The Issue The issue in the case is whether the Respondent is quilty of the violation alleged in the Administrative Complaint; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent was certified by the Commission on February 28, 1992, and was issued Law Enforcement certificate number 122723. (Stipulation) The Respondent was employed as a Special Agent for the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, from September 13, 1991, to October 18, 1996. (Stipulation) Kenneth Hunter is employed as a deputy sheriff with the Leon County Sheriff's Office, and has been so employed since July 5, 1989. Deputy Hunter has known the Respondent since 1991, when they attended law enforcement academy together. Deputy Hunter and the Respondent kept in touch over that period of time. On June 17, 1995, at approximately 9:00 a.m., the Respondent called Deputy Hunter at his residence. The Respondent told Deputy Hunter that the Respondent's brother, Reverend Gregory James, had been beaten up by Colby Richardson, and that Richardson had stolen some money from his brother, a local minister. The Respondent told Deputy Hunter that the amount stolen was $1,500.00. Some of the money which was taken was money which Reverend James had withdrawn intending to give it to the Respondent. The Respondent stated to Hunter that the prior evening he had spoken to Colby Richardson, and that Mr. Richardson had agreed to return the money taken from Reverend James. The Respondent asked Deputy Hunter to accompany him to Quincy, Florida, to find Richardson. When Respondent called Hunter, the Respondent was on his way to Pensacola, Florida, for a professional course, and was driving his state-issued vehicle which was equipped with a police radio and strobe light. The Respondent picked up Deputy Hunter at Hunter's residence, and introduced Hunter to Reverend James, who was riding in the back seat of the vehicle. Deputy Hunter asked the Respondent why his brother had not reported the robbery, and the Respondent stated that his brother was well known in the community, and did not want to make "a big stink" about it. The Respondent, Deputy Hunter, and Reverend James traveled to Quincy, Florida. While in Quincy, the Respondent spoke to two females who knew Mr. Richardson, and gave the Respondent the telephone number of Mr. Richardson's girlfriend, Rosilyn Copeland. The Respondent telephoned Ms. Copeland and asked for and received directions to her residence. The Respondent, Respondent's brother, and Deputy Hunter traveled to Ms. Copeland's residence in Quincy, Florida. The Respondent knocked on the door, and when Ms. Copeland answered the door, introduced himself as "Agent James," and introduced Deputy Hunter as "Officer Hunter." The Respondent was wearing black pants, a black polo shirt, and a black baseball cap. A conflict in the testimony exists regarding whether the Respondent, who was wearing a badge on a chain around his neck, removed his Special Agent badge from beneath his shirt and showed it to Ms. Copeland. Ms. Copeland later believed that the Respondent was a law enforcement officer who was looking for Mr. Richardson to recover money Mr. Richardson had stolen from Respondent's brother. The Respondent testified at hearing, and stated he was wearing a black shirt on the day in question, and his badge could have been visible. Deputy Hunter gave a statement to the investigator. It is noted that Hunter was also outside his jurisdiction and was the subject or the potential subject of an investigation into his activities in association with the Respondent during this incident. Hunter stated that he never identified himself to anyone they met, and that the Respondent identified himself as “Agent James” and him as “Deputy Hunter.” Hunter stated that he informed the Respondent that it was inappropriate to introduce themselves as officers, and told him not to do that. The Respondent continued to talk with Ms. Copeland about Mr. Richardson's location, and Ms. Copeland told them that she had driven Mr. Richardson to his mother's house. The Respondent asked Ms. Copeland how he could get in touch with Mr. Richardson, and she stated that she would call Mr. Richardson. Ms. Copeland contacted Mr. Richardson on the telephone, and the Respondent, who was standing outside, entered the apartment and took the telephone from Ms. Copeland. The Respondent talked to Mr. Richardson and told him that he had better give back the money. The Respondent told Deputy Hunter to talk to Mr. Richardson. Mr. Richardson stated to Hunter that he wanted to return the money, but was worried about what would happen to him. Deputy Hunter informed Mr. Richardson that nothing would happen to him, and that they only wanted the money back. Mr. Richardson stated that he didn't have all of the money, but would have it by 1:00 p.m. The Respondent gave Mr. Richardson a pager number with which to get in touch with him when Richardson had the money. The Respondent, his brother, and Hunter left Copeland’s, and drove to the residence of Bruce (last name unknown), where the robbery had occurred. Bruce was not there when they arrived, but they met Bruce driving up as they drove away. In the conversation that followed, the Respondent identified himself as Agent James. The Respondent was confrontational with Bruce and accused him of setting his brother up. Bruce denied having been involved, but Hunter was suspicious of Bruce’s version of events. Deputy Hunter told the Respondent that the facts did not sound right, and that they should report the matter to local law enforcement. The Respondent, Deputy Hunter and Reverend James went to the local police department; however, they were advised that the Gadsden County sheriff had jurisdiction. They did not seek assistance from the sheriff's department because of a personal conflict between Respondent's brother and the watch officer at the sheriff's department. Thereafter, the Respondent called Ms. Copeland to find out where Mr. Richardson was living. The Respondent, Reverend James, and Deputy Hunter traveled to the area known as Coon Bottom in the vicinity of