The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at the final hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is now, and has been since February 15, 1993, a Florida-licensed hearing aid specialist. He holds license number AS2453. For the past seven years, Respondent has owned Advanced Hearing Center, Inc. (Advanced Hearing), a hearing aid business located in North Palm Beach, Florida. W. J. is a hearing impaired hearing aid wearer. He and his wife of 32 years, F. J., reside in Florida (on Singer Island in Palm Beach County) part of the year (generally, January through the middle of April) and in New Jersey the remainder of the year. In late March of 1997, toward the end of their stay in Florida that year, W. J. contacted Respondent by telephone at Advanced Hearing to inquire about getting the hearing aid for his left ear repaired. W. J. had not had any previous dealings with Respondent. He had learned that Respondent was a hearing aid specialist upon reading the advertisement for Advanced Hearing in the Yellow Pages, and was "impressed" that Respondent had a Ph.D. During their telephone conversation, Respondent invited W. J. to visit Advanced Hearing with his wife. He told W. J. that, during the visit, he would look at the hearing aid that needed repair and, in addition, give W. J. a free hearing test. W. J., accompanied by his wife, visited Advanced Hearing on Tuesday, April 1, 1997. While waiting to see Respondent, W. J. was asked to read written "testimonials" from satisfied patients of Respondent's. W. J. and his wife were subsequently escorted to Respondent's office, where they remained for the duration of the visit. While in Respondent's office, W. J. filled out a medical history form. The information that W. J. provided on the form indicated that he did not have any significant medical problems warranting referral to a medical doctor. Respondent then used a video otoscope to examine W. J.'s ear canals. The ear canals were "normal looking" and, although there was some wax buildup, the eardrums were visible. As he performed the otoscope examination, Respondent explained to the J.s what he saw. He told them about the wax buildup and cautioned that the lack of adequate "cerumen management" could lead to "abnormalities or infections or a fungus c[ould] grow," conditions which would require medical attention. Inasmuch as W. J. had not reported any recent history of infection and the otoscope examination had not revealed any observable abnormality, Respondent proceeded to test W. J.'s hearing. He performed pure tone audiometric testing by air and by bone and recorded the results of such testing. Respondent's office, where the testing was done, was a "certified testing room," within the meaning of Section 484.0501(6), Florida Statutes. The air and bone tests revealed no significant difference or "gap" between W. J.'s air conduction hearing and his bone conduction hearing. After the testing, Respondent informed the J.s that he was unable to repair W. J.'s old hearing aid (for his left ear), and he suggested that they purchase new, "upgrade[d]" hearing aids for W. J. if they could afford to do so. Respondent recommended the Starkey Sequel Circuit, the "pinnacle product" of "one of the largest [hearing aid] manufacturers in the world" (Starkey), because he believed that it would help alleviate the "problems with distortion and loud noise" that W. J. had reported that he was experiencing. Respondent informed the J.s that he could sell them this Starkey product at a "great price." The J.s told Respondent that they were reluctant to purchase new hearing aids in Florida because they were planning on returning to their residence in New Jersey shortly, and that, in any event, they were interested in Siemens Music, not Starkey Sequel Circuit, hearing aids. Respondent replied that the Starkey Sequel Circuit was comparable to the Siemens Music and that any Starkey dealer would be able to service Starkey Sequel Circuit hearing aids purchased from his business. After considering Respondent's comments and discussing the matter with his wife, W. J. signed a written agreement to purchase Starkey Sequel Circuit hearing aids from Advanced Hearing for $3,800.00. W. J. paid the full purchase price, by credit card, before leaving. On the credit card receipt that W. J. received were written the words, "no refunds." The "purchase agreement" that W. J. signed had a "guarantee date" of "2 yrs." and contained the following provisions: Within a period of one year after delivery patient may have these instruments serviced at Advanced Hearing Center, Inc. without any cost under the terms of the guarantee issued by the manufacturer. As the degree of satisfaction is dependent upon user, motivation, diligent adherence to instructions, and proper use of this prosthesis, all warranties are confined to those issued by the manufacturer. Examination, test, and other representations are non-medical and for the sole purpose of fitting hearing aids. I hereby acknowledge that I have been provided information concerning the advantages of telecoils, "t" coils, or "t" switches; which included the increased access to telephones and assistive listening systems. I have been provided in writing with the terms and conditions of the 30-day trial period and money back guarantee; with notice of my right to cancel the purchase within 30 days of receipt of the hearing aid(s) for a valid reason based on a failure to achieve a specific measured performance such as sound improvements or improved word discrimination. It shall be the responsibility of the person selling the hearing aid(s) to maintain the audiometric documentation necessary to establish the measured improvement. If the hearing aid must be repaired, or adjusted during the 30- day[] trial period, the running of the 30- day trial period is suspended one day for each 24 hour period that the hearing aid is not in the purchaser's possession. A repaired, remade, or adjusted hearing aid must be claimed by the purchaser within three working days after notification of availability. In the event of cancellation within the 30-day trial period, the seller may retain a charge not to exceed $150.00 on a monaural fitting (one hearing aid) and $200.00 on a binaural fitting (two hearing aids) for earmolds and services provided to fit the hearing aids. In addition, the purchaser may be charged a cancellation fee not to exceed 5% of the total purchase price. If the hearing system improves word discrimination, which the seller has the right to test and document, no refund will be issued. If a problem arises you should return immediately to the office listed above. In the event a complaint concerning a hearing aid and/or guarantee cannot be reconciled, you may contact the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, 1940 North Monroe Street, Tallahassee, FL 32399-0783. Telephone Number (904) 488-6602. I understand that this purchase agreement comprises the entire agreement and no other agreement of any kind, verbal understanding or promise whatsoever will be recognized or be binding upon Advanced Hearing Center, Inc. THE USE OF A HEARING AID WILL NOT RESTORE NORMAL HEARING, NOR WILL IT PREVENT FURTHER HEARING LOSS. After the "purchase agreement" was signed, Respondent made earmolds to send to Starkey. The earmolds, along with a manufacturer's order form that Respondent had completed, were subsequently sent to Starkey. On the order form, Respondent provided information concerning the results of the air conduction testing, but not of the bone conduction testing, he had performed on W. J. The J.s left Advanced Hearing following their April 1, 1997, visit without taking a copy of the signed "purchase agreement" with them. At their request, Respondent mailed them a copy of the "purchase agreement," which they received sometime on or about Saturday, April 5, 1997, along with the following cover letter, dated April 1, 1997: Thank you both for coming to Advanced Hearing Center and mutually deciding to purchase your new hearing system. I am confident that the Starkey Sequels will improve your hearing, especially since it minimizes distortion of louder sounds as we thoroughly discussed. Your custom order is being processed and we will notify you when it comes in to set an appointment for the fitting and pick up of your new instruments. Also enclosed please find another copy of the purchase agreement. It was not long after the J.s had left Advanced Hearing on April 1, 1997, that they started having second thoughts about the purchase they had made. The next morning (April 2, 1997), they telephoned Respondent and advised him of their "doubts" and concerns regarding the purchase. Respondent "talked it out" with them, and, at the end of the conversation, the J.s expressed their willingness to "accept the delivery" of the hearing aids. W. J., again accompanied by his wife, returned to Advanced Hearing on Tuesday, April 8, 1997, to be fitted with the new hearing aids. He had not seen a medical doctor since his last visit to Advanced Hearing. When Respondent first fitted W. J. with the new hearing aids, W. J. told Respondent that he heard a whistling noise. Respondent thereupon removed the hearing aids and, using a "metal probe," took wax out of both of W. J.'s ears. He then again fitted W. J. with the new hearing aids. This time W. J. did not hear any whistling noise or other feedback. Respondent proceeded to test and measure W. J.'s hearing. The audiometric test results, which were reduced to writing and placed in the patient file Respondent maintained on W. J., revealed that, with the new hearing aids, W. J. enjoyed a significant improvement in hearing. Following the testing, the J.s accepted delivery of new hearing aids. Respondent provided the J.s with a copy of the "purchase agreement" that W. J. had signed during his previous visit to Advanced Hearing, on which Respondent had added the serial numbers of the new hearing aids and the date of delivery (April 8, 1997). W. J. left Advanced Hearing on April 8, 1997, wearing the new hearing aids. Sometime after leaving Advanced Hearing, W. J. began hearing the same whistling noises that he had heard when Respondent had first fitted him. After returning to New Jersey on April 9, 1997, the J.s brought the new hearing aids to a New Jersey audiologist to be serviced. The New Jersey audiologist told the J.s that to correct the whistling problem new earmolds would have to be made. She further advised the J.s that she "would have to charge [them] a considerable amount of money" to make these earmolds. Respondent was not furnished a signed written request from W. J. requesting that Respondent release to the New Jersey audiologist the records in the file Respondent maintained on W. J. Accordingly, Respondent never sent the New Jersey audiologist these records. On May 1, 1997, the J.s shipped the new hearing aids back to Respondent, along with a letter (dated that same day, May 1, 1997), in which they demanded a "full refund" based upon their claim that the hearing aids neither fit nor worked properly. On