The Issue Whether Medicaid overpayments were made to Petitioners, Jeanette E. Norris, M.D., and Sandcastle Pediatrics, and, if so, what is the total amount of these overpayments.
Findings Of Fact The Agency is the state agency charged with administration of the Medicaid program in Florida under Section 409.907, Florida Statutes. Petitioner Norris is a physician who, during the period of January 1, 1997, through October 16, 1999, provided Medicaid services to Medicaid beneficiaries pursuant to a valid Medicaid provider agreement with the Agency under provider number 0543756-00. Petitioner Norris at all times relevant to this matter, provided Medicaid services in an office owned by Petitioner Norris, doing business as Sandcastle Pediatrics, but all Medicaid claims were claimed by and paid to Petitioner. The Agency performed an audit of paid Medicaid claims for services claimed to have been performed by Petitioner Norris during the period January 1, 1997, through October 16, 1999. On March 12, 2201, the Agency issued a Final Agency Audit Report ("Audit Report" or "FAAR"), requesting Petitioner Norris to reimburse the Agency $39,534.32, alleged for overpayments of Medicaid claims submitted by and paid to Petitioner Norris. The determination of overpayment was based upon audit findings that services provided by Petitioner Norris did not meet Medicaid criteria. These criteria included: lack of documentation of services rendered; lack of documentation to support the higher level of service billed; failure to document the required elements for early periodic screening for diagnosis; failure to document performance of treatment services; and billing for two codes when one code incorporated the elements of the other code. During the Audit period, the applicable statutes, laws, rules and policy guidelines (Medicaid rules) in effect required Petitioner Norris to maintain all Medicaid-related records and information that supported any and all Medicaid invoices or claims made by Petitioner Norris during the Audit period. During the Audit period, the Medicaid rules required Petitioner Norris to provide the Agency or the Agency's authorized representatives all the Medicaid-related records and other information that supported all the Medicaid-related invoices or claims for which Petitioner Norris billed Medicaid during the Audit period. Petitioner Norris was required to maintain all medical and Medicaid-related records for a period of five years to satisfy all necessary inquiries by the Agency. During all times relevant to this matter, Petitioner Norris had an affirmative duty to assure that each claim presented to the Agency was true and accurate, and that goods and services were provided in accord with applicable provisions of the Medicaid rules. Medicaid goods and services are deemed excessive or medically unnecessary unless both the medical basis and specific need for them are fully and properly documented in the recipient's medical record. At the request of Ms. Lynne Edwards, the Agency's auditor, the Agency generated a random list of 24 Medicaid recipients (cluster sample) rendered services by Petitioner Norris during the audit period. In addition, the Agency generated work papers of: the total number of recipients to whom Petitioner Norris rendered services during the audit period; the total number of claims by Petitioner Norris with dates of service during the audit period; the total amount paid to Petitioner Norris for all claims with dates of service during the audit period; and worksheets representing each recipient's claims for the audit period. Ms. Edwards obtained the work papers generated by the Agency concerning the random cluster sample, provided 24-hour advance notice to Petitioner Norris of an on-site visit, and performed an on-site visit at the office where Petitioner Norris provided medical services and maintained patient records. After the on-site visit, Ms. Edwards prepared an on-site investigative summary. When Ms. Edwards performed the on-site visit, she spoke with Petitioner Norris. Ms. Edwards presented Petitioner Norris with a questionnaire and printout of the names of the 24 patients in the cluster sample, and asked Petitioner Norris to fill out the questionnaire and mail back to Ms. Edwards the completed questionnaire along with copies of the medical records of the 24 patients in the cluster sample. Ms. Edwards also asked to see medical records of a few of the patients in the cluster sample while she was on-site. Petitioner Norris did not mail a completed questionnaire to Ms. Edwards. Subsequent to the on-site visit, Petitioner Norris provided the Agency with medical records for five of the 24 recipients in the sample. The records were given to Ms. Blanca Notman, the Agency's registered nurse consultant, for policy compliance review. Thereafter, Petitioner Norris submitted medical records for an additional five recipients in the sample. Ms. Edwards forwarded the additional medical records to Ms. Notman for review. After Ms. Notman reviewed the medical records and provided her comments on the claims worksheets, Ms. Notman forwarded the records and worksheets to Dr. Larry Deeb, a pediatrician physician consultant, for a review relating to medical necessity and level of care issues. After review and comments by Dr. Deeb, the records and worksheets were returned to Ms. Notman, who calculated adjustments on the claims worksheets based on the opinions of Dr. Deeb. Ms. Notman returned the medical records and worksheets to Ms. Edwards, along with a Professional Medical Review Report signed by Ms. Notman and Dr. Deeb. Ms. Edwards received the medical records, worksheets, and the Professional Medical Review Report, totaled the overpayments per patient/cluster in the sample, and arrived at a figure of $3,298.45 as the total overpayment for all cluster sample claims. Ms. Edwards submitted the cluster sampling information and the audit review results to another Agency employee for the generation of the extrapolated overpayment calculation, using the Agency's formula. The Agency employee generated and provided to Ms. Edwards the overpayment calculation that represented the findings of the audit of the cluster sampling extrapolated to the total paid claims in the audit period, which was $39,534.32. The Agency prepared its February 6, 2001, Preliminary Agency Audit Report (PAAR) based on the audit review of the medical records provided by Petitioner Norris for the paid claims in the cluster sample. Petitioner Norris provided no documentation for 14 of the 24 patients in the cluster sample, and the audit took this into account. The PAAR was mailed to Petitioner Norris. The PAAR identified all policy violations and determinations found in the audit review. Petitioner Norris closed her medical practice in March 2001. Petitioner Norris joined the employees of a group that provides physicians to hospitals on contract for limited periods of time. This required Petitioner Norris to be away from home and unavailable for large periods of time, which complicated all aspects of this case. The PAAR informed Petitioner Norris that the findings were preliminary and encouraged Petitioner Norris to submit any additional documentation she felt would serve to reduce the overpayment within 30 days. Petitioner Norris did not submit additional documentation to the Agency. Pursuant to Section 409.9131, Florida Statutes (2000 Supp.), the Agency prepared and mailed to Petitioner Norris its March 12, 2001, Final Agency Audit Report (FAAR), asserting a total overpayment determination of $39,534.32 and again identifying all policy violations and determinations found in the audit review. After receipt of the FAAR, Petitioner Norris requested an informal hearing, which the Agency received on April 13, 2001. In her hearing request Petitioner Norris said the 30 days given between the PAAR and FAAR for the submission of additional documentation was not sufficient because she was in the process of closing her medical office and relocating her files and medical records. Petitioner Norris requested an additional 60 days for the submission of additional information, and the letter inferred there were disputed issues of material fact. On April 26, 2001, the Agency's clerk submitted a request to Petitioner Norris that she clarify her hearing request, given what appeared to be disputed issues of material fact. On September 12, 2001, Petitioner Norris sent the Agency a letter that informed the Informal Hearing Officer of dates of availability and acknowledged there were disputed issues of material fact. The matter was subsequently referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings. On March 28, 2002, the Agency took the deposition of Dr. Deeb in lieu of live trial testimony. Prior to the commencement of the deposition, the determination of the Agency as to the paid claims in the cluster sample was reviewed by the parties and stipulations were entered into between the Agency and Petitioner Norris. The stipulations were restated during the deposition. Based on the stipulations prior to and during the deposition of Dr. Deeb, the Agency re-calculated the total overpayment for the paid claims in the cluster sample, extrapolated the sample findings to the population, and determined the adjusted total overpayment of paid Medicaid claims. Prior to the commencement of the final hearing on April 1, 2002, the parties agreed that the information set forth in AHCA Exhibit 10A represented the Agency's final determination as to the claims in the cluster sample determined to be overpayments by the Agency, with the exception of the "No Documentation" overpayment for the date of service of March 3, 1997, which the parties agreed should not be listed on the exhibit because the Agency represented that it would recalculate the extrapolated total overpayment, based upon the final determinations set forth in the Agency Exhibit 10A (subtracting out the "No Documentation" March 3, 1997 listing), and the parties were permitted to supplement AHCA Exhibit 30 with any updated total overpayment determination. The Agency recalculated the extrapolated total overpayment after April 1, 2002, which was determined to be $4,000.48, and supplemented AHCA Exhibit 30 by filing AHCA Exhibit 30A on June 7, 2002. On April 1, 2002, when the final hearing commenced, the parties agreed that the only Medicaid claims overpayment determinations made by the Agency concerning the audit of the claims in the cluster sample that were in dispute were the following: Blood count/fingerstick hemoglobin and hemocrit tests performed as a part of a physician office visits as follows: Recipient/ Patient Date of Service Procedure Billed Reason for Claim Denial Overpayment 13 3/25/97 Blood Count/HE Part of OV $ 2.00 14 2/24/97 Blood Count/HE Part of OV $ 2.00 14 3/10/97 Blood Count/HE Part of OV $ 2.00 16 4/4/98 Blood Count/HE Part of OV $ 2.00 16 5/12/98 Blood Count/HE Part of OV $ 2.00 16 6/18/98 Blood Count/HE Part of OV $ 2.00 Office visit (OV) cannot be billed the same day that an EPSDT is billed, when patient only seen once that day: Recipient/ Patient Date of Service Procedure Billed Reason for Claim Denial Overpayment 22 7/29/97 OV-99202 OV billed same $31.35 same day as EPSDT On April 1, 2002, when the final hearing commenced, the parties agreed that the following claims overpayment determinations made by the Agency concerning the audit of the claims in the cluster sample were not in dispute: Claims were no medical records existed to indicate services were performed: Recipient/ Patient Date of Service Procedure Billed Reason for Claim Denial Overpayment 3 5/12/97 EPSDT No Med. Rec. $64.98 3 5/12/97 blood count No Med. Rec. $ 2.00 3 5/12/97 immunization No Med. Rec. $10.00 3 5/12/97 immunization No Med. Rec. $10.00 3 5/12/97 immunization No Med. Rec. $10.00 3 8/27/97 immunization No Med. Rec. $10.00 3 8/27/97 immunization No Med. Rec. $10.00 3 8/27/97 immunization No Med. Rec. $10.00 3 8/27/97 immunization No Med. Rec. $10.00 7 7/30/97 OV-99213 No Med. Rec. $25.00 22 7/14/98 EPSDT No Med. Rec. $65.33 Office visit (OV) claims, to include Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment Services claims (EPSDTs), that lacked all EPSDT components, adjusted to appropriate level of care OV claims. Recipient/ Date of Adjustment Reason for Patient Service Made Adjustment Overpayment 3 8/27/97 EPSDT to 99214 OV Lacked components $27.72 3 8/27/98 99205 OV to 99204 OV Level of Service $38.18 9 10/17/97 99205 OV to 99204 OV Level of Service $17.04 10 4/3/97 99204 OV to 99203 OV Level of Service $21.36 14 3/24/97 99214 OV to 99213 OV Level of Service $12.26 14 4/28/97 99214 OV to 99213 OV Level of Service $12.26 16 1/20/97 99205 OV to 99204 OV Level of Service $17.04 16 3/5/97 99214 OV to 99213 OV Level of Service $12.26 19 3/11/97 99205 OV to 99204 OV Level of Service $17.04 20 4/2/97 99214 OV to 99213 OV Level of Service $12.26 21 2/13/98 99205 OV to 99204 OV Level of Service $16.77 23 8/4/97 99204 OV to 99203 OV Level of Service $21.36 As to the disputed claims concerning the blood count/fingerstick hemoglobin and hemocrit test performed as a part of a physician office visit, Petitioner Norris testified that she did not see the test as a routine part of an office visit, she disagreed with the policy that the test could not be billed separately, and she indicated that usually her nurse would perform the test, which she agreed involved a little prick of blood run through something and took about five minutes. The preponderance of the evidence established that the Agency's determination as to these disputed claims was correct--the Medicaid Handbooks in effect during the audit prohibited Petitioner Norris from separately billing for these tests because they were done during an office visit. The one disputed claim concerning an EPSDT and office visit billed on the same day when the patient was only seen once was for the treatment of the patient's oral infection (thrush). Petitioner Norris admitted that she received reimbursement for office visit procedure Code 99202, in addition to being reimbursed for an EPSDT, even though the patient was seen only once on that day. It was undisputed that prior to the issuance of the Agency's audit report, a peer review was performed by Dr. Larry C. Deeb, a pediatrician in active practice pursuant to Section 409.9131, Florida Statutes (2000 Supp.) Based on the documentation that Petitioner Norris provided to the Agency before the issuance of the Agency audit report, the Agency audit report and related work papers, the adjustment made because of stipulations between the parties after the Agency Audit Report was issued, a preponderance of the evidence establishes there is a Medicaid claims overpayment of $4,000.48 to Petitioner Norris for paid Medicaid claims for the audit period. On April 1, 2002, at the final hearing, Petitioner Norris announced that she disputed the appropriateness of the Agency's statistical formula regarding the extrapolation of the Agency's audit findings concerning the paid claims in the cluster sample to the universe/population of all paid claims during the audit period. The Agency objected on numerous grounds, all of which were overruled. The Agency was permitted to present rebuttal testimony at the conclusion of the presentation of evidence by Petitioner Norris, which the Agency did on June 3, 2002. The statistical formula utilized by the Agency when it made findings based on the cluster sample audit and applied to extrapolate those findings to the population of patient claims paid during the audit period is found on page two of the agency audit report. It was undisputed that