Findings Of Fact Petitioner was first licensed as a ball bondsman in 1961 or 1962. In 1969 (Exhibit 2), Petitioner was charged with being incompetent and untrustworthy as a bail bondsman, found guilty and placed on one year's probation which was successfully completed. In 1973, Petitioner was again charged with conducting himself in a manner unbecoming a bail bondsman (Exhibit 3). These charges alleged failure to return the premium paid on a supersedes bond when the prisoner was not released from jail on the bond and failure to maintain his office open to the general public as required. In the Final Order issued in this case, Petitioner was fined $850 and placed on probation for two years. Upon failure of Petitioner to comply with the terms of the Final Order, his license was revoked for a period of ten months after which the revocation was set aside and his license restored. In 1979, a hearing was conducted by the undersigned Hearing Officer on charges alleging that Petitioner had failed to maintain the minimum requirement for permanent office records and failed to maintain a place of business accessible to the public and be actively engaged in the bail bond business in violation of Chapter 64B, Florida Statutes. Petitioner was found guilty as charged, and the recommendation that his license be revoked was adopted by the Commissioner of Insurance in the Final order. In 1986, Petitioner was arrested for operating a donut shop in Tampa utilizing topless waitresses in violation of Tampa Ordinance 24-11. These charges were dismissed on appeal to the circuit court (Exhibit 5). Witnesses called by Petitioner included the attorney who prosecuted the 1979 case (Exhibit 4) against Respondent; the investigator who investigated the 1979 charges for the Department, and a sitting circuit court judge who filed an appeal of the 1979 revocation order on behalf of the Petitioner At the time the charges which led to the revocation were preferred, Respondent was without power to write bonds, but still had an obligation to service bonds still outstanding. The two witnesses who testified in these proceedings on the status of a licensed bail bondsman without power to write new bonds both concurred that this places a bail bondsman in the anomalous position of one who has no need for an office to provide bail bonds for the public but who still needs to be accessible to those clients for whom he has outstanding bonds. This distinction was not clarified at the 1979 hearing. All three witnesses who testified on behalf of Petitioner were aware of nothing that would disqualify Petitioner as a bail bondsman at this time. No evidence was submitted that Petitioner was convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, except for the admission by Petitioner that on or about August 11, 1966, he pleaded guilty to uttering a check without sufficient funds on deposit with which the check could be honored. This offense occurred more than 20 years ago and prior to Petitioner twice being found qualified for licensure by Respondent as a bail bondsman.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Patterson is currently eligible for licensure and is licensed in this state as a limited surety agent (bail bondsman). At all times material to the Administrative Complaint, Mr. Patterson was eligible for licensure and was licensed in Florida as a limited surety agent (bail bondsman) with Crews Bonding Agency located in Jacksonville, Duval County, Florida. As such, he was a full-time employee of the Crews Bonding Agency and worked the 4:30 p.m. to 8:00 a.m., or night shift, each night. Mr. Patterson was the only licensed bail bondsman on this shift at the Crews Bonding Agency. Ralph Bunch Collins was also a full-time employee of Crews Bonding Agency at all times material, and at all times material, Mr. Collins worked the night shift with Mr. Patterson. Mr. Collins was recognized by Mr. Patterson and his employer as an administrative assistant whose job entailed clerical duties with regard to the bonding process. Mr. Patterson and Mr. Collins worked as a team. Mr. Collins is not a limited surety agent, bail bondsman, runner, or permittee under Chapter 648, F.S. At all times material, Jerelyn Rodriguez, ne' Langtree, was licensed in Florida as a limited surety agent (bail bondsman) with Crews Bonding Agency. She, also, was a full-time employee of that agency and was its designated office manager. Mrs. Rodriquez worked the hours of 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. daily with an administrative assistant named Mrs. Cook, and together Rodriquez and Cook constituted the Crews Bonding Agency's day shift team. The 1983 version of the statute under which Mr. Patterson is charged in the Administrative Complaint read as follows: 648.441 Furnishing supplies to an unlicensed bail bondsmen prohibited: civil liability and penalty.-- No insurer, bail bondsman, runner, or permittee under this chapter shall furnish to any person any blank forms, applications, stationery, or other supplies to be used in soliciting, negotiating, or effecting bail bonds until such person has received from the department a license to act as a bail bondsman and has duly qualified as such. Any insurer, licensee, or permittee who furnishes to any bail bondsman or other person not named or appointed by `the insurer represented any of the supplies mentioned in subsection (1) and accepts any basil bond business from or writes any bail `bond business for such bail bondsman, person, or agency shall be subject to civil liability to any insured of such insurer to thee same extent and in the same manner as if such bail bondsman or other person had been appointed, licensed, or authorized by the insurer, general agent, or bail bondsman to act in its or his behalf by the department. [Emphasis supplied] On March 27, 1984 a Consent Order was entered in the Circuit Court in and for Duval County, Florida, in the case styled, Jack I. Etheridge and F.G.C. Bonding and Insurance Corporation v. State of Florida and State of Florida Department of Insurance, Case No. 82-10537. That Consent Order provided, in pertinent part, as follows: 4. Florida statute 648.441(1) likewise must be given a liberal and common sense application in order to preserve its constitutionality. It is the intent of the Legislature, as interpreted by this Court that said subsection is designed to prohibit licensed bail bondsmen from