The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the offenses alleged in the Administrative Complaint issued August 25, 2000, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating insurance licenses and appointments pursuant to Chapter 626, Florida Statutes. At all times material to the allegations in this case, the Respondent has been licensed as a Life Health and Annuity Agent, Life Health and Variable Annuity Agent, and a Health Insurance Agent in this state. On March 7, 1982, the Respondent was celebrating her birthday, she turned 22 that day, and was returning home with her husband when the vehicle they were in was stopped for a minor traffic infraction (expired tag). Believing he had to perform a "pat down" for his safety, the officer felt the Respondent's purse and noticed a bulge in the shape of a small weapon. The small hand gun had been a birthday present to the Respondent. Upon discovering the weapon, the officer charged the Respondent with carrying a concealed firearm. Initially the Respondent entered a written plea of not guilty but subsequently changed the plea in open court to one of nolo contendere. In connection with the plea change, the court entered an Order Granting Probation and Fixing Terms Thereof. The fact that the Respondent was placed on probation is not disputed. Further, as the Court determined the Respondent was not likely to again engage in a criminal course of conduct, adjudication was withheld and probation set for a period of one year. The Respondent successfully completed that year of probation and has had no further incidents of criminal misconduct. The Respondent erroneously believed that the successful completion of the probationary period, and the fact that adjudication had been withheld, resulted in the expungement of the criminal record. As the Respondent later found out, criminal records are not automatically sealed or expunged. On November 2, 1999, the Respondent filed an application for licensure as a life health and variable annuity agent with the Petitioner. That application contained two questions dealing with the applicant's past criminal history. As to both questions, the Respondent erroneously entered "no" responses. Had the Respondent entered accurate answers, both responses would have been "yes" based upon the status of the Respondent's criminal record at the time the application was submitted to the Petitioner. The Respondent has a medical condition that she claims has damaged her long term-memory. According to the Respondent, she answered the questions as she did because she did not remember all the facts surrounding the criminal history at the time the application was completed but that, even if she had, she would have assumed the matter was sealed and fully resolved since adjudication was withheld. The Respondent's account in this regard has been deemed credible. The Respondent did not intend to mislead the Petitioner and acted more in ignorance of the law as to the prior arrest and probation than in willful disregard of her responsibility to disclose it. At the time Respondent completed her application for licensure she read the paragraph that appears at the bottom of the third page of said application in bold typeface that states: IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU HAVE READ ALL OF THE FOREGOING QUESTIONS CAREFULLY AND HAVE ANSWERED THEM FULLY. THIS IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT AS IT RELATES TO AN APPLICANT'S LAW ENFORCEMENT RECORDS. THE DEPARTMENT DEEMS ALL MATTERS THAT ARE PART OF AN APPLICANT'S LAW ENFORCEMENT RECORDS TO BE A SIGNIFICANT AND MATERIAL ELEMENT OF THE APPLICATION, THE OMISSION OF ANY PART OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT RECORD IS A MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION OR MATERIAL MISSTATEMENT IN AND OF ITSELF. YOUR FAILURE TO DIVULGE YOUR COMPLETE LAW ENFORCEMENT RECORD ON THIS APPLICATION CAN RESULT IN YOUR APPLICATION BEING DENIED. In addition to the foregoing, the application submitted by the Respondent provided the following statement: Under penalty of perjury, I declare that I have read the foregoing application for license and the facts stated in it are true. I understand that misrepresentation of any fact required to be disclosed through this application is a violation of The Florida Insurance and Administrative Codes and may result in the denial of my application and/or the revocation of my insurance license(s). The answers provided by the Respondent to the two questions (application questions numbered 18 and 19) were incorrect, misleading, and were presumably used to support the issuance of the Respondent's licenses. Although the Respondent is eligible to have her criminal record sealed or expunged, as of the date of the hearing she had not completed that process. During the investigation of this matter, the Respondent fully cooperated with the Petitioner and obtained copies of documents as requested.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance impose an administrative fine against the Respondent in an amount sufficient to cover the costs of prosecuting this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of May, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ________________________________ J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of May, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard J. Santurri, Esquire Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Joseph H. Fernandez, Esquire The Law Offices of Brand & Fernandez, P.A. 2 Northeast 40th Street Suite 403 Miami, Florida 33137 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer/Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated that Petitioner, Gary N. Piccirillo, was afforded a presumptive parole release date interview on May 14, 1982. Thereafter, on June 9, 1982, Respondent, Florida Parole and Probation Commission (FPPC), considered Petitioner's presumptive parole release date (PPRD) and set it for September 30, 1986. On June 28, 1982, Petitioner sought review of his established PPRD pursuant to Rule 23-21.12, Florida Administrative Code, and Section 947.173, Florida Statutes. In November 1983, a special parole interview was granted Petitioner, but the Commission at that hearing declined to change or modify Petitioner's PPRD. Petitioner's next biennial interview for review of his PPRD is scheduled for September 1984. However, Petitioner is currently scheduled to be released from confinement in either September or October 1984, if he is given credit for all earned gain time. Petitioner questions that portion of the rule which provides for only one review of the Commission action establishing or changing the PPRD, but apparently fails to recognize that portion which also provides for subsequent (biennial, special, or effective) establishments of PPRD, which tend to ensure at least periodic reviews of the PPRD. Petitioner attacks the validity of the rule, as amended on October 1, 1982, as it pertains to Sections (1)(e) and (2). He contends that (1)(e), which calls for verification of written or printed evidence provided directly by the inmate and notification to the proper state attorney if any of this evidence is invalid because it constitutes a threat of a penalty, which tends to inhibit the average inmate from presenting evidence he might otherwise present. Petitioner does not question the propriety of reporting false information, only the inclusion of a basis for doing so within the rule. Petitioner also contends that that portion of Paragraph (2) of the rule which provides that the Respondent will not address matters within certain categories, unless new factual information came into existence after the initial interview, is unfair, unduly restrictive, and places an unreasonable burden on prisoners who would be unprepared psychologically to present all their information at the initial interview in its best light. Petitioner contends that after the newness of incarceration wears off and the individual is more comfortable with the system, he would be better prepared to present this information again.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated section 70-54, Pinellas County Code, which prohibits retaliation against a person who has opposed a discriminatory employment practice, by terminating the Petitioner's employment, and, if so, the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Menz was hired by Dr. Weisel as a receptionist for his dental office located in Tarpon Springs, Pinellas County, Florida, on October 6, 2007. Ms. Menz's job responsibilities included answering the phone, checking patients in and out of the office, collecting co-payments, and entering treatment plans in the record. According to Dr. Weisel, Ms. Menz was a good employee because she was eager to learn, and she was very people orientated. Respondent is a professional association located in Tarpon Springs, Pinellas County, Florida. Respondent employees less than 15 employees and is in the business of providing dentistry services. Respondent is subject to the Pinellas County Code concerning human relations. In June 2008, Dr. Weisel sold his Tarpon Springs dental practice to Dr. Kontos. Dr. Kontos had graduated from dental school in May 2007 and had worked for another dentist office. By January 2008, Dr. Kontos wanted to purchase a dental practice in his hometown, Tarpon Springs. When Dr. Kontos purchased the practice from Dr. Weisel, Dr. Kontos had no experience in owning a business or managing employees. According to Dr. Kontos, he decided to keep all of Dr. Weisel's employees for continuity. Dr. Kontos described Ms. Menz's job duties as opening the practice in the morning, "in-putting insurance," collecting co-payments, and "doing treatment plans." By July 2008, Dr. Kontos had promoted one of the dental assistants, Daniel Mauzerolle (Mr. Mauzerolle), to office manager. During the time that Mr. Mauzerolle worked for Dr. Kontos, they became friends and would socialize together. Ms. Menz testified that she had complained to Dr. Kontos in the past about Mr. Mauzerolle about issues from work. Ms. Sholtes, a former dental hygienist for Dr. Kontos, also testified on Ms. Menz's behalf. She testified that Ms. Menz was a good employee and courteous to patients. By November 2008, Dr. Kontos hired Ms. Marchese to collect aging insurance claims and account receivables, as well as review his office procedures. According to Dr. Kontos, the dental practice had a "phenomenal" amount of outstanding insurance claims, in excess of $20,000.00, which had been denied. Ms. Marchese had worked in the dental field since 1991 and was familiar with software systems used to run dental offices. Further, she was familiar with the submission of insurance forms for dental reimbursement. On May 11, 2009, Ms. Menz opened the office at 7:00 a.m. As she turned on her computer, Ms. Menz noticed the internet web history showed that someone had used her computer the night before. Ms. Menz found that one site had been visited 28 times. Upon visiting the site, Ms. Menz found that the website contained pornographic images. Further, because Mr. Mauzerolle was the only person that worked in the evening in the office, Ms. Menz assumed that Mr. Mauzerolle was the person who had accessed the pornographic site. Ms. Menz credibly testified that she informed Dr. Kontos and told him that Mr. Mauzerolle's actions were unacceptable to her. Ms. Menz credibly testified that she told Dr. Kontos that she could not work under the conditions that she considered to be a hostile workplace environment. Dr. Kontos informed Ms. Menz that he would "take care of it." Dr. Kontos credibly testified that Mr. Mauzerolle, in addition to being the office manager, was his friend and that he was not happy with Ms. Menz reporting the issues concerning the pornography in his office. Two days later, on May 13, 2009, Dr. Kontos terminated Ms. Menz's employment. Ms. Menz credibly testified that at the time of her termination, Dr. Kontos did not provide her a reason for her termination, only stating "nothing personal, but I'm going to have to let you go." Dr. Kontos testified that he had already decided to terminate Ms. Menz's employment before May 11, 2009, when Ms. Menz complained about the pornography. According to Dr. Kontos, Ms. Marchese had informed him since the end of 2008 about errors that Ms. Menz had been making at work that cost the dental practice money. Dr. Kontos indicated that Ms. Menz made errors such as failing to collect co-payments or collecting improper co-payments and failing to fill out the insurance forms correctly. The result was that insurance claims would be denied and the dental office would lose money. According to Dr. Kontos and Ms. Marchese, on or before April 8, 2009, Ms. Menz made an error that almost cost the dental practice $2,000.00. The alleged error involved putting the wrong information concerning an insurance plan for a patient. Based on this error, Dr. Kontos testified that he made a decision with Mr. Mauzerolle and Ms. Marchese to place an advertisement for a receptionist with Craigslist to replace Ms. Menz. Later that day, Mr. Mauzerolle placed the advertisement with Craigslist. On April 9, 2009, potential job applicants began calling Dr. Kontos' office about the receptionist position. Ms. Menz took the phone messages from the applicants, including Ms. Kristen Chase. Ms. Menz credibly testified that based on phone calls that she asked Dr. Kontos about the job advertisement and whether or not she was doing a good job. Ms. Menz credibly testified that Dr. Kontos stated that she was doing a good job and not to worry about the advertisement. Further, Ms. Menz credibly testified that she asked Ms. Marchese about the advertisement. Ms. Menz testified that Ms. Marchese stated that Dr. Kontos was seeking to replace Christina Benzel (Ms. Benzel), a co-worker who worked the front desk with Ms. Menz. Ms. Menz believed Ms. Marchese because Ms. Menz had observed