The Issue The issue for determination is whether, as alleged, Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on her sex, thereby violating Section 760.10, Florida Statutes. If that violation occurred, the remaining issue is what relief is appropriate. Petitioner contends that she should have received disability benefits during her pregnancy from July 21, 1987 through September 10, 1987 and that Respondent's refusal to pay constituted discrimination.
Findings Of Fact In their joint prehearing statement, filed at hearing, the parties stipulated to the following: During the calendar year 1987 the Petitioner was employed by the Respondent at its Melbourne, Florida, plant. During 1987 the Respondent provided weekly income benefits for non-occupational disability pursuant to the provisions of a document entitled "Addendum to Weekly Income Benefits for Non-Work Related to Disability." (Exhibit R-4) The Petitioner was off from work for the Respondent from April 21, 1987 through October 26, 1987. The Petitioner delivered a child on September 10, 1987. The Petitioner received weekly income benefits of $189.33 for the period from April 21, 1987 through July 21, 1987 and from September 10, 1987 through October 23, 1987. On Monday October 26, 1987, Petitioner returned to work with Respondent at her regular position and rate of pay. Respondent (Acopian) is a manufacturer of electronic components with a plant in Melbourne, Florida. Commencing in October 1979, and at all times relevant, Petitioner was employed by Acopian as an assembly worker. Her assigned duties required her to assemble and solder personal computer boards, a task performed primarily in a seated position and requiring little physical exertion. When she was hired, Ms. Faith was instructed regarding the company's benefit plan by Evan Martin, Vice President for the company. Mr. Martin is responsible for overall operations of the plant and for personnel matters. Ms. Faith filed the requisite forms and received disability benefits under the company's plan between November 9, 1981 and January 18, 1982, when she was unable to perform her duties due to pregnancy and childbirth. Sometime prior to April 20, 1987, Ms. Faith learned that she was pregnant again. Her treating physician was Dr. Eugene F. Wawrzyniak, an obstetrician with offices in Palm Bay, Florida. On April 20, 1987, Ms. Faith was given a note by her physician stating that she should be excused from work until the estimated date of her delivery, October 8, 1987. Ms. Faith's mother took the note to Acopian, delivering it to Doris Hayden, Evan Martin's Administrative Assistant, and the person responsible for maintaining the personnel files and disability claims. Ms. Faith was given the claim forms and completed portions of the form on May 10, 1987, indicating that her period of disability was to commence April 22, 1987. She also indicated on the form that her sickness or injury arose out of the course of her employment. Because of that, Ms. Hayden submitted the form to the state worker's compensation agency. She understood that the agency required forms be sent anytime an employee claims a work- related illness or injury. On May 18, 1987, Ms. Faith received notice of denial of the worker's compensation claim based on no injury arising out of employment. On June 15, 1987, Acopian received another note from Dr. Wawrzniak indicating that Ms. Faith must remain home due to threat of a miscarriage. Dr. Wawrzniak also completed the physician's portion of the disability claim form on June 15, 1987, indicating that Ms. Faith would be disabled from April 21 through six weeks post-partum. The condition he listed was "pregnancy with threatened spontaneous abortion." (Respondent's Exhibit 7.) Ms. Faith completed her portion of the form on June 19, 1987, and this time did not indicate the condition arose out of her employment. Evan Martin routinely reviews all claims for non-work related benefits. The company is self-insured as to that benefit plan. Mr. Martin had never seen a case at Acopian where a physician stated so early in pregnancy that the patient would be disabled for virtually the entire term of pregnancy. Because he was confused as to Dr. Wawrzniak's statement, he sent the doctor a letter, dated July 17, 1987, requesting medical facts in support of his diagnosis. Although Dr. Wawrzniak later testified, at his deposition on December 1, 1988, that his clinical impression in 1987 was that Petitioner could not have returned to her duties at Respondent after July 18, 1987, his response to Mr. Martin dated July 18, 1987 was not consistent with that conclusion. Specifically, he indicated in his July 18, 1987 correspondence that: Gerda Faith is a 27 year old white female, G- 3, P-1, who had a natural delivery in 1981 with a miscarriage of June 1986. She was seen in this pregnancy on 2/13/87 initial visit with a positive pregnancy test. She subsequently followed in the next two months with post coital bleeding and lower abdominal cramping. This would suspect [sic] a threatened abortion or miscarriage at this time and [sic] was told to rest and work would have to be curtailed. Otherwise, presently in the pregnancy on 7/28/87 she was examined fetal size [sic] approximately 30 weeks gestation which is consistent with her due date of 10/8/87. She is doing well and there is no sign of threatened [sic] miscarriage at this point in time, otherwise, there is no vaginal bleeding as in the first trimester of pregnancy and the patient is doing well. (Emphasis added) (Respondent's Exhibit 10.) Insofar as there appeared to be inconsistencies between this latest report and Dr. Wawrzyniak's statements as to the period of anticipated disability, and no supporting medical documentation was provided, Mr. Martin again requested medical evidence from the physician on August 31, 1987. Mr. Martin's August 31, 1987 correspondence stated in pertinent part that: It appears to us while Gerda had difficulties during the first trimester of her [sic] pregnancy, thereafter she could have returned to work until some time in late September, 1987. This is based upon your statement that she is now doing well, and there is no sign of threatened miscarriage at this point in time. However, this appears to be inconsistent with your statement on Gerda's health insurance claim form that she would be continuously and totally disabled and unable to work from April 21, 1987 through six weeks after the birth. (Emphasis supplied) We would appreciate it if you could provide the medical evidence upon which you relied in stating that she was continuously disabled and unable to work for the entire period of time rather than after the first trimester had passed and the threat of miscarriage had subsided. This information is necessary so that we may evaluate further whether to provide disability payments for the entire period claimed. (Respondent's Exhibit 11.) By letter dated September 1, 1987, Dr. Wawrzyniak responded as follows: In regards to your most recent letter on August 31, 1987 in relation to Gerda Faith, my last letter stated that she was doing better after 30 week gestation in which was written on 7/18/87. I felt that at this point and [sic] time there was no sign of threatened miscarriage and that she did not have any complaints regarding these symptoms of second or third trimester bleeding. Presently, she is doing well and I feel that under the circumstances she has approximately 5 weeks to go in her pregnancy and her due date is October that she can go back to work. She is physically fit and is out of danger in regards to her pregnancy at this stage. Mind you that this may change dramatically from week to week and if I so chose [sic] to have her out of work I shall write you a personal letter. (Emphasis supplied) (Respondent's Exhibit 12.) On September 9, 1987, Ms. Faith went into labor prematurely and delivered her child on September 10, 1987. It is undisputed that she was out of work from April 21, 1987, through October 23, 1987. She was initially paid benefits for the post-partum period and was later paid for the period April 21, 1987 through July 21, 1987, when Acopian was told by her doctor that there was no sign of threatened miscarriage. She claims she is owed benefits between July 21, 1987 and her delivery. Ms. Faith acknowledges that under Acopian's plan an employee is not automatically entitled to disability benefits simply because she is pregnant. The non-work related disability benefits under Acopian's plan are available to male and female employees alike for a wide range of medical conditions. Since 1983, payments have been made to at least seventeen women, including Ms. Faith, for pregnancy or pregnancy-related conditions. It is not unusual for Acopian, either through Evan Martin or his assistant, Doris Hayden, to seek clarification in medical documentation for both males and females. In such instances the physician usually cooperates fully.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's Petition for Relief be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of April, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Patrick J. Deese, Esquire Post Office Box 361937 Melbourne, Florida 32936-1037 Edward H. Feege, Esquire Post Office Box 2165 Lehigh Valley, PA 18001-2165 Donald A. Griffin, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Dana Baird, Esquire General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925
