Findings Of Fact Petitioner herein is the State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales Condominiums and Mobile Homes. One Respondent in this matter is Tanwin Corporation (hereinafter "Tanwin") the developer of two residential condominiums known as Vista Del Lago Condominium I and Vista Del Lago Condominium II, located in West Palm Beach, Florida. The other Respondent is Vista Del Lago Condominium Association, Inc. (hereinafter "Association"), the condominium association for Vista Del Lago Condominiums I and II. Transition from developer control of the Association has not occurred, and at all times pertinent hereto, Respondent Tanwin has in fact controlled the operation of the Respondent Association. The Declaration of Condominium for Vista Del Lago Condominium I (hereinafter "Condo I") was recorded in the public records on December 12, 1980. The Declaration of Condominium for Vista Del Lago Condominium II (hereinafter "Condo II") was recorded in the public records on March 11, 1982. Condo I contains 16 units; and Condo II contains 18 units. Herbert and Judith Tannenbaum are the President and Secretary, respectively, of both Tanwin and the Association and are members of the Association's Board of Directors. The developer-controlled Association failed to provide a proposed budget of common expenses for Condo I for the fiscal year 1982. The developer-controlled Association failed to provide a proposed budget of common expenses for Condo I and Condo II for 1983 until the unit owner meeting in March or April of 1983. The budget provided at that time contained no provision for reserves. Although the document alleged to be the 1983 proposed budget admitted in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 17 does contain an allocation for reserves, Petitioner's Exhibits numbered 17 is not the 1983 budget disseminated to unit owners at the annual meeting in 1983. In addition, the 1983 budget was received by the unit owners at the meeting at which the proposed budget was to be considered and not prior to the budget meeting. Statutory reserves were not waived during the period December, 1980 through December, 1983. The "start-up" budgets contained as exhibits to the Declarations of Condominium indicate that reserves were to be collected from unit owners at the rate of $15 per month per unit at least during the first year commencing December of 1980 with the first closing. Hence, reserves were not waived December, 1980 through December, 1981. From November, 1981 through December, 1983, no vote to waive reserves was taken by the unit owners. Although reserves were discussed at the 1983 meeting, no vote was taken during the period in question including 1983, to waive reserves. The developer as owner of unsold units; has failed to pay to the Association monthly maintenance for common expenses during the period December, 1980 through December, 1983. The developer Tanwin has, in the nature of an affirmative defense, alleged the existence of a guarantee of common expenses pursuant to Section 718.116(8), Florida Statutes, which purportedly ran from the inception of the condominiums to date. Accordingly, the initial issue for resolution is whether the developer pursuant to statute guaranteed common expenses. Section 718.116(8)(b) provides that a developer may be excused from payment of common expenses pertaining to developer-owned units for that period of time during which he has guaranteed to each purchaser in the declaration of condominium, purchase contract or prospectus, or by an agreement between the developer and a majority of unit owners other than the developer, that their assessments for common expenses would not increase over a stated dollar amount during the guarantee period and the developer agrees to pay any amount necessary for common expenses not produced by the assessments at the guaranteed level receivable from other unit owners, or "shortfall". Actual purchase agreements were admitted in evidence. Respondents seek to label certain unambiguous language in the purchase contracts as a guarantee. This language, uniform throughout all those contracts as well as the form purchase contract filed with Petitioner except that of Phillip May, provides as follows: 9. UNIT ASSESSMENTS. The Budget included in the Offering Circular sets forth Seller's best estimation of the contemplated expenses for operating and maintaining the Condominium during its initial year. Purchaser's monthly assessment under the aforementioned Budget is in the amount of $109.00. Until Closing of Title, Seller has the right (without affecting Purchaser's obligation to purchase in accordance with the provisions hereof, to modify the estimated Budget and assessments periodically if then current cost figures indicate that an updating of estimates is appropriate). [Emphasis added]. That portion of the purchase agreement set forth above does not constitute a guarantee. Instead, the purchase agreement simply includes a best estimation of expenses for the initial year. It does not govern assessments after the expiration of one year, and even as to the initial year, the language in the contract sets forth only a "best estimation" and not a guarantee that the assessments would not increase during the "guarantee period." Phillip May's purchase agreement reflects that he purchased his unit in August of 1983; after condominium complaints had been filed by the unit owners with the Florida Division of Land Sales Condominiums and Mobile Homes. His purchase agreement has been altered from the purchase agreement of earlier purchasers in that his purchase agreement expressly, by footnote contains a one- year guarantee running from closing. The guarantee contained in his purchase agreement was presented by the developer without any request from Mr. May for the inclusion of a guarantee in his purchase agreement. The guarantee language in this purchase agreement is useful for the purpose of comparing the language with those portions of the pre-complaint contracts which Respondents assert contain or constitute a guarantee. Similarly it is determined that no guarantee of common expenses exists in the Declarations of Condominium for Condo I and II or in the prospectus for Condo II. While Respondents seek to assert the existence of a guarantee in those documents, the portions of those unambiguous documents which according to Respondents contain a guarantee, have no relation to a guarantee or do not guarantee that the assessments for common expenses would not increase. Respondent Tanwin also seeks to prove the existence of an oral guarantee which was allegedly communicated to purchasers at the closing of their particular condominium units. However, purchasers were told by Herbert or Judith Tannenbaum only that assessments should remain in the amount of $109 per month per unit unless there existed insufficient funds in the Association to pay bills. This is the antithesis of a guarantee. During a guarantee period the developer in exchange for an exemption from payment of assessments on developer- owned units agrees to pay any deficits incurred by the condominium association. Accordingly, no guarantee was conveyed at the closing of condominium units. Further Respondent Tanwin's additional contention that an oral guarantee arose when the condominiums came into existence is plainly contradicted by the express language throughout the condominium documents and purchase agreements that there exist no oral representations and that no reliance can be placed on any oral representations outside the written agreements. Further, prior to December, 1983, no reference was ever made by the developer either inside or outside of unit owner meetings as to the existence of the alleged guarantee. Moreover, a comparison between on the one hand, the 1981 and 1982 financial statements prepared in March of 1983, and on the other hand, the 1983 financial statements, clearly reveals that even the accountant for Tanwin was unaware of the existence of a guarantee during the period in question. While the 1983 statements, prepared in 1984 after unit owners filed complaints with Petitioner contain references to a developer guarantee, the 1981 and 1982 statements fail to mention a guarantee. Instead, included in the 1981 and 1982 statements of the Association are references under the current liabilities portion of the balance sheets for those years, to a "Due to Tanwin Corporation" liability in the amounts of $2,138 for 1981 and $2,006 for 1982. Petitioner through Ronald DiCrescenzo, the C.P.A. for Tanwin, established that at a minimum, the $2,006 figure reflected in the 1982 balance sheet was in fact reimbursed to Tanwin. Section 7D-18.05(1),(c), Florida Administrative Code, entitled "Budgets" and effective on July 22, 1980, was officially recognized prior to the final hearing in this cause. That section requires each condominium filing to include an estimated operating budget which contains "[a] statement of any guarantee of assessments or other election and obligation of the developer pursuant to Section 718.116(8); Florida Statutes." The estimated operating budgets for Condo I and Condo II do not include a statement of any guarantee of assessments or other election or obligation of the developer. The testimony of Herbert Tannenbaum with regard to an oral (or written) guarantee is not credible. He first testified that an oral guarantee was communicated to purchasers at the closing of each unit. In contrast, Tannenbaum also testified that the first discussion he had regarding a guarantee occurred with his attorney after the filing of the Notice to Show Cause in this action. Tannenbaum further testified that he did not understand what a guarantee was until after this case had begun and was unaware of the existence of any guarantee prior to consulting with his attorney in regard to this case. Moreover, Ronald DiCrescenzo, the C.P.A. for Tanwin testified that it was Tannenbaum who informed DiCrescenzo of the existence of a guarantee but DiCrescenzo was unable or unwilling to specify the date on which this communication occurred. Respondent Tanwin also seeks to establish the existence of a guarantee through Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 5 which is a document signed by less than the majority of unit owners even including Tannenbaum and his son, and signed on an unknown date during 1984. The document provides: The undersigned Unit Owners at the Vista Del Lago Condominium do not wish to give up the benefits of the developer's continuing guarantee which has been in effect since the inception of the condominium and agreed to by a majority of unit owners and whereby the developer has continuously guaranteed a maintenance level of no more than $109.00 per month per unit, until control of the condominium affairs is turned over to the unit owners in accordance with Florida's Condominium law. According to Respondent Tanwin, Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 5 constitutes a memorandum signed by unit owners evidencing their belief that a continuous guarantee of the developer has been in effect. First, however, this document was never admitted into evidence for that purpose; rather the document was admitted only to establish the fact that a unit owner had signed the document. Second, this document, unlike the purchase agreements or other condominium documents is ambiguous and is not probative of the existence of a guarantee. Instead, the evidence is overwhelming that the document was prepared by the developer in the course of this litigation for use in this litigation. Moreover, unit owner testimony is clear regarding what Mr. and Mrs. Tannenbaum disclosed to unit owners as the purpose for the document when soliciting their signatures, to- wit: that the document was a petition evidencing the unit owners' desire that their monthly maintenance payments not be increased and that prior confusion as to whether reserves had been waived needed resolution. Respondent Tanwin did pay assessments on some developer-owned units during the period December, 1980 through December, 1983, a fact which is inconsistent with its position that a guarantee existed. Noteworthy is the statement by Ronald DiCrescenzo, the C.P.A. for Tanwin, in his August 16, 1983, letter to Herbert Tannenbaum wherein it is stated: "It is my understanding that you are doing the following: . . .