May 5, 1997, Respondent refused delivery of the package containing the hearing aids and the letter. Thereafter, on or about May 6, 1997, W. J. filed a complaint against Respondent with Petitioner. The J.s re-sent to Respondent the May 1, 1997, letter requesting a "full refund." The letter was delivered to Respondent on May 9, 1997. Respondent refused to provide the refund that the J.s had demanded because he believed that, inasmuch as he had the audiometric documentation necessary to establish that the hearing aids significantly improved W. J.'s hearing, the J.s did not have a "valid reason," under the existing law, to void their purchase of the hearing aids. Respondent did agree, however, to pay for a qualified person in New Jersey to make earmolds for W. J. so that the problem with the hearing aids could be corrected. He also offered to take the hearing aids back and exchange them for Siemens Music hearing aids. Neither of these offers, though, was acceptable to the J.s. Unsuccessful in their efforts to obtain a refund from Respondent, the J.s sought redress from their credit card company. The credit card company sent the J.s the following letter, dated May 30, 1997: This is in reference to the billing error from ADVANCED HEARING CTR in the amount(s) of $3,800.00. Based on the information you have provided, we have removed the item(s) from dispute and issued a credit to your current account. Please be advised that the merchant has the opportunity for rebuttal. If this occurs, we may need to contact you for further information if deemed necessary to support your case. However, if the merchant can provide documentation that proves the charge(s) to be valid, we will have no alternative but to place the charge(s) back on your account. If this is necessary, we will send you a written explanation. . . . Respondent, on behalf of Advanced Hearing, took advantage of the "opportunity for rebuttal" provided by the credit card company. The matter was finally resolved in October of 1997, with the credit card company siding with the J.s. The end result of the dispute resolution process was that the J.s were made whole and $3,800.00 was "charged back" to Advanced Hearing's account. In early December of 1997, Respondent discovered that there were several files missing from his office. He suspected a disgruntled former employee whom he had recently terminated. (The employee's personnel file was among the missing files.) Respondent contacted the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office, which investigated the matter. The deputy that conducted the investigation found no signs of forced entry. No arrests were made as a result of the investigation. Following the completion of the investigation, Respondent found that there were other files, including W. J.'s patient file, that were missing. Respondent made an effort to recreate the documentation that was in W. J.'s file. He contacted Starkey and obtained, over the telephone, the test result information that he had included on the manufacturer's order form he had sent to Starkey. He recorded this information on an Audiometric Case History and Tests form that he uses in his practice. On the form, he wrote that this was "partial information obtained from manufacturer." In January of 1998, Respondent's secretary inadvertently charged the J.s' credit card account $3,800.00. The mistake was subsequently rectified. Sometime in 1998, the J.s mailed to Respondent the hearing aids they had purchased from Advanced Hearing the year before. This time Respondent accepted delivery. The hearing aids were "not in working order" when they were received by Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Board enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint issued against Respondent in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of May, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of May, 2001.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent violated Subsections 484.056(1)(g) and (h), Florida Statutes (1999), respectively, by committing fraud, deceit, negligence, incompetence, or misconduct in the dispensing of a hearing aid and by failing to provide a sales receipt and other required information; and, if so, what penalty, if any, should be imposed against Respondent's license as a hearing aid specialist. (All chapter and section references are to Florida Statutes (1999) unless otherwise stated.)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for regulating the practice of hearing aid specialists in Florida pursuant to Chapter 484. Respondent is licensed as a hearing aid specialist in Florida pursuant to license number AS0002712. The Administrative Complaint involves the sale and service of an original pair of hearing aids and replacement hearing aids to a single customer. The record identifies the customer as C.P. in order to preserve the customer's confidentiality. C.P. is an elderly gentleman who is hearing impaired. C.P.'s wife accompanied and assisted C.P. in most of his dealings with Respondent. On February 16, 1999, Respondent performed a free hearing test on C.P. at Elfers Optical and Hearing Company (Elfers). Elfers is located on State Road 54 in New Port Richey, Florida. C.P. had heard of Respondent from a friend and responded to a newspaper advertisement by Elfers for a free hearing test. Respondent advised C.P. that C.P. needed two hearing aids. Respondent concluded that C.P. needed a hearing aid for each ear for balance. Respondent recommended programmable hearing aids for several reasons. Respondent represented that programmable hearing aids could be programmed for hearing needs that change over time and therefore would not have to be replaced. However, programmable hearing aids are more expensive than others. C.P. stated that he wanted to think about it. C.P. left the office and subsequently made an appointment for a return visit on February 19, 1999. When C.P. returned to Elfers on February 19, 1999, Respondent was sick and not in the office. Ms. Phillys Strand (Strand), Respondent's employee, saw C.P. and his wife. C.P. stated that he had decided to purchase the programmable hearing aids recommended by Respondent. Strand fitted C.P. for two hearing aids and had C.P. execute a contract for the purchase of two Philips Encanto II programmable hearing aids (Encantos) at the total price of $3,832 (the contract). C.P. paid $3,832 on February 19, 1999. The contract states that there was a one-year warranty on the hearing aids. The one-year warranty covered replacement or repair but not a refund of the purchase price. The contract specifically states that C.P. had only 30 days from the date of delivery (the 30-day trial period) in which to obtain a refund of the purchase price. Respondent delivered the Encantos to C.P. on March 1, 1999. C.P. returned to Elfers on March 3, 1999, complaining that the hearing aids hurt his ears. Respondent ground down the hearing aids, and C.P. left Elfers with the modified hearing aids. C.P. returned to Elfers on March 10, 1999, and requested a refund from Respondent. C.P. explained that he had recently learned that he needed surgery on one of his ears to remove a cancerous legion and would be unable to use the hearing aids before the expiration of the 30-day trial period for obtaining a refund. On March 10, 1999, Respondent stated to C.P. that under Florida law C.P. had one year in which to obtain a refund. Neither Florida law nor the manufacturer provides a warranty that authorizes a refund for one year. The provisions in the contract pertaining to a refund of the purchase price merely reflect the terms of the applicable section of Florida Statutes. In relevant part, the purchase contract provides: Unless otherwise stated, the hearing aid is new and warranted for one year by dispenser . . . . The guarantee shall permit the purchaser to cancel for a valid reason within 30 days of the receipt of the hearing aid(s). A valid reason shall be defined as failure by the purchaser to achieve satisfaction from use of the hearing aid(s), so long as the hearing aid(s) is returned to the seller within the 30-day trial period in good working condition. In the event of cancellation within the 30-day trial period, [Elfers] will retain $150 plus 5% of total purchase price on monaural fitting, or $200 plus 5% of total purchase price on binaural fitting for ear molds and services provided to fit the hearing aids, pursuant to 484.0512FS. . . . On March 10, 1999, C.P. properly tendered the Encantos to Respondent in accordance with the requirements of the contract and Section 484.0512. C.P. had a valid reason, within the meaning of the contract and applicable law, for the failure to achieve satisfaction with the Encantos. C.P. properly requested a refund within the 30-day trial period that began on March 1, 1999, when Respondent delivered the Encantos to C.P. On March 10, 1999, Respondent had actual knowledge that C.P. had properly tendered the Encantos for a valid reason and properly requested a refund. Respondent had actual knowledge of the falsity of the statement that Florida law allowed C.P. one year in which to obtain a refund. Respondent had actual knowledge that neither Florida law nor any warranty amends the 30-day trial period prescribed in the contract and Section 484.0512 for obtaining a refund. In any event, Respondent had constructive knowledge that his statements to C.P. were false. The misrepresentation by Respondent on March 10, 1999, induced C.P. to retain the Encantos. The false statements by Respondent on March 10, 1999, induced C.P. to unknowingly allow the lapse of his statutory and contractual right to a refund. Respondent had actual, or constructive knowledge, of the effect of Respondent's false statement to C.P. C.P. underwent surgery on March 24, 1999, and could not wear the Encantos again until May 21, 1999. When C.P. began wearing the Encantos again on May 21, 1999, the left hearing aid hurt his ear. C.P. compared the two hearing aids and discovered that the left hearing aid was longer than the right. On May 27, 1999, C.P. and his wife returned to Respondent. Respondent made a new impression, using a substance different from that used by Strand for the initial impression, and told C.P. that Respondent would send the impression to the manufacturer for a new set of hearing aids. C.P. and his wife would be traveling in New York when Respondent received the new hearing aids, and Respondent agreed to mail the new hearing aids to C.P. in New York. C.P. received the new hearing aids while he was in New York. C.P. heard a "swishing" noise in the new hearing aids when people around him were talking. C.P. advised Respondent of the bothersome noise. Pursuant to Respondent's instructions, C.P. returned the hearing aids to Respondent. C.P. received hearing aids directly from the manufacturer on July 21, 1999, while C.P. was still in New York. The hearing aids created a pulsating sound. The volume wheel did not work, and the left hearing aid fell out of C.P.'s ear on at least one occasion. Respondent told C.P. that