The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her national origin or ethnicity in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Fabiola Heiblum ("Heiblum") is a Hispanic woman who, at all times relevant to this action, has owned Unit No. 5C in the Carlton Bay Condominium, which is located in North Miami Beach, Florida. She purchased her unit in 2004 and has resided there continuously since some time in 2005. Respondent Carlton Bay Condominium Association, Inc. ("Association") is the entity responsible for operating and managing the condominium property in which Heiblum's unit is located. In March 2008, the Association's Board of Directors ("Board") approved a special assessment, to be levied against all unit owners, the proceeds of which would be used to pay insurance premiums. Each owner was required to pay his share of the special assessment in full on April 1, 2008, or, alternatively, in three equal monthly installments, due on the first of April, May, and June 2008, respectively. Heiblum's share of this special assessment was $912.81. At or around the same time, the Board also enacted a procedure for collecting assessments, including the special insurance assessment. According to this procedure, owners would have a grace period of 15 days within which to make a required payment. After that period, a delinquent owner would be notified, in writing, that the failure to pay his balance due within 15 days after the date of the notice would result in referral of the matter to an attorney for collection. The attorney, in that event, would file a Claim of Lien and send a demand letter threatening to initiate a foreclosure proceeding if the outstanding balance (together with costs and attorney's fees) was not paid within 30 days after receipt of the demand. This collection procedure applied to all unit owners. Heiblum did not make any payment toward the special assessment on April 1, 2008. She made no payment on May 1, 2008, either. (Heiblum concedes her obligation to pay the special assessment and does not contend that the Association failed to give proper notice regarding her default.) The Association accordingly asked its attorney to file a Claim of Lien against Unit No. 5C and take the legal steps necessary to collect the unpaid debt. By letter dated May 8, 2008, the Association's attorney notified Heiblum that a Claim of Lien against her property had been recorded in the public records; further, demand was made that she pay $1402.81 (the original debt of $912.81 plus costs and attorney's fees) to avoid foreclosure. On or around May 10, 2008, Heiblum gave the Association a check in the amount of $500, which the Association returned, under cover of a letter dated May 16, 2008, because its attorney was now in charge of collecting the overdue debt. Heiblum eventually paid the special assessment in full, together with costs and attorney's fees, thereby obviating the need for a foreclosure suit. Heiblum believes that the Association prosecuted its claims for unpaid special assessments more aggressively against Hispanics such as herself than persons of other national origins or ethnicities, for which owners the Association allegedly showed greater forbearance. Specifically, she believes that the Association did not retain its attorney to undertake collection efforts against non-Hispanic unit owners, sparing them the costs and fees that she was compelled to pay. There is, however, no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of any sort of unlawful housing discrimination could be made. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that the Association did not commit any prohibited discriminatory act vis-à-vis Heiblum.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding the Association not liable for housing discrimination and awarding Heiblum no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of February, 2009.
The Issue Whether applicant is eligible for relocation assistance monetary benefits pursuant to Public Law 91-646 and Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970. Although notice of hearing was provided to Mr. and Mrs. Limegrover on March 26, 1976, they did not appear at the time of hearing. Upon telephonic inquiry on June 8th by a representative of the Department of Transportation, Mr. Limegrover advised that he had received the notice and although he had intended to call the Department of Transportation concerning the matter, he had forgotten to do so. He stated that he desired a continuance of the case. His request was objected to by counsel for the Department of Transportation. The request for continuance was denied as being untimely and good cause not having been shown therefor. The hearing was conducted as an uncontested proceeding.
Findings Of Fact By letter of October 20, 1975, Mr. and Mrs. Richard Limegrover of Courtly Manors Mobile Home Park, Hialeah Gardens, Florida, were advised by the Florida Department of Transportation that it was in the process of acquiring right-of-way for State Road #25 (U.S. 27) in their area, and that the mobile home lot the Limegrovers occupied as tenants would be required for construction of the facility. The letter provided the Department's assurance that they would not be required to move until at least 90 days had elapsed from the date of receipt of the letter, and that they would receive a further notice specifying the actual date by which the property must be vacated at least 30 days prior to the date specified. The letter concluded by an expression of the Department's desire to assist in relocation and to answer any questions concerning such matters. On December 8, 1975, a further letter was sent to the Limegrovers by the Department of Transportation assuring the addressees that the prior letter had not been a notice to move and that no one at the Courtly Manors Mobile Home Park would be required to move until negotiations with the owner had been completed or monies placed with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Dade County by court order. It further stated that in the interim period relocatees living within Courtly Manors who were eligible and decided to move on their own initiative would be assisted by the Department in their relocation. Limegrover called Mr. Carl Moon, Right-of-Way Agent, Department of Transportation, Ft. Lauderdale, on December 11, requesting assistance in arrangements for moving his mobile home. Moon discovered that Limegrover wanted to move before January 1, 1976, as he had reserved a lot in another mobile home park. However, Limegrover told him that when he advised his current landlord on December 11 of the projected move on December 30, the landlord stated that in the absence of 30 days notice, Limegrover must forfeit his $90.00 security deposit. Limegrover told Moon that he felt the Department of Transportation should pay the $90.00 security deposit since he was being forced to move by that agency. Moon told him that he was not required to move that soon, but Limegrover was unwilling to wait, fearing that he would not be able to find a satisfactory place later on. Accordingly, Moon assisted him in his moving arrangements and Limegrover was paid for his moving expenses in the amount of $640.00 and smaller sums for reinstallation of his telephone and disconnection and reconnection of his gas equipment. Inasmuch as the Department of transportation declined to pay the $90.00 representing alleged forfeiture of the security deposit, Limegrover filed this relocation appeal. (Testimony of Moon, Exhibits 1 & 2).
Recommendation That the appeal of Richard and Jane Limegrover, in the amount of $90.00, be denied. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of July, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Phillip Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Room 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida Richard S. and Jane E. Limegrover Lot F4, Haven Lakes Mobile Home Park 11201 S.W. 55th Street Miramar, Florida 33025
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on her sex or an alleged handicap contrary to Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2008), Fair Housing Act, as amended (the Act).