Findings Of Fact On July 8, 1986, Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, sent Petitioner, Shirley Johnson, a letter to confirm her separation from employment as a Human Services Worker II in Pierce Cottage, Unit II, Facility IV, at the Gulf Coast Center in Ft. Myers. At the time, Johnson was a permanent employee of HRS. Her job at Pierce Cottage was to help care for 29 severely profoundly mentally retarded persons. On or about May 6, 1986, HRS' Gulf Coast Center instituted new policies for applying for authorization for leave from work. /1 No longer would Petitioner and fellow employees be required to notify their immediate supervisor, Twila Bevins, of their absence or tardiness. Instead, the employees are responsible only to notify the group shift supervisor on duty at Pierce Cottage. The employee only advises the group shift supervisor of the employee's intent to apply for authorization for leave and the amount and time the leave would be taken. The group shift supervisor does not approve leave. Authorization for leave must be obtained directly from the immediate supervisor, Twila Bevins, by explaining the reasons for the leave request which would entitle the employee to authorization for leave. Application for authorization for leave can be made either before or after the group shift supervisor is notified. However, no leave can be authorized for an employee who did not personally give notification of anticipated absence unless the employee is incapacitated. Petitioner is a mother of six. She also cares for her father, who has heart disease, and for her mother, who is overweight and has limited mobility. After a separation she has been reconciled with her husband, who, after being out of work, is now employed and contributes to the support of the family. On July 2, 1986, Petitioner and her immediate supervisor agreed that Petitioner would have July 3 and 4 off, but would work from 6:30 A.M. to 2:30 P.M. on July 5. Petitioner also was scheduled to work on July 6, 7 and 8, 1986. During the early morning hours of Saturday, July 5, between approximately 1:00 A.M. and 4:30 A.M., Petitioner's father had a heart attack and Petitioner and her husband went with him to the hospital and stayed there while he was being cared for. When they returned home at approximately 4:30 A.M., they were told by Petitioner's mother that Petitioner's brother was in jail in Ocala and that she was very concerned about her son. At her mother's request, Petitioner and her husband agreed to drive to Ocala to bail her brother out of jail. When they arrived in Ocala, Petitioner's husband, who was driving when they arrived in Ocala, was arrested for driving with a license under suspension and was himself put in jail. Petitioner herself then had to drive back to Ft. Myers to get money to bail her husband out of jail, drive back to Ocala to bail him out, and drive her husband back to Ft. Myers, a drive of a total of approximately 600 miles. Petitioner did not work and did not call in to work on Saturday, July 5. She was absent without authorized leave. On Sunday, July 6, 1986, Petitioner called into work at 6:30 A.M. to explain to the shift supervisor why she had been absent the previous day, and to notify him that she would not be in until approximately 10:00 A.M. However, tired from her ordeal the previous day and developing a severe headache, Petitioner did not work on Sunday, July 6. She called in later in the morning and spoke to one of the women working in Pierce Cottage but did not speak to the group shift supervisor. She was again absent without authorized leave. On the following morning, Monday, July 7, 1986, Petitioner called in at 6:25 A.M. to tell the group shift supervisor she would be late getting in to work. However, her headache got worse, and the pain traveled down to her neck and down one side of her body. The pain was so severe that she was crying uncontrollably. Although she still told her husband that she wanted to go to work to avoid any disciplinary problems, he talked her into letting him telephone Pierce Cottage to say that she would not be able to work on July 7. At approximately 6:45 A.M., her husband telephoned the group shift supervisor and told him that Petitioner would not be at work at all that day because of her physical condition. On Tuesday, July 8, 1986, Petitioner still was in approximately the same physical condition. At approximately 7:00 A.M., her husband telephoned the group shift supervisor at Pierce Cottage, reported her physical condition, and reported that Petitioner would not be in to work on July 8. Petitioner's husband also reported that Petitioner would probably have to see a doctor that day. Petitioner did indeed go to the Lee County Health Department on July 8, 1986, to be seen for her physical condition. Petitioner went to the Lee County Health Department because she and her husband could not afford to pay a private doctor. When Petitioner arrived at the Health Department at approximately 2:00 P.M., there was no doctor available to see her. She left at approximately 3:00 P.M. with a note confirming the she had been at the Health Department between 2:00 and 3:00 P.M., and that she needed a follow-up appointment. Although Petitioner still was suffering from a severe headache on Wednesday, July 9, 1986, she went to work, turning in her note from the Health Department. However, upon arriving, she was advised of HRS' July 8 letter confirming her separation from her employment. After reciting the grounds upon which HRS had taken the position that Petitioner should be deemed to have abandoned her position, the letter stated: "In the event it was not your intention to resign from employment, you are instructed to immediately contact me and provide a reasonable and acceptable explanation for your unauthorized absence from your employment." Petitioner was absent without authorized leave on July 5 and 6, 1986. Petitioner was not incapacitated from telephoning her group shift supervisor on July 7 and July 8, 1986. However, under the circumstances, it was reasonable for her to have her husband telephone for her. She did not intend to abandon her position. As of July 2, 1986, Petitioner had 27 hours of annual leave and 8 hours of compensatory time in her accumulative leave records and available for use July 5 - 8, 1986. She also would earn an additional 5 hours of annual leave and 4 hours of sick leave by July 10, 1986. This would have been enough to cover her absences and permit her to be paid during her absences if authorized and approved.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact' and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Administration enter a Final Order granting the petition in this case and ruling that the circumstances of this case do not constitute an abandonment of Petitioner's position. RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of November, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November, 1986.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is eligible to receive disability income payments under the State Group Disability Income Self-insurance Plan (DISP).
Findings Of Fact On or about February 1, 2005, James S. Purdy, Public Defender for the Seventh Judicial Circuit, State of Florida, hired Petitioner as a "part-time" appellate attorney. Petitioner's duties included representing indigent criminal defendants on appeal. As a "part-time" attorney, Petitioner worked the same number of hours as full-time attorneys. His workload was equivalent to the workload carried by all part-time and full- time appellate attorneys. However, except to attend weekly staff meetings, Petitioner did not perform his duties at the Public Defender's Office. Petitioner and other "part-time" attorneys were free to work from home and/or to maintain a private law office. During Petitioner's employment with the Public Defender's Office, Craig S. Dyer, Deputy Public Defender, was in charge of personnel. James Wulchak, Chief of the Appellate Division, was Petitioner's direct supervisor. Petitioner has been under the continuous care of a physician for Parkinson's disease since his diagnosis in 1997. Parkinson’s disease is a neurological degenerative movement disorder for which there is no known cure. The disease's symptoms initially are responsive to medication but become less responsive over time as the disease progresses. Despite the slow progressive nature of Parkinson’s, Petitioner always was able to compensate for his disability by typing his briefs during the periods of time that his medications were effective in relieving his symptoms. Sometimes he worked before dawn, during the evening hours, or on weekends. Petitioner never informed Mr. Purdy, Mr. Dyer, or Mr. Wulchak that he was unable to perform his duties due to a physical disability. Petitioner never requested or advised his employer of a need for special accommodation to perform his assigned tasks. Petitioner continued to perform the duties required of him as an appellate attorney up through the last day of his employment. Petitioner's employer never contemplated dismissing Petitioner due to his inability to perform satisfactory work. In a meeting on March 25, 2008, Mr. Purdy requested Petitioner's resignation due to an incident unrelated to his disability. Petitioner responded that he needed time to ascertain the status of his insurance benefits. Several days later, Mr. Dyer placed a telephone call to Petitioner. Petitioner again refused to resign. On April 15, 2008, Petitioner attended a routine weekly staff meeting. After the staff meeting, Mr. Dyer and Mr. Wulchak had a private meeting with Petitioner. When Petitioner refused to tender his resignation, Mr. Dyer terminated Petitioner's employment effective immediately. But for the incident unrelated to Petitioner's physical condition, Petitioner's employer would have allowed him to continue to work after April 15, 2008. The next day, Petitioner met with representatives of the Public Defender's Office to surrender files. The Public Defender's Office denied Petitioner's request to be paid for work performed on April 16, 2008. As of April 15, 2008, Petitioner had accumulated 228 hours of annual leave and 242.59 hours of sick leave. Respondent paid Petitioner for 120 hours of annual leave, the maximum allowed. Petitioner did not receive payment for accumulated sick leave because he had not worked six years for the state. At all times relevant here, Petitioner's employment was classified as Select Exempt Service (SES). The DISP is one of the employment benefits that Respondent provides to SES employees under Florida Administrative Code Rules 60P-6 and 60P- The purpose of DISP is to provide employees who are on leave with income once their accumulated leave is depleted. In April 2008, Petitioner filed a claim for disability benefits with the Social Security Administration. On May 5, 2008, Petitioner filed a Notice of Intent to file a claim for benefits under the DISP. In the notice, Petitioner asserted that he was disabled as of April 15, 2008, the last day he was a paid employee. Within 90 days thereafter, Petitioner filed his completed claim for disability income payments under DISP. In a letter dated July 1, 2008, Respondent advised Petitioner that he was not eligible to receive DISP payments because he was no longer a state employee. A letter dated July 5, 2008, advised Petitioner that he would receive Social Security disability income in the amount of $2,060 per month commencing October 2008. Petitioner offered the deposition testimony of Richard Boehme, M.D. in lieu of testimony at hearing. Dr. Boehme, a board-certified neurologist, treated Petitioner several times in 2003 and again in January 2004. Thereafter, Dr. Boehme did not see Petitioner professionally until August 2008. Dr. Boehme's medical opinion was that Petitioner was totally disabled and unable to perform the duties pertaining to his employment as of January 1, 2008. Dr. Boehme's testimony is not persuasive in light of Petitioner's continued productivity up through April 15, 2008. Dr. Boehme did not place any specific limitations on the physical activities of Petitioner. According to Dr. Boehme, there was no medical reason to keep Petitioner from continuing to perform the same duties he performed on his last day at work. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Petitioner was performing satisfactorily on April 15, 2008.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order finding that Petitioner is not entitled to DISP benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of November, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of November, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Sonja P. Mathews, Esquire Department of Management Services Office of the General Counsel 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Henry T. Swann, III Henry Swann, III Post Office Box 4415 St. Augustine, Florida 32085 Dennis Robert Schutt, Esquire Schutt, Schmidt & Noey 2700-C University Boulevard West Jacksonville, Florida 32217 John Brenneis, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue Whether Respondent subjected Petitioner to employment discrimination by refusing to hire Petitioner based upon Petitioner?s disability. Whether Respondent failed to make reasonable accommodations for Petitioner?s physical disabilities.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a trucking company that has over 7,000 trucks that carry payload throughout the country. Petitioner alleges that Respondent did not hire him as a truck driver because Petitioner is disabled, or because Respondent perceived that Petitioner had a disability. Petitioner?s claimed disabilities are a skip of the heart and lower back pain. Petitioner completed his initial application for a truck driving position with Respondent on November 6, 2008, which Respondent received on December 10, 2008. In accordance with Respondent?s hiring process, once Respondent receives an initial application for a driver position, it conducts a preliminary review of the information provided by the applicant. If an applicant provides sufficient information to pass preliminary review, Respondent then sends the applicant a pre-approval letter with an attached “Pre- Training Checklist,” which sets forth a number of requirements for hiring. Respondent?s Pre-Training Checklist requires applicants to have three years of work history. Respondent uses work histories for references from previous employers to check on the background of its applicants as part of Respondent?s obligation to the public to ensure that the drivers it hires will be safe. Respondent?s pre-approval letter advises applicants that “[t]his pre-approval is contingent upon further background investigations, including motor vehicle reports and the successful completion of the hiring process.” Petitioner?s initial application contained no work history. Instead, Petitioner wrote in his application that he had lost his job because the company he was working for had gone out of business, and that he was a stay-at-home dad. Although Respondent sent Petitioner a pre-approval letter, Respondent requested Petitioner to submit additional information regarding his income and work history. Petitioner then submitted information demonstrating that he had no work history in the three years prior to his application. Thereafter, Respondent declined to hire Petitioner based upon his lack of work history. Although Petitioner claims that Respondent failed to hire him because Petitioner was disabled, the evidence submitted by Petitioner was insufficient to show that Petitioner ever informed Respondent of his alleged disability during the application process. Petitioner argued at the final hearing that tax returns and Social Security Benefit Statements submitted to Respondent as part of the application process to verify Petitioner?s earnings should have alerted Respondent to the fact that Petitioner was disabled.1/ Those returns and statements, however, standing alone, do not demonstrate that Respondent was made aware that Petitioner was claiming to be disabled, especially in light of the fact that Petitioner produced no evidence that Respondent received any other information whatsoever from Petitioner, Petitioner?s truck-driving school, or any other entity about Petitioner?s claimed disability or physical limitations, prior to making the decision not to hire Petitioner. Respondent denied receiving such information, and it is found that Respondent did not receive information from any person or entity regarding Petitioner?s alleged disability prior to making the decision not to hire Petitioner. Regarding Respondent?s alleged failure to accommodate, Petitioner testified that, in order to accommodate his disability, he would not be able to load or unload trucks, and would need to be given time to visit his doctor. Petitioner, however, failed to show that he ever requested an accommodation from Respondent. Moreover, the ability to load and unload trucks is an essential duty of the driver position for which Petitioner applied. At the final hearing, Respondent provided evidence that it employs and provides accommodations for a number of drivers with disabilities. Respondent?s evidence that it hires disabled persons is consistent with guidelines adopted by Respondent stating that Respondent “provides equal employment opportunities to all employees and applicants for employment without regard to race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, disability, marital status or veteran status in accordance with applicable federal and state laws.” In sum, Petitioner failed to demonstrate that Respondent discriminated against him by refusing to hire him because of his disability or that Respondent failed to make reasonable accommodations for Petitioner?s disability. Rather, based upon the evidence adduced at the final hearing, it is found that Respondent decided not to hire Petitioner because he failed to provide three years of work experience required of all applicants.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Complaint and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of April, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 2011. 1/ The tax statements consist of forms 1040EZ for 2006 and 2007 signed by Petitioner and his wife. On both forms, the lines for “occupation” next to Petitioner's wife's signature state, “Disable/Cashier.” The occupation lines on both forms next to Petitioner's signature state, “Disable.” The Social Security Benefit Statements consist of five Form SSA-1099 Social Security Benefit Statements for years 2005 through 2007, including Petitioner's wife's 2005 statement for benefits totaling $9,494.40, Petitioner's 2006 statement for benefits totaling $7,542.00, Petitioner's wife's 2006 statement for benefits totaling $9,882.00, Petitioner's 2007 statement for benefits totaling $7,794.00, and Petitioner's wife's 2007 statement for benefits totaling $10,206.00. 2/ Unless otherwise indicated, all references to statutes or rules are to the current, 2010, versions, which have not been substantively revised since the relevant hiring decision in this case. 3/ See Finding of Fact 13, supra. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Edward Rhoades 7470 Northwest 167th Place Trenton, Florida 32693 Ignacio J. Garcia, Esquire Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C. 100 North Tampa Street, Suite 3600 Tampa, Florida 33602 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Prior to February 25, 1986, the Petitioner, Tommie Miller, was employed by the Respondent, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) at the Brevard Regional Juvenile Detention Center as a detention child care worker I. During the time relevant to this case, June and July, 1987, Ms. Miller's supervisor was Michele McKinley, detention center superintendent. On February 25, 1986, Ms. Miller injured her lower back, injuring two nerves. The injury was job connected, and Ms. Miller was eligible for and received workers compensation benefits. Ms. Miller was receiving workers compensation benefits during the period relevant to this case, July 10 through 27, 1987. With the exception of a brief time during the period of June 22 through 24, 1987, Ms. Miller was absent from work from February 1986 through August 10, 1987, and thereafter, for that matter. On June 24, 1987, she reinjured her back at work. During the months she was out of work, Ms. Miller was treated in various rehabilitation programs. In June and July, 1987, she was receiving treatment from Woods Rehabilitation Services, Inc., and the rehabilitation nurse assigned to her case was Joan Patterson. R. Ex. 5. Ms. Miller lives 25 miles from the detention center, and testified that in June and July of 1987, her back hurt too much to allow her to drive to work at the detention center. Ms. Miller had exhausted her sick leave by July 22, 1987. It is inferred that she was on approved leave without pay by July 22, 1987. This inference is based on the fact that nearly a year and a half had elapsed from the date of the injury, and normal sick, annual, and compensatory leave would have been exhausted. This inference is also based upon the rules concerning the proper way to characterize the absence of an employee due to a job connected disability discussed in the conclusions of law. It is inferred that on July 22, 1987, the period of approved leave without pay was indefinite. This inference is based on the findings of fact which follow and the lack of evidence of a definite period of approved leave without pay. On June 22, 1987, Dr. Stanley Kaplan provided a written statement excusing Ms. Miller from work. On June 29, 1987, Ms. Miller was again seen by Dr. Kaplan for evaluation. Dr. Kaplan performed the normal therapy he was then performing for Ms. Miller, but did not tell her she could return to work. This finding of fact is limited to what Ms. Miller