allowing non- licensed persons to actually conduct a (sic) legitimate and licensed activities of a licensed bail bondsman. Therefore this Court finds that it is a constitutionally permissable (sic) legislative act to prevent licensed person (sic) from providing non- licensed persons with forms and supplies of the trade that would permit the non-licensed persons to violate the law. However, this does not preclude clerical activities by non- licensed persons under the direct supervision of a licensed person to the extent that it is consistent with the general intent of said section. (Emphasis supplied) [Patterson Exhibit 1] The wife of Jack I. Etheridge, who was a plaintiff in the foregoing civil lawsuit, was an owner of the Crews Bonding Agency at all times material to the instant administrative proceeding. The foregoing Circuit Court Consent Order to which DOI was a party is the only relevant interpretation by a court of competent jurisdiction of Section 648.441 F.S. which either party hereto or the undersigned has been able to discover. DOI put on no expert evidence of agency construction of the statute either formally by rule or informally by policy. Subsequent to that Circuit Court Consent Order, the statute interpreted therein [see FOF 5, supra] was amended to add subsection (3), as follows: Any person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. All three statutory subsections were in effect at all times material to the administrative charges against' Mr. Patterson. During the night shift of New Year's Eve, December 31, 1988, Susan Miller a/k/a Sharon Miller, who was then the wife of James Edward Miller, contacted the Crews Bonding Agency by telephone and relayed certain necessary information to Ralph Collins as a predicate to securing a bond to get her husband out of the Duval County Jail. In turn, Mr. Collins called the jail and received basic information for making out the necessary bonding papers. Mrs. Miller arrived at the bonding agency and Mr. Collins prepared certain paperwork for her signature, that of her husband, and that of the Mr. Patterson as bail bondsman. It is the unrefuted testimony of Mr. Patterson, Mr. Collins, Jerelyn Rodriquez, and Gilbert Clark that in doing so, Mr. Collins was conforming to the standard operating procedure of the Crews Bonding Agency and the custom in the bonding trade at least as far as that trade has been practiced within Duval County, Florida, since the entry of the March 27, 1984 Consent Order. Patterson Exhibit 2 and the testimony of Correctional Officer Larry Wooten established that, provided the licensed bondsman presents the bond and personally receives the prisoner into his custody, the foregoing clerical practice and procedure has been acquiesced-in by a published policy of the Duval County Sheriff's Office and by county jail personnel, of which Mr. Wooten is one. There was unrefuted testimony that without such clerical help, a licensed bondsman could not function 24 hours a day, as is common in the trade. It is also the unrefuted testimony of Mr. Patterson, Mr. Collins, and Mrs. Rodriquez that at all times material to the Miller transaction, Mr. Collins was subject to the supervision of Mr. Patterson, that Mr. Patterson had the absolute right to alter any document prepared by Mr. Collins prior to signing the Miller bond, and that Mr. Patterson ultimately could have rejected underwriting Mr. Miller's bond if, after Mr. Patterson's review, the documents Mr. Collins had prepared did not conform to the insurance law, rules, or standards to which Mr. Patterson, as a licensee, was bound to conform. The foregoing testimony is further supported by the testimony of Gilbert Clark. Mr. Clark is a licensed bail bondsman who is not now and never has been associated with the Crews Bonding Agency. He testified that Mr. Patterson could ultimately have refused to place the Miller bond even if Mr. Patterson's only dissatisfaction upon his review of the documents prepared by Mr. Collins had been the sufficiency of the collateral or premium provided by the Millers. With regard to the Miller transaction, Mr. Collins prepared the Indemnity Agreement (DOI Exhibit 2e) for signature by Mr. Miller's wife, which Mr. Collins notarized with certificate, seal, and stamp. Collins prepared a Promissory Note (DOI Exhibit 2f) and signed on the line provided for a witness to Mrs. Miller's signature but without applying his notary certificate, seal, or stamp. Collins prepared a Premium Receipt (DOI Exhibit 2g) and signed on the line acknowledging that the premium had been "received by" him in the form of a check from Mr. and Mrs. Miller. The nature of the Premium Receipt and the Collateral Receipt does not necessarily require the Millers' signatures, but Mr. Collins testified that his own signature on the Premium Receipt was meant to signify that he had witnessed signatures and that he had signed it as a notary but that he did not affix a notary certificate, seal, and stamp because he saw no reason for those formalities. Because of the requirements of Chapter 117 F.S. governing notaries public, because the document speaks for itself, and because Mr. Collins testified that he, in fact, received the premium, his testimony that he signed the Premium Receipt for the Miller transaction only as a notary or witness is not credible, particularly since the exhibit (DOI Exhibit 2g) does not bear the Millers' signatures. Mr. Collins prepared the Collateral Receipt (also DOI Exhibit 2g) and received the collateral, signifying same by his signature. (TR 40-41). However, Mr. Patterson signed on the Miller bond and went through all the bond papers, including the foregoing, with Mr. Miller after Mr. Patterson personally physically obtained Mr. Miller's release from jail. On July 7, 1989, Henry A. Robinson went to Crews Bonding Agency in an effort to bond his son, Henry Steve Robinson, out of the Duval County Jail. All of the father's negotiations were with Mrs. Rodriquez. The father did not testify. At all times material to the Robinson transaction, both Mrs. Cook and Mr. Collins had signs on their respective desks, proclaiming them to be administrative assistants, and a sign on Mr. Patterson's desk proclaimed him to be a bail bondsman. When Mr. Patterson and Mr. Collins arrived at Crews Bonding Agency for the July 7, 1989 night shift, some paperwork had already been prepared by Mrs. Rodriquez and others. Mrs. Rodriquez