The Issue The issue is whether the Petitioner, a former employee of the Respondent, was overpaid in the amount of $1,165.76, and should be required to repay that amount to the Respondent.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was a career service employee of the Respondent and was initially employed on November 17, 1997. The Petitioner’s employment with the Respondent was terminated on June 30, 2003, due to layoffs created by the outsourcing of the Family Services Unit of the Respondent. The Petitioner’s annual rate of pay at the time of her termination was $19,797.44, paid bi-weekly. By letters dated August 26, 2003, October 14, 2003, and February 16, 2004, the Petitioner was informed that six separate salary overpayments had occurred. The Petitioner actually worked 56 hours during the pay period of June 20, 2003 through July 3, 2003, but was inadvertently paid for 80 hours of work. The Petitioner was inadvertently paid for working the days of July 1, 2, and 3, 2003, although her employment had been terminated effective June 30, 2003. The overpayment was for 24 hours, amounting to $183.79, based upon the Petitioner’s annual rate of pay. The Petitioner was no longer employed by the Respondent during the pay period of July 4, 2003 through July 17, 2003, but was inadvertently paid for 80 hours of work. The overpayment amounted to $601.70, based upon the Petitioner’s annual rate of pay. Following termination of employment, the Respondent’s Human Resources Department conducted an audit of the terminated employee’s leave. An audit was performed by the Respondent concerning the Petitioner’s leave. In the course and scope of the Respondent performing the audit of the Petitioner’s leave, the Respondent discovered that the Petitioner had been overpaid for four pay periods in 2003. Once an employee of the Respondent no longer has sick leave remaining, annual leave is used to cover any shortages in sick leave. Once an employee of the Respondent no longer has either sick leave or annual leave remaining, the employee cannot be paid for additional time taken as leave. The additional time becomes “leave without pay.” The Petitioner was overpaid in four separate pay periods when she had insufficient sick or annual leave as follows: 1/31/03-2/13/03: 16.50 hours 4/11/03-4/24/03: 22.75 hours 4/25/03-5/08/03: 4.25 hours 5/23/03-6/05/03: 4.75 hours The sum of the hours of overpayment is 48.25, which translates to the amount of $380.27 in overpayment to the Petitioner for the referenced pay periods. The total amount of the Respondent’s overpayment to the Petitioner, based upon the salary payments for July 1, 2, and 3, 2003, July 4 through 17, 2003, and the four pay periods in which the Petitioner was overpaid when her sick and annual leave had run out is $183.79 plus $601.70 plus $380.27, which totals $1,165.76. The Petitioner was not at fault for the overpayment. She did not falsify her leave reports or timesheets, nor was she accused by the Respondent of having done so. The Petitioner believed that the pay she received for July 4, 2003 through July 17, 2003, was severance pay since she had been terminated when her position had been eliminated. The Respondent does not issue severance pay to terminated employees. The Petitioner believes that some of the leave she had taken during the four pay periods when her sick and annual leave had run out should have been considered administrative leave which, according to the Respondent, was offered to employees in the Family Services Unit who were facing termination as an aid to finding new jobs. Administrative leave was available to employees whose positions were being eliminated to allow them to use the Internet while at the office to search for jobs, and to leave the office for interviews or any testing required for re- employment. The Petitioner failed to document leave time, if any, during the pay periods at issue in this proceeding, that she took for purposes of job testing or interviews. The Petitioner failed to properly designate administrative leave on the automated leave system, Time Direct, for the pay periods at issue in this proceeding, even though, as a secretary specialist for the Respondent for seven years, her duties included keeping track of leave for the people in her work unit. The Respondent offered several of the Petitioner’s timesheets that reflect the Petitioner’s having taken administrative leave on more than 30 occasions from October 2002 through May 2003. These time entries for administrative leave include time during each of the four pay periods at issue in this proceeding, January 31, 2003 through February 13, 2003, April 11, 2003 through April 24, 2003, April 25, 2003 through May 8, 2003, and May 23, 2003 through June 5, 2003.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent enter a Final Order requiring the Petitioner to repay the Respondent $1,165.76. