The Issue The issue is whether Polk County's small scale development amendment (CPA2003S-02) adopted by Ordinance No. 03-03 on January 22, 2003, as later amended by Ordinance No. 03-19 on March 15, 2003, is in compliance.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background Berry is the owner of a tract of land located on the southwest corner of the intersection of Eagle Lake Loop Road (County Road 540-A) and Pollard Road in Section 16, Township 29, Range 26 in the eastern part of unincorporated Polk County, Florida. The property lies south of the City of Winter Haven, east-southeast of the City of Eagle Lake, less than a mile south of Lake Eloise (on which Cypress Gardens is located), and west of U.S. Highway 27. Because Berry owns property within the County, and submitted oral and written comments to the County prior to the adoption of the challenged amendment, it has standing to participate in this action. On July 19, 2002, Berry filed an application with the County Planning Department seeking to change the land use on 9.99 acres (or just below the threshold of 10.0 acres for a small scale amendment) from RL-1 to Neighborhood Activity Center (NAC) to include approximately 4.95 acres of various neighborhood specialty shops such as a grocery store, drug store, convenience store, and dry cleaners, with the remaining acreage used as a mini-warehouse self-storage facility. In September 2002, Berry amended its application by seeking to change 3.93 acres from RL-1 to CC and 6.06 acres from RL-1 to BPC-1. The application was assigned Case File No. CPA2003S- 02. Under the County's review process, the application is first reviewed by the County Development Review Committee (Committee), then by the County Planning Commission (CPC), which either accepts or rejects the Committee's recommendation, and finally by the Board of County Commissioners (Board), which either adopts the amendment, adopts the amendment as amended by the Board, or rejects the amendment. After conducting a preliminary review of the application, on September 16, 2002, the Committee conducted a public hearing and voted to recommend approval. The matter was then transmitted to the CPC, which conducted a meeting on October 9, 2002, and recommended that the Board approve the amendment. On January 22, 2003, by a 3-2 vote, the Board adopted CPA2003S-02 changing the designation on the FLUM of the County Comprehensive Plan (Plan) as proposed by Berry. This was confirmed by the County's adoption of Ordinance No. 03-03. On February 21, 2003, Petitioners filed their Petition challenging the Berry amendment. The matter was again placed on the Board's agenda on March 19, 2003, after the County discovered that Ordinance No. 03-03 had inadvertently changed the land use on the entire parcel to CC rather a mix of CC and BPC-1. In addition, there were minor errors in the legal description of both the 3.93 and 6.06-acre parcels. Accordingly, Ordinance No. 03-19 was enacted to correct those errors. A second Petition for Formal Administrative Proceedings (with essentially the same allegations, but also adding an allegation that the same property had been improperly subject to two small scale amendments within a 12- month period) was filed by Petitioners on March 19, 2003, challenging the action taken in Ordinance No. 03-19. At the outset of the final hearing, Petitioners voluntarily dismissed two allegations contained in their Petition. In their Proposed Recommended Order, Petitioners have further narrowed the issues by addressing only the following allegations: that the property which is the subject of this proceeding exceeds 10.0 acres in size and therefore cannot qualify as a small scale amendment; and that the amendment violates Future Land Use Element (FLUE) Policies 2.102-A1, 2.113-B-3, 2.113-B-4, 2.110-C3, and 2.113-B-1 and is thus internally inconsistent with the Plan. These issues will be discussed separately below. All other allegations contained in the second Petition and the parties' Pre-Hearing Stipulation are deemed to have been withdrawn or abandoned. Because the change in the FLUM was filed and approved as a small scale plan amendment under Section 163.3187(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2003),1 a compliance review of the amendment was not made by the Department of Community Affairs (DCA). See § 163.3187(3)(a), Fla. Stat. Standing of Petitioners Durham is a realtor/developer who owns property within 250 feet of Berry's property and resides at 10 Lake Eloise Lane, Southeast, Winter Haven, Florida. He made oral and written comments to the County prior to the adoption of the amendment. As such, he qualifies as an affected person under Section 163.3184(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and has standing to bring this action. CPPI began as an association in November 2002 and was later incorporated in February 2003. Presently, it has around 100 members, all of whom reside in the County. According to its chairperson, its purpose is to "help educate and inform residents of Polk County . . . towards growth matters that may affect their daily lives." The organization "encourages donations" from its members; it was scheduled to have conducted its first annual meeting on January 10, 2004; and members prepared and circulated petitions opposing the amendment to residents of the area in December 2002 and January 2003. At least one member of CPPI made written and oral comments on its behalf to the County prior to the adoption of the amendment in March 2003. There is no evidence, however, that CPPI (as opposed to its individual members) owns property or owns or operates a business within the County. Therefore, it lacks standing to file a petition. The land and surrounding uses Berry owns a triangle-shaped parcel of land (the parent parcel) totaling around 14 acres which fronts on Eagle Lake Loop Road (a 24-foot wide urban collector road) to the north, Pollard Road (a local road) to the east, and a CSX railroad track, with right-of-way, on its western side. (Pollard Road dead ends at Eagle Lake Loop Road, and another collector road, Eloise Loop Road, continues to the north from the intersection). Pollard Road provides access to eight nearby single-family homes, which lie south of the Berry property and front on Pollard Road, and eventually terminates at the City of Winter Haven's Sewage Treatment Plant (an institutional use), which lies slightly more than a mile south of the site. To the west of the site directly across the railroad tracks and fronting on Eagle Lake Loop Road is additional property owned by Berry and on which were once located the original Berry corporate offices. The Berry office buildings are now used, at least partially, by other tenants. Although the land across the railroad tracks is classified as Residential Suburban (RS), the property can be used for offices since the buildings were constructed, and office use began, prior to the adoption of the Plan. Directly across Pollard Road to the east is a vacant 10-acre tract of land owned by the Baptist Ridge Association, which intends to construct a church on the property. Berry's property is now classified as RL-1, a land use classification which "is characterized by single-family dwelling units, duplex units, and small-scale multi-family units." Since at least the 1950s, however, or long before the County adopted its Plan, the property has been used primarily for agriculture purposes (citrus groves); therefore, Berry is grandfathered to continue this non-conforming use on its property. Presently, the entire tract of land is undeveloped and largely covered by an orange grove, which Berry describes as "past maturation and is declining." Citrus trucks and trailers have been parked on the extreme northwestern corner of the parent parcel and are used in conjunction with the citrus operation. Except for the former Berry offices, a nearby beauty salon operating out of a house, and a convenience store about three-quarters of a mile away, which all began operation before the Plan was adopted and are grandfathered as non- conforming uses, and the City of Winter Haven's large tract of institutional land to the south, all of the property within slightly less than a one-mile radius of the Berry property is classified in various residential land use categories with only residential uses. The Amendment As noted above, Berry has owned the subject property for many years. In 1987, Berry (then under the name of Jack M. Berry, Sr.) made application with the County for a zoning change on the property from Rural Conservation (RC) to Commercial (C-3) to allow typical commercial uses. The application was ultimately denied by the County on the ground, among others, that the zoning district being proposed was inconsistent with the Plan, "given the residential development pattern in the area." At least partly on the theory that the area has changed substantially in the last 15 years, Berry has filed (and the County has approved) an application seeking to change the land use on the property to commercial uses. Berry has carved out of the parent parcel two smaller parcels totaling 9.99 acres in size and seeks to change the land use on the northern parcel (3.93 acres) to CC and the land use on the southern parcel (6.06 acres) to BPC-1. The remaining land in the parent parcel, which consists of a 0.43-acre triangle-shaped parcel on the northwestern corner of the parent parcel and now used by citrus trucks, and a vacant 2.74-acre triangle-shaped parcel on the southern end, will remain R-1. (However, all parties agree that if the amendment is approved, these remaining parcels will be unsuitable for residential development.) In addition, strips of land ranging from 22 to 28 feet in width which front on Eagle Lake Loop Road and Pollard Road will be dedicated to the County for right-of-way and have not been included in the 9.99-acre amendment. Presumably, the proposed change is being done in this manner so that the total acreage is less than 10.0 acres, which qualifies the application to be processed as a small scale development amendment rather than a regular plan amendment and subject to DCA review and approval. If the change is approved, the northern part of the parcel (3.93 acres) will be changed to CC to develop convenience commercial uses. Under the Plan, the most typical tenant in this category is a convenience store, while other typical tenants include laundry, dry cleaning, barber, restaurant, gas station, and office uses. The southern (and larger) portion of the tract will be changed to BPC-1. The most typical tenant in this category is "[o]ne or more light- assembly plants, or warehouse facilities," which include a mini-warehouse storage facility. Other typical tenants described in the Plan are offices, distribution centers, research and development firms, and high-density residential, with proper buffering. (Berry says it intends to build a mini-warehouse facility on the southern parcel; however, any of the above described uses could be placed on the property if the change is approved.) Petitioners' Objections In broad terms, Petitioners have contended