during the audit period, Petitioner Norris saw 305 Medicaid patients and had a total of 3,035 Medicaid claims paid. It also was undisputed that a random sample of 24 Medicaid patients who were provided services by Petitioner Norris during the audit period was selected by the Agency for this audit, and all Medicaid paid claims during the audit period for each of the 24 randomly selected patients were reviewed in this audit. Petitioner Norris presented the expert testimony of Dr. Ibrahim Ahmad, regarding the Agency's challenged formula.1 The formula used by the Agency is the one used for infinite populations. In this case, the audited cases were a sample of a finite population. This builds an error into the calculation which can only be corrected by testing the sample against the population to determine if it is reflective of the population. Dr. Ahmad observed that this "proofing" had not been done and in the absence of such a proof of the sample he could not deem the results accurate. The Agency presented the expert testimony of Dr. Mark Johnson on the statistics issue.2 Dr. Johnson explained that there is an adjustment term in the challenged formula--"U" minus "N" under the square root--that adjusts the challenged formula for finite populations.3 In addition to reviewing the Agency's final audit report letter and Agency materials related to the generation of the sample in this case, Dr. Johnson conducted his own analysis of the data, using an Excel spreadsheet program and a statistical package. He was able to reproduce, independently, the same numerical results as the Agency--the estimated overpayment, variance estimates, and the lower 95 percent confidence interval limit. In this case, Dr. Johnson determined the sample was representative of the population because, looking at some of their summary values, they were consistent with the population as a whole. Dr. Johnson indicated that by using the Agency's formula, he arrived at the same calculated values as the Agency. He also investigated assumptions underlying the procedures used in the analysis of this cluster sampling design. Dr. Johnson reviewed the random distribution of the 24 clusters, compared the dollar per claim values in the sample with the figures for the population, and compared the number of claims per patient in the sample with the number of claims per patient in the population. Dr. Johnson's investigation of these properties of the random sample in comparison to the properties of the whole population led him to the conclusion that the sample was representative of the population in this case. The Agency's statistical formula adjusts the "best guess" estimate the total Medicaid overpayment ($7,803.10) downward based on the lower end of the 95 percent confidence interval, causing the overpayment being sought by the Agency to be 4,000.48. The confidence interval is plus or minus the estimate--in this case, the 95 percent confidence interval is $4,000.48 to $11,605.62 (i.e., $7,803.10 plus or minus $3,802.62). Statistically, there is 95 percent confidence that the true overpayment lies within this interval, and the Agency, by seeking the overpayment at the low end of the confidence interval, is giving Petitioner Norris the entire benefit of all of the uncertainty associated with the sampling process. Prior to the commencement of the final hearing in this cause, the Agency had filed its notice of intent to seek investigative costs, expert witness costs, and attorney's fees. At the final hearing, it was determined, as a matter of record, that jurisdiction would be retained for the determination of the Agency's request for such costs and fees. The procedural record of the case reveals that this case was forwarded to DOAH precipitously and before the Petitioner Norris would informally present information which reduced the claim from almost $40,000 to $4,000. At the commencement of the hearing, the parties stipulated to most of the operative facts. The statistical formula was a real issue, and in sum, Petitioner Norris was right; the formula reported was inappropriate. The Agency showed it did not use the reported formula, but one that adjusted for a finite population. Further, the testimony of Petitioner Norris' expert witness was not that the amount of alleged overpayment was wrong, but that the formula was not appropriate. The Agency's expert testified that a factor not stated in the letter was used to adjust the challenged formula for a finite population. Further, the Agency's expert testified he normed the stratified sample against the sampled population, and it did represent that population. This was one of the approaches Dr. Ahmad had suggested to validate the process when using the stated formula. However, Dr. Johnson did this after the challenge, not before. In sum, the burden was on the Agency to prove its case, and by failing to adopt its formula by rule, the Agency placed itself in the position of proving the formula's appropriateness at every hearing. It is so in this case. The request for costs and fees is denied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Agency for Health Care Administration issue a final order requiring Petitioner Norris to reimburse the Agency for Medicaid overpayments in the total amount of $4,000.48, plus such interest as may statutorily accrue. For the reasons found above, the Agency's motion for investigative costs, expert witness fees, and attorney's fees is denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of February, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of February, 2003.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner must reimburse the Respondent for Medicaid overpayments as set out in the Amended Final Agency Audit Report dated November 13, 2000, and, if so, the amount to be repaid.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Agency is the state agency responsible for the administration of the Medicaid program in Florida, and, as one of its duties, the Agency is charged with recovering overpayments made to Medicaid providers. Section 409.913, Florida Statutes (2000). At all times material to this proceeding, Peripheral Medical Services provided durable medical equipment and home health services to Medicaid recipients in Florida pursuant to a contract with the Agency, and it was assigned Medicaid provider number 950348000.2 The Medicaid Provider Agreement entered into by Peripheral Medical Services provides in pertinent part: The Provider agrees to participate in the Florida Medicaid program under the following terms and conditions: * * * (5) The Medicaid provider shall: * * * (b) Keep and maintain in a systematic and orderly manner all medical and Medicaid related records as the Agency may require and as it determines necessary; make available for state and federal audits for five years, complete and accurate medical, business, and fiscal records that fully justify and disclose the extent of the goods and services rendered and billings made under the Medicaid program. The provider agrees that only contemporaneously made records of goods and services provided will be admissible in evidence in any proceeding relating to payment for or provision of services for the purpose of supporting any claim submitted to or paid by the Medicaid program. After the Agency received a routine report from its Medicaid Program Office located in Miami, Florida, the Agency conducted an audit of the claims submitted by Peripheral Medical Services for the 27 Medicaid recipients to whom it provided oxygen durable medical equipment and services during the audit period extending from August 5, 1996, to July 6, 1998. Pursuant to certificates of medical necessity, Peripheral Medical Services provided each of the 27 Medicaid recipients with an oxygen concentrator during the audit period, and it submitted Medicaid claims for monthly visits to each of these patients. During the period of time covered by the audit, Peripheral Medical Services received payments for services provided to the 27 Medicaid recipients in an amount totaling $76,926.74. Peripheral Medical Services maintained patient records for these 27 Medicaid recipients, and, during the audit, it provided the Agency with the patient records as documentation to support the claims. At the times material to this proceeding, the DME/Medical Supply Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook governing "Oxygen and Oxygen Related Equipment" provided in pertinent part: "Monthly Home Visit Requirements: When the CRTT, RRT or RN conducts a home visit, the following information about the recipient's condition and the condition of the equipment must be documented in the recipient's record: . . . the monthly checks of the operation and safety of the equipment." The Agency's inspector compared the patient records to the list of claims submitted by Peripheral Medical Services for which it received payment from Medicaid, and he reached the following conclusions, which were memorialized in the audit work papers and the summary report he prepared: Peripheral Medical Services made 21 claims for payment for monthly visits to patient M.C., but it failed to provide documentation establishing that checks of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators were performed at 14 of the visits; $3,639.90 of the $6,106.80 paid by Medicaid was not supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made 12 claims for payment for monthly visits to patient C.M., but it failed to provide documentation establishing that checks of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators were performed at eight of the visits; $2,498.20 of the $3,747.30 paid by Medicaid was not supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made 14 claims for payment for monthly visits to patient J.P-O., but it failed to provide documentation establishing that checks of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators were performed at eight of the visits; $2,498.20 of the $4,340.55 paid by Medicaid was not supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made 13 claims for payment for monthly visits to patient F.A., but it failed to provide documentation establishing that checks of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators were performed at eight of the visits; $2,361.63 of the $3,915.18 paid by Medicaid was not supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made 20 claims for payment for monthly visits to patient N.V., but it failed to provide documentation establishing that checks of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators were performed at 12 of the visits; $3,595.18 of the $6,061.98 paid by Medicaid was not supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made ten claims for payment for monthly visits to patient M.P., but it failed to provide documentation establishing that checks of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators were performed at six of the visits; $1,325.22 of the $2,270.36 paid by Medicaid was not supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made one claim for payment for a monthly visit to patient M.A., and it provided documentation establishing that a check of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators was performed at this visit; the payment made by Medicaid was supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made one claim for payment for a monthly visit to patient M.B., and it provided documentation establishing that a check of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators was performed at this visit; the payment made by Medicaid was supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made 21 claims for payment for monthly visits to patient R.Q., but it failed to provide documentation establishing that checks of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators were performed at 15 of the visits; $4,172.69 of the $6,015.04 paid by Medicaid was not supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made 19 claims for payment for monthly visits to patient M.P., but it failed to provide documentation establishing that checks of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators were performed at 12 of the visits; $3,975.64 of the $5,833.64 paid by Medicaid was not supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made 11 claims for payment for monthly visits to patient E.D., but it failed to provide documentation establishing that checks of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators were performed at six of the visits; $1,813.19 of the $3,366.74 paid by Medicaid was not supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made 15 claims for payment for monthly visits to patient I.S., but it failed to provide documentation establishing that checks of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators were performed at ten of the visits; $2,679.60 of the $4,233.15 paid by Medicaid was not supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made five claims for payment for monthly visits to patient R.G., but it failed to provide documentation establishing that checks of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators were performed at any of the visits; the entire $1,522.25 paid by Medicaid was not supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made one claim for payment for a monthly visit to patient R.B., and it provided documentation establishing that a check of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators was performed at this visit; the payment made by Medicaid was supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made two claims for payment for monthly visits to patient A.A., but it failed to provide documentation establishing that a check of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators was performed at one of the visits; $320.10 of the $640.20 paid by Medicaid was not supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made one claim for payment for a monthly visit to patient L.B., and it provided documentation establishing that a check of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators was performed at this visit; the payment made by Medicaid was supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made 20 claims for payment for monthly visits to patient D.C., but it failed to provide documentation establishing that checks of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators were performed at 14 of the visits; $3,868.24 of the $5,726.24 paid by Medicaid was not supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made one claim for payment for a monthly visit to patient D.M., and it provided documentation establishing that a check of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators was performed at this visit; the payment made by Medicaid was supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made one claim for payment for a monthly visit to patient K.R., and it provided documentation establishing that a check of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators was performed at this visit; the payment made by Medicaid was supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made 16 claims for payment for monthly visits to patient D.G., but it failed to provide documentation establishing that checks of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators were performed at ten of the visits; $2,954.88 of the $4,812.88 paid by Medicaid was not supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made 23 claims for payment for monthly visits to patient M.V., but it failed to provide documentation establishing that checks of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators