The Issue The issue is whether the application of Thomas J. White Development Company for the establishment of a uniform community development district under Chapter 190, Florida Statutes, and Rule Chapter 42-1, Florida Administrative Code, should be granted.
Findings Of Fact The facilities and services that will be provided by the St. Lucie West Services District are the financing, constriction, ownership, operation, and maintenance of the surface water management and control system for the area, and necessary bridges and culverts. The land encompassed by the proposed development district is a development of regional impact. The final revised development order for the area was issued on February 27, 1989, by the City of Port St. Lucie. Exhibit 4. The land within the proposed district is composed of approximately 4,600 contiguous acres located in the city. The proposed district is bounded on the north and south by the city. The western and eastern boundaries are Interstate 95 and the Florida Turnpike, respectively. A map showing the location of the area to be serviced by the proposed district is found in Exhibit 2; a metes and bounds legal description of the proposed district is attached to the petition as Exhibit 1. The overall development to be serviced by the district will include a variety of single family and multifamily housing units, as well as commercial, industrial, and educational uses. A portion of the future land use map for the City of Port St. Lucie was received in evidence as Exhibit 3, and shows approved land uses for the St. Lucie West area. In the proceedings leading to the issuance of the development order, the city determined that the St. Lucie West development would be consistent with all applicable state, regional, and local comprehensive plans and policies. The proposed development of the district is consistent with the City of Port St. Lucie Comprehensive Plan: 1985, as amended. Exhibit 12. Ernest R. Dike, Jr. is the director of development of Thomas J. White Development Company. He is an expert engineer experienced in the planning, construction and management of large scale communities. Mr. Dike has substantial experience as a civil engineer, and holds an advanced academic degree in planning. He served as director of public works and as city engineer for the City of Port St. Lucie for the three years preceding his employment by White. As White's director of development over the last three and a half years, Mr. Dike assisted in the preparation of the petition; he also identified and explained the exhibits which were admitted into evidence. He assisted in crafting the development order for St. Lucie West which was adopted by the City of Port St. Lucie in February, 1987 and amended on February 27, 1989. Dike has been personally involved with the sales of land from White to other developers of property within the proposed district. All the owners of the real property to be included in the district have given their written consent to the establishment of the proposed district. Since the Thomas J. White Development Company purchased the approximately 4,600 acres which became St. Lucie West, Dike has directed the permitting and approval for all aspects of the project. In the design, White Development Company has accommodated the desires of St. Lucie County to obtain a spring training facility for a professional baseball team. White Development Company agreed to give the county 100 acres of land to build a training facility for the New York Mets. A predevelopment order for the stadium was obtained, which permitted the development of certain roads, a bridge over the Florida Turnpike, and an interchange with Interstate 95 which will all provide access to St. Lucie West These transportation facilities were completed without the use of any state or federal funds. None of these expenses will be born by the proposed district. The establishment of the district would not be inconsistent with any of the elements or provisions of the state comprehensive plan, the regional plan, or the local comprehensive plan. Creation of the district would be the best alternative available for providing water management and control facilities for the land encompassed by the proposed district. The South Florida Water Management District (SFWMD) and the City of Port St. Lucie have concluded that when fully developed, the land would discharge no additional water into the city's stormwater system as compared to the contribution of stormwater by the land made before it was developed by White. Mr. Dike also testified about the debt service required to amortize the debt on any benefit bonds issued by the proposed district, and the cost of operation and maintenance of the surface water control facilities to be constructed by the proposed district. Mr. Dike prepared a spread sheet entitled "Projected Statement of Cash Flow for the Years 1990-2000". (Exhibit 18). The estimated construction costs for water management facilities in the projection are reasonable. Based on White's plans for the district, and utilizing the assumptions for absorption of the residential and commercial space to be constructed, the benefit and maintenance taxes are projected to begin at $114 per taxable unit per year. These benefit and maintenance taxes will rise to no more than $170 per taxable unit per year in 1996. These projections are consistent with the testimony of Mr. Dike and of Dr. Henry Fishkind, an economist. All assumptions made in projecting future benefit taxes are reasonable. While these projections do not bind the district, which is not yet formed, and the district's electors could ultimately decide to assume additional responsibilities, the evidence shows that the benefit and maintenance taxes projected are adequate to pay the debt to be incurred by the proposed construction of surface water management facilities. Lester L. Solin, Jr., testified as an expert in land use planning. He was a planning consultant with the City of Port St. Lucie when the development of St. Lucie West by White Development Company was first under consideration, and worked with the city to formulate the overall development plan. St. Lucie West has been integrated into the future land use map for the City of Port St. Lucie Comprehensive Plan: 1985. Mr. Solin is also familiar with the state comprehensive plan. He has reviewed the application for development approval for the St. Lucie West development of regional impact. The proposed district would be consistent with the state comprehensive plan, Chapter 187 Florida Statutes. Mr. Solin is also familiar with the City of Port St. Lucie Comprehensive Plan: 1985 (Exhibit 12). The creation of the St. Lucie West Services District would not be inconsistent with any of the goals, objectives or policies in that plan. Peter L. Pimentel is the current executive director of the Northern Palm Beach County Water Control District (NPBWD). Mr. Pimentel testified as an