in fact did not hear, and is not a finding concerning Dr. Kaplan's opinion on June 29, 1987. On July 17, 1987, Ms. Miller visited Dr. Stanley Kaplan for rehabilitative treatment. Dr. Kaplan did not tell Ms. Miller at that time that she could go back to work. This finding of fact is limited to what Ms. Miller in fact did not hear, and is not a finding concerning Dr. Kaplan's opinion on July 17, 1987. On July 22, 1987, Ms. McKinley wrote a certified letter to the Petitioner, Tommie Miller. R. Ex. I. The letter in its entirety stated: I've been informed by Ms. Patterson of Woods rehabilitation that Dr. Kaplan released you to return to work as of 7/10/87. She further reported that you stated you didn't understand that you could return to work. In addition, we have had no further contact from you since 6/24/87. I am now going to have to require you to report back to work on 7/27/87, by 9:00 a.m. If you do not report back to work on this date or provide the appropriate medical documentation as to your absence, we will have to assume that you have abandoned your position with HRS. Thus, the letter of July 22, 1987, explicitly gave Ms. Miller two options: report to work at 9:00 a.m. on July 27, 1987, or "provide the appropriate medical documentation as to your absence." From the contents of the letter, it is concluded that when the letter was written, Ms. McKinley thought that Dr. Kaplan had released Ms. Miller to return to work on July 10, 1987. It is also concluded from the contents of the letter and from R. Ex. 5, which Ms. McKinley testified she had in her possession and was aware of when she wrote the July 22, 1987, letter, that Ms. McKinley was aware on July 22, 1987, that Ms. Patterson had said that Ms. Miller had said that she (Ms. Miller) did not understand that Dr. Kaplan had said she could return to work. On July 22, 1987, Ms. Miller was examined by Richard P. Newman, M.D. On July 24, 1987, Ms. Miller received the letter of July 22, 1987. As soon as she received the letter, Ms. Miller called Ms. McKinley on the telephone. Ms. Miller told Ms. McKinley that her current medical problem was an inability to drive to work, but that she could work if she was able to travel to work. Ms. McKinley told Ms. Miller that she had not received a written report from a physician concerning Ms. Miller's condition since June 24, 1987. Ms. McKinley told Ms. Miller that she (Ms. McKinley) still needed medical documentation, and that she could not authorize leave based on her oral report without medical documentation. Ms. Miller then told Ms. McKinley that Ms. Patterson at the Woods Rehabilitation Services was supposed to send the doctor's report to Ms. McKinley. During the telephone call, Ms. McKinley did not ask her (Ms. Miller) to personally deliver the doctor's report, and did not tell Ms. Miller that reliance upon Ms. Patterson was inappropriate. Moreover, Ms. McKinley did not warn Ms. Miller that if Ms. Patterson fi1ed to deliver the report by July 27, 1987, that Ms. Miller would automatically forfeit her job. At the time of the phone call from Ms. Miller, Ms. McKinley was in possession of R. Ex. 5. The top of page two of that document advised Ms. McKinley that Ms. Miller was scheduled for an evaluation by Dr. Newman on July 22, 1987. In the fourth paragraph of page two of R. Ex. 5, Ms. McKinley was advised that Ms. Miller would attend the appointment with Dr. Newman. In the seventh paragraph of page two of R. Ex. 5, Ms. McKinley was advised that Nurse Patterson felt that Dr. Newman's evaluation was important to an assessment of the current status of Ms. Miller's medical condition. These findings are based upon what is in fact stated in R. Ex. 5 and known to Ms. McKinley as what Ms. Patterson had written. No finding is made as to whether what is stated in R. Ex. 5 is true. It is concluded that during the telephone conversation with Ms. Miller on July 24, 1987, Ms. McKinley knew that Ms. Miller was to have been evaluated by Dr. Newman on July 22, 1987. At the time of the phone call on June 24, 1987, Ms. McKinley did not ask Ms. Miller to tell her what Dr. Newman had determined concerning Ms. Miller's medical condition, and did not ask Ms. Miller about Dr. Newman's evaluation two days earlier. As a result, during the July 24, 1987, telephone conversation, inexplicably neither Ms. McKinley nor Ms. Miller mentioned anything about Dr. Newman's evaluation on July 22, 1987. R. Ex. 2A is the report of Dr. Newman with respect to the visit of July 22, 1987. The report indicates on its face that Woods Rehab Services and Ms. Tommie Miller are listed as recipients of the "cc." The report of Dr. Newman of July 22, 1987, R. Ex. 2A, states in part: At this time, my feeling would be that the drive to and from Titusville is causing her more harm than good. Since she works for the state, it would be in the best interest of all parties concerned to move her to a position in the Rockledge area because she will be able to commute a very short drive and would be quite capable of performing this type of sedentary work. On July 24, 1987, Ms. Miller called Dr. Newman to get another written report, and asked Dr. Newman to send that report to Ms. Patterson at Woods Rehabilitation Center. R. Ex. 2B is that report. The report of July 24, 1987, shows that Woods Rehabilitation Services, Inc., but not Ms. Miller, was the recipient of a "cc." The report of July 24, 1987, R. Ex. 2A states in part: It is not the act of driving itself, but it is the riding in the car that is bothering her back and I do not think that she should be having to travel by car 25 miles in either direction to work when she could be doing a similar job virtually around the corner from her house. It is concluded that the report of Dr. Newman, in written form, supported Ms. Miller's oral statement to Ms. McKinley that she was physically unable to drive to the detention center due to the distance. These findings of fact are based upon what in fact is printed on the face of the reports, and is not a finding that the statements contained in the reports are true. Ms. Patterson told Ms. Miller that she would send the report to Ms. McKinley. Ms. Patterson told Ms. Miller that she did communicate with HRS. No finding is made as to the truth of Ms. Patterson's statement, but only that Ms. Miller in fact heard Ms. Patterson make this statement to her. Ms. Miller thought Ms. Patterson would and did send the medical report of July 22, 1987, to Ms. McKinley. Ms. Patterson did not send Dr. Newman's medical report to Ms. McKinley. There was a prior pattern of dealing between the parties such that Ms. Patterson, with reasonable frequency, though not routinely, communicated to Ms. McKinley concerning the current medical status of Ms. Miller with respect to her ability to resume her job with HRS. This finding of fact is based upon the testimony of Ms. Miller, who stated that she relied upon Ms. Patterson to keep Ms. McKinley informed, and the testimony of Ms. Miller that on July 24, 1987, she told Ms. McKinley by telephone that Ms. Patterson would send the medical documentation. It is also based upon the testimony of Ms. McKinley, who testified that Ms. Patterson did, from time to time discuss with her Ms. Miller's medical condition and job alternatives. But most important, this finding is based on the letter of July 22, 1987, itself. The first sentence of that letter stated: "I've been informed by Ms. Patterson of Woods rehabilitation that Dr. Kaplan released you to return to work as of 7/10/87." It is noted that R. Ex. 5, which Ms. McKinley testified was the only information she had on July 22, 1987, was an extensive report prepared by Nurse Patterson, and shows Michele McKinley in the "cc" list, from which it is inferred that Ms. Patterson routinely sent these medical evaluations to Ms. McKinley. In the year between August, 1986, and July, 1987, there is no evidence that Ms. Miller had failed to provide HRS with medical documentation concerning her injury as may have been required by HRS, or that HRS had not been satisfied with the reports received from Nurse Patterson and her predecessors. In particular, there is no evidence that during this twelve month period HRS had discussed with Ms. Miller any problem of receipt of medical documentation, or had occasion to warn her that it was her personal responsibility to provide medical documentation, and that her failure to do so would result in loss of her job. Such a warning, it is inferred, would have been appropriate if Nurse Patterson had failed to send medical documentation that had been previously demanded by HRS. In short, during the period from July, 1986, to July, 1987, it must be concluded that whatever system of medical documentation was then required by HRS, if any, was complied with satisfactorily. On July 28, 1986, Ms. Miller was warned by her supervisor that she had a personal responsibility to keep HRS informed concerning her medical condition. The warning on this date was prompted by the fact that HRS was then not receiving medical documentation that it needed. The relevance of this warning with respect to the period of June and July, 1987, is diminished for several reasons. First, this warning occurred a year before, and there is no evidence of any failure in the intervening 12 months by Ms. Miller to satisfy HRS's needs for medical documentation. Further, the July, 1986, incident occurred because Ms. Miller then did not have a rehabilitation nurse assigned to her case, and thus had no medical representative to send medical information to HRS for her. But more important, as discussed in the preceding paragraph, when Nurse Patterson and her predecessors were assigned to Ms. Miller, Ms. Miller relied upon them to send medical information. The system apparently worked, since there is no evidence of a dissatisfaction by HRS with medical documentation after July, 1986, until the letter of July 22, 1987. The medical documentation was still not received by Ms. McKinley on August 10, 1987. Ms. Miller did not report to work in the period from July 22, 1987, to August 10, 1987. On August 10, 1987, HRS by letter notified Ms. Miller that HRS concluded that Ms. Miller had abandoned her position. Ms. Miller did not learn that Ms. McKinley had not received the medical documentation until she received the letter of August 10, 1987. On August 18, 1987, Ms. Miller requested a formal administrative hearing concerning the conclusion that she had abandoned her position.