that the small scale amendment actually involves a use of more than 10 acres since the strips of land being dedicated as right-of-way to the County must be counted as a part of the land being amended. They also contend that the plan amendment violates five FLUE policies and is therefore internally inconsistent with the Plan. A small scale development amendment can only be adopted if "[t]he proposed amendment involves a use of 10 acres or fewer." See § 163.3187(1)(c)1., Fla. Stat. The parties have agreed that the legal description of the parcel subject to the change includes only 9.99 acres, or less than the 10-acre threshold. However, prior to the development of the site, Berry intends to dedicate to the County two strips of land, one fronting on Eagle Lake Loop Road (28 feet wide), and the other on Pollard Road (22 feet wide), for future right-of-way for some public purpose. Petitioners contend that the right-of-way constitutes essential infrastructure for the development and must be included as a part of the amendment. If this land is added to the amendment, the total acreage would obviously exceed 10.0 acres. The dedicated land is not "essential infrastructure" needed for the development activities on the land, since two roadways (Eagle Lake Loop Road and Pollard Road) already exist on the northern and eastern boundaries of the property, and they are sufficient in size to provide ingress to, and egress from, the property. Instead, the County will "bank" the land in the event some form of right-of-way activity is needed in the future. It is noted that Eagle Lake Loop Road was recently widened to 24 feet, and it is not anticipated that a further widening will occur for a number of years. There is nothing in the Plan which requires an applicant for an amendment to include all of its property in a proposed amendment, or prevents an applicant from leaving a residual piece of property out of the application. Therefore, Berry was not required to include in the amendment the right- of-way or the two smaller residual pieces of property that will remain R-1. Finally, assuming arguendo that Petitioners' contention is correct, that is, that an applicant must include right-of-way land dedicated to the local government in the total acreage calculation, Berry could still lawfully comply with the 10-acre threshold by simply reducing the other acreage being changed to CC or BPC by the amount of land being dedicated to the local government for right-of-way. Therefore, it is found that Berry has not improperly excluded from the amendment land necessary for essential infrastructure so as to violate Section 163.3187(1)(c)1., Florida Statutes, as alleged by Petitioners. Policy 2.102-A1 requires compatibility between adjacent uses. More specifically, it provides that: Land shall be developed so that adjacent uses are compatible with each other, pursuant to the requirements of other Policies in this Future Land Use Element, so that one or more of the following provisions are accomplished: there have been provisions made which buffer incompatible uses from dissimilar uses; incompatible uses are made to be more compatible to each other through limiting the intensity and scale of the more intense use; uses are transitioned through a gradual scaling of different land use activities through the use of innovative development techniques such as a Planned Unit Development. Therefore, as the Plan is now written, so long as Berry develops the land in a manner which accomplishes at least one of the three "provisions" in paragraphs a - c of the policy, so as to make the adjacent uses compatible, the proposed land use change is permissible. As noted above, except for a few non-conforming uses adjacent to, or near the property, virtually all of the area around the Berry property is designated for residential use. The area to the north and northeast is developed with up-scale (with some homes ranging to as high as $1 million in value), low density, large lot, single-family residential subdivisions, including Harbour Estates, Cedar Cove, Cypress Cove, Gaines Cove, and Valhalla. To the east of the site are more subdivisions, including Eloise Place, Skidmore, Cypress Point, Lake Eloise Estates, Eloise Pointe Estates, a mobile home park, and Little Lake Estates. The lands to the south are primarily agriculture and in active citrus groves, with eight single-family homes on Pollard Road. Finally, a church will be built on the property directly across the street from the Berry property at the southeast corner of the intersection of Eagle Lake Loop Road and Pollard Road. The County Planning Director agrees that a convenience store (which is an authorized use on CC land), standing alone, is incompatible with adjacent single-family residences. Given this acknowledgement, and the fact that a non-binding, proposed site plan submitted by Berry with its application does not provide for any buffering between the commercial uses and the residential areas, Petitioners contend that none of the conditions required for compatibility in paragraphs a through c have been met, and thus the policy has been violated. The County has made clear, however, that when a final site plan is submitted, there must be "provisions [in the site plan] . . . which buffer incompatible uses from dissimilar uses," as required by the policy. Assuming that this is done at the site plan stage, at least one of the three provisions will be accomplished, thereby satisfying the compatibility requirement. This being so, the plan amendment does not violate the policy and in this respect is not internally inconsistent with the Plan. Petitioners next contend that the amendment is inconsistent with Policy 2.110-C3, which contains locational criteria for CC property. One such criterion requires that "Convenience Centers shall be located at the intersections of arterial and/or collector roads." Because the property is at a T-shaped intersection (as opposed to a traditional cross intersection with four directions for traffic to move off the site), Petitioners assert that the property is not located at an "intersection" within the meaning of the policy. Eagle Lake Loop Road, on which the northern boundary of the property fronts, is designated as an urban collector road. That road forms an intersection with Pollard Road (a local road) and Eloise Loop Road (also an urban collector road), which meets Eagle Lake Loop Road from the north at the intersection, and then makes a 90 degree turn to the east. (When Eagle Lake Loop Road continues to the east beyond the intersection, it turns into Eloise Loop Road, and later into Thompson Nursery Road, until it eventually intersects with U.S. Highway 17.) There is no dispute that the two collector roads (Eagle Loop Lake Road and Eloise Loop Road) form a T intersection, rather than a traditional cross intersection. For many years, however, the County has considered a T intersection and a cross intersection to be the same in terms of satisfying Plan requirements. Indeed, at the present time, at least four other CC designated properties within the County are located at T intersections. The County's interpretation of the policy is consistent with sound planning principles, is reasonable and logical, and is more persuasive than the contrary view offered by Petitioners. Accordingly, it is found that the amendment does not conflict with Policy 2.110- C3. Petitioners also contend that the amendment is inconsistent with Policy 2.113-B-3, which provides that "Business-Park Centers shall be located with consideration being given to regional transportation issues, and should be located at the intersections of arterial roads, and preferably on a fixed-route mass-transit line." (Emphasis added.) The use of the word "should" (rather than "shall") is intended to state a preference, but not an absolute requirement, that BPC lands be located at the intersections of arterial roads. According to the County's Planning Director, this is because "most cases that come [before the County] don't meet the ideal situation" of satisfying every requirement, and the County has used this permissive language to give itself some degree of flexibility in handling cases that do not meet every Plan requirement. Therefore, even though it is preferable that BPC land be located at the intersection of arterial roads, this requirement is not mandatory, and the County has the flexibility to approve a BPC land use change at property not sited at the intersection of arterial roads. In contrast to the permissive language described above, Policy 2.113-B-4 provides that development within a Business-Park Center shall conform to certain development criteria, including one that Business-Park Centers shall have frontage on, or direct access to, an arterial roadway, or a frontage road or service drive which directly serves an arterial roadway. Business-Park Centers shall incorporate the use of frontage roads or shared ingress/egress facilities wherever practical. In this case, the closest arterial roadway to Berry's property is State Road 17 to the west, which is four miles away, while State Road 60, another arterial roadway, is approximately six miles to the south. These arterial roads must be accessed, at least at the beginning of the trip, by Eagle Lake Loop Road, a two-lane, 24-foot wide urban collector that runs through predominately residential neighborhoods with some homes having fences within a foot or two from the road. The County interprets the requirement that BPC land have "direct access to an arterial road" to be satisfied if the property fronts on a collector road, which then provides access to an arterial road. Under the County's interpretation, the requirement is met since Eagle Lake Loop Road provides access (albeit 4 to 6 miles away) to State Roads 17 and 60. The County says it has consistently interpreted this provision in this manner for at least ten years, and has approved other applications for changes to BPC when those parcels were located on urban collector roads. (The distance between these other BPC parcels and the arterial roads is not of record, however.) While Policy 2.113-B-1 provides that Business-Park Centers are "not intended to accommodate major commercial or other high-traffic producing facilities," they "are intended to promote employment opportunities within the region by allowing for the establishment of office parks, research and development parks, areas for light-industrial facilities, distribution centers, and mixed-use employment parks." The same policy provides that they must have a usable area of 10 acres or more, have a service-area radius of 20 miles or more, be supported by a population of 150,000 or more people, and have a gross leasable area of 500,000 to 2,000,000 square feet. Given this description of their purpose and characteristics, and the wide range of commercial activities that are allowed on Business-Park Center lands, it is not surprising that Policy 2.113-B-3 provides that BPC lands should be located "at the intersections of arterial roads, and preferably on a fixed-route mass-transit line," while Policy 2.113-B-4 requires that they "have direct frontage on, or direct access to, an arterial roadway, or a frontage road or service drive which directly serves on an arterial roadway." When reading these provisions as a whole, it is unreasonable to conclude, as the County does, that "direct access" contemplates a drive of over 4 miles, partly on a narrow two- lane road, in order to reach an arterial road. Accordingly, on this issue, Petitioners' evidence is the most persuasive, and it is found that the plan amendment conflicts with Policy 2.113-B-4 and in this respect is internally inconsistent with the Plan. Policy 2.110-C3 sets forth the following location criteria for Convenience Centers: LOCATION CRITERIA Convenience Centers shall be located at the intersections of arterial and/or collector roads. There shall be the following traveling distance, on public roads, between the center of Convenience Center and the center of any other Convenience Center, or other higher- level Activity Center, Linear Commercial Corridor, or Commercial Enclave providing for the same convenience shopping needs: One (1) mile within the UDA and UGA Two (2) miles within the SDA and UEA This required separation may be reduced if: The higher-level Activity Center, Linear Commercial Corridor or Commercial Enclave within the required distance separation is over 80 percent developed; or the proposed Convenience Center market- area radius, minimum population support is over 5,000 people. Petitioners contend that this policy has been violated in two respects: the Berry property is not located at the intersection of arterial roads; and there is an existing convenience center located within 0.8 mile of the Barry property, and Berry cannot qualify for a reduction in the required separation, as described in paragraphs a and b. For the reasons stated in Findings of Fact 30-32, it is found that the Berry property is located at the intersection of two collector roads (Eagle Lake Loop Road and Eloise Loop Road) and that a T intersection satisfies the requirements of the policy. As to the second contention, the Berry property is located within an UGA (Urban Growth Area), and an existing convenience store is located at the intersection of Rifle Range Road and Eagle Lake Loop Road, or less than a mile west of Berry's property. The land use on the property on which the store sits was recently changed (in December 2003) to BPC, which does not allow a convenience store. However, the store is a non-conforming use, having been located at that site before the Plan was adopted. The locational requirement in Policy 2.110-C-3 that CC lands within the UGA be located at least a mile apart is not the least bit vague or ambiguous: CC designated lands (and not individual convenience stores, as Petitioners suggest) must be separated by at least a mile, unless one of the two criteria for reducing this separation is met. Because there is no CC land within a one-mile radius of the Berry land, the policy has not been violated. Policy 2.113-B-1 sets forth the following relevant characteristic for Business-Park Centers: General characteristics of Business-Park Centers are: Usable Area 10 acres or more There is no dispute that the useable area for the BPC land is only 6.06 acres, or approximately 60 percent of the required acreage. Petitioners contend that the amendment violates the foregoing policy because the useable area on Barry's property is much less than "10 acres or more." While the former County Planning Director conceded that the 10-acre usable area requirement is "mandatory," he justified the amendment on the ground that the 6.06 acres "approximates" 10 acres, and thus satisfies the policy. In the same vein, the current County Planning Director asserted that if Berry was proposing a stand-alone BPC, it would have been required to have 10 usable acres. In this case, though, he pointed out that the Berry property will be used for a nonresidential mixed use (BPC and CC) totaling almost 10 acres, and therefore Berry has satisfied the requirement. The Planning Director admitted, however, that nothing in the Plan specifically allows this type of exception. He justified the County's action on the theory that the Plan "doesn't anticipate every situation that comes in," and "interpretations have to be made of the comprehensive plan and how it's applied." The requirement that Business-Park Centers have a usable area of 10 or more acres is clear and unambiguous, was characterized as being "mandatory," and is not subject to any exceptions in the Plan. This being so, the County's interpretation is found to be unreasonable and contrary to the plain language in the policy, and in this respect the plan amendment is internally inconsistent with the Plan.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administration Commission enter a final order determining that the small scale development amendment (CPA2003S-02) adopted by Polk County by Ordinance No. 03-03, as amended by Ordinance No. 03-19, is not in compliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of February, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of February, 2004.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is RECOMMENDED THAT: The Board enter an order finding that the 275 acre site itself proposed for Unit 3 is consistent and in conformity with existing land use plans and zoning ordinances; The Board find the railroad spur to be consistent with Polk County's zoning ordinance. The Board find that the proposed 46 mile associated transmission line is consistent and in conformity with existing land use and zoning ordinances with the exception of that portion of the line which traverses the Green Swamp area; and The Board hold the transmission line within the Green Swamp area not to be in conformance or compliance with the Green Swamp regulations, and that the applicant must apply for a variance from such regulations to Polk County officials before any further consideration of this certification by the Board. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 12th day of September, 1978. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675
The Issue The issue is whether the Petition to Amend the Boundaries of the Crossings at Fleming Island Community Development District (Petition) meets the applicable criteria set forth in Chapter 190, Florida Statutes (2007)1, and Florida Administrative Code Rule Chapter 42-1. The purpose of the local public hearing was to gather information in anticipation of quasi-legislative rulemaking by the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission (Commission).
The Issue The issue is whether proposed rules 9J-5.026(3)(d), (7)(b), (7)(c)4. and 6., (8)(a), (9)(a)3., 6., 18., and 19., and 9J- 11.023(2), (4), and (5), and existing Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.003(80) are invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority for the reasons alleged in the Petition for Administrative Hearing to Challenge Proposed Amendments to Chapters 9J-5 and 9J-11, F.A.C. and to Challenge Existing Rule 9J-5.003(80) (Petition).1
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence presented by the parties, the following findings are made: The Parties Petitioners are not-for-profit organizations whose members own real property throughout the State. A substantial number of their respective members own real property which could be amassed as one or more areas in the RLSA program. Some members of these organizations have taken steps in an effort to have their land designated as an RLSA. On behalf of their respective members, each Petitioner has a substantial interest in public policy relating to land use planning, growth management, and the protection of agricultural, rural, and conservation lands. Respondent, Department of Community Affairs (Department), has stipulated to the facts necessary to establish standing for each Petitioner. The Department is the state agency charged with implementing the review provisions of the Local Government Planning and Land Development Regulation Act codified in Sections 163.3164, et seq., Florida Statutes. The Original Statute Creating the RLSA Program Because of the complexity of the subject matter, a recitation of the RLSA program's history is appropriate. In 2001, the Legislature enacted Chapter 2001-279, Laws of Florida, codified as Section 163.3177(11)(d), Florida Statutes, which created the RLSA pilot program. The law became effective on July 1, 2001, and stated: It is the intent of the Legislature that rural land stewardship areas be used to further the following broad principles of rural sustainability: restoration and maintenance of the economic value of rural land; control of urban sprawl; identification and protection of ecosystems, habitats, and natural resources; promotion of rural economic activity; maintenance of the viability of Florida's agriculture economy; and protection of the character of the rural areas of Florida. § 163.3177(11)(d)2., Fla. Stat. (2001). While the eligibility criteria and substantive requirements of the RLSA program have been amended several times, the foregoing principles have remained the same. The statute provides an option, not an exception, under the State's growth management laws for local governments to implement innovative planning and development strategies for large, rural parcels. While having many of the attributes of a traditional "transfer of development rights" program, the RLSA planning process provides additional planning and economic incentives as well as flexibility for the local government to implement this program. The program was best summarized by Secretary Pelham at hearing as follows: The RLSA process is an optional planning process which local governments may elect to use in rural and agricultural areas of the state. Essentially it provides incentives to landowners to preserve or conserve environmental and natural resources and agricultural lands by giving them stewardship credits that may be assigned to those lands to be preserved, but which can be used on other lands through a transfer of those credits to the receiving areas. Tr. at 182. The first step in the RLSA planning process is for the local government to "apply to the Department in writing requesting consideration for authorization to designate a [RLSA]." § 163.3177(11)(d)3., Fla. Stat. (2001). Under the original statute, if the Department chose to authorize a local government to designate an RLSA, it would do so by written agreement with the local government. See § 163.3177(11)(d)4. and (5), Fla. Stat. (2001). Because the original statute was a pilot program, the Department could authorize only five local governments to designate RLSAs. See § 163.3177(11)(d)6., Fla. Stat. (2001). To be eligible for designation as an RLSA under this pilot program, a parcel of land had to be larger than 50,000 acres but not over 250,000 acres; it had to be designated as rural or a substantial equivalent on the future land use map (FLUM); and it had to be located outside the municipal and established urban growth boundaries. See § 163.3177(11)(d)6., Fla. Stat. (2001). For this reason, only counties (and