Respondent would have Betty Lou Gage (Gage), Respondent's assistant, locate a hearing aid specialist in New York where C.P. could take the hearing aids. On August 6, 1999, C.P. took the hearing aids to Genesee Hearing Aid in Buffalo, New York (Genesee), pursuant to Gage's instructions. Genesee advised C.P. that they did not work on Phillips programmable hearing aids and charged C.P. $15. On September 30, 1999, C.P. and his wife went to Respondent's office. C.P. complained that the hearing aids were whistling and falling out of his ears. While C.P. was in Respondent's office on September 30, 1999, C.P. requested a refund of the purchase price for a valid reason and tendered the hearing aids to Respondent in good condition. The tender and request for refund was within the one-year period previously represented by Respondent as required by Florida law. Respondent advised C.P. that the warranty was over. Respondent asked C.P. if C.P. wanted Respondent to send the hearing aids back to the manufacturer and have the manufacturer make the hearing aids automatic. C.P. agreed. On October 21, 1999, C.P. returned to Respondent's office for the new hearing aids. The toggle switch used for adjusting hearing aids was still on the outside of the hearing aids, but C.P. accepted the hearing aids anyway. Respondent advised C.P. not to wear the hearing aids while hunting. C.P. did not wear the hearing aids in November 1999 because he was hunting in New York. In December 1999, C.P. asked his wife to check the serial numbers on the hearing aids. C.P. and his wife discovered that the hearing aids were not Encantos. When C.P. and his wife returned to Florida, they went to Hearx, the provider of hearing aids under C.P.'s new insurance policy with Humana. A specialist at Hearx examined the hearing aids and confirmed that the hearing aids were not Phillips programmable hearing aids. Rather, they were half- shell conventional hearing aids with a retail value that ranged from $700 to $900. C.P. telephoned Elfers on January 19, 2000. A representative at Elfers advised C.P. that C.P. would need to speak to Respondent and that Respondent was no longer employed at that location. The representative advised C.P. to try reaching Respondent at the Holiday office. C.P. and his wife found Respondent at the Holiday office. C.P. advised Respondent that the hearing aids were not the Encantos C.P. had purchased and requested a refund. The request for refund was made within the one-year period represented by Respondent on March 10, 1999, in which C.P. could request a refund. C.P. also requested the telephone number for Phillips. Respondent told C.P. that Phillips was out of business and left the office. Jeff Ruff, another employee at the Holiday office, offered to try a new substance to put a seal around the hearing aids for a better fit. C.P. left the hearing aids with Ruff and obtained a receipt. C.P.'s wife telephoned Phillips, provided the serial numbers for the Encantos, and asked whether Respondent had returned the Encantos. The representative for Phillips stated that Respondent had returned the Encantos on October 8, 1999, and that Phillips had sent the half-shell conventional hearing aids back to Respondent. The serial numbers of the half-shell conventional hearing aids sent to Respondent matched those on the hearing aids that C.P.'s wife checked in December 1999. The market value of the half-shell conventional hearing aids is more than $2,000 less than that of the Encantos. Respondent should have refunded the difference in market value to C.P. Respondent did not refund the difference in market price to C.P. Respondent did not provide C.P. with any written documentation, including a sales receipt, for the half-shell conventional hearing aids; did not provide C.P. with a warranty for the half-shell conventional hearing aids; did not advise C.P. that Respondent had changed the hearing aids provided to C.P.; and did not advise C.P. of the difference in market value between the Encantos and half-shell conventional hearing aids. Respondent has not refunded any money to C.P. Respondent has not otherwise made restitution for the harm suffered by C.P. This is not Respondent's first offense. Petitioner has previously disciplined Respondent's license in two cases in which Respondent either allowed the 30-day trial period to lapse before taking action requested by the customer or refused to refund the entire amount of the purchase price. Petitioner imposed administrative fines in those two cases that totaled $1,000; required Respondent to pay costs of $805; and required Respondent pay a refund to the customer in the amount $544. A substantial period of time has not lapsed since Respondent's previous discipline. Petitioner entered a final order in the previous two cases on April 15, 2002.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating Subsections 484.056(1)(g) and (h); revoking Respondent's license; assessing an administrative fine of $2,000 and the costs of investigation and prosecution; requiring Respondent to make restitution to C.P. in the amount of $3,832; and requiring Respondent to pay all fines, costs, and restitution within 30 days of the date of the Final Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of September, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of September, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Kathryn E. Price, Esquire Bureau of Practitioner Regulation Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 Gage Davey 6521 Berea Lane New Port Richey, Florida 34653 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Susan Foster, Executive Director Board of Hearing Aid Specialists Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
Findings Of Fact Ms. Joan Westhrin was accepted, over objection, as an expert hearing aid specialist, and her testimony as follows, is also accepted and adopted as findings of fact. Hearing aid specialists are licensed to perform audiometric testing. Audiometric testing is the function of presenting pure tones through headphones to establish a threshold of hearing. A threshold of hearing is the basis for the smallest amount of sound which the human ear can perceive. The testing is done by using air conduction by way of headphones and bone conduction. A comparison is made between the air conduction and the bone conduction results on the audiogram to determine if the client has a sensory neural hearing loss, meaning a loss in the nerve, or a mechanical function that would indicate that it is something that should be referred to a medical doctor for medical attention. During hearing examinations, the hearing aid specialist must also do an audioscopic examination, or a physical look into the ear canal, to rule out any anomaly that might be developing in order to determine whether the client is a candidate for medical testing. Ear mold impressions provide an exact duplicate of the ear canal so that a hearing aid may have an exact fit in the ear. A cotton block is used in the ear to prevent the impression material, silicone, from traveling down to the ear drum, and the material is left in the ear about five or six minutes to set properly. A hearing aid specialist must perform a complete audiological examination in order to provide a client with an appropriate hearing aid. Specific training is required for an individual to provide a safe examination, testing, ear mold impressions, and selection of a hearing aid for a client. Otherwise, an untrained individual may adversely impact on the client when performing the hearing test and providing a hearing aid. The parties' joint prehearing statement stipulated that the following are "facts which are admitted": The Respondent's name is Jack Lee Beckwith. The Respondent has been, at all times material hereto, a licensed hearing aid specialist in the State of Florida. The Respondent's hearing aid license number is AS 0001775. The Respondent's address is 14 Wildwood Trail, Ormond Beach, Florida 32174-4343. The Respondent is listed as a sponsor on the application of Jean Dewey for a hearing aid trainee and did not sponsor her until December 5, 1989. The Respondent is listed as a sponsor for David Dewey as a hearing aid specialist trainee and did not sponsor him until December 5, 1989. When Respondent became the Deweys' sponsor, he assumed responsibility for supervision of them as trainees. David Dewey is not guilty of canvassing, as set forth in Chapter 484. Jean Dewey is not guilty of canvassing, as set forth in Chapter 484. Despite the stipulations contained in sub-8 and sub-9 above, Petitioner presented, without objection, evidence geared to the issue of Respondent telling Mrs. Dewey to canvass. After Petitioner had rested, Respondent moved to dismiss the administrative complaint in part upon grounds that there had been no showing that Respondent had told Mrs. Dewey to canvass and upon the language of the stipulation, which was worded similarly to a prior request for admission. In response, Petitioner's counsel asserted that there had been no meeting of the minds in the stipulation because she thought she was only agreeing that Mr. and Mrs. Dewey had never been adjudicated guilty of canvassing. The motion to dismiss was taken under advisement for resolution in this recommended order (TR 134-135). The Jeanne Lyons Trust bought Brill's Hearing Aid Center in Daytona Beach in June, 1989. At that time, Jeanne Lyons was 100 percent owner of the Jeanne Lyons Trust and the Trust owned 100 percent of Brill's Hearing Aid Center, Inc. Jeanne Lyons is married to David F. Lyons. Mr. Lyons was not employed by the trust or by the hearing aid center corporation or by his wife in any capacity, but at all times material to this administrative complaint, he acted as "go-between" for all three. From 1988 to 1992, Mr. Lyons served on the Board of Hearing Aid Specialists. He is, and at all times material has been, a licensed hearing aid specialist. Respondent Jack Beckwith was an employee of the corporation, Brill's Hearing Aid Center, Inc., in Daytona Beach, Florida. He formed a separate management corporation with his wife, who is also a licensed hearing aid specialist. The management corporation was hired by the Jeanne Lyons Trust to manage Brill's in Daytona Beach and to help expand Brill's operations south into New Smyrna Beach and north into Palm Coast. The purpose of the management corporation was to avoid paying the Beckwiths as employees for the expansion work. In each of the new locations, a lease within an optometrist's office was negotiated by Mr. Lyons in approximately July, 1989. Respondent Beckwith is married to Kim Beckwith. Karen Martin was Mr. Beckwith's office manager at the Daytona Beach Brill's Hearing Aid Center. David James Jenkins is the son-in-law of David and Jean Dewey, a married couple. Mr. and Mrs. Lyons, Mrs. Beckwith, Ms. Martin, Mr. Jenkins and Mr. and Mrs. Dewey were not charged in the administrative complaint herein. Karen Martin had known Jean Dewey through prior employment. In July or August 1989, Ms. Martin set up a luncheon meeting for Mrs. Dewey