expert in special district management, planning, staffing, reporting, and coordination with local governments. As the director of the Northern Palm Beach County Water Control District, he oversees a staff which works with other regulatory agencies on permitting, implementation, planning, construction and operation of water management systems. He coordinates construction with contractors, and engineers, and works with lawyers in carrying out the policies established by the district board of directors. The land encompassed by the NPBWD is approximately 200,000 acres. Mr. Pimentel has substantial experience, having worked as the executive director for two large independent special taxing districts, which are similar in structure and have similar powers as the community development district which White Development Company wishes to establish. Mr. Pimentel's testimony was especially persuasive due to his experience with water control entities. The proposed district is the best alternative available for financing, constructing, owning, operating and maintaining the surface water management and control facility for the area encompassed by the proposed district. It provides a more efficient use of resources, and provides the opportunity for new growth in the district to pay for its own surface water management, rather than imposing that cost on general government. The proposed district would not be incompatible with the capacity or uses of existing local and regional community services and facilities. The area to be served by the proposed district is amenable to separate special- district government. Henry H. Fishkind, Ph.D. testified as an expert economist about the economic consequences of establishing a community development district under Chapter 190, Florida Statutes, the economic consequences of financing the surface water management and control system through the use of tax exempt bonds, and the cost of operating and maintaining those structures by a community development district. Dr. Fishkind prepared the economic impact statement for the proposed district required by Section 120.54, Florida Statutes. The costs to the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission, and to state and local agencies in reviewing the petition are minimal. The costs to the City of Port St. Lucie and to St. Lucie County have been covered by the $15,000 filing fee which White paid to each of those governments. The cost to the City of Port St. Lucie once the district is operating would be negligible. The potential debt of the proposed district will not become general obligations or debts of the city or county governments. The cost of the surface water improvements will be paid by those who benefit from them. The economic impact statement is adequate, and meets the requirements of Section 124.54(2)(b), Florida Statutes. During the first six years, the proposed district would be controlled by Thomas J. White Development Company since White still would be the largest landowner. Tax exempt benefit bonds would be issued to construct the surface water management facilities. Both White and residents of the proposed district would share the burden of amortizing these bonds through benefit taxes. According to Dr. Fishkind, whose opinion is credited, from an economic perspective: The creation of the St. Lucie West District is not inconsistent with the state and local comprehensive plan; The land to be served by the proposed district is of sufficient size, is sufficiently compact and is sufficiently contiguous to be developed as a functional interrelated community; The proposed district is the best alternative for providing surface water management for the community, since other alternatives such as municiple service taking units or homeowners' associations are more expensive or more cumbersome; The area to be served by the proposed district is amenable to separate special-district government. All factors which are required to be considered in establishing a community development district under Section 190.005(1)(e), Florida Statutes, were analyzed by the witnesses presented by the Thomas White Development Company. Their testimony was persuasive, and the application meets all requirements of Chapter 190.
Conclusions Based on the record made, it is concluded: That all statements contained in the petition are true and correct; The creation of the proposed district is not inconsistent with any applicable element of the state comprehensive plan, or the City of Port St. Lucie Comprehensive Plan; The area in the proposed district is of sufficient size, is sufficiently compact, and is sufficiently contiguous to be developed as one functional, interrelated community; The district is the best alternative for delivering water management services to the area to be serviced by the district, and would be superior to the creation of a municipal service taxing unit, a homeowner's association, or to providing water management by the general county government of St. Lucie County; The community development services provided by the proposed district will not be incompatible with the capacity or uses of existing local and regional community development services and facilities; The area to be served by the proposed district is amenable to separate special district government. Accordingly it is recommended that the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission grant the petition of the Thomas J. White Development Company and adopt a rule pursuant to Section 190.005(f), Florida Statutes (1987), establishing the St. Lucie West Services District. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of September, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. William R. Dorsey, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of September, 1989 APPENDIX A Case No. 89-0072 Witnesses Earnest R. Dike, Jr., 590 NW Peacock Loop, Port St. Lucie, Florida. Lester L. Solin, Solin and Associates, 901 Douglas Avenue, Suite 207, Altamonte Springs, Florida. Peter Pimentel, 5725 Corporate Way, Suite 203, West Palm Beach Florida. Dr. Henry H. Fishkind, 201 North New York Avenue, Suite 300 Winter Park, Florida. APPENDIX B Case No. 89-0072 List of Documentary Evidence Exhibit 1. Petition for Rulemaking filed by Thomas J. White Development Company, Inc., including seven exhibits. Exhibit 2. Location Map for the proposed St. Lucie West Services District. Exhibit 3. Future Land Use Map for the area Exhibit 4. Resolution 89-R7 of the city council of Port St. Lucie, Florida, which is the development order for the St. Lucie West Development of Regional Impact. Exhibit 5. Transmittal letter for the Petition for the establishment of the Services District to the City of Port St. Lucie and filing fee, and transmittal letter for the St. Lucie West Development District to the St. Lucie County Board of County Commissioners, and filing fee. Exhibit 6. Transmittal letter for the Petition for the establishment