[Playing maintenance assessments on units completed but not sold." It is inconceivable that a developer during a "guarantee period" would pay assessments on some developer units as the purpose of the statutory guarantee is to exempt the developer from such assessments. The assessments for common expenses of unit owners other than the developer have increased during the purported guarantee period. At least some, if not all, unit owners paid monthly assessments of $128 - $130 for at least half of 1984. This fact is probative of the issue of whether a guarantee existed because unit owner assessments must remain constant during a guarantee period. At the Spring 1984 meeting chaired by Mr. Tannenbaum a vote was taken for the first time as to whether reserves should be waived. Although only 21 owners were present in person or by proxy; the vote was tabulated as 12 in favor and 12 opposed. Mr. Tannenbaum, therefore, announced an increase in monthly maintenance payments to fund reserves. Thereafter owners began paying an increased assessment. The fact that the developer-controlled Association collected increased assessments from unit owners during 1984, and had up to the time of the final hearing in this cause made no effort to redistribute those funds suggests that the developer-controlled Association and the developer considered themselves to be under no obligation to keep maintenance assessments at a constant level. There was no guarantee of assessments for common expenses by Tanwin from December, 1980, through at least December, 1983. Since there was no guarantee during the time period in question, Respondent Tanwin is liable to the Respondent Association for the amount of monthly assessments for common expenses on all developer-owned units for which monthly assessments have not been paid. In conjunction with the determination that Tanwin owes money to the Association (and not vice versa), Respondent Tanwin attempted to obtain an offset by claiming the benefit of a management contract between either Tannenbaum or Tanwin and the Association. No such management contract exists, either written or oral. Although a management contract is mentioned in one of the condominium documents there is no indication that one ever came into being, and no written contract was even offered in evidence. Likewise, no evidence was offered to show the terms of any oral contract; rather, Tannenbaum admitted that he may never have told any of the unit owners that there was a management contract. Tannenbaum's testimony is consistent with the fact that no budget or financial statement reflects any expense to the Association for a management contract with anyone. Likewise, the "budget" contained within Condo II's documents recorded on March 11, 1982, specifically states that any management fee expense was not applicable. Lastly, Tannenbaum's testimony regarding the existence of a management contract is contrary to the statement signed by him on February 10, 1981, which specifically advised Petitioner that the Association did not employ professional management. To the extent that Respondent Tanwin attempted to establish some quantum meruit basis for its claim of an offset, it is specifically found that no basis for any payment has been proven for the following reasons: Tannenbaum had no prior experience in managing a condominium, which is buttressed by the number of violations of the condominium laws determined herein; Tannenbaum does not know what condominium managers earn; no delineation was made as to specific duties performed by Tannenbaum on behalf of the Association as opposed to those duties performed by Tannenbaum on behalf of Respondent Tanwin; since there was no testimony as to duties performed for the Association, there was necessarily no testimony as to what duties were performed on behalf of the Association in Tannenbaum's capacity as President of the Association and member of the Association's Board of Directors as opposed to duties allegedly performed as a "manager." Tannenbaum's testimony as to the value of his "services" ranged from $10,000 to $15,000 a year to a lump sum of $60,000; it is interesting to note that the value of his services alone some years exceeded the Association's annual budget. Respondent Tanwin has failed to prove entitlement to an offset amount, either pursuant to contract or based upon quantum meruit. The financial statements of the Association--including balance sheets, statements of position, and statements of receipts and expenditures--for 1980-81 and for 1982 reveal consolidation of the records for Condo I and Condo II in these statements. Additionally, DiCrescenzo admitted that separate accounting records were not maintained for each condominium and Herbert Tannenbaum also admitted to maintaining consolidated records. Accordingly, the developer- controlled Association failed to maintain separate accounting records for each condominium it manages. The By-Laws of the Association provide: SECTION. 7. Annual Audit. An audit of the accounts of the Corporation shall be made annually by a Certified Public Accountant - and a copy of the Report shall be furnished to each member not later than April 1st of the year following the year in which the Report was made. The financial statement for 1981 bears the completion date of February 9, 1983. The 1982 financial statement contains a completion date of March 1, 1983. Both the 1981 and the 1982 statements were delivered to the unit owners in March or April, 1983. Accordingly, Respondents failed to provide the 1981 financial report of actual receipts and expenditures in compliance with the Association's By-Laws. As set forth hereinabove, statutory reserves were not waived during the period of December, 1980 through December, 1983. Being a common expense, reserves must be fully funded unless waived annually. In the instant case, Respondents, rather than arguing that reserves had in fact been fully funded, sought to prove that reserves had been waived during the years in question. The fact that reserves were not fully funded is established by reviewing the financial statements. In accordance with the start-up budgets, reserves were initially established at the level of $15.00 per unit per month. Therefore, during 1981, for Condo I containing sixteen units, the Association's reserve account should contain 16 multiplied by $15.00 per month multiplied by 12 months, or $2,880. Since the Declaration of Condominium for Condo II was not recorded until March 11, 1982, assessments for common expenses including allocations to reserves, were not collected from Condo II during 1981. Therefore, the balance in the reserve account as reflected in the balance sheet for the year 1981 should be no less than $2,880. The actual balance reflected in this account is $2,445. Both Tannenbaum and DiCrescenzo testified that most of the balance in that account was composed of purchaser contributions from the closing of each condominium unit "equivalent to 2 months maintenance to be placed in a special reserve fund" as called for in the purchase contracts. Tannenbaum further admitted that instead of collecting $15.00 per month per unit for reserves, the money that would have gone into the reserve account was used "to run the condominium." Similarly, for the year ending 1982, the balance in the reserve account also reflects that reserves were not being funded. First, the amount of reserves which should have been set aside in 1981 of $2,880 is added to the total amount of reserves which should have been collected for 1982 for Condo I ($2880), giving a total figure of $5,760. To this figure should be added the reserves which should have been collected from units in Condo II during 1982. This figure is derived by multiplying the total number of units in Condo II, 18 units, by $15.00 per unit multiplied by 8 months (since Condo II was recorded in March of 1982) to yield a figure for Condo II of $2,160. Adding total reserve assessments for Condo I and II, $2,160 plus $5,760 equals $7,920 the correct reserve balance at the close of 1982. The actual balance for the period ended December 31, 1982, is reflected to be $4,138. Similarly, the amount of reserves required for Condos I and II as of December 31, 1983, can be calculated using the same formula. Although the 1983 financial statement prepared in 1984 reflects the existence of a funded reserve account, both DiCrescenzo and Tannenbaum admitted there was no separate reserves account set up during the time period involved herein. Statutory reserves were not waived and were not fully funded for the period of December, 1980 through December, 1983. All parties hereto presented much evidence, unsupported by the books and records of the corporations, for the determination herein of the amounts of money owed by Respondent Tanwin to the Association to bring current the total amount which Tanwin should have been paying to the Association from the inception of each condominium for monthly maintenance on condominium units not yet sold by the developer, together with the amount owed by Tanwin to the Association so that a separate reserve account can be established and fully funded for all years in which the majority of unit owners including the developer have not waived reserves. No findings of fact determining the exact amount Tanwin owes to the Association will be made for several reasons: first, the determination of that amount requires an accounting between the two Respondents herein which is a matter that can only be litigated, if litigation is necessary, in the circuit courts of this state; second, the determination of the amount due between the private parties hereto is not necessary for the determination by Petitioner of the statutory violations charged in the Amended Notice to Show Cause; and third, where books and records exist; one witness on each side testifying as to conclusions reached from review of those records, even though the witnesses be expert, does not present either the quantity or the quality of evidence necessary to trace the income and outgo of specific moneys through different corporate accounts over a period of time, especially where each expert opinion is based upon questionable assumptions. It is, however, clear from the record in this cause that Respondent Tanwin owes money to the Respondent Association and further owes to the Respondent Association an accounting of all moneys on a specific item by item basis.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered: Finding Respondent Tanwin Corporation guilty of the allegations contained in Counts 1-7 of the Amended Notice to Show Cause; Dismissing with prejudice Count 8 of the Amended Notice to Show Cause; Assessing against Respondent Tanwin Corporation a civil penalty in the amount of $17,000 to be paid by certified check made payable to the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes within 45 days from entry of the Final Order herein; Ordering Respondents to forthwith comply with all provisions of the Condominium Act and the rules promulgated thereunder; And requiring Tanwin Corporation to provide and pay for an accounting by an independent certified public accountant of all funds owed by the developer as its share of common expenses on unsold units and the amount for which Tanwin is liable in order that the reserve account be fully funded, with a copy of that accounting to be filed with Petitioner within 90 days of the date of the Final Order. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 9th day of August, 1985, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of August, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Karl M. Scheuerman, Esquire Thomas A. Bell, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Joseph S. Paglino, Esquire 88 Northeast 79th Street Miami, Florida 33138 E. James Kearney, Director Department of Business Regulation Division of Florida Land Sales Condominiums and Mobile Homes 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard B. Burroughs, Jr., Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL CONSENT ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION DIVISION OF FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS AND MOBILE HOMES DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION, DIVISION OF FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS AND MOBILE HOMES, Petitioner, CASE NO. 84-0437 DOCKET NO. 84001MVC TANWIN CORPORATION and VISTA DEL LAGO CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC. Respondents. / FINAL CONSENT ORDER The Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, (hereinafter the Division), Vista Del Lago Condominium Inc., (hereinafter the Association), and Tanwin Corporation, (hereinafter Tanwin), hereby stipulate and agree to the terms and issuance of this Final Consent Order as follows: WHEREAS, the Division issued a Notice to Show Cause directed to Respondents and, WHEREAS, after issuance of the Recommended Order in this cause, the parties amicably conferred for the purpose of achieving a settlement of the case, and WHEREAS, Tanwin is desirous of resolving the matters alleged in the Notice to Show Cause without engaging in further administrative proceedings or judicial review thereof, NOW, THEREFORE, it is stipulated and agreed as follows:
The Issue The issue is whether Respondents discriminated against Petitioner, Christa Bartok, on the basis of her disability, in violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA).