had already reviewed all the papers prepared by someone else, and Mrs. Rodriquez had tentatively committed to underwriting the bond on Henry Steve Robinson. Mr. Patterson did not thereafter "second guess" Mrs. Rodriquez's initial work or judgment despite his absolute right to reject the bond for all the reasons aforesaid in FOF 12. Some further Robinson transaction paperwork was prepared by Mr. Collins after he came on duty. The nature of several of these documents did not require either the signature of the father, the mother, or the son or the notarizing thereof, but the evidence indicates that Mr. Collins thought some of them did. Premium Receipt 127003 (DOI Exhibit 4f, apparently one of two such receipts) and the Collateral Receipt (DOI Exhibit 4b) for this transaction were signed by Mr. Collins on the "received by" lines. He testified that he signed these only as a Crews employee, i.e., a clerk administrative assistant, and as a notary but without affixing his notarial seal. Collins testified that he signed as a witness for the father's signature on the witness line as a Crews employee for the Contingency Promissory Note (DOI Exhibit 4c, TR 48-50), that he did not notarize the note initially when the senior Mr. Robinson signed it in his presence because arrangements were made for the senior Mr. Robinson's convenience to allow Mrs. Robinson to sign the following day, and that the next day, Mr. Collins just witnessed on the other side of that document. However, the documentary evidence (DOI Exhibit 4c) is clear that Mrs. Robinson (the mother) never signed the Contingency Promissory Note. Mr. Collins testified that he signed as a Crews Bonding Agency employee and then notarized with a certificate, seal, and stamp the Indemnity Agreement to the effect that it had been signed by Mr. Robinson's father and mother when in fact the mother never signed that document. (TR 52-56, DOI 4e). Due to the provisions of Chapter 117 F.S., the discrepancy between the exhibits and the testimony, and the vacillation of Mr. Collins in giving his oral testimony, it is found that contrary to Mr. Collins' oral testimony, he was confused or uninformed as to his actual function with regard to the Robinson transaction. However, Mr. Patterson reviewed all the Robinson papers and documents and signed the General Appearance Bond as surety and as attorney-in-fact and an agent of Crews Bonding Agency. Mr. Patterson also personally effectuated Henry Steve Robinson's release from jail on July 7, 1989. Henry Steve Robinson (the son) had been bonded out of the Duval County Jail by the team of Patterson and Collins of the Crews Bonding Agency on at least two occasions, and due to Mr. Robinson's confusion of dates, his testimony concerning exactly what papers he went over with Mr. Patterson or anyone else on July 7, 1989 was somewhat vague. However, he was very clear on some points: Mr. Collins never said he was a bail bondsman, it was Mr. Patterson who signed Robinson out of jail each time, and Robinson signed papers in the bonding agency office each time. Robinson believed that Mr. Patterson was the person who explained all the papers to him in Collins' presence on the date in question, but could not be sure. Mr. Collins and Mr. Patterson asserted that as of the July 11, 1990 formal hearing, Crews Bonding Agency clerical personnel are no longer permitted to sign premium and collateral receipts. This instruction was given in anticipation of amendments to Section 648.441 F.S. which were due to go into effect October 1, 1990. Although Mrs. Miller did not testify, the evidence as a whole from other witnesses supports the reasonable inference that this case arose partly because she complained to DOI when Mr. Collins and other Crews Bonding Agency employees refused to summarily reincarcerate her husband upon her oral complaints of domestic problems. No finding has been made concerning what impression of Mr. Collins was formed by Mrs. Miller or concerning the state of Mrs. Miller's mind because the evidence presented on those issues was speculative and not the type of hearsay which would explain or supplement direct and probative evidence. Neither Mr. Miller or Mr. Henry Steve Robinson appeared to have any complaints with the bonding process or participants.
Recommendation DOAH Case No. 90-0406 Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DOAH Case No. 90-0584 Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance and `Treasurer enter a Final Order granting Mr. Patterson's application for a resident license to represent Amwest Surety Insurance Company as a limited surety agent (bail bondsman). DONE and ENTERED this 17th day of October, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of October, 1990.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent, who is a limited surety agent, is guilty of violating Section 648.571(1), Florida Statutes, by failing to return the collateral within 21 days after the discharge of the bail bond; Section 648.45(2)(e), Florida Statutes, by demonstrating lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the bail bond business; Section 648.45(2)(g), Florida Statutes, by engaging in fraudulent or dishonest practices in the conduct of business under the license; and Section 648.45(2)(j), Florida Statutes, by willfully failing to comply with, or willfully violating any proper order or rule of the department or willfully violating any provision of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes, or the Insurance Code. If guilty of any of these violations, an additional issue is the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent has been a licensed surety agent, holding license number A134458. Respondent is the president and owner of Big Larry Bail Bonds in Fort Lauderdale. Mark Blackman, who is 45 years old, is a licensed mortgage broker and sophisticated in business matters. He has been convicted four times of driving under the influence over the past 20 years. The arrest that resulted in the fourth conviction took place on December 7, 2003. Mr. Blackman's girlfriend at the time of his arrest, Tracy, suggested that he purchase a bail bond from Respondent. Tracy, who was addicted to crack cocaine, had previously purchased a bail bond from Respondent when she had been arrested for the possession of cocaine. Mr. Blackman instructed Tracy to visit Respondent's office and arrange for Respondent to post