that Ms. Benzel's job responsibilities had been reduced. According to Dr. Kontos, sometime at the beginning of May 2009, he and Mr. Mauzerolle interviewed Ms. Chase for the receptionist job. According to Dr. Kontos, he offered Ms. Chase the job after the interview, and he had decided to replace Ms. Menz. Dr. Kontos's testimony on the point that he offered Ms. Chase the job in early May and had decided to replace Ms. Menz is not credible. Ms. Chase credibly testified that she did not receive the job offer from Dr. Kontos at the interview in early May. Further, Ms. Chase credibly testified that, because she did not hear anything from Dr. Kontos, she had assumed that she had not gotten the job. Further, Ms. Chase credibly testified that she was offered the job on May 14, 2009. Dr. Kontos testified that he had decided to terminate Ms. Menz on April 8, 2009, but that he did not tell her before May 13, 2009, because he "had to build up the nerve to do it." He testified that he felt bad having to terminate her and that he let her go because she made too many mistakes. For support concerning the number of errors made by Ms. Menz, Respondent offered the testimony of Ms. Marchese and numerous exhibits. Ms. Marchese testified that because of the number of errors occurring in the office that she moved her work space to be next to Ms. Menz. According to Ms. Marchese, she was monitoring Ms. Menz and providing "one-on-one training." Further, Ms. Marchese offered testimony that each day she would conduct an "audit trail" of the office and bring errors to Dr. Kontos's attention daily. Ms. Marchese testified that Ms. Menz failed to collect co-payments; entered insurance information incorrectly, resulting in insurance reimbursements being denied; failed to provide adequate information to support insurance billings; and gave patients incorrect estimates on the amount that the patient would owe for different treatments based on the patient's insurance plan. Ms. Marchese testified that she estimated that Ms. Menz had cost the dental office approximately $100,000.00 in lost revenue and made 90 percent of the office errors. Ms. Marchese identified a number of exhibits that supported Respondent's claim that Ms. Menz was terminated for numerous errors. Ms. Marchese further testified that in March 2009 that she told Dr. Kontos and Mr. Mauzerolle that Ms. Menz was "untrainable" and that she should be terminated. According to Ms. Marchese, in April 2009, she discussed with Dr. Kontos and Mr. Mauzerolle the error that nearly cost the practice $2,000.00 and the decision to advertise for the new receptionist. After the advertisement was taken out in Craigslist for the new receptionist, Ms. Marchese remembered being asked by Ms. Menz about the advertisement and about whether or not Dr. Kontos was seeking to replace her. Ms. Marchese testified that she told Ms. Menz that she did not know if Dr. Kontos was seeking to replace her. Ms. Marchese denied telling Ms. Menz that Dr. Kontos was seeking to replace Ms. Benzel. Ms. Marchese, however, admitted that Dr. Kontos had been unhappy with Ms. Benzel based on her internet usage at the office. Ms. Marchese testified that she informed Dr. Kontos about each of these errors daily and testified about a group of exhibits. A review of the exhibits identified by Ms. Marchese, Exhibits 25, 27, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 36, 41, and 44 shows that the documents are dated December 18 and 21, 2009. When questioned about the dates on the exhibits, Ms. Marchese testified that these exhibits were documentation from the "daily sheets" and that she had "minimized the amount of discovery." Also, she explained that the documents were "printed to condense the information into one page instead of, for instance, on exhibit 25, it would have been over 30 pages." Further, she testified that she had added the notes explaining Ms. Menz's errors to the sheets on or after December 18, 2009. The "daily sheets" were not admitted into evidence. At best, the offered exhibits may be considered summaries. Even considering the documents, the record shows that the offered exhibits show that the documents were compiled to support Ms. Menz's termination after May 13, 2009, and in response to the investigation by Pinellas County. Thus, the exhibits carry little weight in the consideration. Similarly, Exhibits 10, 11, 18, 23, and 24 are all dated after Ms. Menz's termination date of May 13, 2009. A review of Exhibit 10 shows a "Single Patient Ledger" printed up on September 8, 2009. Based on Ms. Marchese's testimony, the document shows that on April 8, 2009, the patient received two dental procedures that cost $1,050.00. According to Ms. Marchese, the patient was told to pay $215.00 for two treatments. Presumably, the balance of the dental bill would be paid by insurance. However, Ms. Marchese testified that the patient did not have dental coverage for the two procedures. Consequently, the dental office lost money on the two procedures because the patient refused to pay, and there was no insurance to bill. Although the testimony shows this event occurred before the termination, the "Single Payer Ledger" is dated after the termination. Further, a hand-written notation from the patient's chart, which is part of Exhibit 10, stating that "Valerie dropped the ball on the correct fee twice" is dated May 14, 2009, the day after her termination. Similarly, a review of Exhibits 23 and 24 shows that they are insurance claims that were denied before May 13, 2009. Ms. Marchese testified that Dr. Kontos was aware of these errors. However, Exhibits 23 and 24 only show that insurance claims were re- submitted after the date of Ms. Menz's termination. The exhibits do not support the finding that the claims were denied because of Ms. Menz or that these errors were considered before terminating her employment. These exhibits were prepared after the termination as a justification for the action as opposed to contemporaneous proof of Ms. Menz's performance. In contrast to the above listed exhibits, Exhibits 6, 7, 8, and 9 are examples of errors and notes that were documented before Ms. Menz's termination. A review of these exhibits shows that the complained of errors occurred on January 22, 2009; February 3, 2009; March 2, 2009; and April 27, 2009. Respondent also offered the testimony of other employees from the dental office. Ms. Little, a dental hygienist, testified that she was aware that Ms. Menz made errors in entering codes for different treatment plans. She had spoken to Ms. Menz about the error, and Ms. Menz indicated that she would try to correct the problem. According to Ms. Little, the errors continued, but were not as bad. Finally, Ms. Little testified that Ms. Marchese was responsible for insurance claims with the office. Similarly, Ms. O'Leary, a dental hygienist, testified that she knew that Ms. Menz had some issues with insurance, but that she had a good working relationship with Ms. Menz. Ms. Menz candidly