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of March, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of March, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Rosanna Boyd Apartment 162 3400 Townsend Boulevard Jacksonville, Florida 32277 Robin Whipple-Hunter, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 2417 Jacksonville, Florida 32231-0083 Paul Flounlacker, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Jerry Regier, Secretary Department of Children and Family Services Building 1, Room 202 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Petitioners received salary overpayments from the Agency for Persons with Disabilities.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Petitioners Ileana Toledo, Norma Pedraza, and Lil Guerrero have been career service employees of Respondent. The Department of Management Services (“DMS”) has a classification and pay system that is used by Respondent, and DMS is responsible for designating employment positions within Respondent. A position is either included for overtime pay or excluded from overtime pay. At issue is whether Petitioners erroneously received monetary compensation for overtime hours worked after their position was reclassified from an included career service position to an excluded career service position. Prior to March 28, 2013, Petitioners held the position of Human Services Counselor III, which was designated by DMS as an included career service position. On March 26, 2013, Respondent proposed to reclassify Petitioners’ position from Human Services Counselor III to Human Service Program Analyst, which is designated by DMS as an excluded career service position. The proposed reclassification resulted from a reorganization of Respondent’s regional offices, and an effort by Respondent to standardize its functions, services, and types of positions in its regional offices. In a letter dated March 26, 2013, Petitioners were advised by Respondent’s Human Resources Director, Dale Sullivan, that if they accepted an offer to reclassify their position from Human Services Counselor III to Human Service Program Analyst, their “current status and salary will remain unchanged.” Notably, the March 26, 2013, letter makes no specific mention of overtime. On March 28, 2013, Petitioners accepted Respondent’s offer of employment to reclassify their position from Human Services Counselor III to Human Service Program Analyst. Typically, employees of Respondent who are appointed to new positions are placed in probationary status, as opposed to permanent status, and are required to review and execute new position descriptions. However, the reclassification of Petitioners’ position by Respondent was not typical. As part of the reclassification of Petitioners’ position to Human Service Program Analyst, Respondent provided Petitioners with a new position description. However, Petitioners’ job duties, salaries, and permanent status remained the same as they had been in their prior position of Human Services Counselor III. Petitioners read and acknowledged their receipt of the new position description on March 28, 2013. On the first page of the position description, there is a heading titled “Position Attributes”. Under this heading, the term “Overtime” is shown, followed by two boxes, “Yes” and “No.” The “No” box is marked, indicating that Petitioners are not eligible to work overtime hours. The position description further indicates that Petitioners would be career service employees. However, the position description does not specifically include the terms included or excluded. Prior to the reclassification, Petitioners were paid bi-weekly based on an 80-hour pay period. If they worked more than 80 hours in a pay period, they received additional monetary compensation for their overtime hours. Payment for Petitioners’ regular and overtime work hours was based on employee timesheets submitted to the People First leave and payroll system. After the reclassification of their position, Petitioners continued to work overtime in excess of their bi-weekly contractual hours, despite the prohibition in the position description. Petitioners were required to obtain approval by their supervisors before being allowed to work overtime. Petitioners’ overtime was approved by their supervisors after the reclassification despite the prohibition on working overtime hours as indicated in the position description. During the pay periods of March 29-April 11, 2013; April 26-May 9, 2013; and May 10-June 23, 2013, Petitioner Ileana Toledo worked a total of 28 hours of overtime, and received monetary compensation in the amount of $464.63 from Respondent for these overtime hours. For the pay periods of March 29-April 11, 2013; April 12-April 25, 2013; April 26-May 9, 2013; and May 10-May 23, 2013, Petitioner Norma Pedraza worked a total of 32.25 hours of overtime, and received monetary compensation in the amount of $624.14 from Respondent for these overtime hours. For the pay periods of March 29-April 11, 2013; April 12-April 25, 2013; April 26-May 9, 2013; and May 10-May 23, 2013, Petitioner Lil Guerrero worked a total of 25.50 hours of