bond, which was $23,500. Respondent agreed to post bond, but only if Mr. Blackman paid the bond premium of $2350 and delivered, as security, a note for the entire bail bond, an indemnity agreement, title to his 2002 C32 Mercedes Benz, and the vehicle itself. With Tracy's help, Mr. Blackman complied with these conditions, and Respondent bailed him out of jail. At this point, the agreement between Respondent and Mr. Blackman, with respect to the car, was that Respondent would store the car in a safe place. Accordingly, immediately upon receiving the car, Respondent drove it to a body shop where it could be stored safely and without charge. Three or four days later, while out on bail, Mr. Blackman was arrested for felony possession of cocaine. The judge revoked the original bond and refused to set bond for the new offense. At this time, the vehicle no longer served as security because the bail bond that it had secured no longer existed. Thus, at this time, Mr. Blackman was entitled to the return of the vehicle. Neither Mr. Blackman nor Respondent was under any misimpression as to Mr. Blackman's status at the time of the second arrest. Both men knew that Mr. Blackman would not be able to be released from jail on bail for these alleged offenses. Mr. Blackman would remain in jail until February 2004, after which time, following a plea deal, Mr. Blackman began serving nights in jail. The day after his re-arrest, Mr. Blackman called Respondent from jail and asked him if he would help Mr. Blackman sell the vehicle. Mr. Blackman explained that he knew that he was going to lose his driver's license. He asked Respondent if he knew anyone who worked at an automobile auction. Eventually, Mr. Blackman asked Respondent if he wanted to purchase the car, but Respondent declined, at least initially. Within a day or two after speaking to Mr. Blackman the day after his re-arrest, Respondent removed the car from the body shop, so he could show it to a prospective buyer. Respondent did not return the car to the body shop, but instead kept the car at his office or home. The record does not establish that Respondent had driven the car for any reason prior to showing it two or three days after Respondent's second arrest. For several reasons, Mr. Blackman was content with Respondent's possession of the car after it no longer served as collateral for a bail bond. Although released from jail during days starting in February 2004, Mr. Blackman remained concerned about the car during the evenings, while he was in jail. As he explained to Respondent at the time, Mr. Blackman did not want his brother to have access to the car. As Mr. Blackman testified at the hearing, he was also concerned that a friend of Tracy not have access to the car. Mr. Blackman's concerns may have extended to Tracy, who he later determined stole $20,000 from Mr. Blackman while he was in jail. Unable to drive the car due to his loss of driving privileges, Mr. Blackman did not want the car parked in his crime-ridden neighborhood. Additionally, Mr. Blackman's auto insurance expired in January 2004. For these reasons, Mr. Blackman was in no hurry after his re-arrest for Respondent to give up possession of Mr. Blackman's car. The car was safer with Respondent than it would have been returned to Mr. Blackman. Mr. Blackman knew that he would not be charged storage and was hopeful that Respondent would sell the car for Mr. Blackman. At no time, though, did Respondent try to document the change from his holding the car as collateral for a bail bond to holding it for the convenience of Mr. Blackman. Specifically, Respondent never tried to obtain Mr. Blackman's signature on a collateral release, which would document that the car no longer secured a now-nonexistent bail bond. Respondent claimed that he could not obtain Mr. Blackman's signature while he was in jail, but it is customary for limited surety agents to visit inmates in jail to obtain their signatures on paperwork, such as a collateral release. Also, in February 2004, Respondent could have obtained Mr. Blackman's signature at anytime during the day. After showing the car the first time, two or three days after Mr. Blackman's second arrest, Respondent began to use the vehicle for his personal and business purposes, as well as occasionally showing it to a prospective buyer. After January 2004, Mr. Blackman's car was no longer insured. It is unclear whether the registration and license tag expired during this period. Before Mr. Blackman was released on days, Respondent produced offers of $28,000 and $29,000 from two different persons, but Mr. Blackman wanted $38,000 for the car and refused these offers. After being released on days, Mr. Blackman did not visit Respondent or ask for him to return the car. Mr. Blackman was likely preoccupied with other matters immediately after his release from jail in February. Failing to report to jail one night shortly after his release, Mr. Blackman violated one of the conditions of his sentence, took off, and was re-arrested and returned to jail in March or April 2004. Only after he was again incarcerated did Mr. Blackman re-address the issue of the car with Respondent. The first thing he did was tell Respondent to deduct $1200 from the price of the car for a bond forfeiture on a bond that Respondent had written on Tracy. The next thing, on April 13, 2004, Mr. Blackman entered into a written agreement with Respondent for the sale of the vehicle, on the same date, to Respondent for $35,000 cash. However, Respondent backed out of the deal. About six weeks later, in late May 2004, Mr. Blackman sent his sister to pick up the car. She had a power of attorney, but it did not apply to the car, so Respondent would not release the car to her. This was a reasonable action on Respondent's part, given his knowledge of Mr. Blackman's distrust of at least one other family member. A couple of weeks later, in early June, Mr. Blackman's sister returned with a proper power of attorney, and Respondent released the car to her. After taking the car from Respondent, Mr. Blackman's sister and her husband noticed that the car had considerably higher mileage than Mr. Blackman had said that it should have. Respondent had driven the vehicle 7,000 to 10,000 miles during the six months that he had possessed the car, but entirely after the second arrest in December. Respondent was cavalier about his use of the car, as he incurred numerous parking tickets, as well as tolls on Mr. Blackman's SunPass transponder that was in the car when it was delivered to Respondent--all of which charges were imposed on Mr. Blackman. After repeated demands, Respondent paid off only some of these charges. The additional mileage that Respondent put on the vehicle reduced the vehicle's fair market value by as much as $3000. On August 1, 2004, Mr. Blackman's sister, using her power of attorney and with her brother's approval, sold the car for $33,000 to a person other than Respondent.