of St. Lucie West Services District to the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission. Exhibit 7. Letter from the staff of the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission determining that the Petition appears to satisfy the requirements of Section 190.005, Florida Statutes, and Rule 42-1.009 Florida Administrative Code. Exhibit 8. Resolution 89-R6 from the City of Port St. Lucie, Florida supporting the petition of the Thomas J. White Development Company, Inc. for the establishment of the St. Lucie West Services District. Exhibit 9. Resolution 89-41 of the Board of County Commissioners of St. Lucie County supporting the petition of Thomas J. White Development Company, Inc. for the establishment of the St. Lucie West Services District. Exhibit 10. Proof of publication in the local newspapers and in the Florida Administrative Weekly of the Notice of the Hearing on the petition for the establishment of the community development district and notices to other interested persons. Exhibit 11. Copy of the State Comprehensive Plan Chapter 187, Florida Statutes (1987) Exhibit 12. Copy of the Comprehensive Plan: 1985 of the City of Port St. Lucie, Ordinance 85-102. Exhibit 13. Resume of Ernest R. Dike, Jr., P.E. APPENDIX B CONT. Case No. 89-0072 Exhibit 14. Permit granted to Thomas J. White Development Company, Inc. by the South Florida Water Management District for the construction and operation of a water management system. Exhibit 15. The prepared testimony Lester L. Solin, Jr. Exhibit 16. The resume of Peter L. Pimentel. Exhibit 17. The prepared testimony of Henry H. Fishkind, Ph.D. Exhibit 18. The additional prepared testimony of Mr. Dike including the computer generated spread sheet. COPIES FURNISHED: E. Lee Worsham, Esquire HONIGAMAN MILLER SCHWARTZ and COHN 1655 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard Suite 600 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 James C. Vaughn Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission Office of the Governor The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001 William Buezett The Governor, Legal and Legislative Office The Capitol, Room 209 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001 Carla Stanford, Esquire Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerville Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 David McIntyre, Esquire County Attorney 2300 Virginia Avenue Fort Pierce, Florida 34982 Roger Orr, Esquire City Attorney 220 South Second Street Fort Pierce, Florida 33450 Patty Woodworth, Director Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission Planning & Budgeting Executive Office of the Governor The Capitol, PL-05 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001
The Issue Whether Florida Administrative Code Rules 61G15- 21.009(1)(b) and (3) and 61G15-20.0015(3) are invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulated facts submitted by the parties and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Board of Professional Engineers ("Board") is the state agency responsible for the licensure and regulation of professional engineers in Florida. §§ 471.007, 471.008, 471.013, and 471.031, Fla. Stat. (2005).1 Mr. Hursh is an individual who applied for licensure by endorsement with the Board to be licensed as a professional engineer. Mr. Hursh is licensed in another state, so he applied for licensure by endorsement pursuant to Section 471.015(3)(b), Florida Statutes. Mr. Hursh failed to pass the required Principles and Practice Examination, provided by the National Council of Examiners for Engineers and Surveyors ("NCEES") five times since October 1, 1992, in an effort to become licensed as an engineer in Florida. In April 2004, Mr. Hursh passed the NCEES examination in Delaware, met Delaware's other licensing criteria, and, on July 14, 2004, was issued a license to practice engineering by the State of Delaware. In August 2004, Mr. Hursh filed his application for licensure by endorsement with the State of Florida and subsequently provided all supporting documentation as requested by the Board, including a Verification of Licensure from the Delaware Association of Professional Engineers. Mr. Hursh did not provide a copy of the Delaware licensing requirements. On January 19, 2005, the Application Committee of the Board denied Mr. Hursh's application, citing as the reason "5 time failure - need 12 hrs. of courses prior to endorsement." Delaware's licensing criteria was never reviewed by the Board to determine if the Delaware licensing criteria was substantially the same as Florida's licensing criteria. On February 10, 2005, the Board filed a Notice of Denial of Mr. Hursh's application for licensure by endorsement, citing as the basis for the denial that Mr. Hursh had failed the examination five times and needed to meet the additional college credit requirements of Section 471.013, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G15.21.007.
The Issue Whether a consumptive use permit for the quantities of water requested in the application should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Application 7500137 seeks an average daily withdrawal of 2.4 million gallons of water with maximum daily withdrawal not more than 2.88 million gallons from an existing well in order to process phosphate and reclaim land. This is an existing use for mining operations located southwest of Lakeland, Florida, on land consisting of 1531 acres. Notice was published in a newspaper of general circulation, to wit: The Lakeland Ledger, on November 11 & 18, 1975, pursuant to Section 373.146, Florida Statutes. The application and affidavit of publication were admitted into evidence without objection as Composite Exhibit 1, together with correspondence from James R. Brown, Vice President, Dagus Engineers, Inc., dated November 19, 1975 to the Southwest Florida Water Management District. No objections were received by the Water Management District as to the application. Mr. George Szell, hydrologist of the Water Management District testified that the application met the conditions for a consumptive use permit as set forth in Chapter 16J-2.11, Florida Administrative Code, except that the quantity of water requested to be withdrawn is 41.06 per cent over the maximum average daily withdrawal permitted under the water crop theory as set forth in Section 16J-2.11(3), F.A.C. However, the Water Management District witness recommended waiver of that provision since the mining operations will be concluded in several years and thereafter the water table and hydrologic conditions will return to normal. The Water District staff recommended approval of the application with the condition that a meter be installed on the well and that the applicant be required to take monthly readings thereof and submit quarterly reports of the readings to the District. The applicant's representative agreed to these conditions at the hearing.