The Issue Whether Respondent committed a discriminatory housing practice against Petitioner as alleged in the Petition for Relief dated September 15, 2005, and if so, what relief should the Florida Commission on Human Relations provide.
Findings Of Fact Because no evidence was offered at the final hearing held in the instant case, no findings of fact are made.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 2005.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner by refusing to rent her an apartment because she is legally blind and relies upon a service dog to ambulate independently.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Lourdes Guzman (“Guzman”) is legally blind and relies upon a service dog (also referred to as a guide dog or “seeing eye” dog) to ambulate independently. Respondent Charles Harris (“Harris”) owns an eight-unit apartment building (the “Property”) located in Bay Harbor Islands, Florida. Harris, who is retired, holds the Property for investment purposes and lives on the rental income it generates. In or around April of 2002, Harris placed an advertisement in the newspaper seeking a tenant for one his rental units. Guzman saw this ad, was interested, and made an appointment to see the Property. A short time later, Guzman and her live-in boyfriend José Robert (“Robert”) met Harris and Paul Karolyi (“Karolyi”) late one afternoon at the Property. (Karolyi is a tenant of Harris’s who helps out at the Property; Guzman and Robert viewed him as the “building manager,” which was apparently a reasonable perception.) During their conversation, the prospective renters mentioned that they owned a dog. Upon hearing this, Harris explained that he had just finished renovating the advertised unit because the previous tenant’s dog had destroyed the rug and caused other damage to the premises. Thus, Harris told Guzman and Robert, he was not interested in renting this unit to someone with a dog. Robert then informed Harris that: (a) Guzman’s sight was impaired; (b) the dog in question was a service dog; and (c) Harris was legally obligated to let Guzman bring the dog into the unit, should she become Harris’s tenant, as a reasonable accommodation of her handicap. Once he understood the situation, Harris acknowledged that a service dog was different and stated that he would not refuse to rent the unit to someone with a service dog. Accordingly, Harris gave Guzman and Robert a rental application, which Guzman later completed and returned to Harris. After receiving Guzman’s application, Harris checked her references and discovered that Guzman’s two most recent landlords considered her to be a poor tenant. While Guzman disputes the veracity of some of the information that was provided to Harris, at hearing she admitted that much of what he learned was true. The following rental history is based on Guzman’s admissions. Town & Country Apartments. From October 2001 until January 24, 2002, Guzman lived at the Town & Country Apartments in Bay Harbor Islands, Florida. Her landlord was T & C Associates, Ltd. (“T & C”). At least six times during this 16-month period, Guzman failed to timely pay her rent and was required to pay a late fee. She also received at least five statutory “three-day notices” warning that her failure to pay the overdue monthly rent within 72 hours would trigger an eviction proceeding.1 T & C sued to evict Guzman after she failed to pay the rent due for December 2001. Consequently, when Guzman vacated the Town & Country Apartments on January 24, 2002, she did so pursuant to a writ of possession. Guzman claims that she chose to be evicted as an expedient means of breaking her lease with T & C. The Sahara. After being evicted from the Town & Country Apartments, Guzman moved into a unit at the “Sahara”—— which Guzman described at hearing as a “motel”——pursuant to a short-term lease. Guzman’s landlord at the Sahara was Allen L. Kaul (“Kaul”). Guzman lived at the Sahara for about two months.2 Guzman had some sort of dispute with Kaul, and when she moved out of the Sahara she took the keys to the unit she was vacating and the remote control device that opened a gate to the premises; these items were never returned to Kaul. These facts convinced Harris that Guzman was not an acceptable risk. He notified Guzman that he would not rent to her due to her “poor credit history.” Ultimate Factual Determinations Harris rejected Guzman’s rental application, not because of her handicap or service dog, but because he discovered, through a reasonable process of checking references, that Guzman had recently been evicted from one apartment and vacated another under suspicious (or at least questionable) circumstances, taking with her some personal property of the landlord’s that she never returned. There is no credible, competent evidence that Harris rented his apartments to non-handicapped persons having rental histories similar to Guzman’s. Nor does the evidence support a finding that Harris invoked Guzman’s negative rental history (the material aspects of which were undisputed) as a pretext for discrimination. In short, Harris did not discriminate unlawfully against Guzman; rather, he rejected her rental application for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order dismissing Guzman’s Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of May, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of May, 2003.
The Issue Whether Respondents Adams Group Home, Inc., and Joyce Adams' ("Respondents") group home licensure renewal applications should be denied.