State Road 12 in Gadsden County looking for Mr. Richardson. They encountered three boys, and the Respondent identified himself as Agent James. He asked them if they knew where Mrs. Richardson lived, and the boys pointed out her house. The Respondent, Respondent's brother, and Deputy Hunter went to her house and asked her where her son, Colby, was. When she asked why they wanted to know, the Respondent identified himself as "Agent James" and stated that they were looking for Colby. Ms. Richardson stated that she did not know where he was. Deputy Hunter wrote the Respondent's beeper number on the back of his (Hunter's) business cards, gave it to Ms. Richardson, and they left. Later that day, when Colby did not contact them, Deputy Hunter again suggested to the Respondent and Reverend James that they report the offense to the local sheriff. They obtained the mobile number of an investigator with the local Sheriff's Office. Reverend James dialed the number and handed the phone to Deputy Hunter who advised the sheriff investigator of the information as he knew it. On March 18, 1996, eight months after the incident, the Respondent gave a sworn statement to Internal Inspector John W. Harris of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation. Prior to giving his statement, the Respondent was allowed to review the statements previously given by Ms. Copeland and Deputy Hunter. The Respondent was placed under oath and notified that giving a false statement under oath constituted perjury. The Respondent stated to the investigator that he was in Tallahassee on June 17, 1995, on his way to a Narcotics Investigations Identification school in Pensacola. The Respondent stated that he and Deputy Hunter traveled to Quincy in his state vehicle to find the individual identified as Colby Richardson, who had robbed his brother. The Respondent stated that he was driving his police car, carrying his weapon and wearing his badge around his neck. Respondent stated they went to Colby Richardson's girlfriend's house, and that he introduced himself as "James" and that he introduced Deputy Hunter as "Hunter." When the Respondent was asked if he introduced himself as "Agent James" to Ms. Copeland, he stated, "No, I just said James." When asked if he had shown Ms. Copeland a badge, he stated, "No, I can't recall showing her a badge." When he was again asked if he reached inside his shirt and pulled out his badge to show her, he stated, "No, not that I can recall." The Respondent was asked if he showed his badge to anyone while he was near Colby Richardson's mother's house. The Respondent stated that he did not show his badge to the juveniles nor to Ms. Richardson. Respondent admitted that he wore his badge on a chain around his neck, and that he had it on his neck when he was talking to Ms. Copeland. The Respondent believes that Ms. Copeland knew that he was wearing a badge because she could see the outline of the badge under his shirt. There is no evidence and it is not alleged that Respondent knew at the time of the incident that his brother had not been robbed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent be found guilty of failure to maintain good moral character, as required by Subsection 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, (1995), and that Respondent's certifications be suspended for a period of twelve months and until he presents evidence to the commission that he has taken such courses as the commission may direct on professional responsibility. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of December, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of December, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard D. Courtemanche, Jr., Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Theodore E. Mack, Esquire Powell & Mack 803 North Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner should revoke, suspend or otherwise discipline Respondent’s certification as a law enforcement officer pursuant to Section 943.1395(7), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner issued Certificate Number 91034 to Respondent on August 24, 1984. At all times material to this matter, Respondent worked as a patrolman for the City of Chiefland Police Department. During the last couple months of his active duty service, he was training to become a K-9 officer. In 1993, Petitioner issued a letter of guidance to Respondent and placed him on one year of probation after Respondent admitted that he had engaged in sex while on duty. On March 17, 1994, Henry W. Nicholson became Chief of Police in the City of Chiefland. In the summer of 1994, Michelle Hallman (formerly Michelle King) worked at ABC Pizza. She was eighteen years old at that time. On days that she was not working, Michelle sometimes went to ABC Pizza to help the other employees close up. On one such evening, Ms. Hallman met Respondent and Officer Hicks in the ABC Pizza Parking lot. They had a casual conversation in which Ms. Hallman joked that she would tell the Chief that Respondent had pinched her on the butt. Respondent laughed and replied that he would tell the Chief that Ms. Hallman dropped on her knees and begged. Respondent also told Ms. Hallman that he did not need that kind of trouble again. The Chief pulled into the parking lot while Ms. Hallman was talking to Respondent and Officer Hicks. The Chief needed to let Respondent know that he was not planning to go to K-9 training with Respondent that evening. About a month later, on June 10, 1994, Respondent was patrolling near a community center known as the Pine Land Center. He saw Ms. Hallman riding by in her car. He and Ms. Hallman pulled their respective cars into the parking lot of the community center and had another casual conversation. During this conversation, Ms. Hallman asked Respondent if he ever messed around. Respondent replied that because of his past problems he never went out with anyone unless the girl asked him. The next evening, June 11, 1994, Respondent began his shift at 6:00 p.m. He was scheduled to work a twelve hour shift. Early in the evening, Respondent saw