were performed at 15 of the visits; $4,172.69 of the $6,639.59 paid by Medicaid was not supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made one claim for payment for a monthly visit to patient L.F., and it provided documentation establishing that a check of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators was performed at this visit; the payment made by Medicaid was supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made six claims for payment for monthly visits to patient R.N., but it failed to provide documentation establishing that checks of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators were performed at any of the visits; the entire $1,920.60 paid by Medicaid was not supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made 22 claims for payment for monthly visits to patient T.P., but it failed to provide documentation establishing that checks of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators were performed at 15 of the visits; $4,172.69 of the $6,335.14 paid by Medicaid was not supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made nine claims for payment for monthly visits to patient A.V., but it failed to provide documentation establishing that checks of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators were performed at eight of the visits; $1,889.30 of the $2,102.70 paid by Medicaid was not supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made two claims for payment for monthly visits to patient R.P., and it provided documentation establishing that checks of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators were performed at these visits; the payments made by Medicaid were supported by documentation. aa. Peripheral Medical Services made one claim for payment for a monthly visit to patient E.R., and it provided documentation establishing that a check of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators was performed at this visit; the payment made by Medicaid was supported by documentation. The patient records provided by Peripheral Medical Services do not contain documentation that the required operation and safety checks were performed in the months identified by the Agency in its audit work papers, and the Agency's calculations of the amounts paid by Medicaid that are subject to recoupment are supported by the summary report prepared by the Agency's inspector, as well as by the Agency's summary report. Peripheral Medical Services received payments totalling $49,380.20 from Medicaid on claims not supported by documentation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order finding that Peripheral Medical Services, Inc., was overpaid for services provided to Medicaid recipients for the audit period extending from August 5, 1996, to July 6, 1998, and requiring Peripheral Medical Services, Inc., to repay the Agency for Health Care Administration the principal amount of $49,380.20. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of November, 2001.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner overpaid Respondent Medicaid funds, for which Section 409.913(10), Florida Statutes (2002), authorizes Petitioner to seek repayment from Respondent.
Findings Of Fact During 1998, Respondent was an authorized Medicaid provider, pursuant to Medicaid provider number 105425200, and was a party to a valid Medicaid Provider Agreement with Petitioner. Respondent filed claims with Petitioner for payment, under the Medicaid program, for the goods and services that are the subject of the audit described below, and Petitioner paid Respondent for these claims. The audit period in this case is 1998. During 1998, Respondent submitted to Petitioner 36,257 claims for nearly 5.5 million units of over one thousand types of drugs. These claims totaled $3,075,449.88, which Petitioner paid Respondent. On June 2, 1999, Petitioner sent a letter to Respondent informing it of a review of its pharmacy claims for 1998. The letter requests documentation of all purchases of 12 named drugs for 1998 and documentation of all credits for these drugs during the same period. The letter states that acceptable documentation includes itemized wholesaler sales history reports, itemized manufacturer sales history reports, itemized invoices, and credit return receipts. By letter dated June 5, 1999, Respondent provided the requested information. By letter dated June 23, 2000, Petitioner advised Respondent that it had examined the paid Medicaid claims for 1998 and the acquisition documentation that Respondent had provided in June 1999. The letter states: "You have failed to provide adequate documentation to the effect that the available quantity of certain drugs of given strength was as great as the quantity of those drugs billed to and reimbursed by Medicaid.” Thus, Petitioner made a "provisional" determination that it had overpaid Respondent $1,092,205.32. The letter invites Respondent to provide additional information to reduce the overpayment determination. The June 23 letter contains an Overpayment Attachment that lists ten of the twelve drugs for which Petitioner had sought documentation in its earlier letter. For each of these ten drugs, the Overpayment Attachment lists the generic code, number of units for which Medicaid paid, the total amount of Medicaid payments, the total units documented by Respondent to have been available during the relevant period, and the number of units for which Respondent provided no availability documentation. The Overpayment Attachment also calculates the amount of Medicaid payments attributable to the unavailable units and the total overpayment, which is $1,092,205.32. The overpayment calculations described in the preceding paragraph assume that all available units of the audited drugs were sold to Medicaid patients. The effect of this improbable scenario reduces the amount of the overpayment. The overpayment calculations attempt no extrapolation of overpayments on the over 10,000 other drugs for which Respondent received Medicaid payments during 1998. The effect of limiting the overpayment calculation to the ten listed drugs reduces the amount of the overpayment. However, the ten listed drugs are the drugs that generated the most Medicaid payments to Respondent and account for over one-third of the total Medicaid payments during the relevant period. Respondent provided additional information to Petitioner on August 30 and November 3, 2000. However, after examining the information, Petitioner advised Respondent, by letter dated April 8, 2002, that its final determination was that Respondent owed $1,096,489.77 due to its receipt of Medicaid overpayments. The overpayment increased by over $4000 due to the determination that Respondent's records documented 1000 fewer available units of two dosages of Risperdone than Petitioner had previously determined.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order directing Respondent to pay Petitioner $1,096,489.77, plus interest, to repay overpayments that it received from the Medicaid program for the sale of drugs in 1998. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of November, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Rhonda M. Medows, M.D., Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3116 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Valda Clark Christian, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Grant P. Dearborn Assistant General Counsel Building 3, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5407 Jose M. Herrera Jose M. Herrera, P.A. 1401 Ponce de Leon Boulevard Suite 200 Coral Gables, Florida 33134
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent is liable to Petitioner for the principal sum of $94,675.83, which equals the amount that the Florida Medicaid Program paid Respondent for the "professional component" of claims for radiologic services rendered to Respondent's patients between July 1, 2001 and December 31, 2005.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Agency for Health Care Administration ("AHCA" or the "Agency") is the state agency responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid Program ("Medicaid"). Respondent Harold L. Murray, M.D. ("Murray") was, at all relevant times, a Medicaid provider authorized to receive reimbursement for covered services rendered to Medicaid beneficiaries. Exercising its statutory authority to oversee the integrity of Medicaid, the Agency sent investigators to Murray's office on November 22, 2005. The purpose of this visit was to verify that claims paid by Medicaid had not exceeded authorized amounts. To this end, the investigators inspected Murray's facilities and reviewed his medical records. What the investigators saw gave them reasons to believe that Medicaid had been overpaying Murray for radiologic services. They focused on the period from July 1, 2001 to December 31, 2005 (the "Audit Period"). During the Audit Period, Murray had submitted approximately 2,000 claims seeking the "maximum fee" for radiologic services, which Medicaid had paid. The maximum fee includes compensation for "professional component" services. (Medicaid uses the term "professional component" to describe the physician's services of interpreting a radiologic study and reporting his or her findings. These services are distinguished from those comprising the "technical component," which are routinely performed by technicians. These latter services include operating the radiologic equipment (e.g. an X-ray or sonographic machine) and performing the exam.) It appeared to the investigators that Murray had not, in fact, been performing the professional component. Using information in its database, the Agency determined that, during the Audit Period, Murray had received Medicaid payments totaling $94,675.83 for professional component services. The Agency repeatedly requested that Murray supply additional information that might substantiate his prior claims for fees relating to the professional component. Murray failed, refused, or was unable to comply with the Agency's requests. Murray did testify at hearing, however, providing a reasonably clear picture of what had occurred. On direct examination, Murray explained that he had performed the "first preliminary" review of each radiologic examination in question before sending the study to a radiologist, whom he paid "out of [his own] pocket" to interpret the exam and make a report. According to Murray, Medicaid paid only for his (Murray's) professional component services——not the radiologist's. Murray argues that he is entitled to compensation for the professional component services that he personally performed, notwithstanding that another doctor performed the same services. Analysis of the Facts Although Murray's position might have some superficial appeal, it does not withstand scrutiny as a matter of fact, the undersigned has determined. To explain why this is so requires an analysis of Murray's testimony that entails neither legal conclusions nor findings of historical fact. The undersigned's rationale, being essentially fact-based, is explicated here in the interests of organizational coherence and readability. Assume first, for the sake of argument, that Murray's "first preliminary" review constituted an authoritative interpretation of the radiologic study. Because it is reasonable to infer (and the undersigned finds) that the radiologist's subsequent interpretation of the study was authoritative——Murray's routine practice of ordering and personally paying for the "second opinion" would have been inexplicable, and indeed irrational, if the radiologist's interpretation were of dubious value——the inevitable conclusion, assuming Murray's findings were authoritative, is that the "second opinion" was nearly always duplicative, excessive, and unnecessary.i Murray's responses to that conclusion doubtless would be: (1) Medicaid did not pay for the second opinion, so whether it was excessive and unnecessary is irrelevant; and (2) there is no statute, rule, or Medicaid policy that forbids a provider from procuring, at his own expense, a second opinion——even an unnecessary one. It is not accurate to say, however, that Medicaid did not pay for the second opinion; this, ultimately, is the fatal flaw in Murray's reasoning. To the contrary, Murray's testimony shows clearly that Medicaid did pay for some or all of the expense of the second opinion, albeit indirectly, when it paid Murray for the same work. As his own account reveals, Murray was, in effect, merely a conduit for the Medicaid money, which passed through his hands on its way to the radiologist. Murray contends, of course, that the Medicaid payments for the professional component were "his," that he had earned them by performing the "first preliminary" read, and that he was free to spend his income however he chose. If our initial assumption were true, namely that Murray's preliminary interpretation were authoritative, then his claim to the Medicaid payments at issue might have merit. But, on reflection, this assumption is difficult, if not impossible, to square with the fact that Murray found it necessary always to pay another doctor to perform the very same professional component services. Indeed, having a second opinion was so important to Murray that he was willing to perform his purported preliminary read at a substantially discounted rate, at least, if not for free——or even, maybe, at a financial loss: in every instance, one of these was necessarily the net economic result of his actions.ii If, as we have assumed, Murray were performing a valuable professional service each time he interpreted a radiologic exam, then——the question naturally arises——why would he effectively have given away his expert opinions? Murray testified that he did so for "the safety of [his] patient" and because the radiologist is "educated for that." But these "answers," far from being persuasive, actually undermine the assumption that spawns the question of motive. Indeed, Murray's testimony confirms a reasonable inference contrary to our initial assumption, which inference is that Murray lacked sufficient confidence in his so-called "preliminary" interpretations ever to rely on them alone. This inference, which the undersigned accepts as a finding, arises from the basic undisputed fact that Murray routinely sought "second opinions" for every patient. It is ultimately determined, therefore, that whatever Murray's "first preliminary" reviews comprised, they did not constitute authoritative interpretations of the radiologic studies at hand. That being the case, it is determined that Murray's preliminary opinions added little or no actual value to the subject medical transactions. Offering some sort of provisional opinion that holds only until the "real" opinion can be obtained from the radiologist is not tantamount to performing the professional component.iii Based on the evidence presented, it is determined that the radiologist performed the professional component of the radiologic studies at issue, not Murray. As a result of improperly claiming that he had performed professional component services when in fact he had not, Murray received from Medicaid a total of $94,675.83 in payments that were not authorized to be paid. This grand total of $94,675.83 constitutes an overpayment that Murray must return to the Agency.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency enter a final order requiring Murray to repay the Agency the principal amount of $94,675.83, together with an administrative fine of $1,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of July, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 2007.