Recommendation It is recommended that Application No. 7500137 submitted by Poseidon Mines, Inc., for a consumptive water use permit be granted on the condition that a meter be installed on the applicant's well and that monthly readings be taken and submitted quarterly by the applicant to the Southwest Florida Water Management District. It is further recommended that the Board of Governors of the Southwest Florida Water Management District, pursuant to Rule 16J-2.11(5), for good cause, grant an exception to the provisions of Rule 16J-2.11(3), as being consistent with the public interest. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of January, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: J.T. Ahern, Staff Attorney Southwest Florida Water Management District P.O. Box 457 Brooksville, Florida 33512 Poseidon Mines, Inc. P.O. Box 5172 Bartow, Florida
The Issue Whether the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) has jurisdiction to conduct a formal hearing under the provisions of Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if a Petition for Relief is referred to the DOAH for formal hearing based on a Notice of Determination: No Jurisdiction issued by the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR resume jurisdiction of the matter and complete the investigation of the Charge of Discrimination, pursuant to Section 760.11(3), Florida Statutes, or permit Petitioner to make her election of remedies pursuant to Section 760.11(8), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of February, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of February, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: William R. Amlong, Esquire Amlong & Amlong, P.A. 500 Northeast Fourth Street Second Floor Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301-1154 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Keith C. Tischler, Esquire Powers, Quaschnick, et. al. 1669 Mahan Center Boulevard Post Office Box 12186 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-2186 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Florida Administrative Code Rule 40E-7.523(2)(c) is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.*
Findings Of Fact The Parties 1. The District is a public corporation existing by virtue of Chapter 25270, Laws of Florida (1949), and operating pursuant to Chapter 373, Florida Statutes, and Title 40E-7, Florida Administrative Code, asa multipurpose water management district, with its principal office in West Palm Beach, Florida. 2. KRVSA is a Florida corporation whose members are substantially affected by the rule in question. 3. Phillip B. Griner is an individual who holds a Special Use License to use the Lower Reedy Creek Management Area/Rough Island Management Unit Protected Zone. He has been a member of KVSA since its inception in 1998 and was serving on its board of directors at the time of the final hearing.
Conclusions Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Petition for Administrative Hearing is denied. DONE AND ORDERED this 19th day of December, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Pan ate J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of December, 2003.
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by filing the original notice of appeal with Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings and a copy, accompanied by filing fees prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal, First District, or with the District Court of Appeal in the Appellate District where the party resides. The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed. 31
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, the following Findings of Fact are made: An Overview of Petitioner's Employment with the District Petitioner was employed by the District from June of 1988, until his termination, which was effective January 14, 1992. Prior to his termination he had an unblemished disciplinary record. Petitioner was initially hired by the District as a Construction Representative. In January of 1989, he assumed the duties of a Regulatory Professional I. He was promoted in 1990 to a Regulatory Professional II, a position he held until he was terminated. At the time of his termination, Petitioner had attained regular employee status inasmuch as he had successfully completed his probationary period. As a Regulatory Professional II, Petitioner was responsible for monitoring the public's compliance with the District's regulatory programs, a task that involved the exercise of considerable discretion with minimal supervision as well as frequent and substantial contact with citizens in his assigned territory, which covered all of Okeechobee and St. Lucie Counties and parts of Glades and Highlands Counties. Petitioner also supervised one subordinate employee, Donald Hagan, a Regulatory Professional I, who assisted Petitioner in his monitoring activities. Petitioner was assigned a District vehicle for official use during the workday. After hours, the vehicle was secured in the parking lot outside the District field station in Okeechobee where Petitioner was headquartered. Petitioner worked an eight-hour day. His normal work hours were 7:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., however, he occasionally deviated from this schedule when necessary to accommodate his workload. In addition to a lunch break, Petitioner was allowed to take two 15 minute work breaks during his eight-hour workday, one in the morning and one in the afternoon. He was permitted to take these breaks whether he was in the field station or out in the field. In September and most of October of 1991, Petitioner's immediate supervisor was Edward Maciejko. Maciejko was headquartered in West Palm Beach, approximately 60 to 65 miles from the Okeechobee field station out of which Petitioner worked. On October 23, 1991, Alan Goldstein became Petitioner's immediate supervisor. Goldstein's work station was located in Okeechobee approximately three miles from Petitioner's work station. Goldstein remained Petitioner's immediate supervisor until Petitioner's termination. The Employee Handbook The District has an Employee Handbook that is designed to provide information and guidance to District employees regarding employment-related matters. As do all new District employees, Petitioner received a copy of the Employee Handbook upon being hired and its contents were reviewed with him during his orientation. The Employee Handbook contains the District's Attendance and Leave Policy (Policy No. 300), which addresses the subjects of "normal work hours" and "work breaks" as follows: NORMAL WORK HOURS All full-time regular and initial probationary employees shall perform their assigned duties for 40 hours each work week unless otherwise authorized. All part-time regular and temporary employees shall perform their assigned duties for the total number of hours for which compensation is received. The normal workday shall be 8 hours unless otherwise authorized by the employee's Division Director. WORK BREAKS All District employees are