The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's application for an initial license to operate an Assisted Living Facility should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this licensure dispute, Petitioner, Fosset Home for the Elderly, seeks an initial license to operate an Assisted Living Facility (ALF) in Jacksonville, Florida. In a preliminary decision issued on June 8, 1999, Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA), denied the application on the grounds that on April 8, 1998, Petitioner's owner had "pled guilty to operating an unlicensed [ALF] and [was] placed on 24 months' probation," and that her probation conditions prohibited her "from operating or maintaining an [ALF]." Petitioner denied the allegations and contended that its owner had met all terms of probation; that its owner had not been adjudicated guilty of the charges; that the denial was based on "erroneous facts"; and that AHCA had abused its discretion. Petitioner's owner is Shirley I. Fosset, a certified nursing assistant. Although the record is not altogether clear, it appears that several years ago, perhaps in 1994 or 1995, she assumed ownership of a licensed ALF known as Barlow Community Home in Jacksonville, Florida. It is undisputed that while operating that facility, Fosset was not cited for failing to adhere to AHCA regulations. Because the prior owner would not keep the facility's building in good repair, however, Fosset decided to move to a new location when it came time to renew the license, and to seek a new license under her own name. While seeking a new license, she continued to "knowingly" operate an ALF after her old license had expired. Sometime during the first half of 1997, but prior to June 19, 1997, Fosset was advised by AHCA to obtain a license within ten working days or else be subject to prosecution. Fosset then filed an application for licensure on an undisclosed date, but it was deemed incomplete because it lacked a legible fire marshal's report; zoning verification; sanitation and inspection reports; and a completed assets, liabilities, and statement of operation form. There were also unpaid license fees. Although she later submitted a legible fire marshal's report and paid the fees, the application was never determined to be complete and was therefore denied. On February 26, 1998, an information was filed by the Duval County State Attorney against Fosset charging that on June 19, 1997, she was operating an unlicensed ALF in Duval County, a third degree felony. On April 9, 1998, Fosset pled guilty to the charge, and adjudication of guilt was withheld. She was placed on supervised probation for 24 months, and one condition of probation prohibited her from "operating and maintaining an adult living facility" during her probationary period. According to Petitioner, her term of supervised probation was terminated on April 30, 1999, or prior to the original two-year period, and this was not contradicted. If this is true, then the condition that she not operate an ALF during her probationary period has also expired. The state attorney's office notified AHCA of Fosset's guilty plea by letter dated April 24, 1998. After receiving the letter, AHCA issued an Amended Administrative Complaint against Fosset on June 8, 1998, charging her with operating an unlicensed ALF. The parties eventually entered into a Joint Stipulation on July 7, 1998, wherein Fosset agreed to pay a fine, and a Final Order was entered on August 21, 1998, accepting the stipulation. On an undisclosed date in 1998, Fosset filed a second application for licensure. This application was preliminarily denied on May 20, 1998, on the ground she had "pled guilty to operating an unlicensed ALF." When no request for a hearing was made, a Final Order confirming this action was entered by AHCA on July 1, 1998. A third application was filed by Petitioner with AHCA on April 28, 1999, by which she again sought an initial license authorizing the operation of a five-bed ALF at 1244 Edgewood Avenue, West, Jacksonville, Florida. On May 25, 1999, the application was denied under Section 400.414(1)(m), Florida Statutes, on the grounds Fosset had pled guilty to operating an unlicensed ALF, and the terms of her probation prohibited her from operating such a facility. On June 8, 1999, AHCA amended its earlier letter and added Section 400.414(3), Florida Statutes, as an additional statutory ground for denying the application. The latter statute authorizes AHCA to deny an application whenever an applicant has been denied an application within the preceding five-year period. This controversy followed. Petitioner concedes that she operated a facility without a license after being told to cease operations, but she did so only because she did not wish to "throw [her clients] out on the street," especially since none of them had other family or another facility in which to be placed. Despite being well- intentioned, Fosset nonetheless violated the law by continuing to operate without a license. Petitioner also points out that she has attempted in good faith on no less than three occasions to obtain a license. However, the first application was denied for technical reasons (incompleteness), and there is no record evidence that all of the missing items were ever submitted. Her last two efforts were properly rebuffed because Petitioner had continued to operate an ALF without a valid license. Finally, there is no dispute that Petitioner desires a license because she is truly committed to assisting elderly persons.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's application for an initial license to operate an Assisted Living Facility. