egress along the northern boundary of the Property. Another of the sold lots, Lot F (0.823 acres), requires ingress/egress along the cleared road that was cut through unsold lots. The other two sold lots, Lots C (0.681 acres) and D (0.731 acres), are contiguous and require ingress/egress along the cleared road that was cut through unsold lots. Lots C and D are separated by Lot E, a 0.691-acre unsold portion of the Property. In 1985, after selling the four lots, the Applicant had a Boundary Survey of the Property prepared by Joseph G. Knapp, Registered Land Surveyor. The Boundary Survey was completed June 22, 1985. The Boundary Survey identifies how the Applicant intends to subdivide the Property into 34 lots. Three of the lots are just over one acre. The rest of the lots are between 0.6 acres and just under one acre. The Boundary Survey prepared for the Applicant could have served as a recorded plat but was not recorded with Clay County by the Applicant. Steps 3 through 6 outlined in Ms. Crawford's letter of January 14, 1970, setting out the representations from Clay County concerning the laws governing development of the Property in 1970, and in particular, recording a plat of the Property, were not followed by the Applicant. At the time of the formal hearing of this case, approximately 23 acres of the Property remain unsold. Rights that will be Destroyed. Clay County adopted a comprehensive growth management plan in January 1992. Pursuant to the plan, the land use for he Property was designated as "Agriculture." Land designated with a land use of "Agriculture" pursuant to the plan may be developed at a density of one residential unit per 20 acres. The land use designation was modified in 1994 to "RA 2" but not in any material respect. Property designated "Agriculture" or "RA 2" may also be used for agricultural purposes as long as they are "bona fide" agricultural purposes, or "good faith commercial agricultural use of the land." Prior to the adoption of the Clay County comprehensive plan, the Applicants could have sold the remaining 23.7 acres of the Property as the remaining 30 unsold lots designated in the Boundary Survey prepared for the Applicant. As a result of the land use designation for the Property adopted in Clay County's comprehensive plan, the remaining 23.7 acres of the Property with easements for ingress and egress to sold lots may be developed with one residential unit only. Procedural Requirements. The parties stipulated that the procedural requirements of Vested Rights Review Process of Clay County, adopted by Clay County Ordinance 92-18, as amended, have been met.