overtime, and received monetary compensation in the amount of $426.65 from Respondent for these overtime hours. Respondent’s payment of monetary compensation to Petitioners for the overtime hours worked after the reclassification of their position to Human Service Program Analyst occurred due to an administrative coding error, thereby resulting in the overpayment of monetary compensation to Petitioners by Respondent in the amounts the Respondent seeks to recover from Petitioners. The administrative coding error occurred because of Respondent’s failure to note the change from included to excluded on the People First system following the reclassification of Petitioners’ position. The error occurred due to an honest mistake, and resulted in the overpayments at issue. Petitioners should not have received monetary compensation for their overtime hours in the Human Service Program Analyst position because a Human Service Program Analyst position is an excluded career service position. An excluded career service employee must earn and receive regular compensation leave credits for overtime work, but cannot receive monetary compensation for overtime work. On the other hand, included career service employees, such as those persons in Petitioners’ previous position of Human Services Counselor III, must receive monetary compensation for overtime hours worked, rather than regular compensatory leave credits. Neither Petitioners nor their supervisors were aware at the time that the overpayments were made that Petitioners could not receive monetary compensation for their overtime hours, but must instead receive regular compensatory leave credits. At hearing, Petitioners did not dispute the amounts and hours of overtime worked as set forth in paragraphs 12-14 above. In accordance with the Department of Management Services’ Bureau of Payroll Manual, the amount of salary overpaid, and the amount sought to be repaid, was calculated as set forth in paragraphs 12-14 above. When an agency has determined that a salary overpayment has occurred, it is required to follow procedures set forth in the above-referenced manual, to seek repayment. Respondent followed those procedures in making the calculations relevant in this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Agency for Persons with Disabilities determining that: 1) Petitioner Ileana Toledo was erroneously paid salary in the amount of $464.63; 2) Petitioner Norma Pedraza was erroneously paid salary in the amount of $624.13; 3) Petitioner Lil Guerrero was erroneously paid salary in the amount of $426.65; and 4) Petitioners are entitled to be compensated by Respondent through compensatory leave credits for the overtime hours worked as reflected in paragraphs 12-14 above. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of November, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of November, 2013.
The Issue Whether Respondent received a salary overpayment from Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony and evidence presented at the final hearing, the following findings of fact are made. At all times material to this matter, Respondent was a career service employee of Petitioner until her separation on November 2, 2018. On November 21, 2018, Petitioner issued a pay warrant to Respondent for the pay period of November 2, 2018, through November 15, 2018, in the amount of $981.29. Since Respondent was separated from the Department, the pay warrant issued resulted in Respondent being overpaid $981.29. Upon discovering the error, Petitioner issued a letter notifying Respondent of the overpayment. Petitioner later conducted an audit and determined that Respondent’s leave balance and uniform allowance payment should be deducted from the overpayment amount, which resulted in a remaining total of $349.90. On July 10, 2019, Petitioner sent Respondent an amended letter requesting the remaining overpayment balance in the amount of $349.90.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Corrections enter a Final Order requiring Sierra McQueen-Ellis to repay Petitioner $349.90. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of December, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S YOLONDA Y. GREEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of December, 2019.