not cities) were eligible to participate in the program. Once it received Department authorization to designate an RLSA, the county was to then propose and adopt a plan amendment designating the RLSA. See § 163.3177(11)(d)6., Fla. Stat. (2001). This plan amendment was to be subject to full review under Section 163.3184, Florida Statutes, for a compliance determination. Also, the plan amendment was required to specifically address the following: Criteria for the designation of receiving areas within rural land stewardship areas in which innovative planning and development strategies may be applied. Criteria shall at a minimum provide for the following adequacy of suitable land to accommodate development so as to avoid conflict with environmentally sensitive areas, resources, and habitats; compatibility between and transition from higher density uses to lower intensity rural uses; the establishment of receiving area service boundaries which provide for a separation between receiving areas and other land uses within the rural land stewardship area through limitations on the extension of services; and connection of receiving areas with the rest of the rural land stewardship area using rural design and rural road corridors. Goals, objectives, and policies setting forth the innovative planning and development strategies to be applied within rural land stewardship areas pursuant to the provisions of this section. A process for the implementation of innovative planning and development strategies within the rural land stewardship area, including those described in this subsection and s. 9J-5.006(5)(l), Florida Administrative Code, which provide for a functional mix of land uses and which are applied through the adoption by the local government of zoning and land development regulations applicable to the rural land stewardship area. A process which encourages visioning pursuant to s. 163.3167(11) to ensure that innovative planning and development strategies comply with the provisions of this section. The control of sprawl through the use of innovative strategies and creative land use techniques consistent with the provisions of this subsection and rule 9J-5.006(5)(l), Florida Administrative Code. Once the plan amendment was in place, the county was then to implement it through land development regulations. Under the original statute, the county by ordinance was to "assign to the [RLSA] a certain number of credits, to be known as 'transferable rural land use credits' . . . ." These credits would then be transferred to designated receiving areas "solely for the purpose of implementing innovative planning and development strategies and creative land use planning techniques adopted by the local government pursuant to this section." See § 163.3177(11)(d)8.b., Fla. Stat. (2001). Once transferable rural land use credits were transferred from a parcel, the underlying land uses would be extinguished, the parcel would be limited to agriculture or conservation, and the transfer would be memorialized as a restrictive covenant running with the land. See § 163.3177(11)(d)8.k., Fla. Stat. (2001). The Department was granted the authority to implement this section by rule in the original statute. However, the Department did not adopt rules. No county applied to participate in this pilot program. Amendments to the RLSA Statute The Legislature substantially amended the statute in 2004. See Ch. 2004-372, Laws of Fla. Although the program had no participants as of that time, the Legislature removed the pilot status of the program and the limitation on the number of local governments that may be authorized to designate an RLSA. See § 163.3177(11)(d)1., Fla. Stat. (2004). Although the requirement for a written agreement between the county and the Department was deleted, the requirement for the county's application and Department's authorization prior to the designation of an RLSA remained. See § 163.3177(11)(d)1. and 4., Fla. Stat. (2004). The minimum acreage for an RLSA was reduced to 10,000 acres and the maximum was removed. § 163.3177(11)(d)4., Fla. Stat. (2004). The statute also explicitly recognized that RLSAs could be multi-county. § 163.3177(11)(d)2., Fla. Stat. (2004). In 2005, the Legislature again amended the statute in several respects, one of which was directed to the stewardship credit methodology. See Ch. 2005-290, Laws of Fla. However, the statute still requires that the total amount of credits is to be tied to the "25-year or greater projected population of the rural land stewardship area." Although the statute was amended again in 2006, those amendments have no bearing on the issues in this case. See Ch. 2006-220, Laws of Fla. Designating an RLSA Under the Statute Collier County has been frequently mentioned as a local government with an RLSA program. However, that County's comprehensive plan provisions regarding rural development were not adopted under the RLSA statute; rather, they were adopted by the County in 1999 as conventional plan amendments that were later approved in 2002 by a final order issued by the Administration Commission. Collier County's rural planning program does, however, have some of the same core attributes found in the RLSA program, including the creation of transferable land use credits to enable development in designated receiving areas. The Department closely examined the Collier County program as part of its "Rural Land Stewardship Area Program 2007 Annual Report to the Legislature" (2007 Annual Report). See Joint Exhibit 4. See also § 163.3177(11)(d)8., Fla. Stat. ("[t]he department shall report to the Legislature on an annual basis on the results of implementation of [RLSAs] authorized by the department"). This examination revealed several substantial flaws in the program. First, the Collier County program is extremely complex, with over twenty general attributes that must be examined for every acre of land assigned stewardship credits. This would make it difficult and expensive for small rural counties with limited resources. The Collier County program also assigns the highest stewardship credits to environmentally sensitive lands and appreciably lower values to agricultural land. The result is that development is directed to agricultural areas. For example, eighty-seven percent of the footprint of one receiving area that is currently being developed, known as Ave Maria, was in active agriculture prior to its designation for development. In this respect, the Collier County system is directing development to agricultural lands and not protecting and conserving those lands, which the Department contends contravenes the principles of rural sustainability. Another major concern with the Collier County program is the extent and distribution of receiving areas. The Collier County program does not have any requirements that the receiving area be clustered, thus allowing for the possibility of scattered, sprawling receiving areas throughout eastern Collier County. Also, there appears to be no limit on the footprint of these receiving areas. The original Collier County program envisioned development on only nine to ten percent of the entire area, for a total of approximately 16,800 acres. However, due to the complexity and "flexibility" within the Collier County stewardship credit system, "the maximum development footprint cannot be determined." On September 12, 2006, St. Lucie County adopted plan amendments under the RLSA statute. Later that year, the Department reviewed the amendments and found them to be in compliance. In preparing the 2007 Annual Report, the Department undertook a detailed analysis of the St. Lucie RLSA amendments. Even though the amendments had been previously found to be in compliance, the new analysis revealed several shortcomings in the amendments, including their failure to discuss, analyze, or demonstrate how they further the principles of rural sustainability, a primary focus of the program. Also, the amendments were not supported by an analysis of land use need. Instead of projecting population and need, the RLSA adopted an arbitrary cap of 13,248 dwelling units with "no known planning basis." The St. Lucie RLSA is similar to the Collier County program in two respects: it is very complex, and it places no spacial limits on the footprint of the development area. Due to these shortcomings, the Department has placed little, if any, reliance on the St. Lucie County RLSA amendments as an example of proper planning under the RLSA statute. There is no evidence that any development has occurred under the St. Lucie program, and its most recent Evaluation and Appraisal Report dated October 2008 indicated that none may ever occur. In 2007, Highlands and Osceola Counties both applied for and were granted authorization by the Department to designate RLSAs. However, both counties later notified the Department that they would no longer pursue the RLSAs, and the authorizations were withdrawn by the Department. The Rule Development Process In early 2007, the Department became aware of assertions by some landowners that the RLSA program provides for unlimited development within a stewardship area; that RLSA plan amendments were not subject to the growth management provisions in Chapter 163, Florida Statutes; and that RLSAs were not subject to a needs analysis, as required by the law. At the same time, the Department received numerous inquiries from large landowners and/or their representatives regarding RLSA proposals, some as large as 750,000 acres, and for two "new towns" with 100,000 and 60,000 dwelling units, respectively. It also became aware of concerns and criticisms leveled against the one adopted RLSA program in St. Lucie County and rural planning efforts in Collier County. The main criticism was that the system being used for RLSA planning was too complex, which resulted in an expensive, consultant- intensive process that lacked transparency and was largely incomprehensible. Based on the above concerns and criticisms, the Department began gathering information in early 2007 in preparation for rulemaking. On July 19, 2007, it conducted its first workshop. Two other workshops were held, and the first draft of proposed rule 9J-5.026 was issued in January 2008. That proposed rule set forth the minimum substantive requirements for RLSA planning. In September 2008, the Department issued its first draft of proposed rule 9J-11.023, which sets forth the procedural requirements for a local government to seek authorization from the Department to designate an RLSA. After receiving comments from interested parties, the Department noticed the rules for adoption and conducted a rule adoption hearing. On January 7, 2009, Petitioners filed a Petition challenging most of the provisions in the proposed rules. See DOAH Case No. 09-0048RP. Based upon that challenge, which raised new issues not previously brought to the attention of the Department, the Department withdrew the rules and made substantial revisions to address these concerns. This rendered moot Petitioners' earlier challenge. After the revised rules were noticed for adoption, Petitioners filed their Petition challenging