Deputy Meeks, a deputy with the sheriff’s office. They agreed to eat supper together at the Subway around 11:00 p.m. As the evening progressed, Respondent answered several calls. Between 8:30 and 9:00 p.m. Respondent responded to a call involving a dog bite. After completing the matter involving the dog bite, Respondent saw Ms. Hallman at or near the Circle K. She told him she wanted to talk to him. They agreed to meet at a small public park known as Delma Lock. The park was near a school and a football field. A baseball game was in progress at a baseball field located between the Circle K and the park. The area of the park in which Respondent and Ms. Hallman met was dimly lit. Even so, Ms. Hallman felt like there were too many people around the park or driving by that might recognize her. Respondent suggested they go to the police station. Respondent parked his patrol car in front of the police station. When Ms. Hallman arrived she parked on the side of the building. They went in the side door and into Respondent’s office. There was no other person present in the building. Ms. Hallman told Respondent that she had been a witness to an automobile accident earlier in the day. Respondent and Ms. Hallman had been in his office just a few minutes when Deputy Meeks knocked on the back door of the police station. Respondent opened the door for Deputy Meeks who was ready to go to the Subway for supper. While Respondent and Deputy Meeks were eating their sandwiches at the Subway, Ms. Hallman came in to get a sandwich for a friend of hers. She carried on a brief conversation with Respondent. Sometime around midnight, Respondent spent a few minutes at the Midtown Jiffy visiting with a friend of his, Joan Schubert. From 12:46 to 12:56 a.m., Respondent checked on the alarm at the Senior Citizens Center. Respondent next saw Ms. Hallman near the Circle K. They agreed to meet back at the Delma Lock park. Once again there were too many people at the park for Ms. Hallman to be comfortable. Respondent suggested they meet at the Department of Transportation building. He told Ms. Hallman how to find the building. Ms. Hallman arrived at the designated building first. Respondent pulled into the driveway and told her to follow him. They drove behind the building and parked. Both of them got out of their cars. The area was well lit, but cars from the highway in front could not see what was going on. Respondent took off his gun belt and dropped his pants. Ms. Hallman dropped her shorts. They had sexual intercourse standing up and leaning against the trunk of Ms. Hallman’s car. After having sex, Respondent heard a radio call for Deputy Meeks to respond to a disturbance at Levy Norris’s house. The call originated around 1:35 a.m. The dispatcher explained that the Norris residence was across the road from the Catholic church and down an unpaved road beside Thompson’s garage. Respondent knew that Deputy Meeks was making the final loop of his patrol before going off duty at 2:00 a.m. Respondent was out of breath when he got to his radio. He called Deputy Meeks on the radio and asked him where he was coming from. Deputy Meeks replied that he was in Rosewood which was at least ten miles away. Respondent said that he was “right here at the church.” Respondent asked Deputy Meeks whether he should wait or go on to the Norris residence. Deputy Meeks told Respondent to go ahead and gave Respondent directions. Respondent left Ms. Hallman in the parking lot of the Department of Transportation building. She did not see him again. Respondent was enroute to the Norris residence by 1:38 a.m. He arrived on the scene at 1:42 a.m. It took him four minutes to get there. The Catholic church was used as a landmark to identify the road on which Levy Norris lived. It is located in the same vicinity as the Department of Transportation building where Respondent met Ms. Hallman. Later in June of 1994, Ms. Hallman went to Chief Nicholson to complain that another of his officers made derogatory comments about her which caused her to lose a prior job. Ms. Hallman said the same officer was attempting to get her fired from her current job by making derogatory remarks about her to her employer. In the course of investigating this complaint, Chief Nicholson learned that Respondent may have had an affair with Ms. Hallman. Chief Nicholson called Ms. Hallman and requested that she come to his office. At that meeting, Ms. Hallman denied that she and Respondent had sex. A day or two later, Ms. Hallman returned to Chief Nicholson’s office. She admitted that she had sex with Respondent. Respondent never included his interaction with Ms. Hallman in his duty log. Respondent gave sworn statements to Chief Nicholson on June 24, 1994 and July 1, 1994. When questioned, Respondent knowingly made false statements to mislead Chief Nicholson about his relationship with Ms. Hallman. Chief Nicholson concluded his internal investigation and decided to terminate Respondent’s employment. Chief Nicholson advised Respondent of his decision in a memorandum dated July 6, 1994 and received by Respondent’s counsel on July 25, 1994. The Chiefland City Commission, sitting as the City Personnel Review Board, conducted a hearing on August 29, 1997. Respondent’s employment with the City of Chiefland was terminated effective September 6, 1994.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is recommended that Petitioner enter a Final Order revoking Respondent’s law enforcement certification. DONE AND ORDERED this 8th day of April, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of April, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul D. Johnston, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Joan Stewart, Esquire 300 East Brevard Street Tallahassee, FL 32301-1218 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Michael Ramage, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Jose Iglesias (Petitioner or Iglesias) is entitled to attorney's fees and costs from the Complainant/Respondent, Robert Nieman (Respondent or Nieman), pursuant to Section 112.317(8), Florida Statutes (2004).
