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EDWARD S. NARBUT vs. DIVISION OF LICENSING, 80-001473 (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-001473 Latest Update: Dec. 22, 1980

Findings Of Fact Petitioner filed an application for licensure as a Class "F" Unarmed Security Guard. Question numbered 13 on that application form is as follows: "Have you ever been arrested? If yes, list any and all arrests and dispositions." Petitioner replied affirmatively and advised that in April, 1962, he had been charged with breaking and entering in Broward County and had served a three and one-half year sentence. He further advised that he had received a pardon from Governor Askew with permission to bear firearms. Petitioner did not report any other arrests or charges, since he believed that only felonies were required to be reported. The report moved into evidence by the Respondent lists various governmental entities as contributors of fingerprints at times when Petitioner was either "arrested or received" on several charges and the disposition of each. According to that report, Petitioner was either "arrested or received" by the police department in Youngstown, Ohio, in 1952 for carrying concealed weapons. Petitioner never knew he was charged with that crime, although he does recall that at that time he was working for a railroad and there was some type of incident with the police due to the fact that he and other railroad employees were carrying mace and blackjacks. The report further reflects that in 1961 Petitioner was "arrested or received" on several breaking and entering charges by law enforcement entities in St. Petersburg, West Palm Beach, and Raiford, Florida, and that he was sentenced to a prison term. Respondent presented no evidence to indicate that any of the breaking and entering charges were other than the crime(s) for which Petitioner has received a pardon. The report further indicates that Petitioner was "arrested or received" by the police department in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, in 1968 for contempt of court, for which he was fined, and in 1970 for a "worthless check (warr)," for which he was also fined. Regarding the contempt of court charge, Petitioner was in a different courtroom on a different case, but the record is devoid of any evidence as to the type of matters involved. As to the worthless check, Petitioner attempted to redeem the check the following day, but found that he was too late.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED THAT: A Final Order be entered approving Petitioner's application for an Unarmed Security Guard License. RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of December, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of December, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Edward S. Narbut 317 South East 12th Avenue, Apt. 2 Pompano Beach, Florida 33060 W. J. Gladwin, Jr., Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 The Honorable George Firestone Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIVISION OF LICENSING vs ARMSTAR PROTECTIVE SERVICE AND MANUEL VERNERETTE, 97-001867 (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Apr. 16, 1997 Number: 97-001867 Latest Update: Mar. 27, 1998

The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondents are guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against them, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken, if any.

Findings Of Fact Jacquelyn Kendrick is the owner of the Club Ecstasy, an adult entertainment club with dancers and strippers, located in Fort Lauderdale. In August 1996 the Club had a contract for security services with Warrior, a security agency. Respondent Manuel Vernerette, as an employee of Warrior, provided security services at the Club. When Warrior's relationship with the Club ended, Kendrick approached Respondent Vernerette with regard to working for the Club. Although Vernerette was currently employed by Navarro during the day, he was able to work at the Club at night. Kendrick also asked him if he knew others who would work at the Club, and he referred several other Navarro employees to Kendrick, who interviewed them. One of the Club's employees would check identification and frisk the Club's customers for weapons outside the front door. The customer could then enter the Club, purchase a "ticket", and then pass through a second door into the "actual" Club portion of the premises. The customer's ticket was collected at the second door. Vernerette's duties were primarily to "collect the tickets" at the second door. He also helped stock the bar and collected money from customers who wanted to use the "VIP rooms". He also had some supervisory responsibilities over some of the Club's employees he had referred to Kendrick. Vernerette only worked inside the Club. On November 23, 1996, two of Petitioner's investigators appeared at the Club to check identification and licenses of any security officers working at the Club. When they arrived, Vernerette was outside with several other Club employees he had referred to Kendrick. Someone other than Vernerette was stationed at the door searching customers. Vernerette appeared to be overseeing the operation. Although all of those employees wore dark clothing, they were not in uniforms. At the request of the investigators, Vernerette produced his Class "D" security officer license and his Class "G" firearm license. At the time Vernerette, who also holds a concealed weapon or firearm license, was wearing a 9 mm. semi-automatic firearm in a gun belt which was covered by his jacket. He was also wearing a badge. He told the investigators how many security officers were working inside the Club and that they could come outside to have their licenses checked. Those persons were summoned. The investigators did not go into the Club that night. In response to the investigator's questions, Vernerette told them that all the security officers were employees of the Club. He specifically used the term "in-house" security. He was cooperative with the investigators. The investigators were told that "Jackie" was the person they needed to speak to regarding the employment status of the security officers but that she was not there. On January 30, 1997, the investigators returned to the Club since they had been unsuccessful in their attempts to contact Jackie. She was there that night. Vernerette was not since he had stopped working at the Club by January 3. Jackie denied that Vernerette and the other security officers were employees. She was unable to produce any documentation regarding her relationship with Vernerette or the other security officers. She had no contract, no payroll records, and no cancelled checks. She advised Petitioner's investigators that she paid Vernerette, sometimes by check and sometimes in cash, and that he then paid the others. After the investigators interviewed her, Kendrick began using deputies from the Broward County Sheriff's Office to provide security services at the Club. In February 1997 Vernerette received his Class "B" license, a security agency license. He visited Kendrick at the Club, gave her a proposal to provide security services at the Club, and gave her his new business card. The business card advertises Armstar Protective Services, lists Vernerette as the President and C.E.O., and includes his Class "B" license number. Vernerette did not conduct the business of a security agency without being so licensed when he worked at the Club. He worked there as an employee of the business and not as an independent contractor. Further, Vernerette did not perform security officer duties at the Club between November 23, 1996, and January 30, 1997.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding Respondents not guilty of the allegations contained in Counts I, III, and V and dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against them. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of February, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Kristi Reid Bronson, Esquire Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, Mail Station 4 LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of February, 1998. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Yolanda Fox, Esquire Law Offices of C. Jean-Joseph Mercede Executive Park 1876 North University Drive, Suite 309C Plantation, Florida 33322 Don Bell, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, Plaza Level 2 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Honorable Sandra B. Mortham Secretary of State Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57493.6101493.6102493.6115493.6118493.6301
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KENNETH DUNNING vs DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIVISION OF LICENSING, 98-005572 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Dec. 18, 1998 Number: 98-005572 Latest Update: Jun. 21, 1999