numerous provisions within the proposed rules as well as one existing rule. The Objections As summarized in their Proposed Final Order, Petitioners contend (a) that proposed rules 9J-11.023(2), (4), and (5) are invalid because they exceed the Department's grant of rulemaking authority;4 (b) that proposed rules 9J-5.026(7)(b), (7)(c)4., 6., (8)(a), and (9)(a)3., 6., 18., and 19. enlarge, modify, or contravene the specific provisions of law implemented; (c) that proposed rule 9J-5.026(3) is vague and fails to establish adequate standards for agency decisions; (d) that proposed rule 9J-5.026(9)(a)18. is arbitrary; and (e) that existing Rule 9J-5.003(80) contravenes the specific provisions of law implemented. The remaining allegations have been voluntarily dismissed. a. Does proposed rule 9J-11.023 exceed the grant of legislative authority? Petitioners first contend that subsections (2) and (4) in their entirety and the words "If authorized to proceed" in the first sentence of subsection (5) of proposed rule 9J-11.023 are an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because they exceed the Department's specific grant of legislative authority. The challenged subsections of the proposed rule read as follows: 9J-11.023 Procedure for the Designation of a Rural Land Stewardship Area. * * * (2) Pre-Notification Actions. Prior to giving official notification of intent to designate a RLSA to the Department, the county(ies) shall conduct at least one noticed public workshop to discuss and evaluate the appropriateness of establishing a RLSA. The county(ies) shall invite the Department of Community Affairs, Department of Agricultural and Consumer Affairs, Department of Environmental Protection, Department of Transportation, Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, affected regional planning council(s), and affected water management district(s) (collectively referred to as the "RLSA Interagency Technical Advisory Team") to participate in the workshop. Potentially affected landowners and other interested parties shall be given notice and invited to participate in the workshop. The workshop shall address: the statutory process for designating a RLSA; the planning issues that are likely to arise; and the technical assistance that will be available from state and regional agencies if the county(ies) proceed to designate a RLSA. The county(ies) shall provide opportunities for broad public participation in the RLSA process, which may include a series of public meetings or workshops. The county(ies), in coordination with the affected landowners, shall host a site visit of the RLSA for the RLSA Interagency Technical Advisory Team in conjunction with the workshop or after the notification of intent to designate pursuant to paragraph (4)(b). * * * Review of Notification of Intent to Designate. The Department will provide members of the RLSA Interagency Technical Advisory Team with a copy of the notification of intent to designate within five days after receipt of the notification. If a site visit was not made prior to the notification of intent to designate, the Department will contact the county(ies) within ten days after receipt of the notification of intent to arrange a site visit of the proposed RLSA and surrounding lands. The county(ies) shall ensure proper coordination with the affected landowners. The Department will coordinate the scheduling of the site visit with the members of the RLSA Interagency Technical Advisory Team and request their participation in the site visit. Members of the RLSA Interagency Technical Advisory Team shall be asked to provide the Department oral and/or written comments on the proposed RLSA within 30 days of the receipt of the notification of intent to designate or the site visit, if it occurs after the notification. The Department may also request meetings with the members of the RLSA Interagency Technical Advisory Team to discuss and evaluate the notification and site visit. The Department may also request a conference with the county's(ies') staff(s) to discuss issues and questions that have arisen as a result of the site visit, comments from members of the Interagency Technical Advisory Team and other stakeholders, and the Department's evaluation of the RLSA proposal. Not later than 60 days following the receipt of the notification of intent to designate or the site visit, whichever is later, the Department shall issue a written notification to the county(ies). The Department's notification shall authorize the county(ies) to proceed with a plan amendment to designate the RLSA or inform the county(ies) of the Department's decision not to authorize. The decision shall be based on the information contained in or gained from the notification, site visit, other agency comments, and other information received. The Department shall authorize the county(ies) to proceed if it determines that the proposed RLSA meets the threshold eligibility requirements of subsection 9J-5.026(4), F.A.C. and that there is a reasonable likelihood that the RLSA will further the principles of rural sustainability. If the Department decides to authorize the county(ies) to proceed with a plan amendment to designate a RLSA, the notification will set forth the facts on which the authorization is based, and may include recommendations to the county(ies) regarding the RLSA. The notification will not guarantee that a comprehensive plan amendment(s) to designate a RLSA will be found in compliance by the Department. It will only constitute the Department's authorization to designate a RLSA if the necessary comprehensive plan amendment(s) are adopted and found in compliance pursuant to Section 163.3184, F.S. If the Department decides not to authorize the county(ies) to proceed with a plan amendment to designate a RLSA, the agency's notification will explain the reasons for the decision. Amendment to the Comprehensive Plan: If authorized to proceed, the county(ies) may prepare and process a plan amendment(s) that will be reviewed by the Department pursuant to Section 163.3184, F.S. The county(ies) may, in preparing the plan amendment(s), establish a local visioning process to facilitate the development of a RLSA plan amendment. The Department encourages the county(ies) to seek and utilize technical assistance from the members of the RLSA Interagency Technical Advisory Team in preparing a RLSA plan amendment. 33. Sections 120.52(8)(b) and 120.54(3)(a)1., Florida Statutes, require that the agency list in the rulemaking notice the purported rulemaking authority for the proposed rule. To comply with this requirement, the Department's rulemaking notice cites Sections 163.3177(9) and (11)(h), Florida Statutes, as the specific authority for adopting the rule and Section 163.3177(11)(d)1., Florida Statutes, as the law being implemented. In its Proposed Final Order, the Department relies on Section 163.3177(11)(h) as the specific statutory authority for rulemaking. It provides that the Department "may adopt rules necessary to implement the provisions of [subsection 163.3177(11)]," including the RLSA provisions found in Section 163.3177(11)(d). On the other hand, the law being implemented is quite lengthy and reads as follows: (11)(d)1. The department, in cooperation with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, the Department of Environmental Protection, water management districts, and regional planning councils, shall provide assistance to local governments in the implementation of this paragraph and rule 9J-5.006(5)(l), Florida Administrative Code. Implementation of those provisions shall include a process by which the department may authorize local governments to designate all or portions of lands classified in the future land use element as predominately agriculture, rural, open, open-rural, or a substantively equivalent land use, as a rural land stewardship area within which planning and economic incentives are applied to encourage the implementation of innovative and flexible planning techniques, including those contained herein and in rule 9J- 5.006(5)(l), Florida Administrative Code. Assistance may include, but is not limited to: Assistance from the Department of Environmental Protection and water management districts in creating the geographic information systems land cover database and aerial photogrammetry needed to prepare for a [RLSA]; Support for local government implementation of rural land stewardship concepts by providing information and assistance to local governments regarding land acquisition and assistance to local governments regarding land acquisition programs that may be used by the local government programs that may be used by the local government or landowners to leverage the protection of greater acreage and maximize the effectiveness of rural land stewardship areas; and Expansion of the role of the Department of Community Affairs as a resource agency to facilitate establishment of [RLSAs] in smaller rural counties that do not have the staff or planning budgets to create a [RLSA]. Proposed rule 9J-11.023 describes in detail the process by which a local government is to request Department authorization to designate a RLSA. At issue here are provisions in subsections (2), (4), and (5) of the rule that require a local government wishing to designate an RLSA to conduct a public workshop; cover particular topics during the workshop; host a site visit with designated agencies; and based on the information gathered from this process to then allow the Department, in its discretion, to either authorize or not authorize the local government to begin to prepare and process an RLSA amendment. The latter decision is based on whether the local government has shown "a reasonable likelihood that the RLSA will further the principles of rural sustainability." Petitioners contend that there is no specific grant of rulemaking authority that authorizes the Department to mandate these procedures in the rule or to prevent a local government from proposing and processing an RLSA plan amendment. Instead, they contend that the enabling statute only allows the Department to promulgate rules that are "necessary" to implement the RLSA program, those being a requirement that the county provide notice to the Department that it intends to propose a RLSA plan amendment and a description of the subsequent review process by the Department to determine whether the amendment is in compliance. Section 163.3177(11)(d)1., Florida Statutes, authorizes the Department to provide "assistance to local governments in the implementation of this paragraph and rule 9J- 5.006(5)(l)." (The cited rule, among other things, encourages "innovative and flexible planning and development strategies" that allow conversion of rural and agricultural lands to other uses.) The statute also includes specific authority to establish a "process by which the department may authorize local governments to designate all or portions of lands classified in the future land use element (FLUE] as predominately agricultural, rural, open, open-rural, or a substantively equivalent land use, as a [RLSA] . . . ." The rule accomplishes