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of September, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of September, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: William Roberts, Jr., Esquire 816 Broad Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202-4754 Michael O. Mathis, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Building 3, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration Building 3, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Julie Gallagher, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Building 3, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether the son of Floyd Goins, an enrollee of the State of Florida Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan, is an eligible dependent under the provisions of such plan, and therefore eligible for insurance benefits.
Findings Of Fact Background Floyd Goins (the "Insured") has been employed by the State of Florida, Dade County State Attorney's Office, for approximately 11 years, and was, at all times material hereto, a participant in the State of Florida Employees' Group Health Self Insurance Plan (the "Plan"), with family coverage. On January 17, 1988, the Insured's son, Ronald Goins (Ronald), date of birth March 7, 1965, was involved in an automobile accident in which he sustained serious injury. As a consequence, Ronald was admitted to Jackson Memorial Hospital, where he apparently underwent extensive treatment. As a result of the accident, Ronald suffered severe physical handicap, in that he cannot walk or talk, and is not capable of self sustaining employment. Currently, Ronald resides with his parents, and is wholly dependent upon them for support. As a consequence of the medical expenses incurred on behalf of Ronald, a request for reimbursement was made to respondent, Department of Administration, Division of State Employees' Insurance (Department), under the Plan. Upon review, the Department, relying upon the provisions of Rule 22K- 1.103, Florida Administrative Code, concluded that Ronald, since he was over the age of 19 at the time of the accident and was not enrolled in and attending a school, college or university as a full-time student at the time of the accident, was ineligible for coverage as a dependent under the Plan. Accordingly, the Department denied the request for reimbursement. Thereafter, the Insured assigned to petitioner, The Public Health Trust of Dade County, Florida d/b/a Jackson Memorial Hospital, his interest in any benefits payable for services rendered by such facility as a consequence of Ronald's admission, and further authorized Jackson Memorial to take whatever legal action might be necessary to collect such benefits. As a consequence, petitioner filed a request for formal hearing to contest the Department's conclusion that Ronald was ineligible for coverage under the Plan. 1/ The issue of coverage. Under the provisions of the Plan, an employee's "eligible children" are included within the definition of "eligible dependents" who are eligible to participate in the Plan, provided family coverage has been selected. Rules 22K- 1.103(5) and 22K-1.201(2), Florida Administrative Code. "Eligible children" are defined by Rule 22K-1.103(4), Florida Administrative Code, as follows: "Eligible children" shall mean the employee's . . . own children . . . Such children are eligible for coverage as follows: From their date of birth to the end of the month in which their nineteenth (19th) birthday occurs; From their nineteenth (19th) birthday to the end of the month in which their twenty-third (23rd) birthday occurs, if they are enrolled in and regularly attending on a full-time basis any school, college or university which provides training or educational activities, and which is certified or licensed by a state or foreign country. Such children who are mentally or physically handicapped shall be eligible to continue coverage after attainment of the above age limits and while the employee's or retiree's family coverage is in effect provided such children are incapable of self- sustaining employment by reason of such mental or physical handicap and chiefly dependent upon the employee, retiree or supervising spouse for support and maintenance. (Emphasis added) And, Rule 22K-1.103(9), Florida Administrative Code, defines "full-time basis", as follows: (9) "Full-time basis" shall mean the number of hours required by the school, college or university to qualify an eligible child as a full-time student. In no case shall an eligible child be considered attending on a full-time basis unless such child is currently enrolled and attending, or has, during the previous twelve (12) month period, attended as a full-time student, two (2) semesters, three (3) quarters or eight (8) months at such school, college or university. (Emphasis added) Here, petitioner contends that Ronald was an eligible dependent of the Insured, and therefore covered by the Plan because he was "enrolled in and regularly attending on a full-time basis" Bauder College, an institution licensed by the State of Florida, at the time of his accident or, alternatively, because such accident rendered him "physically handicapped." The proof fails, however, to support the conclusion that Ronald was an eligible dependent of the Insured, at the time of the accident, on either basis. Ronald's educational pursuits. Regarding Ronald's educational pursuits, the proof demonstrates that his public education was interrupted in or about 1984 when he was incarcerated in the State prison