Findings Of Fact Parties and Background APD is the state agency charged with regulating the licensing and operation of foster care facilities, group home facilities, and residential centers, pursuant to sections 20.197 and 393.067, Florida Statutes. Under section 393.063(19), a group home facility means a residential facility "which provides a family living environment including supervision and care necessary to meet the physical, emotional, and social needs of its residents." The capacity of such a facility must be at least four but not more than 15 residents. Respondents are licensees of two group home facilities, known as Adams Group Home #1, located at 2400 Oleander Drive, Miramar, Florida 33023, and Adams Group Home #2, located at 7131 Southwest 16th Street, Pembroke Pines, Florida 33023. Respondents' group homes provide a family living environment within a residential, single-family structure with a combined total of not more than 12 adult residents with developmental disabilities. Joyce Adams is Adams Group Homes' corporate officer. Ms. Adams has been licensed through APD to provide group home services for 18 years. Group homes licensed by APD are required to apply for a renewal license every year. The renewal process involves a review of the applications to make sure they are accurate and complete and an observation by a licensing specialist at the facilities to ensure the facilities are in compliance with the applicable statutes and administrative rules. Every year prior to 2018, including 2014 through 2017, Respondents' group home licensure renewal applications for Adams Group Home #1 and Adams Group Home #2 were approved by APD. No evidence was presented at hearing demonstrating that Respondents have ever been the subject of any corrective action plan or proposed disciplinary agency action in the form of an administrative fine, suspension or revocation of a license, or moratorium on admissions, prior to APD's March 13, 2018, denial letter. The March 13, 2018, Denial Letter Against this backdrop, on December 20, 2017, Respondents submitted applications to APD for renewal of the licenses of Adams Group Home #1 and Adams Group Home #2, which were set to expire in March 2018. By letter dated March 13, 2018, APD notified Respondents of the denial of their group home licensure renewal applications. APD's grounds for the denial of the license applications are set forth in the denial letter in four counts. In Counts I and II, APD alleges the Department of Children and Families ("DCF") commenced investigations which resulted in DCF's verified findings of abuse, neglect or exploitation against Ms. Adams in February 2014 and December 2015, respectively. APD further alleges that based on section 393.0673(2), it "may" deny an application for licensure based solely on DCF's verified findings. In Count III, APD alleges Respondents used video cameras in the common areas in 2016 and 2017 without written consents for the common areas in violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 65G-2.009(7), which constitutes a Class II violation. In "Count IIII," APD alleges that after Hurricane Irma struck south Florida on September 10, 2017, Respondents had "no power at the group home," Respondents utilized a "makeshift grill" less than ten feet from the structure, and failed to care for its residents. APD specifically alleges that on September 19, 2017, a resident of Adams Group Home #2 "was taken to the emergency room at Memorial Regional Hospital for confusion and fever." APD further alleges that Respondents' conduct described in "Count IIII" constitutes Class I violations, and that the conduct violates rule 65G-2.009(1)(d) with regard to the minimum standards of facilities to ensure the health and safety of the residents and address the provision of appropriate physical care and supervision; adhering to and protecting resident rights and freedoms in accordance with the Bill of Rights of Persons with Developmental Disabilities, as provided in section 393.13; and section 393.13(3)(a) and (g), relating to humane care, abuse, neglect, or exploitation. Count I The parties stipulated that on December 29, 2013, DCF commenced an investigation of Respondents' group homes, and that on February 25, 2014, DCF closed its investigation with verified findings of abuse, neglect, or exploitation on the part of Ms. Adams. APD was aware of DCF's verified findings upon completion of DCF's investigation. At hearing, APD provided no witnesses with first-hand knowledge of the specific facts involved in the violation. Instead, APD presented unsigned DCF investigative reports and a DCF supervisor's testimony regarding the general investigative process. At hearing, Ms. Adams explained the facts and circumstances surrounding the violation. Ms. Adams testified the incident involved M.K., a 41-year-old female resident of Respondents' group home since 2006, who is developmentally disabled. According to Ms. Adams, on Sunday, December 29, 2013, M.K. was taken by personal car to the emergency room at Memorial Hospital, Pembroke Pines, where she was admitted. Ms. Adams testified that M.K. had been coughing for a few days, and she had consulted with a nurse practitioner about M.K.'s condition on Thursday, December 26, 2013. However, M.K.'s condition had not improved by Sunday, she looked weak, and Ms. Adams did not want to wait until Monday for M.K. to be seen by a doctor. M.K. was transported to the hospital on Sunday, December 29, 2013, by a facility employee. Emergency (911) had been called for M.K. on approximately eight occasions prior to December 29, 2013. Ms. Adams persuasively and credibly testified she would not have hesitated to call 911 for M.K. if she felt it was necessary. On Monday, December 30, 2013, the next business day, Ms. Adams provided an incident report to APD. Ms. Adams also immediately notified M.K.'s waiver support coordinator. M.K. returned to Respondents' group home after her release from the hospital where she has continued to reside since then. Count II The parties stipulated that on November 4, 2015, DCF commenced an investigation of Respondents' group homes, and that on December 12, 2015, DCF closed its investigation with verified findings of abuse, neglect, or exploitation on the part of Ms. Adams. APD was aware of DCF's verified findings upon completion of DCF's investigation. At hearing, Ashley Cole, regional program supervisor for the southeast region of APD, testified about the facts and circumstances surrounding the violation. The violation involved the use of residents' funds to request a new support coordinator.1/ Specifically, in November 2015, Ms. Cole conducted a review of client files at one of Respondents' group homes, including a review of financial ledgers, and saw disbursements of money from three residents to an attorney, totaling $1,300.00. When asked about this by Ms. Cole, Ms. Adams explained that the funds were used to pay an attorney to write letters on behalf of the three residents requesting new support coordinators. The funds were used to benefit the three residents and the letters were written by Respondents' attorney on behalf of the three residents. At hearing, Ms. Cole testified that it is typical for an APD client or the client's guardian to request a new support coordinator, not the group home owner, and that it is not required that a request for a new support coordinator be in writing. Although it may not be typical for the group home owner to request a new support coordinator in writing on behalf of the residents, it is not prohibited by law. None of the three residents had guardians or family members to assist in the handling of their affairs. Ms. Adams testified that she had attempted to obtain assistance from the current support coordinator to act on the residents' behalf, but to no avail. Two of the residents