The Issue The issues in the case are whether the Respondent’s application for a Class G Firearms license should be approved and whether his existing Concealed Weapons license should be revoked.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the agency charged with regulating the licensure and sale of weapons in the State of Florida. By letter dated November 5, 1998, the Department of State, Division of Licensing, notified Kenneth Dunning that his application for a Class “G” license had been denied. The grounds for the proposed denial are as follows: Failure to qualify under Section 493.6118(4), Florida Statutes, in that you were convicted of a felony and your civil rights, including the specific right to possess firearms, have not been restored by the State of Michigan. For information, please contact the state (sic) of Michigan. In 1960, Mr. Dunning was convicted of attempted armed robbery, a felony, in the State of Michigan. On December 23, 1998, the Department filed an Administrative Complaint against Mr. Dunning, seeking to revoke his Concealed Weapons license, number W98-00504. As grounds for the proposed revocation, the Complaint states as follows: On or about June 17, 1960, in the State of Michigan, Respondent was convicted of attempted armed robbery, a felony, and has not had the right to own or possess firearms restored in the State of Michigan. Respondent is ineligible for licensure pursuant to Sections 790.06(2)(d) and 790,23, Florida Statutes. There is no evidence that Mr. Dunning’s civil rights were lost as a result of his 1960 conviction. The evidence, including Mr. Dunning’s uncontradicted testimony and available documents, establishes that Mr. Dunning’s civil rights, if impacted at all by his 1960 conviction, have been restored without reservation. By Order dated May 23, 1997, from the Office of Executive Clemency, Mr. Dunning was granted a restoration of civil rights “except the specific authority to possess or own a firearm” by the Governor of the State of Florida with the concurrence of the requisite members of the State Cabinet. The Certificate of Restoration indicates it is valid “in the State of Florida for any and all felony convictions in the state other than Florida, or in any United States court or military court. . . .” By Executive Order dated September 10, 1998, and signed by the Governor of the State of Florida, Mr. Dunning was granted “the right to own, possess or use firearms.” Department Exhibit numbered 1 is a letter dated September 28, 1998, from “Anthony P. Gledhill” who is identified as “Division Counsel, Detroit” for the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms to John P. Booth, Assistant General Counsel, Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE). The letter is a legal analysis of case law related to restoration of an individual’s civil rights after conviction. The exhibit does not establish that Mr. Dunning’s conviction resulted in a loss of his civil rights. The letter does not establish that his civil rights, if impacted by the conviction, were not completely restored. Department Exhibit numbered 2 is a letter dated September 24, 1998, to Mr. Dunhill from Mr. Booth. The letter identifies as the reason for FDLE’s nonapproval of Mr. Dunning's attempt to purchase a firearm under Section 790.065, Florida Statutes, “the determination by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms that your civil rights have not been fully restored by Michigan. . . .” The exhibit does not establish that Mr. Dunning’s conviction resulted in a loss of his civil rights. The letter does not establish that his civil rights, if impacted by the conviction, were not completely restored.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation enter a final order granting the application of Kenneth Dunning for a Class “G” firearms license and dismissing the Administrative Complaint addressed herein. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of April, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Steve Bensko, Esquire Division of Licensing Department of State The Capitol, Mail Station 4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Kenneth Dunning 806 Walker Drive Tampa, Florida 33613 Honorable Katherine Harris Secretary of State Department of State The Capitol, Plaza Lever 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Deborah K. Kearney, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, Lower Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250