Findings Of Fact The Provider received the Final Audit Report that gave notice of Provider's right to an administrative hearing regarding the audit adjustments. The Provider filed a petition requesting an administrative hearing, and then caused· that petition to be Pagel of 4 Filed January 13, 2010 10:00 AM Division of Administrative Hearings. dismissed and the administrative hearing case to be closed. Provider chose not to dispute the facts set forth in the Final Audit Report; they are hereby deemed admitted and adopted by the Agency.
Conclusions THIS CAUSE came before me for issuance of a Final Order on a Final Audit Report dated October 13, 2006 (Audit Period/Engagement No.: July 31, 2001/NH05- 125C). By the Final Audit Report, the Agency for Health Care Administration ("AHCA" or "Agency"), informed the Petitioner, EGRET COVE CENTER ("Provider") that Medicaid reimbursement principles required adjustment of the cost allocations stated in the Provider's cost report. The Agency notified the Provider of the adjustments ARCA was making to the cost report. In response to AHCA's Audit Report, the Provider filed a timely petition for administrative hearing. Subsequent to the petition for administrative hearing, the Provider filed a voluntary dismissal of the hearing request. As such, the Audit Report, and the cost report adjustments as set forth in Audit Report are final.
The Issue Whether the Agency for Health Care Administration (Agency or Petitioner) is entitled to recover from Ideal Pugh, Sr., d/b/a Services on Time, LLC (Respondent), alleged Medicaid overpayments, administrative fines, and investigative, legal, and expert witness costs.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration, enter a final order requiring Respondent, Ideal Pugh, Sr., d/b/a Services on Time, LLC: To repay the sum of $563,073.76, for overpayments on claims that did not comply with the requirements of Medicaid laws, rules, and provider handbooks; To pay interest on the sum of $563,073.76 at the rate of ten percent per annum from the date of the overpayment determination; To pay a fine of $1,000 for failure to furnish all Medicaid-related records within the requested timeframe; To pay a fine of $1,500 for violations of the requirements of Medicaid laws, rules, and provider handbooks; and To pay allowable costs pursuant to subsection 409.913(23)(a), Florida Statutes. If a disputed issue of material fact arises regarding the appropriate amount of those costs, the matter may be referred back to DOAH for a further recommendation regarding costs. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of May, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of May, 2012.
The Issue The amount to be paid by Petitioners, Pedro Garcia, a minor by and through his parents and natural guardians, Jesus Garcia and Norma Cisneros ("Petitioners") to Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration ("AHCA"), out of the settlement proceeds, as reimbursement for past Medicaid expenditures pursuant to section 409.910, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Pedro Garcia ("Pedro") was born on October 30, 2014. When he was two months old, he presented to the emergency room ("ER") with vomiting and excessive crying. The doctors failed to diagnose an intestinal blockage and discharged Pedro home. Pedro was taken again to the ER in dire distress. He was airlifted to a pediatric hospital where emergency surgery was performed to remove 90 percent of his intestine. Pedro now suffers from the effects of having 90 percent of his intestine removed, including: nutritional deficiencies, diarrhea, dehydration, and abdominal distress. He cannot play with exertion and his activities are limited. Pedro will suffer the effects of his injury for the remainder of his life. A portion of Pedro's medical care related to the injury was paid by AHCA through the Medicaid program and Medicaid, through AHCA, provided $71,230.43 in benefits. Pedro's parents and natural guardians, Jesus Garcia and Norma Cisneros, brought a medical malpractice action against the medical providers and staff responsible for Pedro's care ("Defendants") to recover all of Pedro's damages, as well as their individual damages associated with their son's injury. Because of uncertainty on issues of liability and only a $250,000 insurance policy on the most culpable defendant, Pedro's medical malpractice action against the Defendants was settled for a confidential unallocated lump sum of $2,000,000. During the pendency of Pedro's medical malpractice action, AHCA was notified of the action and AHCA asserted a $71,230.43 Medicaid lien against Pedro's cause of action and settlement of that action. The Medicaid program through AHCA, spent $71,230.43 on behalf of Pedro, all of which represents expenditures paid for Pedro's past medical expenses. Another non-AHCA Medicaid provider, Integral Quality Care, provided $223,089.26 in past medical expenses on behalf of Pedro. Another non-AHCA Medicaid provider, Department of Health, Child's Medical Services, provided $168,161.12 in past medical expenses on behalf of Pedro. Accordingly, a total of $462,480.81 was paid for Pedro's past medical expenses. AHCA did not commence a civil action to enforce its rights under section 409.910 or intervene or join in Pedro's action against the Defendants. By letter, AHCA was notified of Pedro's settlement. AHCA has not filed a motion to set-aside, void, or otherwise dispute Pedro's settlement. Application of the formula in section 409.910(11)(f) to Pedro's $2,000,000 settlement requires payment to AHCA of the full $71,230.43 Medicaid lien. At the hearing, Petitioners presented the expert testimony of attorney Edward H. Zebersky, who represented Pedro throughout the underlying medical malpractice action against the Defendants. Without objection, Mr. Zebersky was accepted as an expert in the valuation of damages suffered by injured parties. Mr. Zebersky has been an attorney since 1991. Since 1992, Mr. Zebersky has been a plaintiff's trial lawyer, with a substantial portion of his practice devoted to personal injury cases, including medical malpractice matters. He is a partner with the law firm of Zebersky Payne Shaw Lewenz, LLP and AV rated by Martindale-Hubbell. Mr. Zebersky is a member of numerous trial attorney associations and has held leadership positions in several associations, including president of the Florida Justice Association in 2006 and serving on the Board of Governors of the American Association for Justice for the past ten years. Mr. Zebersky handles jury trials. He has secured multiple eight-figure verdicts and several seven-figure verdicts, and he stays abreast of jury verdicts on other cases in his area. As a routine part of his practice, Mr. Zebersky makes assessments concerning the value of damages suffered by his clients. Mr. Zebersky was accepted as an expert in a Medicaid lien dispute at DOAH in the case of Herrera v. Agency for Health Care Administration, Case No. 16-1270MTR, 2016 Fla. Div. Admin. Hear. LEXIS 493 (Fla. DOAH Oct. 11, 2016). Mr. Zebersky was familiar with the circumstances surrounding Pedro's injury and medical malpractice claims and gave a detailed explanation of them. Mr. Zebersky reviewed Pedro's life care plan, which details Pedro's future medical needs, and an economist report, which calculated the present value of Pedro's future medical care and present value of Pedro's lost future earnings. The economist placed the present value of Pedro's future medical expenses and lost future earnings at approximately $9,500,000. According to Mr. Zebersky, past medical expenses would also be added to arrive at the full value of Pedro's economic damages. Mr. Zebersky testified that in addition to economic damages, a jury would also be asked to assign a value to past and future noneconomic damages (i.e., pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life). Mr. Zebersky testified that Pedro's claim for noneconomic damages would have an exceedingly high number, which as a "rule of thumb" is three times the value of his economic damages. Mr. Zebersky persuasively and credibly testified that the total value of all of Pedro's damages would be in excess of $20,000,000, and that valuing Pedro's damages at $15,000,000 is a very conservative and low valuation of his damages. Mr. Zebersky persuasively and credibly testified that the $2,000,000 settlement did not fully compensate Pedro for the full value of his damages. Mr. Zebersky testified that based on a conservative value of all of Pedro's damages of $15,000,000, the $2,000,000 settlement represents a recovery of 13.33 percent of the full value of his damages. AHCA did not call any witnesses, present any evidence as to the value of damages, or propose a different valuation of damages. Mr. Zebersky's testimony regarding the total value of Pedro's damages was credible, unimpeached, and unrebutted. Petitioner proved that the settlement of $2,000,000 does not fully compensate Pedro for the full value of his damages. Mr. Zebersky further testified that because Pedro only recovered in the settlement 13.33 percent of the full value of his damages, he only recovered 13.33 percent of AHCA's $71,230.43 Medicaid lien, or $9,495.01. Mr. Zebersky testified that it would be reasonable to allocate $9,495.01 of the settlement to past medical expenses paid by AHCA through the Medicaid program. Following the settlement, Mr. Zebersky negotiated the non-AHCA Integral Quality Care Medicaid lien from $233,089.26 to $18,737.00, and the non-AHCA Department of Health, Child's Medical Services lien from $168,161.12 to $22,415. On cross-examination, Mr. Zebersky acknowledged that the $233,089.26 and $168,161.12 from Integral Quality Care and Department of Health, Child's Medical Services are part of Pedro's claim for past medical expenses. However, Mr. Zebersky failed to include these past medical expenses in applying the ratio to reduce the Medicaid lien amount owed to AHCA. AHCA successfully contested the methodology used to calculate the allocation to past medical expenses based on Mr. Zebersky's failure to include these past medical expenses in applying the ratio. Accordingly, Petitioners proved by a preponderance of the evidence that 13.33 percent is the appropriate pro rata share of Pedro's past medical expenses to be applied to determine the amount recoverable by AHCA in satisfaction of its Medicaid lien. Total past medical expenses is the sum of AHCA's lien in the amount of $71,230.43, and the past medical expenses in the amounts of $233,089.26 and $168,161.12, which equals $462,480.81. Accordingly, following Mr. Zebersky's methodology and applying the $15,000,000 valuation to the proper amount of total past medical expenses of $462,480.81, the settlement portion properly allocable to Pedro's past medical expenses to satisfy AHCA's lien is $61,648.69 ($462,480.81 x 13.33 percent = $61,648.69).