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order dismissing Counts I and III, finding Respondent guilty of violation Section 648.45(2)(e), Florida Statutes, in Count II, and imposing a six-month suspension and a $5000 administrative fine. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of October, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of October, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Greg S. Marr, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Michael A. Levin, Esquire Law Offices of Michael A. Levin Global Commerce Center 1900 North Commerce Parkway Weston, Florida 33326 Larry Lorenzo Jones 1310 Sistrunk Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33331 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capital, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Carlos G. Muñiz, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307
Findings Of Fact Petitioner issued license No. 23-1635-2COP to respondents, authorizing them to sell beer and wine for consumption on the premises. Later, on February 2, 1978, after Osvaldo Iglesia's indictment for conspiracy to import "approximately 50,000 pounds of marijuana . . . and 25 kilos of cocaine," Special Agent Harold Lierly of the federal Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) telephones petitioner's Officer Alford, seeking assistance in apprehending Osvaldo Iglesia. Officer Alford then telephoned Osvaldo Iglesia and asked him to come to petitioner's office and to bring his driver's license with him; and notified the DEA. When Mr. Iglesia arrived, Officer Alford checked his identification, and DEA agent Leslie W. Thompson effected an arrest, pursuant to warrant. Subsequently, Osvaldo Iglesia was released from custody upon the posting of a $150,000.00 bond. When he failed to report for his removal hearing on February 16, 1978, a bench warrant issued, Petitioner's exhibit No. 4, and the magistrate recommended bond forfeiture. Petitioner's exhibit No. 1. On February 24, 1978, a United States District Judge ordered forfeiture of the bond. Petitioner's exhibit No. 2. On April 18, 1978, a judgment of bail bond forfeiture, in the amount of $50,000.00, seems to have been entered. Petitioner's exhibit No. 3.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that petitioner revoke respondent's license, No. 23-1635-2COP. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of October 1979 in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Dennis E. LaRosa, Esquire Staff Attorney Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Osvaldo & Rosalba Iglesia 2500 Palm Avenue Hialeah, Florida
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent violated sections 648.442(1), 648.442(2), 648.442(4), 648.571(1), 648.45(2)(e), 648.45(2)(h), 648.45(2)(j), 648.571(3)(b)1., and 648.571(3)(b)2., Florida Statutes (2007),1/ and Florida Administrative Code Rules 69B-221.145(4)(a) and 69B- 221.145(4)(b), and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for regulating insurance and insurance-related activities, including limited surety (bail bond) licensees in Florida. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Mr. Wilson has been licensed in this state as a limited surety (bail bond) (2-34) agent, license number D012026. Mr. Wilson is the owner of Against All Odds Bail Bonds (Against All Odds), which is located in Tampa, Florida. As a bail bond agent, Mr. Wilson's duties include writing bail bonds for defendants who are incarcerated; ensuring the defendants appear for court dates; arresting defendants who fail to appear in court and returning them to jail; and returning collateral to defendants when requested. In 2007, Mr. Wilson was the only limited surety agent working at Against All Odds. In May 2007, Michael Wisher (Mr. Wisher) was arrested for driving under the influence, and his bond was set at $2,000. Mr. Wilson was contacted to post a surety bond on Mr. Wisher's behalf. On May 12 or 13, 2007, Mr. Wilson met Mr. Wisher at the Hillsborough County Jail, where Mr. Wisher was being held. Mr. Wilson advised Mr. Wisher that the premium for the bail bond was $200 and that an additional $1,800 for collateral was required. Mr. Wisher agreed to the arrangement and gave Mr. Wilson permission to use his credit card for the payment. Mr. Wilson used Mr. Wisher's credit card at the jail to pay for the premium and collateral for a total of $2,000. Mr. Wilson secured an appearance bond with United States Fire Insurance Company on May 13, 2007. Mr. Wilson was released and accompanied Mr. Wilson to the office of Against All Odds, where he executed an Indemnitor/Guarantor Check List dated May 12, 2007. Two of the provisions of the checklist provide: I understand that my collateral cannot be released until all bonds posted on my behalf for defendant have been exonerated and written notice form the court received by the bail agency. I understand that it is my [Mr. Wisher's] responsibility to request return of any collateral provided. There may be a delay of return of collateral until the bail agency has researched the exoneration date and verified the bail bond status with the appropriate courts. The process may be done faster if I obtain written verification of the bond exoneration from the court and provide it to the bail agency. Mr. Wilson did not issue a receipt to Mr. Wisher, showing that Mr. Wisher had paid $2,000. Based on Mr. Wilson's testimony, the Indemnitor/Guarantor Check List is not the receipt. Mr. Wilson claims that he did issue a collateral receipt, but that receipt did not show the credit card fee that was being imposed. According to Mr. Wilson, the copy of the receipt was destroyed in a fire. Mr. Wisher's testimony is credited that he did not receive a receipt. Computer records of the Clerk of Hillsborough Circuit Court show that on September 18, 2007, the bond was deactivated and a