Findings Of Fact Based on evidence offered at hearing and testimony of witnesses, as well as the facts agreed upon in the Pre-hearing Stipulation, the following Findings of Fact are found: Bayou Breeze is a residential condominium association in Pensacola, Florida. Ms. Bartok was a prospective buyer of a condominium unit from its owner, a Bayou Breeze resident. The address of the unit was 300 Bayou Boulevard, Unit 106, Pensacola, Florida. Ms. Bartok is a person with a non-visible disability, which she described as anxiety, emotional distress disorder, and an autoimmune disease. Ms. Bartok was also the owner of a dog named Moni, weighing more than 40 pounds. She identified Moni as her emotional support dog. At all times material to this matter, Ms. Bartok was represented by Simone Sands, a real estate broker. The seller of Unit 106 was represented by Greg Thomas, also a realtor. The communication regarding all aspects of the sale of the property was through the two realtors. At the time of executing the contract, Bayou Breeze3 Bylaws provided, in pertinent part, Pets. Pets shall be kept or maintained in and about the condominium property only if unit owner is granted a conditional license to maintain one pet by the Association. Such a license will be granted subject to the following conditions and reservations: A. Acceptable Pets. The only pets to be maintained on condominium property shall be dogs under twenty (20) pounds when fully grown, cats and small birds. In addition, the Declaration of Condominium Paragraph XVI provided, in pertinent part, Approval of Purchasers, Lessees and Transferees No unit owner shall sell, lease or otherwise convey a unit, nor shall any sale, lease, conveyance or transfer of a unit other than by foreclosure or by devise or operation of law on account of the death of the unit owner, be effective unless the board of directors of the Association shall have approved the identity of the proposed purchaser, lessee or transferee in writing. Application of a proposed purchaser, lessee or transferee shall be in writing and on a form to be provided by the Association and shall be accompanied by two letters of recommendation. Any such application not rejected within 10 days after receipt by the Association or an officer thereof shall be deemed to have been approved. The costs for the submission of an application shall not exceed $100. … 3 The association name changed from Pensacola Executive House Condominium Association, Inc. to its current name. Right of First Refusal Should an Owner wish to sell or transfer his Unit, he shall deliver to the Association an Owner’s written notice containing a copy of the executed purchase agreement between buyer and seller, which agreement shall be executed subject to the Associations [sic] waiver of its right of first refusal and consent to the sale or transfer. The Owner shall also submit to the Association, within five (5) days from receipt of any request from the Association, any supplemental information as may be required by the Association. Ms. Bartok received the declarations and bylaws. However, a list of items to be submitted to the Association for sale of a property was provided to the owner, which included: letter of intent to sell, application for sale/transfer, two letters of recommendation, background check, and contract for sale. The list of items provided to the owner was not provided to Ms. Bartok. On June 20, 2020, Ms. Bartok executed a residential contract for purchase of Unit 106. A term that Ms. Bartok included in the contract provided, in pertinent part: “contingent upon buyer receiving HOA approval for her emotional support dog which is over condo weight restrictions but meets Fair Housing Act requirements for HOA waiver.”4 Ms. Bartok also provided a letter with her contract dated June 15, 2020, from her treating physician, Timothy Tuel, M.D., of Baptist Health Care. The letter stated: Dear Christa, I do believe you have several medical conditions that would benefit from a properly trained emotional support animal. Please contact me if you have other questions. 4 Ms. Bartok executed a counteroffer for the property on June 24, 2020, which did not change the term regarding approval of her ESA. Although, the letter does not specifically identify Ms. Bartok’s disability, it references her “medical conditions,” and that she could benefit from having an ESA. In addition to the contract and letter from Dr. Tuel, Ms. Bartok provided a completed application, two letters of recommendation, and a receipt for training for her dog.5 Ms. Bartok did not provide a completed background check because Mr. Thomas had advised Ms. Sands that the “HOA manager does it.” In addition, on June 30, 2020, in response to Ms. Sands’ text of, “good morning any reply from HOA,” Mr. Thomas indicated, “[n]o, not yet they’re doing background check.” Thus, Ms. Bartok had a reasonable belief that she could rely upon Mr. Thomas’ statement that the HOA was facilitating the background check and there was no need to provide the information at that time. Ms. Trimaur, the property manager for the Association, has managed Bayou Breeze condominiums for more than 11 years, and generally, receives all applications for sale or transfers of units at Bayou Breeze. She received the application materials Ms. Bartok submitted for the sale of Unit 106, which included the sales contract, letter from Dr. Tuel, reference letters, and the receipt for pet training sessions. Although Ms. Trimaur stated that it was difficult to read the digital copy of the letter from Dr. Tuel, she recalled that there was reference to Ms. Bartok’s “medical condition.” Ms. Trimaur also testified that Mr. Thomas told her that Ms. Bartok requested a waiver of the pet policy. Ms. Trimaur did not receive the financial or criminal background information with Ms. Bartok’s application packet. Ms. Trimaur submitted the application materials to Mr. Cross for review. She testified that she also had verbal discussions about the dog with Mr. Cross. 5 The receipt for training referenced “Beginner Training-for Moni” and was scheduled to begin on July 25, 2020. Mr. Cross, the president of the association, reviewed a copy of the application materials. He testified that Ms. Trimaur bypassed normal approval process by submitting the packet without the background checks due to COVID-19. As the Association president, Mr. Cross is required to review all application materials to determine whether the Association elects to exercise its right of first refusal. Mr. Cross testified that he reviewed the contract. However, he testified that he did not recall reading Ms. Bartok’s term that the acceptance was contingent upon approval of her emotional support dog. Mr. Cross did not state that there were pages missing or that there was anything that would prevent him reviewing the contract in its entirety. Mr. Cross testified that he reviewed the recommendation letters,6 which noted the size of Petitioner’s dog. He also spoke to Ms. Trimaur about the dog. After review of the application materials that Ms. Bartok submitted, Mr. Cross sent a letter to Anai, the owner of Unit 106, on July 2, 2021. The letter stated: Dear Anai, The association is in receipt of your request to sell your condominium unit 106 Bayou Breeze Condominiums, 300 Bayou Breeze, Pensacola, Fla. As you know there are specific requirements a potential new purchaser of a condominium must meet, according to the Bayou Breeze Declaration of Condominiums, Articles of Incorporation, By-Laws and Rules and Regulations, before they will be eligible to purchase a Condominium at the said premises. Section X of the By-Laws states the following: Pets. Pets shall be kept or maintained in and about the 6 The recommendations were not offered into evidence in this case. condominium property only if a unit owner is granted a conditional license to maintain one pet by the association. Such a license will be granted subject to the following conditions and reservations: Section A clearly states that a dog weighting [sic] 20 pounds or less that was fully grown could qualify. Section D. states that the dog must be carried in the arms when taken in and out of the building. The information that you have submitted so far is primarily the request for the Association to waive its pet restrictions in accordance to the By-Laws, section X of the Condominium Governing Laws. Unfortunately, that is something that we cannot do. Don’t get me wrong, I love dogs. I, at one time lived at Bayou Breeze but had to move because I wanted a dog. I have been the president of this association for 29 years. Over the years the association has had many requests much like your potential buyer’s request to waive our rules. We are well aware of the HUD laws as well as the American Disability Act. We have, unfortunately been to court several times on this issue. We have never waived the pet requirements. Even though we have not received all of the background information and detailed documentation that is necessary for the Association to approve a purchase of this unit, I am notifying you that the Association cannot except [sic] this application, because of the current situation that you have presented. Sincerely Charles D. Cross President, Bayou Breeze Condominium Association 300 Bayou Breeze, Pensacola, Fl. 32501 Mr. Cross acknowledged in his written position statement that Ms. Bartok submitted a request for waiver for an ESA. He testified that he did not deny the request for an ESA because it was not clear to him that the request was for an ESA. Both Mr. Cross and Ms. Trimaur testified that Ms. Bartok’s request for an ESA was not accepted because the materials provided were incomplete, i.e. that the application did not include the financial and criminal background check. Both Ms. Trimaur and Mr. Cross testified that other tenants of Bayou Breeze have been approved for ESAs. The letter from Mr. Cross to Anai is inconsistent with Mr. Cross’ testimony. First, the letter signed by Mr. Cross clearly states that he is aware of the request for a “pet waiver” and stated that he is “well aware of the HUD laws as well as the American Disability Act. … We have never waived the pet requirements.” Second, the letter states that “Even though we have not received the background information, … the Association cannot except [sic] the application, because of the current situation that you have presented.” At hearing, Mr. Cross testified that he expected to receive more information. If the application packet was incomplete and Mr. Cross expected to receive additional information, it would follow that Mr. Cross would specify in writing to Anai the items that were needed to complete the application. That did not happen in this case. The letter makes no reference that additional information could be provided or what information was necessary. Last, Mr. Cross claimed the letter to Anai was not a denial letter. However, it clearly stated that the request to waive the pet restriction was something the Association could not do and has never done, even when involving the ADA. The undersigned finds that the statements in the letter together with the term in the contract seeking a waiver and Ms. Bartok’s letter from her physician demonstrates that Respondents had notice of Ms. Bartok’s request for a reasonable accommodation pursuant to the ADA. The undersigned also finds that Respondent’s letter of July 2, 2020, was a denial of Ms. Bartok’s application for purchase of Unit 106 based on her request for a reasonable accommodation, a waiver for her ESA. Ms. Bartok testified that she believed the July 2, 2020, letter was a denial of her application. Believing she could not purchase the property, she canceled the contract on the same date. After Ms. Bartok canceled the contract, believing that the Association improperly denied her request for a “pet waiver” for her ESA, she submitted a letter dated July 8, 2020, requesting a reasonable accommodation for her disability. That letter included another letter from Dr. Tuel, to the Association, which stated, in pertinent part: Dear Housing Association: Christa Bartok is my patient and has been under my care since April 7, 2020. I am intimately familiar with her history and with the functional limitations imposed by her disability. She meets the definition of disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Fair Housing Act, and Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Due to [intentionally omitted] illness, Christa Bartok has certain limitations regarding performing some life activities. [Intentionally omitted] can be a direct effect of a chronic illness. In order to help alleviate these difficulties, and to enhance his/her ability to live independently and to fully use and enjoy the dwelling unit you own and/or administer, I am prescribing an emotional support animal that will assist Christa Bartok in coping with his/her disability. Her dog Monroe (Moni) qualifies as an emotional support animal under the guidelines put forth by the Fair Housing Act and The American’s [sic] with Disabilities Act. … Ms. Bartok credibly testified that she submitted the letter with attachments to Mr. Cross’ email address. She submitted a second request for reconsideration of the Association’s decision on July 10, 2021. Ms. Bartok did not receive a response to her letters. Although Mr. Cross confirmed his email at the final hearing, he denied receiving Ms. Bartok’s emailed requests for reasonable accommodation. The undersigned credits Ms. Bartok’s testimony on the issue of whether the emails were sent to Mr. Cross. Ms. Bartok testified that after she canceled the contract, she purchased another home. She asserts that she incurred costs for the difference in the amount of the mortgage she has paid since the denial letter was issued, the difference in costs for HOA dues, and the loss associated with extending her rental agreement prior to purchasing her new home. Ms. Bartok did not provide any supporting documents to demonstrate her loss that she asserts she incurred as a result of Respondent’s discriminatory actions. Ultimate Findings of Fact The evidence demonstrates that Ms. Bartok established that she suffers from anxiety, emotional distress disorder, and an autoimmune disease, and therefore, she has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that she is disabled within the meaning of the FHA. Ms. Bartok’s additional term included in her application for sale and the request for accommodation submitted following rejection of her application, was sufficient to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association was on notice that Ms. Bartok sought the “pet waiver” as a reasonable accommodation for her ESA. The undersigned finds the preponderance of evidence supports a finding that approving Ms. Bartok’s dog as an ESA was a reasonable accommodation that would assist Ms. Bartok by providing emotional support; and Respondents refused the requested accommodation. There is not sufficient evidence to establish that the Association has articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for withholding approval of Ms. Bartok’s ESA. Therefore, Ms. Bartok established by a preponderance of evidence that Respondents discriminated against her based on her disability, by failing to approve a request for a reasonable accommodation (approving Ms. Bartok’s ESA) in violation of the FHA.
Conclusions For Petitioner: Christa N. Bartok, pro se 203 Southeast Syrcle Drive Pensacola, Florida 32507 For Respondent: Sharon D. Regan, Esquire Post Office Box 13404 Pensacola, Florida 32591
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order granting Christa Bartok’s Petition for Relief, in part, as follows: finding that Respondents engaged in a discriminatory housing practice based on Ms. Bartok’s disability, by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation to Ms. Bartok in the form of an ESA; and (b) ordering Respondents to prohibit the practice of denying reasonable accommodations to individuals and potential buyers who request a reasonable accommodation on the basis of their disability. Ms. Bartok, having failed to prove she suffered any quantifiable damages as a result of her purchase of a different home, she is not entitled to damages or other financial relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of October, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: S YOLONDA Y. GREEN Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of October, 2021. Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Sharon D. Regan, Esquire Post Office Box 13404 Pensacola, Florida 32591 Christa N. Bartok 203 Southeast Syrcle Drive Pensacola, Florida 32507 Stanley Gorsica, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020
The Issue The ultimate issues to be resolved in this proceeding are whether the Respondent has committed violations of the Florida Condominium Act (Chapter 718, Florida Statutes) and, if so, whether a cease and desist order and/or civil fine should be imposed. Petitioner contends that the allegations of the Notice to Show Cause have been established and that a cease and desist order and civil fine are appropriate. The Respondent contends that to the extent any violations of the Act have been established, they are only of a technical sort, and do not justify the imposition of any sanction.