Findings Of Fact The Parties The Petitioner is the state agency that administers the Florida Medicaid program, which includes pharmacies that participate in the program. The Petitioner's Office of Program Integrity is responsible for insuring that the goods and services billed to the Medicaid program are those that are actually provided to Medicaid recipients. Medicaid is a joint program, funded by the federal government and by the State of Florida, and is administered pursuant to both state and federal statutes and rules. All services or goods billed to the program must be necessary, Medicaid compensable, and must also have actually been provided to eligible recipients by providers prior to submitting claims. Any payment made by the Medicaid program for goods or services not actually provided to an eligible recipient is subject to recoupment by the Petitioner, and the provider is also subject to the imposition of administrative fines and exclusion from the program for a specified period of time. The Respondent is a community pharmacy located in a hispanic section of Miami, Florida, which has been owned and operated for the past six years by Frances Larin, a licensed pharmacist, who makes all drug purchases and does all Medicaid billings at the pharmacy herself. Most of Respondent's customers have limited financial resources and are Medicaid recipients. The Respondent has participated in the Medicaid program for approximately eight years, and has not previously been charged with overbilling the Medicaid program. The Respondent has cooperated fully with the Petitioner throughout these proceedings. Prior Review From February to April 1988, the Petitioner's Office of Program Integrity had a review performed of the Respondent's billings to Medicaid from March 1, 1987 to December 31, 1987. This review was conducted for the Petitioner by the Foundation for Health Care, Inc. (Foundation), contract auditors, and resulted in the determination that the Respondent had overbilled the Medicaid program for prescription drugs dispensed to program recipients during the review period. In performing this review, the Foundation used an across-the-board Medicaid percentage of 54% in determining the available units of the various drugs on hand for dispensing to Medicaid recipients. Based upon the Foundation's review, the Petitioner sought recoupment for overpayments in the amount of $28,649.99 by letter to the Respondent dated July 20, 1988, as well as an administrative fine of $7,162.49, and a three month suspension from the program. The Respondent timely sought a formal administrative hearing in which it disputed the results of the Foundation review. However, after the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings, the Petitioner withdrew its notice of overpayment and imposition of administrative sanctions, and thus, without a determination on the merits, the Division of Administrative Hearings file was closed and jurisdiction was relinquished to the Petitioner. Subsequently, the Petitioner entered a Final Order which provided that the Respondent would be re-audited. The Respondent timely sought judicial review of this Final Order in which it challenged that Petitioner's right to conduct a further review of the period March 1, 1987 to December 31, 1987. However, the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District, dismissed the Respondent's appeal, and the Petitioner proceeded with a further review. The KPMG Review (a) For purposes of its further review, the Petitioner employed the public accounting and management consulting firm of KPMG Peat Marwick which designed a statistically valid sampling methodology to determine the Respondent's Medicaid percentage for each drug, and also to perform a management review of the Respondent. It was established by competent substantial evidence in the record, and in particular by the expert testimony in statistics from Dr. Robert Ladner and Robert Peirce, that the KPMG methodology was statistically valid. The KPMG review was conducted during the latter half of 1989, and included developing a Medicaid percentage for individual drugs based upon an analysis of prescriptions for all drugs in question to determine the portion of each drug's total sales that went to Medicaid recipients, calculating the total units claimed for each drug for which the Respondent sought reimbursement during the audit period, and calculating the total units purchased by the Respondent for each drug claimed for reimbursement during the audit period. The Medicaid percentage of each drug was then applied to total purchases for each specific drug to determine the amount of each drug that was on hand at the Respondent's pharmacy for dispensing to Medicaid recipients. This number of available units was then compared with the total units claimed for reimbursement. Where the units claimed exceeded the units available for dispensing, a positive variance was noted, and this number of excess units claimed was then multiplied by the per unit reimbursement amount for that particular drug in order to obtain the amount of the apparent overbilling for that particular drug. Where the total units available for dispensing exceeded the total units claimed for a particular drug, a negative variance was noted. It was stipulated by the parties that negative variances did not indicate underpayments, and the evidence, including specifically the testimony and report of Dr. Victor Pestien, an expert in statistics, does not establish that such negative variances should be offset against the positive variances or that they in any way reduce the positive variances. This is the first instance in which this methodology has been utilized by the Petitioner in seeking a recoupment of an alleged Medicaid overpayment from a pharmacy, and this methodology was not set forth in any rule or regulation of the Petitioner that had been adopted at any time material hereto. Previous audits used an overall Medicaid percentage to calculate the portion of a pharmacy's business that was comprised of Medicaid recipients, and the quantity of drugs that were available to them. Using a drug specific Medicaid percentage, however, is a more accurate and conservative approach to determining overpayments than using a fixed percentage. Based upon the consideration of all evidence in the record, it is specifically found that the greater weight of evidence establishes that the methodology used by KPMG in this review for calculating Medicaid percentages was sound and reasonable, and in no way precluded the Respondent from presenting additional competent substantial evidence to the Petitioner, or at hearing, which would have established different Medicaid percentages for particular drugs. (a) The type of review conducted by KPMG is known as an aggregate analysis, a generally accepted type of statistical analysis, in which drugs that have been billed to and paid for by the Medicaid program are reviewed to determine whether the pharmacy under review purchased or otherwise acquired a sufficient quantity of drugs to justify its billings to Medicaid. Interchangeable brand-name drugs and generic equivalents were grouped together so that in conducting this review, whole equivalent groups of drugs were considered as one type of drug, regardless of differences in individual product names. To obtain a statistically random sample, prescriptions were put in numerical order and every fourth prescription for the review period was examined, and since prescriptions may be refilled for up to a year after they are originally filled, reviewers also examined every prescription for the year prior to the review period. Competent substantial evidence establishes that KPMG performed an appropriate and valid statistical analysis, and that they used an acceptable sampling methodology which produced a truly random result. The underlying assumption of this analysis is that before a drug can be claimed to have been dispensed and billed to Medicaid, the pharmacy under review must have that drug in its possession. (b) The approach taken by KPMG and the Petitioner was to be as conservative as possible in resolving all uncertainties and questions which arose during the course of this review in favor of the Respondent. KPMG did not conduct a financial audit of the Respondent, but did prepare a management report based upon its review of Respondent's operations during the audit period. Data used by KPMG in its methodology in calculating the amount paid by Medicaid to the Respondent, the unit price of drugs dispensed, and the quantity claimed by Respondent for payment by Medicaid, was derived from computer based information provided by the Petitioner's fiscal agent. During the period of time being reviewed in this case, Electronic Data Systems (EDS) was the Petitioner's fiscal agent, while Consultec was the Petitioner's fiscal agent during the period when the KPMG review was actually being performed. When Consultec was selected as the Petitioner's fiscal agent and replaced EDS on January 1, 1989, EDS turned over its computer records to the new agent by copying all of its magnetic, computer files, along with supporting microfiche documentation, which it then provided to Consultec under the supervision of the Petitioner. Upon receipt of these magnetic tapes, Consultec placed them in a controlled environment vault, and then later converted the information on these tapes to a new format used by Consultec. It was established by competent substantial evidence that in this process, no data was added, deleted or changed in any manner. The "units claimed" data was subsequently provided by computer download from the Consultec claims data base directly to the Petitioner's Office of Program Integrity. It was established by competent substantial evidence that data regarding claims which originated with EDS passed through Consultec to the Petitioner's Office of Program Integrity unchanged. Specific information regarding Respondent, including the claimed quantity of drugs dispensed and amounts paid, was accessed by staff in the Office of Program Integrity, randomly verified, and then made available to KPMG. Both Consultec and EDS are nationally recognized data processing and management companies. Competent substantial evidence established that the claims processing function utilized by the Petitioner in the Medicaid program during the period at issue was subject to several quality control checks to insure that claims were properly processed and appropriate payments were made. On occasion claim adjustments were made, but these were reasonable and for good cause, such as a substantiated underpayment. The computer hardware utilized in this process was reliable and properly maintained. In order to verify the data used by KPMG concerning the dollar amount of claims paid and the quantity of units of medication claimed, an "audit trail" was performed using 140 randomly selected sample claims by tracing each claim from its claim reference number to its associated remittance voucher and cancelled checks, where available. This audit trail verified that the data used as the basis for quantity claimed and total dollars paid was valid and reliable. The KPMG review was not limited to the top 100 drugs, by volume claimed, during the audit period, but included each drug dispensed by the Respondent to Medicaid recipients during the audit period. In its report dated November 20, 1989, KPMG calculated a total Medicaid overpayment to Respondent of $30,452.59, and based thereon, the Petitioner notified the Respondent that it was seeking recoupment of this amount, as well as an administrative fine of $2,000 and termination from the Medicaid program for at least two years. Subsequently, however, the Petitioner and KPMG reviewed and considered additional invoices documenting additional purchases of drugs in question by the Respondent during the audit period, and prepared a revised report dated August 30, 1990. Based upon this revised report, the Petitioner sought recoupment of a revised, reduced overpayment calculated to be $21,939.93, as well as a $2,000 administrative fine and a minimum two year termination from the program, and it was on this basis that this matter proceeded to final hearing. The Top 100 Drugs Subsequent to the final hearing, the Petitioner issued an amended recoupment letter dated October 17, 1990, which limited the recoupment it is seeking in this matter to the top 100 drugs, by dollar volume of claims, plus their generic equivalents. This resulted in the elimination of many individual drugs with relatively small overpayments from the list of overpayments, and left only five instances among these top 100 drugs where the difference between the quantity available, adjusted for standard error, and the quantity claimed is less than 100 units. In many instances the difference is well in excess of 1,000 units. The sanctions being sought in this amended recoupment letter further reduced the recoupment being sought to $12,643.11, reduced the administrative fine to $1,400, and reduced the period of exclusion from the program that is being sought to 16 months. However, due to an error in calculating the top 100 drugs and equivalents, the Petitioner issued a second amended recoupment letter dated October 26, 1990, further reducing the administrative fine sought to $1,200 and reducing the period of exclusion to 14 months. Inventory Analysis In performing its review, KPMG obtained information concerning the quantities of drugs purchased during the review period by the Respondent directly from the pharmacy's wholesalers and from a review of invoices retained by the Respondent for a period that included one month prior to the review period through one month after the review period (February 1, 1987, to January 31, 1988). The effect of seasonal variations in pharmacy sales and ordering patterns was also taken into account, and balanced, by extending this period to a full twelve months. All documentation concerning drug acquisitions was requested from Respondent, and the information received and considered by KPMG and the Petitioner was checked for reasonableness by a consultant pharmacist and cross validated by two reviewers. It was stipulated by the parties that the Respondent's main wholesaler, Gulf Distribution, Inc., had and maintained accurate information and