certificate of discharge of bond was issued in Mr. Wisher's case. Mr. Wilson claims not to have received the certificate of discharge, and no certificate of discharge was entered in evidence. Mr. Wisher contacted Mr. Wilson on December 17, 2007, requesting that his collateral be returned. Mr. Wisher advised Mr. Wilson that the bond had been discharged. Mr. Wilson was aware that the bond had been discharged because he had checked the computer records of the Clerk of the Hillsborough Circuit Court and saw the record showing the discharge of the bond. Mr. Wilson sent Mr. Wisher a money order for $500 on January 3, 2008. He sent Mr. Wisher another money order dated January 31, 2008, for another $500. Mr. Wisher did not agree to have his collateral returned in installments. By the end of January 2008, Mr. Wilson still owed Mr. Wisher $800. Mr. Wisher made numerous telephone calls to Mr. Wilson in an attempt to get the remaining amount of his collateral. In June 2008, Mr. Wisher wrote Mr. Wilson two times in an attempt to get his collateral returned. Both letters were returned by the United States Postal Service as unclaimed. Mr. Wisher did not receive any additional money from Mr. Wilson. Mr. Wilson claims that he mailed Mr. Wisher an additional $400, but the evidence does not support his claim. He submitted a copy of an envelope addressed to Mr. Wisher with a first class stamp on it. The envelope did not bear a post mark. The exhibit also had a portion of a customer receipt from the United States Postal Service, which states return of collateral in the section entitled "Pay To" and Michael Wisher in the section labeled "C.O.D. or Used For." The receipt contains no date and does not specify what service or goods for which the receipt was issued. Additionally, it appears that the receipt is not complete based on the wording at the bottom which states serial number; year, month, day; post office; and amount. Such wording would suggest that additional information would be part of the receipt, but the receipt provided by Mr. Wilson did not contain the additional information. In addition to the premium of $200, Mr. Wilson charged Mr. Wisher $400 for a credit card fee. This amount represented percent of the total bond amount, not just the collateral amount. The credit card fee which Mr. Wilson charged was more than the fee which the credit card company charged him for use of the credit card. Mr. Wilson claims that he was taught at the bail bond school held in Fort Lauderdale that up to 20 percent of the total bond amount could be charged to the client for the use of a credit card. The Department did not establish that Mr. Wilson failed to have a sign in his office posting the credit card fee schedule when Mr. Wisher visited his office. However, Mr. Wisher was not provided a copy of the credit card fee schedule.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Mr. Wilson did not violate sections 648.442(1), 648.442(4), and 648.571(3)(b)2.; finding that Mr. Wilson violated sections 648.442(2), 648.571(1), 648.571(3)(b)1., 648.45(2)(e), 648.45(2)(h), and 648.45(2)(j) and rules 69B-221.145(4)(a) and 69B-221.145(4)(b); suspending Mr. Wilson's license for six months; imposing an administrative fine of $5,000; and requiring Mr. Wilson to return the remainder of Mr. Wisher's collateral to him. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of November, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN BELYEU KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of November, 2011.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated provision of the Florida Insurance Code by employing a convicted felon in the bail bond business. Whether Respondent violated the provisions of the Florida Insurance Code by failing to report a change of address to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to the dates and occurrences referred to in this matter, Respondent Clarence Luther Cephas, Sr., was licensed in the State of Florida as a bail bond agent. Pursuant to Florida law, Petitioner has jurisdiction over the bail bond licensure and appointments of Respondent. Records of the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Florida (Criminal Division), show that Pamela Jean Coleman, a/k/a Deborah Lee Diehl, a/k/a Pamela Jean Jones, a/k/a Pamela Jones, a/k/a Pamela Coleman, pleaded guilty and was adjudicated guilty on March 28, 1975, in case number 75-239 CF, of buying or receiving or aiding in concealment of stolen property, a felony. Records of the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Florida (Criminal Division), show that Pamela Jean Coleman, a/k/a Deborah Lee Diehl, a/k/a Pamela Jean Jones, a/k/a Pamela Jones, a/k/a Pamela Coleman, pleaded guilty and was adjudicated guilty on October 22, 1975, in case number 75-2390 CF, of violation of drug abuse law, a felony. Records of the State of Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) show that the conviction set forth in paragraph 4 above included convictions on March 28, 1975, and July 17, 1975, for parole violations. On or about March 7, 1980, the State of Florida Office of Executive Clemency restored the civil rights of Pamela Jean Coleman, relative to Coleman's criminal convictions in Palm Beach County, Florida, in 1975. Records of the FDLE show that on or about November 25, 1991, Pamela Jean Coleman, a/k/a Deborah Lee Diehl, a/k/a Pamela Jean Jones, a/k/a Pamela Jones, a/k/a Pamela Coleman, plead nolo contendere, was adjudicated guilty, and convicted of retail theft in Polk County, Florida, a misdemeanor of the first degree, which constituted a crime of moral turpitude. Records of the Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Polk County, State of Florida, show that on or about November 25, 1991, Pamela Jean Coleman, a/k/a Deborah Lee Diehl, a/k/a Pamela Jean Jones, a/k/a Pamela Jones, a/k/a Pamela Coleman, in case number CF91-1923, pled nolo contendere, was adjudicated guilty and convicted of petit theft, a misdemeanor of the first degree, which constituted a crime of moral turpitude. Records of the Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Polk County, State of Florida, show that on or about December 16, 2002, an Amended Information was filed against Pamela Jean Coleman (a/k/a Deborah Lee Diehl, a/k/a Pamela Jean Jones, a/k/a Pamela Jones, a/k/a Pamela Coleman) in case number CFO2-00597A-XX, charging that between November 27, 2000, and