provided one work break during the first half of their workday and one work break during the second half of their workday, except in extreme emergency. No single work break shall exceed 15 minutes. An employee is not permitted to accumulate unused work breaks nor may the work break be used to cover an employee's late arrival or early departure from duty. All employees shall take a minimum of one half hour lunch break each workday. The following discussion is found in the Employee Handbook concerning the "Code of Ethics:" Florida has been a leader among the states in establishing ethical standards for public officials and employees and recognizing the right of her people to protect the public trust against abuse. Our state constitution was revised in 1968 to require that (a)a code of ethics for all state employees and non-judicial officers prohibiting conflict between public duty and private interests shall be prescribed by law. Art III, Sec. 18, Fla. Constitution. The "Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees" by which the Legislature carried out this constitutional mandate is found in Chapter 112 (Part III) of the Florida Statutes. The purpose of the Code is to ensure that public officials and employees conduct themselves independently and impartially, not using their offices or positions for private gains other than remuneration provided by law and to avoid conflicts between public duties and private interest. . . . The standards of conduct summarized below generally apply to all District employees. The types of conduct prohibited are: Gifts- No public employee shall solicit or accept anything of value- including a gift, loan, reward, promise of future employment, favor, or service- that is based on any understanding that the vote, official action, or judgment of the employee would be influenced by such gift. Sec. 112.313(2), Fla. Stat. (1991). Unauthorized Compensation- No public employee or his/her spouse or minor child shall accept any compensation, payment or thing of value which, with the exercise of reasonable care, is known or should be known to influence the official action of such employee. Sec. 112.313(4), Fla. Stat. (1991). Doing Business with One's Agency- No public employee acting as a purchasing agent or acting in his/her official capacity shall, directly or indirectly, purchase, rent, or lease any realty, goods, or services from a business entity in which his/her spouse, or child is an officer, partner, director, or proprietor, or in which his/her spouse, or child (or any combination of them) has a material interest. Nor shall a public employee, acting in a private capacity, rent, lease, or sell any realty, goods or services to his/her own agency. Sec. 112.313(3), Fla. Stat. (1991). Conflicting Employment or Contractual Relationship- No public employee shall hold any employment or contractual relationship with any business entity or agency which is subject to the regulation of, or doing business with, the employee's agency. Nor shall an employee hold any employment or contractual relationship which will pose a recurring conflict between his/her private interests and his/her public duties or which would impede the full and faithful discharge of his/her duties. Sec. 112.313(7), Fla. Stat. (1991). Exemptions- Under certain circumstances the prohibitions of subsections (3) and (7) of Section 112.313, Florida Statutes, may not apply. Misuse of Public Position- No public employee shall corruptly use or attempt to use his/her official position or any property or resource within his/her trust, or perform his/her official duties, to obtain a special privilege, benefit or exemption for himself/ herself or others. Sec. 112.313(6), Fla. Stat. (1991). Disclosure or Use Of Certain Information- No public employee shall disclose or use information not available to the general public and gained by reason of his/her public position for his/her personal gain or benefit or the gain or benefit of others. Sec. 112.313(8), Fla. Stat.(1991). More specific ethics laws address financial disclosure and the reporting requirements which apply to Governing Board members, senior management, and employees with contracting authority. The above information has been provided to help you understand State Ethics Laws. The District supports and enforces these laws to the best of its ability and expects each employee to conduct their activities in a lawful manner. Conflicts of interest may be avoided by greater awareness of these Ethics Laws. If you are in doubt about the applicability of the ethics laws to your own circumstances or the circumstances of a subordinate or co-worker, contact the District's Office of Counsel. They will answer your questions or assist you in obtaining an opinion from the Commission on Ethics. Also included in the Employee Handbook is the District's Corrective Action Policy (Policy No. 803), which establishes standards governing non- executive employee conduct and discipline. Section F. of Policy No. 803 lists those acts of misconduct for which a non-executive District employee who has attained regular status may be disciplined. It provides in pertinent part as follows: The following forms of misconduct are unacceptable and subject an employee to corrective action based on the particular circumstances surrounding the incident. The list is provided merely as examples and is not intended to be all inclusive. The identification of these examples does not preclude the District's right to discipline or dismiss employees for other causes, including acts of misconduct which breach the requirements inherent in the employment relationship. 1. Unbecoming conduct: Any action or conduct by an employee which impedes the District's efforts, brings discredit on the District, impairs the operation or efficiency of the District or any employee, or impairs the employee's ability to perform his or her job. . . . 5. Absence Without Authorized Leave: Failure to obtain approval from the proper authority prior to any absence from work, except in the case of an emergency, illness or accident which requires the employee to be absent prior to receiving approval; Inexcusable or repeated failure to notify the appropriate Supervisor or division office of absence, due to sickness, within ten (10) minutes from the start of the normal work day; Being more than ten (10) minutes late to work for an inexcusable reason or on a repeated basis without notifying the appropriate Supervisor, or division office. . . . Unauthorized Use of District Property, Services, Equipment or Personnel: The use of any District property, services, equipment or personnel for any purpose other than District business. Employees shall be required to reimburse the District for the cost incurred by the District as a result of the unauthorized use of equipment or property. Improper or Careless Use of District Property, Including Vehicles: Failure to care for or properly use District property or equipment such as the failure to observe the proper speed limit while driving a District vehicle. . . . 