Recommendation It is therefore recommended that the Department of Administration enter its final order finding that the Petitioner, Tommie Miller, did not abandon her position with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services by being absent from her job for three consecutive workdays without authorized leave. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 17th day of March, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM C. SHERRILL, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of March, 1988. APPENDIX To Recommended Order in Case No. 87-4136 The following are rulings upon proposed findings of fact which have either been rejected or which have been adopted by reference. The numbers used designate the unnumbered paragraphs used by the Petitioner, in sequence. Findings of fact proposed by the Petitioner: Fourth sentence, there is no transcript, and the Hearing Officer's notes do not record the testimony that the medical excuse "indicated that the estimated Date of Return to Duty as unknown." The Hearing Officer has no independent memory of such testimony sufficient to conclude that this proposed finding of fact is true. The same is true with respect to the sentence: "Ms. Miller advised McKinley that she had been to see Dr. Richard P. Newman, M.D. on July 22, 1987." If the record reflected that Ms. Miller so testified, the Hearing Officer would make this finding of fact, since there was no reason to disbelieve Ms. Miller's testimony, and Ms. McKinley testified that she could not remember. Ms. Miller's testimony, as well as Ms. McKinley's testimony, appeared to be honest and straightforward, testifying to the truth both remembered at the time of testifying. The last sentence is not relevant. The first and third sentences are rejected since no one from Woods Rehabilitation Services testified. There is no evidence in the record that Ms. Patterson in writing told Ms. Miller that she advised Ms. McKinley of Ms. Miller's continued disability, and thus that portion of the sixth sentence is rejected. Findings of fact proposed by the Respondent: None. COPIES FURNISHED: Linoria Anthony AFSCME Council 79 345 South Magnolia Drive Suite F-21 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James A. Sawyer, Jr., Esquire District VII Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Suite 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller, Esquire Acting General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Suite 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Edward Willison Carroll, III, is currently eligible for licensure and is licensed in this state as a Credit Life, including Credit Disability Insurance Agent; General Lines - Property, Casualty, Surety and Miscellaneous Lines Agent; General Lines - Motor Vehicle Physical Damage and Mechanical Breakdown Agent; Ordinary Life, including Health Insurance Agent; Health Insurance Agent; and Automobile and Inspection and Warranty Association Salesman. On March 10, 1980, respondent filed a verified application with petitioner for examination as a General Lines Agent (Property, Casualty, and Miscellaneous Lines) . Question number 13 of the application asked the following: Have you ever been charged with or convicted of a felony? If so, complete the following and submit a full and detailed report on a separate sheet. Date Name of Court Address of Court Nature of Charge and Outcome Respondent answered no to this question. On May 28, 1982, respondent filed a verified application with petitioner for examination as an Ordinary Life including Disability Agent. Question number 15 of the application asked the following: Have you ever been charged with or convicted of a felony? If so, complete the following and submit a full and detailed report on a separate sheet. Date Name of Court Address of Court Nature of Charge and Outcome Respondent answered no to this question. Respondent's answers to question 13 on the March 10, 1980, application and question 15 on the March 28, 1982, application were false. On December 11, 1970, the State Attorney for the Second Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida, filed an information with the circuit court which charged that respondent did on December 3, 1970, in Leon County, Florida ... knowingly commit a lewd or lascivious act in the presence of Alice Leigh Divita, a female child under the age of fourteen years, to-wit: of the age of six years, without intent to commit rape upon said child, contrary to Section 800.04, F.S. On March 9, 1971, respondent entered a plea of guilty to the crime of fondling, as charged in the information. The court withheld adjudication of guilty and imposition of sentence, and placed respondent on probation for a period of three years. At hearing, respondent conceded that he had been charged with the aforementioned felony. He averred, however, that his failure to disclose such charge on his applications was not intended to be deceitful but was premised on his belief that he could properly answer no to such inquiries because adjudication of guilty had been withheld. While respondent may reasonably have believed that he could respond in the negative to an inquiry concerning felony convictions, his contention that he held an honest belief that he could also respond in the negative to inquiries about whether the had ever been charged with a felony is not persuasive. But for the foregoing charge, respondent has not been charged or convicted of any other felonies. Nor, has the respondent been shown to have engaged in any improprieties as an insurance agent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered suspending respondent's licensure and eligibility for licensure for three months. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16th day of August, 1988. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of August, 1988. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: 1. Addressed in paragraph 1. 2 & 3. Addressed in paragraph 2. 4 & 5. Addressed in paragraph 3. 6. Addressed in paragraph 5. 7 & 8 Addressed in paragraph 6. 9 & 10. Addressed in paragraphs 7 and 8. 11. Addressed in paragraph 9. 12-14. Rejected as not relevant. COPIES FURNISHED: S. Marc Herskovitz, Esquire Office of Legal Services 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Thomas L. Neilson, Esquire 105 West Fifth Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32303 The Honorable William Gunter State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Don Dowdell, Esquire General Counsel The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue Whether or not Petitioner, pursuant to Rule 6C-770 F.A.C., abandoned her position as a Secretary Specialist, thereby resigning from Florida State University by being absent without leave for three consecutive days.
Findings Of Fact At all times material, Petitioner, Teresa Loewy, was employed as a Secretary Specialist in the Department of Educational Leadership at Florida State University (FSU). On October 22, 1989, Petitioner Loewy reported that she had suffered a head injury as a result of an on-the-job accident. That same day, she was seen at Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center and released. On October 23, 1987, FSU placed Petitioner on administrative leave for 40 hours. Contact was made by Petitioner and her husband, Mr. Samuel Loewy, with Dr. David Leslie, Department Chairman, with Nina Mingledorff, Department Staff Assistant and Petitioner's immediate supervisor, and with Motney Gray, FSU Workers' Compensation Supervisor. The Loewys were informed that a worker's compensation report had been completed and forwarded by the Department to Ms. Gray. This is the first formal step in an employer acknowledging that workers' compensation or medical benefits may be due a worker pursuant to Chapter 440, F.S., "The Florida Workers' Compensation Law." By letter dated November 3, mailed November 5, and received by Petitioner on November 10, 1987, Chairman Leslie informed Petitioner in pertinent part as follows: As you may be aware, you have been on disability leave for a 40 hour work period. Beyond that limit, this office will not certify any additional leave for you unless we receive medical proof that you are unable to return to work. Although you may apply for workers' compensation, I believe that similar proof will be required by that office. Absent any further communication from you and absent proof to the contrary, we assume that you are capable of returning to work and have elected not to do so (R-3). By letter of November 5, 1987, (R-9) Motney Gray notified Petitioner that Ms. Gray's communications with Joe D. Rawlings, M.D. had convinced Ms. Gray that Petitioner was not still impaired and was able to work and that Ms. Gray was terminating workers' compensation medical benefits and Petitioner's disability leave as of that date. By letter dated November 12 and received November 13, 1987, Robert L. Lathrop, Dean of the College, informed Petitioner as follows: Based on Motney Gray's letter of November 5, to you, we are hereby notifying you as of 8:00 a.m. November 6, you have been on unauthorized leave. Because of your unauthorized leave of absence, I am writing this letter to determine your intentions concerning continued employment at Florida State University. You must report for work immediately, or provide your supervisor, Mrs. Nina Mingledorff, with appropriate medical certification by 4:30 p.m., Monday, November 16, or it will be assumed you have voluntarily resigned due to abandonment of your position. (R-1) In response, on November 16, 1987, Mr. Loewy, on behalf of his wife, delivered to the Department a handwritten note from Dr. Rawlings, (R-2) which read: To whom it may concern: Mrs. Teresa Loewy is still under my care for headaches dating back to her injury on 10-22-87. At that point in time, Dr. Rawlings could be accurately characterized as Petitioner's primary treating physician pursuant to Chapter 440, F.S., "The Florida Workers' Compensation Law". Copies of this letter were seen by Nina Mingledorff and by Annette Roberts, FSU Employee Labor Relations Coordinator. On November 17, 1987, Petitioner and Mr. Loewy, together with another couple, visited Petitioner's workplace. Their purpose was to have Petitioner physically on the employment premises to demonstrate that Petitioner was unable to work due to her injury. At that time, the Loewy faction spoke with Annette Roberts, with John Goldinger, Assistant Personnel Director, and with Dean Lathrop. Initially, Petitioner was given a termination letter prepared for the Dean's signature, based upon Petitioner's three consecutive days' absence without prior authorization, which letter was as yet unsigned. However, as a result of the Loewy faction's face-to-face interview with Dean Lathrop, a new memorandum was prepared and actually signed by the Dean. This second communication was addressed to John Goldinger and read as follows: I am hereby authorizing leave of absence for Ms. Teresa A. Loewy beginning November 16, 1987, at 3:00 p.m. and ending no