January 25, 2002, in the County of Polk and State of Florida, having been convicted of or pled guilty or no contest to a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude or a crime punishable by imprisonment of one year or more under the law of any state, territory, or county, regardless of whether adjudication of guilt was withheld, did participate as a director, officer, manager, or employee of a bail bond agency or office thereof or exercise direct or indirect control in any manner in such agency or office or own shares in a closely held corporation which had an interest in a bail bond business contrary to Section 648.44, Florida Statutes. Further, the records of said court show that on or about January 31, 2002, Pamela Jean Coleman (a/k/a Deborah Lee Diehl, a/k/a Pamela Jean Jones, a/k/a Pamela Jones, a/k/a Pamela Coleman) in case number CFO2-00597A-XX, was tried, found guilty and adjudicated guilty of a violation of Section 648.44(8), Florida Statutes, acting as a bail bondsman while being a convicted felon, a felony of the third degree, as charged in the aforesaid Amended Information. Said conviction is presently on appeal before the Florida Second District Court of Appeal. Respondent knew or should have known the foregoing information. Documents under Seal from the Florida Department of State, Division of Corporations, pertaining to Clarence Luther Cephas, Sr., Bailbonds, Ltd., Inc., show that Pamela Jean Coleman filed original documents on behalf of Respondent's corporation and corresponded with the Department of State, Division of Corporations, on behalf of the said corporation. She was listed as both the registered agent of the corporation and also a vice-president and director of the said corporation as set forth on a document filed over the signature of Respondent. Other filed documentation show Pamela Jean Coleman as the president, secretary, and as director of said corporation. These documents are accurate and valid. The original license application form, Florida Insurance Temporary License Application, under Section 11, Screening Question Information, contains the following language: "If you were adjudged guilty or convicted of a felony crime and your civil rights were lost, provide evidence that your civil rights have been restored." There is no evidence in the record that Coleman provided that information to Petitioner at the time the original application was filed or at any time subsequent to that period, and Coleman signed the application. Respondent gave a statement, under oath, before Luis Rivera, Special Investigator for Petitioner's predecessor (Department of Insurance), on November 27, 2000, wherein he stated: I have known Pamela Coleman/Jones for approximately four years and she has been affiliated with me for most of the time that I have been in the bail bond business. I had asked her if she had ever been convicted of a felony and she said that she had been convicted as a teenager. She had a Certificate of Restoration of Civil Rights from the Office of Executive Clemency that is dated March 7, 1980. I was under the impression that if her rights had been restored, that it would not be a problem with her working for me. I named Pamela as an officer in my corporation because I did not have any family that I could list as an officer except for my daughter, who is a deputy sheriff and could not be an office of the corporation. Respondent had a business address-of-record with Petitioner of B & B Bail Bonds, 580 North Broadway Avenue, Bartow, Florida 33830-3918, when in fact his business address was 2095 East Georgia Street, Bartow, Florida 33830-6710. Respondent did not notify Petitioner of a change of address for his corporation as required by law. In November 2000 during an interview, Luis Rivera and another Special Investigator from his office advised Respondent that Petitioner (then the Department of Insurance) considered him to be in violation of Section 648.44(8), Florida Statutes, notwithstanding any restoration of civil rights granted to Pamela Jean Coleman. Luis Rivera visited the home office of Respondent, on March 7 and 21, 2000, at 2095 East Georgia Street, Bartow, Florida 33830-6710, and knew of no other office location for that agent after that date. Constance Castro, a Special Investigator with the Tampa Office, Petitioner (then the Department of Insurance), Bureau of Agent and Agency Investigations, during September 2001, made an undercover visit to the bail bond office of Respondent, and pretended to be in need of a bail bond for a fictitious relative. She dealt directly with Pamela Jean Coleman who proceeded from the home living area of the house where Respondent was also located, to the office area of the home where Coleman conducted bail bond business with Castro. Special Agent Michael Kreis, Drug Enforcement Agency, in early 2001, had business with Cephas Bail Bonds. He went to the office thereof where he observed Pamela Jean Coleman sitting behind the desk. Coleman told him that she had posted bond the night before for the people he was asking about, and was very familiar with the street names of the people that were being sought. Coleman helped to arrange what was supposed to be a meeting between her and one of the suspects using the ruse that she needed the suspect to sign some bail bond paperwork. Kreis observed Respondent in the office but Coleman seemed to be in charge. Kreis observed her on the phone and dealing with people who came into the Cephas' bail bond office, and noted that by her actions and conduct, she was acting as a bail bond agent. On or about June 19, 2001, Noel Elizabeth "Nikki" Collier was working as a paralegal in her husband's law office when Pamela Jean Coleman visited their office with paperwork for one of their mutual clients to fill out. Coleman left her business card which read "Pamela J. Coleman, President, Clarence L. Cephas, Sr. Bail Bonds." Coleman was dressed in a black outfit with a badge attached to her belt. Coleman told her that if the mutual client did not sign the paperwork then the bail bonds would be revoked. When in the law office, Coleman identified herself as an agent for Clarence Cephas Bail Bonds. Respondent acknowledged that Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 8 was indeed a sworn statement made by him during a visit to Petitioner (then Department of Insurance), Bureau of Agent and Agency Investigations, at its offices