still resided at Respondents' group home as of the beginning of 2018; the other resident died about a year after the incident for reasons unrelated to the written requests for a new support coordinator. Count III Delmarva Foundation, n/k/a Qlarant, has contracted with the State of Florida to evaluate the performance of group home providers such as those operated by Respondents. On May 31, 2016, Delmarva Foundation Quality Assurance Reviewer Martina Pocaterra performed an unannounced observation visit at one of Respondents' group homes. Ms. Pocaterra observed video cameras in the common areas of the group home. The next morning, Respondents provided consent forms from residents for use of cameras in the bedrooms, but not for use in the common areas of the group home. Because there were no consent forms signed by residents allowing the use of video cameras in the common areas, an alert notification form was submitted to APD. On October 3, 2017, Delmarva Foundation Quality Assurance Reviewer Michelle Ceville performed a provider discovery review at one of Respondents' group homes. On this occasion, Ms. Ceville observed video cameras in the common areas of the group home. Respondents again provided consent forms from residents for use of cameras in the bedrooms, but not for use in the common areas. Because there were no consent forms signed by residents allowing the use of video cameras in the common areas, an alert notification form was submitted to APD. The clear and convincing evidence adduced at hearing demonstrates that Respondents violated rule 65G-2.009(7)(a) and (b) by failing to obtain written consent of residents for the use of video monitoring equipment in the common areas. "Count IIII" On September 10, 2017, Hurricane Irma struck Florida. After the hurricane, APD contacted group homes to ensure that the homes had electricity, lights, and air conditioning, and that the homes were safe. On September 15, 2017, Adams Group Home, Inc., informed APD that Adams Group Home #2 had electricity and running water, and that Adams Group Home #2 residents had not been evacuated. On September 19, 2017, Kimberly Robinson, an APD human services program analyst, conducted a wellness check at one of Respondents' group homes. It is unclear from Ms. Robinson's testimony which group home she actually visited. However, Ms. Robinson observed that the home had air conditioning, and that "everything in the home was fine." On September 19, 2017, Pembroke Pines Assistant Fire Marshal Shawn Hallich visited Adams Group Home #2 and conducted an inspection. He testified that he "did a walk around real quick," and that on the enclosed outdoor patio on the back porch of the home, he noticed "a pot on two blocks with two pieces of wood and an open flame with charcoal, and something . . . being cooked on it." According to Mr. Hallich, the cooking device was located on the back patio "approximately, probably 10 feet from the sliding glass door, maybe a little bit less than that." Mr. Hallich did not use any device to measure the distance of the cooking device from the structure of the home. Mr. Hallich testified that the cooking device was a safety hazard because there was an open flame and there was nothing to prevent the cooking device from being tipped over or falling over on its own. During his inspection, Mr. Hallich also observed that there was no air conditioning inside the home. There was some electricity inside the home, but not enough voltage necessary for the air conditioning system to operate. However, there were fans located and operating in every room of the home, and the windows were open. Mr. Hallich testified it was hot, but he did not use any device to measure the temperature inside the home. Mr. Hallich also acknowledged that if the fans were on inside the home, the circulation would have made it feel cooler inside the home. On September 19, 2017, Mr. Hallich issued a Notice of Violation, stating the nature of the violation as: "No air conditioning and unsafe cooking practices being conducted." Mr. Hallich recommended the following action be taken: (1) "Must relocate all residence [sic] until all power has been restored[; (2)] All cooking must be conducted at least 10 feet away from the structure using a commercial cooking appliance." As to the violation found by Mr. Hallich with respect to the outside cooking device, Ms. Adams asked Mr. Hallich whether she could use it outside, and he told her that "it had to be 10 feet away from the structure for cooking." In issuing the Notice of Violation with respect to the cooking device, Mr. Hallich specifically relied on section 10.10.6.1 of the Florida Fire Prevention Code which provides as follows: For other than one- and two-family dwellings, no hibachi, grill, or other similar devices used for cooking, heating, or any other purpose shall be used or kindled on any Balcony, under any overhanging portion, or within 10 ft (3 m) of any structure. Mr. Hallich's reliance on section 10.10.6.1 of the Florida Fire Prevention Code is misplaced because Adams Group Home #2 is a single-family dwelling. As a single- family dwelling, Respondents' group home is exempt from section 10.10.6.1. In any event, APD failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the cooking device was located within ten feet of the single-family dwelling. In addition, APD failed to present clear and convincing evidence that any residents of the group home were taken to the hospital or were not properly cared for by Respondents because of the lack of air conditioning. In sum, APD failed to present clear and convincing evidence at hearing to demonstrate a violation of rule 65G- 2.009(1)(d) and section 393.13.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that that the Agency for Persons with Disability enter a final order granting Respondents' applications for licensure renewal.3/ DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of August, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 2018.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner rented the residence at 1881 Northwest 27th Avenue, Miami, Florida (displaced residence), where he lived with his wife and four children for four years prior to being displaced by Respondent in 1990. The displaced residence was approximately 1100 square feet of livable space and contained two bedrooms and two baths. Petitioner owned an import business which imported baby strollers from outside the United States for resale in the United States. Petitioner used approximately 150 square feet of space in one of the rooms of the displaced residence to store these baby strollers. William Sawyer was the owner of the displaced residence and the real property on which it was situated. Mr. Sawyer rented the residence to Petitioner and his wife pursuant to a lease dated July 2, 1986. The monthly rental for the residence was $475.00 (which was later verbally increased to $500.00). In addition to the residence, the property on which the displaced residence was located contained approximately 100 feet of frontage on the south side of the Miami River with a dock that was capable of mooring seagoing vessels. The property also contained a small warehouse. Pertinent to this proceeding, the lease contained the following provisions: #10. It is understood by Tenant that Landlord must have access through Drive-Way to Warehouse Building on property and that some of Landlord's equipment may be stored on property. #11. It is further understood and agreed by Tenants that Warehouse Building and all Dock Space area of property is reserved for the exclusive use and purposes of Landlord & free access to same is to be granted by Tenants at all times. Said Warehouse & Dock Space may be rented out by Landlord as he sees fit. Respondent purchased the subject property from Mr. Sawyer1/ in order to widen Northwest 27th