system, and that he remained so incarcerated until the later part of 1987. While incarcerated, Ronald apparently pursued some educational program, although no specifics were offered at hearing from which any conclusion could be drawn regarding its "full-time" nature, since the Department of Education awarded to him a high school diploma on December 12, 1984. Ronald apparently also pursued, while incarcerated, a course of study in electronic repair through Sumter Vocational School, during the period of November 1, 1985 to September 20, 1986. [Petitioner's Exhibit 1]. Again, no specifics were offered at hearing from which any conclusion could be drawn regarding the "full- time" nature of this program, but Ronald was awarded a certificate upon its completion. In sum, the proof fails to support the conclusion that Ronald, while incarcerated, was enrolled in and regularly attending any school on a "full-time basis", as that term is defined by Rule 22K-1.103(9), Florida Administrative Code. Moreover, there is no proof of record that Ronald pursued any educational program after September 20, 1986, a date in excess of 12 months prior to his automobile accident, excepting his enrollment at Bauder College. Regarding Ronald's enrollment at Bauder College, the proof demonstrates that on November 3, 1987, Ronald executed an enrollment agreement with Bauder College whereby he elected to pursue an educational program in electronic engineering technology. According to the enrollment agreement, the program was to start January 19, 1988, and the school calendar [Respondent's Exhibit 1] confirms that January 19, 1988, was "ORIENTATION/REGISTRATION - FIRST DAY" of the 1988 Winter Quarter. Ronald was, however, hospitalized on January 17, 1988 as a consequence of his automobile accident, and never started his course of training. 2/ Therefore, Ronald, although enrolled, was not yet "regularly attending" school when injured and, therefore, was not at the time of his accident an eligible dependent of the Insured. 3/ Ronald's handicapped status. Here, petitioner also contends that, as a consequence of his handicap, Ronald was an eligible dependent under the Plan. Such contention is rejected as contrary to the provisions of Rule 22K-1.103(4), Florida Administrative Code. Handicap, under the facts of this case, is not a factor which renders a person eligible for coverage. Rather, handicap is a factor which permits the child of the insured "to continue coverage" after attainment of the age limits for coverage. Rule 22K-1.103(4)c), Florida Administrative Code. Ronald, not having been a covered dependent at the time he suffered his handicap, had no coverage to continue. Estoppel Notwithstanding the rules which govern eligibility to participate in the Plan, petitioner contends that the Department should be estopped to apply such rules in the instant case. 4/ The predicate for petitioner's argument lies in a brochure [Petitioner's Exhibit 7] that was provided the Insured, and which defines eligible dependents as follows: Your own children . . . ; if they are under the age of 19, if they are full-time students under the age of 23, or if they are determined by the administrator to be mentally or physically handicapped, incapable of self- sustaining employment, chiefly dependent upon your support, and otherwise insurable. Petitioner's claim of estoppel is unpersuasive for a number of reasons. First, the brochure does not purport to replicate the Plan, but to summarize it, and advises all recipients that it "is not a contract since it does not include all of the provisions, definitions, benefits, exclusions and limitations" of the Plan. Under such circumstances, it would not be reasonable to rely solely on the brochure for any definition of coverage. Second, and perhaps most importantly, the proof is not persuasive that the Insured relied upon the referenced provision of the brochure or that he made any change in position as a consequence of such provision.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered which finds that Ronald Goins is not covered by the Plan, and which dismisses the petition with prejudice. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of December 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December 1991.
The Issue The issue is whether, pursuant to section 112.3173, Florida Statutes (2017),1/ Petitioner forfeited his Florida Retirement System Investment Plan account after he was found guilty by a jury of conspiracy to commit first degree murder.
Findings Of Fact The Florida Retirement System (FRS) is a public retirement system as defined by Florida law. See § 121.021(3), Fla. Stat. Petitioner was a state employee and a special risk class member of the FRS. Work History Petitioner was a 20-year DOC employee. Since 2004, he served as a sergeant at the Reception and Medical Center at Lake Butler, Florida (Center). A sergeant is a supervisory position whose duties include the “care, custody and control of inmates.” Retaliating against an inmate is a violation of DOC policy and the oath administered to correction officers.2/ Witnessing or having knowledge of a DOC officer’s conspiracy to murder a former inmate, and failing to report that conspiracy would also be a violation of a DOC sergeant’s duties. As explained by Petitioner, such conduct would be, “outside the guidelines. That’s not the rules. That’s not what [a DOC sergeant is] supposed to do.” Underlying Crime On August 4, 2013, Thomas Driver, a DOC corrections officer who worked at the Center at the same time as Petitioner, was involved in an altercation with an inmate (referred to