admitted that she made mistakes at her work and credibly testified that she was never told of the many errors that Respondent was claiming she had made or that she had cost Respondent money. Dr. Kontos admitted that that he did not individually counsel Ms. Menz about her errors. Rather than counsel individual employees, Dr. Kontos testified that it was his practice to speak to his employees as a group about errors because he wanted to avoid similar errors. Ms. Menz testified that she earned $10.75 an hour and that she had been out of work for 87 weeks. Ms. Menz agreed with her counsel's question that her calculated damages were $37,410.00. The record also shows that Ms. Menz filed for unemployment compensation, but was unclear about whether or not she received any compensation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered: Finding that Respondent violated section 70-54, Pinellas County Code. Ordering Respondent to pay Ms. Menz the sum of $37,410.00 and interest at the prevailing statutory rate; and Ordering Respondent to pay Ms. Menz reasonable costs and attorney's fees. Jurisdiction is retained to determine the amount of costs and attorney's fees, if the parties are unable to agree to the amount. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of May, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S THOMAS P. CRAPPS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of May, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: William C. Faulkner, Esquire Pinellas County Attorney's Office 315 Court Street Clearwater, Florida 33756 Jeremy W. Rodgers, Esquire Spector Gadon and Rosen, LLP 390 Central Avenue, Suite 1550 St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Matthew K. Fenton, Esquire Wenzel, Fenton, and Cabassa, P.A. 1110 North Florida Avenue, Suite 300 Tampa, Florida 33602 Leon W. Russell, Director/EEO Officer Pinellas County Office of Human Rights 400 South Fort Harrison Avenue, 5th Floor Clearwater, Florida 33756 Peter J. Genova, Jr., EEO Coordinator Pinellas County Office of Human Rights 400 South Fort Harrison Avenue, 5th Floor Clearwater, Florida 33756
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a Florida Highway Patrol trooper and has permanent Career Service status. His appeal of his eight (8) hour suspension was timely filed with the Career Service Commission. Timecard records of the Petitioner were introduced and show that he had indicated that he was on duty at the times indicated on the cards. Lieutenant Tom Sigmond testified that he had examined the radio logs of the Florida Highway Patrol station to which he and the Petitioner were assigned and had compared the radio log entries for the dates which the Petitioner had indicated on his timecards that he was on duty. Lieutenant Sigmond stated that his examination of these records revealed that the Petitioner's timecard entries were inaccurate, however, that the entries taken as a whole did not reveal any attempt by the Petitioner to defraud the State by certifying that he had worked more hours than he was required to work. What Lieutenant Sigmond found were inaccuracies between the times the Petitioner had indicated on his timecard he had worked and the times he had actually worked as reflected by entries on the radio log. The radio log is maintained at the Highway Patrol station by the dispatcher on duty and reflects the date and time that patrol personnel go on duty and off duty. The inaccuracies found by Lieutenant Sigmond occurred on weekends when the Petitioner was attending college classes. The Petitioner had approval to work split hours as the duty supervisor on weekends when he attended college classes. There was no impropriety in the Petitioner attending classes or working split shifts. Subsequent to the closing of the agency's case, objection and motion to strike Lieutenant Sigmond's testimony was made by the Petitioner on the basis that his testimony regarding logs was hearsay upon which no finding could be based. The Hearing Officer permitted the agency to reopen its case and to introduce the actual radio logs about which Lieutenant Sigmond had testified. The agency presented the radio logs, which were introduced and substituted at a later date permitted. The agency, again, rested and the Petitioner moved to exclude the radio logs on the basis that they had not been properly authenticated by the custodian of the records. This motion by the Petitioner was denied by the Hearing Officer. Comparison of the radio logs with the timecards prepared by the Petitioner substantiates the testimony presented by Lieutenant Sigmond.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the agency's action be sustained. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of May, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: John Whitney, Esq. Department of Law Enforcement Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, FL 32304 Frederick E. Landt, III, Esq. P. O. Box 1943 Ocala, FL 32670 Mrs. Dorothy Roberts Appeals Coordinator Department of Administration Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32304
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Dr. Robinson has been licensed to practice dentistry in the State of Florida having been issued license number DN0007588. Dr. Robinson practices dentistry in Jacksonville, Florida. From May 12, 1986, to October 1, 1987, Dr. Robinson rendered dentistry services to T.L.J., the patient listed as patient #1 in the Amended Administrative Complaint. Dr. Robinson's records regarding T.L.J. are slightly deficient in that they do not completely set forth a treatment plan for the patient. The records do contain an adequate patient history, medical history, and examination results, and they do justify the course of treatment. During the course of his treatment of T.L.J., Dr. Robinson initiated a root canal on T.L.J.'s tooth #30 on August 14, 1987. On August 17, 1987, he sealed tooth #30. On September 10, 1987, Dr. Robinson opened tooth #30 to drain it and started T.L.J. on antibiotics. During this time period, Dr. Robinson was also doing other work on T.L.J.'s teeth, especially on tooth #19 which was to be crowned. On October 1, 1987, T.L.J. returned to Dr. Robinson's office to have the crown cemented on tooth #19 and to have the root canal on tooth #30 completed. During this visit something happened that caused T.L.J. to leave the office without having the root canal completed. She refused to return. The root canal was finally done by Dr. Standish. On August 14, 1987, T.L.J. and her husband had already signed the insurance claim form for the root canal. Dr. Robinson had also signed the form. By his signature, Dr. Robinson had certified that the procedure indicated by date had been completed. In fact, the root canal had not been completed. Through an error by Dr. Robinson's staff, the insurance claim form was sent to the insurance company, even though the procedure had not been completed. The insurance company, American General Insurance Company, paid it's share of the claim, $260.00, on September 17, 1987. That check was deposited by office personnel into Dr. Robinson's account on September 28, 1987, over a signature stamp of Dr. Robinson's. On November 30, 1987, DPR sent Dr. Robinson notification that a complaint was filed in this case. It was then that Dr. Robinson determined that the root canal procedure had been erroneously billed and that the payment by the insurance company had been deposited to his account. On December 11, 1987, Dr. Robinson returned the $260.00 payment to the insurance company.