this purpose by requiring state agency technical assistance, establishing the process for a workshop and site visit, requiring that the county's notification describe the basis for the designation, requiring broad public participation, and assuring, by approval or disapproval of the county's preliminary proposal, that the proposed RLSA will promote the principles of rural sustainability. Notably, had the Legislature intended this authorization process to be the same as the existing compliance review process for conventional plan amendments, there would be no need for this statutory language. The proposed rule does not exceed the Department's grant of rulemaking authority. b. Do certain provisions within proposed rule 9J-5.026(7) and (9) enlarge, modify, or contravene the law implemented? Petitioners further contend that proposed rules 9J- 5.026(7)(b), (7)(c)4., 6., (8)(a), and (9)(a)3., 6., 18., and enlarge, modify, or contravene the specific provisions of law implemented. The challenged rules read as follows: 9J-5.026 Rural Land Stewardship Area (RLSA) * * * Data and Analysis Requirements. * * * Population Projections and Analysis of Land Use Need. Population projections and analysis of land use need shall be prepared in accordance with Rule 9J-5.006, F.A.C., with the following modifications: The amount and extent of allowable development in the RLSA must be based on the 25-year or greater projected population of the RLSA; the anticipated effect of the proposed RLSA must receiving areas, including any committed catalyst projects, infrastructure improvements, or other projects that would attract and support development; the furtherance of the statutory principles of rural sustainability; and the goals, objectives, and policies of the RLSA plan amendment. * * * 4. Land development and other conversion threats whereby rural resources under threat require more incentives via stewardship credits and less threatened resources require lesser incentives. This includes the future threat of low-density sprawl on lands within and surrounding Eligible Receiving Areas; and * * * 6. Values shall be assigned to all of the land in the RLSA. The highest values shall be assigned to the most environmentally valuable land, and to open space and agricultural land where the retention of such lands is a priority. The assignment of values shall be submitted with the RLSA plan amendment as part of the supporting data and analysis. * * * Stewardship Credit System Criteria. (a) Each credit shall represent a defined number of residential units or a defined amount of non-residential square footage. The credit transferee may decide whether to use the credit for a residential or non- residential use in accordance with the land use standards established for the Designated Receiving Area. * * * Goals, Objectives, Policies, and Map. * * * (a) The goals, objectives, and policies shall include the following: * * * 3. Identification of the innovative planning and development strategies to be used within the RLSA, and a process for implementing the strategies, including the adoption of implementing plan amendments, land development regulations, and the issuance of development orders. The process shall include provision for the Department's review of a proposed land development regulation to designate a receiving area for consistency with the RLSA plan amendment. * * * 6. A requirement that Eligible Receiving Areas shall be located on land that is suitable for development and have the lowest land values based on the land values analysis conducted pursuant to paragraph (7)(c). * * * Policies for new towns which comply with the following: As required by subsection 9J-5.003(80) and paragraph 9J-5.006(5)(1), F.A.C., a new town shall be designated on the future land use map. A new town shall be located within a Designated Receiving Area. The plan amendment designating a new town shall include a master development plan that establishes the size of the new town, the amount, location, type, density and intensity of development, and the design standards to be utilized in the new town. Any increase in the density or intensity of land use required to achieve the proposed new town may occur only through the use of stewardship credits assigned or transferred to the Designated Receiving Area either prior to or subsequent to the designation of the new town on the future land use map. New towns shall be surrounded by greenbelts, except for any connecting rural road corridors and to the extent that new towns are adjacent to existing or planned urban development or incorporated areas. A future land use map amendment to designate a new town shall be internally consistent with RLSA provisions of the comprehensive plan. A future land use map amendment to designate a new town shall be accompanied by an amendment to the capital improvements element to incorporate a financially feasible five-year capital improvements schedule for the public facilities necessary to serve the new town and an amendment to the transportation or traffic circulation element to designate any new rural road corridors required to connect the new town with the rest of the RLSA. Provisions to ensure that any use of the underlying densities and intensities of land uses assigned to parcels of land by the county comprehensive plan prior to designation of the RLSA furthers the principles of rural sustainability. * * * The grant of authority for this rule is cited as Sections 163.3177(9) and (11)(h), Florida Statutes, while Sections 163.3177(2), (3), (6)(a), (8), (10)(e), (11)(a), (b), and (d)1., 2., 4., 5., and 6., Florida Statutes, are cited as the laws being implemented. Subsection (2) of the law being implemented provides that "[c]oordination of the several elements of the local comprehensive plan shall be a major objective of the planning process"; subsection (3) is a lengthy provision requiring that a comprehensive plan include a capital improvements element; paragraph (6)(a) describes in detail the matters that must be contained in the FLUE; subsection (8) requires that all elements of the comprehensive plan be based on data appropriate to the element involved; paragraph (10)(e) generally provides that support data and analysis shall not be subject to the compliance review process, but they must be based on appropriate data; paragraph (11)(a) describes the Legislature's recognition of using innovative planning and development strategies; paragraph (11)(b) expresses the intent of the Legislature to allow the conversion of rural lands to other uses, where appropriate, including urban villages, new towns, satellite communities, area-based allocations, clustering, and open space provisions, mixed-use development, and sector planning; and subparagraphs (11)(d)1., 2., 4., 5., and 6. describe the statutory process for creating an RLSA. Subsection (7) of the proposed rule sets forth the data and analysis requirements that apply to all RLSA plan amendments, including data and analysis of existing conditions (subparagraphs (7)(a)1. through 10.); population projections and analysis of land use (paragraph (7)(b)); and a land values analysis (subparagraphs (7)(c)1. through 6.). A land use needs analysis is an integral part of the planning process. Paragraph (7)(b) requires that an RLSA amendment be supported by population projections and an analysis of land use need such that the amount and extent of allowable development must be based on the 25-year or greater projected population of the RLSA, other items, and the anticipated effect of proposed RLSA receiving areas. Petitioners contend that this language contravenes Section 163.3177(11)(d)6., Florida Statutes, amended in 2005, which provides in part that the total amount of development "must enable the realization of the long- term vision and goals for the 25-year or greater projected population of the [RLSA], which may take into consideration the anticipated effect of the proposed receiving areas." See Ch. 2005-290, Laws of Fla. Paragraph (7)(b) does not contravene the terms of the statute. As expressed in the law being implemented, the rule directs that the need analysis shall be based upon, among other things, "the anticipated effect of the proposed RLSA receiving areas " As a part of the data and analysis to be supplied, paragraph (7)(c) requires that an RLSA amendment be supported by a land values analysis that considers six components described in subparagraphs 1. through 6. This in turn requires a comprehensive analysis of rural resources that exist within the RLSA. Subparagraph 4. requires that the analysis include the development threats to rural resources and that resources under threat of conversion receive more incentives from stewardship credits than resources under less of a threat. Petitioners contend that the rule contravenes Section 163.3177(11)(d)6.j., Florida Statutes, because it requires a greater value to be assigned to resources under threat of conversion and would result in other rural and natural and agricultural resources which may have a higher intrinsic value being assigned fewer credits. Specifically, the cited statute requires that "the highest number of credits per acre" should be "assigned to the most environmentally valuable land, or, in locations where the retention of open space and agricultural land is a priority, to such lands." The purpose of the rule is straightforward: to protect those resources that are under the greatest threat and those that are most susceptible to harm over time through land development or other changes, including urban sprawl. Contrary to Petitioners' assertion, the overall analysis does in fact consider all forms of rural resources in determining how the credits will be assigned. The rule implements the statutory directive of attaining the principles of rural sustainability. Subparagraph (7)(c)6. requires, among other things, that the local government submit as a part of the data and analysis supporting the plan amendment "the assignment of values" of all lands in the RLSA. Petitioners contend that assigning values at the time of the amendment "locks in these values" and would require a subsequent plan amendment in contravention of Section 163.3177(11)(d)6., Florida Statutes, which Petitioners argue contemplates the creation of credits after the adoption of the plan amendment. At hearing, however, the Department explained that because conditions will obviously change over time, the land values analysis will be periodically updated and can be changed without a new plan amendment. In their Proposed Final Order, Petitioners concede that given this interpretation of the rule, it "would not be an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority." See Petitioners' Proposed Final Order, par. 73. Paragraph (8)(a) of the proposed rule requires each stewardship credit to represent either a defined number of residential units or non-residential square footage. Once the credits are created in sending areas, they can be transferred to designated receiving areas to be used to enable development that is consistent with the RLSA goals, objectives, and policies. Petitioners contend