11. Lying or Failure to Give Truthful or Requested Information: Oral or written statements that are deliberately inaccurate, incorrect or misleading but which do not constitute falsification of records. This includes lying or failure to provide information during an internal investigation. . . . 24. Violation or Disregard of Safety Practices: The failure to follow established safety practices as outlined in the District's Accident Prevention Manual. This includes failure to report any injury or accident; the performance of unsafe acts; or the failure to wear or use appropriate safety equipment. . . . Negligence: The failure to use ordinary or reasonable care, caution, attention, diligence or discretion in the performance of assigned duties and responsibilities. Falsification of a District Record: The intentional issuance of a false or incomplete report or record, either oral or written, or the intentional failure to issue a record regarding the performance of work duties, attendance, injury, illness, job qualifications or other work related matters. Policy No. 803 specifically provides for four basic types of "corrective action" to deal with acts of misconduct. They are, in order of severity: oral reprimand (OR); written reprimand (WR); suspension (S); and dismissal (D). In determining the appropriate "corrective action" to be taken in a particular situation, supervisory personnel must follow the "standards" set forth in Section G. of Policy No. 803, which provides as follows: This section has been established as a guide for use by Supervisors to help ensure that all employees receive similar treatment in like circumstances. The guidelines on severity of corrective action outlined in Section H. is not meant to be an exhaustive listing of all possible acts of misconduct or forms of corrective action. Appropriate corrective action of unlisted acts of misconduct may be derived by comparing the nature and seriousness of the offense to those listed in Section H. In many cases, the guidelines on severity of corrective action are based on the number of occurrences and the seriousness of the offense and are presented as a range of action which covers more than one form of corrective action. The use of a particular form of corrective action is not mandatory simply because it is listed in Section H. Realizing that some of the offenses listed will be more or less serious in certain cases, the supervisor taking the corrective action shall utilize good judgment in light of all available facts. The corrective action selected must ultimately be appropriate in light of the particular circumstances surrounding the incident and the employee's past performance and conduct record. For example, even for offenses where dismissal is not indicated for a first offense, dismissal on a first occurrence may be assessed for an aggravated offense or a continuous pattern of misconduct. Similarly, where dismissal is indicated, a less severe form of corrective action may be taken. This action may be taken so long as it is more severe than that given in the most recent prior occurrence that is still active, and is reasonably consistent with other cases of misconduct for other employees. Temporary and initial probationary employees may be suspended or dismissed without regard to the standards of corrective action. In determining the severity of corrective action to be applied, the authorized Supervisor should take into account the following variables: The severity of the specific act of misconduct. The circumstances under which the violation occurred. The consequences of the employee's actions in regard to its affect on the District operation and on other employees. The guidelines on severity of corrective action outlined in Section H. of this policy. The overall work record of the employee; length of employment; and the employee's prior history of other similar or unrelated corrective actions, including active and inactive offenses. The length of time since earlier corrective action, the similarity or dissimilarity of the offense, and the severity of earlier offenses. The following are among "the guidelines on severity of corrective action outlined in Section H." of Policy No. 803: 1. Unbecoming conduct: 1st occurrence- WR, S or D . . 5. Absence Without Authorized Leave (Does not affect scheduling or work of others): 1st occurrence- OR; 2nd occurrence- WR . . Unauthorized Use of District Property, Services, Equipment, or Personnel (With intent to obtain personal gain: 1) Cost to District of less than $50.00): 1st occurrence- S; 2nd occurrence- S or D; 3rd occurrence: D Unauthorized Use of District Property, Services, Equipment, or Personnel (With intent to obtain personal gain: 2) Cost to District of more than $50.00): 1st occurrence- S or D; 2nd occurrence- D Improper or Careless Use of District Property (Not involving personal injury or property damage): 1st occurrence: OR . . . 11. Lying or Failure to Give Truthful or Requested Information: 1st occurrence- WR or S; 2nd occurrence- S or D; 3rd occurrence- D . . . 24. Violation or Disregard of Safety Practices (Not involving personal injury or property damage): 1st occurrence- OR . . . Negligence (Not involving personal injury or property damage): 1st occurrence- OR . . . Falsification of District Record: 1st occurrence- S or D; 2nd occurrence- D The Accident and Related Events In the latter part of September of 1991, Petitioner's personal vehicle was in an automotive repair shop in Stuart. On September 17, 1991, at Petitioner's request, Donald Hagan, Petitioner's subordinate, drove Petitioner to the repair shop in Stuart, which was outside of their assigned territory, in a District vehicle. The purpose of the trip was to ascertain whether the repairs on Petitioner's personal vehicle had been completed. Upon his arrival at the repair shop, Petitioner was advised that the necessary parts had not come in and that therefore it would be another week until he would be able to pick up his vehicle. A week later, on September 24, 1991, at approximately 1:00 p.m., Hagan was in his District vehicle in the parking lot outside the Okeechobee field station when Petitioner walked up to him. Petitioner told Hagan that the repairs on Petitioner's personal vehicle had been completed. He then asked if Hagan would give him a ride to the repair shop in Stuart so that he could pick up the vehicle. Hagan responded in the affirmative. Petitioner thereupon entered Hagan's District vehicle and sat down in the front passenger seat. After Petitioner was situated, Hagan drove off, headed in the direction of the repair shop. Before reaching their destination, Hagan and Petitioner were involved in an automobile accident when Hagan lost control of the vehicle and it ended up in a ditch. The vehicle was damaged and it was towed to West Palm Beach for repairs. Hagan sustained two fractured ribs as a result of the accident. Petitioner was also injured, but not as seriously as Hagan. Both received medical treatment for their injuries. Hagan's and Petitioner's ill-fated trip did not have any District- related purpose. Nonetheless, following