Findings Of Fact Nautico Bay Club, Inc., is the developer of the Nautico Bay Condominium, located at 6937 Bay Drive, Miami Beach, Florida. At all times material to this proceeding, Samuel Weintraub was the president of Nautico Bay Club, Inc., and was primarily responsible for conducting its day-to-day business activities. The Nautico Bay Club Condominium includes 48 residential units. The first units were sold on December 1, 1980. The final closing on the 48 units occurred on December 31, 1980. The Respondent failed to call an annual meeting of the unit owners at Nautico Bay Condominium during 1981. The Respondent was having some difficulty communicating with some of the unit owners because they lived outside of the country. Nonetheless, the Respondent did not give written notice to unit owners of an annual meeting during 1981, did not post notice of an annual meeting during 1981 on the condominium property, did not send a notice of an annual meeting during 1981 by mail to each unit owner, and did not retain a post office certificate of mailing as proof of mailing of notice to unit owners. No annual meeting of unit owners was conducted during 1981. As the developer who maintained control over condominium activities during 1981, the Respondent was obliged to call and conduct an annual meeting of unit owners. The Respondent retained a private public accounting firm to prepare a financial statement for the Nautico Bay Club Condominium for the year ending December 31, 1981. The statement was completed on February 10, 1982. The Respondent remained in charge of the administration of the condominium association at that time. The Respondent made no effort to provide copies of the financial statement by mail or personal delivery to each unit owner. While some unit owners may have obtained copies of the financial statement within 60 days of December 31, 1981, most did not. At least one unit owner did not receive a copy of the financial statement until sometime in November, 1982. On or about September 17, 1982, the Respondent turned over operation of the condominium association to the Nautico Bay Club Condominium Association. The Respondent's president, Mr. Weintraub, offered to have the financial records reviewed by the independent certified public accounting firm that he had utilized in the past. The unit owners protested and asked instead that he pay to have the documents reviewed by a firm of their choosing. The Respondent did not have the financial records and statements reviewed by an independent accounting firm. He offered to have them reviewed by the firm he had utilized in the past, but the unit owners declined that offer. In the prospectus that the Respondent offered to potential unit purchasers, an estimated monthly operating budget and an estimated annual operating budget for the condominium, and an estimated monthly operating budget and an estimated annual operating budget per unit were set out. No other proposed budget was issued for 1981, nor does it appear that one was required, since the first persons who purchased units did not do so until December, 1980. No proposed annual budget of common expenses was prepared for the 1982 calendar year. Instead, the Respondent merely utilized the estimated budgets that had been set out in the prospectus. These were never, however, presented as a proposed annual budget for 1982. The Respondent did not provide as a part of its budgets for 1981 or 1982 for reserve accounts for capital expenditures and deferred maintenance. Accounts were not established to reserve funds for roof replacement, building painting, pavement resurfacing, and the like. The estimated replacement costs of such items were not a part of any budget prepared by Respondent. The funds were neither established nor funded by the Respondent. Mr. Weintraub testified that the reason the accounts were not established is that he had difficulty collecting assessments from unit owners. It does not appear, however, that the Respondent made any effort to collect assessments from unit owners, nor that the accounts were established with such funds as could have been collected.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent engaged in a discriminatory housing practice by allegedly excluding Petitioner from participating in a homeowner’s meeting on January 14, 2009, or ejecting Petitioner from the meeting, based on Petitioner’s religion and alleged handicap, in violation of Section 760.37 and Subsections 760.23(2), 760.23(8), 760.23(8)(2)(b), and 784.03(1)(a)(l), Florida Statutes (2008),1 and, if not, whether Respondent is entitled to attorney fees and costs pursuant to Section 120.595, Florida Statutes (2009).
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a condominium association defined in Section 718.103, Florida Statutes. Respondent manages a condominium development, identified in the record as Tregate East Condominiums (Tregate). Tregate is a covered multifamily dwelling within the meaning of Subsection 760.22(2), Florida Statutes. Petitioner is a Jewish male whose age is not evidenced in the record. A preponderance of the evidence presented at the final hearing does not establish a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of religion, ethnicity, medical, or mental disability, or perceived disability. Rather, a preponderance of the evidence shows that Respondent did not discriminate against Petitioner in the association meeting on January 14, 2009. In particular, the fact-finder reviewed the videotape of the entire meeting that took place on January 14, 2009. The meeting evidenced controversy, acrimony, and differences of opinion over issues confronting the homeowners present. However, the video tape did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on Petitioner’s religion, ethnicity, or alleged handicap. Respondent seeks attorney’s fees in this proceeding pursuant to Section 120.595, Florida Statutes (2009). Pursuant to Subsection 120.595(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2009), this Recommended Order finds that Petitioner has participated in this proceeding for an improper purpose. Petitioner participated in this proceeding for a frivolous purpose within the meaning of Subsection 120.595(1)(e)1., Florida Statutes (2009). The evidence submitted by Petitioner presented no justiciable issue of fact or law. Petitioner provided no evidence to support a finding that he suffers from a handicap defined in Subsection 760.22(7), Florida Statutes. Petitioner claims to have a disability based on migraine headaches but offered no medical evidence to support a finding that Petitioner suffers from migraine headaches or any medical or mental disability. Petitioner’s testimony was vague and ambiguous, lacked precision, and was not specific as to material facts. Petitioner called four other witnesses and cross-examined Respondent’s witnesses. Petitioner’s examination of his witnesses and cross-examination of Respondent’s witnesses may be fairly summarized as consisting of comments on the answers to questions and argument with the witnesses. Petitioner repeatedly disregarded instructions from the ALJ not to argue with witnesses and not to comment on the testimony of a witness. Petitioner offered no evidence or legal authority that the alleged exclusion from the homeowners meeting on January 14, 2009, was prohibited under Florida’s Fair Housing Act.3 Petitioner offered no evidence that he is a “buyer” or “renter” of a Tregate condominium within the meaning of Section 760.23, Florida Statutes. Rather, the undisputed evidence shows that Petitioner is not a buyer or renter of a Tregate condominium. Petitioner attended the homeowners meeting on January 14, 2009, pursuant to a power of attorney executed by the owner of the condominium. If a preponderance of the evidence were to have shown that the owner’s representative had been excluded from the meeting, the harm allegedly prohibited by the Fair Housing Act would have been suffered vicariously by the condominium owner, not the non-owner and non-renter who was attending the meeting in a representative capacity for the owner. The condominium owner is not a party to this proceeding. A preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner has standing to bring this action. Petitioner was neither an owner nor a renter on January 14, 2009. Petitioner’s only legal right to be present at the meeting was in a representative capacity for the owner. The alleged exclusion of Petitioner was an alleged harm to the principal under the Fair Housing Act. Respondent is the prevailing party in this proceeding, and Petitioner is the non-prevailing party. Petitioner has participated in two or more similar proceedings involving Respondent. The parties resolved those proceedings through settlement. The resolution is detailed in the Determination of No Cause by the Commission and incorporated herein by this reference. Respondent seeks attorney’s fees totaling $3,412.00 and costs totaling $1,001.50. No finding is made as to the reasonableness of the attorney fees costs because Respondent did not include an hourly rate and did not submit an affidavit of fees and costs. However, the referring agency has statutory authority to award fees costs in the final order pursuant to Subsection 760.11(7), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief and requiring Petitioner to pay reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in the amounts to be determined by the Commission after hearing further evidence on fees and costs in accordance with Subsection 760.11(7), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of April, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of April, 2010.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondents are guilty of the following: (a) breach of fiduciary relationship in violation of Section 718.111(1)(a), Florida Statutes; (b) failure to respond in writing to written inquiries in violation of Section 718.112(2)(a)2., Florida Statutes; (c) failure to properly notice a meeting in which regular assessments were discussed in violation of Section 718.112(2)(c), Florida Statutes; (d) failure to proportionately excuse payment of common expenses for all units owners after doing so for one unit owner in violation of Section 718.116(9)(a), Florida Statutes; and (e) willfully and knowingly violating Chapter 718, Florida Statutes, in violation of Section 718.501(d)(4), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Ocean Gate is a unit-owner controlled condominium located in St. Augustine, Florida. A three-member board of directors governs Ocean Gate. However, Article V of Ocean Gate's Articles of Incorporation states as follows in relevant part: This corporation shall have three (3) directors initially. Thereafter, the number of directors may be increased from time to time in the manner provided by the Bylaws, but shall never be fewer than three. Ocean Gate's original developer was Robert Laurence/Ocean Gate Development, Inc. On or about June 16, 1999, the developer recorded Ocean Gate's Declaration of Condominium in the official record book 1417, page 1932, of the public records of St. Johns County, Florida. At that time, Ocean Gate's directors, as set forth in the Articles of Incorporation, were Roger W. McClain, Leslie Gallagher, and Robert J.L. Laurence. The property at issue includes two buildings (2.1 and 2.2) containing a total of 10 units. Units 600, 604, 608, 612, 616, and 620 are located in Ocean Gate's 2.1 building. Units 605, 609, 613, and 617 are located in Ocean Gate's 2.2 building. On June 16, 1999, the following deeds were recorded in the official record book of St. Johns County, Florida: (a) unit 600 to Mr. and Mrs. Grissom (later sold to the Mr. Barrow/Flag Development Corporation); (b) unit 604 to Mr. and Mrs. McNeely; (c) unit 608 to Dr. and Mrs. Blankenship; (d) unit 612 to Mr. and Mrs. Klinehoffer; (e) unit 616 to Mr. and Mrs. Pittman (later sold to Mr. and Mrs. Weaver); and (f) unit 620 to Mr. and Mrs. Carabetta. The unit owners in the 2.1 building had to lend the developer funds to complete the construction of their units. Even so, these unit owners had to foreclose on that loan and spend additional funds to complete the construction on their units. On or about July 1, 1999, Ocean Gate issued a Notice of Owners Meeting. The meeting was scheduled for July 17, 1999. The agenda attached to the notice included the following: (a) call to order; (b) establish a quorum; (c) waiver of 60-day notice; (d) introduction of May Management Services, Inc. (May Management); (e) official approval of management contract; (f) discussion of board members; (g) discussion of contract; and (h) adjournment. Ocean Gate held its first unit owners' meeting on July 17, 1999. Mr. Klinehoffer, Mr. and Mrs. Pittman, Dr. and Mrs. Blankenship, Mr. and Mrs. McNeely, Mr. Grissom, and Mr. and Mrs. Carabetta attended the meeting. The developer did not attend the meeting. During the July 17, 1999, meeting, the unit owners accepted the resignation of Les R. Gallagher, as a director, and elected the following directors/officers: Mr. Grissom, president; Mr. Kleinhoffer, vice president; and Mrs. Pittman, secretary/treasurer. The representative of May Management announced that the developer had turned over $8,308.44 to the unit owners. Ocean Gate conducted a unit owners meeting on December 4, 1999. Mr. Grissom and Dr. Blankenship attended the meeting. Mrs. Pittman attended by proxy. A representative of the developer was also in attendance. During the meeting, the unit owners approved Ocean Gate's 2000 operating budget. On or about January 14, 2000, Mrs. Pittman resigned as a director and secretary/treasurer. A unit owners meeting took place on January 29, 2000. Mr. Grissom, Dr. and Mrs. Blankenship, Mr. Carabetta, Mr. and