as Mr. Williams). During that altercation Mr. Williams bit Mr. Driver. Charles Newcomb was a former DOC employee who knew Petitioner from the Center and also about Mr. Driver’s incident with Mr. Williams. All of the DOC employees at the Center knew about the incident between Mr. Williams and Mr. Driver. Based on information they gathered from working at the Center, Mr. Driver, Mr. Newcomb and Petitioner (collectively referred to as the conspirators) believed Mr. Williams had a contagious medical condition and intentionally bit Mr. Driver to infect him. After the incident Mr. Driver was subject to treatment for a possible infection. Mr. Williams was African-American. Although their race is not apparent from the record, in December 2014, the conspirators were members of a local chapter KKK. Joe Moore, served as a Knighthawk for the KKK. A Knighthawk is the person responsible for security at KKK events and traditionally is responsible for the security and protection of the KKK Grand Dragon (the leader of the local KKK chapter). Petitioner and his fellow KKK members (also referred to as “klansmen”) knew that Mr. Moore was a veteran and had training as a sniper. Unbeknownst to the conspirators, however, Mr. Moore was a undercover informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI). Although Mr. Newcomb and Mr. Driver referred to each other and Mr. Moore as “Brother,” they referred to and addressed Petitioner as “Sarge” based on his position as a DOC sergeant at the Center. On December 6, 2014, Mr. Driver and Petitioner approached Mr. Moore at a KKK event. As they spoke, Mr. Newcomb stood nearby to ensure that the other klansmen would not interrupt or overhear the conversation. Mr. Driver and Petitioner showed Mr. Moore a picture of an African-American male. The picture was on an 8” x 10” piece of paper that looked as if it had been printed from a database. It was apparent to Mr. Moore at the time that it was a picture of an inmate. After speaking with Petitioner and Mr. Driver, Mr. Moore believed they wanted his help to harm or kill Mr. Williams. Mr. Moore immediately notified the FBI of his conversation with Petitioner and Mr. Driver. At the FBI’s request, Mr. Moore began wearing a microphone and secretly, but legally, taping and transmitting his conversations with the conspirators. Eventually, it was confirmed that the conspirators wanted Mr. Williams put “six-feet under.” Mr. Driver explained to Mr. Moore the graphic nature of the altercation, his subsequent blood treatment as a result of Mr. Williams’ attack, and the fact Mr. Williams served very little time for the attack before he was released on probation. Mr. Driver clearly wanted revenge. Mr. Driver: Yeah, it pissed me off. If I could I’d kick his fricking throat out. Mr. Moore: That’s not necessary I’m all over it we’re all over . . . how do you want [it] done? Mr. Driver: Well. I’m going to tell you like this: If it was me personally and I had another chance at him I’d stomp his larynx. On January 30, 2015, Petitioner, Mr. Newcomb, and Mr. Moore met at a prearranged location and time to drive to the area of Mr. Williams’ home. Mr. Williams had been released and was no longer in custody at the Center. Mr. Driver was intentionally absent from this drive so that he would not come under suspicion for the actions Petitioner and Mr. Newcomb were planning to take that night. In fact, based on his knowledge from working at the Center, Petitioner assured the group that Mr. Driver was working the night shift at the Center and, therefore, had an alibi. Petitioner clearly knew the purpose of the drive was to attempt to kill Mr. Williams. Prior to the drive, Petitioner asked when they were going to “grab him” and discussed with the others whether he should bring his gun on the ride. He told the others that he had obtained the gun, a nine-millimeter, from “the guy that I work with.” Petitioner also wanted to wear protective clothing because he knew, presumably from his work as a DOC sergeant at the Center, that Mr. Williams had a contagious infection or disease. During the car ride, Petitioner discussed the best way to terminate Mr. Williams without raising suspicion. Mr. Newcomb suggested abducting Mr. Williams, injecting him with insulin, and leaving him near the water with a fishing pole. Petitioner said this would look suspicious unless Mr. Williams was known to go fishing. The men also discussed how to dispose of Mr. Williams’ body. Petitioner suggested a “complete disposal” by chopping up the body. At some point that night Mr. Newcomb indicated a recent picture of Mr. Williams would be helpful; Petitioner agreed to “go to work and pull up [Mr. Williams’] picture.” When they arrived in Mr. Williams’ neighborhood, Petitioner made numerous offensive and stereotypical remarks about African-Americans. Neither Petitioner nor the others took any action against Mr. Williams the night of the January 30 drive; and Mr. Williams was never harmed.3/ On March 19, 2015, Mr. Moore met with Petitioner and showed him a staged picture of Mr. Williams’ body lying on the ground in a pool of blood. Upon seeing the photo of what he believed was Mr. Williams’ dead body, Petitioner laughed and stated, “I love it. F—king p-d on himself . . . good f-king job.” During that same meeting, Mr. Moore asked Petitioner if he was happy with the results. Petitioner seemed elated: Mr. Moore: And, we need to make sure that everybody was happy with it. Petitioner: Hell yeah . . . uh Brother I love you, man. . . . I will call [Mr. Driver] as soon as I get – dude you don’t know how happy . . . I love you, brother. I