The Issue Whether Respondent, Citrus Direct, LLC, owes Petitioner, Marvin Hajos, the sum of $5,397.00 for citrus that was purchased, but not harvested.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the instant case, Petitioner and Citrus Direct were involved in the growing and marketing of citrus fruit in the State of Florida. On June 12, 2008, Citrus Direct agreed to purchase fruit from Petitioner. The terms of their agreement were reduced to writing. The "Fresh Fruit Contract" provided that Citrus Direct would purchase from Petitioner all of the varieties of citrus fruits of merchantable quality as delineated in the contract. More specifically, Citrus Direct was entitled to purchase "Valencia" oranges from Petitioner for "$3.00 on tree net" per box. The terms of the contract suggests that it is for "citrus fruit for the year 2005/2006 and merchantable at the time of picking. . . ." The contract does not identify a total amount of fruit expected from the grove. Prior to entering into the above-referenced contract, Petitioner had made arrangements with an unidentified third party to have the grove picked, but for some reason, that agreement fell through. Jason Cooper, known in the citrus business as a "bird dog," brought the parties together. Mr. Cooper is an independent contractor who finds grove owners who need to have their groves picked and refers them to buyers. The "Fresh Fruit Contract" was signed on June 12, 2008. The grove was picked on June 15, 17, 26 and 30, 2008. Two hundred and sixty-four boxes of fruit were picked from Petitioner's grove. Petitioner received payment of $603.00. Citrus Direct forwarded an additional check for $189.00 to Petitioner; however, Petitioner did not receive the check. No admissible evidence was received regarding the number of boxes of fruit that were anticipated from the grove. However, on June 30, 2008, all the fruit that was reasonably available to be picked in the grove had been picked.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order dismissing Petitioner, Marvin Hajos', Amended Complaint, but requiring Respondent, Citrus Direct, LLC, to pay Petitioner $189.00, if that amount has not already been paid. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of April, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of April, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Charles H. Bronson Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 407 South Calhoun Street, Suite 520 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Christopher E. Green, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Office of Citrus License and Bond Mayo Building, Mail Station 38 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Marvin Hajos 3510 Northwest 94th Avenue Hollywood, Florida 33024 State Farm Fire and Casualty Company One State Farm Plaza Bloomington, Illinois Hans Katros Citrus Direct, LLC 61710 1406 Palm Drive Winter Haven, Florida 33884
The Issue Does the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department)'s proposed rule 5E-1.023 constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings are made: On February 2, 1996, the Department published in the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 22, Number 5, the text of proposed rule to be known as Rule 5ER-1.023, which the Department indicated that it intended to adopt. The proposed rule reads: 5E-1.023 Fertilizer. Procedures for Landowners and Leaseholders to Submit the Notice of Intent to Comply with Nitrogen Best Management Practices (BMPs). Definitions "Interim Measures" means primarily horticultural practices consistent with the fertilizer recommendations published by the University of Florida or the Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University, or modified by the Department, to reflect public input. "Notice of Intent to Comply with BMPs" means a notice of intent to comply with nitrogen Interim Measures and/or BMPs, or to no longer apply fertilizers or other soil-applied nutritional materials containing nitrogen. Notice of Intent to Comply with Nitrogen BMPs and all document requests made of the department must be submitted to the Environmental Administrator, Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Division of Agricultural Environmental Services, 3125 Conner Blvd., Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1650. Proof of providing Notice of Intent to the Department must be retained by the submitter. The Notice must contain the following information related to the implementation of the BMPs and Interim Measures: the name of the BMP or Interim Measures to be followed, the date of implementation, the name or other identification of the parcel or land unit upon which the practices will be implemented, the county(s) where said parcels are located, and the signature of the landowner(s) or leaseholder(s). The Department will consider requests to: (a) adopt Best Management Practices and Interim Measures as defined in this rule, other than those incorporated herein, in accordance with Section 576.045(3)(b), Florida Statutes; and, (b) modify adopted Best Management Practice and Interim Measures as defined in this rule based upon submission of adequate data in accordance with Section 576.045(3)(b), Florida Statutes. Approved Nitrogen BMPs Shadehouse Grown Leatherleaf Ferns. The BMP for Shadehouse grown leatherleaf ferns found in the University of Florida, Cooperative Extension Service, Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences Bulletin 300 (published February 1995), Irrigation and Nutrient Management Practices for Commercial Leatherleaf Fern Production in Florida" is hereby adopted. Copies may be obtained from Central Florida Research and Education Center, Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences, University of Florida, 2807 Binion Road, Apoka, Florida 32707. The associated record keeping requirements specified in "Record- keeping For The Nitrogen Best Management Practices For Shadehouse Grown Leatherleaf Ferns" dated 12-01-95 is also adopted. Copies are available from the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Division of Agricultural Environmental Services, 3125 Conner Blvd., Doyle Conner Building, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1650. (a) Approved Nitrogen Interim Measures. Citrus. [The approved "Nitrogen Interim Measure For Florida Citrus", dated 12-01-95], and the associated recordkeeping requirements dated 12-01-95 [are hereby adopted and incorporated by reference into this rule]. Copies may be obtained from the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Division of Agricultural Environ- mental Services, 3125 Conner Blvd. Doyle Conner Building, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1650. The foregoing documents are incorporated by reference into this rule. [Emphasis added] Specific Authority 576.045 FS. Law Implemented 576.045. History - New Section 576.011(2), Florida Statutes, provides: (2) "Best-management practices" means practices or combinations of practices determined by research or field testing in representative sites to be the most effective and practicable methods of fertilization designed to meet nitrate groundwater quality standards, including economic and technological considerations. Because of the lack of research or field testing with citrus to determine the most practicable methods of fertilization of citrus in conjunction with nitrate groundwater quality standards, the Department is proposing the Nitrogen Interim Measure for Florida Citrus rather than Best-management practices for citrus. Interim Measures is not defined by statute. However, the Department has defined Interim Measure in proposed rule 5E-1.023. For 1, 2, and 3 year old citrus groves, the Approved Nitrogen Interim Measure For Florida Citrus (Nitrogen Interim Measure), dated 12-01-95, provides for maximum nitrogen (N) rates per calendar year to be determined by set amounts of N per tree. The range of annual N rates for groves four years old or older is set out in pounds per acre. For oranges the range is 120 - 240 pounds of N per acre per year. For grapefruit the range is 120 - 210 pounds N per acre per year. On February 21, 1996, Petitioners filed a Petition challenging the Department's proposed rule 5E-1.023 on the basis that the proposed rule was an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. More specifically, the Petitioners challenges the Nitrogen Interim Measure dated 12-01-95, and more particularly, that portion of the Nitrogen Interim Measure setting the range of annual N rates for grapefruit and oranges in groves four years old or older which Petitioners contend is arbitrary and capricious. GBS Groves, Inc. is a Florida corporation which owns a grapefruit grove in Polk County, Florida and such corporation is solely owned by James T. Griffiths and Anita N. Griffiths. Withers and Harshman, Inc. is a Florida corporation owning grapefruit groves in Polk County and Highlands County, Florida with its principal place of business located in Sebring, Highlands County, Florida. Petitioners would be substantially affected by the adoption of this proposed rule and thereby have standing to bring this action. The parties have stipulated that: on November 5, 1993, the Department gave notice in the Florida Administrative Weekly of its intent to adopt proposed rule 5E-1.023; and proposed rule 5E-1.023 implements Section 576.045(6), Florida Statutes, by: establishing procedures for landowners and leaseholders to submit notice of intent to comply with nitrogen best management practices (BMPs) and interim measures; (2) adopting a specific BMP for shadehouse grown fern; and (3) adopting an interim measure for