Mrs. McNeely, and Mr. Weaver were in attendance. In a notice dated March 22, 2000, Ocean Gate scheduled a unit owners meeting for April 15, 2000. The agenda included the following: (a) call to order; (b) establish a quorum; (c) approval of minutes of January 29, 2000; (d) financial report; (e) old business (release of lien payment for John M. Williams); (f) new business, including election of director; (g) date of next meeting; and (h) adjournment. During the meeting, Mr. Weaver was elected to fill a vacancy on Ocean Gate's board of directors. The Carabettas' unit, which is located in the 2.1 building, is the largest unit on the property. Mr. Carabetta refused to pay some of Ocean Gate's assessments because he did not believe Ocean Gate was properly maintaining his unit. In time, he filed at least one lawsuit against Ocean Gate and its board of directors. He also filed defamation and discrimination lawsuits against some of the unit owners in their individual capacities. Mr. Carabetta testified at hearing that Ocean Gate failed to maintain his unit while expending funds to maintain the units of the Weavers, the Blankenships, the McNeelys, and the Klinehoffers. There is no persuasive evidence that the directors of Ocean Gate improperly refused to pay for maintenance/repair of the common elements in the 2.1 building, including the limited common elements directly affecting Mr. Carabetta's unit. The 2.2 building was the subject of a foreclosure suit. It was sold on the courthouse steps to Flag Development Corporation on June 13, 2000. Pursuant to that sale, Flag Development Corporation also bought two additional condominium developments, Ocean Gate Phase II and Ocean Gate Phase III, which are not a part of the property at issue here. The record contains a Certificate of Title conveying real and personal property to Flag Development Corporation. The certificate refers to a description of real and personal property, "Exhibit A," which is not attached to the copy of the certificate in the record. John Williams and Mr. Barrow are business associates affiliated with Flag Development Corporation. After receiving title to the 2.2 building, their company did nothing more than clean up the property. They did no construction, maintenance, or repair work. In two letters, Jones & Pellicer, Inc., civil engineers and land surveyors, responded to Mr. Weaver's request for a survey to determine the square footage for each unit. The first letter dated May 31, 2000, referred to the survey of units 600, 604, 608, 612, 616, and 620 in the 2.1 building. The second letter dated July 31, 2000, referred to the survey of units 605, 609, 613, and 617 in the 2.2 building. According to the letters, the surveys determined the square footage for each unit using the floor area, as defined by Section 4.7-Unit Boundaries "A" and "B" in the Ocean Gate Declaration of Condominium. Mr. Walters purchased the four units in Ocean Gate's 2.2 building from John Williams/Flag Development Corporation in late July or early August 2000. The purchase price was approximately one million dollars. The record contains a copy of the corporate warranty deed conveying the 2.2 building to Mr. Walters. The deed states that the transfer of title is "subject to taxes for the current year, covenants, restrictions, and easements of record, if any." The attachments to the deed describing the property include Schedule A, Exhibit A, and Exhibit A Continued. The document identified as Exhibit A Continued, and which appears to be signed by the original developer, is not legible. When Mr. Walters bought the four units, the 2.2 building had a roof, windows, walls, and doors from which the square footage of each unit could be determined. The building was about 45 percent complete but not sufficiently complete to qualify any of the units in the building for a certificate of occupancy. Mr. Walters hired a contractor to complete the construction on his units. The construction, which involved a considerable sum of money, included work on the common elements and the interior of the units. There were liens on the 2.2 building for Ocean Gate's assessments when Mr. Walters purchased his four units. Mr. Walters refused to pay any past or ongoing assessments on his four units. In turn, Ocean Gate refused to expend any funds to maintain or repair the 2.2 building. Ocean Gate continued to impose assessments on all unit owners, including Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta. Ocean Gate also had to impose special assessments on some unit owners to make up the shortfall when Mr. Walters and/or Mr. Carabetta refused to pay their regular assessments. On October 17, 2000, Ocean Gate filed a Revised Claim of Lien against Mr. Walters for unpaid assessments and late charges. The Revised Claim of Lien alleged that Mr. Walters owed Ocean Gate a balance of $20,983.42. In a letter dated October 18, 2000, Ocean Gate advised Mr. Walters that a foreclosure suit would be instituted if he did not pay the assessments and charges. Early in 2001, Ocean Gate filed a Complaint seeking foreclosure of the liens against Mr. Walters in Case No. CA-01- 85, in the Circuit Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit, in and for St. Johns County, Florida. On or about March 1, 2001, Mr. Walters filed a Motion to Dismiss in Case No. CA-01-85, in the Circuit Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit, in and for St. Johns County, Florida. Mr. Walters took the position that he was not obliged to pay condominium assessment until a certificate of occupancy was issued and that the original developer had never relinquished control of Ocean Gate. Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta together owned over 51 percent of the total square footage in all units. Therefore, they controlled a majority of Ocean Gate's voting interests, which are directly proportional to the square footage in each unit. Specifically, Mr. Walters controlled a total of 36.207 percent of the membership voting interests and Mr. Carabetta controlled a total of 15.990 percent of the membership voting interests. Mr. Weaver was Ocean Gate's president in September 2001. Mr. McNeely and Mr. Klinehoffer were also directors/officers. All three of the directors were named as defendants in one or more of Mr. Carabetta's lawsuits. On or about September 26, 2001, Mr. Weaver issued the second notice of Ocean Gate's annual meeting of unit owners. The notice included the following agenda items: (a) roll call; (b) reading of minutes of last meeting; (c) reports of officers; (d) election of directors; (e) unfinished business; (f) original resolutions and new business; and (g) adjournment. The annual meeting of Ocean Gate's unit owners took place on October 27, 2001. During the meeting Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta, in concert with one additional unit owner, used their majority voting interests to elect themselves as directors. Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta received 64 percent of the votes. Dr. Blankenship, receiving 84.69 percent of the votes, became Ocean Gate's third director and "acting" president. After the election of the directors, Mr. Walters expressed his frustration about the liens on his property and the pending foreclosure action involving at that time approximately $50,000 in assessments and interest. In an effort to resolve the conflict, Dr. Blankenship proposed the following as a global concept: Homer Barrow and the newly elected Ocean Gate Phase I Condo Association Board will attempt to satisfy the concerns of the Carabetta's [sic] with regard to correction of deficiencies on their unit. The Carabettas will dismiss all lawsuits and complaints against other unit owners and boards and pay overdue assessments. Richard Walters will contribute $10,000 to the Phase I Association as final settlement of lien/foreclosure action. Unit owners will end foreclosure action against Richard Walters and forgive existing liens against Richard Walters. It is understood that the above action and commitments are interdependent and sequential in the order listed above. Minutes of Meeting of the Unit Owners, October 27, 2001. Mr. Walters initially objected to paying the $10,000. However, John Williams persuaded Mr. Walters to join in the proposed agreement. After Dr. Blankenship's motion regarding the proposed agreement was seconded, the unit owners who were present at the October 27, 2001, meeting verbally approved the proposed agreement. The unit owners never reduced the proposed agreement to writing. They never signed a copy of the minutes containing the proposed agreement. Mr. Klinehoffer was the only unit owner who was not present at the meeting. Mr. Klinehoffer had not given Mr. Weaver or any other unit owner his proxy to vote in favor of a settlement of the pending litigation against Mr. Walters. More importantly, the consideration of assessments and a settlement agreement regarding the foreclosure suit were not included as agenda items in the notice of the unit owners' meeting. On November 17, 2001, Ocean Gate's directors held another meeting. They elected the following officers: Dr. Blankenship, president; Mr. Walters, vice-president; and Mr. Carabetta, secretary/treasurer. During the November 17, 2001, meeting, Mr. Walters wanted to discuss implementing the proposed settlement agreement from the October 27, 2001, unit owners' meeting. In other words, Mr. Walters wanted Ocean Gate to drop the foreclosure suit against him in exchange for $10,000. However, the minority unit owners asserted that Mr. Carabetta had not dropped his lawsuits against Ocean Gate and the other unit owners in the 2.1 building. Mr. Weaver took the position that the proposed settlement agreement was not valid unless it was implemented sequentially beginning with coming to terms with Mr. Carabetta and Mr. Carabetta dropping all of his lawsuits. Mr. McNeely asserted that he would not agree to participate in the global agreement. Mr. Klinehoffer stated that he did not agree to the global agreement and specifically objected to any change in Mr. Walters' assessment responsibilities or liabilities. On December 10, 2001, Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta conducted a board of directors meeting. A facsimile transmission had been sent to Dr. Blankenship as notice of the meeting, but he was out of town and had no actual prior knowledge about the meeting or its agenda. The notice for the December 10, 2001, board of directors meeting was posted on Ocean Gate's property 48 hours in advance of the meeting. The agenda attached to the notice made reference to a non-specific item identified as "approval of resolutions" without reference to the subject matter and without mention of assessments or settlement agreements. During the December 10, 2001, board of directors meeting, Mr. Walters proposed a resolution to allow him to pay $10,000 in lieu of his past due assessments, to release the liens on his four units, and to dismiss the foreclosure action. After Mr. Walters proposed the resolution, Mr. Carabetta provided a second and voted to pass the resolution. Mr. Weaver and Mr. McNeely protested that Mr. Walters could not vote due to a conflict of interest and that without Mr. Walters' vote, the board of directors did not have a quorum. Mr. Walters then recused himself. Next Mr. Weaver contacted Dr. Blankenship by telephone. However, on faulty advice from Mr. Carabetta's personal attorney, Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta refused to let Dr. Blankenship vote on the resolution. Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta also refused to let Ocean Gate's attorney, Roseanne Perrine, participate in the meeting by telephone. Before the meeting adjourned, Mr. Walters declared that the resolution had passed and the matter was closed based on Mr. Carabetta's sole affirmative vote. Next, Mr. Walters proposed that Ocean Gate terminate its contract with May Management. Mr. Walters then introduced a representative of Coastal Realty and Property Management, Inc. (Coastal). Over Mr. Weaver's objections, Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta voted to replace May Management with Coastal. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that May Management was a reputable company with no major complaints from the unit owners. In a letter dated December 11, 2001, Ms. Perrine reminded Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta that her firm represented Ocean Gate in the foreclosure action against Mr. Walters. She claimed that the resolution passed on December 10, 2001, was invalid. She asserted that she would withdraw as counsel of record if requested to dismiss the lawsuit based on the December 10, 2001, resolution. In a letter dated December 12, 2001, Mr. Carabatta enclosed a copy of a check made payable to Ocean Gate in the amount of $8,062.54. According to the letter, the check represented the amount of Mr. Carabetta's assessments though year 2001. The letter stated that the check had been delivered to Coastal for deposit into an operating account for Ocean Gate. Finally, the letter demanded that May Management stop all foreclosure proceedings against Mr. Carabetta and release the lien of record against his property. On December 12, 2001, Mr. Carabetta authorized Coastal to open new bank accounts for Ocean Gate using his check as an initial deposit. Dr. Blankenship wrote a letter dated December 13, 2001, to Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta. In the letter, Mr. Blankenship objected to the lack of notice regarding the December 10, 2001, board of directors meeting and its agenda. Dr. Blankenship's letter complained that he had not been allowed to vote when he was called during the meeting. On or about December 16, 2001, the Circuit Court Judge in Case No.: CA-01-85, in the Seventh Judicial Circuit, in and for St. Johns County, Florida, entered an Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants Motion to Dismiss. The order states as follows in pertinent part: Third, the Defendants assert the Plaintiff is without standing to assess maintenance fees, file liens, or foreclose any lien because the developer never turned over control of the association to the unit owners pursuant to Article 8.5 of the Declaration of Condominium of Ocean Gate Phase I, A Condominium. Nothing contained in Article 8.5 of the Declaration supports the Defendant's assertion. The Association was given the authority to assess fees in Paragraph 7 of the Declaration, not Article 8.5. Paragraph 7 states: Assessments. To provide the funds necessary for proper operation and maintenance of the Condominium, the Phase I Association has been granted the right to make, levy, and collect Assessments and Special Assessments against all Unit Owners and Units. Fourth, the Defendants' assert the condominium association had no authority to charge condominium fees since the buildings have not yet been completed, nor have certificates of occupancy been issued. According to Ris Investment Group, Inc. v. Dep't of Business and Professional Regulation, 695 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), the question before the Court is whether, in accordance with the Declaration, the term "unit" was intended to encompass raw land and/or condominiums which had not yet been purchased, or just land upon which the condominium units had already been built and/or purchased. A review of the pertinent portion of the Declaration is necessary to answer the foregoing questions. Paragraph 7 of the Declarations states: Assessments. To provide the funds necessary for proper operation and maintenance of the Condominium, the Phase I Association has been granted the right to make, levy, and collect Assessments and Special Assessments against all Unit Owners and Units. Paragraph 3 of the Declaration states: Definitions. ‘Unit’ means a part of the Condominium Property, which is to be subject to exclusive private ownership as defined in the Condominium Act. ‘Condominium Property’ means the parcel of real property described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto, together with all improvements built or to be built thereon, and the easements and rights appurtenant thereto. A review of Exhibit ‘A’ and ‘A-1’ reveals that the term "Condominium Property" refers to the entire condominium complex, not just one unit. Reading the pertinent portions of the Declaration, in toto, it appears as though the parties intended that the Association could assess fees from "units" which encompass any portion of the condominium property, whether improvements have been built or are to be built thereon. Accordingly the Defendant's assertion is without merit and the Motion to Dismiss in this regard is denied. Around the first of January 2002, Mr. Walters tendered a check to Ocean Gate in the amount of $10,000. The front side of Mr. Walter's check, number 652, indicates that it was for association dues in full through December 31, 2001. The backside of the check states, "Endorsement of this instrument constitutes payment in full for association dues on 605, 609, 613, and 617, Mediterranean Way, thru December 31, 2001." There is no evidence that the $10,000 check was deposited to Ocean Gate's bank account. After the December 2001 meeting, the Weavers, McNeelys, Klinehoffers, and Blankenships sent numerous letters by certified mail to Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta. The letters protested the manner in which Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta had conducted the December 10, 2001, and subsequent meetings, demanding that they remove themselves as directors, and inquiring about many other matters relating to the operation and management of Ocean Gate. Many of the letters specifically requested Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta to respond in writing within 30 days as required by Section 718.112(2)(a)2., Florida Statutes. Mr. Carabetta responded to one of the complaint letters. All subsequent complaint letters were referred to Alan Scott, Esquire. Mr. Scott did not provide a written response to the letters unless specifically directed to do so by Mr. Walters and/or Mr. Carabetta. Mr. Scott responded to one complaint letter. On or about January 24, 2002, Mr. Scott, writing on behalf of Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta, sent a letter to Dr. Blankenship and May Management. The letter stated that a majority of Ocean Gate's voting interests (Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta) had entered into written agreements to remove Dr. Blankenship from his position as a director. On January 29, 2002, Mr. Carabetta filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal without Prejudice in one of his lawsuits naming Ocean Gate as defendant. That case was Case No. CA01-858 in the Circuit Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit, in and for St. Johns County, Florida. Competent evidence indicates the Mr. Carabetta dismissed all of his lawsuits against his neighbors after the December 2001 meeting. Ocean Gate's directors issued a notice dated February 4, 2002. The notice indicated that the directors would meet on February 7, 2002. The agenda for that meeting included the following: (a) call to order; (b) roll call; (c) appointment of new director; (d) fill officer vacancies; (e) consider discharge of association attorneys and appointment of new association legal counsel; (f) consider discharge of May Management and appointment of Coastal; and (g) consider change of association mailing address and resident agent. During the directors' meeting on February 7, 2002, Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta appointed Mr. Barrow as a director. The directors then elected Mr. Walters as president, Mr. Barrow as vice-president, with Mr. Carabetta retaining his office as secretary/treasurer. Next, the directors voted to make the following changes: (a) to fire May Management and hire Coastal as Ocean Gate's management company; (b) to discharge Ms. Perrine and retain Mr. Scott as Ocean Gate's attorney; and (c) to update the corporate report data showing Mr. Scott as registered agent. In a letter dated February 8, 2002, Mr. Klinehoffer, Mr. Weaver, Mr. McNeely, and Dr. Blankenship advised Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta that the February 7, 2002, directors' meeting had not been properly noticed. The letter alleged that the notice had not been posted on the property 48 hours in advance of the meeting and that none of the minority unit owners had received notice by fax, phone, or letter. By letter dated March 1, 2002, Mr. Walters, Mr. Carabetta and Mr. Barrows advised Ms. Perrine's law firm that her services as counsel for Ocean Gate were terminated. The letter directed Mr. Perrine to turn over her foreclosure file to Mr. Scott, who would replace her as counsel for Ocean Gate. By letter dated March 25, 2002, the minority unit owners objected to the termination of Ms. Perrine as Ocean Gate's attorney. During an April 10, 2002, directors' meeting, Mr. Carabetta and Mr. Barrows voted to accept Mr. Walters' payment of $10,000 in satisfaction of his past due assessments, penalties and interest. Thereafter, Mr. Walters tendered his check for $10,000 on the same day that Ocean Gate's new attorney, Mr. Scott, dismissed the foreclosure suit against Mr. Walters. In a letter dated April 17, 2002, Mr. Weaver protested the actions taken by Mr. Walters, Mr. Carabetta, and Mr. Barrows during the April 10, 2002, directors' meeting. Additionally, the minority unit owners continued to send Mr. Walters, Mr. Carabetta, and Mr. Barrow letters complaining about various problems in the management of Ocean Gate and requesting a response within 30 days. The minority unit owners did not receive any responses to these letters. In a letter dated April 17, 2002, Petitioner's investigator, Eurkie McLemore, advised Mr. Walters about the complaints filed against him and Mr. Carabetta by the minority unit owners. Ms. McLemore requested a response to the allegations by April 30, 2002. The letter contained the following warning: Please note that if you as a MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND OFFICER OF THE ASSOCIATION fail to respond to this letter, or if another complaint is received, the Division will pursue an enforcement resolution, which may result in civil penalties of up to $5,000 per violation. Therefore, you are urged to respond appropriately to this warning letter and to use your best efforts to comply with sections 718.111(1)(a), 718.116(9)(a), 718.112(2)(c), 718.112(2)(a)2., Florida Statutes, now and in the future. By letter dated April 30, 2002, Ocean Gate's attorney, Mr. Scott, responded to Ms. McLemore's letter. According to the letter, Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta denied the allegations and did not indicate that any corrective action would be taken. In June 2002 Ocean Gate's directors authorized Mr. Scott, as Ocean Gate's counsel, to file a voluntary dismissal with prejudice in the foreclosure suit against Mr. Walters. Mr. Walters sold his units at an on-site auction in July 2002. Mr. Walters executed warranty deeds for the three successful bidders in August 2002. As of January 31, 2002, Mr. Walters owed Ocean Gate past-due assessments plus interest in the amount of $62,943.56. The accrued interest on that amount as of June 16, 2003, was $15,767.36. Mr. Walters paid his quarterly assessments at the end of March and June 2002. He also paid Ocean Gate $10,000 when the foreclosure suit was dismissed in June 2002. Therefore, the total amount that Mr. Walters owed Ocean Gate as of June 16, 2003, was $68,710.92 During the hearing, Mr. Walters presented evidence that he was entitled to an offset for his expense in maintaining and repairing the 2.2 building. However, the evidence presented is insufficient to determine whether Mr. Walters' expenses were related to maintenance and repair of common elements. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Mr. Walters is not entitled to an offset.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner issue a final order imposing a civil penalty on Respondents in the amount of $10,000 each and requiring Mr. Walters to make restitution to Ocean Gate in the amount of $68,710.92 plus interest on this amount from June 16, 2003, until the date payment is made. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of August, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of August, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: John B. Bamberg, Esquire Post Office Box 2210 St. Augustine, Florida 32085 Joseph S. Garwood, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Ross Fleetwood, Division Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0892 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
Findings Of Fact For purposes of the Motions to Dismiss filed by Agrico and the Department, the following findings of fact are based upon the pleadings in this case, matters to which the parties have stipulated, and DOAH Case Number 86-3618, as well as final agency action resulting therefrom: On or about August 26, 1986, Petitioners filed with the Department a petition for formal administrative proceeding which challenged the dredge and fill permit that the Department intended to issue to Agrico. The Department transmitted this matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for hearing, and it was assigned to the undersigned Hearing Officer as DOAH Case Number 86- 3618. Petitioners relied upon Sections 120.57(1) and 403.412(5), Florida Statutes, to "initiate" DOAH Case Number 86-3618 as is clearly set forth in paragraph 20 of their Petition filed in that case. In their Motion for Fees and Costs at paragraph 3, Petitioners further allege, and thereby concede, that they "initiated the above styled proceeding (DOAH Case Number 86-3618)." A final hearing was scheduled to begin on April 28, 1987 in DOAH Case Number 86-3618. However by letter to the Department dated March 2, 1987, Agrico voluntarily withdrew its application for a dredge and fill permit which was the subject of that case. Thereafter, a telephone conference call was held on March 17, 1987, following which an Order Closing File was filed in DOAH Case Number 86-3618 on that same date, and jurisdiction was relinquished to the Department. The Final Order in Case Number 86-3618 was entered by the Department on May 18, 1987 which states: Upon consideration, it is ORDERED that the withdrawal of permit application number 53-1093999 is GRANTED with prejudice to further Department consideration of the application, but without prejudice to the future submission of another dredge and fill application covering the same tract of land covered by application number 53-1093999. The withdrawal of permit application number 53-1093999 divests the Department of jurisdiction to proceed with consideration of (Booker Creek and Manasota's) petition. Humana of Florida, Inc., v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 500 So.2d 186 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Accordingly, the above-captioned case (DOAH Case Number 86-3618) is DISMISSED as moot. On July 16, 1987, Petitioners timely filed their Motion for Fees and Costs which was assigned to the undersigned Hearing Officer and given DOAH Case Number 87-3007F. Petitioners are each incorporated as not-for-profit corporations within the State of Florida, with principal off ices in Florida, and each having less than twenty-five full time employees, as well as a net worth of not more than two million dollars.