Findings Of Fact On August 14, 2003, the Respondent executed a Complaint that was filed with the Ethics Commission against the Petitioner. The Complaint alleged: Vice Mayor Iglesias is constantly interfering with Police Department’s day-to- day operations, and spreading false rumors about Police Department personnel. (Document #1) Vice Mayor Iglesias is causing a hostile work environment with constant complaints about officers. Vice Mayor Iglesias is constantly encouraging racism, pitting hispanics against white and black officers of the Department. Vice Mayor Iglesias filed false police reports (verbally) constantly for his own gain and benefits. Vice Mayor Iglesias’s 16-year-old son works part time in Town Hall. (Nepotism) Vice Mayor Iglesias improper use of his title by instructing the Town Manager to take actions on the police department, and even retaliation against the Police Chief and myself. Vice Mayor Iglesias ordered public records about himself not to be released, and then when they were released he insisted the secretary releasing the records be fired. (Document #1) Mr. Iglesias is falsely using the title of M.D. and in fact used this title to gain his seat on the council and then becoming Vice Mayor. When Mr. Iglesias has been questioned on this matter by residents in the past he has stated he was a brain surgeon, a foot doctor, and a chiropractor, and could not list a hospital where he did his residency to become M.D. (Document #2) At all times material to this case the Petitioner was Vice Mayor serving on the Town’s governing council. As such, the Petitioner was subject to the ethics provisions governed by the Ethics Commission. The Respondent is a town employee and serves as a police sergeant within the police department. Mr. Nieman has been so employed for over 20 years. After an investigation of three of the allegations set forth in the Complaint (only three were deemed legally sufficient to warrant investigation) and consideration of the Advocate’s recommendation, the Ethics Commission entered a Public Report on March 16, 2004. The Public Report dismissed the Complaint and closed the matter. On April 14, 2004, the Petitioner filed the instant Fee Petition pursuant to Section 112.317(8), Florida Statutes (2004). The Fee Petition alleged that the Complaint “is based on eight allegations, all of which are false and were known to be false by Complainant when he filed the Complaint.” Additionally, the Fee Petition stated the Complaint “was filed by the Complainant with the knowledge the Complaint contained one or more false allegations, or with reckless disregard as to whether the Complaint contained false allegations. ” At hearing, the Petitioner presented evidence as to the three allegations of the Complaint that were investigated and deemed legally sufficient to require an ethics investigation. Those allegations were: whether the Petitioner had filed false police reports for his personal benefit; whether the Petitioner had attempted to prevent the release of a public record or insisted on the firing of the person who had released the record; and whether the Petitioner had caused his son to be employed by the Town. The false police reports allegation stemmed from the Petitioner’s use of public roads for rollerblading. The Petitioner is an avid rollerblader and likes to rollerblade for exercise. The Petitioner opined that rollerblading puts less stress on his back and has less impact than jogging. The Petitioner frequently rollerblades on the public road within the Town. Automobile traffic on the road must go around the Petitioner in order to pass. It is the Petitioner’s position that since there is no sidewalk or shoulder suitable to rollerblade, he is entitled to use the road surface just as a pedestrian might use the road surface. The Petitioner skates toward the middle of the lane and not on the edge of the road surface because the roadway is better there for the rollerblades. The record in this case does not clarify whether the Petitioner skates with or against the traffic. In connection with the rollerblading, the Respondent believes that the Petitioner is not entitled to use the road as he does and that if the Petitioner did not use his position as a councilman for influence, he would be cited for rollerblading down the road as he does. Further, the Respondent maintains that the Petitioner has made verbal complaints against motorists who passed too close to him. The Respondent maintains that the verbal complaints are false in that the Petitioner is not entitled to use the roadway as he does and therefore cannot complain against motorists as he does. The Petitioner does not deny the activity. The Respondent has observed the Petitioner rollerblading down the road. The Respondent has not issued a citation to the Petitioner because he is assigned an administrative position within the police department and he believes he is not allowed to issue such citations. The Respondent based the allegation regarding this claim upon statements he has heard from police officers within the Town’s police department. The Respondent did not subpoena the officers to the hearing because he did not want to involve other Town employees in the matter. The Respondent does not have any evidence to support the allegation other than what he believed he had been told in his experience as a police officer for the Town. The record does not demonstrate any written record of either the Petitioner being cited for improper rollerblading or making a report against a vehicle. As to the second allegation that was investigated, a memo purportedly from the chief of police was released to a member of the public by accident. It was included within a stack of documents that had been requested by a private citizen. The document stated in part: SUBJECT: Ethics violations and continual interference of day-to-day police operations by the Vice Mayor Iglesias This memorandum is to inform you [Mayor Michael Addicott] of constant harassment of police personnel and interference in daily operations by the new vice mayor. The Petitioner admitted that he was concerned that the document had been released in error and that the person who wrongly released a document should be disciplined. The Petitioner did not know about the document before it was released. He did not attempt to prevent the release of the document. Instead, the Petitioner sought to, after-the-fact find out why the document had been released, if the document was in fact a public record subject to release, and if the employee should be disciplined for the release. The document in question was a public record, was subject to public release, and the employee was not disciplined for its release. Nevertheless, the Petitioner did require a second (and arguably third opinion) regarding whether the document constituted a public record. In the meanwhile, the controversy within the Town over whether the document should have been released was widely discussed among Town employees. The Respondent filed his claim based upon several reports that the Petitioner wanted the secretary who released the report fired. One of the Respondent’s sources was the Chief of Police. The Respondent did not question the veracity of the police chief. At hearing, the Petitioner did not deny that discipline would have been appropriate if the release of the document were shown to be erroneous. The Petitioner acknowledged that the Town pursued a full review of the matter and that he was among those who called for the review. As to the third allegation (that the Petitioner caused his son to be hired by the Town), the Respondent believed that once the Petitioner was elected as a councilman that the son was not eligible to work for the Town. The Respondent thought that rules prohibiting nepotism applied to the Petitioner’s son and that as such the son could not continue to work for the Town. The Respondent based this interpretation on a general but un- researched idea about nepotism. He also discussed this matter with another Town employee who also thought the son was not eligible to work for the Town. In fact, the Petitioner’s son, Joseph, started working for the Town in a part-time position prior to the Petitioner being elected to office. After the Petitioner became Vice Mayor, the son continued with his duties but was moved from an independent contractor status to part-time employee status. The son then received a raise in his hourly rate of pay when the Town employees also