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Dentistry, enter a Final Order dismissing the Amended Administrative Complaint filed against John D. Robinson, D.M.D. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of July, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of July, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-0809 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Dentistry Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1 & 2(1); 3(2); 6 & 7(5); 8(6); and 9-12(9-12). Proposed findings of fact 4 and 5 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack L. McRay Senior Attorney Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 John D. Robinson, D.M.D. 1566-3 Dunn Avenue Jacksonville, Florida 32218 Kenneth Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 William Buckhalt Executive Director Board of Dentistry 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, a certified law enforcement officer, failed to maintain good moral character by knowingly making a false statement in writing with the intent to mislead a public servant in the performance of his official duties, a failure that, if proved, would warrant the imposition of discipline upon Respondent's certificate.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Pablo Barrios ("Barrios") is a Florida- certified law enforcement officer and, as such, falls under the regulatory and disciplinary jurisdiction of Petitioner Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission ("Commission"). At the time of the final hearing, and at all times relevant to this case, Barrios was employed as a police officer by Florida International University ("FIU"). The events giving rise to this proceeding took place on July 17, 2003. That morning, Barrios attended an in-service training class taught by Sgt. Alfonso. There were about a dozen other FIU police officers in the class. Shortly after the class began, Barrios and Sgt. Alfonso got into an argument over Barrios's use of a digital recorder. (Sgt. Alfonso was apparently offended that Barrios would record the lecture; Barrios claimed that he was merely using the device to keep track of the time.) Sgt. Alfonso asked Barrios to leave the classroom. Barrios did leave, remarking on his way out that if he (Barrios) had intended to turn on the recording device, he would first have told everyone in the "fucking room." Barrios later returned to the classroom and sat in the back. The lesson proceeded to conclusion uneventfully. When the class ended, Capt. Wright entered the room. Someone had reported the verbal altercation between Barrios and Sgt. Alfonso, and Capt. Wright was there to find out what had happened. To that end, Capt. Wright asked each of the officers present to prepare a statement describing the incident and stating specifically whether "improper language" had been used. In response to Capt. Wright's request, Barrios wrote the following statement: I was single[d] out by Sergeant Alfonso for taking out [sic] a personal recorder out of my laptop bag. Capt. Wright considered Barrios's statement to be incomplete. He therefore wrote the following question beneath Barrios's description of the event: Lt. Barrios, was improper language ever used during the incident. Barrios answered the captain's query, in writing, with one word: "No."1 Ultimate Factual Determinations The undersigned infers (and is convinced) that Barrios knew, when presented with Capt. Wright's imprecisely drafted question regarding the use of "improper language," that this interrogatory, though ambiguous and open to interpretation, was meant to require Barrios to either admit or deny using the "f" word during the incident. The undersigned further infers (but is not convinced) that Barrios was likely aware that Capt. Wright would misinterpret Barrios's negative answer as an affirmation that no one (including Barrios) had uttered the word "fuck" or any of its cognates. The undersigned is not clearly convinced, however, that Barrios intended to mislead Capt. Wright.2 Rather, since admitting that his language had been "improper" would have been tantamount to confessing misbehavior,3 Barrios likely intended to deny having engaged in inappropriate behavior. The undersigned is also not clearly convinced that Barrios's statement was false, for two reasons. First, the undersigned is not convinced that Barrios believed his language to have been improper.4 To the contrary, the evidence persuades the undersigned that Barrios subjectively believed his words were justified. It is likely, in other words, that Barrios made what was, for him, a true statement. Second, Barrios's statement has not been clearly and convincingly falsified——that is, shown via ordinary evidence to be objectively untrue. Because the adjective "improper" reflects an opinion or judgment about something, such an opinion could be falsified only if5 (among other things) there were a clear objective standard against which to measure or judge the thing in question.6 The Commission offered no evidence regarding such an objective standard for determining that Barrios's language was improper and hence failed objectively to falsify Barrios's denial that improper language had been used.7 In sum, the Commission failed clearly and convincingly to prove, as was its burden, that Barrios made a "false statement" with the intent to mislead Capt. Wright.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order finding Barrios not guilty of failing to maintain good moral character by knowingly making a false statement in writing with the intent to mislead a public servant in the performance of his official duties. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of February, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of February, 2005.