The Issue Whether Respondent, a condominium association, violated Section 718.112(2)(c), Florida Statutes; by holding board meetings on January 2, 7, and 16 or 17, 1985, which were not open to all unit owners and for which notice was not posted; If so, what sanctions should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, is the state agency charged with the duty of enforcing Chapter 718, Florida Statutes, the Florida Condominium Law. Respondent, Windsor Park Condominium Association, Inc., is the condominium association responsible for a 64-unit residential condominium known as the Windsor Park North Condominium ("Condominium") located at 120 Wettaw Lane, North Palm Beach, Florida. In their Prehearing Stipulations, the parties agreed that the disputed issues are whether the Association, contrary to law, held condominium board meetings on January 2, 6 and 16 and 17, 1985, which were not open to all unit owners and for which notice was not posted. The Association contends that if such meetings were, in fact, held, they were "emergency" meetings for which notice was not required under the statute. In December 1984, a five-member board of administration was elected by the members of the Association to run the condominium association in 1985; Muriel Siebern was elected President. Until November 1984, Respondent had contracted with a professional management company known as First Columbia Management to manage the Condominium. Norma Calhoun carried out those management duties on behalf of the company. When the contract expired in November 1984, Harry Christie (then President of the Association) signed a new one-year contract, on behalf of the Association, with Florida Management Professionals, Inc., a newly formed management company which was owned by Norma Calhoun. Until November 1984, the First Columbia Management hired, fired, and supervised employees, maintenance personnel and repairmen billed and collected assessments of common expenses paid Association bills prepared the annual budget and year-end financial statements communicated with the Association's attorney and, attended unit owner meetings. From November until early January, 1985, these functions continued to be performed by Norma Calhoun, on behalf of her newly formed management company. But in early January 1985, the newly elected board of administration terminated the Association's contract with Ms. Calhoun's company and began performing the management duties of the Association without the assistance of a professional management company. II. The newly elected board of administration of the Association held four meetings between January 2 and January 17, 1985. Advance notice of these meetings was not posted on the Condominium property; and no unit owners other than members of the present (or past) board attended. The first meeting was held on January 2, 1985, at the former management company's offices in North Palm Beach. Four members of the board (a quorum) were present: Muriel Siebern, President; Sue Day, Vice President; Fred Kelly, Treasurer; and Lori Powers, Member-at-Large. Ms. Calhoun, and Harry Christie, President of the outgoing board, were also present. One purpose of this meeting was to affect a turn-over of the Association's records to the new board. Mr. Christie, outgoing president, presented the key to the locker room, financial statements for the Association from January through October 1984, the book of minutes, a history of the names and addresses of all unit owners, and the results of the vote taken at the December 1984 annual meeting. The board, however, also discussed with Ms. Calhoun the nature and performance of her management duties, reviewed various contracts, and discussed with her a pending court hearing in a lawsuit in which the Association was a party. No emergency conditions surrounded this meeting which would have precluded the posting of notice at least 48 hours in advance. Ms. Siebern had called Ms. Calhoun five days before the meeting to ask her to attend. III. On January 7, 1985, Ms. Siebern and two other members of the board (a quorum) met in the offices of Richard Breithart (the attorney who now represents the Association) to discuss the management contract which Mr. Christie had signed with Florida Management Professionals, Inc., in November 1984. (The board members had discussed the contract on the way to attorney Breithart's offices and felt it was not binding.) After Mr. Breithart concurred, the board decided to fire Ms. Calhoun and terminate the contract with her management company. After polling the two absent board members (by telephone) and obtaining their concurrence, the three board members met with Ms. Calhoun that same day at First Columbia Management's offices, and informed her of their decisions. They asked that she turn over to them all of the Association's records, including all financial statements. Some of those records were not immediately available since they were kept at the former management company's offices in Clearwater. Ms. Calhoun responded that she would retrieve the material, but that it would take several weeks to receive it. The board members asked her to call them when it was received. No one told Ms. Calhoun that an emergency existed or that there was an urgent or pressing need for the records. The board members also asked that the Association's checkbook be returned. Although the Association asserts that these were emergency meetings which excuse their failure to post 48 hours notices, no emergency has been shown. Prior to their January 7 meeting, the individual board members were given at least 24 hours notice. The ostensible "emergency" was based on the need to obtain the Association's complete records from Ms. Calhoun, but Mrs. Siebern and other members of the board became aware of the need to obtain the Association's records as early as December 1984. Moreover, the board members, thereafter, did not articulate a need to obtain the records on an emergency basis, which precluded 48 hours notice. (See letter of Ms. Siebern to Mr. Cassels, dated February 12, 1984, attached to Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2). The Association's answers to the Division's interrogatories also fail to mention the existence of an emergency. (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3) Finally, the Association has not shown any likelihood of injury if it had delayed its January 7 meeting an additional 24 hours in order to post 48-hour notices to all unit owners. Although the board encountered delay in obtaining the Association's complete records from Ms. Calhoun, no injury was shown. There is no evidence or even allegation that Ms. Calhoun was guilty of misappropriation of funds or that the Condominium's bills were not being timely paid. IV. On January 16 or 17, 1985, three board members, including Ms. Siebern, met again at the offices of attorney Breithart. After obtaining concurrence (by telephone) of the two absent board members, the board decided to dispense with the services of attorney Levine, who had been representing the Association in the pending lawsuit, and hire attorney Breithart in his place. The Association asserts that an emergency existed (precluding the need to post notice in advance of the meeting) since a hearing in the pending lawsuit was imminent. This emergency, however, was self-induced even if it existed, it was brought about by the board's failure to timely act. (The board members were dissatisfied with attorney Levine as early as December 1984, when he advised the members at the annual meeting of the Association that they would not prevail on the merits of the pending lawsuit. The board members were aware--then--that a hearing would be scheduled in the lawsuit during the next several weeks.) Another reason for firing attorney Levine was his alleged charging of expensive fees. But it has not been shown why action could not be taken to resolve this concern after giving 48 hours notice, as required by the Condominium Law.
Recommendation Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Association be found guilty of four violations of Section 718.112(2)(c), Florida Statutes; that it be required to submit a certified check for $4,000 to the Division; and that it be ordered to henceforth conduct all board meetings in accordance with the notice and open meeting requirements of the Condominium Law. DONE and ORDERED this 26th day of February, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Karl M. Scheuerman, Esq. 725 S. Bronough St. Tallahassee, FL 32301 Richard O. Breithart, Esq. 818 U.S. Highway One, Suite 8 North Palm Beach, FL 33408 APPENDIX RULINGS ON PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 1-7. Approved, in substance. 8. Adopted, except the last nine lines are rejected as not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. 9-31. Adopted, in substance. RULINGS ON RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 1-2. Adopted, in substance. 3a-d; 4-7. Rejected as not supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the Joint Prehearing Stipulation, the following relevant facts are found: At all times material hereto, Pinnacle Port Community Association (hereinafter referred to as PPCA) has been a not- for-profit corporation created under Chapter 617 Florida Statutes, and was the association, as defined in Section 718.103(2), Florida Statutes, which operated the four separate condominiums which together constitute the Pinnacle Port Resort. The Pinnacle Port Resort is located in Bay County, Florida and consists of four separate residential condominiums, identified as Phases I-A, I-B, I-C, I-D, and together these condominiums have a combined total of 408 units. Although each of the above condominiums was created by a separate recorded declaration of condominium, the declarations are, in all respects material to this proceeding and for all time periods relevant hereto, identical to the declaration for Phase I-B received into evidence as Joint Exhibit I. The Pinnacle Port Condominiums are located on a pie- shaped parcel of property which is bordered by the Gulf of Mexico on the south and there is a large lake, known as Lake Powell, located a short distance to the north of the condominium property. Immediately to the west of the condominium property, on land owned by a third party, Avondale Mills Corporation, there is a narrow channel, known as Phillips Inlet, that connects the Gulf of Mexico to Lake Powell. Because of fluctuating water levels in the channel and tidal action which regularly causes some shifting of sand around the channel, the current inlet does not provide trustworthy year round navigation for use by recreational boats between Lake Powell and the Gulf of Mexico. During 1983, several individuals owning land adjacent to Lake Powell, including Avondale Mills Corporation and certain unit owners at Pinnacle Port, decided to work together to investigate the possibility of stabilizing the inlet in order to provide a year round navigable channel between Lake Powell and the Gulf of Mexico. In March of 1984, the above land owners formed a not- for-profit corporation, known as Lake Powell Improvement Corporation, and through individual financial contributions by the members of this corporation began developing plans and conducting studies on the feasibility of stabilizing the Phillips Inlet. In May of 1984, the board of directors of Respondent adopted a resolution supporting the efforts of the Lake Powell Improvement Corporation and a non-binding straw vote of Pinnacle Port unit owners was conducted by the board of directors. The results of this vote were 232 votes in favor, 32 votes opposed, 6 votes requesting additional information and 138 unit owners did not respond. A true and correct copy of the correspondence which was sent to unit owners and representative samples of ballots returned from unit owners was received into evidence as Joint Exhibit 3. On or about August 11, 1984, at a meeting of the Respondent association, a majority of the voting interests present at the meeting for each of the four Pinnacle Port Condominiums approved a resolution "to participate in the stabilization of Phillips Inlet at the cost of no more than an average of $700.00 per unit." The resolution, which would authorize assessments in a total amount of $285,600.00, was passed by a vote of 179 votes in favor, of which 108 votes were by proxy; 81 votes against, of which 36 votes were by proxy; and 2 abstentions. The association is comprised of 408 members entitled to vote, in person or by proxy, and at least 205 members must be present, in person or by proxy, at a meeting of the association to satisfy quorum requirements. As part of the above resolution, the unit owners were advised that up to 50% of the proposed assessment would be used to obtain governmental permits required prior to beginning construction activities to stabilize the inlet and 50% of the assessments collected, plus any remaining funds collected previously for permitting purposes, would be used later for construction of the stabilized inlet if the governmental permits were granted. Based on the August 1984 resolution, the association has assessed as a common expense approximately $142,000.00 from unit owners and has contributed approximately $110,792.00 of these funds to the Lake Powell Improvement Corporation. In addition, the association is currently holding approximately $14,823.00 as interest on the funds collected for the Phillips Inlet projects. The Respondent has no written or formal agreement with Lake Powell Improvement Corporation. The funds were contributed to that corporation with the understanding that they would be used to conduct environmental and engineering studies and take other similar steps to obtain governmental permits which are necessary as a prerequisite to constructing the stabilized inlet. Respondent alleges that all of the funds spent have either been paid to Lake Powell Improvement Corporation or to third parties performing professional services for that corporation and that these funds have in fact been used to conduct environmental studies and to take other steps to obtain the necessary governmental permits. The Petitioner and the Intervenors do not dispute this statement in this proceeding. If the necessary governmental permits can be obtained, Lake Powell Improvement Corporation intends to dredge a new channel adjacent to the existing channel at Phillips Inlet and located on property owned exclusively by Avondale Mills Inc. The exact location of the proposed channel on the Avondale Mills property has not yet been determined. The Respondent expects the channel to be located approximately as shown on the maps included in the joint-application filed with the various agencies which have jurisdiction to issue the necessary permits. A true and correct copy of this joint application was received into evidence as Joint Exhibit 2. In order to complete the proposed channel, it will be essential that permits be obtained from the Florida, Department of Natural Resources and the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation and the United States Army Corps of Engineers. Although Lake Powell Improvement Corporation filed a joint application with both the above agencies in October of 1985, the permits have neither been granted nor denied. At the time of the August 1984 resolution, and continuing to the present, the property upon which the stabilized --inlet is proposed to be constructed was not a common