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: At all times material to these proceedings, Petitioner Rodriguez has been employed by the Hillsborough County Board of County Commissioners as the Director of the Department of Emergency Support Services. This position is exempt from the Hillsborough County Civil Service Act because it is a managerial/executive position under the jurisdiction of the County Administrator. Petitioner's employment with the County allows him to participate in the Florida Retirement System administered by the Division. On January 1, 1988, the County implemented a classification and compensation system for all positions under the jurisdiction of the County Administrator that are exempt from the Civil Service Act. This system is known as the Hillsborough County Exempt Service Classification and Compensation Plan (the Plan). As an incumbent employee, Petitioner's salary was not reviewed or subjected to the compensation structure set forth in the Plan until October 1, 1988. Effective October 1, 1988, Petitioner's compensation with the County was structured according to the Plan, as revised May 1988. During his performance rating prepared December 12, 1988, Petitioner's job performance from October 1, 1987 through September 30, 1988 was found to exceed standards. Under the Plan, this meant that his current annual salary could be increased. The salary action permitted by the Plan was a combination of salary adjustment "merit increase" and a one-year "performance pay" increase. The salary adjustment under the "merit increase" category became part of Petitioner's adjusted base salary. The "performance pay" was an increase created for a one- year term. It was not part of Petitioner's base salary. This method of creating a pay increase applied to Petitioner because his pay was already above the midpoint of the pay grade the Plan dictated the County was willing to pay for the performance of his particular job when completed to the required standard. The division of salary increases above the midpoint into two separate categories was placed into the Plan in order to balance two distinct County interests. The first was to keep the maximum salary range in a pay grade aligned with the competitive salary indicators in the geographical area for the same type of work. The second was to annually reward each employee whose performance exceeded standards over the past year and to motivate continued high performance on a personalized basis. The compensation approved for Petitioner for October 1, 1988 through September 30, 1989, was a "merit increase" of three percent of his current annual salary along with a one-year "performance payment" of eight percent of his current annual salary. This created an annual salary of $58,177,00 base pay with a one-year performance increase of $4,514.00. Petitioner's total compensation for the time period was $62,691.00. The pay increase approved for Petitioner for October 1, 1989 through September 30, 1990, was a five percent "merit increase" and a four percent "performance payment" of his current salary. This gave Petitioner a new base pay of $61,090.00 with a one-year performance increase of $2,330.00. Petitioner's total compensation for the time period was $63,419.00. From October 1, 1990 through September 30, 1991, Petitioner had the same base pay and one year performance increase as the year before. So did every other employee subject to the Plan. This salary designation violated the Plan because a "merit increase" was required before a one year "performance pay" increase could occur. However, "performance pay" was still classified in the usual manner and was not pledged by the County as a payment that would be reoccurring. From October 1, 1991 to September 30, 1992, Petitioner's base salary is $66,020.42. The County no longer pays the "performance pay" previously in effect under the Plan. Instead, the part of Petitioner's salary designated as "performance pay" the year before was added into his base salary. As a result, retirement benefits are earned on Petitioner's entire salary in this pay period.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: Petitioner's "performance pay" received from October 1, 1988 through September 30, 1991, should be excluded from the calculation of his "average final compensation" by the Division. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #1 and #2. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #5. Rejected. Contrary to fact. Accepted. See HO #10. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to fact. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to fact. Reestablished each year. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Respondent's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #1. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #5, #6 and #10. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #10. Accepted. See HO #7. Accepted. Evidence is rejected because calculations are incorrect. Accepted. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: GILBERT M RODRIGUEZ 18506 TURTLE DR LUTZ FL 33549 STANLEY M DANEK ESQ DIVISION OF RETIREMENT CEDARS EXECUTIVE CENTER/BLDG C 2639 N MONROE ST TALLAHASSEE FL 32399 1560 A J McMULLIAN III DIRECTOR DIVISION OF RETIREMENT CEDARS EXECUTIVE CENTER/BLDG C 2639 N MONROE ST TALLAHASSEE FL 32399 1560 AUGUSTUS AIKENS ESQ JOHN PIENO GENERAL COUNSEL SECRETARY OF ADMINISTRATION DEPT OF ADMINISTRATION 435 CARLTON BLDG 435 CARLTON BLDG TALLAHASSEE FL 32399 1560 TALLAHASSEE FL 32399 1560
The Issue The issue in the case is whether supplemental payments made to the Petitioner by Brevard Community College constitute creditable compensation for purposes of determining retirement benefits under the Florida Retirement System.