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent should deny Petitioner's application to be licensed as a resident personal lines insurance agent.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing insurance agents in the state pursuant to Chapter 626, Florida Statutes (2004). On October 29, 2004, Respondent received Petitioner's application to be licensed as a resident personal lines insurance agent (insurance agent). On October 13, 2005, Respondent issued a Notice of Denial to Petitioner. Respondent based the denial on several grounds that fall into three categories. The first category is based on Petitioner's prior criminal history. In relevant part, the Notice of Denial denies the application because Petitioner pled nolo contendere to a crime punishable by imprisonment of one year or more. The Notice of Denial further states that the crime was one of moral turpitude and that Subsection 626.611(14), Florida Statutes (2004), makes denial of the application compulsory. Even if the crime were not one of moral turpitude, the Notice of Denial states that the plea of nolo contendere provides a discretionary ground to deny the application pursuant to Subsection 626.621(8), Florida Statutes (2004). The Notice of Denial states a second category of grounds that are also compulsory. The second category of grounds may be fairly summarized as alleging a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance. The second category of grounds generally relates to turpitude inherent in the criminal offense and an inaccurate application answer stating that Petitioner had no prior criminal record. The Notice of Denial states that Petitioner lacks one or more qualifications for the license, that Petitioner committed a material misstatement or misrepresentation on her application, and that Petitioner demonstrated a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance as provided in Subsections 626.611(1), 626.611(2), and 626.611(7), Florida Statutes (2004). The third category of grounds relates to waiting periods. The Notice of Denial states that Petitioner must wait 17 years from the date she pled nolo contendere before applying for a license as an insurance agent. The waiting period is based on agency rules in Florida Administrative Code Rules 69B-211.042(4)(b) and 69B-211.042(8) that are promulgated pursuant to Subsection 626.207(1), Florida Statutes (2004). The remaining Findings of Fact address the factual sufficiency of the second category of grounds for denial. The conclusions of law, in relevant part, address the legal sufficiency of the remaining grounds for denial. The criminal record of Petitioner is not disputed. On October 4, 2004, Petitioner pled nolo contendere to a third degree felony of grand theft in the Circuit Court in and for Pasco County, Florida, Case No. CRCO4-1177-CFAES. The court withheld adjudication of guilt and imposed fines and costs of $395. Petitioner served 30 days in the Pasco County jail. The court placed Petitioner on supervised probation for 18 months, which Petitioner successfully terminated early on September 27, 2005. Petitioner contests neither the inaccuracy of the application answer stating she had no prior criminal record nor the materiality of the inaccuracy. However, Petitioner does contest the agency's assertion that Petitioner possessed the culpable knowledge or scienter required to misstate, misrepresent, or commit fraud in attempting to obtain a license within the meaning of Subsection 626.611(2), Florida Statutes (2004). Petitioner also contests the assertions that she lacks one or more qualifications for licensure and that she lacks fitness or trustworthiness within the meaning of Subsections 626.611(1), 626.611(2), and 626.611(7), Florida Statutes (2004). Petitioner testified that her employer submitted her application electronically. Petitioner testified that she gave her employer accurate information concerning her application, but she did not review the application before transmission. The trier of fact finds the testimony concerning Petitioner's lack of culpable knowledge to be credible and persuasive. Petitioner testified with extraordinary candor. Her demeanor was frank and unguarded. Her denial of culpable intent to mislead the agency is consistent with the totality of evidence in this proceeding and with Petitioner's demonstrated fitness and trustworthiness after November 2002. After Petitioner gave birth to a son on March 20, 2002, her treating physician advised her to undergo a tubal ligation, and the subsequent surgery was successful. The resulting inability to bear more children, however, led Petitioner into a mental state that was subsequently diagnosed as severe clinical depression. Petitioner returned to work approximately 12 weeks after surgery. From August 2002 through November 2002, Petitioner engaged in an episode of compulsive spending in which she incurred approximately $70,000 in credit card debt that she charged to personal and business credit cards. In order to pay the debt, Petitioner began taking money from her employer. Petitioner describes her hedonistic offense in her own words: [T]his incident occurred when I was suffering from severe depression that was [subsequently] diagnosed by a physician. I have been under the treatment of a psychiatrist and also a psychologist. I still see my psychiatrist quarterly to make sure that all is well with my medications . . . . The psychologist released me from her care because she felt that I can now deal with everyday stress. . . . So in order to fill that void [of no more children] I started shopping. And I would - I would go to the mall in a day and I would spend several thousand dollars on absolute garbage, you know, when you look. I mean. I started buying clothes; I bought furniture. I just was a shopaholic. I would go every Saturday and Sunday and spend time at the mall and just shop like crazy. [M]y husband had no idea of our finances. He just gave the paycheck and said: You do what you need to do. As long as he could have cash he didn't care. So he had no idea. He didn't even know how much money I made; he didn't know how much our mortgage was; he didn't know anything about our finances. And then once I started having all these credit card bills then I was, you know, robbing Peter to pay Paul . . . . And then it just got where I snapped . . . . And . . . unfortunately it looked like the easy way out. It was an answer to my problems and I could continue doing what I needed to do. [T]he attorney [employer] pretty much left me to do what I needed to do. I wrote all of his court motions, and I wrote all of his pleadings, and accountings, and inventories, and he didn't even look at them. He would just sign them. He didn't review them at all. And so when I would give him checks to sign . . . I would just take him the check and say, "I need you to sign a check," and he would sign the check and wouldn't even look to see . . . it was [to me]. Transcript (TR), pages 15 and 24-26. After November 2002, Petitioner voluntarily disclosed her offense to her employer. Petitioner's effort to reclaim her integrity and trustworthiness was both epiphanic and Herculean. The effort is best described in her own words: I started contemplating suicide and said: Oh, well, this will take care of all the problems. But then I had read up and didn't want my kids to grow up without a parent or think that for some reason they caused me to do it. So at that point in time I was just - I didn't know what to do or where to turn. I was just completely lost. And so I hadn't been to church in like a year. For whatever reason the Sunday before