love you, brother. I love you brother. At the final hearing, Petitioner claimed he did not intend to hurt Mr. Williams, but only went along with the others because he believed it was part of the KKK initiation process; and that he was entrapped by the FBI. He also argued he did not know the victim was Mr. Williams or that he was a former inmate. Petitioner’s assertions are not credible and his testimony is unbelievable for a number of reasons. First, the evidence at the underlying criminal trial established the conspirators did not want KKK leaders to know about the plan to attack Mr. Williams. Petitioner admitted the KKK oath includes a promise not to commit acts of violence. These facts contradict the assertion that Petitioner was pretending to plan the death of an African-American (who coincidentally happened to be a former inmate) just to prove his loyalty to the KKK. Second, although he claimed he was unaware of the purpose of the January 30 car ride or that Mr. Williams was a former inmate, the transcripts of the taped recordings clearly establish this is not true. In fact, Petitioner not only knew who the intended victim was, but knew he had attacked Mr. Driver and that he allegedly had an infectious disease. Third, Petitioner’s testimony that he was a passive participant induced by the FBI informant into planning the death of Mr. Williams is also implausible. Again, Petitioner offered to bring a gun along on the ride, offered advice on how to possibly set up the attack so that it looked like an accident, and suggested how to dispose of Mr. Williams’ body. Petitioner’s reaction to seeing Mr. Williams’ body in the photo also contradicts any contention that he did not intend harm to Mr. Williams or that he did not derive any pleasure from his death. Finally, Petitioner testified he was not racist. This was clearly contradicted by the statements he made about African- Americans during the January 30 car ride. Similarly, his testimony that he was a passive KKK member who only participated in its social aspects (i.e., picnics and “fellowship”) was belied by his own acknowledgment that his wife did not want him to be a member of the KKK, and that he participated in cross-burnings.4/ On August 11, 2017, a jury found Mr. Moran guilty of Conspiracy to Commit Murder in the First Degree.5/ Findings of Ultimate Fact The evidence clearly establishes there is a nexus between Petitioner’s employment as a DOC correctional sergeant at the Center and the commission of the felony of conspiracy to commit murder. Petitioner’s actions were intentional and he knew his participation in the conspiracy was illegal. Petitioner knowingly violated his obligation as a sworn correctional officer by participating in the conspiracy and not reporting the criminal activity committed by the other conspirators. Petitioner defrauded the public from receiving the faithful performance of his duties as a DOC sergeant. The public had a right to expect that one entrusted with guarding inmates would not act as a violent vigilante to exact revenge for a fellow correctional officer. Petitioner realized a profit, gain, or advantage from the commission of the crime in the form of self-gratification and comradery with and respect from Mr. Driver. Petitioner used his power, rights, privileges, and the knowledge accessible to him through his work as a correctional officer to facilitate his crime.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the State Board of Administration issue a final order finding that Petitioner was a public employee convicted of a specified offense committed prior to retirement; and that pursuant to section 112.3173, he has forfeited all of his rights and benefits in his Florida Retirement System Investment Plan account, except for the return of his accumulated contributions as of the date of his termination. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of May, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May, 2018.
The Issue At issue is whether respondent should have a $200 civil penalty imposed for the alleged violation set forth in the administrative complaint. Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined:
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Almira C. Morgan, operates an adult congregate living facility under the name of Morgan Retirement Home at 432 South F Street, Lake Worth, Florida. The facility is licensed by petitioner, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), and as such, is subject to that agency's regulatory jurisdiction. On or about February 17, 1986, James Valinoti, an HRS program analyst, conducted a routine inspection of respondent's facility. During the course of the inspection, Valinoti requested documentation verifying that Morgan's employees were free of communicable diseases. This documentation is normally presented in the form of a certificate from a medical doctor. The requirement that employees be free of communicable disease was then embodied in Rule 10A- 5.19(5)(g), Florida Administrative Code [now renumbered as Rule 10A-5.019(5)(g) Since Morgan had no documentation to comply with the rule, Valinoti prepared a "Notification of Deficiencies" which recited the deficiency, class of violation, and date on which the deficiency had to be corrected. Morgan acknowledged receiving a copy of the same on March 14, 1986. According to the notice, Morgan had until April 12, 1986, in which to comply with the regulation. Sometime in April 1986 a nurse who was employed by Dr. David H. Kiner, a West Palm Beach internist, visited Morgan's facilities and administered skin tests for