citrus. Petitioners concede that their challenge to the proposed rule is based solely on Section 120.52(8)(e), Florida Statutes, in that the proposed rule is arbitrary and capricious. Prior to, and independent of, the Department's work on proposed rule 5E-1.023, the faculty of the University of Florida, Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences (IFAS), had begun work on revising IFAS's citrus fertilization guidelines. This revision eventually became SP 169, Nutrition of Florida Citrus Trees (SP 169), and supersedes the Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin 536 series A through D, Recommended Fertilizers and Nutritional Sprays for Citrus (Bulletin 536), which had provided guidelines for Florida citrus fertilization since 1954. SP 169 is the official position of IFAS on the subject of nutritional requirements for citrus in Florida. Sometime around August 1994, Department met with and requested IFAS to provide the Department with a interim measure for citrus fertilization which could be adopted by the Department. The Department reviewed the first draft of the proposed interim measure for citrus fertilization prepared by IFAS and concluded that it would not be acceptable to the citrus industry because it was too detailed. Thereafter, the first draft was revised by IFAS and now appears as: 6. Fertilizer Guidelines, SP 169, pages 21 through 25. While IFAS's interim measure contains many recommendations, the recommendation most relevant to this proceeding is the recommended range of the annual rate of N for groves four years old or older. The recommended rates are expressed in pounds of N per acre per year. For oranges a range of 120 - 200 pounds of N per acre per year is recommended. For grapefruit a range of 120 - 160 pounds of N per acre per year is recommended. For other varieties a range of 120 - 200 pounds per acre per year is recommended. SP 169 also provides the criteria, including, but not limited to, soil load, varieties, leaf and soil analysis, fertilizer placement and application frequency and timing for determining a rate within the recommended range and to exceed the upper level of the range. Using these criteria a range of 120 - 180 pounds of N per acre per year for grapefruit can be supported and range of 120 - 240 pounds of N per acre per year for oranges can be supported. SP 169 also recommends that all available sources of N, including, but not limited to, organic sources and foliar applications, be included in the calculation of the annual N rate. Also recommended is that while the annual N rate may be exceeded in any given calendar year, the average annual rate over three years should not exceed the guidelines. Subsequent to receiving the proposed citrus interim measure from IFAS, the Department held a series of meetings and public workshops wherein growers and representatives from the fertilizer industry and grower organizations were given an opportunity to be heard and to make suggestions. In an effort to make the interim measure more flexible so as to gain industry acceptance, the Department compromised on several of the citrus fertilization guidelines set out in SP 169. The comprises were: (a) not to include any N from foliar application in the calculation of the annual N rate; (b) to include only fifty percent of the total N content of the source from all organic sources in the calculation of the annual rate of N; and (c) increase the recommended range of the annual rate of N for grapefruit and oranges to 120 - 210 pounds per acre and 120 - 240 pounds per acre, respectively, without considering the criteria set out in SP 169 for determining a rate within the recommended range or to exceed the upper limits of the range. In deciding not to include any N from foliar application in the calculation of the annual rate of N, the Department considered: (a) the fact that N from foliar application would be quickly absorbed through the leaf and reduce the likelihood of any N leaching into the ground water; (b) that the cost of foliar application of N would prevent the indiscriminate use of foliar application of N; and (c) that foliar application would give the grower wishing to obtain maximum yield a source of N not included in the calculation of the annual rate. However, the Department did not consider the additional cost of the N to the grower who heretofore had used sources of N other than foliar application for obtaining maximum yield. In making the decision to include only 50 percent of the content of the source of N from all organic sources the Department took into consideration the public policy of encouraging the use of municipal sludge and other similar products, and the fact that on an average only fifty percent of the content of the source of N would be an available source of N. Although IFAS disagreed with the Department on not counting all the N in organic sources, IFAS did agree that since it was not known how much of the N in organic sources was immediately available, the figure of 50 percent of the content of the source was as good a figure as any. Increasing the range of the annual rate of N per acre from 120 - 160 pounds to 120 - 180 pounds for grapefruit and from 120 - 200 pounds to 120 - 240 pounds for oranges came about as a result of a meeting on April 20, 1995, at Florida Citrus Mutual. Apparently, the justification for the increase was due to the recommendations contained in the Criteria for selecting a rate within the recommended rate set out in SP 169, Fertilizer Guidelines which provides: Crop load. Nitrogen requirements vary as crop load changes. Replacement of N lost by crop removal is the largest requirement for N. Groves producing low to average crops do no require high fertilizer rates. Higher rates may be considered for very productive groves. Rates for oranges up to 240 lb per acre may be considered for groves producing over 700 boxes per acre. However, rates above 200 lb per acre should be used only if there is a demonstrated need based on leaf analysis, and if optimal fertilizer placement, timing, and irrigation scheduling are employed. For grapefruit producing over 800 boxes per acre, 180 lb N may be considered. The increase in the range of the annual rate per acre of N from 120 - 180 pounds to 120 - 210 pounds for grapefruit came about as result of Dr. Koo's concern over a potassium deficiency. Most fertilizers are formulated on a 1 to 1 ratio of N and potassium, and the application of only 180 pounds of potassium could result in a potassium deficiency. The Department did not consider if citrus trees could absorb N and potassium in a ratio other than a 1 to 1 which would have allowed the proper application of potassium without increasing the annual N rate. The following language appears in SP 169, Fertilizer Guidelines, 6.2 Bearing Trees: Rates of 0.4 lb N per box for oranges land lb N per box for grapefruit were recommended previously. With good manage- ment, oranges frequently exceed 600 boxes per acre and grapefruit production is commonly above 800 boxes per acre. Use of lb N per box in groves producing over 500 boxes per acre results in application of over 200 lb N per acre. The advantage of rates above 200 lb has not been demonstrated. Economic benefits are quest- ionable, and the potential for groundwater contamination increases. A significant yield response to rates above 200 lb N per acre appears unlikely, and other management practices should be first evaluated if grove performance at 200 lb N per acre is not satisfactory. Experts, both growers and researchers, testifying for Petitioners and previous IFAS Research Bulletins on citrus fertilization, disagree with the statements: (a) that the advantage of annual rates of N above 200 pounds per acre has not been demonstrated; (b) that economic benefits of annual rates of N above 200 pounds per acre are questionable; and (c) that a significant yield response to annual rates of N above 200 pounds per acre appears unlikely. This language also appears to be in conflict the language quoted above dealing with the criteria, "Crop load". Petitioners' experts and previous IFAS Research Bulletins disagree with the conclusion that there is a basis for a higher annual rate of N per acre for oranges over grapefruit. On November 14, 1995, the Department presented the citrus Interim Measure which recommended a range of 120 - 210 pounds N per acre annual rate for grapefruit and a range of 120 - 240 pounds N per acre annual rate for oranges to the Fertilizer Technical Council. After hearing testimony on the merits of the citrus Interim Measure, the Fertilizer Technical Council voted to recommend changing the citrus Interim Measure to provide that oranges and grapefruit be treated the same with a range of annual N rate per acre of 120 - 240 pounds for both. The Commissioner of Agriculture did not accept the recommendation from the Fertilizer Technical Council. In addition to the Fertilizer Technical Council, a large segment of the citrus industry, including, but not limited to, growers and grower organizations, expressed their approval of using the same range of annual rates of 120 - 240 pounds of N per acre for both oranges and grapefruit. However, the Department had already compromised by increasing the maximum annual rate of nitrogen per acre for grapefruit by 30 pounds above the maximum annual rate suggested by IFAS in SP 169, while leaving the maximum annual rate of nitrogen per acre for oranges at 240 pounds, the maximum rate suggested by IFAS in SP 169.
The Issue What is the amount owed by D. L. Scotto and Company, Inc., d/b/a Tuxedo Fruit Company, to Thomas E. Davis, Inc., for Valencia oranges purchased in January, April, and May 2013?