and her husband, David Dewey, with Jack Beckwith. Mr. Beckwith ultimately introduced Mr. Dewey to Mr. Lyons sometime in August, 1989. The Deweys seemed good prospects to manage one of Brill's branch centers. On behalf of his wife and her trust and corporation, Mr. Lyons approved Mr. Beckwith's hiring the Deweys and becoming their sponsor to train as hearing aid specialists. At all times material, Mr. and Mrs. Dewey believed themselves to be in the employ of Respondent Beckwith and Mr. Lyons, operating as partners in Brill's. In negotiations with the Deweys, Mr. Beckwith estimated that Mr. Dewey could make $60,000.00 a year and Mrs. Dewey could make $40,000.00 a year based upon a 20 percent commission on gross deposits from hearing aid sales out of the New Smyrna Beach office after the Deweys became fully licensed as hearing aid specialists. He explained that licensure as a trainee and training were prerequisites to becoming fully licensed as hearing aid specialists. Both Mr. and Mrs. Dewey had a background in sales. Their testimony clearly reveals that they saw the selling of hearing aids from the perspective of marketing a product on a lucrative commission basis rather than from the viewpoint of a health care technologist. The commission arrangement proposed by Mr. Beckwith on behalf of the Jeanne Lyons Trust d/b/a Brill's Hearing Aid Center, Inc. was very attractive to them. They wanted to get started as soon as possible to make an increased commission over what they were being paid in other employments at the time they interviewed with Mr. Beckwith. They also found it attractive that they could work together near their home. Another factor motivating the Deweys to get started as soon as possible was that Mr. Dewey was employed at a marina which was about to close, and the marina closing would entirely eliminate Mr. Dewey's income. The Deweys were so enthusiastic about Mr. Beckwith's proposal that they nominated their son-in-law, David James Jenkins, to work in Brill's new Palm Coast office. During September 1989, Mr. and Mrs. Beckwith, with the approval of David F. Lyons, provided some free informal training sessions for Ms. Martin, Mr. Jenkins, and Mr. and Mrs. Dewey, just to see if they would really like hearing aid work and be adaptable to it before the Deweys and Mr. Jenkins quit their existing employments. This was not intended by Mr. Beckwith to be a real apprentice-type program. These sessions occurred twice a week and involved playing an instructional tape, handing out some printed statutes, rules, and technical materials, practicing with an audiometer, and learning to make ear molds. Each potential trainee was given his own audiometer to take home just for practice. On or about October 1, 1989, David Dewey signed an application to the Board of Hearing Aid Specialists to become a hearing aid trainee. His application for the trainee license listed Jack Beckwith as his sponsor. On or about October 1, 1989, Jean Dewey signed an application to the Board of Hearing Aid Specialists to become a hearing aid trainee. Her application for the trainee license listed Jack Beckwith as her sponsor. On or about October 2, 1989, Mr. Beckwith sent Mr. and Mrs. Dewey to operate Brill's Hearing Aid Center in space leased from Cady and Timko, optometrists, in New Smyrna Beach, Florida. The Deweys had precipitously quit their previous employment and had no income. Mr. Beckwith established what days of the week and hours they worked at Brill's, what they wore, and how they should be paid. He told them they could not be paid as employees until they were accepted and issued trainee numbers by the Department as trainees. Mr. and Mrs. Dewey were not paid any wages between October 1, 1989 and December 12, 1989. Due to the delay in receiving trainee licenses and numbers from the licensing agency and their lack of income, Mr. Dewey became infuriated and pressed both Mr. Beckwith and Mr. Lyons for action on licensing. As a result, he received sporadic checks from Brill's Hearing Aid Center. The amount of the checks apparently did not amount to projected commissions. The checks were signed by Jack Beckwith with the permission of David and Jeanne Lyons. The checks were referenced on their face as "loans". Mr. Dewey claimed that the purpose of this notation was so that Mr. Beckwith or others could avoid paying employee-related taxes. Mr. Lyons and Mr. Beckwith asserted that the notation was to insure that Mr. Dewey paid back Mrs. Lyons' advances after Mr. and Mrs. Dewey received their trainee licenses and went on the regular payroll. Mrs. Dewey received no checks. The lease Mr. Lyons had negotiated with Cady-Timko, O.D., P.A. provided for Brill's Hearing Aid Center, New Smyrna Beach to have ". . . [a]ccess to patient files to contact patients to tell them of hearing aid services available . . . [and] opportunity to confirm optometrist appointments and ask if they would like hearing test also." Sometime in October 1989, Mr. Beckwith also sent Mr. Jenkins to operate the newly leased office of Brill's Hearing Aid Center, Palm Coast, Florida. Mr. Jenkins claimed to have worked briefly at a Brill's Center in Ormond Beach, but there is no other evidence that there even was a Brill's Center in Ormond Beach. Mr. Jenkins quit the Palm Coast office approximately November 1, 1989 because no clients came there and he was "starving to death." He testified that he was instructed by Mr. and Mrs. Beckwith to make cold calls to potential hearing aid customers from all of the files in the adjacent optometrist's office in Palm Coast, but that he, Mr. Jenkins, so feared rejection that he asked his wife, Mrs. Jenkins, to make the calls. Mr. Jenkins also testified that he did some audiometric testing and that Mrs. Beckwith checked all the audiometric testing he did, but he was vague as to whether this was done at Brill's office in Palm Coast or during his pre-training. His testimony was unclear as to whether Mrs. Beckwith also personally supervised all his audiometric testing. Mrs. Beckwith was not charged with any violations. Respondent Beckwith was not charged in the pending administrative complaint with anything done by Mr. Jenkins. Mr. and Mrs. Jenkins were not charged with any violations. On or about October 15, 1989, Jack Beckwith signed and mailed to the Department of Professional Regulation a Brill's Hearing Aid Center, Daytona Beach check for $400.00 to cover trainee applications for Mr. and Mrs. Dewey, Mr. Jenkins, and Ms. Martin, at $100 apiece. The applications and check were not received or processed by the Department until December 1, 1989. The actual trainee licenses were issued for Mr. and Mrs. Dewey on December 5, 1989. Mr. Beckwith's clear testimony that he submitted the check and four applications together by mail on October 15, 1989 is credible and compelling as opposed to other witnesses' inferences of a December 1, 1989 submittal date because the check face references the four applications specifically, including Mr. Jenkins' application, and the evidence is unrefuted that Mr. Jenkins quit his association with Brill's on or about November 1, 1989. No motive or reasonable rationale was advanced as to why Respondent should mail in $100 of Brill's money to register Mr. Jenkins as a trainee on December 1, 1989, thirty days after Mr. Jenkins had already quit. As noted above, the parties have stipulated as fact that Jack Beckwith did not become the Deweys' sponsor until December 5, 1989. At all times material, the training course and apprenticeship program under a sponsor approved by the licensing agency took approximately six months to complete before the applicant could sit for the hearing aid specialist licensure exam. From all accounts, it appears that it was standard operating procedure in the industry for sponsors to allow trainees to perform all services under direct supervision of their sponsor from the date the application for trainee status was mailed to the licensing agency. In this case, that date would have been October 15, 1989. David Dewey and Jean Dewey were not registered as trainees with the Board of Hearing Aid Specialists until December 5, 1989. According to the testimony of Theresa L. Skelton, the Department's policy was to treat applicants as trainees as soon as it received their checks, which in this case was December 1, 1989. Apparently in 1989, the agency did no extensive background check on applicants, and trainee licensing was largely a ministerial act if the proposed sponsor was legitimate. As far as the Department was concerned, trainees could legally perform all services under sponsor supervision as soon as their application and check were processed. See also, Sections 484.0445(1) and (2) F.S. infra. In October 1989, when Mr. Beckwith sent Mr. and Mrs. Dewey to the Brill's office in New Smyrna Beach, he instructed them to sell batteries and make appointments for persons who answered a newspaper advertisement he had placed to announce opening that branch office. He also told them to telephone current patients of the Daytona Beach Brill's Hearing Aid Center who lived in New Smyrna Beach and tell them that they no longer had to travel to Daytona Beach but could be serviced more conveniently at the new New Smyrna Beach location. Mr. Beckwith testified that he also told Mrs. Dewey to telephone "recall patients" for the optometry office. Recall patients were patients of the optometry office who needed to be reminded to come in to pick up glasses already ordered or who were due for a new eye appointment. Mrs. Dewey was also told to announce the opening of the hearing aid center to any of the optometry recall patients whose records bore Dr. Cady's notation, "HL" for "hearing loss", and also simultaneously make appointments for hearing tests. Mr. Beckwith intended that all appointments would be made for Wednesdays when he would come to New Smyrna Beach to do hearing tests and fit and deliver hearing aids. This testimony is in accord with the conditions of Brill's lease with Cady-Timko O.D. P.A., negotiated by Mr. Lyons. Mrs. Dewey testified credibly that Mr. Beckwith approved a script for her use for these telephone calls. Nothing in the script clearly shows that she was calling exclusively optometric recalls, Brill's old patients, or making "cold" calls. However, it mentions nothing about existing eyewear or appointments, and it does offer a free hearing test. Mrs. Dewey further testified that Ms. Martin instructed her how to use Dr. Cady's files to make a list and call all of Dr. Cady's patients over a certain age, regardless of an "HL" notation, paying special attention to those with insurance coverage. Mrs. Dewey understood these instructions also came from Mr. Beckwith and made telephone calls pursuant to the method outlined by Ms. Martin. Mr. Beckwith denied giving these instructions or approving the script. Mrs. Dewey's testimony and the list show that after the first two pages going through Dr. Cady's files with names beginning with the B's and C's of the alphabet had been prepared by Ms. Martin and one appointment scheduled