that the rule will prohibit mixed-use development in contravention of Section 163.3177(11)(d)4.c., Florida Statutes, which requires that the RLSA goals, policies, and objective provide for a "functional mix of land uses." There is no prohibition of a mix of land uses. In fact, the opposite is true. As clarified by a Department witness, "a mix is essentially required, as you can see from [sub]paragraph (9)(a)17., which describes that a mix of use must be addressed." Tr. at 273. The rule does not contravene the statute. Subsection (9) of the proposed rule generally requires that the RLSA plan amendment contain goals, objectives, policies, and a map. Subparagraphs (9)(a)1. through 21. require that the goals, objectives, and policies identify the innovative planning and development strategies to be used in the RLSA process, including the adoption of implementing plan amendments, land development regulations, and the issuance of development orders. Petitioners allege that subparagraphs 3., 6., 18., and enlarge, modify, or contravene the law implemented. Subparagraph 3. requires "implementing plan amendments" because the Department recognized the fact that the RLSA planning process will consume years or even decades and will require implementing plan amendments to accomplish its purpose. This is especially true here as the RLSA process involves the development of large tracts of land (as much as 100,000 acres or more) that will take years or decades to fully implement and build out. At a minimum, under current law, the "implementing plan amendments" will include a capital improvements element annual update; water supply planning, and the designation of new towns. Except for the requirement that an implementing plan amendment designate a new town pursuant to existing Rule 9J-5.003(80), Petitioners agree that the proposed rule is valid. Because the cited existing rule has been determined to be valid, Petitioners' contention is rejected. See Findings 62-65, infra. Subparagraph 6. provides that the goals, policies, and objectives shall contain "a requirement that the Eligible Receiving Areas shall be located on land that is suitable for development and have the lowest land values on the land values analysis conducted pursuant to paragraph (7)(c)." Petitioners contend that this provision limits the flexibility of local governments to determine the best location for Eligible Receiving Areas and therefore contravenes the provisions in various parts of Section 163.3177, Florida Statutes, that emphasize flexibility. The rule implements the principles of rural sustainability contained in Section 163.3177(11)(d)2., Florida Statutes. Only by directing development to land with the lowest environmental, agricultural, and rural resource value will an RLSA protect ecosystems, habitat, natural resources, and the agricultural economy. The rule does not contravene this statute. Subparagraph 18. requires an RLSA plan amendment to include policies for "new towns," including a requirement that a new town be designated on the FLUM. Petitioners contend that the requirement to designate a new town on the FLUM contravenes Section 163.3177(11)(4)(d)4., Florida Statutes, which provides for the implementation of the innovative planning and development strategies included in existing Rule 9J-5.006(5)(l) through zoning and land development regulations. At hearing, Petitioners narrowed their argument to this one feature in the rule. Because the Department may lawfully require that new towns be designated on the FLUM, subparagraph 18. is consistent with the statute implemented. See Findings 62-65, infra. Subparagraph 19. requires that RLSA plan amendments contain goals, objectives, and policies "to ensure that any use of the underlying densities and intensities of land uses assigned to parcels of land by the county comprehensive plan prior to designation of the RLSA furthers the principles of rural sustainability." Petitioners contend this provision contravenes Section 163.3177(11)(d)6., Florida Statutes, because it "impinges on existing land use rights which is contrary to one of the statutory principles of rural sustainability, namely the 'restoration and maintenance of the economic value associated with rural lands.'" The rule, however, furthers the principles of rural sustainability, as required by Section 163.3177(11)(d)1., Florida Statutes, since it requires that all lands within an RLSA, whether or not in a Designated Receiving Area, be developed in a manner that furthers those principles. It does not contravene the cited statute. Petitioners also contend that subparagraph 19. contravenes Section 163.3161(9), Florida Statutes, which requires, among other things, that all programs be applied "with sensitivity for private property rights and not be unduly restrictive." Petitioners surmise that the rule may operate to displace underlying density within the RSLA regardless of the use of the RLSA credit system. However, the rule does not displace any underlying density; it only requires that underlying rights be exercised consistent with the RLSA. More specifically, existing densities may be used in any manner that furthers the principles without displacing any of those densities. The rule does not contravene either statute. Is proposed rule 9J-5.026(3) vague and does it have inadequate standards for agency decisions? Petitioners next contend that subsection (3) of proposed rule 9J-5.026, and specifically certain words within the definition of the term "greenbelt," are vague and fail to establish adequate standards for agency decisions. That provision reads as follows: 9J-5.026 Rural Land Stewardship Area (RSLA) * * * (3) Definitions * * * (d) "Greenbelt" means a border of permanently undeveloped land sufficient in size to effectively preclude the expansion of urban development into the surrounding rural lands and to provide an effective buffer to protect the surrounding rural resources from development impacts. A greenbelt is an undeveloped area that surrounds an urban area, a new town, or other urban development and is meant to separate the urban developed area from the surrounding area to provide a border that protects surrounding rural lands from urban development. Petitioners contend that the use of the adjectives "sufficient," "effectively," and "effective" to describe the greenbelt buffer are vague and lack standards to guide agency determinations. In common usage, the word "sufficient" means that the greenbelt is sufficient in size to accomplish its purpose of precluding the expansion of urban development into the surrounding rural lands. Similarly, the word "effectively" means that the use or creation of a buffer to protect urban encroachment on rural lands will be accomplished in an effective manner. Likewise, the word "effective" simply means that the greenbelt achieves the purpose of creating a buffer. These phrases are easily understood by persons of ordinary intelligence, particularly when read in context with other provisions of the rule. See, e.g., Cole Vision Corp., et al. v. Dept. of Bus. and Prof. Reg., 688 So. 2d 404, 410 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). Petitioners contend, however, that the rule fails to explicitly include the standard that site-specific data would be considered in determining the "sufficiency" of a buffer. However, this level of detail is not needed since site-specific information is typically considered and applied by the local government and Department through the planning process and might include, for example, the nature of the urban area, the potential impacts if the urban area is extended, the nature of the surrounding land, and other similar factors. The rule is not so vague or lacks sufficient standards as to be invalid. Is proposed rule 9J-5.026(9)(a)18. arbitrary? Petitioners further contend that subparagraph (9)(a)18. of proposed rule 9J-5.026 is arbitrary. That rule reads as follows: 18. Policies for new towns which comply with the following: As required by subsection 9J-5.003(80) and paragraph 9J-5.006(5)(1), F.A.C., a new town shall be designated on the future land use map. A new town shall be located within a Designated Receiving Area. The plan amendment designating a new town shall include a master development plan that establishes the size of the new town, the amount, location, type, density and intensity of development, and the design standards to be utilized in the new town. Any increase in the density or intensity of land use required to achieve the proposed new town may occur only through the use of stewardship credits assigned or transferred to the Designated Receiving Area either prior to or subsequent to the designation of the new town on the future land use map. New towns shall be surrounded by greenbelts, except for any connecting rural road corridors and to the extent that new towns are adjacent to existing or planned urban development or incorporated areas. A future land use map amendment to designate a new town shall be internally consistent with RLSA provisions of the comprehensive plan. A future land use map amendment to designate a new town shall be accompanied by an amendment to the capital improvements element to incorporate a financially feasible five-year capital improvements schedule for the public facilities necessary to serve the new town and an amendment to the transportation or traffic circulation element to designate any new rural road corridors required to connect the new town with the rest of the RSLA. As noted earlier, this rule sets forth the requirements for policies in the RLSA plan amendment that are applicable to new towns. Petitioners contend that the rule is arbitrary because it "selectively emphasizes" a new town as only one of several innovative and flexible planning strategies set forth in existing Rule 9J-5.006(5)(l). To be arbitrary, a rule must not be supported by logic or the necessary facts. See § 120.52(8)(e), Fla. Stat. Here, the more persuasive evidence shows that new towns are much larger development types; they are more intense than other development forms; and they will likely generate greater impacts. In an RLSA, they take on even more significance since the planning goal is to further the principles of rural sustainability. Collectively, these factors form a sufficient basis and rationale for giving new towns different treatment than other development forms that are smaller, have fewer uses, are less intense, and are more likely to have lesser impacts. The proposed rule is not arbitrary. e. Does existing Rule 9J-5.003(80) contravene the specific provisions of law implemented? Finally, Petitioners have challenged existing Rule 9J- 5.003(80), which became effective in 1994, on the ground that it contravenes the specific provisions of law implemented. That rule defines the term "new town" as follows: (80) "New town" means a new urban activity center designated on the future land use map and located within a rural area, distinct and geographically separated from existing urban areas and other new towns. A new town is of sufficient size, population and land use composition to support a variety of economic and social activities consistent with an urban area designation. New towns include basic economic activities; all major land use categories; and a centrally provided full range of public facilities and services. New towns are based on a master development plan. The specific authority for the rule, when adopted, was Section 163.3177(9) and (10), while the law being implemented was identified as Sections 163.3177 and 163.3178, Florida Statutes. Because Section 163.3178 involves coastal management, and a new town would probably not be located in a coastal zone, it has marginal relevance to this proceeding. The Department relies principally on Section 163.3177(6)(a), Florida Statutes, which requires, among other things, that "various categories of land use shall be shown on a land use map or map series."6 The existing definition provides, in part, that a new town will include "all major land use categories, with the possible exception of agricultural and industrial." Because they include numerous land use categories, new towns are by definition a mixed-use land use category. See Fla. Admin. Code 9J-5.006(4)(c). Mixed-use land use categories must be designated on the FLUM. See § 163.3177(6)(a), Fla. Stat.