records regarding its sales to the Respondent, and that it properly transferred that information to computer disks which were provided to KPMG. Subsequent thereto, additional invoices were discovered and were also made available to KPMG. The Petitioner stipulated that these additional invoices from Gulf did not reduce the number of drug units purchased by, and invoiced to, Respondent. Pharmacies in Florida which choose to participate in the Medicaid program are required to maintain complete and accurate patient and fiscal records which fully substantiate the extent of services rendered and billings made for a period of five years from the date of billing or service, and are also required to retain all invoices from wholesalers, or from the transfer or receipt of drugs through barter or exchange, for a period of five years. (a) Actual beginning and ending inventories of the top 100 drugs reviewed by KPMG for which the Petitioner now seeks recoupment in the amount of $12,643.11 were not determined. Rather, an estimate of inventory on hand was derived by counting invoices of all drug acquisitions through purchase, transfer or exchange made by the Respondent during the review period, as well as invoices of acquisitions made one month prior to and one month after the review period. Additionally, all documentation provided by the Respondent of bulk, or large, acquisitions made during or prior to the review period was also considered and included in the Petitioner's estimate of inventory. It was established by competent substantial evidence that pharmacies generally keep a drug inventory consisting of a two to two-and-a-half week supply on hand, and acquire drugs in anticipation of future sales rather than as a replacement of inventory depletion from past sales. Therefore, a basic assumption of the KPMG methodology, relied upon and accepted by the Petitioner, that Respondent had only those drugs available for dispensing which were obtained by invoiced purchase from wholesalers, or through transfer or exchange, between February 1, 1987 and January 31, 1988, as well as documented invoiced bulk purchases prior to this time period, is reasonable. At hearing, the Respondent established that a significant quantity of nine specific drugs were purchased during the review period from suppliers other than Gulf that were not considered by KPMG. These drugs include Xanax (.5 mg.), Inderal (10 mg.), Tagamet (300 mg.), Nitrostat (.4 mg.), Trental (400 mg.), Motrin (400 mg.), Motrin (600 mg.), Quinamm (260 mg.), and Quinidine Sulfate (200 mg.). It is, therefore, found that the overpayment of $2,902.19 calculated by KPMG and relied upon by the Petitioner for these particular drugs has not been supported by competent substantial evidence. Frances Larin, Respondent's owner and operator, testified that she did not follow the generally accepted practice of retaining only a two to two-and-a- half week supply of drugs on hand. Rather, she testified that for a significant number of the top 100 drugs at issue in this proceeding, she would purchase large quantites in bulk, and was thus able to draw down on these inventories without making additional purchases of particular drugs for over a year. The Respondent sought to establish that due to very large beginning inventories of particular drugs at issue, it was able to legitimately dispense more units during the review period than it purchased during the same time. However, the Respondent did not produce evidence in support of its position, such as invoices for bulk purchases which KPMG or the Petitioner did not consider, or complete records of bartering or transfers which had not been considered, and which would have supported its claim of a significantly larger beginning inventory for these particular drugs than would be the generally accepted practice. To the contrary, competent substantial evidence in the record, as well as the demeanor of Larin while testifying, establishes that Respondent's claim is unreasonable and lacks credibility. The deposition testimony of JoAnn Padell is outweighed by the testimony of Deborah Launer, Susan McCleod, and Robert Peirce. A review of the Respondent's purchasing patterns clearly shows that Respondent generally and routinely kept low inventories of drugs on hand, placing daily orders with Gulf to obtain drugs on an as-needed basis. Recoupment Based upon the foregoing, it is found that competent substantial evidence establishes that the Respondent overbilled the Medicaid program during the review period at issue in this case in the amount of $9,740.92 ($12,643.11 claimed in the second amended recoupment letter minus the $2,902.19 claim associated with the nine specific drugs for which significant purchases were omitted from the KPMG review, as found above at Finding 13). Petitioner is authorized to recoup the established overpayment of $9,740.92 from the Respondent. Sanctions (a) In determining the sanctions stated in the second amended recoupment letter which Petitioner seeks to impose upon the Respondent, the Petitioner considered the provisions of Section 409.266(13), Florida Statutes, as well as the impact which sanctioning this Medicaid provider would have upon Medicaid recipients. Competent substantial evidence establishes that there are eight pharmacies which accept Medicaid within a one mile radius from the Respondent's location, and twenty-six such pharmacies within a two mile radius. Medicaid recipients are issued new cards each month and may transfer pharmacies at the beginning of each month. Therefore, it is found that Medicaid recipients would not be substantially affected by the imposition of sanctions upon the Respondent. The parties stipulated that the sanction matrix set forth in Rule10C- 7.063, Florida Administrative Code, was not applied by the Petitioner against the Respondent in this case because it was not in effect at the time of this review. The sanctions which the Petitioner seeks to impose against the Respondent, therefore, are based upon non-rule policy which must be explicated in this proceeding. In seeking to explicate its non-rule policy upon which the sanctions set forth in the second amended recoupment letter are based, the Petitioner established that it was concerned that sanctions imposed in prior cases, as well as in the original recoupment letter which had been sent to the Respondent in this case, had been too lenient in view of the seriousness of Medicaid violations. The Petitioner developed its non-rule sanctions policy after the KPMG review had been completed, and based its proposal upon the maximum sanctions set forth in state and federal statutes and rules. Specifically, Section 409.266(12), Florida Statutes, provides for a maximum fine of $10,000; the maximum exclusion period applied in previous cases by the Office of Program Integrity is ten years, and the minimum exclusionary period imposed by the federal government has been five years for the failure to supply payment information. At hearing, the Petitioner explained that it first determined the percent of Respondent's total Medicaid payments that the overpayment represented, and then applied that percentage to these maximum sanctions allowed under law and existing policy. The overpayment of $12,643.11 claimed by the Petitioner in its second amended letter of recoupment is 12% of the total payment of $100,397.88 made by the Petitioner to Respondent for the review period, and 12% of the maximum fine and exclusion period is $1,200 and 14 months, respectively. While the Petitioner explained the manner by which this exclusionary period and fine were calculated, it did not explicate its non-rule policy by establishing a reasonable, rational basis for applying the percentage of Medicaid overbillings to the maximum fine and exclusionary period. Certainly, the arithmetic calculation used to arrive at these proposed sanctions is clear, but there was no explication through competent substantial evidence which would establish that there is a basis in fact or logic for this calculation. Therefore, it is found that the Petitioner's non-rule policy used to propose these sanctions is arbitrary and capricious. Due to the lack of any evidentiary basis in the record which would support the imposition of the sanctions of an administrative fine or a period of exclusion from the Medicaid program, the Petitioner is not authorized to impose sanctions on the Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that Petitioner enter a Final Order which requires that Respondent to repay the Petitioner for Medicaid overbillings in the amount of $9,704.92, but which does not impose sanctions consisting of either an administrative fine or period of exclusion. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of January, 1991 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of January, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Rulings on the Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Finding 1. Adopted in Finding 2. Adopted in Finding 3. Adopted in Finding 1. Adopted in Finding 4. Adopted in Findings 4 and 5. 7-10. Adopted in Findings 6 and 7, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 11-17. Rejected as unnecessary. 18-20. Adopted in Findings 6 and 7. 21-24. Adopted in Finding 12. 25. Adopted in Finding 2. 26-28. This is a conclusion of law and not a proposed finding. 29-30. Adopted in Finding 8. 31-32. Adopted in Findings 7 and 10. Adopted in Finding 6. Rejected as unnecessary. 35-39. Adopted in Finding 7. 40-47. Adopted in Finding 7, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 48. Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial 49-51. Adopted in Finding 7, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 52-53. Rejected as unnecessary. 54-63. Adopted in Finding 12, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding 8. Adopted in Finding 9. 66-67. Adopted in Finding 8, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 68-69. Adopted in Finding 9. 70-78. Adopted in Finding 8, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 79-82. Adopted in Finding 8. 83-85. Rejected as unnecessary. 86-93. Adopted in Finding 13, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 94-97. Adopted in Finding 14, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 98-103. Adopted in Finding 14. 104-105 Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. 106-107 Adopted in Finding 12. 108. Adopted in Findings 12 and 13. 109-112 Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. 113-115 Adopted in Finding 13, but otherwise Rejected as immaterial. This is a conclusion of law and not a proposed finding. Adopted in Finding 11. 118-119 Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial 120-122 Adopted in Finding 11. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding 6. 125-128 Rejected as unnecessary. 129. Adopted in Finding 6. 130-132 Adopted in Finding 9. Adopted in Finding 11. This is a conclusion of law and not a proposed finding. 135-147 Adopted in Finding 16, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. 148. Adopted in Finding 11. 149-150 Adopted in Finding 16, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 151-152 Rejected as unnecessary. 153. Rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. Rulings on the Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1. Adopted in Finding 4. 2-3. Adopted in Finding 5, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary and not based on competent substantial evidence. 4-5. Adopted in Findings 3, 6 and 7. 6-7. Adopted in Finding 10, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 8-9. Adopted in Finding 11. 10-11. Adopted in Finding 3, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding 6. Rejected as immaterial and unnecessary. 14-15. Rejected as argument on the evidence rather than a proposed finding, and otherwise as not based on competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Finding 7, but otherwise Rejected as argument on the evidence rather than a proposed finding. Rejected as repetitive and otherwise as immaterial. Adopted in Finding 13, but Rejected in Finding 14 and otherwise as argument on the evidence rather than a proposed finding and as not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected in Finding 14, as immaterial, speculative, and as not based on competent substantial evidence. 20-21. Rejected in Finding 6, as immaterial, and as not based on competent substantial evidence. 22-23. Rejected in Findings 13 and 14, and otherwise as immaterial and not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected as repetitive and otherwise as argument on the evidence rather than a proposed finding. Rejected in Findings 13 and 14. 26-30. Rejected as a statement of the Respondent's position and not a proposed finding, as speculative and contrary to competent substantial evidence, and as totally without citation to authority in the record as required by Rule 22I-6.031(3), Florida Administrative Code. 31-35. Rejected in Finding 6, and as not based on competent substantial evidence and as unnecessary. 36-38. Adopted in Findings 12 and 13. 39-41. Adopted in Finding 8. 42. Rejected as immaterial. 43-44. Rejected in Finding 9. 45. Rejected as simply a summation of testimony and not a proposed finding. 46-48. Rejected in Finding 9, and otherwise as immaterial and not based on competent substantial evidence. 49-50. Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. 51. Adopted in Finding 16, but otherwise Rejected as immaterial. 52-53. Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. Adopted and Rejected in part in Finding 16. 56-57. Adopted in Finding 16. 58-61. Rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. 