tuberculosis to Morgan and another employee named Violet Shepard. As agreed to by the parties, and for purposes of this proceeding only, this test was all that Morgan needed to comply with the rule. Dr. Kiner then prepared two small typewritten notes stating that the two were "free from communicable diseases." Through inadvertence, he did not place a date on the notes. When Valinoti returned to reinspect the facility on May 21, 1986, Morgan gave him the two notes. Because they were undated, Valinoti would not accept the notes. He did agree, however, that Morgan was making a good faith effort to comply with the rule. Nonetheless, he cited her for a Class III violation, a violation which "indirectly" or "potentially" threatens the safety, health or security of the residents. The administrative complaint was thereafter issued proposing that respondent be fined $200. Shortly after the administrative complaint was issued, Morgan obtained a third note from Dr. Kiner stating that the date had been omitted by "inadvertence." Morgan then contacted an HRS dietary inspector (Ms. Perez) who advised her to mail the notes to her, and she would give them to Valinoti. Although Morgan mailed the dated notes to Perez, the agency did not consider this to be timely correction of the deficiency.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of violating Rule 10A- 5.19(5)(g), and that a $100 civil penalty be imposed. DONE AND ORDERED this 27th day of March 1987 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of March 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: K. C. Collette, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 111 Georgia Avenue, Third Floor West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 James A. Cassidy, Esquire 120 South Olive Street Suite 711 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: On or about 1:00 p.m. on September 2, 1978, a Saturday, Deputy Reder from the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office went to the "Sweet Magnolia Boarding Home," a licensed adult congregate living facility (ACLF) operated by the petitioner, as a result of a call from either the petitioner's daughter or a relative of one of the residents. Upon his arrival, Deputy Reder found four elderly boarders or residents, petitioner's, fifteen or sixteen year old daughter and her female friend of about the same age. The petitioner's daughter and the residents were upset, but none of the residents needed emergency medical assistance. The relatives of the residents and the respondent were notified that the four residents were without adult supervision, and the residents were removed from the facility that day. On the Monday preceding Saturday, September 2, 1978, petitioner received a telephone call informing her that her husband had had an accident in Detroit, Michigan and had injured his back. Petitioner left Tampa on that day and flew to Detroit. It was her testimony that she left Mary Ann Cowley, who had worked for her for about one year, in charge of the "Sweet Magnolia Boarding Home" while she was gone. She further testified that she left approximately $700.00 with her fifteen or sixteen year old daughter to pay the rent and buy food for the residents during her absence. When she returned to the facility late Saturday night on September 2, 1978, no one was there and many of her belongings were gone. Petitioner did not contact the respondent regarding this incident. Her husband was not hospitalized for his back injury. On or about September 22, 1978, an administrative complaint against petitioner was filed by the respondent seeking to revoke her ACLF license. Having failed to respond to the complaint, respondent, on October 18, 1978, entered a "Judgment of Revocation of License" by default. Said judgment found that petitioner voluntarily discontinued operation of the facility without providing advance notice to respondent and without surrendering her license, that she left residents boarded at the home without adult supervision while she left the state and that a deputy reported that there was no food in the premises on September 2, 1978, and that the residents had not been fed for two days. Deputy Reder did not check the premises for food and one of the boarder's daughter did not hear her mother complain of being hungry on the day she removed her from the petitioner's facility. Petitioner testified that she never received the administrative complaint or notice that her ACLF license had been revoked. Petitioner applied for another ACLF license in March of 1980. Before this was processed, and in April of 1980, she was hospitalized for two or three days for elbow surgery and left her husband in charge of the unlicensed facility. Her husband had never assumed this responsibility in the past. On Monday, April 14, 1980, petitioner's husband prepared a bath for one of the residents who was approximately eighty-nine years old and frail, helped her into the bathtub and then left the bathroom to complete some chores in the kitchen. While he was gone, this elderly resident drowned in the bathtub. The incident was described in the police report as an "accidental death" and no charges were brought against petitioner or her husband. Respondent was not notified of the drowning incident until several weeks later. During this same general time period, from March through early July, 1980, negotiations were had between petitioner and respondent regarding her March application for ACLF licensure. Respondent's Aging and Adult Services Program Office had many concerns regarding the issuance of a license to petitioner, including