Findings Of Fact A "dealer in agricultural products" is defined as a person, partnership, corporation, or other business entity, "engaged within this state in the business of purchasing, receiving, or soliciting agricultural products from the producer . . . for resale or processing for sale " § 604.15(2), Fla. Stat. (2013).1/ Respondent is licensed as a dealer in agricultural products. Petitioner is a "producer" for purposes of sections through 604.34, Florida Statutes. See § 604.15(9), Fla. Stat. (defining "producer" as "any producer of agricultural products produced in the state"). Contract #077 On January 25, 2013, Petitioner and Respondent entered into citrus fruit contract #077 wherein Respondent, for the price of $9.50 per box, agreed to purchase 5,000 boxes of Valencia oranges from Petitioner's Cock Pen grove. Petitioner delivered, and Respondent accepted, 2,925 boxes of the promised oranges. To date, Respondent has only paid Petitioner for 1,962 ($9.50 x 1,962 = $18,639) boxes of oranges from the Cock Pen grove. Contract #078 On January 25, 2013, Petitioner and Respondent entered into a second citrus fruit contract (#078) wherein Respondent, for the price of $9.50 per box, agreed to purchase 4,500 boxes of Valencia oranges from Petitioner's Patrick grove. Petitioner delivered, and Respondent accepted, 2,988 boxes of the promised oranges. To date, Respondent has only paid Petitioner for 792 ($9.50 x 792 = $7,524) boxes of oranges from the Patrick grove. Contract #M012 On April 25, 2013, Petitioner and Respondent entered into a third citrus fruit contract (#M012) wherein Respondent, for the price of $11.00 per box, agreed to purchase 1,200 boxes of Valencia oranges from Petitioner's Johnson grove and 1,500 boxes of Valencia oranges from Petitioner's Allegato grove. Petitioner delivered, and Respondent accepted, 1,161 boxes of the promised oranges from the Johnson grove and 1,296 boxes of oranges from the Allegato grove. To date, Respondent has not paid Petitioner for the oranges received from the Johnson and Allegato groves. Contract #M013 On May 2, 2013, Petitioner and Respondent entered into a fourth citrus fruit contract (#M013) wherein Respondent, for the price of $11.00 per box, agreed to purchase 1,500 boxes of Valencia oranges from Petitioner's Tommy Ann grove. Petitioner delivered, and Respondent accepted, 1,674 boxes of the promised oranges from the Tommy Ann grove. To date, Respondent has not paid Petitioner for the oranges received from the Tommy Ann grove. Respondent's defense Each of the citrus fruit contracts at issue provides that the oranges "must be merchantable for fresh usage at the time of harvest and delivery." Respondent claims that significant quantities of the oranges that were received from Petitioner were not merchantable for fresh usage at the time of harvest and delivery. In reviewing the documentary evidence presented by both parties, it is evident that Petitioner's oranges were harvested and delivered to Respondent during the months of January through May 2013. From this period forward to the date of the final hearing held herein, Respondent never informed Petitioner that there was an issue with the merchantability of the oranges. Instead, whenever Petitioner contacted Respondent about the status of payment for the oranges, Respondent repeatedly assured Petitioner that payment was forthcoming. Respondent's testimony regarding the alleged compromised merchantability of the oranges that he received from Petitioner is not credible.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order finding that D. L. Scotto and Company, Inc., d/b/a Tuxedo Fruit Company, is indebted to Thomas E. Davis, Inc., in the amount of $75,501.50 (includes filing fee) for the balance due for the oranges it purchased from Petitioner on January 25, April 25, and May 2, 2013. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of April, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of April, 2014.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Deerfield Groves Company (Deerfield), is a licensed citrus fruit dealer under Chapter 601, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 20-34, Florida Administrative Code. As a licensee, Deerfield is subject to administrative and criminal prosecution for violation of the statutes and rules governing licensed citrus fruit dealers and was under administrative prosecution for alleged violations of Section 601.33, Florida Statutes, and Rule 20-34.11, Florida Administrative Code, at the time of the final hearing. Deerfield has legal standing as a party petitioner in this case. Respondent, Department Of Citrus (DOC), promulgated Rule 20-34.11, Florida Administrative Code, under the authority of Section 601.10, Florida Statutes. Rule 20-34.11 is designed to implement Section 601.33, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Department Of Agriculture And Consumer Services, (DACS), is the agency charged with the duty to enforce Section 601.33, Florida Statutes, and Rule 20- 34.11, Florida Administrative Code. Personnel of DACS' Division Of Fruit And Vegetable Inspection also are responsible for testing fresh citrus for maturity under Chapter 20-34, Florida Administrative Code. Licensees such as Deerfield furnish a testing room for DACS inspectors to perform maturity tests and certify fresh citrus, as required for marketing fresh fruit. DACS leases an extractor, used for squeezing juice from fruit samples, and subleases the extractor to the licensee. Under the sublease, the extractor is kept in the testing room for use by DACS inspectors and, when not being used by DACS inspectors, for use by the licensee in performing its own tests. Typically, the licensee furnishes the testing room with a table for two and a chair or two. When DACS inspectors perform maturity tests at the beginning of the early harvest, they bring most of the things they need for testing. The licensee provides the bins in which the fruit samples are carried into the testing room. The inspectors bring either a DACS slicing knife or their own. The licensee provides buckets it owns for use by the inspector during the test to collect juice extracted from fruit samples. The DACS inspectors also bring: a sizer to measure the fruit samples; a 2000 c.c. graduated cylinder to measure juice quantities; a 500 c.c. graduated cylinder to hold juice being tested for solids content and for temperature; aluminum pans to hold the graduated cylinders; a combination hydrometer for measuring juice solids content and temperature; a 25 m.1. pipet for transferring a measured amount of juice into a flask; the flask; a bottle of phenothaline with eyedropper top used for adding measured amounts of phenothaline to the flask of measured juice; a bottle of alkaline solution; and a burette for adding a measured amount of the alkaline solution to the flask of measured juice. During the harvest season, DACS leaves its equipment, instruments and solutions referred to in the preceding paragraph in the testing room. They are kept separate from the licensee's property and are not supposed to be used by the licensee. However, DACS allows the licensee to use its own bins and buckets and the extractor to conduct its own tests in the testing room when DACS inspectors are not using it. 1/ Some DACS inspectors request or allow licensees to assist during testing or to handle the fruit samples. 2/ Some allow licensees to attempt to influence the inspector's judgment by questioning the validity of the test or the accuracy of the inspector's observations or by comparing the inspector's results with the results of its own tests. Sometimes, this results in correction of an error the inspector otherwise would have made. It was not proved, however that there is an agency policy of requesting or allowing licensees to conduct themselves in those ways during testing. DACS has a policy to allow only one licensee representative in the testing room with the DACS inspector during testing. Violation of this policy is viewed as a violation of Section 601.33, Florida Statutes (1983). However, not all DACS inspectors strictly enforce this policy. Some allow more than one licensee representative in the testing room.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent H & R Packing & Sales Company, LLC, must pay Petitioner the full contract price for citrus fruit that said Respondent accepted upon tender despite knowing that the goods were nonconforming.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Betty H. Shinn, d/b/a Shinn Groves ("Shinn"), is in the business of growing citrus fruit and hence is a "producer" within the regulatory jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services ("Department"). Respondent H & R Packing & Sales Company, LLC ("HRPS"), is a "citrus fruit dealer" operating within the Department's jurisdiction. On November 3, 2004, Shinn and HRPS entered into a contract (the "Contract") whereby HRPS agreed to harvest "fresh fruit quality" navel oranges from a particular section of Shinn's grove, which oranges Shinn agreed to sell to HRPS for the price of $8.00 per field box. The Contract provided, in pertinent part, as follows: The SELLER [that is, Shinn] shall take all reasonable and normal precautions to maintain fresh fruit quality during the life of this agreement. Failure to exercise close control to mites and other pests shall constitute a violation of this agreement. Further, the BUYER [i.e. HRPS] may at his option cancel this contract or renegotiate the price to be paid and the conditions of sale. In addition, the parties agreed that HRPS would pick the fruit no later than January 1, 2005, and pay for the oranges "within 45 days of the week of the harvest." An agent of HRPS's named Frederick Gaines inspected the crop identified to the Contract on a couple of occasions in November and December 2004. At some point he notified Shinn that the oranges were being damaged by rust mites. Shinn arranged to have the crop sprayed with Thiolux (a miticide), which was done around December 6, 2004. HRPS harvested the crop on January 3, 2005. (HRPS's performance in this regard was nonconforming, because the oranges were to be picked no later than January 1, 2005. By allowing HRPS to proceed after the deadline, however, Shinn waived HRPS's untimely performance.) At or about the time of the harvest, Mr. Gaines orally notified Charles Shinn (who is the son——and an agent——of Petitioner Betty Shinn) that the oranges had been damaged by rust mites and consequently were not fresh fruit quality. Mr. Shinn suggested that the oranges be "run through" the packing house (where the fruit would be graded on its quality), after which the parties could renegotiate the price, if necessary, to adjust for any material deficiencies in the quality of the crop. This proposal was evidently acceptable to HRPS, for it proceeded to harvest the oranges with knowledge that the crop was (or might not be) fresh fruit quality. HRPS picked 790 field boxes of oranges from Shinn's grove pursuant to the Contract. When these oranges were graded at the packing house, an unusually small percentage (approximately 34%) could be "packed out," that is, packaged and delivered for sale as fresh fruit.i The rest "graded out," i.e. failed to meet the standards for sale as fresh fruit, and were sold, at a loss, to juice processors. HRPS was obligated under the Contract to pay Shinn for the oranges on or before February 22, 2005, but HRPS let the deadline pass without either paying for the oranges or notifying Shinn of a breach with respect thereto. By letter dated March 17, 2005, Shinn demanded that HRPS pay the full contact price of $6,320 for the fruit harvested under the Contract.ii HRPS responded to Shinn's demand-letter via correspondence dated March 24, 2005. In this letter, HRPS acknowledged the Contract's existence but disclaimed the duty to pay in full due to the fruit's generally poor quality. HRPS expressed some willingness to resolve the matter amicably but offered no payment. Shinn was not satisfied and initiated this administrative proceeding. Ultimate Factual Determinations HRPS harvested and hauled away the oranges identified to the Contract. This performance constituted acceptance of the goods, and such acceptance was made with knowledge of a (possible) nonconformity, namely that the oranges were not fresh fruit quality due to rust mite damage. The apparent nonconformity was made manifest to HRPS shortly after the harvest, when an unusually small percentage of the pertinent crop was "packed out." HRPS failed, however, to notify Shinn of the breach within a reasonable time after confirming the nonconformity. Consequently, HRPS is barred from any remedy for breach. HRPS's failure to pay for the oranges at the Contract rate constituted a breach of the Contract entitling Shinn to recover the full price, together with pre-award interest. Accordingly, HRPS is obligated to pay Shinn the principal amount of $6,320.00, together with statutory interest of $378.20 (for the period 02/22/05 - 12/31/05). Interest will continue to accrue on the outstanding balance of $6,320.00 in the amount of $1.56 per day from January 1, 2006, until the date of the final order.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order awarding Shinn the sum of $6,320.00, together with pre-award interest in the amount of $378.20 (through December 31, 2005), plus additional interest from January 1 2006, until the date of the final order, which will accrue in the amount of $1.56 per day. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of December, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of December, 2005.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent Clark's Country Farmers Market, Inc. owes Petitioner a sum of money for shipments of citrus fruit.