received a raise. The Petitioner did not supervise the son’s employment and did not direct the son’s work. The record is unclear as to whether the Petitioner voted on the pay raise or not. At hearing the Respondent maintained that he had had numerous conversations with persons at the Ethics Commission who recommended that he add the information regarding the nepotism claim to his allegations. He admitted that he did not independently check any laws or rules that might pertain to nepotism before filing the claim. Much of the Respondent’s attitude and comments in connection with the Petitioner must be viewed in the context of the happenings within the Town. For unknown reasons, the Town, its employees, and the governing council were in a state of change and confrontation. The Respondent and the Petitioner apparently do not relate well to one another personally. The Respondent is suspicious of the Petitioner’s medical credentials and is uncertain as to why the Petitioner holds himself out as an “M.D.”, when he is not licensed nor is he eligible to be licensed as a medical doctor. The Petitioner believes the Respondent holds some animosity toward him for unknown reasons. Further, because the Respondent admitted he believes the Petitioner is arrogant, that belief somehow that demonstrates malice toward the Petitioner. The questions of whether the Petitioner is credentialed to be a medical doctor, whether the Petitioner attempted to interfere with the police department, or whether the Petitioner spread false rumors regarding the police department were not investigated and do not support, if true, an ethics violation. If attorney's fees and costs are entered in this cause the beneficiary of an award will be the Town. The Petitioner has incurred no expenses or costs associated with the defense of the Complaint. The Town agreed to pay and has paid all attorney's fees and costs associated with this case. The Petitioner presented several invoices from the Law Offices of Stuart R. Michelson that were alleged to pertain to the instant case. The Petitioner also presented testimony from an expert witness who was to be paid by the Town. That witness, an attorney, was to be paid $200.00 per hour for his efforts in this matter. Although the Petitioner’s expert testified that the hourly rates for fees applied in this cause were reasonable, there was no evidence that the time was actually expended in connection with the instant case. There is no way to know if the services were performed for the defense against the Respondent’s Complaint. The expert merely opined that the invoices he reviewed were reasonable. He maintained that the Petitioner should recover $27,455.53 in this matter.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the Fee Petition in this case. S DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of June, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of June, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Kaye Starling, Agency Clerk Commission on Ethics 3600 Maclay Boulevard, South, Suite 201 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phillip C. Claypool, General Counsel Commission on Ethics 3600 Mclay Boulevard, South, Suite 201 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Bonnie J. Williams, Executive Director Commission on Ethics 3600 Mclay Boulevard, South, Suite 201 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 James J. Birch, Esquire Law Office of Stuart R. Michelson 200 Southeast 13th Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Robert Nieman 9731 Southwest 12th Street Pembroke Pines, Florida 33026
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed employment discrimination against Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Peruvian South American Indian and Hispanic. He is also a Spanish speaker, although he speaks English fluently. Respondent owns and operates a chain of grocery stores. Petitioner worked at Respondent's store in Fort Lauderdale from December 1992 until he was terminated in August 2005. Petitioner started as a produce clerk and, at the time of his termination, he had worked his way up to produce manager. He had been employed as a produce manager of the Fort Lauderdale store since April 2002. Petitioner enjoyed a good reputation among his coworkers. He was fair and a good manager. He enjoyed good rapport with customers and employees. Petitioner's employment record was unblemished except for one incident prior to the subject incident. On February 17, 2005, Petitioner received an Unsatisfactory Work Warning for misuse of Respondent's email system and inappropriate communication. Petitioner was one of several employees disciplined at this time for this offense. Under well-established and uniformly enforced rules, Respondent maintained a policy of terminating any employee who received any discipline within six months after receipt of an Unsatisfactory Work Warning. On August 3, 2005--which is within six months of February 17, 2005--Petitioner was approached by an employee whom he supervised. The employee asked Petitioner for an evaluation. Petitioner complied, informing the employee that his work merited a raise, but no money was available at the time for raises. The employee took his request to Petitioner's supervisor, who conducted a meeting with the employee and Petitioner. During the meeting, she explained Respondent's policy about raises, correcting the mistaken understanding of Petitioner that raises were not presently available. She approved the employee for a raise. The meeting was amicable and ended in this fashion. Later in the day of the meeting, Petitioner approached the employee, playfully tapped him with a small bundle of wire wraps used to bind produce, and asked him, jokingly, why he was trying to get Petitioner into trouble. The employee felt intimidated about the incident and reported it to Respondent's supervisor. Respondent has no tolerance for workplace behavior that may be perceived as intimidating to its employees. Based on this policy, Respondent determined that it was necessary to discipline Petitioner for the incident with the employee. But for the prior incident involving the company email system, Respondent would not have terminated Petitioner. However, because the second incident occurred within six months of the earlier warning, Respondent, consistent with its policy, terminated Petitioner. There is no evidence whatsoever that Respondent terminated Petitioner due to his race or national origin. Although the reason for terminating him does not withstand much scrutiny, it is abundantly clear that the cited reason for termination does not mask an unlawful basis for termination.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of June, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Alan D. Jimenez 820 Northeast 19th Terrace Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33304 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jennifer L. Price, Esquire Stearns, Weaver, Miller, Weissler Alhadeff & Sitterson, P.A. 200 East Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 2100 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301
The Issue Whether Respondent is guilty of having obtained a real estate license by fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(m), Florida Statutes (2004). Whether Respondent is guilty of failure to comply with Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-2.027(2), and, therefore, is in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2004).