element for -any of the Pinnacle Port Condominiums and the Respondent-Association does not have any contractual or property interest, existing or contingent, in this property. Although no agreement has previously been entered into between the members of Lake Powell Improvement Corporation concerning the future maintenance of the proposed channel, it is contemplated that an agreement will be entered into prior to the actual construction of the channel. The Respondent further contemplates contributing up to one third of the cost of maintenance, contingent upon unit owner approval, through further assessments against the unit owners. If the governmental permits applied for are granted and the inlet is constructed and maintained to a depth and width as proposed in the permit applications, the Pinnacle Port unit owners and their guests with boats, either docked at the Respondent's pier or launched at the boat ramp in Lake Powell, will have convenient access to the Gulf of Mexico. There are no existing boat ramps, piers, or docks located along the Gulf of Mexico or Pinnacle Port property. The Pinnacle Port condominiums have a rental program which advertises and rents owner's units on both a short and long term basis for owners who so desire. At the present time, 240 units participate in this rental program and an unknown number of additional owners occasionally rent their units independently. Based on the evidence produced at the hearing and the testimony of Randall Clark Chandler, the following finding of fact is made: Although it is reasonable to expect that the planned stabilization of Phillips Inlet would provide recreational benefit to some unit owners and might help to make the units at the resort more marketable, factors affecting the relative costs and benefits of the project (such as, whether necessary governmental permits are granted; the amount of future assessments which will be imposed against units to pay for construction and maintenance costs of the inlet; the possible imposition of restrictions or restrictive convenants on the use of the inlet or the adjoining lands; the effect of the inlet on water quality; and future market conditions are speculative at this time and make it impossible to quantify the value of the stabilization project or even to conclude that the project will clearly or substantially benefit unit owners.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that: (1) Respondent immediately cease and desist any further collection of assessments based on the August, 1984 resolution at issue herein and immediately obtain and refund to unit owners, on a pro rata basis, any monies in its possession which were previously collected under this assessment; (2) Respondent refund, on a pro rata basis, all interest on the funds previously collected for the Phillips Inlet project and; (3) Respondent, in the future, strictly comply with the provisions of Chapter 718, Florida Statutes and any future violations of the statutes at issue here shall be considered as a basis for aggravating civil penalties should administrative action be necessary in the future. Respectfully submitted and entered this 20th day of October, 1986, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of October, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard Coats, Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes Department of Business Regulation The Johns Building 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 James Rearney, Secretary Department of Business Regulation The Johns Building 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 John C. Courtney, Esq. Deputy General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32301-1927 Michael Reichman, Esq. Post Office Box 4 Monticello, FL 32344 Marshall Conrad, Esq. Post Office Box 39 Tallahassee, FL 32302 APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner 1.-3. Adopted in Findings of Fact 1-3. 4. Rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. 5.-21. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4-19. 21. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent 1.-19. Adopted in Findings of Fact 1-19. 20. Rejected as not comporting to the substantial competent evidence in the record. The Intervenors submitted a "Recommended Order" which adopted the Findings of Fact submitted by the Respondent in its Proposed Findings of Fact.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, The Mills Development Group of Florida, Inc., owns a condominium project now under construction at 1660 Gulf Boulevard, Clearwater, Florida. The project is on the south end of Sand Key, a thin finger-like strip of land which runs in a north-south direction between the Gulf of Mexico and Clearwater Harbor. Gulf Boulevard is the principal road traversing the Key. The condominium project is situated on the west side of Gulf Boulevard and fronts the Gulf of Mexico. Petitioner proposes to construct a marina on the east side of Gulf Boulevard which fronts Clearwater Harbor. It will be used by the condominium residents and their guests. If the application is approved, Petitioner will construct a 683' x 6' boardwalk next to the seawall, which extends along the waterline on Clearwater Harbor. Extending outward from the boardwalk no more than 30 feet will be 20 catwalks providing slips for approximately 40 boats. Petitioner desires to build a boardwalk to have access to the deeper water which lies outward from the seawall and to avoid dredging activities. The boardwalk will also provide greater safety for the boaters. The proposed project lies within an area currently zoned by the City as District RM-28 (High Density Multi-Family Use District). This District was created to provide for high density apartment and condominium development use. Permitted uses and structures within the District include apartment houses, townhouse developments and accessory buildings, including recreational buildings and/or community meeting buildings. A number of special exceptions are authorized within a RM-28 District. These include, inter alia, a Type A Marina facility for pleasure craft docking. Accordingly, if the application is approved, the use will be consistent with the Land Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance. The City expressed concern that persons using the facilities may wish to park on the grassy strip which lies between Gulf Boulevard and the proposed marina which in turn will impede the traffic flow on the thoroughfare. However, adequate parking for guests and residents will be located at the condominium across the street. Further, no material change in the amount of traffic is expected to be generated by the facility. Moreover, City approval is required if Petitioner desires to provide improved parking facilities on the grassy strip in the future. Intervenor/Respondent, isle of Sand Key Condominium Association, is a condominium association located to the east of Petitioner and approximately 150 feet across the channel at the proposed marina's northern end. The Association does not object to the project itself but is concerned only with the proposed length of the boardwalk. The Association has its own marina facilities which run perpendicular with the waterway and Sand Key. If approved, the proposed boardwalk would lie directly across the waterway from the Association's facilities leaving insufficient space in the channel for expansion of its marina. The Association also contends the proposed marina, if constructed in its present design, will violate an Easement Agreement entered into in November, 1975, by the prior owner of Petitioner's property and the Association. However, this concern is beyond the scope of this proceeding.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Grove Isle, Ltd. is the developer of a 510 unit three-tower condominium project on an island now known as Grove Isle in Biscayne Bay. As part of the project Grove Isle plans to construct a ninety slip pleasure boat marina on the west side of the island. Since its inception, the project has been in litigation between the parties to this Proceeding. See Bayshore Homeowners Association, Inc., et al v. DER, DOAH Case No. 79-2186, 79-2324 and 79-2354; State ex rel. Gardner v. Sailboat Key, Inc., 295 So.2d 658 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A. 1974); Doheny vs. Sailboat Key, Inc., 306 So.2d 616 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A. 1974); Bayshore Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Ferre, Case No. 80-101-AP (Circuit Court, Appellate Division, Dade County, September 16, 1980). Petitioners Doheny and Filer have their residences near the site of the proposed marina. In the past they have used the waters in and around this site for fishing, boating and swimming. If the marina is constructed their use of the waters in the immediate area of the marina could be limited somewhat. While Petitioner Jaffer does not live in the immediate area of the marina, he also uses the waters of Biscayne Bay around Grove Isle for recreation. The project could have some minimal impact on his use of those waters. The protesting organizations: Bayshore Homeowners Association, Inc., Coconut Grove Civil Club, Tigertail Association, and the Tropical Audubon Society, Inc. all have members who use the waters of Biscayne Bay in the area of the project for nature study or recreation. The use of these waters by their members could be diminished in some degree if the marina is constructed. That portion of Grove Isle from which the marina will project is owned by Grove Isle Club, Inc., an entity created to operate the recreational facilities appurtenant to the Grove Isle Condominium. The Club is an integral part of the Grove Isle condominium project. Membership in the Club is mandatory for unit owners. It is the plan of Grove Isle, Ltd. that after the marina is constructed the individual wet-slips will be sold to only condominium owners. Grove Isle, Ltd. expects to realize a onetime profit from the sale of each slip. The slips would therefore not produce a periodic or reoccurring income to the developer. In the recent past, DNR has interpreted its rules relating to submerged land leases not to require a lease for the construction of a marina over submerged state lands if the marina will not generate a regular income. Evidence of this practice dates back to June 8, 1978. On March 29, 1979, Grove Isle applied to DNR for a state lease of the submerged lands over which the proposed marina would be constructed. By a letter of April 4, 1979, from Daniel S. Meisen, Administrator, Operations Section, Bureau of State Lands, the Department informed Grove Isle that a lease would not be required. The full text of the letter follows: April 4, 1979 Ms. Pat Bourguin Post, Buckley, Schub and Jernigan, Inc. 7500 Northwest 52nd Street Miami, Florida 33166 Dear Ms. Bourguin: Martin Margulies A review of the above referenced application has aided us in determining that a lease will not be required although the submerged bottom lands are state-owned. Submerged land leases are not re- quired for private docks or non-income producing facilities. Your $150.00 refund is being processed and will be forwarded to you within the next two months. If we can be of further assistance in this matter, please contact Laura Lewallen of this office. Sincerely, Daniel S. Meisen Administrator Operations Section Bureau of State Lands DSM/11m cc: DER West Palm Beach Health Department The State of Florida owns the submerged lands to the west of Grove Isle over which the marina would be constructed. Beginning in the fall of 1979 and continuing through the spring of 1980, there was a string of correspondence between DNR, Mr. Doheny and Grove Isle. This was its basic pattern. Mr. Doheny would write to DNR with some information indicating in his opinion that the proposed marina would not be private in nature, that is, persons other than condominium owners might be able to use the wet-slips. In response to Mr. Doheny's letter DNR would then query Grove Isle requesting assurances that the marina would be private. At least three of these inquiries, April 26, 1979; October 26, 1979; and February 12, 1980, appear in the record. Grove Isle then responded with letters indicating in various ways that the marina would not be income producing. It is apparent from some of the correspondence that there were also oral communications among the parties. The contents of these communications do not appear in the record. Finally on March 13, 1980, Mr. Doheny wrote to DNR on behalf of the Homeowner Petitioners to express his disagreement with the Department's position previously expressed in correspondence dating back to April 4, 1979, that if the proposed marina is limited to only condominium owners and does not produce direct income then it does not require a lease. Mr. Dean on behalf of Dr. Gissendaner replied to Mr. Doheny on March 24, 1980, by reiterating the Department's consistent position on this project. The text of the letter fellow's: March 24, 1980 David A. Doheny, Esquire 1111 South Bayshore Drive Miami, Florida 33131 Re: Grove Isle Marina Dear David: Dr. Gissendanner asked that I respond to your letter dated March 13, 1980 regarding Grove Isle Marina. Attached his a copy of the affidavit executed by Grove Isle, Ltd. and the subsequent letter to Grove Isle, Ltd. from the Department of Natural Resources. It is the position of the Department of Natural Resources that where a condominium marina will derive no income from the rental or lease of boat slips and furthermore, where all slips will be used exclusively by the condominium unit purchasers that the marina is not a commercial/industrial docking facility requiring a lease from the Trustees pursuant to Rule 16C-12.14, F.A.C. and Chapter 253.03, F.S. (1979). This position is based on the proposition that riparian rights attached to a single condominium unit purchaser as do riparian rights for a single family lot owner who likewise is exempt from a submerged land lease. Sincerely, Henry Dean Assistant Department Attorney Division of State Lands HD/le Enclosures cc: Elton J. Gissendanner Richard P. Ludington On May 3, 1979, the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund passed a resolution which states in pertinent part that: Where the Trustees have title, by either deed of conveyance or sovereignty pursuant to 1 and/or 2 above, and where any person has requested an environmental or other permit and where the Trustees neither by statute nor rule must give permission for the use involved in the permit, the Execu- tive Director is authorized to indicate, by letter or otherwise, said circumstances and that no action by the Trustees is necessary for the said use; . . . Subsequently Mr. Jaffer, the Homeowners and Mr. Filer filed their petitions for administrative hearings on April 2, 1980, 4/ April 9, 1980, and April 21, 1980, respectively. DNR's position concerning a lease requirement was well known to all of the Petitioners by at least January 2 and 3, 1980, the date of the final hearing on the related DER cases for the instant project. 5/
Recommendation For the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Natural Resources issue a final order dismissing the petitions in Case Nos. 80-670, 80-768, and 80-815. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 11th day of December, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL PEARCE DODSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December, 1980.