the Monday that I went to [an] attorney I went to church and they told a story. And I said: You know, I'm willing to confess to what I've done at whatever cost because I can't - I can't keep going like this, and I can't keep pretending like nothing is wrong, and laying in bed and the couch all day. So I went to [an] attorney the very next day. Q. Do you need a moment? A. I'm okay. * * * In January 2003, I'm sorry. This is hard reliving it. THE COURT: That's okay. Take your time and if you need a recess just let me know. A. This is the first time that I just really said it out loud. THE COURT: Yes. A. In January of 2003, I contacted [an attorney]. I informed him . . . that I had done something wrong and I didn't know where to turn to or who to turn to. At this point in time I hadn't told my family and nobody knew. All they knew is that something was wrong with me. I wasn't myself. I was withdrawn and I stayed in bed . . . all day. The attorney immediately contacted my former employer to advise that there was a problem with his accounting system. Up until this time he had no knowledge of any . . . problems. My attorney also contacted a doctor for me to see immediately because he could tell that something was not right with me. At this time that my attorney contacted my former employer I offered to make immediate restitution, which I did [over time]. At this point in time my employer said that he did not want to contact any authorities because he didn't want the publicity in a small town. And as far as I knew, the situation was taken care of. I was making restitution and I thought it was over. At some point in time my former employer contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). After meeting with the FBI, I agreed to assist them because my former employer was billing my time as the attorney's time in guardianship cases. This would cause clients to run out of money and become eligible for Medicaid and other state governmental services. The federal government ended up dropping the charge against me and I . . . agreed to assist them in any cases against my employer. When things were not moving along in the federal case my former employer also contacted the local authorities. I was arrested on May 1 of 2004. And this was almost - this was almost a year-and-a-half after I had first come forward. And then in September 2004, my attorney was ready to go to trial. At the last minute the State Attorney offered a plea deal. I was told that I could finally put this nightmare behind me by pleading no contest and I would have no criminal record because the court would withhold adjudication. [T]he judge made a point to mention that adjudication was being withheld so I would have no felony criminal record. And also at this time there was no restitution ordered because I had already paid it all back. TR at 15-18. Petitioner paid approximately $85,000 in restitution. Restitution was a Sisyphean effort, as Petitioner explains: I paid back cash. I had taken - I had calculated $40,000. He said that I calculated - that I had taken $60,000 and then he raised it to $80,000 for his time. But I - I paid back $45,000 in cash. The credit card companies, he contacted every credit card company that I paid and they all reversed all of their [charges]. So I ended up owing, you know, another $45,000 back in credit cards that he had . . . all the payments reversed. . . . So I paid a total - it was $85,000. * * * [W]e sold everything we had. . . . We sold our home. I had bought my husband a third vehicle. We sold that. We had a motorcycle that sold. We had a lot of toys. TR at 27-28. The trier of fact is not persuaded that Petitioner would have lied on her license application in October 2005 after voluntarily disclosing her offense in January 2003. When Petitioner exercised a conscious choice to confess her offense, she knew with certainty that shame would follow her exposure to her husband and children. Petitioner also knew that her choice would subject her family to the financial hardship and social upheaval inherent in selling everything they owned to make restitution to her former employer. Petitioner learned a new occupation, contributed to her family's recovery, and testified candidly and frankly about her offense. When the court sentenced Petitioner to 30 days in jail, Petitioner requested that she be allowed to serve the sentence every other weekend. Petitioner worked during the week and did not want to be away from her children all week and every weekend. The judge granted the request. The trier of fact finds that Petitioner neither misstated nor misrepresented her criminal record on her license application. Nor did Petitioner commit fraud in answering the questions on the application within the meaning of Subsection 626.611(2), Florida Statutes (2004). The trier of fact finds that Petitioner does not lack one or more of the qualifications for licensure required in Subsection 626.611(1), Florida Statutes (2004).1 Nor does Petitioner demonstrate a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance within the meaning of Subsection 626.611(7), Florida Statutes (2004).
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order determining that Petitioner's license application has been granted by operation of law. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of May, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 2006.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: On or about October 25, 1988, a Felony Complaint was filed in Municipal Court, Mt. San Jacinto Judicial District, Riverside County, California (Case No. 884467) charging that Petitioner had committed a violation of Section 278.5, Subdivision (b) of the Penal Code, a felony, in that on or about September 1, 1988, in the County of Riverside, State of California, she, being a person having physical custody of a child pursuant to an order, judgment, and decree of court which granted to another person [her former husband] rights of physical custody and visitation, did willfully and unlawfully, with the intent to deprive such person of such rights to custody and visitation, detain, conceal, take, and entice away such child, to wit, JAMES H. RODEN [her son, who, according to court documents, was born on April 22, 1989]. An Amended Felony Complaint charging Petitioner with the same felony offense was filed on or about April 8, 1991. Subsequently, there were plea negotiations which resulted in Petitioner entering a guilty plea to a reduced, misdemeanor charge, which the court accepted. In June or July of 1993, Petitioner submitted to the Department an application for licensure as a general lines insurance agent. Among the questions on the application form that Petitioner filled out were the following: Have you ever been charged with or convicted of or pleaded guilty or no contest to a crime involving moral turpitude (yes or no), or a felony (yes or no), or a crime punishable by imprisonment of one (1) year or more under the law of any