Avenue, Miami, Florida, as part of a federally funded project. Petitioner was displaced from his residence and became entitled to relocation benefits provided by the Federal Uniform Relocation Assistance Program, 49 CFR 24. The program, as it pertains to projects within the State of Florida, is administered by Respondent. Under the relocation program, Respondent is required to locate a functionally equivalent replacement dwelling taking into consideration the needs and the life-styles of the persons being displaced. The amount of the relocation benefits is calculated pursuant to a formula by which the difference between the rent and utilities for the original residence and the rent and utilities for the replacement residence is determined and thereafter multiplied by 42. Respondent calculated the benefits to which Petitioner was entitled as being in the amount of $23,821.14. Petitioner accepted that amount under protest and reserved his right to challenge in these proceedings his right to additional benefits, contending that the replacement residence was not functionally equivalent to the Sawyer property for two reasons: First, the replacement residence did not have access to deep water. Second, zoning of the replacement residence did not permit the operation of his import business from his home as did the Sawyer property.2/ Petitioner's testimony that he was initially attracted to the displaced residence because its zoning permitted him to operate his business from his residence and because of the river frontage is found to be credible and is accepted. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner owned a steel- hulled sailboat that is 70 feet in length and 20 feet in beam. The river frontage adjacent to the Sawyer property was important to Petitioner because it gave him deep water access and protection during the hurricane season. The river frontage provided security for his boat and allowed him quick and easy access to it. The depth of the river at the Sawyer property was approximately 10 feet and was sufficient depth for Petitioner's boat. Petitioner could have sailed his boat from the Sawyer property into the Atlantic. For one month in either late 1987 or early 1988, Petitioner rented the dock from Mr. Sawyer at the rate of $270.00 per month. Petitioner did not lease the dock from Mr. Sawyer or have the right to moor his sailboat at the dock at any time other than the one-month period in late 1987 or early 1988. At least during part of the time Petitioner resided at the Sawyer property, the sailboat was moored approximately 150 yards from the Sawyer property where it was undergoing a complete overhaul of its masts. The work that was being done on the sailboat could not have been done at the Sawyer property because there was insufficient access for the heavy-duty crane that was required for the work. Although Petitioner testified that he could have rented the dock at any time he wanted at the rate of $270.00 per month, and that he intended to rent the dock from Mr. Sawyer after extensive repairs had been made to his boat, there was no evidence that Petitioner actually used the dock at the times pertinent hereto or that he had the right to use the dock. Petitioner's ownership of the boat was an important part of his and his family's life-style. Petitioner had built the sailboat himself, he had invested considerable sums in the boat, he and his family had traveled extensively on the boat, and he and his family had lived on the boat at one time. When Respondent's displacement specialist first met with Petitioner, Petitioner was informed that the river frontage would be included in calculating the displacement benefits.3/ The river frontage of the displaced residence was considered by Respondent to be water view only since Petitioner had no legal right to use the frontage and because Petitioner was not in fact using the dock. The zoning of the displaced residence permitted Petitioner to operate his import business from the residence. This business consisted of importing items, such as baby strollers, from out of the United States for resale in the United States. Petitioner utilized approximately 150 square feet of the space of the displaced residence to store those items from time to time. Petitioner located a dwelling that Respondent used as the replacement dwelling in calculating the benefits that were paid to Petitioner. Petitioner used the benefits he received from Respondent as a down-payment on his purchase of that dwelling. All comparables considered by Respondent in determining the displacement benefits to which Petitioner was entitled, including the replacement dwelling purchased by Petitioner, had water view. The replacement dwelling purchased by Petitioner has no access to deep water on which he can sail his boat. The zoning of the replacement dwelling purchased by Petitioner does not permit the operation of Petitioner's business from the residence. The replacement dwelling, as compared to the displaced dwelling, is larger (1,400 square feet vs. 1,100 square feet), has more bedrooms (3 vs. 2), and has more total rooms (9 vs. 6). The replacement dwelling also has a garage and a screen porch whereas the displaced residence did not. Respondent established that Petitioner has been properly compensated for the displacement if Petitioner's claims for additional compensation are rejected.4/
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered which finds that Petitioner was properly compensated under the relocation program and which denies Petitioner's appeal. DONE AND ORDERED this 9th day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 1992.
The Issue Whether Petitioner committed the violations alleged in the citations he received on February 6, 1997. If so, what amount, if any, should he be fined.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: At all times material to the instant case, Petitioner owned and operated two apartment buildings located (adjacent to each other) at 732 and 740 Joe Louis Avenue in Pahokee, Florida (hereinafter referred to as the 732 Apartments and the 740 Apartments, respectively). Each building contained ten apartments used to house migrant farmworkers and members of their families, including their children. Among Petitioner's tenants was Speedy Martin. Petitioner paid Martin to help him maintain the buildings and grounds. Michael Menor is a Sanitation and Safety Specialist with the Department. He is assigned to the Department's Belle Glade office. In his capacity as a Sanitation and Safety Specialist, he inspects migrant farmworker housing to ascertain whether there is compliance with applicable statutory and rule requirements. Menor conducted inspections of the 732 and 740 Apartments on January 14, 1997. The inspections revealed the existence of violations at both locations. Following his inspections, Menor prepared inspection reports which accurately described the violations that existed at the two locations at the time of the inspections and which gave notice that these violations needed to be corrected by 8:00 a.m. on January 28, 1997. Before leaving, he handed these inspection reports to one of Petitioner's tenants, Marlo Camble. Approximately a week later, Camble provided the reports to Speedy Martin, who, in turn, notified Petitioner of the contents of the reports. The inspection report describing the condition of the 732 Apartments and grounds at the time of the January 14, 1997, inspection contained the following "comments and instructions": Repair cracks in building, south side. Replace 11 bathroom screens missing from building. Broken window [in] Apt. # 5 and two broken windows [in] Apt. 4. Repair or replace covers for water meters. Clean out garbage, litter and debris from east side of b[ui]ld[ing]. Replace missing screens [in] Apt[s]. #1 [and] 2. Provide or repair heat [in] Apt. #2. Exposed wires [hanging from two] public lighting . . . fixtures [on] west side of b[ui]lding. Exposed wires in meter room. Empty out storage area and repair door under stairs. Repair wall on side of storage area. Repair public lighting on 2nd floor. Repair or replace stove [in] Apt. #9. Repair or replace stove [in] Apt. #2. Note: Smoke detectors missing [from] Apt. #8. Fire extinguisher missing [from] Apt. #2. All fire extinguishers require reinspection and retag. The inspection report describing the condition of the 740 Apartments and grounds at the time of the January 14, 1997, inspection contained the following "comments and instructions": Replace missing screens in Apt[s]. #4 and #5. Repair leak on overhang, [in] front of Apt[s]. #4 and #5. Clean out garbage, litter and debris from east side of building. Repair heater [in] Apt. #4. Repair broken windows [in] Apt. #4. (2 windows broken). Remove or repair screen door [on] Apt. #3. Repair public lighting. Repair screen [in] Apt. #1. Exposed electrical wires [in] front of Apt. #1. Repair door frame and screen in meter room. Clean room. Provide cover for electrical wires in meter room. Repair overhang [on] corner of b[ui]ld[ing's] west side. Remove wooden poles [on] south side of building. Repair broken window [in] Apt. #3 [on] south side of building. Repair wall [on] south side of building. Provide covers for water meters. Replace 2 missing bathroom screens [on] south side of building. Repair public lighting [on] 2nd floor. Replace missing screen [in] Apt. #7. Repair 2 broken windows [in] Apt. #6. Exposed wire [on] west side of Apt. #6. Repair storage door under stairs and clean storage room. Note: All fire extinguishers require retag and reinspection. Replace fire extinguisher and smoke detector [in] Apt. #2. Menor returned to the 732 and 740 Apartments on January 31, 1997, to conduct follow-up inspections.1 The follow- up inspections revealed that, although Petitioner had remedied some of the problems that Menor had discovered during his January 14, 1997, inspections (and had noted in his reports of those inspections), most of the violations found during these earlier inspections had not been corrected. Following his January 31, 1997, inspections, Menor prepared inspection reports which accurately described the violations that existed at the two locations at the time of the inspections and which gave notice that these violations needed to be corrected by 8:00 a.m. on February 4, 1997. Menor, on February 3, 1997, "faxed" Petitioner copies of the inspection reports. He also spoke with Petitioner and advised him of the contents of the reports. The inspection report describing the condition of the 732 Apartments and grounds at the time of the January 31, 1997, inspection contained the following "comments and instructions": Repair cracks in building, south side. Replace 11 bathroom screens missing from building. Broken window [in] Apt. #5 and two broken windows [in] Apt. #4. Repair or replace covers for water meters. Clean out garbage, litter and debris [from] east side of building. Replace missing screens [in] Apt[s]. #1 [and] 2. Provide or repair heat [in] Apt. #2. Repair door to storage area under stairs. Repair or replace stove [in] Apt. #9. Repair or replace stove [in] Apt. #2. Provide effective extermination of rodents. The inspection report describing the condition of the 740 Apartments and grounds at the time of the January 31, 1997, inspection contained the following "comments and instructions": Replace missing screens in Apt[s]. #4 [and] #5. Repair leak on overhang, [in] front of Apt[s]. #4 [and] #5. Clean out garbage, litter and debris from east side of b[ui]ld[ing]. Repair 2 heaters [in] Apt. #4. Repair overhang [on] corner of building['s] west side. Repair broken window [in] Apt. #3 [on] south side of building. Repair wall [on] south side of building. Provide covers for water meters. Replace 2 missing bathroom screens [on] south side of b[ui]ld[ing]. Repair public lighting [on] south side of b[ui]ld[ing]. Repair broken window (2)[in] Apt. #6. Repair storage door und[er] stairs. Provide effective extermination of rodents. Menor next inspected the 732 and 740 Apartments on February 4, 1997. The inspections revealed that none of the violations that Menor had discovered during his January 31, 1997, inspections (and had noted in his reports of those inspections) had been remedied, with the exception of the violation resulting from the broken heater in Apartment number 2 in the 732 Apartments, which had been repaired since the January 31, 1997, inspections. (One of the heaters in Apartment number 9 in the 732 Apartments, however, was now in disrepair.) Although Petitioner had taken steps to address some of these continuing violations, his efforts, as Menor's February 4, 1997, inspections revealed, were inadequate to correct the targeted problems. Petitioner had ordered meter covers from the City of Pahokee, but he had not yet received them nor had he placed any temporary coverings over the uncovered meters. He had attempted to repair the cracks in the building on the south side of the 732 Apartments; the door to the storage area under the stairs in the 732 Apartments; the overhang in front of Apartment numbers 4 and 5 in the 740 Apartments; the overhang on the west side of the 740 Apartments; the wall on the south side of the 740 Apartments; and the door to the storage area under the stairs in the 740 Apartments; but the repairs he had made had not been done properly. He had put rat poison under the buildings and given tenants rat traps in an effort to alleviate the rodent infestation problem at the 732 and 740 Apartments; however, he had not gone to the expense of hiring a professional exterminator to deal with the problem, even though it should have been apparent to him that the services of an exterminator were needed to effectively eliminate the rat population at the two locations. Following the February 4, 1997, inspections, Menor prepared inspection reports which accurately described the violations that existed at the 732 and 740 Apartments at the time of the inspections and which gave notice that these violations needed to be corrected by 8:00 a.m. on February 6, 1997. Menor spoke with Petitioner and advised Petitioner of the contents of the inspection reports and what Petitioner needed to do to remedy the violations noted in the reports. Menor returned to inspect the 732 and 740 Apartments on February 6, 1997. Upon his arrival, Menor met Petitioner, who had also just arrived on the scene. In Petitioner's car were screens and light bulbs that Petitioner intended to install in the apartments and public areas that needed them. Notwithstanding Petitioner's intentions, none of the violations that Menor had discovered during his February 4, 1997, inspections (and had noted in his reports of those inspections) had yet been remedied. Inasmuch as the deadline that Menor had given Petitioner to correct these violations had passed, Menor issued Petitioner two citations, one for the continuing violations at the 732 Apartments and the other for the continuing violations at the 740 Apartments. Each citation directed Petitioner "to pay a fine in the amount of $500.00," but provided that Petitioner could "have the amount of the fine . . . reduced or waived completely by demonstrating good faith in correcting the violations or by presenting 'before and after' evidence to the Palm Beach County Public Health Unit within 48 hours of the time of the issuance of th[e] citation." Menor told Petitioner that he would be back to the apartments on Monday, February 10, 1997, to see if the violations had been corrected and if a reduction or waiver of the fines was warranted. On February 10, 1997, Petitioner telephoned Menor and advised him that he needed an extra day to bring the 732 and 740 Apartments