on Tuesday, October 17, 1989 and one on Wednesday, October 18, 1989, Mrs. Dewey started back at the A's and prepared a more extensive list of names. This suggests that Mrs. Dewey went behind Ms. Martin's work and selected from Dr. Cady's files some names which Ms. Martin had excluded. Comparison of the list with a 1989 calendar shows that Mrs. Dewey booked approximately 35 appointments for dates between October 2, 1989 and December 12, 1989, without regard to whether they fell on Wednesdays. Most of the appointments she booked were for days other than Wednesdays. They included days between December 5, 1989 and December 12, 1989 while Mr. Beckwith was listed as the Deweys' sponsor. Mrs. Dewey, whose background was in sales, considered what she was doing to be "telemarketing". Neither Dr. Cady's files nor Mrs. Dewey's list showed that any person she telephoned had expressed an interest in hearing aids before Ms. Martin or Mrs. Dewey contacted them. Mrs. Dewey's list clearly shows that most of the people called either did not acknowledge that they had a hearing loss or were not interested in a hearing test and/or hearing aids. Mr. Dewey testified that between October 2, 1989 and December 12, 1989, he performed unsupervised audiometric testing, the taking of ear mold impressions, and the sale and dispensing of hearing aids to 20-24 persons and that he did so either with the instructions or knowledge of Mr. Beckwith and outside Mr. Beckwith's presence because Mr. Beckwith remained in Daytona Beach except on Wednesdays. Mr. Lyons and Mr. Beckwith denied issuing such instructions and denied even any knowledge that this had occurred until Mr. Beckwith was served with the administrative complaint. Mr. Beckwith testified that when he was present on Wednesdays, Mr. Dewey would sit in with him and observe testing and delivery and that whatever he allowed Mr. Dewey to do in his presence was overseen by him and he signed the appropriate documentation. He denied knowing that Mr. Dewey was also practicing as a hearing aid specialist when he was not present. Mr. Dewey conceded that Mr. Lyons specifically instructed him not to make any deliveries, and it is clear from Mr. Dewey's testimony that he thought Mr. Lyons' instruction meant "no home deliveries to patients", instead of "no delivery of finished hearing aids to clients anywhere, including the office," which would be a partial definition of "no dispensing." Although Mr. Dewey has claimed to make sales of hearing aids, he also has, since 1989, consistently maintained that he never "delivered" a hearing aid to a client. His testimony at formal hearing does not render clear whether or not he actually fitted a completed hearing aid on a client or ever actually collected money for a "sale" without supervision by Mr. or Mrs. Beckwith. Mr. Dewey testified that Mr. Beckwith or Mrs. Beckwith signed all paperwork as being responsible for the tests, etc. which he performed in their absence. No documentation of hearing tests or hearing aid sales by Mr. Dewey were submitted; no clients Mr. Dewey allegedly serviced testified; no bank deposits showing income from the New Smyrna Beach location were offered; and Mrs. Beckwith did not testify. Mr. Beckwith testified he personally delivered no hearing aids from the New Smyrna Beach office. On or about December 6, 1989, but before the Deweys had received their trainee licenses or been informed that they had been licensed as of December 5, 1989, they invited George Selas, a competitor and a licensed hearing aid specialist, whom Mrs. Dewey had known for some time, into the New Smyrna Beach office of Brill's Hearing Aid Center. When they explained the "telemarketing" that Mrs. Dewey was doing, Mr. Selas informed them that it was illegal and that they should not be practicing as hearing aid specialists before trainee numbers were issued to them by the Department. The Deweys immediately notified the Department by telephone on December 6 and in writing on December 7, 1989 of everything they had been doing and disassociated themselves from Respondent Beckwith, Mr. and Mrs. Lyons, and Brill's. That would mean that after December 6 they no longer operated out of their sponsorship situation with Mr. Beckwith, despite any booked appointments. As of December 12 or 13, 1989, they formally changed their sponsorship to Mr. Selas. They finished their training and apprenticeship under his sponsorship and were licensed as hearing aid specialists in 1990. As a result of information received from Mr. Dewey and Mr. Selas, Dr. Cady gave notice he was terminating the lease for Brill's New Smyrna Beach office. Mr. Selas and Brill's, represented by Mr. Beckwith, were competing for the same contract with an HMO in 1989-1990. Respondent attributes all of Mr. Dewey's actions to collusion with Mr. Selas in order to obtain the HMO contract and rent the space occupied by Brill's in New Smyrna Beach. These inferences are based upon inadmissible hearsay from someone at the HMO who allegedly got an anonymous phone call, and Dr. Cady's understanding of something Mr. Dewey may have said either to Dr. Cady or to his office manager.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Hearing Aid Specialists enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Sections 484.056(1)(h) and (t) F.S., not guilty of all other charges, and revoking his license. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of January, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitute specific rulings, pursuant to S120.59(2), F.S., upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF). Petitioner's PFOF: 1-3 Accepted, except as to the use of the word "employed." See the Conclusions of Law. 4 Rejected upon contrary evidence of greater weight and credibility in Finding of Fact 33. 5-7 Accepted. 8 Accepted as modified in Finding of Fact 21 to better conform to the record and statute. 9-10 Accepted, except that receipt of the check was testified to be December 1, 1989. Rejected in part as a conclusion of law. See Finding of Fact 21 and the Conclusions of Law. Rejected because misleading as stated. See Finding of Fact 33 upon the greater weight of the credible evidence. Accepted. 14-16 Rejected only upon the word "employment" as a word of art. See Findings of Fact 15, 27-31 and the Conclusions of Law. 17 Rejected as a conclusion of law. See Findings of Fact 21, 27-31 and the Conclusions of Law. 18-22 Accepted, except for unnecessary, subordinate, and/or cumulative material and legal argument. Rejected as a conclusion of law. Covered in Findings of Fact 21, 27-33 and the Conclusions of Law. Accepted. 25-26 Covered only as necessary in Finding of Fact 22-25. 27-29 Accepted except as to word "employee." See Conclusions of Law. 30-31 Rejected as unnecessary or subordinate. Rejected as a finding of fact; see the Conclusions of Law. Rejected because misleading as stated. See Finding of Fact 9 and 15. 34-35 Rejected upon the greater weight of the credible evidence in Findings of Fact 15-16. Rejected as a mere recitation of nondispositive testimony. Rejected as not proven. Respondent's PFOF: 1-7 Accepted. Rejected as a conclusion of law. See Finding of Fact 20-21 and the Conclusions of Law. Sentence 1 is rejected as a legal conclusion. Sentence 2 is accepted in part in Finding of Fact 15-16 and 21 and otherwise rejected as a legal conclusion. The remaining sentences are accepted except that unnecessary, subordinate or cumulative material has not been adopted. 10-12 Accepted except that unnecessary, subordinate or cumulative material has not been adopted. The first sentence is rejected a mischaracterizing Mrs. Dewey's testimony. The second sentence is rejected upon the greater weight of the credible evidence as a whole. Accepted. First 15 Rejected as not proven. Dr. Cady's deposition is vague on this point. See Findings of Fact 34-35. Second 14 The first sentence is accepted. The second sentence is rejected as a mischaracterization. The third sentence is accepted. Second 15 Rejected as legal argument. 16 Rejected as legal argument. COPIES FURNISHED: Raymond Shope, Esquire Northern Trust Bank Building, Suite 225 4001 Tamiami Trail North Naples, FL 33940 Susan E. Lindgard, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Ste 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Jack McRay, Esquire General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Ste 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Suzanne Lee, Executive Director Board of Hearing Aid Specialists Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Ste 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
The Issue The issues in these two consolidated cases concern whether Respondent committed several violations alleged in two separate administrative complaints and, if so, what penalties should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to these consolidated cases, Respondent was a licensed hearing aid specialist in the State of Florida, having been issued license number AS 2169. On or about February 8, 2001, S. K. visited Respondent's business located at 3971 Jog Road, Suite 7, Greenacres, Florida, in order to buy hearing aids. On that day S. K. purchased two Audibel brand hearing aids. The invoice provided to S. K. clearly indicates that he was purchasing Audibel brand hearing aids. There is no mention of Beltone anywhere on the invoice. The two hearing aids purchased by S. K. on February 8, 2001, were delivered to S. K. on February 23, 2001. Hearing aids of the type purchased by S. K. are specially manufactured to address the specific needs of each patient. Accordingly, the hearing aids must be manufactured after the contract is entered into. At the time of the delivery of the hearing aids, S. K. was provided with an invoice that contained the name of the manufacturer, the serial numbers of the hearing aids, and the two-year warranty by Audibel. S. K. returned several times for adjustments to the new Audibel brand hearing aids. On March 20, 2001, the hearing aids were sent to the factory to change the volume control to a screw set control. The repair agreement document filled out by Respondent on March 20, 2001, contains the Beltone name and logo in one corner, but does not otherwise mention Beltone. The hearing aids were returned to S. K. on March 29, 2001. Sometime thereafter, S. K. decided to spend the summer in Connecticut. Before leaving for Connecticut, S. K. asked Respondent's secretary for the name of a Beltone dealer near his Connecticut address. The secretary provided the requested information. S. K. mistakenly thought he had purchased Beltone brand hearing aids from Respondent until June 24, 2001, when S. K. visited a Beltone dealer in Connecticut for adjustments. On or about June 24, 2001, a Beltone dealer in Connecticut wrote a letter to Respondent on S. K.'s behalf requesting a refund for S. K. Respondent did not state or imply to S. K. that Respondent was selling Beltone brand hearing aids to S. K. To the contrary, Respondent specifically told S. K. that Respondent was selling Audibel brand hearing aids to S. K.