Florida Laws (8) 120.57493.6118775.082775.083775.084790.06790.065790.23
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DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs DAVID L. JORDAN, 91-001001 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Feb. 13, 1991 Number: 91-001001 Latest Update: Jun. 20, 1991

Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto David L. Jordan was certified in firearms instruction (Stipulation by the parties). On July 20, 1990, while conducting a firearms training class for probation and parole officer candidates, Respondent, while demonstrating use of a shotgun, pointed a shotgun at a female student at close range and pulled the trigger. Respondent was attempting to demonstrate the intimidating nature of a shotgun to the students. Prior to pointing the shotgun at the student, Respondent had checked the magazine and chamber of the gun to insure the gun was unloaded and showed this check to most of the students in the class. He then, with his back to the female student, operated the slide on the pump shotgun by pulling the rack back and then forward, turned toward the student with the shotgun muzzle within a foot of the student's face and pulled the trigger. This incident was extremely disturbing to the student at whom the gun had been pointed and to most of the rest of the class as well. During the morning session of the firearms training class, the senior instructor in the class, Sergeant Oates, had pointed a revolver at members of the class, and both Respondent and Oates had allowed students to point revolvers at other students to practice squeezing the trigger while dry firing. It is a cardinal safety rule when handling firearms to never point a firearm at another person unless compatible with the right to use deadly force. (Exhibits 1 and 2) The Florida Firearms Training Manual (Exhibit 1) expresses the rule as "Never point a firearm at anyone unless compatible with deadly force departmental policy and Chapter 776, Florida Statutes." It is gross negligence for an instructor in firearms training to point a weapon at another person or allow students to point firearms at other persons. The training of the class which Respondent was instructing on July 20, 1990, was conducted with functional weapons.

Recommendation It is recommended that the certification of David L. Jordan as a firearms instructor be revoked. This recommendation is in accordance with Rule 11B- 20.0012(1), Florida Administrative Code. RECOMMENDED this 20th day of June, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael R. Ramage, Esquire Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 David L. Jordan 6213 Watermark Drive Apartment 206 Riverview, FL 33659 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 James T. Moore Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302

Florida Laws (1) 943.12 Florida Administrative Code (2) 11B-20.00111B-20.0012
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIVISION OF LICENSING vs ANGEL LUIS LUGO, 93-002566 (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida May 07, 1993 Number: 93-002566 Latest Update: Feb. 06, 1995

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent's Class "D" Security Officer License and/or Class "G" Statewide Firearm License should be revoked or otherwise disciplined based upon the alleged violations of Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, set forth in the Third Amended Administrative Complaint filed by Petitioner.

Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence introduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: On or about June 7, 1989, Respondent filed an application for a Class "D" Security Officer License with the Department. The application form asked the applicant whether he had ever been arrested and to list any and all arrests. The application specifically provided that "falsification of this question may be grounds for denial of your license." Respondent answered affirmatively that he had been arrested. The only specific incident listed on the application was an arrest in 1979 for a charge of "asault [sic] with a deadly weapon intemp [sic] to kill Fay N.C. [sic]." The Application also required the applicant to set forth the outcome of all arrests. Respondent replied that the "charges was [sic] drop [sic]." On or about July 17, 1990, Respondent submitted an application with the Department for a Class "G" Statewide Firearms License. The application form for this license included an identical request regarding prior arrests. In response, Respondent checked the box indicating he had never been arrested and wrote "N/A" where he was supposed to indicate the date, charge and outcome of the arrests. Respondent has not provided any explanation for why his Class "D" Application disclosed an arrest in 1979, but his Class "G" Application did not reference this arrest. This discrepancy is not alleged in the Third Amended Administrative Complaint. Petitioner has submitted a certificate from the Cumberland County, North Carolina Superior Court which indicates that a criminal summons was issued for "Angelo Louis Lugo" on or about May 5, 1987, for a charge of "M Assault By Pointing A Gun." It is not clear whether this summons is directed at Respondent nor is it clear whether the Summons was ever served and/or the subject was arrested. The ultimate disposition of this criminal case is not clear. Respondent denies ever being served with the summons referenced in this court record. The evidence was insufficient to establish that Respondent was ever arrested in connection with this matter. Petitioner has submitted a second certified record from the Cumberland County, North Carolina Superior Court, which indicates that Respondent was issued a "Citation" on March 10, 1986, for the charge of "M Shoplifting Concealment Goods." No other evidence or explanation of this record has been provided. Respondent admits that he was issued a Notice to Appear in court after he was caught by store security personnel taking aspirin from a bottle. He testified that he did not list this matter on his applications because he was not "arrested." Instead, he claims that he was merely issued a citation to appear in court. The evidence presented in this case did not refute Respondent's version of the events surrounding this court record. In sum, the evidence was not clear and convincing that Respondent was ever formally "arrested" for this incident. The ultimate disposition of this criminal charge is not clear from the record in this proceeding. Counts III and IV of the Third Amended Administrative Complaint are based upon an incident that occurred on February 9, 1993 between Respondent and Jorge Ruiz. There is a good deal of conflicting evidence regarding this incident. Both Respondent and Ruiz have testified and/or given statements on several occasions about the incident including statements to the police, testimony in a related criminal proceeding against Respondent and depositions taken in connection with a civil lawsuit filed by Ruiz against Respondent, Respondent's employer and the Bank where Respondent worked. It is impossible and unnecessary to resolve all of the conflicts in the differing accounts of the incident as described by Respondent and Ruiz at various times. After considering all of the evidence presented, including the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, the findings in this Recommended Order are based upon the clear and convincing evidence presented. On February 9, 1993, Respondent was working as an armed security guard at a Barnett Bank in Plantation, Florida. At approximately 1:30 p.m., Respondent was working outside the bank in the vicinity of the drive-thru lanes. He was there to direct traffic and monitor the area. Around this time, Jorge Ruiz pulled into the paved area in front of the drive-thru booths. Ruiz had been to the Bank on numerous occasions in the past and he had often used the drive-thru windows. Ruiz has a very powerful radio in his pick-up truck and he admits that he tends to play music at a loud volume. On at least one prior occasion, Ruiz had proceeded to the drive-thru station with his radio blasting. The tellers had complained about the noise coming through the intercom system. During the week or so prior to February 9, 1993, Ruiz and Respondent had at least one minor confrontation. During this prior instance, Respondent advised Ruiz that he had to turn his radio down before he reached the drive-thru booth because the intercom system picked up the background noise and it interfered with the tellers' ability to communicate with the customers. Ruiz replied that he would turn down the radio when he got to the window. When Ruiz entered the Bank's parking lot on February 9, 1993, his radio was playing loudly. Respondent approached the driver's side window of Ruiz' vehicle and asked Ruiz to turn his radio down. Ruiz responded with a number of obscenities. Respondent told Ruiz that unless he turned his radio down, he could not use the drive-thru facility. Ruiz refused to comply. Respondent stood in front of Ruiz' vehicle and directed him away from the drive-thru lane. Ruiz' vehicle moved forward and bumped into Respondent. Respondent drew his gun and shouted at Ruiz to stop the car and get out. Respondent claims that he intended to hold Ruiz while he called the police. The parties exchanged words and Ruiz' truck again moved forward striking Respondent. Respondent was not knocked down or otherwise injured, however, his gun discharged. The bullet penetrated the windshield of Ruiz' truck and hit the steering wheel. A fragment from the steering wheel struck Ruiz in the neck or chest area, causing a minor wound. Respondent contends that he was justified in drawing his weapon and/or using deadly force "to prevent the escape from custody of a person who committed a felony in his presence." This contention is rejected because there is no evidence that Ruiz was attempting to escape. Furthermore, it is not clear that Ruiz in fact committed a felony, nor does it appear that the use of force was reasonably necessary under the circumstances of this case. Respondent also contends that he was justified in drawing his weapon in self-defense because he was being threatened by a deadly weapon, i.e. Ruiz' truck, and he had no reasonable means of escape. Respondent claims that he was boxed in by a vehicle in front of the truck and had no reasonable way to retreat from the "deadly force" that confronted him. Respondent's contention that he had no reasonable means of escape is rejected as not credible. Contrary to Respondent's claim, the evidence was clear that Respondent had reasonable means of escape. Moreover, there were alternate ways to handle the situation which would have diffused rather than exacerbated the tension and danger. Respondent claims that the gun discharged accidently when the truck hit him. No persuasive evidence was presented to refute this contention. Indeed, in some of his statements, Ruiz admitted that the gun may have gone off by accident when his truck struck Respondent. In sum, it is clear that Ruiz was belligerent and abusive and that his car bumped into Respondent twice. Nonetheless, Respondent's contention that he was justified in drawing his weapon and that he had no reasonable means of escape is rejected. While it can not be concluded from the evidence presented that Respondent deliberately shot at Ruiz, the evidence did establish that Respondent was guilty of negligence, misconduct and/or incompetency when he drew and pointed his loaded weapon at Ruiz. The circumstances did not justify Respondent pointing a loaded weapon at Ruiz. Without question, Respondent failed to demonstrate that level of discretion and caution that is expected of a person licensed to carry a firearm in the course of his employment. After the gun went off, Respondent immediately jumped into the truck and took Ruiz to a nearby hospital where Ruiz' minor injury was treated and he was released.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the Department of State, Division of Licensing enter a Final Order dismissing Counts I, II, and III of the Third Amended Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent and finding Respondent guilty of the allegations contained in Count IV of that Third Amended Administrative Complaint. As a penalty for the violation, Respondent should be fined $1,500.00, his Class "G" Firearms License should be revoked and his Class "D" Security Guard License should be placed on probation for three years. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of December, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-2566 Petitioner has not submitted any proposed Findings of Fact. Respondent's proposed recommended order included a section entitled Findings of Fact. However, that section does not include any individually numbered proposed findings of fact and the paragraphs contained in this section of Respondent's proposal include a mixture factual assertions, argument and legal conclusions. The proposal has been fully reviewed and considered. However, because proposed findings of fact have not been separately identified, no rulings are made with respect to Respondent's proposal. COPIES FURNISHED: Henri C. Cawthon Assistant General Counsel Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, MS #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 James S. Benjamin, Esquire Benjamin & Aaronson, P.A. 100 Northeast Third Avenue, Suite 850 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250