into compliance. Menor responded by telling Petitioner that he would postpone his inspections of the apartments until the following day. The following day, February 11, 1997, Menor paid a return visit to the 732 and 740 Apartments to conduct post- citation inspections. Some of the continuing violations that Menor had discovered during his February 4, 1997, inspections (and had noted in his reports of those inspections) had still not yet been remedied. These unremedied violations created conditions that posed a serious threat to the health and safety of the tenants. Following his February 11, 1997, inspections, Menor prepared inspection reports which accurately described the violations that existed at the two locations at the time of the inspections and which gave notice that these violations needed to be corrected by 8:00 a.m. on February 17, 1997. Menor provided Petitioner, who was present during the inspections, copies of the inspection reports. The inspection report describing the condition of the 732 Apartments and grounds at the time of the February 11, 1997, inspection contained the following "comments and instructions": Replace covers for water meters. . . . Repair door to storage area. Provide effective extermination of rodents. Repair cracks in building, south side. Screens missing from bathroom window[s]. The inspection report describing the condition of the 740 Apartments and grounds at the time of the February 11, 1997, inspection contained the following "comments and instructions": Repair overhang [on] corner of building['s] west side./Repair storage door. Provide covers for water meters. Repair 2 broken windows [in] Apt. #6. Provide effective extermination of rodents. Menor next inspected the 732 and 740 Apartments on February 17, 1997. The inspections revealed that at neither location had Petitioner yet "provide[d] covers for water meters" or "provide[d] effective extermination of rodents," although he had corrected the other violations Menor had discovered during his February 11, 1997, inspections (and had noted in his reports of those inspections). Following his February 17, 1997, inspections, Menor prepared inspection reports which accurately described the violations that existed at the two locations at the time of the inspections. Copies of these inspection reports were "faxed" to Petitioner on February 18, 1997. On February 24, 1997, Menor received a complaint from a tenant living in Apartment number 4 in the 740 Apartments that there were "rats in [her] refrigerator." Later that day, Menor went to the 740 Apartments to investigate the complaint. His investigation revealed evidence that rats had entered the complainant's refrigerator through a hole. Menor spoke with Petitioner following his investigation and emphasized the importance of Petitioner providing his tenants with effective "pest control." Two days later, on February 26, 1997, Petitioner telephoned Menor and told Menor that he (Petitioner) had made arrangements for a "pest control" company, Glades Pest Control, to provide extermination services at the 732 and 740 Apartments, but that it would not be until March 4, 1997, that such services would be rendered. On April 18, 1997, Menor returned to the 732 and 740 Apartments to ascertain whether the continuing violations that he had discovered during his February 17, 1997, inspections (and had noted in his reports of those inspections) had been remedied. The inspections revealed that these violations had been corrected.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order finding Respondent guilty of the violations alleged in the February 6, 1997, citations and fining him a total of $1,000.00 ($500.00 per citation) for these violations. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of August, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of August, 1997.
Findings Of Fact In March, 1982, the Petitioner, Eleanor R. Booth, and her husband, Fred E. Booth, owned and lived upon a tract of land located at 4721 State Road 84, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The tract was taken by the Department of Transportation for road right- of-way, and the issue in this case is whether the Department of Transportation, pursuant to its policies, has properly calculated the amount to be paid to the Petitioner. Mr. Booth is now deceased. Mr. and Mrs. Booth lived on the property for thirty-four years. T. 48. The total tract was 19,593 square feet, which is somewhat less than one-half acre. T. 18, 21; P. Ex. 1. On or about October 15, 1982, which was the date of the appraisal of the property, there were seven trailers or mobile homes on the property. Two trailers were designated by the appraiser as storage and workshop, respectively. One trailer was designated by the appraiser as the mobile home of Mr. and Mrs. Booth. The others were not designated. The appraisal parcel sketch also showed a shed, a restroom, and a laundry. The shower and toilet (restroom) building was made of concrete and contained 58 square feet. A one story frame building of about 215 square feet was used as a laundry. The shed was a metal and frame shed measuring 8.5 by 8.0 feet. The appraiser considered the shower/toilet building and the laundry building to be real property improvements. The trailers were considered to be personal property. P. Ex. 1. The Department of Transportation selected as the comparable replacement dwelling a 1972 mobile home containing about 500 habitable square feet, 750 total square feet, and consisting of a total of 5 rooms, with 2 bedrooms and 1 bathroom. R. Ex. 2; T. 18, 23. The selling price was $29,500. R. Ex. 2. The primary issue in this case is whether the replacement dwelling described above is comparable. This in turn depends upon an analysis of the manner in which Mr. and Mrs. Booth used the various trailers and buildings located on their property. The mobile home which contained the kitchen, bedroom, and bathroom primarily used by Mr. and Mrs. Booth had about 322 habitable square feet and 390 total square feet. R. Ex. 2. It consisted of 4 rooms in total, 1 bedroom, 1 living room, 1 kitchen, and 1 bathroom. T. 71. The only evidence submitted by the Department of Transportation concerning the nature of the "dwelling" of Mr. and Mrs. Booth or the manner in which the additional trailers and other out buildings were used is the household survey, P. Ex. 1, which was signed on March 30, 1982, by Mr. Booth and B.A. Davis for the Department. This form was intended to identify the social and economic status of the family and to identify the number of rooms, number of baths, number of people, and similar data concerning the household, but the evidence shows that in part it was filled out incorrectly. P. Ex. 1 characterizes the "subject dwelling" as a mobile home consisting of 3 rooms, with 1 bedroom and 1 bathroom. Mr. Davis did not testify, and Mr. Booth is deceased. Tracy Graff, who was called by the Department as its only witness, made it clear that he did not personally know the status of uses of the out buildings and trailers, but simply concurred with what he thought was the conclusion drawn by Mr. Davis on P. Ex. 1 as to what was the "dwelling" of Mr. and Mrs. Booth. See T. 35, 39, 41, 42. Mr. Graff did not testify that the tract of land was or had been used as a commercial trailer park with trailers for rent to the public, and neither did any other witness. Mr. and Mrs. Booth routinely used the laundry building, the toilet and shower building, and the shed located on the property for their personal, domestic use. T. 50, 67, 68. Mr. Booth was rarely in the mobile home when visited by his daughter, but was elsewhere on the property working. T. 59. Mr. Booth primarily kept tools, lawn equipment, paint, and other maintenance materials in the shed. T. 62, 68, 75. Two other trailers were used by Mr. and Mrs. Booth for storage of personal belongings. T. 62, 68. This was necessary because there was not room enough in the one mobile home for storage of personal property. T. 64. 