state, territory or county, whether or not a judgment or con- viction has been entered? (yes or no) If yes, give date(s): What was the crime? Where and when were you charged? Did you plead guilty or nolo contendre? Were you convicted? Was adjudication withheld? Please provide a brief description of the nature of the offense charged If there has been more than one such felony charge, provide an explanation as to each charge on an attachment. Certified copies of the Information or Indictment and Final Adjudication for each charge is required. On this portion of the form, Petitioner wrote "no" in each of the first three blank spaces and made no further entries, notwithstanding that several years prior thereto, in Mt. San Jacinto Judicial District Municipal Court Case No. 884467, she had indeed been charged with (albeit not found guilty or convicted of) a felony punishable by imprisonment of one year or more. Petitioner, however, did not intend to misrepresent or conceal any information or to otherwise deceive the Department concerning her past. She mistakenly believed that, in this portion of the form, the Department was inquiring only about criminal offenses involving "moral turpitude." After looking up the term "moral turpitude" in the dictionary, she determined that the crime with which she was charged in Mt. San Jacinto Judicial District Municipal Court Case No. 884467 was not one involving "moral turpitude" inasmuch as her actions in abducting her son were intended to protect the child and were not in any way "wicked." After receiving Petitioner's application, the Department conducted a records check which revealed the felony charge that had been filed against Petitioner in Mt. San Jacinto Judicial District Municipal Court Case No. 884467. The Department thereupon advised Petitioner of its discovery and asked her to supply it with certain documnents that were filed in the case. Petitioner complied with the Department's request.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order announcing its intention to continue to process Petitioner's application for licensure as a general lines insurance agent rather than denying the application on the ground stated in the Department's January 26, 1994, denial letter. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 14th day of September, 1994. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of September, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Lisa Beth Weiner 572 Northeast 31st Street Pompano Beach, Florida 33064 James A. Bossart, Esquire Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neill General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent violated Sections 943.1395(6), 943.1395(7), and 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2001), and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was employed as a certified correctional officer at the Franklin County jail in Apalachicola, Florida. She held the rank of sergeant. On the evening of May 19, 2001, Respondent was not on duty. Instead, she was driving her vehicle around Apalachicola, Florida. Patricia Carroll was a passenger in Respondent's vehicle. Ms. Carroll was employed as the Finance Director for the Franklin County Sheriff's Office. At approximately 7:45 p.m., two females in another vehicle stopped in the street to talk to Respondent. The driver of the second vehicle, H.B., was 16 years old. The passenger in the second vehicle, C.B., was 18 years old. H.B. and C.B. asked Respondent if she would purchase some alcohol for them. Respondent agreed to make the purchase, telling H.B. and C.B. to meet her at the grocery store. Respondent and H.B. drove their vehicles to a grocery store parking lot. Respondent asked H.B. and C.B. if they wanted a six-pack of beer. Responding affirmatively, H.B. and C.B. asked Respondent to buy them a six-pack of Zima. H.B. and C.B. gave Respondent money to buy the alcohol. Respondent went into the grocery store and purchased a six-pack of Zima. She exited the store and gave the alcohol to H.B. and C.B. through passenger window of H.B.'s vehicle. The two vehicles then left the parking lot. Casey Nash, an employee at the Franklin County Courthouse, was sitting in a vehicle in the grocery store parking lot when Respondent and H.B. arrived there. Ms. Nash saw Respondent give the alcohol to H.B. and C.B. Ms. Nash knew H.B. was a minor. Subsequently that evening, Ms. Nash reported her observations to a deputy sheriff. On May 21, 2001, H.B. and C.B. gave sworn written statements regarding the incident to an investigator for the Franklin County Sheriff's Office. In the statements, H.B. and C.B. stated that Respondent had purchased beer from them. On May 29, 2001, Respondent gave a sworn written statement to an investigator for the Franklin County Sheriff's Office. Respondent's statement indicated that she purchased an alcoholic beverage for Ms. Carroll at the grocery store on the evening of May 19, 2001. She did not reveal her purchase of alcohol for H.B. and C.B. Respondent was charged in a criminal case with contributing to the delinquency of a minor. She subsequently pled nolo contendere to a lesser included charge of aiding and abetting possession of alcohol by an underaged person. On June 7, 2001, the judge accepted Respondent's plea, withheld adjudication of guilt, and ordered Respondent to pay a $195 fine. On June 20, 2001, Respondent made a second sworn statement to an investigator for the Franklin County Sheriff's Office. In the second sworn statement, Petitioner admitted that she had purchased the alcohol for H.B. and C.B. on May 19, 2001, and that she had avoided revealing all the facts in her May 29, 2001, sworn statement. According to the second sworn statement, Respondent did not tell the whole truth because she "was confused and scared about what had happened." As a result of her actions, Respondent's employer demoted her, taking away the rank of sergeant and placing her on probation for six months. Respondent's employment at the Franklin County jail subsequently was terminated for reasons unrelated to this case. The record does not reveal how long Respondent has been a certified correctional officer. There is no evidence that Respondent has a prior disciplinary history. Respondent currently is working as a painter. It was apparent at the hearing that Petitioner is remorseful for her misconduct.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a final order revoking Respondent's certification as a correctional officer. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of September, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of September, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Erika R. Bartley 215 Martin Luther King Avenue Apalachicola, Florida 32320 Laurie B. Binder, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Louis A. Vargas, General Counsel Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-6563 James Crosby, Jr., Secretary Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-6563