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to Section 20.165 and Chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes (2004). At all times material, Respondent was a licensed Florida real estate sales associate, issued license number 3019284 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes (2004). Petitioner has jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings for the Florida Real Estate Commission (Commission). Petitioner is authorized to prosecute administrative complaints against licensees within the Commission's jurisdiction. On or about August 6, 2001, Respondent submitted to Petitioner an application for licensure as a real estate salesperson. Respondent signed a sworn affidavit on the application which indicated that Respondent carefully read the application, answers, and the attached statements, if any, and that all such answers and statements were true, correct, and complete to his knowledge without any evasions or mental reservations. Question 9 on the application asks: Have you ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no Contest), even if adjudication was withheld: This question applies to a violation of the laws of any municipality, county, state or nation, including traffic offenses (but not parking, speeding, inspection, or traffic signal violations), without regard to whether you were placed on probation, had adjudication withheld, paroled, or pardoned. If you intend to answer "NO" because you believe those records have been expunged or sealed by court order pursuant to Section 943.058, Florida Statutes, or applicable law of another state, you are responsible for verifying the expungement or sealing to answering "NO." If you answered "Yes," attach the details including dates and outcome, including any sentence and conditions imposed, in full on a separate sheet of paper. Your answer to this question will be checked against local, state and federal records. Failure to answer this question accurately could cause denial of licensure. If you do not fully understand this question, consult with an attorney or the Division of Real Estate. Respondent marked the "Yes" box on the application in response to this question and provided insufficient or no explanation for the incidents in his criminal history. Respondent signed the "Affidavit of Applicant." Respondent's signature was duly notarized, and the application was submitted. Relying on Respondent's incomplete representations, Petitioner issued Respondent a Florida real estate salesperson's license. Petitioner subsequently performed a background check and discovered the following: In 1998, Respondent was adjudicated guilty of DUI. In 1987, Respondent was adjudicated guilty of possession of a controlled substance. In 1986, Respondent was adjudicated guilty of driving under the influence of liquor. In 1985, Respondent was adjudicated guilty of driving a motor vehicle while his license was suspended. In 1985, Respondent was adjudicated guilty of simple assault and battery. Respondent failed to include the above-mentioned adjudications on his application for licensure. Petitioner's Exhibits 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 are copies of court documents demonstrating that Respondent was adjudicated guilty in each unreported offense. Respondent testified that he failed to report the adjudications until August 20, 2003. However, Respondent's reporting of the adjudications occurred after Petitioner discovered them and prompted Respondent to explain.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order declaring Respondent has been found guilty of violating Subsection 475.25(1)(m), Florida Statutes (2004), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-2.027(2), and, therefore, Subsection 475.25(1)(c), Florida Statutes, as charged in the Administrative Complaint, and suspending Respondent's license until June 30, 2005, and requiring that Respondent pay a $1,000 fine. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of June, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM R. PFEIFFER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of June, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: James P. Harwood, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Hurston Building North Tower Suite 801N 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Michael G. Nichola, Esquire 800 North Ferncreek Avenue Orlando, Florida 32803 Leon Biegalski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Juana Watkins, Acting Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 802, North Orlando, Florida 32801
Recommendation By reasons of the foregoing Facts and Conclusions of Law, I recommend that the Respondent's license be revoked. DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of August, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675
The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner's application for licensure should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner filed an application with the Department requesting to be licensed as a credit life or credit disability agent, a credit property agent, and a credit agent. Petitioner answered in the negative to question numbered 3, which provides as follows: Have you ever been charged, convicted, found guilty, or pleaded guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) to a crime under the laws of any municipality, county, state, territory or country, whether or not adjudication was withheld or a judgment of conviction was entered? Below that question is a warning advising that a criminal history can be cause for denying an application and that misrepresentations as to criminal history can be cause for suspending or revoking a license. Petitioner read that warning when he completed his application. Immediately above Petitioner's signature on his application for licensure is a section entitled "Final Statement" containing the following language: I do solemnly swear that all answers to the foregoing questions and statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief . . . . * * * Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have read the foregoing application for license and that the facts stated in it are true. I understand that misrepresentation of any fact required to be disclosed through this application is a violation of The Florida Insurance and Administrative Codes and may result in the denial of my application . . . . Petitioner read these statements when he completed his application for licensure. When Petitioner signed his application on April 9, 2003, he was aware that a truthful application was required. The Department obtained Petitioner's criminal history record that revealed that he had been arrested on February 12, 1981, in Lake County, Florida, for possession of marijuana, a controlled substance, in excess of 20 grams, a felony. The Department directed Petitioner to provide certified copies of the court documents related to that arrest. Those certified records reveal, and Petitioner so testified at the final hearing in this cause, that Petitioner was arrested, taken to jail, booked, and posted bail. An information was filed against him. He eventually pled guilty, adjudication was withheld, and he was sentenced to two years of probation, subject to certain conditions, and paid court costs. Petitioner satisfactorily completed the terms and obtained early release from probation. In addition to his court appearance the day after his arrest, Petitioner appeared before the circuit court judge on at least four occasions. Petitioner knowingly provided a false answer to the criminal history question on his application. Petitioner intended to misrepresent or conceal information regarding his criminal history. The Department classifies the crime Petitioner committed as a Class "A" crime.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying Petitioner's application for licensure as a credit life or credit disability agent, as a credit property agent, and as a credit agent. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of May, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of May, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Albert T. Escueta 1688 Pecan Court Orange Park, Florida 32073-3614 Dana M. Wiehle, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Tom Gallagher, Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issue in the case is whether Tracy Jean (Petitioner) was the subject of unlawful discrimination by Florida Hospital Medical Group (Respondent)1/ in violation of chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2015).2/