Recommendation On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Hearing Aid Specialists enter a Final Order concluding that all counts in both Administrative Complaints in these two consolidated cases should be dismissed because the evidence is insufficient to prove the violations alleged by clear and convincing evidence. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of July, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of July, 2003.
The Issue Has Respondent violated Section 484.056(1)(g), Florida Statutes as alleged in the Administrative Complaint? If so, what, if any, disciplinary action is appropriate?
Findings Of Fact In September of 1989, Mrs. Mary Louise Gibson, then in her late seventies, purchased "full-shell" Sonotone hearing aids at Hearing Aid Services in Temecula, California. The hearing aids were manufactured by TelStar Electronics, Inc., located in Longwood, Florida. The manufacturer's warranty covering the hearing aids expired on December 22, 1990. Some time after the purchase of the hearing aids, members of Mrs. Gibson's family began to tell her that she was not hearing well despite use of the hearing aids. In August, 1991, some eight months or so after the warranty had expired, Mrs. Gibson, thinking the hearing aids were still under warranty, visited the TelStar manufacturing facility in Longwood to see what could be done about her poor "hearing aid-assisted" hearing. At the manufacturing facility, Mrs. Gibson was referred to the manufacturer's retail store in an adjoining part of the building housing the manufacturer's operation. With Mrs. Gibson was her husband, who was also having trouble with his hearing aids, and her daughter, Mary A. Gibson. By virtue of the referral, the Gibsons and her husband went from the manufacturing end of the building to the manufacturer's retail store. Working as a hearing aid specialist in the manufacturing facility's retail store was Respondent, Nick Joseph Spina. At the time of Mrs. Gibson's visit, Mr. Spina was licensed by the Board of Hearing Aid Specialists as a hearing aid specialist in the state of Florida. His license number is AS 0001750. Mr. Spina continues to be and has been at all times material to this proceeding the holder of the hearing aid specialist license. Not a salaried employee of TelStar, Mr. Spina's pay at the TelStar retail store was based entirely on commissions from new sales. In any given sale, the commission was thirty per cent of the gross amount of the sale. Mr. Spina conducted an audiogram of Mrs. Gibson. He concluded that Mrs. Gibson needed a type of shell for her hearing aids different from the style she had been using: a "full-shell," which occludes the ear canal entirely. In Mr. Spina's professional opinion, Mrs. Gibson needed a helix-type shell which fills only the top of the ear and leaves the ear canal unoccluded. The Purchase Agreement executed by Mr. Gibson shows on the day the Gibsons consulted with Mr. Spina that Mrs. Gibson's husband, Horace Gibson, agreed to pay $450.00 for a recasing of Mrs. Gibson's hearing aids. The comments section of the order form states "Recased to helix aids," and shows a charge of $139.00. On August 28, 1991, Mrs. Gibson picked up the recased hearing aids. The invoice of the same date shows that TelStar Electronics, Inc., charged $139.00 for the recasing. Mrs. Gibson, as was agreed under the terms of the Purchase Agreement, paid $450.00 for the recasing. Approximately five months later, in January of 1992, Mrs. Gibson visited Mr. Spina again. Based on a second audiogram, Mr. Spina told her that she had experienced a dramatic change in her hearing since the August testing and needed another type of hearing aid. A purchase order form signed January 16, 1992, with an order date of January 13, 1992, shows that Mrs. Gibson agreed to pay $1078 for a hearing system described as "NEW" and being a Sonotone Model ITE, colored pink, with a warranty period from 1/16/92 to 1/16/94, a two-year warranty. The serial numbers for the new hearing aids are listed on the purchase agreements as 92F24064 for the hearing aid for the left ear and 92F24065 for the hearing aid for the right ear. The purchase order form is signed by Nick Spina. On the same date the "new" hearing system was ordered, January 13, 1994, Mr. Spina executed a second form, a repair order form. The repair order form ordered that M. L. Gibson's hearing aids bearing serial numbers 91F13666 and 91F13665, the helix-type hearing aids provided her the previous August by Respondent, be remade as "full shell" hearing aids. The order form for the repair of the helix hearing aids shows that Respondent ordered them to be assigned new serial numbers identical to those listed on the purchase order form for the new hearing aids, 92F24064 for the left ear and 92F24065 for the right ear, and be shipped back on January 15, 1992. This same form shows that a 2 year warranty was to be added to the hearing aids for the repair. An invoice dated January 15, 1994, shows a shipment by Sonotone Corporation, TelStar Division in Longwood, Florida, of Purchase Order number "Gibson TS R/M" of Order Number 60864, the order executed by Respondent on January 13, 1994. The hearing aids were remade to full shell hearing aids, reassigned the serial numbers ordered by respondent, and the circuit, microphone and receiver were changed. No charge was made for the remake of the helix hearing aids back into full shell hearing aids because the hearing aids were under warranty from the recasing accomplished the previous August. The remade hearing aids were not given an additional two-year warranty. It is not customary in the industry to give two-year warranties for remade hearing aids. A warranty for remade hearing aids is much less than two years, typically 6 months. Two-year warranties are reserved for new hearing aids. Mrs. Gibson picked up the hearing aids and paid $1078 for them, believing them to be new hearing aids. Mrs. Gibson's daughter, who accompanied her mother to all the transactions with Respondent, also was under the impression that brand new hearing aids had been provided her mother in January of 1992. Less than two months later, on March 10, 1992, Mrs. Gibson consulted Freddi M. Catlett, of the Arkansas Hearing Aid Center in Hot Springs, Arkansas, because her hearing aids were rubbing her ear so as to make it sore. Ms. Catlett sent impressions of Mrs. Gibson's ears as well as the hearing aids to the Sonotone factory in Florida. Instead of 92F24065, the serial number of Mrs. Gibson's right hearing aid, the order form lists the serial number of the hearing aids as 92-24065, substituting a "-" for the "F", the third digit in the serial number. Otherwise the number on the order form is identical to the serial number of the right hearing aid purchased by Mrs. Gibson in January of 1992 from Respondent. Both Mrs. Gibson and her daughter, despite the fact that Mrs. Gibson had two pairs of hearing aids, were sure that the hearing aids examined by Ms. Catlett were the "new" hearing aids purchased from Respondent in January of 1992. The hearing aids were returned to Mrs. Catlett from the Sonotone factory with an invoice charging $74.50 for a replating and recasing of the hearing aids. The service department notes on the order form shows that the warranty on the hearing aids, which should have been good until January of 1994 had the hearing aids been new in January of 1992, had expired on January 28, 1992. Upon being noticed that the warranty had expired, Ms. Catlett contacted Sonotone to inquire further. She was told that the hearing aids had been purchased in 1989 and that the warranty was no longer in effect. Ms. Catlett then questioned Mrs. Gibson and was assured that the hearing aids were the "new" hearing aids purchased from Respondent the previous January. The hearing aids examined by Ms. Catlett were the hearing aids purchased in January of 1992 from Respondent. The serial number listed on Ms. Catlett's order form mistakenly listed "-" as the third digit instead of "F". Contrary to Mr. Spina's representation, the hearing aids he sold to Mrs. Gibson in January of 1992 were not new, despite his marking on the order form that they would have a two-year warranty. The hearing aids sold as new hearing aids by Respondent in January of 1992 were simply a remake of the helix-type hearing aids that Mr. Spina had remade the August before. These hearing aids were new in 1989 not in 1992.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, and in keeping with Section 484.056(1) and (2), Florida Statutes, RECOMMENDED: That Respondent Nick Joseph Spina's license to practice as a hearing aid specialist be revoked and that Nick Joseph Spina be fined $1000. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of August, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DAVID M. MALONEY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 1994. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Findings of fact in Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order 1, 3-19 are accepted. Finding of fact #2 in Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order is rejected to the extent it implies Mrs. Gibson was 83 in August of 1991. She was 83 at the time of her deposition in April of 1994. Otherwise the finding is accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan E. Landward Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation Suite 60, Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Nick Joseph Spina, Jr. P. O. Box 214 Chipley, FL 32428 Jack McRay General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Suzanne Lee Executive Director Hearing Aid Specialists 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0759
Findings Of Fact During the period from September 3 through September 7, 1974, the Respondent, Dr. Thomas A. Mullin, undertook to perform audiological testing on various patients and staff at University Convalescent Center West (UCCW) and University Convalescent Center East (UCCE) in Deland, Florida. These two convalescent centers, although owned by the same corporation, were at that time separate and distinct facilities, each having its own administrator. UCCW was located at 545 West Euclid Avenue in Deland, Florida, and its administrator was Arthur Anderson. UCCE was at that located at 991 East New York Avenue in Deland, Florida, and its administrator was Gelatha Koranda. Dr. Mullin obtained permission from Arthur Anderson to conduct audiological tests at DCCW and through Anderson's recommendation obtained access to UCCE. Anderson's permission was obtained by Dr. Mullin subsequent to a discussion between Mullin and Anderson in which Dr. Mullin discussed audiological screening of the convalescent center's patients by audiology students from Florida Technological University under Dr. Mullin's supervision. In addition, Dr. Mullin and Andersen discussed a new Medicaid program under which hearing testing and hearing aids could be provided to Medicaid patients. The acquisition of hearing aids under this program was dependent upon the recommendation of an audiologist approved by Medicaid. Dr. Mullin advised Anderson that he wad so approved by MedicaId and would be glad to provide this service to patients of the nursing home at the time the audiological screening was done. Mullin told Anderson at this initial conference that he would test Medicaid patients and bill Medicaid for his professional services and that the nursing home would not be billed. It was further agreed that Dr. Mullin would provide Anderson a report on the patients. These audiological tests were subsequently conducted on Anderson's authority and without the permission and knowledge of Dr. Rauschenberger, house physician for the two nursing homes and in some instances personal