Findings Of Fact From 1970 until his retirement in June 1998, Brevard Community College employed Stephen J. Megregian at an executive level. The State of Florida, Division of Retirement, manages and oversees operation of the Florida Retirement System (FRS) in which Brevard Community College (BCC) participates. In June 1990, the college adopted an Employee Benefit Plan for BCC Executive Employees. The provisions of the plan covered Mr. Megregian, an executive employee. In fact, Mr. Megregian drafted the plan, which was adopted by the college's Board of Trustees. The executive benefit plan included a severance pay benefit for plan participants. The severance benefit was calculated according to a formula using the employee's daily base pay as multiplied by the sum of "benefit days." Benefit days were earned according to employment longevity. A "severance day" calculation determined the amount of severance pay a departing employee would receive. Apparently, at some point in 1994, participants in the FRS learned that the Division of Retirement would exclude some types of compensation, including severance pay, from the "creditable compensation" used to determine retirement benefits. In June 1995, the college amended the plan to provide a severance pay "opt-out" provision to plan participants. The provision entitled plan participants who were within five years of eligibility for FRS retirement benefits to "opt-out" of the severance package and instead immediately begin to receive supplemental payments. Mr. Megregian drafted the "opt-out" provision, which was adopted by the college board. The decision to "opt-out" was irrevocable. A plan participant could not change his or her mind and take the severance package once the "opt-out" decision was made. The supplemental payments were calculated based upon the "severance days" that the employee would have otherwise earned during the year. The payments were made along with the employee's salary payment. The "opt-out" plan did not require a participant to retire after the fifth year of receiving the supplemental payment. The Petitioner asserts that the creation of the "opt- out" provision was in accordance with information provided by the Division of Retirement. There is no evidence that the Division of Retirement provided any information suggesting that the "opt-out" provision would result in an increase in creditable compensation for purposes of determining FRS benefits, or that the "opt-out" provision was an acceptable method of avoiding the severance pay exclusion. There is no evidence that, prior to March of 1998, the college specifically sought any direction or advice from the Division of Retirement as to the supplemental payments made to employees under the "opt-out" provision. The evidence as to why the college did not simply increase base salaries for employees to whom supplemental payments were being made is unclear. There was testimony that the plan was designed to avoid unidentified tax consequences. There was also testimony that the supplemental plan was designed to avoid increasing some employees base salaries beyond the percentage increases awarded to other employees. There was apparently some concern as to the impact the supplemental payments would have on other college employees who were not receiving the additional funds. There is no evidence that the Petitioner performed any additional duties on the college's behalf in exchange for the supplemental payments. The Petitioner was eligible to participate in the "opt- out" plan beginning in the college's 1995-1996 fiscal year, and he elected to do so. As a result of his election, supplemental payments were made in amounts as follows: Fiscal Year 1995-1996, $7,938.46. Fiscal Year 1996-1997, $8,147.13. Fiscal Year 1997-1998, $8,395.40. On March 21, 1998, Brevard Community College requested clarification from the Division of Retirement as to how the supplemental payments would affect a plan participant's benefit. On April 30, 1998, the Division of Retirement notified the college that the supplemental payments would not be included within the calculation of creditable compensation. The Petitioner retired from his employment at Brevard Community College on June 30, 1998. The Petitioner is presently entitled to retirement benefits under the FRS. The Division calculates FRS retirement benefits based on "creditable compensation" paid to an employee during the five years in which an employee's compensation is highest. Some or all of the three years during which the Petitioner received supplemental payments are included in the calculation of his creditable compensation. The evidence fails to establish that the supplemental payments made to the Petitioner should be included within the creditable compensation upon which FRS benefits are calculated. Under the statutes and rules governing FRS benefit determinations, the supplemental payments made to the Petitioner are "bonuses" and are excluded from the "creditable compensation" calculation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the State of Florida, Division of Retirement, enter a final order finding that supplemental payments made to Stephen J. Megregian are bonus payments and are excluded from calculation of creditable compensation for FRS benefit purposes. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of December, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of December, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: David A. Pearson, Esquire Dean, Mead, Egerton, Bloodworth, Capouano & Bozarth, P.A. Post Office Box 2346 Orlando, Florida 32802-2346 Robert B. Button, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Paul A. Rowell, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue The dispute in this case arises out of Respondent's attempt to collect alleged salary overpayments from Petitioner, a former state employee who allegedly continued to be paid wages after resigning her position with Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Having determined, for the reasons set forth below, that the Department lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the instant claim for "money had and received" against its former employee, the undersigned declines to make findings of fact, as such would be a nullity.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order dismissing this administrative proceeding for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of November, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of November, 2005.