Florida Laws (3) 120.57493.6118493.6121
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DIVISION OF LICENSING vs. CARLOS HERNAN GARCIA, 83-002659 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-002659 Latest Update: Mar. 15, 1984

Findings Of Fact The Respondent filed a license application with the Division of Licensing, Department of State for a Class "D" Unarmed Guard License on January 27, 1983. The Division of Licensing did not approve or deny the license application of Carlos Hernan Garcia within the 90-day period from the date of receipt of the application and, accordingly, by operation of Section 120.60(2), Florida Statutes, the Division issued to Respondent a Class "D" Unarmed Security Guard License which expires on May 14, 1983. But for the operation of the 90-day rule, the Division of Licensing would not have issued the Respondent an Unarmed Security Guard License. On July 17, 1983 the Division of Licensing issued an administrative complaint to revoke the license on grounds that the Respondent willfully misrepresented his criminal record in his application in violation of Section 495.319(1)(a), Florida Statutes, committed an assault and battery other than in self defense and committed criminal acts which directly relate to the business for which the license was sought in violation of Sections 493.319(1)(c) and (j), Florida Statutes. On May 19, 1979, the Respondent (while intoxicated) struck a police officer who was investigating a traffic accident in which the Respondent was involved. The Respondent was convicted of assault and battery upon a police officer and received six months probation and adjudication was withheld. On August 5, 1980, the Respondent was responsible for a fire which occurred in the bathroom of a restaurant during business hours for which he was convicted of criminal mischief. On or about October 29, 1982, the Respondent was carrying a concealed firearm, a 25-caliber pistol, without a license or permit required by Sections 790.05 and 790.06, Florida Statutes (1981). Following an argument which took place outside an apartment house, the Respondent shot and injured another person with the pistol. No criminal charges were brought and there was no prosecution as a result of this incident. The Respondent, who reads and writes English, failed to complete question number 13 on his security guard application, pertaining to past criminal arrests and convictions, by omitting any reference to the assault and battery and criminal mischief convictions, since the Respondent knew that he could be denied a license for having committed such crimes, and knowing that the omission, if discovered, would be grounds for denial of his license.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered revoking the Class "D" license of the Respondent Carlos Hernan Garcia. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of March, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 904/480-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15 day of March, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: James V. Antista, Esquire Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Carlos Hernan Garcia 9380 West Flagler Street, #120 Miami, Florida 33130 George Firestone Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mary Gast, Director Division of Licensing The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (3) 120.57120.60790.06
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