the accident, Petitioner reported otherwise, notwithstanding that he knew that he was providing false information to the District. On the night of the accident, he told his then immediate supervisor, Edward Maciejko, over the telephone that he and Hagan were on their way to conduct an inspection of distressed cypress trees in St. Lucie County when the accident occurred. Petitioner also prepared an accident report in which he made the same misrepresentation. A workers' compensation claim was filed on behalf of Petitioner in reliance upon this misrepresentation. Initially, Hagan corroborated Petitioner's story about the purpose of their September 24, 1991, trip. Later, however, he told supervisory personnel the truth about the matter. For his part in the incident and the subsequent cover-up, he was reprimanded and received a two-day suspension. On two occasions following Hagan's revelation regarding the true purpose of the trip, Petitioner was provided an opportunity by Alan Goldstein, who had recently become Petitioner's immediate supervisor and was looking into allegations of misconduct against Petitioner, to recant the statements he had previously made regarding the matter. Petitioner, however, declined to do so and instead repeated what he had said earlier on the subject. 2/ The Speeding Ticket and Related Events On October 3, 1991, while driving his District vehicle to a work- related meeting in Lake Placid, Florida, to which he did not want to be late, Petitioner was stopped by a Florida Highway Patrol trooper and given a traffic citation for travelling 84 miles per hour in a 55-mile per hour zone. Petitioner had exceeded the posted 55-mile per hour speed limit, but by less than the trooper indicated on the citation. Nonetheless, for convenience sake, Petitioner did not contest the citation. On the day he received the citation, Petitioner telephoned Edward Maciejko, who was still his immediate supervisor at the time, and told Maciejko that he had been "flagged down" by a trooper earlier that day while on his way to Lake Placid in his District vehicle. Subsequently, during an investigation of alleged wrongdoing on Petitioner's part conducted after Alan Goldstein, had become Petitioner's immediate supervisor, Goldstein asked Petitioner if he had informed Maciejko about the traffic citation he had received on October 3, 1991. Petitioner responded in the affirmative to this inquiry. To the best of his recollection, he had so informed Maciejko and therefore believed that he was being truthful in his response to Goldstein's inquiry. The Loan and Related Events Dry Lake Dairy (Dairy) is an Okeechobee dairy farm that has been owned and operated by the Rucks family since 1958. J. Boyd Rucks is President of the Dairy. As President, it is his responsibility to deal with governmental agencies that exercise regulatory authority over the Dairy and its operations. The District is one of these governmental agencies. In or sometime prior to 1990, the Dairy received a surface water management permit from the District. It subsequently obtained a modification to the permit to engage in a ditch clearing operation. In November of 1990, the District issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) alleging that the Dairy had violated the terms of its permit. Petitioner was actively involved in the investigation that led to the issuance of the NOV. Following the issuance of the NOV, it was his responsibility to make sure that the necessary steps were being taken by the Dairy to correct the problems identified in the NOV. At first, he visited the Dairy on a regular basis to monitor its compliance efforts. Thereafter, these regular visits ceased and his monitoring activities were confined to flying over the Dairy during his monthly aerial inspection of his territory. By the middle of October of 1991, the Dairy had made substantial progress toward correcting the violation with which it had been charged by the District, but the matter had not been finally resolved. 3/ At the time, Petitioner needed to borrow $500.00. Notwithstanding that the enforcement action against the Dairy, in which he played an integral role, was still ongoing, Petitioner ill-advisedly decided to approach the Dairy's President and its representative in its dealings with the District, J. Boyd Rucks, about loaning him the money. Petitioner knew Rucks through Petitioner's work with the District. Their relationship was purely a professional one. They did not socialize. While Rucks, on behalf of the Dairy, often made cash advances to its employees, neither he nor the Dairy was in the business of making loans to members of the general public. Never before had either of them made a loan to a District employee. At around noon on October 14, 1991, Petitioner was in his District vehicle on his way back from a field inspection when he stopped by Rucks' home and asked Rucks if he would lend Petitioner $500.00. Rucks told Petitioner that he would have to discuss the matter with other members of his family and that Petitioner should return later in the day for an answer. At around 3:30 or 4:00 p.m. that afternoon, Petitioner returned to Rucks' home in his District vehicle. 4/ Having obtained the approval of the family members to whom he had spoken, Rucks gave Petitioner $500.00 from the Dairy's petty cash fund. Petitioner was to repay the money within ten days. There was no interest charged. Petitioner did not believe that he was doing anything wrong in soliciting and accepting this loan from Rucks. There was no understanding on the part of either Petitioner or Rucks that the making of this loan to Petitioner would in any way influence Petitioner in the discharge of his duties as an employee of the District. Petitioner never suggested, nor did Rucks expect, that the Dairy would receive favorable treatment in its dealings with the District as a result of the loan. The two viewed the transaction as a personal matter unrelated to District business. Because of illness that required hospitalization, Petitioner was unable to repay the loan within ten days. The loan was repaid in full within three weeks. Petitioner's Personal Circumstances During the period of time in which the alleged acts of misconduct in the instant case were committed, Petitioner was experiencing a significant amount of stress in his personal life. He was having money problems. In addition, his relationship with his wife was deteriorating. The day after he received the loan from Rucks, Petitioner was admitted to a psychiatric hospital for treatment. He remained hospitalized for two weeks.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the District enter a final order (1) finding that disciplinary action, in the form of a suspension covering the period from January 9, 1992, to the date of the issuance of said final order, should be taken against Petitioner, but based only upon those acts of misconduct described in Conclusion of Law 70 of this Recommended Order, (2) reducing Petitioner's dismissal to such a suspension, and (3) reinstating Petitioner to the position he previously held or a comparable position. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 26th day of October, 1992. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of October, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-3101 The following are the Hearing Officer's specific rulings on what the parties have labelled as "findings of facts" in their proposed recommended orders: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted and incorporated in substance, although not necessarily repeated verbatim, in this Recommended Order. To the extent that this proposed finding states that "[e]mployees receive the Handbook at new employee orientation," it has been accepted and incorporated in substance. Otherwise, it has been rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. First sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Second sentence: Rejected because it is more in the nature of a summary of testimony adduced at hearing than a finding of fact based upon such testimony; Third sentence: Rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. 4-7. Accepted and incorporated in substance. 8. First and second sentences: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Third sentence: Rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. 9-11. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. To the extent that this proposed finding references Edward Muldowney's participation in the internal investigation and Muldowney's "extensive investigative experience," it has been rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. Otherwise, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. 15-16. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. 20-22. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected as a finding of fact because it is more in the nature of legal argument. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected because it is not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. 25a.-25b. To the extent that these proposed findings state that Petitioner was absent during non-break periods of the workday on September 24, 1991, and on October 14, 1991, without the authorization and approval of the appropriate authority, they have been rejected because they are not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. Otherwise, they have been adopted and incorporated in substance. 25c.-26a. Accepted and incorporated in substance. 26b. Last sentence: Rejected because it is not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence; Remaining sentences: Accepted and incorporated in substance. 26c. Last sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Remaining sentences: Rejected because they are more in the nature of summaries of testimony adduced at hearing than findings of fact based upon such testimony. 26d. Accepted and incorporated in substance. 26e. First and second sentences: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Third sentence: Rejected because it is not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. 26f. Accepted and incorporated in substance. This proposed finding, which states that Petitioner lied or failed to give truthful or requested information on six, rather than three, occasions, has been rejected because it is not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. 27a. Accepted and incorporated in substance. 27b. First, second and sixth sentences: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Third and fourth sentences: To the extent that these proposed findings state that Goldstein "specifically asked [Petitioner] if any part of the trip on the day of the accident was for personal reasons" and Petitioner "lied when he responded 'no'" to this question, they have been accepted and incorporated in substance. Otherwise, they have been rejected because they are not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. 27c. To the extent that this proposed finding states that Goldstein talked to Petitioner about the September 17, 1991, trip to Stuart during the discussion referenced therein, it has been rejected because it is not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. Otherwise, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance. 27e. Last sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Remaining sentences: Rejected because they are not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. Accepted and incorporated in substance. First, second, third and sixth sentences: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Fourth sentence: To the extent that this proposed finding states that Hagan "was a passenger in the vehicle at the time," it has been rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. Otherwise, it has been rejected because it is more in the nature of a summary of testimony adduced at hearing than a finding of fact based on such testimony; Fifth sentence: Rejected because it is more in the nature of a summary of testimony adduced at hearing than a finding of fact based on such testimony. 30-32d. Accepted and incorporated in substance. 32e. First sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Second sentence: To the extent that this proposed suggests that Petitioner did not perform "his regulatory functions, including those at the Dry Lake Dairy, in an unbiased manner" as a result of the loan, it has been rejected because it is not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. Otherwise, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance. 10/ Third and fourth sentences: Rejected because they are not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. 11/ 33-33b. Rejected because they concern alleged misconduct outside the scope of the charges specified in the notice of termination. 33c. Rejected because it is more in the nature of a summary of testimony adduced at hearing than a finding of fact based upon such testimony. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted and incorporated in substance. To the extent that this proposed finding states that Petitioner's assigned territory included Martin County, it has been rejected because it is not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. Otherwise, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance. To the extent that this proposed finding recites verbatim the "Grievance Resolution," it has been rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. To the extent that this proposed finding states that Respondent was "summarily" dismissed upon given his notice of termination without the opportunity to respond and that he never before "had an evaluation which was less than satisfactory," it has been rejected because it is not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. To the extent that this proposed finding states that Petitioner was deprived of "due process," that he was terminated "arbitrarily" and that the charges against him "are so vague as to make them void," it has been rejected as a finding of fact because it is more in the nature of legal argument. Otherwise, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance.