The Issue Whether Petitioner received a salary overpayment for the pay period ending November 9, 2000, for which the State of Florida is entitled to be reimbursed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by the State of Florida, Department of Juvenile Justice (Respondent) as a Group Treatment Leader, Class Code 5721, for a four-month period ending on November 6, 2000. This is a career service position. Petitioner resigned from the Respondent on November 6, 2000, due to significant personal problems associated with his marriage. Petitioner's resignation was accepted by his supervisor on the same day. Petitioner was not a permanent career service employee on the date of his resignation. Petitioner received a final payment for work performed for the period October 27, 2000 through November 5, 2000, on approximately November 20, 2001. Petitioner was concerned about the possibility of overpayment and contacted his local personnel office to inquire about it. Petitioner was told by his office personnel officer not to be concerned about it. At that time, Petitioner believed the matter to be resolved and no longer an issue. By letter dated May 16, 2001, Petitioner received correspondence from Respondent alleging that he was overpaid and seeking reimbursement in the amount of $233.53 for 21.0 hours of earned annual leave that was not compensable. The notification was not prompt, but is was made in a timely manner. On May 21, 2001, Petitioner requested a formal hearing before the DOAH. On June 26, 2001, Respondent notified Petitioner that a further audit revealed that he was entitled to be paid for 8.0 hours of special compensation leave. Applying these hours to the overpayment left a balance of 13.0 hours, equaling $144.57 due. While this matter was pending before DOAH, that amount was garnished from Petitioner's wages by the Comptroller, without prior notification. Petitioner had 21.0 hours of earned annual leave while employed by Respondent. Due to excessive working hours and the critical nature of the position with Respondent, Petitioner had very limited opportunities to use his leave during the time he was employed by Respondent. Due to the short time that he was employed by Respondent, Petitioner's earned leave was not transferable to the Department of Heath, his current employer. Petitioner seeks to withdraw his original letter of resignation and substitute a new letter, to be effective November 20, 2000. This would allow him to use the annual leave and special compensatory leave to account for the period in question and cancel the garnishment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Secretary enter a final order authorizing the garnishment of Petitioner's wages in the amount of $144.57 for salary overpayment for the pay period ending November 9, 2000. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of November, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard D. Davison, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Sheldon S. Scrivener 5253 Jamaica Road Cocoa, Florida 32927-9058 William G. Bankhead, Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Robert N. Sechen, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100
The Issue The issue to be resolved is whether Petitioner received more than one increase in pay in any twelve-month period for the category of added duties and responsibilities, Rule 60K-2.006, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Stephen C. Metzler is an Environmental Specialist II in a leadworker position with the Department. Stephen C. Metzler received an Increase to Base Rate of Pay for added duties in the amount of $69.39, on April 7, 1998. Thereafter, Robert Merritt was promoted and there was no one to supervise the employees that he had previously supervised. He asked Petitioner to continue to perform the duties he had been performing, and assume the supervisory duties that Merritt had previously performed. Merritt advised Petitioner that he would be given additional compensation for performing these duties. Petitioner assumed and performed these added supervisory duties, and Merritt administratively initiated the pay increase. Subsequently, the paperwork was prepared by one of Respondent's clerical personnel, reviewed by the personnel officer, and signed by Petitioner's superiors. Petitioner did not see this paperwork at any time prior to its submission and had no part in its preparation. Both of Petitioner's supervisors who had signed and approved the pay-raise testified. They were aware that Petitioner was performing supervisory, leadworker duties and it was their intent to increase his compensation for performing those duties. Metzler received an increase to his base rate of pay for added duties in the amount of $75.86, on October 2, 1998. The Escambia County Health Department was not aware of the rule of prohibiting more than one pay increase in twelve consecutive months for the same category. The Department of Management Services audited the payroll