later than 10:00 a.m. on November 20, 1987. The purpose of this leave is to provide time for Mrs. Loewy to secure medical certification that she is unable to drive herself to work. (R-4) The effect of this memorandum, signed by Dean Lathrop and handed to Petitioner, was to supersede his other unsigned/unconsummated correspondence attempting to terminate her under the three days' absence rule. On November 20, 1987, Mr. Loewy obtained a two page letter from Dr. Rawlings (R-6) dated the preceding day. That letter, which Mr. Loewy was unable to pick up at Dr. Rawlings' office in Thomasville, Georgia, until shortly after the 10:00 a.m. November 20 deadline established by Dean Lathrop's November 17 signed memorandum, may be summarized as follows: Dr. Florek, a board certified neurologist had diagnosed Petitioner as having post-concussive syndrome on October 29, 1987. Sometime between November 3 and 6, Dr. Bridges, an opthomologist had diagnosed her eye examination as "essentially within normal limits". With the concurrence of FSU's Motney Gray, Petitioner was scheduled for an MMPI (a psychological assessment), the results of which had not yet been received on the date of Dr. Rawlings' letter, November 19, 1987. She was also scheduled for an MRI (magnetic resonance imaging, a type of x-ray particularly helpful in determining head and soft tissue injuries) which was scheduled for November 24, 1987. Dr. Rawlings confirmed that the Petitioner continued to come to him with the subjective complaints of headaches, blurred vision, and diplopia. The overall tone of his letter is that Dr. Rawlings thought Petitioner could work as of November 19, 1987, although he did not specifically say so. His rather vague summation was, "I have relayed to Mrs. Loewy [on] a number of occasions that I feel this problem will be self limited and that all attempts will be made on my part to not give her any type medication which might be habit forming." (R-6) On his wife's behalf, on November 20, 1987, at approximately 11:30 a.m., Mr. Loewy presented Dr. Rawlings' November 19, 1987 letter in a sealed envelope to Evelyn Ashley, Dean Lathrop's Administrative Assistant, and also gave a copy of it to Nina Mingledorff. Dean Lathrop was not in the workplace that day. During the time he was at Petitioner's workplace on November 20, 1987, Mrs. Ashley presented Mr. Loewy with a request form for a leave of absence without pay. She and others emphasized to him that the completed form must specify a date the Petitioner could return to work, a fact clearly in contention at that point. He was requested to have Petitioner complete the form and return it. He was not told how long Mrs. Loewy would have in which to complete and return the form. From this point forward the testimony is in sharp conflict. It is debatable whether Mr. Loewy was concerned about the effect such a "form" request might have upon his wife's job status or her incipient workers' compensation claim, whether he merely felt she was entitled to leave with pay, or whether he was ever told he could sign the form for his wife. It is clear, however, that Mr. Loewy refused to complete the form on Petitioner's behalf and also refused to take it to her unless he could add a notation to the form that her job would not be jeopardized by requesting such voluntary leave. Having assessed the candor and demeanor of the respective witnesses and the internal and external credibility and consistency or lack thereof of their respective versions of the events and conversations of November 20, 1987, it is found that FSU personnel refused to permit any additions or deletions to the form. They also refused to permit Mr. Loewy to submit a separate explanatory note with regard to the Loewys' position on the subject, even though it was John Goldinger's view at the time of formal hearing that it had always been normal FSU procedure to permit attachments and addendums to other requests for leave without pay. The standard forms requesting leave without pay which were presented by FSU employees to Mr. Loewy therefore were never given to Petitioner, completed by her, or submitted by the Petitioner to the University, although Mr. Loewy was repeatedly told that Petitioner's job would not be held for her unless the forms were filled out and submitted. Dr. Rawlings' November 19 letter (R-6) was not transmitted by his subordinates to Dean Lathrop at or near the time Mr. Loewy submitted it to them. Neither did Chairman Leslie contemporaneously see Exhibit R-6. According to Dr. Leslie, no one below his administrative level had the authority to determine the sufficiency of that "excuse" and the appropriate person to have decided that issue would have been Dean Lathrop. Annette Roberts and John Goldinger agreed that leave requests often went through Dean Lathrop. Although the Dean might not vary duly promulgated rules, the evidence as a whole, including Dean Lathrop's prior informal extension of Petitioner's leave, supports Annette Roberts' assertion that Dean Lathrop had the discretion to either effect the abandonment or increase the grace/leave period he had previously granted Petitioner. Thereafter, Petitioner never did return to work. On Wednesday, November 25, 1987, Dean Lathrop, unaware of the contents of the November 19 letter from Dr. Rawlings, and therefore never having decided on its sufficiency or lack thereof, prepared the following termination letter to Petitioner: You have been absent without leave of absence for 3 or more consecutive workdays . . . [Rule 6C-5.770(2)(a) is quoted] . . . Based on the above stated rule, you are deemed to have resigned from your position. . . effective this date, November 25, 1987 at 10:00 a.m. (R-10) Bracketed material and emphasis provided] It is clear from the foregoing, that regardless of Petitioner's not having submitted any leave without pay request forms, and regardless of Petitioner's nebulous status as to leave after her initial 40 hours disability leave (See Findings of Fact 4-9 supra), Dean Lathrop counted toward implementation of the three days' abandonment rule only the three consecutive "working days" (presumably 24 work hours) elapsing after his own ultimatum time and date of 10:00 a.m., November 20. The Dean's reasoning, as explained by him at formal hearing, was that the Petitioner had not requested a leave of absence. Evelyn Ashley stated that she had told Dean Lathrop both that the doctor's letter (R-6) had been submitted and also that the Dean could do nothing about processing leave for Mrs. Loewy because R-6 had to be attached to a "request for leave form" and that "form" had not been submitted by the Petitioner. Dean Lathrop testified that if he had seen R-6 and still had any doubts of its sufficiency, he probably would have approved leave on the same basis as he had on November 17, at least until he had the opportunity to consult medical personnel further. It was never determined by FSU personnel prior to formal hearing whether the December 19 communication from Dr. Rawlings (R-6) was sufficient under the terms of the Dean's November 17 memorandum granting further leave up to 10:00 a.m., November 20, 1987. As of Friday, November 20, 1987, Petitioner had only 1.7 hours annual leave and 3.5 hours sick leave status to draw upon. After her separation date, Petitioner was paid for 1.7 hours of accrued annual leave; she was not paid for any accumulated sick leave. Subsequently, Petitioner and FSU became embroiled in workers' compensation litigation and entered into a "Stipulation and Joint Petition" which was adopted and approved by an Order of the Deputy Commissioner dated August 8, 1988. (P-3) 1/ Admitted facts found therefrom which are relevant, material, and significant to the instant cause and which are not cumulative to any of the facts found supra, are as follows: . . . She [Petitioner] was scheduled for an MMPI which was done on November 20, 1987. An MRI scan of the brain was done November 23, 1987 and was interpreted as normal. . . . Dr. Bridges examined the Employee [Petitioner herein] on 11/3/87 and found irregular visual fields, more constricted in the right eye, but otherwise normal examination. The employee was then seen by Dr. Thomas J. Perkins who diagnosed occipital syndrome on the right side and recommended treatment by Dr. Seay. . . . The employer/carrier and employee/claimant stipulate and agree that the maximum medical improvement date is April 25, 1988, pursuant to the medical report of Dr. James T. Willis. [Bracketted material provided] It is clear on the record that Motney Gray, FSU's Coordinator for Insurance Risk, informed Dr. Rawlings on several occasions that it was "possible" that workers' compensation would pay for another employee to transport Petitioner from her home in Thomasville, Georgia, to work at FSU in Tallahassee, Florida, but it is not clear that this offer was ever made any more concrete than as a "possibility", and the offer apparently was never made directly to the Petitioner by any representative of FSU. It is clear that, at some point, Dr. Rawlings conveyed this offer to the Petitioner, but it is not clear on the record that this information ever reached Petitioner at any time prior to November 25, 1987 and simultaneously with a period she also was not taking a drug prescribed by some physician. Petitioner was treated, not just by Dr. Rawlings, but by Doctors Florek, Bridges, Seay, Willis, Hogan, and Perkins. At some point in time, Dr. Willis, a chiropractic physician, became Petitioner's primary treating physician. Moreover, it is clear that Dean Lathrop, who was Petitioner's only superior with authority to determine the sufficiency of the letter of certification (R-6), was concerned about Petitioner's ability or inability to drive herself, not whether someone else could or would drive her to work. In addition to the oral communications to Mr. Loewy on November 20, FSU had directly advised Petitioner concerning the general nature of its abandonment rule and of FSU's requirements for prior approval of all leave requests, first by circulating standard informational documents to all employees, and secondly, by its various letters to Petitioner which are described supra. The parties stipulated that in the event abandonment was not proven, any back wages awarded to Petitioner should be subject to all appropriate class pay increases, and should be reduced by the workers' compensation and unemployment compensation already paid to Petitioner, and should be further reduced by any income earned by her.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered: Finding Petitioner has not abandoned her position. Reinstating Petitioner to her position. Ordering payment of backpay and emoluments from November 25, 1987, less unemployment and workers compensation paid by Respondent and less mitigation earnings of Petitioner, pursuant to the parties' stipulation. Denying any attorney's fees. DONE and ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 5th day of October, 1989. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of October, 1989.