Findings Of Fact The evidence presented at final hearing established the facts that follow. The Parties and Their Problem Spyke's Grove and Clark's are "citrus fruit dealers" operating within the Department's regulatory jurisdiction. As a wholesale shipper, Spyke's Grove packages and arranges for delivery of citrus products pursuant to purchase orders that retail sellers such as Clark's submit. The packages typically are labeled with the retail seller's name, and thus the retail buyer (and the recipient, if the citrus is purchased as a gift) usually will not be aware of Spyke's Grove's involvement. The instant case involves a series of orders that Clark's placed with Spyke's Grove between October and December 1999 for packages of gift fruit. Under a number of informal, largely unwritten contracts, Spyke's Grove agreed, each time it received an order from Clark's, to ship a gift fruit box or basket to the donee designated by Clark's' retail customer, for which fruit shipment Clark's agreed to pay Spyke's Grove. Spyke's Grove alleges that Clark's failed to pay in full for all of the gift fruit packages that Clark's ordered and Spyke's Grove duly shipped. Clark's contends (though not precisely in these terms) that Spyke's Grove materially breached the contracts, thereby discharging Clark's from further performance thereunder. The Transactions From mid-October 1999 until around December 12, 1999, Clark's faxed or e-mailed to Spyke's Grove approximately 350 individual orders for gift fruit packages. Among other information, each order consisted of a shipping label that identified the product (e.g. the type of gift box or basket), the intended recipient, and the destination. Spyke's Grove manifested its intent to fill these orders by faxing statements of acknowledgment to Clark's, by telephoning Clark's, or both. Although the many contracts that arose from these transactions were thus documented, the writings left much unsaid. For example, the parties did not explicitly agree in writing that Spyke's Grove would deliver the subject gift baskets to the donees before Christmas, nor did they make any express oral agreements to this effect.1 Further, the parties did not specifically agree that Spyke's Grove would be obligated to deliver the gift fruit into the hands of the donees and bear the risk of loss until such tender of delivery. Rather, the contracts between Spyke's Grove and Clark's were ordinary shipment contracts that required Spyke's Grove to put the goods into the possession of carriers (such as the U.S. Postal Service or United Parcel Service) who in due course would deliver the packages to the donees. For many weeks, until early December 1999, Clark's placed orders, and Spyke's Grove filled them, under the arrangement just described. The relationship was not completely trouble-free, for the parties had some problems with duplicate orders. Most, if not all, of these difficulties stemmed from the implementation of a computerized ordering system which allowed Clark's to "export" orders directly to Spyke's Grove's electronic database. The parties recognized at the time that errors were occurring, and they attempted contemporaneously to identify and purge unintended duplicates. Pursuant to the course of dealing between these parties, Spyke's Grove filled orders that were not affirmatively identified as errors prior to the scheduled shipment date. The Fire On the night of Sunday, December 12, 1999, a devastating fire at Spyke's Grove's premises caused substantial damage, temporarily disrupting its citrus packing and shipping operations at the peak of the holiday season. Working through and around the loss, Spyke's Grove soon recovered sufficiently to reopen for business. By around noon on Tuesday, December 14, 1999, its telephone service had been restored, and activities relating to shipping resumed on Friday, December 17, 1999. The Aftermath Meantime, Clark's contends, customers had begun calling Clark's on December 10, 1999, to complain that gift fruit packages were not being received as promised. None of the customers testified at hearing, however, and therefore no competent, non-hearsay evidence establishes the contents of their alleged out-of-court statements. On December 14, 1999, following several unsuccessful attempts to communicate with Spyke's Grove shortly after the fire (about which Clark's remained unaware), Denise Clark, acting on behalf of Clark's, reached Robert Spiece, a representative of Spyke's Grove, on his cell phone. At hearing, Ms. Clark and Mr. Spiece gave conflicting accounts as to the substance of their December 14, 1999, telephone conversation. Neither disputed, however, that during this conversation Ms. Clark and Mr. Spiece agreed, at Ms. Clark's request, that all orders of Clark's not yet shipped by Spyke's Grove would be canceled, effective immediately, as a result of the fire. Although Ms. Clark claimed that Mr. Spiece further informed her that Spyke's Grove could not identify which orders had been shipped, the factfinder does not believe that Mr. Spiece made such a sweeping negative statement. Rather, as Mr. Spiece explained at hearing, Ms. Clark probably was told that information regarding the filled orders would not be available that day. Without waiting for further information from Spyke's Grove, Clark's began calling its retail customers to ascertain whether they had received packages that were supposed to have been shipped by Spyke's Grove. Employees of Clark's who had participated in this process——which took four to five days—— testified at hearing about conversations between themselves and various customers. As uncorroborated hearsay, however, the out- of-court statements attributed to these customers were not competent substantial evidence upon which a relevant finding of fact, e.g. that any particular customer or customers had not received their gift fruit, could be based. Moreover, this hearsay evidence, even if competent, would still have been too anecdotal to establish persuasively any widespread failure on the part of the carriers to deliver the packages shipped by Spyke's Grove. On December 15, 1999, Spyke's Grove prepared three draft invoices for the gift fruit packages that Clark's had ordered and which Spyke's Grove had shipped before December 12, 1999. Numbered 1999113001, 1999121101, and 1999121201, the invoices sought payment of $688.72, $2,415.48, and $298.66, respectively. On the first page of Invoice #1999121201, Barbara Spiece, the President of Spyke's Grove, wrote: Some of these were lost in the fire. "A" day left in the morning. "Springfield" was on the floor to go out that night. I realize there are many duplicates in these shipped reports. We tried to watch for them but with different order numbers it was very difficult. Just cross them out [and] you will not be charged for them. I apologize for all of the problems we have had this season [illegible] wish you luck. These bills were faxed to, and received by, Clark's on December 16, 1999. Clark's did not pay the invoices, or dispute them, or cross out the unintended duplicate orders (as it had been invited to do) to effect a reduction in the outstanding balance. Instead, Clark's ignored Spyke's Grove's requests for payment. Not only that, in disregard of its existing contractual obligations and with no advance notice to Spyke's Grove, Clark's proceeded on its own to fill all of the orders that it had placed with Spyke's Grove before December 12, 1999——including those orders that Spyke's Grove, through its draft invoices, claimed to have shipped. Even after the fact, Clark's failed to inform Spyke's Grove that it had, in effect, repudiated its contractual promises to pay Spyke's Grove for the gift fruit packages already shipped as of December 12, 1999 (i.e. the orders not canceled on December 14, 1999). The Inevitable Dispute Having heard nothing from Clark's in response to its December 16, 1999, fax, Spyke's Grove sent its invoices out again, in final form, on January 25, 2000.2 This time, Ms. Spiece did not inscribe any instructions to cross out duplicates for a discount. Numbered 11063001 ($688.72), 11063002 ($2,449.14), and 11063003 ($195.52), these bills totaled $3,333.38. Each of these invoices contained the following boilerplate "terms": Net 14 days prompt payment is expected and appreciated. A 1 ½% monthly service charge (A.P.R. 18% per annum) may be charged on all past due accounts. Customer agrees to pay all costs of collection, including attorneys [sic] fees and court costs, should collection efforts ever become necessary. Clark's did not remit payment or otherwise respond to Spyke's Grove's statements. Accordingly, on June 20, 2000, Spyke's Grove sent a letter to the Department requesting assistance. Clark's was provided a copy of this letter. Shortly thereafter, Spyke's Grove filed a Complaint with the Department, initiating the instant proceeding. Ultimate Factual Determinations Clark's refusal to pay for the goods ordered from and shipped by Spyke's Grove constituted a breach of the contracts between the parties. Spyke's Grove did not materially breach the agreements. Further, Clark's did not object, within a reasonable period of time, to the statements of account that Spyke's Grove rendered preliminarily on December 16, 1999, and finally on January 25, 2000. Accordingly, these invoices amount to an account stated concerning the transactions between the parties. Clark's failed to overcome the presumption of correctness that attaches to an account stated, either by proving fraud, mistake, or error. Spyke's Grove has suffered an injury as a result of Clark's' breach. Spyke's Grove's damages consist of the principal amount of the debt together with pre-award interest at the statutory rate. Accordingly, Spyke's Grove is entitled to recover the following amounts from Clark's: Principal Due Date Statutory Interest $3,333.38 2/08/99 $ 298.66 (2/08/00 - 12/31/00) $ 335.56 (1/01/01 - 11/30/01) $3,333.38 $ 634.22 Interest will continue to accrue on the outstanding balance of $3,333.38 in the amount of $1.00 per day from December 1, 2001, until the date of the final order.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order awarding Spyke's Grove the sum of $3,333.38, together with pre- award interest in the amount of $634.22 (through November 30, 2001), plus additional interest from December 1, 2001, until the date of the final order, which will accrue in the amount of $1.00 per day. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of November, 2001.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Donnie Selph, d/b/a The Citrus Store and D & D Citrus (Donnie Selph), failed to pay amounts owning to Petitioner for citrus fruit harvested from Petitioner's groves, as set forth in the Complaint dated October 13, 2003, and, if so, the amount Petitioner is entitled to recover.
Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying; stipulations by the parties; documentary materials received in evidence; evidentiary rulings made pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes (2003); and the entire record of this proceeding, the following relevant and material findings of fact are determined: At all times material to this proceeding Russ Putnal was a "producer of citrus fruit" and owner of Putnal Groves located at 10755 Russ Road, Myakka City, Florida. A producer of citrus is one that grows citrus in this state for market. At all times material to this proceeding, Donnie Selph was a "Florida-licensed [License Number 756] citrus fruit dealer" operating within the Department's regulatory jurisdiction. Donnie Selph admitted that he is owner of and does business under the names of The Citrus Store and D & D Citrus. On October 13, 2002, Donnie Selph entered into a written contract with Russ Putnal under which Donnie Selph agreed to harvest 10,000 boxes of mid-season oranges on or before June 1, 2003. Donnie Selph agreed to pay $4.35 per box for the mid-season oranges and agreed to pay $6.35 per box for the late-season (grove production) Valencia oranges harvested from Russ Putnal's groves. The form contract, dated January 29, 2003, entered into by Donnie Selph and Russ Putnal contained the following terms and conditions: [T]he Grower, for and in consideration of the payment this date received and to be received as herein provided, has agreed and do by these presents agree to sell to the Buyer all citrus fruits, of merchantable quality at the time of picking, from the grove or groves hereinafter mentioned. The price to be paid to the Grower by the Buyer for said fruit per standard field crate by volume or weight ["weight" was circled] at election of buyer on the trees, for all fruit of merchantable quality at the time of picking, shall be as follows: Oranges, mids, 10,000 boxes (or production), $4.35 [per] box Valencia Oranges, 40,000 boxes (or production), $6.35 [per] box The term "merchantable" as used herein shall be defined as that standard of quality required by the United States Department of Agriculture for interstate shipment in fresh/juiced ["juiced" was circled] fruit form. . . . * * * It is agreed that the advance payment hereby receipted for is to be deducted from said payment as follows: As fruit is harvested, $12,000.00, ck# 6318 * * * Note: Less all state taxes owned by Grower. Mutual YES[?] NO[ ] A bond or certificate of deposit posted with the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services does not necessarily ensure full payment of claims for any nonperformance under this contract. . . . (emphasis added) The undisputed evidence established that Donnie Selph harvested mid-season oranges from Russ Putnal's groves and paid Russ Putnal for those mid-season oranges harvested per the terms of the written contract. According to Russ Putnal, the contract was for mid-season oranges "which are basically a pineapple variety." "Mid-season juice oranges and Valencia oranges are late--late-season oranges. The mids were all paid for--the balance is on the Valencia oranges." The undisputed evidence also established that in the contract hereinabove Donnie Selph also agreed to harvest 40,000 boxes (or production) of late-season Valencia oranges and agreed to pay $6.35 per box for the Valencia oranges harvested from Russ Putnal's groves. The undisputed evidence likewise established that Donnie Selph harvested 11,251 boxes of Valencia oranges pursuant to terms of the written contract with Russ Putnal. During the harvesting of the Valencia oranges, Donnie Selph raised no objection or complaints with Russ Putnal regarding the quality or quantity of late-season Valencia oranges that were harvested. The parties recalled discussing one load that was "light," meaning the average weight per box was less than the average weight per box of the other loads of Valencia oranges picked from the same grove. According to the evidence presented, it is not uncommon in the citrus business to have a few "light" loads when picking 11,251 boxes of fruit. Donnie Selph is obligated to pay Russ Putnal for the 11,251 boxes of Valencia oranges harvested from Russ Putnal's groves and sold for processing. The net payment due and owning Russ Putnal Groves is computed as follows: Total Purchase Price [Valencia oranges]: $71,443.85 Less Harvesting, Mutual, Taxes, etc.: $2,373.57 Less Amount Received [on September 30, 2003]: $5,000.00[2] Net Amount or Claim [Balance Due]: $64,070.28 Donnie Selph did not pay Russ Putnal for the 11,251 boxes of Valencia oranges harvested from Russ Putnal's groves. Russ Putnal made repeated demands upon Donnie Selph for the past due amount of $64,070.28, and Donnie Selph refused and failed to pay Russ Putnal the past due amount of $64,070.28. This debt of $64,070.28 was due and owing on October 1, 2003, the date Donnie Selph made his last payment of $5,000 to Russ Putnal. Regarding this contractual transaction, Russ Putnal testified: I regret that we all have to be here for this, and I've put it off as long as I could and tried every way I knew to avoid coming to this, but basically -- or in simple terms Donnie Selph, Donnie Selph Fruit Company and I had a contract, a written contract for mid-season and late-season oranges for last year (2002/2003). Basically, it hadn't been paid and it's my understanding the bond is for situations of this nature. And I realize the bond is less than half of what's owed, but I think if Donnie had the money he'd pay me. We're all in -- the citrus industry is in some serious throws so I'm just trying to get what I can to try and keep my bills paid. Donnie Selph admitted entering into a written contract with Russ Putnal. Both men acknowledged their experience in the business of selling and buying citrus fruit and doing business with each other over the years. Russ Putnal is a seasoned producer of fruit and well versed in the business of selling his fruit to citrus dealers. Donnie Selph is a seasoned purchaser and dealer of citrus fruit, having been in the business for over 20 years, and well versed in the business of buying fruit from citrus fruit producers and selling fruit to plants and other outlets. Donnie Selph set the stage of this transaction by first testifying that he is in the business of "buying and selling [fruit], by contract, to the concentration plants." Regarding the sale of Russ Putnal's Valencia oranges, he testified that "based on $1.10 a pound what I got out of [the sale of] Putnal's fruit and taking out the costs I forwarded [to Russ Putnal] what was left up to the point of where we're at now [i.e. $64,070.28]." Donnie Selph's refusal to pay Russ Putnal for the Valencia oranges, "because I received only $1.10 per pound," does not relieve him of his contractual obligations to pay $6.35 per box for the Valencia oranges harvested. At the conclusion of the hearing and in lieu of submitting a proposed recommended order, Russ Putnal elected to make the following summation of his case that has been considered: We have a simple contract and a simple problem where fruit was contracted for, harvested, marketed and not paid for by the specifics of the contract. We have a bond in place to cover these discrepancies. The bond is only $30,000; the amount owed is some $64,000 plus. The defense has pretty much put up a smokescreen off the subject of the contract. The focusing in on pound solids and there's nothing in the contract about pound solids. The contract is simply in weight boxes. Donnie Selph's first defense, to the debt claimed in the Complaint, was oral modification of the written contract. Donnie Selph's evidence to support his oral modification defense consisted solely of his recollection, "Mr. Putnal agreed with me that the contract price to be paid would be based on pound solid [unknown at the time of entering the contract]." Donnie Selph testified that he and Russ Putnal discussed, and agreed, that the encircled word "juiced" on the written contract meant that he would pay Russ Putnal at the price Donnie Selph received when he sold the Valencia oranges "as juiced." Russ Putnal emphatically denied making the alleged oral modification of the written contract of $6.35 per box for his Valencia oranges. Russ Putnal insisted that throughout this entire episode with Donnie