of the Department of Health and found several deficiencies including overpayment to Metzler. The Personnel Action Request Form dated April 7, 1999, indicated that the pay increase being approved was to Petitioner's base rate of pay for the performance of added duties. Under the section of the form relating to "Salary," there is no selection under "Salary Additive." The Personnel Action Request Form dated October 2, 1999, indicated that the pay increase being approved was to Petitioner's base rate of pay for the performance of added duties. However, under the section of the form relating to "Salary," salary additive, the block "leadworker" was checked. It was testimony of the personnel officer that, had they known of the Rule restricting two pay increases within twelve consecutive months, they would have checked the block under increase in base rate of pay, Internal Pay Relationships. That, together with the selection of "Leadworker" under "Salary Additive," would have been administratively correct. Both payroll request forms authorize the increase of pay by placing an "X" in the box "added duties." Personnel Action Request one authorized a raise on April 7, 1999, and Personnel Action Request two authorized a raise on October 2, 1999, which is within twelve months of the first raise. McCulough calculated the $1,010.80 overpayment by determining the increases paid prior to the expiration of the twelve-month period of the preceding raise for the same category, added duties and responsibilities. McCullough calculated the amount of overpayment and drafted a letter for the Director of the Health Department's signature. McCullough drafted the letter seeking reimbursement of the $1,010.80, because of the audit exception and the demand of the Department of Management Services to correct the administrative error that had been made.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent correct its paperwork and not attempt to collect the monies involved. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of June, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of June, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephen C. Metzler 4048 Charles Circle Pace, Florida 32571 Rodney M. Johnson, Esquire Department of Health 1295 West Fairfield Drive Pensacola, Florida 32501 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Dr. Robert G. Brooks, Secretary Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
Findings Of Fact For calendar year 1989 and until November 11, 1990, petitioner worked for respondent. As of January 5, 1989, having exhausted accumulated leave balances, petitioner was not entitled either to sick leave or to annual leave. After January 5, 1989, and until her employment with respondent ended on November 11, 1990, petitioner earned 192 hours of sick leave and 192 hours of annual leave. During the pay period ended January 19, 1989, she took 1.75 hours of leave. During the pay period ended February 2, 1989, she took 3.5 hours of leave. During the pay period ended February 16, 1989, she took 1.5 hours of leave. During the pay period ended March 2, 1989, she took 18.25 hours of leave. During the pay period ended March 16, 1989, she took 16 hours of leave. During the pay period ended March 30, 1989, she took 1.5 hours of leave. During the pay period ended April 13, 1989, she took 36 hours of leave. During the pay period ended April 27, 1989, she took 22 hours of leave. During the pay period ended May 11, 1989, she took 20.75 hours of leave. During the pay period ended May 25, 1989, she took 6 hours of leave. During the pay period ended June 8, 1989, she took 8.75 hours of leave. During the pay period ended June 22, 1989, she took 17.25 hours of leave. During the pay period ended July 6, 1989, she took 16 hours of leave. During the pay period ended July 20, 1989, she took 1 hour of leave. During the pay period ended August 3, 1989, she took 9 hours of leave. During the pay period ended August 17, 1989, she took 10 hours of leave. During the pay period ended August 31, 1989, she took 4 hours of leave. During the pay period ended September 14, 1989, she took 12 hours of leave. During the pay period ended September 28, 1989, she took 8.5 hours of leave. During the pay period ended October 12, 1989, she took 10.5 hours of leave. During the pay period ended October 26, 1989, she took 8.5 hours of leave. During the pay period ended November 9, 1989, she took 26.25 hours of leave. During the pay period ended November 23, 1989, she took one hour of leave. During the pay period ended December 7, 1989, there was no leave taken. During the pay period ended December 21, 1989, she took .5 hours of leave. During the pay period ended January 4, 1990, she took 18 hours of leave. During the pay period ended January 18, 1990, she took 10.5 hours of leave. During the pay period ended February 1, 1990, she took 1.5 hours of leave. During the pay period ended February 15, 1990, she took 1.5 hours of leave. During the pay period ended March 1, 