62. Adopted and Rejected in part in Finding 15. COPIES FURNISHED: David G. Pius, Esquire Building Six, Room 233 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 James J. Breen, Esquire Michael P. Scian, Esquire 900 Sun Bank Building 777 Brickell Avenue Miami, FL 33131 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Linda Harris, Acting General Counsel 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Robert B. Williams, Acting Secretary 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Respondent properly maintained and supplied required records to support and document prescription claims, which it billed to Medicaid and for which it received payment from the Medicaid program during the audit period of April 1, 2000 through December 31, 2001. If that is not the case, it must be determined whether the Agency is entitled to recoup from the Respondent the sum it seeks of $108,478.77, as the purported amount overpaid to the Respondent by the Agency. It must also be determined whether the applicable laws and regulations referenced herein were complied with by the Respondent, in terms of its accepting and filling prescriptions, dispensing relevant drugs, and recording and documenting such activities in its pharmacy records. Finally, it must be determined whether the statistical methodologies employed by the Agency, through its audit and investigation of the Respondent, were sufficiently representative and accurate so as to support the calculation of estimated overpayments.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an Agency of the State of Florida charged by the statutes and rules referenced herein with ensuring that proper reimbursement is effected to providers, including pharmacies, by the Medicaid system. Because of its duty to enforce and regulate the Medicaid system, the Petitioner Agency has an audit and oversight function, as well as an enforcement function, to ensure that Medicaid payments and the general operations of the Medicaid system are carried out correctly. It is through this duty imposed by the cited Florida Statutes and rules, as well as the federal regulations it is charged with enforcing, that the Petitioner carried out an audit of the Respondent, Brown Pharmacy, concerning the audit period of April 1, 2000 through December 31, 2001. The Petitioner conducts audits of providers such as Brown in order to ensure compliance with the Medicaid provisions and Medicaid provider agreements. These are called "integrity audits" and are routinely performed by auditors contracted from private firms such as Heritage. Brown Pharmacy (Brown) is licensed in the State of Florida as a pharmacy (license Number PH562). Brown maintained a business location at 312 West 8th Street, Jacksonville, Florida 32206, at times pertinent to this case. During the audit period Brown was an enrolled Medicaid provider authorized to provide Medicaid prescriptions pursuant to a provider agreement with the Agency. The terms of the provider agreement governed the contractual relationship between Brown and the Agency. Pursuant to that provider agreement, Brown was to maintain the Medicaid-related records and documentation for at least five years. Any Medicaid provider, such as Brown, not in compliance with the Medicaid documentation and record retention policies may be subject to the recoupment of Medicaid payments. During the audit period, Brown dispensed prescription drugs to Medicaid recipients. Medicaid claims were filed and paid electronically as "point of sale" transactions during the audit period. Each claim reviewed and at issue in this case was a paid Medicaid claim subject to the provider agreement and pertinent regulations. As a condition of participating in the Medicaid program, a Medicaid provider must comply with all provisions of a provider agreement, which is a voluntarily agreement between the Agency and the provider. Those provisions include the provider's agreement to comply with all relevant local, state and federal laws, rules, regulations, licensure laws, bulletins, manuals, and handbooks, etc. The provider must agree to keep and maintain, in a systematic and orderly manner, all Medicaid- related records as may be required by the Agency and make them available for state and federal agencies and review. It must maintain complete and accurate medical, business, and fiscal records that will justify and disclose the extent of goods and services rendered to customers or patients and rendered as billings to the Medicaid system. Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-4.250 promulgates, as part of the rule, the above-referenced handbook (handbook) which sets out Medicaid polices and rules. The polices and rules govern the rights and responsibilities of drug providers, such as Brown, including coverage and payment methodologies for services and goods rendered to Medicaid recipients and billed to the Medicaid program. The types of records that must be maintained are as follows: Medicaid claim forms, professional records such as patient treatment plans, prior and post authorization information, prescription records, business records, including accounting ledgers, financial statements, purchase and acquisition records etc., tax records, patient counseling information and provider enrollment documentation. Providers who are not in compliance with the Medicaid documentation and record retention policies described in the handbook are subject to administrative sanctions and/or recoupment of Medicaid payments. Medicaid payments for services that lack required documentation and/or appropriate signatures will be recouped. Chapter five of the handbook, in defining overpayment provides that any amount not authorized to be paid by the Medicaid program, whether paid as a result of inaccurate or improper cost reporting, improper claims, unacceptable practices, fraud, abuse or mistake, constitutes overpayment. Incomplete records are records that lack documentation that all requirements or conditions for the providing of services have been met. Medicaid may recoup payments for services or goods when the provider has incomplete records or cannot locate the records. The Agency contracted with Heritage to conduct an on- site audit at Brown. The audit was conducted March 18th through March 20, 2002. Heritage isolated a sample of 205 prescription claims, known as the "judgmental sample" out of a total universe of paid pharmacy claims from Brown totaling 16,727 for the audit period. Heritage also selected 250 random prescription claims out of the remaining total universe of paid pharmacy claims of 16,522, which remained after the 205 judgmental sample claims had been removed or isolated from the remainder of the total claims. With the acquiescence of the Agency, Heritage chose the 205 claims by weighing it in favor of the "high dollar" or more expensive drug prescriptions. Those prescriptions are primarily for HIV and Aids therapy drugs and psychotherapeutic drugs for various mental conditions, including schizophrenia. Weighing of the judgmental sample strongly in favor of the high dollar prescription claims would seem to render the judgmental sample fundamentally unfair against Brown if the judgmental sample had then been extrapolated to the entire universe of claims ($16,727). This was not done, however. The judgmental sample was audited and compiled by doing an actual count and totaling of claim amounts in dollars represented by all the discrepant prescriptions, including all those the Agency and Heritage maintained resulted in "overpayments" to Brown. Therefore, the judgmental sample is an actual number rather than an extrapolated calculation so that weighing the sample in favor of the high dollar prescriptions does not result in an unfair or biased sample, as to the judgmental sample. Because the judgmental sample was drawn from the total pool of audited claims and removed from that claim pool prior to the identification and drawing of the random sample, the two are mutually exclusive and the amounts calculated do not represent a duplication or overlap. Thus the findings from the judgmental sample and then the random sample may be properly added together. The randomly selected claims (random sample) were taken of the remaining 16,522 claims in the audit claim pool after the judgmental sample of 205 claims had been removed. According to the report rendered by Heritage, the 250 randomly selected claims totaled $10,632.59 in paid Medicaid dollars. The Heritage auditors determined that there were 56 discrepant claims out of these which totaled, according to their calculation, $2,450.13 in apparent overpayments. This resulted in an average overcharge per claim of $9.80 (determined by dividing the documented "sanction amount" by the total number of claims in the random sample (250), multiplied by the universe of claims from which the random sample was taken (16,522) which yielded an extrapolated overcharge of $161,924.19. Applying the statistically appropriate 95 percent "one-sided" lower confidence limit of this extrapolation resulted in a purported overpayment extrapolated from the randomly selected claims of $102,700.85. This means that the overpayment amount calculated by Heritage represents an amount statistically 95 percent certain to be the lowest amount overpayment based on the extrapolation of the overpayment represented in the 250 randomly selected claims. The non-extrapolated judgmental findings showed, according to Heritage, that there were 72 discrepant claims. Heritage then determined that, of these, there were $29,381.09 in apparent actual overcharges. The discrepancies determined by Heritage involved the failure to produce documentation of refill authorizations for 80 prescription claims; 31 prescription claims containing an incorrect Medicaid provider number; the failure to produce 12 "hard copy" prescriptions representing 25 claims; four claims that did not have the prescriber's DEA number on the prescription for controlled substances; three claims for prescriptions that did not contain the original date of service; two claims that were billed for quantities greater than that authorized by the physician; one claim that was billed for an incorrect day's supply; one claim that was billed in excess of the maximum allowable quantity of prescription of the drug, set by Medicaid policy; and one prescription claim that was billed for an incorrect prescriber's Medicaid provider number (although this should not be a discrepancy because the correct prescriber was documented in the pharmacy's computer, which the regulations allowed). Additionally, there was one claim billed for a drug different than that prescribed by the physician, according to Heritage in its report. Heritage also conducted an invoice review using utilization reports provided by the Respondent. This was apparently a review of 25 different drugs that purportedly showed that the prorated purchases of those drugs were insufficient to cover the number of units billed to Medicaid for all 25 drugs reviewed, and thus yielded a purported shortage of $87,942.13, representing the amount billed to Medicaid above the amount the records of purchases from suppliers proved that Brown had purchased of those drugs. Based upon the Heritage audit as well as documentation findings and overpayments calculations (see Exhibit 8), the Agency issued a PAAR dated September 27, 2002, determining that Brown had been overpaid $150,036.71 for Medicaid claims during the audit period. That report advised Brown that it was a provisional report only and encouraged Brown to submit any additional information or documentation which might serve to change the overpayment. The report listed examples of documentation that the Agency would consider for a possible reduction in the overpayment amount initially claimed. Thereafter, the Agency agreed to an extension of time for Brown to submit additional documentation and sent a letter to Brown dated October 31, 2003, advising that the audit had been placed in abeyance pending the outcome in a related case, but that the Agency expected to resume the audit and that therefore all Medicaid-related records and documentation regarding paid claims should be maintained and preserved until the audit was finalized. The FAAR was addressed in the testimony of Ms. Stewart for the Agency. Through her testimony it was revealed that certain corrections should be made to the FAAR updating it from the findings in the Heritage initial audit report. The Agency corrected the information in the FAAR for this reason and for the reason that it secured some additional information from the Respondent. Thus, for the audit period it was established that there were 16,727 total claims for prescriptions dispensed by Brown, for which it was paid $795,564.59 during the 21-month audit period, of those claims, 205 were pulled out from the total universe of claims as the judgmental sample. There were some 72 allegedly "discrepant claims" totaling $36,393.51 in dollars paid to Brown. The Agency's position is that $29,381.09 of those are so called "documented overcharges." The random sample of 250 claims was extrapolated to the remaining universe of 16,522 prescription claims. The Agency now takes the position that it found 49 "discrepant claims" in the random sample which totaled $2,154.40 in dollars paid to Brown's pharmacy and of that it maintains that $1,927.55 are "documented overcharges" for the 250 randomly selected claims (for which Brown had been paid $10,632.59). Thus the Agency found an average overcharge for the 250 randomly sampled claims of $7.71 per claim. The $7.71 average per claim overcharge was then multiplied by the remaining universe of 16,522 claims, yielding an extrapolated purported overcharge of $127,387.92. The Agency then applied the 95 percent "one-sided lower confidence limit" to this extrapolation, that is, that it or its statistician, Dr. Johnson, felt that there was a 95 percent chance that the lower confidence limit number it calculated was accurate. That number is $79,097.68. When that number is combined with the Agency's position as to overcharges from the judgmental sample results in a total postulated overcharge of $108,478.77. This is the final amount the Agency claims as an overpayment that must be recouped for Medicaid. The FAAR summarized the discrepant claims for the judgmental sample as follows: 61 claims involve refills which exceeded the authorized number of refills without documentation of reauthorization; 10 claims showed an incorrect prescriber license number but the correct prescriber license number was documented in the pharmacy's computer; and For two claims the hard copy description did not have an original date of service depicted on it and did not reference a DEA number. The discrepant claims shown in the FAAR as to the random sample were as follows: There were 19 claims for refills without documentation of refill authorization (refills had been previously authorized, but for the 19 