Selph the written contract called for "weight boxes." In his post-hearing Memorandum of Law, Donnie Selph admitted entering into a written contract with Russ Putnal, but raised as a defense to payment of the debt Russ Putnal "is going against the bond of The Citrus Store." Donnie Selph argued that Russ Putnal offered no evidence of entering into a written contract with The Citrus Store or personally with Donnie Selph. Donnie Selph's argument is without a foundation in fact and law in this proceeding and is, therefore, rejected. Donnie Selph's second defense, a claim of "detrimental reliance on fraudulent statements made by Russ Putnal," is without foundation in fact. Russ Putnal adamantly denied making a verbal agreement with Donnie Selph that he would accept as payment for his Valencia oranges some amount Donnie Selph may receive when, and if, he sold the Valencia oranges to processing plants as "juiced" rather than by "pound per box." This defense to the contractual debt obligation is without foundation in fact or law in this proceeding and is likewise rejected. The documentary evidence presented by Russ Putnal in support of his demand for payment is uncontroverted. The majority of the documents submitted by Russ Putnal reflected that the fruit described therein was harvested from Russ Putnal's groves in Manatee County. Likewise, the documents from the processing plants reflected that the fruit from Russ Putnal's Manatee County groves averaged a "pound solids per box weight of 6.03676 pound[s] per box." The undisputed evidence established that Donnie Selph picked 11,251 boxes of Valencia oranges from Russ Putnal's grove. The agreed contract price for each box of Valencia oranges picked was $6.35 per box. Likewise, the undisputed evidence established Donnie Selph entered into a written contract with Russ Putnal to purchase a specific citrus fruit (Valencia oranges) at a specific price ($6.35) per box. The evidence established that Donnie Selph picked Russ Putnal's Valencia oranges, sold those Valencia oranges, and failed and refused to pay Russ Putnal the agreed contracted price of $6.35 per box for his Valencia oranges. The evidence of record demonstrated clearly that Donnie Selph is indebted to Russ Putnal for the net sum of $64,070.28 due and owing as of October 1, 2003. This outstanding debt is computed from the gross sum of $71,443.85, less: harvesting, mutual, and taxes for a subtotal of $2,373.57, and less $5,000.00 money paid and received from Donnie Selph. The uncontroverted evidence establishes that Donnie Selph was, at the times material to this proceeding, a Florida- licensed and bonded citrus fruit dealer and that, as of October 1, 2003, Donnie Selph harvested 11,521 boxes of Valencia oranges from Putnal Groves. Russ Putnal timely filed a complaint alleging that Donnie Selph failed to promptly pay its indebtedness to Russ Putnal for the Valencia oranges harvested pursuant the contract. Russ Putnal is, therefore, entitled to payment of the principal amount of $64,070.28 plus pre-judgment interest. Based on the date of the last payment made by Donnie Selph to Russ Putnal, pre-hearing interest would run from October 1, 2003.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order ordering Respondent, Donnie Selph, d/b/a The Citrus Store and d/b/a D & D Citrus, to pay to Petitioner, Russ Putnal, d/b/a Putnal Groves, the sum of $64,070.28, together with pre-judgment interest calculated by the Department pursuant to Section 55.03, Florida Statutes, from October 1, 2003, until paid. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 2004.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Citrus enter a final order dismissing the application filed by the Petitioner for licensure as a citrus fruit dealer. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of May, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of May, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas Ackerman, Executive Director Department of Citrus Post Office Box 9010 605 East Main Street Bartow, Florida 33831-9010 Joseph P. Mawhinney, Esquire Reed and Mawhinney, P.L. 1611 Harden Boulevard Lakeland, Florida 33803-1826 Guillermo Vazquez East West Citrus Packers, LLC 11860 Southwest 183rd Street Miami, Florida 33177-2453
The Issue Whether Respondent's, Department of Citrus, proposed changes to Rules 20-71.005, 20-71.006, and 20-72.009, Florida Administrative Code, are invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence and the testimony of witnesses presented and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: In Florida, all citrus processing plant operations are under continuous inspection by USDA inspectors as a result of a Cooperative Agreement, which has an effective date of July 1, 1968, between the Consumer and Marketing Services (now known as Agricultural Marketing Services), the USDA, and the Florida Department of Agriculture (now known as Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services). By its terms, the Cooperative Agreement contemplates that the State of Florida agency (Respondent herein) may develop standards for processed citrus products under authority granted by Florida state law. As such, Respondent establishes policy and the USDA implements the policy established by Respondent. Since 1949, Chapter 601, Florida Statutes (the "Florida Citrus Code"), has vested Respondent with general and specific legislative authority to inspect, grade, develop minimum quality and maturity standards, and to do myriad other things to ensure the quality of processed citrus products. In addition, the Florida citrus industry has implemented internal quality control testing and standards in an effort to instill consumer confidence in Florida citrus products. Not unlike many other segments of commerce, the Florida citrus industry has evolved from small, local operators to large multi-state conglomerates. Innovation and consolidation has resulted in new products, production techniques, and citrus processing methodology. Where bulk concentrate was stored in 55-gallon drums in the 1950s, it is now stored in 100,000-gallon tanks, and can be transported in huge container trailers towed by semi-tractors. As the Florida citrus industry has changed, so too has governmental and internal testing for product wholesomeness, maturity, grade, and safety. Upon delivery to a citrus processing plant, all citrus fruit is tested for wholesomeness and maturity before it is processed. This initial inspection is accomplished by the arbitrary selection of approximately 38-45 pounds of citrus from throughout a 500-box load. If the citrus passes this initial testing, it proceeds to be processed. Processed citrus product is later tested for grade and, finally, undergoes microbial, pathogen, and safety testing by the Food and Drug Administration. In addition, processors undertake private testing to assure particular quality assurance. In 2001, the Florida Legislature repealed Subsection 601.48(1), Florida Statutes, and, as a result, deleted the statutory requirement for inspections of grade standards in registered citrus processing plants. The repeal of Subsection 601.48(1), Florida Statutes, eliminated legislative direction for a grade inspection; however, there remained other inspection requirements. Section 601.49, Florida Statutes, provides that it is unlawful for any person to sell or transport canned or concentrated products unless the same has been inspected and accompanied by a certificate of inspection or manifest indicating that an inspection has taken place. Subsection 601.48(3), Florida Statutes, exempts intrastate shipment of processed citrus products between licensed citrus fruit dealers who operate processing plants from grade labeling requirements. In 2000, Respondent, by Rule 20-71.005, Florida Administrative Code, established manifest requirements and statements for in-state transport of processed citrus products between registered facilities owned by the same processor. This was the precursor to the proposed rule changes, which are the subject of this rule challenge. Proposed Rule 20-71.005, Florida Administrative Code, allows the intrastate transport of bulk processed citrus products between registered facilities, eliminating the requirement that both facilities be owned by the same individual or entity and establishes informational requirements for the shipping manifest. One of the informational requirements for the shipping manifest established in the proposed rule is a certified statement that "the processed citrus products are being transported in bulk as processor grade." "Processor grade" is a new designation. Proposed Rule 20-71.006, Florida Administrative Code, establishes manifest requirements for transport of processed citrus products with the exception of bulk processed citrus product shipments specified in Rule 20-71.009, Florida Administrative Code. Proposed Rule 20-71.009, Florida Administrative Code, authorizes an inspector to issue a certificate of processor grade, which reflects that the bulk processed citrus product has been inspected for wholesomeness and maturity and ensures that the bulk processed citrus product will be inspected and/or re- graded before final shipment. The proposed rules reflect changes that are taking place in citrus processing methodology; the rule changes ensure that inspection as required by Section 601.49, Florida Statutes, takes place.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 64-4.002 (the “Proposed Rule”) is an invalid exercise of the legislative authority delegated to the Department of Health (the “Department”).