the prior incidents of lack of supervision, inappropriate placements and the drowning incident. Respondent did not feel that a legal basis existed for denial of petitioner's application for licensure, so they offered her a compromise. Petitioner was told that if she removed her present residents, respondent would issue her a license and she could start over with more appropriate residents or boarders. On June 25, 1980, petitioner notified respondent that it was her decision to discontinue her operation as a boarding home and not accept the license to operate as an ACLF. By letter dated June 26, 1980, respondent notified petitioner that she had thirty days to remove the residents from her facility and that legal action would be brought against her if she reopened another unlicensed facility in Hillsborough or Manatee Counties. By letter dated July 3, 1980, respondent again informed petitioner that her decision not to accept the license was considered as final and that a license could not be issued to her at that time. On February 3, 1981, at approximately 3:00 p.m., employees of the respondent made an unannounced visit to petitioner's unlicensed facility. They found that petitioner was not on the premises and that the only people there were petitioner's father, approximately 70 years of age, and two elderly residents. One of the residents was in a hospital bed and was being fed by means of a tube down her throat. Respondent's employees remained on the premises for about 30 minutes and petitioner did not appear during this time. During the time of the unannounced visit by respondent's employees, petitioner had gone to the store. It was her testimony, which was corroborated by her father, that she had asked another person to stay at the facility while she went to the store. That other person was not there when petitioner returned from the store. Betty P. Steiger, R.N., who specializes in geriatric nursing, observed the tube-fed resident in petitioner's facility on February 4, 1981. She was described as an elderly black woman who was incontinent, unable to ambulate, incoherent and a candidate for round-the-clock skilled nursing care. An ACLF was not an appropriate placement for this person. Feeding tubes should be changed only by a registered nurse or a physician and a suction machine should be available in case of aspiration. Ms. Steiger did not observe a suction machine on the petitioner's premises. This tube-fed resident had been living in petitioner's facility for four or five months and had been tube-fed since her arrival. Petitioner is a licensed practical nurse. In February of 1981, she had no other employees. Petitioner again applied for an ACLF license on March 5, 1981. By letter dated May 14, 1981, she was notified by the respondent's Aging and Adult Services Program Office that her application was being denied for the following reasons: You have exhibited a disregard for, and a failure to assume appropriate responsibility for, the welfare of residents under your care. This is evidenced by the following: On October 18, 1978, your license to operate "Sweet Magnolia Boarding Home", an adult congregate living facility, was formally revoked due to your having left the boarders at the facility without any adult supervision during or about September, 1978 while you left the state. When discovered on September 2, 1978, the residents had not been fed for two days and there was no food on the premises. In April, 1980, an elderly resident at your unlicensed facility at 822 Whatley Place, Tampa, Florida, drowned in the bathtub while not receiving proper supervision. On or about February 3, 1981, a resident at your home at 822 Whatley Place, Tampa, Florida, was discovered by the Department's employees to be bedridden and to be in need of full time skilled nursing care. Said resident was being fed through a tube and such condition, without appropriate full time skilled nursing care, materially affected the health, safety, and welfare of said resident in that had such resident regurgitated, this resident, being elderly and very debilitated, would have been unable to clear herself and would have "drowned" in her own bodily fluids. Your retention of this resident, without ap- propriate full time skilled nursing care, constituted a disregard for her welfare. On or about February 3, 1981, employees of the Department made an unannounced visit to your unlicensed facility and discovered that you were not present and that you had not provided for adequate supervision of the residents. Besides the residents, the only person present was your elderly father who, due to his age and physical condition, could not provide safe and adequate supervision to the residents. The actions referred to in paragraphs 1(a) through (d) constitute intentional and/or negligent acts which seriously affected the health, safety, and/or welfare of residents of your facility and constitute grounds to deny your application for a license pursuant to section 400.414(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1980). Your physical plant is short one toilet and one sink. According to Rule 10A-5.11(3)(a)1, Florida Administra- tive Code, there must be a bathroom exclusively for the use of the residents. Since you fail to meet the minimum standards for Adult Congregate Living Facilities, your license is being denied on that basis also. The parties stipulated that petitioner's physical plant was short one bathroom. It was agreed that if all other bases for denial of the license were found to be without merit; petitioner would have 60 days to install a bathroom and, if completed, respondent would issue petitioner a license.