The Issue Did Petitioner suffer an adverse employment action as a result of an unlawful discrimination by the Department of Corrections (Department) in violation of Subsection 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made. At times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner was employed at Brevard Correctional Institution and was considered by the Department to be qualified for the position for which he was employed. Petitioner is a male, African-American. On October 24 1994, Petitioner received a Written Reprimand for the abuse of the Department's sick leave policy, which had occurred on October 21, 1994, in that Petitioner, while on authorized sick leave on October 21, 1994, attended the Dorothy Lewis trial, without authorization from the Department. Petitioner presented no evidence to show that the Written Reprimand issued on October 24, 1994, was issued because of Petitioner's race or gender; rather it was issued based on a reasonable belief that Petitioner had abused the Department's sick leave policy by attending the Dorothy Lewis trial while out on official sick leave. Petitioner presented no evidence to support the remaining allegations contained in the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner in this matter.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Commission enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of January, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. _ WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of January, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Hugh F. Brockington, II 19715 Eagles View Circle Umatilla, Florida 32784 Violet Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Gary L. Grant, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Louis A. Vargas, General Counsel Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-6563 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Respondent has been discriminated against on account of her handicap or disability in connection with her termination of employment, in alleged violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Teresa Cavanaugh, was employed by Sprint from 1985 through 2000. During 1999 and 2000, Ms. Cavanaugh held the position of Technical Analyst I, assigned to the Carrier Market’s department at Sprint’s National Access Service Center in Leesburg, Florida. In this position, Ms. Cavanaugh was responsible for assuring that orders for the use of Sprint’s local telephone lines by long distance carriers such at AT&T were processed correctly. Ms. Cavanaugh’s immediate supervisor in this position was Robert Whittaker, the Customer Access Manager. Mr. Whitaker’s immediate supervisor was Jackie Picard, the National Customer Service Manager. On August 26, 1999, the Petitioner was arrested in Marion County, Florida and charged with two third-degree felonies involving obtaining a controlled substance by fraud and possession of a controlled substance. The Petitioner informed Sprint’s house counsel, Susan Stucker, of her arrest on August 31, 1999. Ms. Cavanaugh explained the arrest to Ms. Stucker and Ms. Stucker informed Ms. Cavanaugh that she needed to report the arrest to her supervisor. Ms. Stucker also told the Petitioner that as long as the arrest was not related to work, she would be permitted to continue working for Sprint until such time as there was a disposition of the charges. After speaking with Ms. Stucker, the Petitioner informed Mr. Whitaker of her arrest. The Petitioner testified that Ms. Stucker informed her, in the above-described conversation, that her job would not be affected as long as adjudication was withheld with respect to the criminal charges. Ms. Stucker, however, denied telling that to Ms. Cavanaugh and instead testified that she would never have made such a statement because, pursuant to Sprint’s unwritten policy, convictions for or pleas to felony charges are terminable offenses, regardless of whether adjudication is withheld. Ms. Stucker also told the Petitioner that Sprint’s policy was to that effect in a subsequent conversation. This dispute in testimony is resolved in favor of that given by Ms. Stucker because of the respective demeanor of the witnesses and Ms. Stucker’s undisputed testimony that on at least two other occasions she approved terminations of persons who pled nolo contendere to felony charges. Her testimony was corroborated by documentation regarding the nolo contendere plea of one of the persons whose employment was terminated, Wilson Hinson. In fact, as with Ms. Cavanaugh, Mr. Hinson’s records demonstrate that the court withheld adjudication of guilt regarding the charges against him. Several weeks later, on Friday, September 17, 1999, the Petitioner sent an e-mail to Mr. Whitaker expressing that she was "losing control of her mind," was "spinning out of control," felt "helpless and desperate," was "going over the edge," and needed "some serious help." The Petitioner indicated also that she had an "overwhelming sense of helplessness and hopelessness." Ms. Cavanaugh stated in her e-mail, and in testimony at the hearing, that prior to this incident, she never had felt this way. She further testified that she had no prior history of mental illness. After reading the Petitioner's e-mail, Mr. Whittaker became concerned that Ms. Cavanaugh could be a threat to herself or to co-workers. Based upon this concern, he shared the e-mail with Ms. Picard, and both Mr. Whittaker and Ms. Picard informed the Human Resources Department of Sprint of its contents. Mr. Whitaker, Ms. Picard and Colby Gilson, the Manager of Employee Relations, developed a plan whereby the Petitioner would be placed on paid "crisis leave" and referred to Sprint's Employee Assistance Program (EAP) for evaluation as to her ability to safely perform her job. Mr. Whittaker informed the Petitioner that she was being placed on leave and referred to EAP on the morning of her next scheduled work day, Monday, September 20, 1999. After meeting with Mr. Whittaker, the Petitioner was placed on leave and evaluated by the EAP. The Petitioner informed the psychiatrist who was evaluating her as part of the EAP process that her mood had improved after being placed on leave. The Petitioner was cleared to return to work on a part-time basis in late December 1999 or early January 2000. She was allowed to return to a full-time schedule in late January 2000. On or about June 27, 2000, the Petitioner, on her own initiative, commenced a short-term disability leave. Because the leave was for an alleged mental condition, the Petitioner was asked to undergo an independent medical examination (IME) pursuant to Sprint's standard policy of verifying leaves for conditions that are difficult to review through objective medical evidence (e.g., mental conditions and soft tissue injuries). The Petitioner underwent the IME, which confirmed her need for leave. The Petitioner then remained on leave until October 17, 2000, at which time she returned to work on a part- time basis. She resumed a full-time schedule approximately one week later, on October 23, 2000, with no restrictions on her ability to work. Due to the amount of leave the Petitioner had taken to date, during September and October 2000, Sprint's Benefits Department in Kansas City sent the Petitioner two letters informing her regarding the availability of long-term disability benefits and disability retirement benefits, respectively, should she wish to apply for them. These letters were sent out pursuant to the Benefits department's standard practice of notifying employees who have been out comparable periods of time of the availability of such benefits so as to minimize the potential lapse in benefits should an employee exhaust all of his or her short-term disability leave. After her return from leave, on or about October 31, 2000, the Petitioner told Mr. Whittaker that she was taking what she believed to be a very strong prescription that had been given to her by her doctor. Mr. Whittaker consulted with Mr. Gilson as to whether he needed to take any action in response to this information. Mr. Gilson informed Mr. Whittaker that he should require the Petitioner to provide a note from her doctor indicating whether or not she could continue at work while taking the medication. Mr. Whittaker followed Mr. Gilson's directions and requested that the Petitioner provide a note from her doctor. She submitted such a note to Mr. Whittaker on November 2, 2000. According to that note, the Petitioner was cleared to work with no limitations or restrictions, "as long as she participates in treatment and maintains compliance with medications and scheduled appointments." The Petitioner has not established how any major life activities have been substantially limited by any alleged mental condition. On or about November 29, 2000, the Petitioner informed Mr. Whittaker that her probation officer would be calling him to verify that she worked at Sprint and was coming to work on a regular basis. According to Whittaker, at no time prior to that conversation had the Petitioner informed him of any final disposition of the felony charges filed against her. Mr. Whittaker informed Mr. Gilson of this conversation, and Gilson then asked Stacy Smith, a security investigator, to contact the court in Marion County to determine whether there had been any final disposition of the charges lodged against the Petitioner in August 1999. Mr. Smith, who as part of his regular job duties had been tracking the proceedings against the Petitioner and other Sprint employees subject to criminal charges, contacted the Marion County Clerk's office which provided documents showing that, in October 2000, the Petitioner pled nolo contendere to the two felony charges. The documents Mr. Smith received also showed that the court had withheld adjudication on the basis of that plea. The information Mr. Smith received from the court ultimately was provided to Mr. Gilson, Ms. Stucker, Mr. Whittaker and Ms. Picard. Based upon Sprint's unwritten policy regarding terminations for felony convictions or pleas, Mr. Whittaker recommended the termination of the Petitioner's employment. Ms. Picard concurred with Mr. Whittaker's recommendation, as did Picard's immediate supervisor, Krystal Barr. Mr. Whittaker's recommendation was reviewed by Ms. Stucker, Mr. Gilson, and David Sapenoff, Mr. Gilson's immediate superior. Each of these individuals concurred in the decision to terminate the Petitioner’s employment. On the basis of Mr. Whittaker's recommendation, and the above-mentioned concurrences, the Petitioner's employment was terminated on December 14, 2000. Although the Petitioner claims that she was never told the basis for her termination, both Mr. Whitaker and Ms. Picard testified that the Petitioner was told that she was terminated because of her felony plea. This dispute in testimony is resolved in favor of that of Mr. Whittaker and Ms. Picard, given both the respective demeanor of the witnesses and the fact that the records of the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security indicate that the Petitioner stated in an interview, regarding her entitlement to unemployment compensation benefits, that she was terminated because of her felony conviction.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations denying the Petition in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of February, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of February, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Teresa Cavanaugh 3010 Northeast Seventh Lane Ocala, Florida 34470 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Patrick M. Muldowney, Esquire Akerman Senterfitt Post Office Box 231 Orlando, Florida 32802-0231 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues to be determined in this case are whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based upon a disability in violation of section 760.10(a), Florida Statutes (2017); and, if so, what remedies are appropriate.