68. Mr. Booth "had a flea market." T. 62. Some of the "flea market" materials were stored in the trailers. T. 63, 64, 76. Some of the "flea market" materials may have been stored in the shed but most of the "flea market" materials were stored under canvas covers adjacent to the shed. T. 73-74. There is no evidence in the record to explain the nature of the "flea market" activities of Mr. and Mrs. Booth. It is uncertain where the flea market was. In 1982, Mr. and Mrs. Booth were living on the property. The niece of the daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Booth and her husband and two children, and the sister of the daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Booth were also residing on the property in 1982. T. 54. Additionally, a nephew of the daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Booth had a camper trailer parked on the property, and may have lived in it from time to time. T. 56, 61, 63. Finally, in 1982 Mr. and Mrs. Booth rented a space to a John Schneider to park his trailer, but apparently Mr. Schneider did not live on the property. T. 55. Thus, all of the persons residing on the property in 1982 were relatives of Mr. and Mrs. Booth. Id. Prior to 1982, one of the other trailers in which relatives lived in 1982 was used by Mr. and Mrs. Booth as a bedroom for their daughter, and as a place to live for their son and his two children. T. 64, 65. These family members were not restricted from using the laundry or toilet and shower buildings, T. 55, 56, and at times used these facilities. T. 71. When Mr. and Mrs. Booth moved from the property, they needed a three bedroom, two bath house and a shed measuring 54 by 25 feet (1350 square feet) to house all of the personal property moved to the new house and which they had had in storage and used in the trailers and shed on the original property. T. 65. Mr. and Mrs. Booth and their daughter considered the trailers to be part of their dwelling because they had pictures, books, and other personal item stored in them, T. 64, 65. The Respondent has adopted as policy the Right of Way Operating Procedures found in P. Ex. 2 and set forth in conclusions of law 4, 5, 6, and 8.
Recommendation For these reasons, it is recommended that the Department of Transportation enter its final order recalculating the replacement housing purchase additive due Eleanor Booth by reference to a comparable replacement dwelling the same as the comparable replacement dwelling initially identified by the Respondent, but having the major exterior attribute of another bathroom. WILLIAM C. SHERRILL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of December, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following are rulings upon findings of fact proposed by the parties which have been rejected in this Recommended Order. The numbers correspond to the numbers of the proposed findings of fact as used by the parties. Findings of fact proposed by the Petitioner: None. Findings of fact proposed by the Respondent: 1. The second and third sentences are rejected because there is no competent evidence in the record that the trailers were rented to other parties or that the tract of land was operated as a "mobile home park." See finding of fact 8. COPIES FURNISHED: James M. Earls Arrow Consultants 3910 N. 65th Avenue Hollywood, Florida 23024 Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Florida Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Kaye H. Henderson, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Thomas H. Bateman, III, Esquire General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 =================================================================
The Issue Whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful housing practice in violation of Section 760.23, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent operated Hickory Hill Mobile Home Park where tenants could rent spaces or lots for the placement of their mobile homes. By notice dated August 26, 1993, all tenants were notified of the closure of the park, effective one year from the date of the notice. On Friday, August 26, 1994, Respondent's representative, Patricia Tripp, preparing for the closure of the park, was notifying persons still in the park that their motor vehicles would have to be moved. She "tagged" cars with notices to owners to the effect that the cars must be moved or the cars would be towed after the conclusion of that day. Extensions were given by Tripp to those persons who requested them if their cars were going to be moved within a few days. At least one extension was granted to a white female tenant who informed Tripp that her car would be gone within a specific number of days of the deadline of August 26, 1994. On August 13, 1994, Petitioner, who is African-American and the former lessee of lot 31, purchased the trailer on lot 25 from the lessee of that lot. The lessee of lot 25 subsequently vacated the premises. Following his purchase, Petitioner then moved into the trailer on lot 25 without formally notifying Respondent. Petitioner moved his original trailer from lot 31 and from Respondent's park on August 18, 1994, continuing to reside at the trailer on lot 25. Under provisions of the form lease between Respondent and tenants of the park, tenants were required to park vehicles in the driveway to individual lots. No parking of vehicles on the street was permitted. Additionally, all motorized vehicles were required to meet state legal requirements to be operated in the park. On August 26, 1996, Petitioner still had a number of vehicles in the park, in addition to his newly acquired mobile home. The vehicles included a bus, manufactured in 1950; a 1978 pickup truck; a 1948 Chrysler automobile; and an ice cream truck. Some of the vehicles were not parked on Petitioner's lot. Tripp questioned Petitioner on August 26, 1994, regarding whether the vehicles belonged to Petitioner. Petitioner responded that they did. Tripp told him that the vehicles would need to be moved since the park was closing and informed him of the deadline. The discussion between the two became heated and eventually Tripp, who felt threatened by Petitioner's attitude and actions, left. Petitioner did not request an extension of the deadline with regard to his vehicles. On Monday, August 29, 1994, Petitioner's vehicles had not been towed. Around 2 p.m. in the afternoon, a tow truck arrived accompanied by a law enforcement officer. After verifying that Petitioner's vehicles met legal requirements and speaking with Respondents' representatives at the scene, the law enforcement officer left. None of Petitioner's vehicles were towed away. Petitioner eventually moved from the park on September 12, 1994, and Respondent's threat to tow Petitioner's vehicles was never realized. Petitioner suffered no quantifiable damages. FCHR's Determination Of No Reasonable Cause was issued on April 5, 1996, documenting FCHR's determination of the non-existence of reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory housing practice had occurred. Petitioner subsequently filed his Petition For Relief on May 10, 1995.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition For Relief. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of November, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of November, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Albert Jerome Lee Post Office Box 1232 Hawthorne, Florida 32640 Claude R. Moulton, Esquire Emmer Development Corporation 2801 Southwest Archer Road Gainesville, Florida 32608 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, Esquire Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