Findings Of Fact In order to better contextualize the facts presented at final hearing and discussed below, the following excerpts from the Proposed Rule and the underlying statutory provision are provided: Section 381.986, Florida Statutes (8) Medical Marijuana Treatment Centers.- (a) The department shall license medical marijuana treatment centers to ensure reasonable statewide accessibility and availability as necessary for qualified patients registered in the medical marijuana use registry and who are issued a physician certification under this section. * * * The department shall license as medical marijuana treatment centers 10 applicants that meet the requirements of this section, under the following parameters: [Previously denied applicants meeting certain requirements not relevant to the instant action.] [One applicant from a specific class pursuant to a federal lawsuit.] As soon as practicable, but not later than October 3, 2017, the Department shall license applicants that meet the requirements of this section in sufficient numbers to result in 10 total licenses issued under this subparagraph, while accounting for the number of licenses issued under sub-subparagraphs a. and b. For up to two of the licenses issued under subparagraph 2., the department shall give preference to applicants thatdemonstrate in their applications that they own one or more facilities that are, or were, used for the canning, concentrating, or otherwise processing of citrus fruit or citrus molasses and will use or convert the facility or facilities for the processing of marijuana. (Emphasis added). Florida Administrative Code Rule 64-4.002 (Proposed) (1)(f) For applicants seeking preference for registration as a medical marijuana treatment center pursuant to ss. 381.986(8)(a)3., F.S., the applicant must provide evidence that: The property at issue currently is or was previously used for the canning, concentrating, or otherwise processing of citrus fruit or citrus molasses. In order to demonstrate the property meets this criteria, the applicant may provide documentation that the applicant currently holds or has held a registration certificate pursuant to section 601.40, F.S. A letter from the Department of Citrus certifying that the property currently is or was previously used for the canning, concentrating, or otherwise processing of citrus fruit or citrus molasses will be accepted as sufficient evidence. The applicant as an individual holds, in his or her name, or the applicant as an entity holds, in the legal name of the entity, the deed to property meeting the criteria set forth in subparagraph 1. above; and A brief explanation of how the property will be used for purposes of growing, processing, or dispensing medical marijuana if the applicant is selected for registration. * * * Subject matter experts will substantively and comparatively review, evaluate, and score applications using [the Scorecard incorporated by reference]. * * * (a)7.(b) Scores for each section of the application will be combined to create an applicant’s total score. The department will generate a final ranking of the applicants in order of highest to lowest scores . . . . (c) In accordance with ss. 391.986(8)(a)3., F.S., the two highest scoring applicants that own one or more facilities that are, or were, used for the canning, concentrating, or otherwise processing of citrus fruit or citrus molasses and will use or convert the facility or facilities for the processing of medical marijuana will receive an additional35 points to their respective total score. Licenses will be awarded, subject to availability as set forth in ss. 381.986(8)(a)2. and 381.986(8)(a)4., F.S., based on the highest total score in the following manner: The highest scoring applicant that is a recognized member of the Pigford or [the Black Farmers Discrimination Litigation] will receive a license. The remaining highest scoring applicants, after the addition of the preference points for applicants pursuant to paragraph (7)(c) above, will receive licenses up to the statutory cap set forth in ss. 381.986(8)(a)2., F.S. The remaining highest scoring applications, after removing any preference points received under paragraph (7)(c), will receive licenses up to the statutory cap . . . . (Emphasis added). The Department is an agency of the State of Florida charged with administering and enforcing laws related to the general health of the people of the state. § 381.0011(2), Fla. Stat. As part of this duty, the Department is charged with implementing the Compassionate Medical Cannabis Act of 2014. See § 381.986, Fla. Stat. Favero is a Florida corporation in good standing since its incorporation in 1974, primarily engaged in the business of growing orchids. Favero aspires to file an application for licensure as a medical marijuana treatment center (“MMTC”). Following the passage of Senate Bill 8A by the 2017 Florida Legislature, which substantially rewrote section 318.986, Florida Statutes, Favero decided to seek the citrus preference described in section 381.986(3)(a)3. (hereinafter referred to as the “Preference Statute”). To that end, Favero purchased a citrus processing business in Safety Harbor, Florida, for approximately $775,000, including the business’s real property and all facilities located thereon. The purchase took place prior to publication of the Proposed Rule. The purchase of the Safety Harbor property reduced Favero’s financial liquidity but, presumably, not its net worth as the value of the property would replace the cash expenditure made for the purchase. It is Favero’s intent to convert the citrus processing facility located on the property into a medical marijuana processing facility if Favero receives the requisite license as a MMTC. Favero contends, as stated in the following paragraphs of its Petition Challenging the Invalidity of Proposed Rule 64-4.002: The Proposed Rule grants a preference to an applicant who owns “property” that was once used for citrus processing. The statute, however, clearly grants the preference only to applicants who “own one or more facilities that are, or were, used for the canning, concentrating, or otherwise processing ” By using the broader word “property” rather than “facility,” the Department is granting the citrus preference to a broader group of applicants than the statute permits, such as owners of packinghouses and other properties that fail to meet the definition of “processor” or were not used for “canning” or “concentrating.” The statute is clear and unambiguous. The use of the word “property” rather than the statutory term “facilities” renders the rule invalid because the use of that term exceeds the Department’s rulemaking authority, enlarges and modifies and contravenes the requirements of Section 381.986(8)(a)3., is vague, fails to establish adequate standards for agency decisions, vests unbridled discretion in the agency and is arbitrary and capricious. See § 120.52(8)., Fla. Stat. * * * The Proposed Rule allows for a preference to only some applicants that own a citrus processing facility. Under the scoring system, applicants demonstrating that they own a citrus processing facility may receive an additional 35 points. However, the Proposed Rule does not guarantee that any applicant owning a citrus processing facility will actually receive those points or get a license. The Proposed Rule merely grants an additional 35 points to two applicants. The Department of Citrus has indicated that more than a dozen companies will qualify for the citrus preference. Under the Proposed Rule, most of those applicants would receive no additional points despite qualifying for the statutory preference. Additionally, the Proposed Rule provides no assurance that any applicant qualifying for the citrus preference will actually receive a license. The Form adopted by the Proposed Rule allows Department evaluators to award a maximum of 1,150 points in several categories. The additional 35 points available under the Proposed Rule amount to an addition of just a 3% bonus. If those extra 35 points are not enough to exceed the scores of other applicants, then no citrus-preference qualifying applicant will receive a license. Favero contends that reduction of its liquid assets could have a negative impact on its overall financial condition when considered by the Department as it reviews Favero’s MMTC application. Favero is concerned that this negative impact may not be completely offset by the citrus preference it is seeking. Mecca is a Florida corporation located at 7965 Lantana Road, Lantana, Florida. It has existed since November 15, 1973, has operated in Florida since the early 1970s, and began citrus farming on approximately 2,000 acres in 1983. Mecca has been and is currently licensed as a citrus dealer and a regulated citrus processing plant and citrus packinghouse. The “processing” done by Mecca does not involve canning or concentrating citrus. Mecca “processes” citrus in its “fresh fruit form” (discussed more fully below). Mecca intends to convert its property and facilities for the purpose of growing, processing or dispensing medical marijuana if its application for an MMTC license is approved. Mecca contends the citrus preference in the Proposed Rule needs further clarification. Mecca also asserts the evaluation and scoring system with respect to the citrus preference constitutes an invalid exercise of the Department’s delegated legislative authority. The Scoring System The MMTC application has 16 separate sections. An applicant may be awarded up to 50 points on some sections, up to 100 points on other sections. The total number of points any application might receive is 1150, presuming a perfect score on each section. Each of the individual sections, whether for 50 or 100 points, is graded in accordance with an evaluation rubric. The rubric contains five categories of scores which are used by reviewers, allowing for a range of