in Tampa, Florida, in November 2000, and that he was indeed warned by Petitioner's personnel that he was in violation of Section 648.44(8), Florida Statutes. He was subsequently warned by the filing of an Administrative Complaint in June 2001, an Amended Administrative Complaint in December 2001, and a Second Amended Complaint in March 2003. Respondent acknowledged that Pamela Jean Coleman was indeed listed as an officer and as a registered agent as well as the filer of various corporation documents, regarding his corporation and on file with the Department of State, Division of Corporations, and that he did sign the paperwork indicating that she was a corporate officer. Respondent further acknowledged that Coleman did participate in his bail bond business and that he did make payments to her as an employee, which included filing of a W-2 Form indicating said payments. During the pendency of this action, the State of Florida, by and through Jerry Hill, State Attorney for the Tenth Judicial Circuit, prosecuted Respondent for criminal violations of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes (2003), in the case styled State of Florida v Clarence Luther Cephas, Florida Tenth Circuit Court, Case Number CF02-00598A-XX (the "criminal case"). The Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit conducted a jury trial in the criminal case. On December 17, 2003, the jury rendered a verdict of "not guilty," and the Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit rendered a judgment of not guilty in the criminal case. The allegations contained in the criminal case were identical to the allegation contained in Count one of Petitioner's Second Amended Administrative Complaint. During the approximate period of time March 1997 to at least December 2001, Respondent did employ and/or did otherwise allow Pamela Jean Coleman to participate in the bail bond business. Respondent did fail to notify the Department of Financial Services of a change of address as required by law.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order as follows: Finding Respondent guilty of employing a convicted felon in the bail bond business, in violation of Sections 648.30, 348.44(8)(b), 648.45(2)(e) and (j), and 648.45(3)(a) and (c), Florida Statutes; Finding Respondent guilty of failing to report a change of address; and Revoking the bail bond agent license and eligibility for licensure of Respondent pursuant to Chapter 648, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of July, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of June, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: James R. Franklin, Esquire The Franklin & Carmichael Law Firm, P.A. 301 East Main Street Post Office Box 50 Bartow, Florida 33806 Dickson E. Kesler, Esquire Department of Financial Services 401 Northwest 2nd Avenue, Suite N-321 Miami, Florida 33128 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue Whether petitioner should take disciplinary action against respondent for the reasons alleged in the administrative complaint?
Findings Of Fact At all pertinent times, respondent Charlie James Perry has held a limited surety agent's license, No. L000078045, originally issued by petitioner in 1989. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. Asked by law enforcement in Daytona Beach to serve an arrest warrant on Jacqueline Yvette Wells Brown, Investigator Gayward Franklin Hendry of the Special Prosecution Division of the Fourth Circuit's State Attorney's office made inquiries in Jacksonville about Ms. Brown. Told that Ms. Brown worked at C.J. Frazier's Bail Bonds, he and Investigator Norris of Daytona Beach visited Frazier's, respondent's place of business at all pertinent times, on February 21, 1992. An African American woman told them Ms. Brown no longer worked there. Investigator Hendry telephoned Frazier's on March 10, 1992, and spoke to Mr. Perry, telling him of the outstanding arrest warrant for Ms. Brown. Respondent Perry told Mr. Hendry he did not know where Ms. Brown was, but that he would try to find out, and he asked Mr. Hendry not to tell anybody he was helping to try to locate her. After eight to ten subsequent attempts to reach Mr. Perry by telephone had proved unavailing, Mr. Hendry next spoke to him on or about April 30, 1992, when Mr. Perry reported he had been unable to get any information about Ms. Brown's whereabouts but that he was still trying. On May 13, 1992, Mr. Hendry and fellow investigator Bob Lassiter were again told that Ms. Brown worked at Frazier's, and were given a description of the car she drove. Half past nine o'clock that morning Investigators Hendry and Lassiter saw a car fitting the description at Frazier's. Mr. Hendry telephoned Frazier's from a pay telephone nearby, and asked for Jackie. Respondent answered, "Ok, hold," or "Yes, just a minute." Then Ronella Daniels got on the line and told Mr. Hendry that Jackie was not there. Investigators Hendry and Lassiter went from the telephone booth to Frazier's, where Ms. Daniels met them at the door. Eventually respondent Perry emerged from a back office to speak to the investigators, who announced that they had come for Ms. Brown. When Mr. Perry told them Ms. Brown was not on the premises, they asked to come in and look. Aware of the arrest warrant, Mr. Perry inquired whether they also had a search warrant, and was informed that they did not. He then made a telephone call to a lawyer in the midst of which Investigators Hendry and Lassiter pushed past him and found Ms. Brown hiding in a shower stall.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That petitioner suspend respondent's license for ninety (90) days. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of October, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of October, 1993. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact, except for No. 4, have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 4, several efforts to reach respondent by phone during that period were made, but without success till on or about April 30, 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Tom Gallagher, State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel T. Gross, Esquire Joseph D. Mandt, Esquire 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Charlie James Perry 2042 Moncrief Road Jacksonville, FL 32209-5775 Charlie James Perry 2180 Kingswood Road Jacksonville, FL 32207-4320