Findings Of Fact The original complaint filed with FCHR states in pertinent part: “I am a disabled female. I have been discriminated against based on disability. On 8/17/2017, I told my CEO (Mr. David Yokeum) that I had to leave the office due to my disability. I was feeling dizzy and needed to take my medication. . . . Respondent knew I had a previous injury on my arm/hand and that I couldn’t use my hand in an excessive amount. I re-injured my hand while cleaning and went to the Emergency Room. I was placed on medical leave until I was cleared by Hand Surgeon. . . . I was told I was no longer needed because I couldn’t clean. The Petition for Relief filed after the FCHR’s Determination of No Cause states in pertinent part: “discriminated, treated unfairly due to anxiety disorder; wrongfully demoted to cleaning person resulting in further aggravation of an injury.” No mention of the anxiety disorder appears in the original complaint. Melissa Bruno is a single mother with two sons. Her father, Thomas Tegenkamp, owns a local business in the Sunrise area. Mr. Tegenkamp has enjoyed a long-standing friendship with David Yokeum, the chief executive officer of WCA USA, Inc. (WCA). There was little, if any, evidence presented about WCA, except that Mr. Yokeum was the chief executive officer and that, at the time of Petitioner’s employment, there were approximately 25 employees. At some point, Mr. Yokeum mentioned to Mr. Tegenkamp that his company was looking for an employee for the office.1/ Mr. Tegenkamp told Mr. Yokeum that his daughter was looking for a job. No evidence was presented regarding her qualifications for the job at WCA-–her past training and job experience was as a cosmetologist. It appears from the evidence that she was hired primarily because of her father’s friendship with Mr. Yokeum. Petitioner was hired by WCA in July 2014 as a receptionist. Initially, her duties included answering the phone and the door, ordering supplies, and helping around the office. Her position was a salaried, as opposed to an hourly, position. About four months after Petitioner was hired, she was given responsibility for the UPS program. The UPS program is a billing function that needed to be completed each week, and involved downloading approximately 20,000 lines of data regarding shipping charges, separating the lines by “members,” and invoicing those members for their shipping costs. Matthew West is the regional director of North America for WCA, and has been with the company for approximately six years. He performed the duties related to the UPS program previously, in addition to several other responsibilities, and performed these duties after Petitioner’s departure. He believes that the UPS program can be completed by one person and is not a full-time job. He was not informed by Petitioner or anyone else that Petitioner had any type of disability. Sudkhanueng Bynoe has worked for WCA for 16 years in a variety of capacities, and currently serves as the company’s office manager. She participated in Petitioner’s hiring, and performs the company’s human resources functions. She remembered that, at some point, Petitioner told her that Petitioner had G.A.D. (generalized anxiety disorder), but she was not familiar with the acronym, and Petitioner did not explain what G.A.D. meant. Petitioner did not ask for any modification of her work based on her anxiety. She acknowledged that she did not advise Ms. Bynoe that her generalized anxiety disorder limited her ability to perform tasks, and did not ask for an accommodation. Both Petitioner’s brother and father testified at hearing. When asked at hearing, neither identified any disability from which Petitioner suffered while working at WCA. Both knew she took medication, but did not know what kind of medication or the basis for taking it. Neither identified any activity of daily life that was impaired by any type of disability. In late 2014, Petitioner was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI). She claimed that the reason for the arrest was that she was overmedicated for her anxiety disorder. She notified her employer about the DUI, and had a conference with Mr. Yokeum and Ms. Bynum about the legal requirements she needed to fulfill with respect to the DUI. None of the documents related to the DUI were admitted into evidence, and the specific requirements were not identified. However, it is undisputed that WCA allowed her time off to attend whatever court dates she had, and that she was allowed to come in late and leave early for an unspecified length of time because she needed to get a ride from her father to and from work. Mr. West described Petitioner as someone who tried very hard, and put in a lot of hours. However, her performance was not up to par. The UPS program needed to be completed each week, and her timeline for completion was way too long. She was often as much as a week behind. He recalled her having a couple of “meltdowns” while with the company, but was never informed that she had a disability. In addition to the length of time that it took Petitioner to complete her work each week, she developed a problem with attendance. When she did come to work, she was frequently late, and took lengthy breaks during the day. Mr. West testified that employees started with five vacation days at the beginning of employment, which would progress to ten days. He testified that there was no specific time allotted for personal time in addition to the vacation days. Ms. Bynoe indicated that employees were allotted ten days each year for vacation, and ten PTO (personal time off) days. Respondent believed that she had ten days for vacation and ten days for PTO, for a total of 20 days each year. Assuming that the attendance policy in fact allowed both vacation days and PTO days, Petitioner’s absences exceeded what was allowed. For example, in 2015, Ms. Bruno took nine days of sick leave, 15.5 days of PTO, and nine days of vacation, for a total of 33.5 days. She was allowed to work from home an additional five days, although working from home meant that someone else had to perform her receptionist duties. In 2016, she took 14 days of sick leave, 10.5 of PTO, and nine days of vacation, again for a total of 33.5 days. She came in after 10:00 a.m. an additional six days and worked from home an additional three days (two full days and two half days).2/ Petitioner had hand surgery in June 2016, which accounted for at least some of her absences. In 2017, from January 1 until August 31, Petitioner took six days of sick leave, 6.5 days of personal leave, and one day of vacation. She worked from home on 8.5 days, and was late (coming in after 10:00 a.m.) 13 times. She was also absent from the office an additional 11 days, of which ten were attributed to her suspension as of August 17, 2017. There were two occasions, although the dates were not specified, where Petitioner did not come into work and did not call to say that she would not be coming in. In short, Petitioner was late or absent more times than anyone else in the company. Because of her absenteeism, there was a meeting at some point in 2017 with Ms. Bynoe and another employee, where Ms. Bynoe requested that Petitioner sign in when she came to work and sign out when she left. She was the only employee required to sign in and out, but the procedure was implemented because of her excessive absences that other employees did not share. Petitioner’s absences were related to a variety of problems, including her mother’s passing, an anxiety disorder, dental work, hand surgery in June 2016, a partial hysterectomy, and ovarian cysts. Petitioner also had some issues with one of her sons, which increased her stress. However, the greater weight of the evidence does not indicate that she had a disability as is contemplated under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The evidence also does not establish that Petitioner ever asked for an accommodation based upon a disability. The greater weight of the testimony established that WCA made several attempts to assist her, by having people help her with carrying supplies and allowing her to occasionally work from home, even though that impeded her ability to perform her receptionist duties. In 2017, issues related to Petitioner’s performance came to a head. Mr. West had several discussions with Petitioner during the last six months of her employment, because she was often as much as a week late completing each week’s invoices. She was also often late in the mornings, and while she testified that when she came in after 10:00 a.m., it was because she was picking up supplies for the office, she did not notify her supervisor at the time that that was what she was doing. As noted above, she was allowed to work from home several times during her last year of employment. A few months before her termination, Petitioner came to work with a cast on her arm, and told Mr. West that she had dropped a couch on it at home. She had broken her wrist. However, she did not ask for a less strenuous job because of her hand, and did not ask for help with the UPS program. Other employees helped her with carrying supplies and other manual tasks. Petitioner was aware that she was behind in her work. On August 16, 2017, she spoke directly with Mr. Yokeum and told him she needed additional help. The next morning Petitioner reported to work, but had to leave for the day shortly after she started, because she was dizzy and “twitching,” and was afraid it would evolve into a panic attack. Once again, Petitioner texted Mr. Yokeum to advise him of her absence and the reason she had to leave the office. Mr. Yokeum was not her direct supervisor. On August 17, 2017, Petitioner was advised by letter from Mark Mairowitz, WCA’s Executive Vice President, that she was being suspended from the office until at least September 1, 2017, due to her office attendance. The letter she received states in part: Hello Melissa David Yokeum called me to his office this morning to express his displeasure at your office attendance record as he has grown very concerned. Because of his relationship with your father, he has asked me, as WCA Executive Vice President, to interact with you and to let you know that you are NOT to contact David from now on. He has no desire to hurt your family and so he has turned all matters regarding your employment over to me. Again, you are NOT to contact David in any way. Doing so will jeopardize your continued employment at WCA. You are only to deal with me from this day forward. Your attendance record has been examined by David and myself and we find a disturbing pattern of absence, with far more days/hours out of the office than other WCA employees. We are concerned for your health and your safety in getting to and from the office and before you can return to the office, you will be required to undergo a complete medical evaluation/examination and obtain a “clean bill of health” letter from a physician before you can return to work. Furthermore, as David will be out of the office until September 1st, he prefers you NOT be in the office until his return. So, consider yourself on suspension until that date. Mr. Mairowitz’s letter also requested that Ms. Bruno return her office computer and cell phone until she was reinstated, and advised her that her salary would be unaffected by the suspension. However, it is unclear from the letter what health issue Mr. Mairowitz is referencing. In early September 2017, Ms. Bruno returned to the office. At this time, she was relieved of her responsibilities related to the UPS program and reassigned to cleaning in addition to stocking the office and breakroom. The cleaning consisted of vacuuming, mopping the floor, and taking out the trash. From management’s point of view, this assignment would allow her to have flexible hours and less responsibility, while not suffering any reduction in pay. From Petitioner’s point of view, the change in job responsibilities was demeaning and humiliating, and meant to embarrass her. Ms. Bruno cleaned the office once, over Labor Day weekend, and did not do so again. She testified that after cleaning the office that weekend, she experienced significant pain in her hand and had to go to the emergency room to have it examined. While she testified that the emergency room sent her home with a work release for two days or until cleared by her hand surgeon, no documentation from the emergency room was submitted at hearing, and no evidence was submitted to demonstrate that the emergency room records were provided to WCA.3/ Ms. Bruno advised Mark (presumably Mark Mairowitz) that she hurt her hand and could not clean the office the way it needed to be cleaned. She did not report back to work at WCA. There was some testimony that the office was closed for a period in September related to a hurricane that hit the area, but there was no evidence as to how many days the office was closed. Petitioner’s employment was terminated as of September 29, 2017. Petitioner saw her hand surgeon on or about September 26, 2017. She submitted documentation from the Vanguard Aesthetic Plastic Surgery which is, for the most part, illegible, but is clear enough to confirm that she was seen as a patient and received some instructions. She did not report to Ms. Bynoe that she had gone to the emergency room, and did not inform her that she was unable to perform work cleaning and organizing the office because of her hand or because of any other disability. Petitioner did not testify that she was unable to perform the duties of cleaning and organizing the office because of her G.A.D. Petitioner did not establish by the greater weight of the evidence that she has a disability. However, she did establish that toward the end of her employment, WCA perceived her as having some sort of disability, as evidenced by Mr. Mairowitz’s letter to her requesting that she get a doctor’s clearance to return to work. Despite evidence that there were concerns, it is not at all clear whether WCA’s perception is based upon problems with her hand or problems caused by her anxiety disorder. Petitioner did not establish by the greater weight of the evidence that she requested an accommodation from her employer based on a disability. Likewise, she did not establish that WCA ever denied a request from Petitioner for an accommodation. Petitioner did not establish that WCA treated persons without a disability differently. No evidence was presented regarding any employee with a similar position and a similar attendance history, much less that such a person was treated differently than Petitioner. If anything, the evidence supports the view that WCA went to great lengths to accommodate Petitioner, in large part because of her father’s relationship with Mr. Yokeum.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Relief be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of January, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of January, 2019.