points in each section. The five categories each have a range depending on whether the section allows 50 or 100 points. The rubric directs that a category 5 response could be awarded between 40 and 50 points in the 50-point sections, or between 80 and 100 points in a 100-point section. A category 4 response could get between 30 and 39 points (or 60 to 79 points); a category 3 could award 20 to 29 points (or 40 to 59 points); a category 2 could be worth 10 to 19 points (or 20 to 39 points); and a category 1 might award 0 to 9 points (or 0 to 19 points). Thus, an applicant may be awarded points anywhere within the range in each category for each section of the application. By way of example, category 5 under the rubric (wherein a reviewer may give an application 40 to 50 or 80 to 100 points) directs the reviewer as follows: Applicant addressed all items. When necessary, each item has multiple, specific examples of experience and knowledge. Experience and knowledge are connected to specific, identifiable people in the application. Plans are clear, detailed, well documented, and thorough. All charts, photographs, maps, sketches, and other supplemental information are clear and legible. When necessary, applicant provides full documentation for representations of future performance. Responses related to financial reflect robust financial resources and clear lines of authority within the organizations. By comparison, under Category 3, which could award 20 to 29 or 40 to 59 points, the rubric directs the reviewer to consider: Either: Applicant responded to all items. Applicant responds to items addressing experience and knowledge, though answers tend to lack specificity. Plans are provided, but are lacking in clarity, documentation, or thoroughness. When necessary, some supplemental information is provided. Responses related to financials do not reflect robust financial resources, but do not raise doubts of applicant’s financial viability, or the organization has unclear lines of authority, or; Most responses are sufficient to be considered Category 4 or 5 Responses, but applicant fails to address some items. Favero asserts that allowing a reviewer to award points from an allowable range gives unbridled discretion to the Department. The argument misses the point that the ranges in each category direct the reviewer on how to score, while allowing some leeway in determining which applications are slightly better or worse than their competitors. Depending on the strength or weakness of one applicant’s response vis-à-vis another applicant, it is reasonable to assign more or fewer points in a comparative review. The rubric is quite descriptive and allows for a nuanced review of responses by the Department reviewers. The Preference The Preference Statute asserts a preference “for up to two of the licenses issued,” i.e., past tense. There are no licenses “issued” during the application review process, so the preference is actually assigned before licensure. The Preference Statute is somewhat confusing in this regard. The Proposed Rule attempts to reconcile this discrepancy by assigning preference points as a part of the application review process, while still approving the most qualified applicants. That approach is reasonable and has merit; it allows the preference to be assigned but does not attempt to insert it into the actual licensure process. The Proposed Rule assigns the preference points at the end of the review, i.e., after an application receives its “total score.” Thus, an applicant could conceivably be awarded 1185 points on the 0 to 1150 point scale. Regardless of how the points are assigned, Favero contends that the 35 preference points are too insignificant as compared to a possible (perfect) score of 1150 during application review. That number of points (35) would be only about three percent of a perfect score. The lower the average scores of all applications, however, the more the 35 points might come into play. If all applicants received an average score of 575 total points, the preference points would be twice as important as compared to perfect 1150 scores. The assignment of the preference points only after totaling the scores is a legitimate and acceptable method. Taking the 16 sections of the application separately, 35 points assigned in any one section could be quite significant. In fact, the Department arrived at the 35 points by taking the average number of possible points per section, i.e., 72, and assigning approximately half of that amount to reach the 35- point preference. The preference points are not just an arbitrary number assigned by the Department. Favero also objects that the Proposed Rule only assigns the 35 preference points to the two highest scoring, eligible applicants, i.e., those who will convert a citrus facility to process medical marijuana. If those two eligible applicants were more than 35 points below other, non-eligible applicants’ scores, assignment of the preference points would not result in the approval of any eligible applicants. The plain language in the Preference Statute and the Proposed Rule allows for a preference of “up to two” applicants. There is, therefore, no mandate that any applicants must receive the preference. While the Legislature can be presumed to have wanted preference points to be awarded (else why would the Preference Statute exist?), the language of the statute merely limits the number of entities which could get such a preference. The Department, interpreting a statute it is charged with implementing, interprets section 381.986(8)(a)3. to mean the issuance of available licenses to as many as two entities which are eligible for the preference. The Proposed Rule allows the Department to assess an applicant’s entitlement to the preference, to assign the preference, and to meet its statutory obligation. Property versus Facility The Legislature clearly intended to give a preference to applicants who “own . . . facilities that are, or were, used for canning, concentrating, or otherwise processing of citrus . . . and will use or convert the . . . facilities for the processing of medical marijuana.” The Legislature failed, however, to provide guidance by way of definitions. While the Legislature chose the words “facility or facilities” in the Preference Statute, the Department complicated the issue by using the word “property” for the most part, but also using the words “facility” and “facilities” at times. Favero contends that a property is much broader in scope than a facility, and the Department therefore exceeded its delegated legislative authority. The Department argues that facilities used to process citrus must be located on some property, obviously. But, facilities located on a property might be leased, so that the fee simple owner of the property is different from the leaseholder of that facility. Thus, if an applicant for a medical marijuana treatment center license wants to avail itself of the preference, it would need to own the facility. Whether that means the applicant must own the property on which the facility is located is not clear in the Preference Statute or in the Proposed Rule. The Department argues that the way to show ownership of a facility is by way of a deed to the property on which the facility is located. In fact, Favero will use a warranty deed to prove ownership of the facilities it purchased in order to obtain the preference. But if Favero purchased land on which citrus had been grown but not processed, i.e., if there had been no facilities on the land to can, concentrate or otherwise process the fruit, except in fresh fruit form, the preference would not apply. And if an applicant obtained a leasehold interest in a facility, it would not be able to “show ownership” by way of a deed to the property. The Preference Statute requires the applicant to convert the facility in order to gain the preference. It is unclear how a piece of unimproved property can be “converted” to another use; land is land. This begs the question of whether growing citrus on a piece of property, and then removing all the citrus trees in order to grow medical marijuana, is a “conversion” of a facility as contemplated by the Legislature. Neither the Preference Statute nor the Proposed Rule contain any definitional assistance to answer that question. An important question to be answered is whether the growing of citrus constitutes “processing” as alluded to by the Legislature. The Preference Statute provides no definition of the word. The Citrus Code (chapter 601, Florida Statutes) also does not define “processing,” but does describe a “processor” of citrus as: ‘[A]ny person engaged within this state in the business of canning, concentrating, or otherwise processing citrus fruit for market other than for shipment in fresh fruit form.” § 601.03(32), Fla. Stat. (Emphasis added). Processing must therefore mean something other than merely growing citrus and packing it up for shipment. That being the case, a property where citrus is grown that is “converted” to a property growing marijuana would not afford an applicant a preference. There must be some “facility” that is or has been used to process citrus, i.e., doing something more with the raw product, in order to constitute “processing.” Therefore, a “packinghouse,” i.e., “[a]ny building, structure, or place where citrus fruit is packed or otherwise prepared for market or shipment in fresh fruit form,” would not be engaged in “processing” citrus. See § 601.03(29), Fla. Stat. Mecca, which owns property where citrus was grown, picked, graded, sorted, polished, cleaned and packaged for transfer “in fresh fruit form,” would not be a processor, either. Mecca owns a packinghouse only, not a processing facility as that term seems to be used by the Legislature. Its operations were not part of the “canning, concentrating, or otherwise processing citrus fruit other than for shipment in fresh fruit form.”