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a black female, who is qualified for employment as a Florida-licensed registered nurse (RN). The Respondent is an “employer” as defined by the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. At a job fair held on June 9, 2015, the Petitioner met representatives from the Respondent, including Tracy Decker, a manager, and Sarah Emerson, a nurse recruiter, and was interviewed by them in relation to potential employment. Ms. Emerson subsequently called the Petitioner to express an interest in hiring the Petitioner as an RN, and to encourage her to submit an application. On June 23, 2015, the Petitioner submitted an electronic employment application for a position as an RN at Florida Hospital. The Respondent’s online application form included questions calling for disclosure of an applicant’s criminal history. Although the Respondent does not automatically reject an applicant who discloses previous criminal activity, the failure to disclose such activity may be deemed by the Respondent to be a falsification of the information, and may disqualify an applicant from employment. The Respondent’s online application form states as follows: I understand that I will not be automatically disqualified from possible employment if, in response to application questions, I disclose criminal records information. I also understand that any false, misleading, incomplete or omitted information in response to application questions will result in ineligibility for employment or termination of employment as it will be deemed falsification of information. As a result, I hereby confirm that if I failed to disclose any criminal records information, it is because it is not required in response to the application’s questions (e.g., parking tickets) or it is because I am certain that the information has been expunged and thus, will not show up during a background check. Finally, I understand that my mistaken belief about whether the response is required or whether the information has been expunged is not a defense to falsification. Accordingly, if I erroneously omitted information, I will be ineligible for employment or my employment will be terminated for falsification. * * * Employment is subject to completion of pre- employment procedures, including but not limited to; verifying employment/personal references; conducting a background investigation/criminal record check; verifying driving record (if appropriate); and confirmation of licensure or registration. In relevant part, the Respondent’s online application form stated as follows: Have you served any of the following for any criminal offense? (check all that apply): pretrial diversion * * * probation (any type) * * * Any other type of alternative, deferred, suspended, postponed or conditional prosecution, adjudication, disposition, sentence, program or release not listed above, please describe: (if not, type N/A) The Petitioner’s response was “N/A” indicating that she had not served any type of punitive sentence or alternative disposition for a criminal offense. On July 19, 2015, the Respondent extended a written offer of employment to the Petitioner. The letter was issued by Erika Cardona-Geis, a recruiter for the Respondent. The offer was contingent on the completion of various requirements, including a background check. For the Respondent’s purposes, an acceptable background check is one that corresponds with the information disclosed on a potential employee’s application. The Respondent’s focus is on the truthfulness and integrity of potential employees, especially those such as RNs employed to provides services and medications to patients. The Respondent utilized a third-party vendor to perform background checks on potential employees. The Respondent provided the vendor’s website link to the Petitioner so that she could submit her information for the background check, and the Petitioner did so. On July 27, 2015, the Respondent received the results of the Petitioner’s background check from the vendor. The Petitioner’s background check revealed criminal activity that had not been disclosed by the Petitioner in her employment application. According to the background check, the Petitioner was charged with separate counts of Grand Theft, Obstruction of Fire Equipment, and Criminal Mischief on September 7, 2008, in Broward County, Florida (Case No. 08-021191CF10-A). The charges resulted in the Petitioner being placed on probation for 15 months and required to make restitution. Adjudication of guilt was withheld. The background check also revealed that the Petitioner was charged with solicitation to commit prostitution on August 16, 2010, in Miami-Dade County, Florida (Case No. B-10- 042025-B). The Petitioner entered a pre-trial diversion program, and the charge was nolle prossed. The Respondent’s formal policy provided that falsification of background check information in an employment application may result in an applicant being deemed ineligible for employment. Nonetheless, when an applicant’s background check revealed information other than that disclosed on an employment application, the Respondent’s standard procedure was to allow an applicant an opportunity to submit additional information to explain the discrepancy, so that the Respondent could assess the reason for nondisclosure rather than automatically reject the applicant. Because the Petitioner’s background check included information inconsistent with that submitted by the Petitioner in her employment application, Ms. Cardona-Geis contacted the Petitioner and offered her the option to submit a written statement regarding the discrepancies and to provide related court records. In response, the Petitioner submitted a letter of explanation dated July 28, 2015, and related court records, as well as a letter from the Florida Board of Nursing and a letter purportedly written by an attorney. Ms. Cardona-Geis provided the Petitioner’s response and materials to Karla Muniz, the Respondent’s human resources director. Ms. Cardona-Geis also provided the Petitioner’s response and materials to Lorraine Pitre, a lawyer and member in good standing of the Florida Bar, employed by the Respondent as an employee relations consultant. Ms. Pitre was responsible for providing counsel and advice to the management of the Respondent’s Human Relations Department. She was also directly involved in the creation of the Respondent’s human resource policies and practices, including those relevant to the Respondent’s consideration of the Petitioner’s employment application. Ms. Pitre was the Respondent’s employee specifically assigned to review matters involving employment background check discrepancies. Ms. Pitre reviewed the Petitioner’s letter of explanation, wherein the Petitioner stated, in relevant part, as follows: The charges were not disclosed because I sealed & expunged the cases. Under the advice of my attorney, he told me there was no need to disclose this information once I went through the expungement process. Ms. Pitre reviewed the court documents submitted by the Petitioner and publicly-available records accessible through the Broward County Clerk’s Office and determined that the Broward County charges that resulted in the Petitioner’s probationary sentence had not been sealed or expunged. Ms. Pitre also reviewed the letter submitted by the Petitioner and purportedly written by an attorney. The letter, dated August 4, 2015, stated as follows: The set forth individual has retained my services to expunge and seal the mentioned cases. I am not at liberty to disclose the information, but I am aware that my client has revealed her past indiscretions. The client, Tracy Jean, has honestly answered “no” to the set forth employment questions of convictions. Furthermore, my client informed me that she has submitted the appropriate documents and has revealed this information to you, which under Florida Statutes is not necessary. Tracy has honored all of your request [sic], has not knowingly lied on the application, and only wants to be looked at as a professional. The letter contradicted the Petitioner’s assertion that the charges had been expunged or sealed prior to the submission of her application for employment. Although the letter identified the writer as “Eric Volz, ESQ,” the letter was not printed on letterhead and was unsigned. Ms. Pitre, who routinely interacted with attorneys in private practice, was concerned about the authenticity of the letter. Ms. Pitre discussed her findings and concerns with Ms. Muniz and with Ms. Cardona-Geis. Based on the Respondent’s review of the Petitioner’s application, the background check information, and the materials subsequently submitted by the Petitioner, the Respondent determined that the Petitioner had submitted false responses to the criminal background history questions on the application. The Respondent revoked the conditional offer of employment previously extended to the Petitioner. There is no evidence that the Petitioner’s race was a consideration in the Respondent’s decision to revoke the conditional offer of employment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petitioner's complaint of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of August, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of August, 2016.