physician of some of the patients. Prior medical authorization is not required for audiological testing in general practice or under the Medicaid program. After the testing program was completed, Dr. Mullin reported in writing to Mr. Anderson the results of the residents and staff at UCCW. Koranda, the administrator at UCE, had not requested a report be filed with her regarding Dr. Mullin's findings, and no report was rendered to her by Dr. Mullin. In neither instance did the administrators request or authorize Dr. Mullin to enter his findings in the patient's medical records maintained at the centers and no such entries were made. Expert testimony varied regarding the obligation of an audiologist to make entries in a patient's record. How ever, it was generally agreed that an audiologist would not make entries on a patient's record without authorization by the administration of the health care facility when testing was not the result of medical referral. As a result of his testing at UCCW, Dr. Mullin prescribed hearing aids for Alfred Miller, Sallie Porter, Ruby Allen, Minnie Jennings, Florence Rogers, and Agnes Flowers, all of whom were Medicaid patients. As a result of audiological testing at UCCE, Dr. Mullin prescribed hearing aids for Jessie Robinson, Maggie Smith, Clara Brown, Emma Van Landingham, Emily Burkhart, Della Stone, and Lenora Gell, all of whom were Medicaid patients. Dr. Mullin prepared prescriptions for hearing aids on the persons named above, and forwarded these prescriptions to Orange Hearing Aid Center in Orlando, Florida which provided and fitted the hearing aids to the individuals. Dr. Mullin submitted the bill directly to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services for his professional services in screening Medicaid patients' hearing and for his professional services in screening and prescribing heading aids for Medicaid patients. Dr. Mullin's basic hearing evaluation test consisted of a pure tone air conduction test. Dr. Mullin conducted further testing if necessary to include a pure tone bone conduction test, speech discrimination test, and speech reception threshold test. A master hearing aid was used for the hearing aid selection process and an audiometer used for the basic testing. Dr. Mullin prescribed hearing aids on the basis of these latter tests Dr. Mullin had planned to conduct all testing in a specially adapted trailer, but was unable to use this trailer because of the immobility of the patients. A bathing facility or "tub room" in each of the nursing homes was provided by the nursing home administration for conducting the tests, and represented to be the only facility available for the testing. These facilities were not ideal in terms of their construction and location for conducting audiological testing. However, Dr. Mullin took what measures he could to reduce ambient noise levels, to include the use of aural domes. No clear and convincing evidence was introduced that the noise conditions during Dr. Mullin's tests were so bad that his test results were invalid. In fact, subsequent tests made by the Board revealed that the patients tested by Dr. Mullin were hard of hearing, although some of the results differed slightly in degree of loss. Subsequent to the testing, as mentioned above, Dr. Mullin filed a written report with Arthur Anderson, administrator of UCCW. This report was rendered on the letterhead of Florida Technological University. This report revealed that Rogers, Silfies, Bowen, Covington, Peppett, Trodden Turner, Farrow, Howard, and Tidson had normal hearing. The report contained specific comments with regard to Rolle, Rigsbee, Goodrich, Rosato, VonDohler, Shalhoub, Thompson, Owens, Murkinson, Tholl, and Hocker. Silfries, Rolle, Owens, Peppett, Goodrich, and Hocker were Medicaid patients upon whom Mullin submitted billings to Medicaid through the Department of Health and Rehabilitative services. The comments on Thompson, Owens, Murkinson and Tholl indicate referral to otolaryngologists. The specific comments with regard to Rolle, Goodrich, Rosato, and Shalhoub indicate a hearing loss but no recommendation for a hearing aid due to some specific contra-indication. The billings submitted to Medicaid through the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services are consistent with the findings reported in Exhibit 3. The billings were for basic hearing evaluations on those Medicaid paie:ts who were determined to have normal hearing and for selective amplification procedures in addition to basic evaluation for those patients whose hearing was not normal. The billings are substantiated by the report filed with Anderson and the audiograms prepared. However, the report does reveal that Herman Owens, who was referred to an otolaryngologist for removal of impacted cerumen in the right ear, received both basic hearing tests and selective hearing amplification procedures, both of which were billed to Medicaid; and J. L. Hocker received selective amplification testing although Mullin's comments indicated that Hocker's right ear had recently undergone surgery for removal of a carcinoma. However, Medicaid's criteria for testing were not introduced and no evidence was introduced, that a patient with impacted ears should not be tested. Also this report contains no reference to the patients for whom Dr. Mullin had prescribed a hearing aid. The report does reveal that where contra-indicated, whether because of the nature of the hearing loss, as indicated with Rolle and Rosato, or patient attitude, as in the case of Goodrich, Dr. Mullin did not prescribe a hearing aid. This relates particularly to the allegation that Dr. Mullin prescribed hearing aids for certain patients who did not want hearing aids, and an implication made that Dr. Mullin recommended hearing aids for patients who could not benefit from them. This report which is on Florida Technological University letterhead is the sole support of the charge that Dr. Mullin misused his connection with Florida Technological University. It is clear that this report was rendered after the testing had been concluded. Clearly, his report rendered after the testing on the letterhead of Florida Technological University could not have been an inducement to Anderson to permit Mullin access to the convalescent center. However, the fact is clear that Dr. Mullin did make a personal profit for a venture undertaken in connection with an otherwise authorized university activity. The evidence indicates that the hearing aids prescribed by Dr. Mullin and provided by Orange Hearing Aid Center were fitted by Merrill Schwartz. Schwartz fitted these hearing aids at UCCW and UCCE. There is no indication that UCCE or UCCW failed to cooperate in any way with Schwartz gaining access to the patients and fitting them with aids. To the contrary, the evidence indicates that both centers cooperated fully in providing Schwartz the opportunity and facilities to fit the hearing aids. The fact that both centers did not question the fitting of the hearing aids substantiates Dr. Mullin's assertion that Anderson expected hearing aids to be fitted to patients under the Medicaid program. Expert testimony was received that the only positive evaluation of the utility of the hearing aid to a patient is a trial by the patient using the aid to include counselling on the use and benefits of the hearing aid to overcome a patient's possible aversion to the aid. Dr. Mullin testified that he had prescribed the aids on a thirty day trial basis, and his audiograms substantiate this. However, his prescriptions to Orange Hearing Aid Center did not reflect any trial period. Merrill Schwartz, the hearing aid salesman for Orange Hearing Aid Center, stated that he fitted the aids from the prescriptions and no trial period was stated. However, the current owner, Irwin Pensack, stated that during his transitional period in taking over Orange Hearing Aid Center from Emmanuel Gitles, that Gitles had impressed upon him the importance of maintaining good customer relationships and providing trial periods routinely when requested. Why the 30 day trial was not included in the prescription was not explained by Dr. Mullin, who stated it was his understanding they were for a 30 day trial. However, in this same regard, the evidence further reveals that none of the staff at UCCW or UCCE contacted Dr. Mullin or Orange Hearing Aid Center with regard to followup counseling or return of the hearing aids when the patients failed to properly use them. It is questionable how effective a 30 trial period would have bean under the circumstances. No evidence was presented to show hat Dr. Mullin received any type of "kickback" or other benefit from Orange Hearing Aid Center. Although substantial and competent evidence was introduced that some of the patients who were fitted with the hearing aids were senile, expert testimony was received that such a condition is not a contra-indication of the need and benefit to the patient of the use of a hearing aid. This is particularly true since the effects of deafness and senility subjectively reinforce one another. Expert testimony was also received that an audiologist would not routinely provide followup services subsequent to audiological testing and the prescription of a hearing aid unless requested to do so by the patient or the hearing aid dealer. The evidence indicates that Dr. Mullin did not receive any requests for followup from either UCC er UCC on behalf of any of the patients for whom hearing aids were prescribed, from patients themselves, or the dealer. The one call made from a patient who had received a hearing aid was made to Orange County Hearing Aid for followup services or repair. Said services were provided by Orange Hearing Aid Center, and indicates that this patient was using the hearing aid. The bills submitted to Medicaid through the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services were in accord with Medicaid's published schedules for the professional services rendered by Dr. Mullin. There is no substantial and competent evidence that Mullin charged for work he did not do or overcharged for the work that he did.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that no action be taken against the certificate of Thomas A. Mullin as a speech pathologist and audiologist. DONE and ORDERED this 26th day of October, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Howard R. Marsee, Esquire Post Office Box 20154 Orlando, Florida 32814 Gene Sellers, Esquire General Counsel's Office Department of Education Knott Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 James M. Russ, Esquire 441 First Federal Building 109 East Church Street Orlando, Florida 32801