1990, she took 3 hours of leave. During the pay period ended March 15, 1990, she took 27 hours of leave. During the pay period ended March 29, 1990, she took 11.5 hours of leave. During the pay period ended April 12, 1990, she took 36 hours of leave. During the pay period ended April 26, 1990, she took 24 hours of leave. During the pay period ended May 10, 1990, she took 34.25 hours of leave. During the pay period ended May 24, 1990, she took .5 hours of leave. During the pay period ended June 7, 1990, she took 2 hours of leave. During the pay period ended June 21, 1990, she took 27.5 hours of leave. During the pay period ended July 5, 1990, there was no leave taken. During the pay period ended July 19, 1990, she took 8 hours of leave. During the pay period ended August 2, 1990, she took 26 hours of leave. During the pay period ended August 16, 1990, she took 31 hours of leave. During the pay period ended August 30, 1990, she took 8 hours of leave. During the pay period ended September 13, 1990, she took 16 hours of leave. During the pay period ended September 27, 1990, she took 24.5 hours of leave. During the pay period ended October 11, 1990, she took 13.25 hours of leave. Because petitioner's time sheets were not always processed in a timely manner, leave balances stated on contemporaneous print outs were not always accurate. (In 1989, respondent had no official mechanism for notifying employees that time sheets were missing.) After petitioner's situation came to the attention of payroll specialists at HRS, a manual audit was performed. For the period ending March 30, 1989, petitioner had an annual leave balance of 6.5 hours. During the next pay period, she used the entire balance, but at the end of the pay period, at the close of business on April 13, 1989, four more hours of annual leave were credited, all of which she used before the succeeding period ended. During the period ended May 25, 1989, she was also out on leave two hours for which she was not entitled to pay. In all, the audit established that respondent had taken some 563 hours of leave after January 5, 1989. This exceeded paid leave she was entitled to by 179 hours. Nothing in the evidence suggests she was docked for more than 135.25 hours' pay.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That respondent deny petitioner's request for refund. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of April, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Sam Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Linda Harris, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Robert L. Powell, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Ruby Bush 3111-21 Mahan Drive, #113 Tallahassee, FL 32308
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is liable for a penalty of $286,400.01 for the alleged failure to maintain workers’ compensation insurance for its employees in violation of Subsection 440.107(7)(d), Florida Statutes (2008).1
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for enforcing the statutory requirement that employers secure the payment of workers’ compensation for the benefit of their employees in accordance with the requirements of Section 440.107. Respondent is a Florida corporation engaged in the construction business. On May 19, 2009, Petitioner's investigator inspected one of Respondent's job sites located at 6665 Mirabella Lane, Naples, Florida. The purpose of the inspection was to determine whether Respondent was in compliance with workers' compensation requirements. The investigator observed workers laying concrete block in a residential development under construction. The investigator interviewed the workers and learned the identity of the individual owner of Respondent. The investigator determined through the Coverage and Compliance Automated System (CCAS) that Respondent had secured workers' compensation coverage. However, Respondent maintained minimum coverage identified in the record as an "if any" policy. An "if any" policy imposes a premium based on zero employees and zero payroll and requires Respondent to notify the insurer of any new employees within three days of being hired. Respondent had reported no workers to his workers' compensation carrier, but had reported 54 employees for purposes of unemployment compensation taxes.2 None of the individuals reported for unemployment compensation taxes had secured workers' compensation coverage for themselves. Respondent is liable for workers' compensation for the 54 workers described in the preceding paragraph, which the trier of fact finds are employees of Respondent. None of the workers has an exemption from workers' compensation coverage. Petitioner correctly calculated the amount owed by Respondent, which is $286,400.01.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order imposing a penalty assessment in the amount of $286,400.01. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of July, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of July, 2010.