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner, Daniel James Bradley's, application for licensure as a resident life including variable annuity and health insurance agent should be denied for the reasons stated in Respondent, Department of Financial Services', Notice of Denial dated April 26, 2004.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for the licensure of insurance agents in the State of Florida pursuant to the authority granted in Chapter 626, Florida Statutes (2004). On January 3, 2004, Mr. Bradley filed an on-line application with the Department seeking licensure as a resident life including variable annuity and health insurance agent. The on-line application form included the following question: Have you ever been convicted, found guilty, or pled guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) to a crime punishable by imprisonment of one (1) year or more under the laws of any municipality, county, state, territory or country, whether or not adjudication was withheld or a judgment of conviction was entered?. Mr. Bradley answered "No," which was a false answer. The Department conducted an internal investigation during the application process, and the criminal history check obtained by the Department revealed that in 1995 Mr. Bradley was charged with two counts of Obtaining Property for Worthless Check(s) (one check in an amount over $150 and one check in an amount less than $150). On May 31, 1995, in State of Florida v. Daniel J. Bradley, Case No. 94-2473F, in the Circuit Court in and for Sarasota County, Florida, Mr. Bradley appeared before Judge Robert B. Bennett and entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of Obtaining Property For a Worthless Check (over $150), which is a third degree felony in violation of Subsection 832.05(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1995). Judge Bennett withheld adjudication of guilt and imposed a fine and court cost in the amount of $250 that was paid by Mr. Bradley. Mr. Bradley testified that during the 1995 period, he was in the midst of a domestic dispute that was finalized in a dissolution of marriage, when he wrote two checks to Sears. He explained further that at the time the checks were written, sufficient funds were in the joint checking account at the bank, but his then-estranged wife withdrew all bank funds without his knowledge or consent resulting in the overdrafts. Explaining his "no" response to the criminal history question on his on-line licensure application form, Mr. Bradley asserted a lack of fully understanding the (intended) meaning of the term "punishable by imprisonment of one (1) year or more." Mr. Bradley testified that he "did not know, and had no reason to know, [or be concerned] that the worthless check charge to which he pled nolo contendere was punishable by imprisonment of one year or more," even though he knew the crime was a third- degree felony. Continuing, Mr. Bradley explained in detail his ongoing domestic entanglement then, as well as his financial obligations now. Mr. Bradley explained that he has undertaken the obligation to care for his parent(s) and his need for income to pay for his children's education. In effect, Mr. Bradley offered an "excusable neglect and a lack of knowledge" explanation for the "no" answer on his on-line licensure application form. Mr. Bradley earnestly insisted that it was not his "intent" to mislead, conceal, or lie about the criminal background question. He explained in detail that he "did not understand nor was he advised by his attorney, Susan Maulucci, or the Sarasota County Circuit Court that any offense that he had been accused or pled guilty to was punishable by a term of incarceration of one or more years." In conclusion, Mr. Bradley stated, "[I]f I had previous knowledge of such information I would never have answered incorrectly. If the question had addressed a felony charge punishable by one or more years, I would have certainly answered yes based on the assumption of a felony being the subject of the question not the period of punishment." It appears from his post-hearing submittal that he was under the impression that the term "felony" is missing from the question and that by the omission, he was somehow misled. The blame-shifting inference Mr. Bradley sought is that it was the omission by the Department to include the word "felony" in its application form that misled him. This suggestion is rejected. Mr. Bradley's explanation becomes even more suspect when one considers: his knowledge and experience as a military police officer; at the time he signed the plea document, it was clear that he was facing up to five years in prison for the crime(s) with which he was charged; when arrested on both misdemeanor and felony check charges, he spent the night in jail; and finally, he signed two bonds, one for the misdemeanor charge and a separate bond for the felony charge before he was released from jail. Mr. Bradley was individually and personally responsible for the accuracy of his answer. His misrepresentation of the truth by answering "no," if not intentional, supports the inference of a reckless or careless disregard as to the truth of the matter asserted. At the time he answered "no" on his application form, Mr. Bradley knew, without a doubt, that he had pled "no contest" to a felony worthless check charge in the Sarasota County Circuit Court in Florida. During his court appearance, he was identified and was personally informed by the presiding judge that he faced a felony charge, and he agreed to enter his plea of nolo contendere to that felony charge. On May 31, 1995, in open court, Mr. Bradley signed an "Acknowledgement and Waiver of Rights" form that contained in paragraph 1, the following statement: "I am pleading to the charge of worthless check (2 counts), and I understand the maximum penalty provided by law is five (5) years prison." (Emphasis added.) After the court accepted his plea, sentenced him, and imposed court costs, Mr. Bradley signed the court's acknowledgement reflecting the disposition of the proceeding. Only after completion of the foregone process was Mr. Bradley free to leave the courtroom.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order dismissing the Petition herein filed by Petitioner, without prejudice, for Petitioner to reapply as provided in the Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-211.042(4). DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of August, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 2004.