Findings Of Fact Daniel C. Throneburg, Sr. (Respondent) is, and has been at all times material hereto, a licensed hearing aid specialist in the State of Florida, having been issued license number AS-0000675. On January 30, 1985, Opal Holbrook agreed to purchase two "Nu Ear" rechargeable hearing aids from Respondent after he had tested her hearing and recommended this hearing aid. The total price of the hearing aid was $1,990. The following was included on the order form signed by both Respondent and Holbrook: If within 7 days of the date of delivery you are not completely satisfied, you will receive a refund less $50.00 fee provided you have kept a scheduled appointment within 72 hours of the date of delivery, to allow the specialist to make necessary adjustments for fit, comfort and personal listening pleasure. Respondent received the "Nu Ear" hearing aids from the manufacturer on or about February 26, 1985, and Holbrook thereafter kept her scheduled appointment within 72 hours of delivery, was fitted, and completed payment in full on February 26, 1985 in the amount of $1,990. Four days after receiving the hearing aids, Holbrook returned to Respondent because she still could not hear. Respondent made some adjustments, and told her to try them for another three or four days. She still could not hear, however, and therefore Holbrook requested a refund from Respondent after attempting to use the hearing aids for about a week. Respondent again asked that she try them a little longer. Holbrook returned numerous times during March, 1985 because her hearing aids had not improved her hearing. Respondent referred her to Mark Krywko for counseling, and adjustments, and she asked Krywko for a refund. Instead, he took an impression of her ears, and made some adjustments in the hearing aids, including boring a hole in them and adding an air hose. Respondent was usually not present when Krywko made these adjustments, counseled her on the use of hearing aids, or when Krywko took the impressions. After numerous attempts to adjust the Nu Ear hearing aids had failed, Respondent agreed to "remake" the hearing aids. Basically, he agreed to exchange the Nu Ear aids for another make. On or about April 19, 1985 Holbrook signed a receipt for Electone hearing aids which she received as replacement for the Nu Ear aids. This receipt states: Any modifications necessary will be performed based upon acceptable industry standards and the manufacturers' warranty. I understand the specialists' responsibility is fitting the hearing instrument(s) and to counsel me in the use of the aid and to mail any aid to the manufacturer for custom modifications. In the unlikely event, I am not happy with the instrument, I understand, I can request and receive another instrument from a different manufacturer at no additional charge within 60 days. Requests for any and all refunds are not allowed. I also understand that if my hearing loss has been progressive and has deteriorated, it will be necessary to return to the office for counseling which will be provided by the hearing aid specialist at "NO EXTRA COST". Holbrook was still unable to hear with the Electone hearing aids and requested a refund. To date, no refund has been provided by Respondent to Holbrook. Respondent stipulated that Holbrook received his business card at his place of business. The card represents that Respondent is a certified hearing aid audiologist, which he is not. Mark Krywko is not a licensed hearing aid specialist in the State of Florida, but at all times material hereto he was in an approved trainee program. At the request of Respondent, he repeatedly made adjustments on Holbrook's hearing aids, took an impression of her ears, gave her the receipt referred to in Finding of Fact 6 when the replacement hearing aids were delivered to her, and counseled her on the use of hearing aids. As such, he engaged in dispensing hearing aids, as defined by Section 484.041(3), Florida Statutes, at the request of Respondent who knew that Krywko was not licensed at the time. Respondent was not present most of the time Krywko performed these services for Holbrook. The receipts which Respondent provided to Holbrook for the Nu Ear and Electone hearing aids did not refer the buyer to the Board of Hearing Aid Specialists for the resolution of complaints, and also did not contain the disclaimer required by Section 484.051(2), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that Petitioner enter a Final Order imposing an administrative fine on Respondent in the amount of $1,000, and placing Respondent on probation for a period of six months, conditioned upon his refunding to Opal Holbrook $1940, the full amount she paid for the hearing aids less a $50.00 fee; in the event Respondent does not pay the administrative fine and complete the refund required herein within thirty days of entry of the Final Order, it is further recommended that Respondent's license be suspended for one year in lieu of the six month period of probation and administrative fine. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of December, 1986 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of December, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Ray Shope, Esquire Staff Attorney Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 2301 Daniel C. Throneberg 8104 Brit Drive Orlando, Florida Fred Roche Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida Wings S. Benton, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether the Petitioner, Caroline T. Davis, is entitled to licensure as a hearing aid specialist by virtue of a passing grade on the September, 1989, examination.
Findings Of Fact Caroline T. Davis was an applicant for licensure as a hearing aid specialist and took the September, 1989, examination. Ms. Davis received an overall score of 71%. A score of 75% is required to pass the examination. As a result of sanctions imposed for failure to produce, Ms. Davis was awarded 2 points. (See Order Imposing Sanctions entered July 24, 1990.) As a result, Ms. Davis has a score of 73% and needs only 2 points to pass the examination. While she challenged numerous portions of the examination, at the hearing Ms. Davis raised specific challenges only to the scoring on Procedures 7-9, 11, and 13 of the earmold impressions portion of the practical examination. Procedure 7 relates to the examination of the ear after removal of the impression. The candidate instructions given prior to the examination advise the candidate to "[d]emonstrate all procedures followed prior, during, and after making an impression." The tape of the examination makes it clear that Ms. Davis stated that she would go back and examine the ear after removing the earmold. However, Ms. Davis did not demonstrate the activity of examining the ear after removing the impression. Ms. Davis did not satisfy the requirements for credit on Procedure 7. Procedure 8 relates to the execution of a correct order form. The instructions required the candidate to fill out an order form for an earmold. Ms. Davis incorrectly filled out the order form for an in-the-ear hearing aid. While the rest of the form was correctly executed, the one error is sufficient to deny credit for a correct answer on Procedure 8. Procedure 9 relates to an explanation by the candidate of how to put on a hearing aid. Ms. Davis did not perform this task. She simply stated that she would explain or demonstrate the way to put on a hearing aid. She did not satisfy the requirements for credit on Procedure 9. Procedure 11 requires the candidate to give the functions of at least three parts of a hearing aid. The candidate instructions advise the candidate to tell the client "the function of the parts of the hearing aid that are important for client use." Ms. Davis explained the functions of two parts: the battery and its proper insertion and the volume control. She named three other parts, but she failed to explain the functions of these parts. Procedure 11 requires more than the simple naming of parts of a hearing aid. Again Ms. Davis failed to perform the required tasks for credit on Procedure 11. Procedure 13 requires the candidate to tell the client about the warranty on the hearing aid. Ms. Davis did state that she would tell the client about the warranty, but she did not do so during the examination. She argues that she should not have to state the warranty information because that would be provided in a written form to the client when the aid is delivered. The candidate instructions make it clear that the candidate is to select one of the aids provided at the examination, is to use that aid in performing various procedures, and is to perform the procedures as if that aid were being delivered to the client. The candidate is required to state the warranty information as to the hearing aid he selected. The very terms of the examination require that the candidate tell about the warranty information, not state that she would do so in a real situation. Ms. Davis did not tell about the warranty and is not entitled to credit for Procedure 13.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Professional Regulation enter a Final Order dismissing the examination challenge of Caroline T. Davis to the September, 1989, examination for licensure as a hearing aid specialist. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of September, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of September, 1990. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, Caroline T. Davis Proposed findings of fact 1, 2, 4, 5, 14, and 16 are unsupported by the competent, substantial evidence. Proposed findings of fact 3, 6-10, 15, and 17-21 are irrelevant. Proposed findings of fact 11-13 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent, Department of Professional Regulation Proposed findings of fact 1 and 4-9 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. Proposed findings of fact 2, 3, and 10 are unnecessary or irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: See Next Page Caroline T. Davis 2401 West 15th Street Panama City, FL 32401 Vytas J. Urba Staff Attorney Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Kenneth E. Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 LouElla Cook Executive Director Board of Hearing Aid Specialists Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact prior to the regulation of hearing aid dispensers in Florida in 1967, the National Hearing Aid Society and its Florida chapter, the Florida Hearing Aid Society, were voluntary nonprofit organizations established to provide information to, and establish certain standards for, its members. In 1951 the National Hearing Aid Society inaugurated the title Certified Hearing Aid Audiologist and established certain criteria for certification. These included two years experience dispensing hearing aids, a letter from a doctor of medicine that he had observed a fitting that had been done by the ,applicant, credit reference, complete the National Hearing Aid Society's certified exam or its equivalent, and submit a fee to the National Hearing Aid Society. Subsequent to 1967, passing of the Florida exam for licensure as a hearing aid specialist was deemed equivalent to the National Hearing Aid Society's exam. The term Certified Hearing Aid Audiologist was patented by the National Bearing Aid Society in 1970. Those hearing aid dispensers certified by the National Hearing Aid Society (NHAS) were authorized by NHAS to advertise and hold themselves out at CHAA's. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1977) defines audiology as: A branch of science dealing with hearing; specif. therapy of individuals having impaired hearing. Audiologists are licensed in Florida pursuant to Section 468.139 et seq. Florida Statutes (1979) which requires formal education and training before the applicant for licensure becomes qualified to take the examination which must be passed before certification is granted. Most audiologists are designated as clinical audiologists apparently because their testing and diagnosing of clients occurs in a clinic equipped with machines designed to test and diagnose hearing difficulties. Many audiologists dispense and fit hearing aids as do some otologists. The latter are exempted from hearing aid regulation by Section 468.137(2) , Florida Statutes. The average person is unaware that a CHAA does not have equal (and some people believe greater) qualifications respecting hearing disorders than does an audiologist. Few people know there is any difference between the two. Even one of Petitioner's witnesses acknowledged that a lot of physicians are confused about the term certified hearing aid audiologist. Accordingly, holding oneself out as a CHAA tends to mislead the general public when one so holding himself out is not, in fact, a qualified audiologist.