Recommendation Based upon the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that petitioner's application for an adult congregate living facility license be DENIED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 10th day of November, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert A. Warner, Esquire Caltgirone & Warner, P.A. 238 East Davis Boulevard, Suite I Davis Island Tampa, Florida 33606 Janice Sortor, Esquire District VI Assistant Legal Counsel 4000 West Buffalo Avenue Tampa, Florida 33614 David Pingree, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Jules Montouri is a retarded adult. Rahya Montouri is his mother. Prior to March, 1980, Jules Montouri resided at a facility maintained by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services in Gainesville, Florida. Jules Montouri's mental capacity is retarded to an extent that he will never be able to completely care for himself and meet his own needs. He can, however, with proper training become capable of living a somewhat normal life with minimal supervision. Since March, 1980, Jules Montouri has resided at "Hillcrest House." Hillcrest House is an adult group residential facility maintained by the Provider, Sheltered Community Residence, Inc. The Provider is under contract with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services to provide a residential educational setting for retarded adult males. The concept of the program offered by the Provider is to move clients out of heavily restricted institutional environments into less restrictive ones. The program is designed to train clients to meet as many of their own needs as they can, and to gradually move them into less and less restrictive living situations. The Provider has sought to teach Jules Montouri to live in harmony in a minimally supervised environment, and to do his own cleaning and cooking. The Provider's goal with respect to Jules Montouri would be to move him into an apartment-type living facility with several other retarded adult males with a minimal degree of supervision. The Provider's program is an appropriate one for Jules Montouri. Except for problems that have developed between the Provider and Rahya Montouri, the program offered by the Provider would have a reasonable prospect of successfully training Jules Montouri to live in a substantially independent manner. Rahya Montouri disagrees with the goal of the Provider's program to steer Jules Montouri toward a level of substantial independence. She has objected to programs designed to train Jules Montouri for marginal employment, and to programs designed to teach him how to cook for himself. While Rahya Montouri maintains that she wants her son to remain as a resident in the Hillcrest House facility, she has found very little but fault with the program. Since Jules Montouri has been a client of the Provider, Rahya Montouri has complained on a constant basis about virtually every aspect of the Provider's program. She visits her son often at the facility, and has complained verbally to staff members on virtually every visit. She has made many complaints through telephone conversations with members of the staff. She has written numerous letters to complain about the facility, the program, other clients, and the staff. For example, she has expressed suspicion that her son has engaged in homosexual conduct and has implied that members of the staff may have been involved. These suspicions and accusations appear to have been based upon no evidence whatever. Mrs. Montouri's antagonistic attitude toward the Provider's program has become disruptive to the program. The Provider's staff at the Hillcrest facility has spent from five to ten hours per week since Jules Montouri has been a client dealing with complaints from Mrs. Montouri. On at least two occasions, Mrs. Montouri has violated the rights of other clients at the facility by going through their belongings looking for items that she asserted had been taken from her son. Mrs. Montouri's antagonism toward the program has affected the ability of Jules Montouri to participate in it. Jules is caught in the unfortunate cross fire between the program and his mother. As can be expected, it has confused him considerably. Recently, he has told several of the Provider's staff members and social workers from the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services that he wishes to leave the program. Mrs. Montouri has complained to the Human Rights Advocacy Committee for Retardation. This committee is a group of volunteers who serve to investigate potential emotional, psychological, or sexual abuse of clients. Mrs. Montouri's complaints have resulted in investigations by the Human Rights Advocacy Committee of the Provider's program. The investigations have not revealed any instances of actual abuse. The investigations have, however, had a demoralizing effect upon the staff of the Provider's program, and could seriously damage the program's reputation. Mrs. Montouri's antagonistic attitude toward the Provider's program has become abusive. The time that the Provider's staff has had to devote to her complaints is unjustified. Her antagonistic attitude has rendered it difficult for her son to progress in the program. Her complaints have demoralized the program's staff and could eventually injure the program's reputation. While the program offered by the Provider is an appropriate one for Jules Montouri and could serve to prepare him to live the most normal life possible for him, it is not practical that he continue in the program.