claims at least one refill had been issued beyond the authorization limit); Fifteen claims showed an incorrect prescriber license number on the claim and the license number was not documented in the Respondent's computer; Seven claims showed an incorrect prescriber license number, but the correct license number was documented in the pharmacy's computer; There were seven claims for which the original hard copy prescriptions could not be found on file during the audit period; For one claim the hard copy prescription did not have an original date of service or DEA number; For one claim the quantity paid exceeded the quantity authorized by the prescriber or dispensed to the recipient; and For one claim the number of days supply submitted by the pharmacy was not consistent with the quantity and directions of the prescriber and the quantity exceeded the limit set by the plan. The most common discrepancies with regard to the judgmental sample and the random sample occurred when the Respondent billed refills in excess of the number authorized by the prescriber, without any written authorization for such being provided in the audit process or later. Concerning the random sample, the second most common discrepancy occurred when the claim depicted an incorrect precriber number on the claim and the license number of the prescriber was not documented in the computer. In the judgmental sample the second most common discrepancy occurred when the claim showed an incorrect prescriber number, but the correct prescriber number was documented in the pharmacy's computer. The discrepancies in the FAAR with the indication "UR", references "unauthorized refills." The records of the pharmacy showed that Brown issued refills of prescriptions to Medicaid recipients in excess of the presriber's limit depicted on the prescriptions but showed no written record of a telephonic or written authorization by the prescriber allowing the additional refill or refills. It is also true that as to some or even many of these the Respondent may have obtained verbal authorization, but failed to document that re- authorization. Medicaid policy, the statutory authority cited herein, and the PDSCLR Handbook provide that all verbal orders authorized by the prescriber of a prescription must be recorded either as a "hard copy" or noted in the pharmacy's computer in order to comply with the relevant law cited herein, for record- keeping and auditing purposes under Medicaid policy. The Agency's Statistical Methodology Mark E. Johnson, Ph.D., testified on behalf of the Petitioner. He was qualified as an expert witness in the area of statistical formulas, statistical methodology, and random sampling, including the random sample statistical methodology employed by the Agency in determining the overpayment amount. He is a professor of statistics at the University of Central Florida. Dr. Johnson reviewed the statistical methodology, numbers and calculations arrived at by the Agency and its extrapolation method of arriving at the overpayment amount. He also used his own independent analysis based upon a software package he commonly uses in the practice of his discipline in testing the methodology employed by the Agency and the random sample employed by the Agency and Heritage. The statistical formula employed by Dr. Johnson and the Agency is a standard one routinely used in Dr. Johnson's profession and statistical sampling. He established through his own testing of the methodology that the random sample was appropriate for Medicaid program integrity audits and determinations as employed in this case. The random sampling, according to Dr. Johnson, was employed because it would be time and cost prohibitive to examine individually each of 16,522 claims regarding overpayment issues. The random sampling methodology using 250 randomly chosen samples is a time and cost saving device and yet still presents a "plausible estimate" as established by Dr. Johnson. He established that for the universe of 16,522 claims which were subjected to the random sample and extrapolation statistical analysis and calculation, that such is a reasonable sample for purposes of this audit and that the 250 random samples employed by the Agency are indeed statistically appropriate random samples. His calculation of overpayment was at variance with the Agency's by 55 cents. He established that is not a significant difference since the 95 percent certainty limit of $79,097.68 for the random sample extrapolation analysis is so much lower than the estimate established at $108,478.22. Dr. Johnson established that the Agency had employed appropriate and valid statistical methods in its determination of the above-referenced overpayment amount based upon the random sample of paid claims. The expert testimony of Dr. Johnson, together with his written report in evidence, is credible and persuasive as to the validity of the random sampling of the claims during the audit period and as to the random sample portion of the analysis employed in arriving at the final overpayment calculation and numbers depicted in the FAAR. Dr. Johnson established the appropriateness of the statistical formula, including extrapolation, used to calculate the overpayment amount, the appropriateness of the sample size relative to the universe of claims, and the improbability that the overpayment amount is attributable to chance causes alone. Thus Dr. Johnson's testimony is accepted as credible and persuasive in establishing the validity of the Agency's method of overpayment calculation, and the overpayment calculation in conjunction with the statistical evidence in this record, except as modified by the findings below.1/ The Respondent's Position Gary Steinberg testified on behalf of the Respondent, Brown Pharmacy. He was accepted as an expert witness in the areas of Medicaid policy, audits and pharmacy practice, including Florida pharmacy practice. Mr. Steinberg acknowledged that Brown had not properly documented all claims that had been paid by the Medicaid program nor maintained all required records. He emphasized in his testimony, however, that Brown had not fraudulently billed the Medicaid program with claims for prescription medications that it had not actually dispensed to the patients or recipients. Rather, all medications involved in the subject prescription claims had actually been dispensed. There is no evidence or claim on the part of the Agency that Brown charged and collected more than the appropriate approved price for the prescriptions at issue. Through the explanation given in his testimony, Mr. Steinberg opined that although Brown was guilty of technical errors in record keeping and documentation as to the prescriptions involved in the subject claims, Brown had made substantial compliance with the Medicaid program requirements of the Medicaid provider agreement and the statutes and rules at issue and policies embodied in the subject handbook. He explained in his testimony that in the pharmacy practice setting in which Brown has operated, whereby it serves a large indigent population in an inner city environment, it is difficult to contact a prescriber at the time when a patient needs a critical prescription refilled in order to get a refill authorization. The prescriptions at issue mostly involve critical medications for HIV/Aids and psychotropic medications for severe mental conditions such as schizophrenia. The patients who need these critical medications (and there are very few patients, since most of the procedures involve filling and refilling for a small number of such recipients) are patients of clinics operated at the nearby university hospital (Shands). In these circumstances, where the patient literally needs the HIV/Aids medication refilled on an immediate basis, possibly even to prevent death, and the mental health patient critically needs a refill in order to prevent harm to the patient or harm to the members of the public if the patient goes without medication and "decompensates," the ethical thing for a pharmacist to do is to refill the prescription and seek authorization later. Mr. Steinberg established that it is often difficult to obtain authorization from the original prescriber since the medication were prescribed by residents practicing in the various clinics at the Shands Hospital and that the residents can not always be identified or contacted easily since they do not maintain a fixed medical practice in the area. Consequently, some of the prescriptions were not documented as to authorization, although in some cases the pharmacy actually obtained authorization and entered it in its computer. In some cases, being unable to obtain re-authorization from the resident who originally prescribed the medication the pharmacy used the DEA license or prescribing number of the hospital itself. He explained that although under the law a pharmacy can refill a prescription on an emergency basis for up to a 72-hour supply, that this is generally impracticable and unsafe for patients in this plight because such indigent, mental health and HIV/Aids patients tend to be non-compliant with their medication regimes quite often anyway, and it is often unreasonable to expect them to return to the pharmacy for another refill within two or three days. He thus opined that the ethical and safe thing for the pharmacist to do was to refill and re-dispense the medical approved medication for up to a 30 or 34-day supply (the normal refill supply duration). He further explained that the Shands Hospital license number was used in some of these circumstances because the resident doctor who originally issued the prescription could not be identified on the Shands Hospital prescription forms and because the resident doctors at the Shands clinics only have and can use Shands Hospital prescription forms in any event. Mr. Steinberg thus established that 35 percent of those prescription claims classified as "WMP," that is the prescription claims contained an incorrect prscriber license number were for these reasons and the pharmacist could only use the Shands Hospital license number because the resident could not be identified from the Shands Hospital prescription forms. He thus opined that 35 percent of the random sample extrapolation amount, the 95 percent statistical confidence limit amount of $79,097.00, should be deleted from that amount in determining the correct amount of overpayment predicated on the random sample. Likewise, with regard to the judgmental sample concerning the HIV/Aids and mental health patient prescriptions and related claims, he opined that, in effect, $19,500.00 of the total $29,381.09 overpayment amount claimed by the Agency pursuant to the judgmental sample portion of the claims, should be deleted from that portion of the overpayment claim by the Agency; this is a result of his explanation regarding "substantial compliance" in the critical refill situation he described concerning the HIV/Aids and mental health patients and their prescription drugs. The preponderant, persuasive evidence does establish (and indeed the Agency acknowledged in its Proposed Recommended Order) with regard to the judgmental sample, that 10 of the claims at issue listed an incorrect prescriber license number, but that the correct prescriber license number was actually documented in the pharmacy's computer record with the name of the prescriber. This circumstances comports with the law referenced below and in the Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order. This results in a reduction in the overpayment claim with regard to the judgmental sample of 13.88 percent of the judgmental sample claims or a reduction of $4,078.09. Likewise, with regard to the random sample extrapolation calculation of overpaid claims, the preponderant, persuasive evidence, also as acknowledged by the Agency in its Proposed Recommended Order, disclosed that seven claims listed an incorrect prescriber license number on the claims, but had been correctly documented in the pharmacy's computer system and therefore were in compliance with the relevant statutes, rules, and the subject handbook. Thus the discrepant claims and the overpayment amount related to the random sample portion of the audit claims should be reduced by 14.28 percent of the total amount of $79,097.00 for a $11,295.05 reduction of that $79,097.00 random sample overpayment amount. Mr. Steinberg demonstrated that Brown was not overcharging on the drugs prescribed and dispensed and was charging the Medicaid-authorized amount for the drugs involved in the prescription claims at issue. The Agency is not claiming that there was any fraudulent practice or illegal overcharging for the prescriptions involved. In fact, Brown was earning only a very small profit on the drugs dispensed that are the subject of the prescription claims at issue. Mr. Steinberg thus opined that since Brown did indeed dispense all the drugs at issue and was only paid the legal authorized amounts for the drugs and prescriptions at issue that recoupment of the amounts sought by the Agency or, in effect, established in these findings of fact, would be fundamentally unfair. He and the Respondent contend, rather, that since Brown performed substantial compliance, but was guilty of technical non-compliance with the relevant rules, agreement, and Medicaid policy, that the Agency should impose a lesser fine instead of seeking recoupment. In summary, in view of the preponderant persuasive evidence establishing the above facts, it has been shown that the documentation and record-keeping, dispensing errors, and omissions in the manner found above, with regard to the prescription claims and types of claims addressed in the above findings of fact, occurred. If those deficiencies amount to violations of the authority cited and discussed below which justify recoupment, then the amount of overpayment established by the above findings of fact is $93,104.95.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Agency for Health Care Administration providing for recoupment of $93,104.95, and that the Respondent, Brown Pharmacy, must re-pay that amount to the Petitioner Agency, through a reasonable re- payment plan established between the parties. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of November, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November, 2006.