("The future land use plan may designate areas for future planned development use involving combinations of types of uses"). As noted above, a new town is recognized in existing Rule 9J-5.006(5)(l) as an innovative and flexible planning option. Because the Legislature referenced this rule provision with approval four times in the RLSA statute, it must be presumed that the Legislature was expressing approval of the existing definition with the mapping requirement. See §§ 163.3177(11)(d)1. (two separate references); 163.3177(11)(d)4.c.; and 163.3177(11)(d)4.e. The rule does not contravene the statute being implemented.
The Issue At issue in this case is whether the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission (FLWAC) should grant the Petition to Amend the Boundaries of the Tomoka Community Development District filed on November 23, 2005 (Petition). The purpose of the Petition is to add 1,122 acres that were intended to be included in the Community Development District (CDD, or District) when it was created in October 2003 but were omitted through the inadvertent use of an erroneous legal description.
The Issue The issue in Case 08-1144GM is whether Martin County Comprehensive Growth Management Plan (CGMP or Plan) Amendment 7-20, called the "Land Protection Incentives" (LPI) Amendment (LPIA), which was adopted by Ordinance 777 on December 11, 2007, and amended by Ordinance 795 on April 29, 2008, is "in compliance," as defined by Section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes.1 The issue in Case 08-1465GM is whether Martin County's Comprehensive Plan Amendment 7-22, called the "Secondary Urban Service District" (SUSD) Amendment (SUSDA), which was adopted by Ordinance 781 on December 11, 2007, is "in compliance," as defined by Section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners' Standing FOF and MCCA objected to the LPIA and the SUSDA during the time period from transmittal to adoption of those amendments.3 FOF FOF is a non-profit organization incorporated in 1986, shortly after Florida’s Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation (Growth Management) Act was enacted to monitor the Act's implementation. FOF engages in legislative, legal, and grassroots advocacy for sustainable comprehensive land use planning in Florida. It conducts membership meetings, sends newsletters to members and others, hosts meetings open to the general public, and initiates or participates in litigation or administrative proceedings concerning amendments to local comprehensive plans. Its main office is in Tallahassee, where several employees work. It also has a branch office in Lake Worth, Palm Beach County, where one employee works. It has no office or employees in Martin County. There was no evidence that FOF has applied for or obtained any license or permit to operate a business in Martin County; nor was there any evidence as to the requirements for obtaining such a license or permit. FOF has approximately 3,500 members; approximately 550 members live or own property in Martin County. FOF does not have a continuous presence in Martin County, other than its members who live and own property there, but it continuously monitors comprehensive planning and related growth management issues in Martin County and from time to time engages in activities in Martin County. Since 1990, FOF was involved in the Loxahatchee Greenways project, a major river corridor running through Martin County; was involved in the protection of Jonathan Dickinson State Park, which is in Martin County; undertook its Palm Beach and Martin County Green Initiative (which addressed housing, legal, transportation, and other planning issues in Martin County and resulted in the distribution of educational materials on Martin County planning issues); opposed specific local development proposals; supported a sales tax referendum to buy and preserve environmentally- sensitive lands; collaborated with the County planning department to update the housing element of the County Comprehensive Plan; assisted with a local affordable housing initiative; published a booklet on comprehensive planning in the County; and conducted a public survey of County residents assessing attitudes about planning. FOF staff members speak at and participate in annual growth management forums in Martin County, which are attended by a substantial number of its members. FOF has regularly commented in person and in writing to the Martin County Commission on proposed CGMP changes. FOF also has previously participated as a party in administrative hearings conducted in the County concerning the CGMP, during which its president has testified as an expert planner. The relief requested by FOF in this case is germane to its goals and appropriate to request on behalf of its members. MCCA MCCA is a Florida not-for-profit corporation created in 1997. It is a membership-based organization of 120 individuals and 14 other organizations. MCCA itself does not own real property in Martin County. However, at least 38 individual members reside and own real property in the County, and at least one organizational member (Audubon of Martin County) owns real property in the County. MCCA does not maintain an office or have paid employees. It operates through its members, who volunteer. MCCA's Articles of Incorporation state that it was formed "to conserve the natural resources of Martin County, to protect the native flora and fauna of Martin County, [and] to maintain and improve the quality of life for all of the residents of Martin County." It engages in various forms of lobbying and advocacy for or against amendments to Martin County's Comprehensive Plan, including initiation or participation in litigation and administrative proceedings. It conducts membership meetings in the County, sends newsletters to members and others, hosts meetings in the County that are open to the general public (including an annual growth management meeting with FOF and an annual awards luncheon with local conservation groups), and works with member organizations on issues relating to the Indian River Lagoon (IRL), including petition drives. The relief requested by MCCA in this case is germane to its goals and appropriate to request on behalf of its members. Martin County Comprehensive Growth Management Plan The CGMP establishes two "urban service districts" in the County, a Primary Urban Service District (PUSD) and a Secondary Urban Service District (SUSD). See CGMP, § 4.4.G. The PUSD has been part of the Plan since it was first adopted in 1982, while the SUSD was added during the major revision of the Plan in 1990. Approximately 65,702 acres (101 square miles) are located within the PUSD. The PUSD encompasses most of the eastern coastal area of the County surrounding four incorporated municipalities, (Stuart, Sewall's Point, Jupiter Island, and Ocean Breeze Park), plus an isolated inland area known as Indiantown. Approximately 9,621 acres (14 square miles) are located within the SUSD. All land within the SUSD is immediately adjacent to land within the PUSD, but is split into several discontinuous sections so that some of the land along the western border of the PUSD abuts land outside the urban service districts. The County's purpose for having urban service districts is to "regulate urban sprawl tendencies by directing growth in a timely and efficient manner to those areas where urban public facilities and services are available, or are programmed to be available at the levels of service adopted in [the Plan]." CGMP, § 4.4.G. The Plan further provides: Objective: Martin County shall concentrate higher densities and intensities of development within the strategically located [PUSDs], as delineated, including commercial or industrial uses as well as residential development exceeding a density of two units per acre . . . . * * * b. Policy: Martin County shall require that new residential development containing one-half acre or smaller lots, commercial uses, and industrial uses shall be located within the [PUSD]. * * * Objective 2. Martin County shall concentrate rural and estate densities not exceeding one unit per gross acre within the [SUSDs] where a reduced level of public facility needs are programmed to be available at the base level of service adopted in the Capital Improvements Element. a. Policy: Martin County shall designate land uses within the [SUSD] in order to provide for the use and extension of urban services in an efficient and economical manner, and consistent with the reduced intensity of urban services normally associated with densities of one unit per gross acre (Estate Density RE-1A) and one unit per two gross acres (Rural Density). . . . * * * f. Policy: In areas designated as [SUSD], where development is proposed that would contain one- half acre lots, or commercial and industrial uses, a change to a [PUSD] designation must be approved by the Board of County Commissioners as part of a land use amendment . . . . The Plan thus generally establishes residential density for land within the PUSD at 2 or more dwelling units per acre, and for land within the SUSD at 1 dwelling unit per acre to 1 dwelling unit per 2 acres. The remaining land within the County that is not within the PUSD or SUSD is generally referred to as "outside" the urban service districts. There are approximately 269,034 acres of such land. The vast majority of such land (approximately 210,379 acres) is designated in the Plan for "agricultural" use. Most of the other land outside the urban service districts is designated for either "public conservation" or "public utilities" See CGMP, § 4.4.L., § 4.4.M.1.a., i., and j. The Plan currently allows residential use of land outside the urban service boundaries that is designated for agricultural use but limits it to either 1 dwelling unit per 5 acres, known as "agricultural ranchette," or 1 dwelling unit per 20 acres. See CGMP, § 4.4.M.1.a.& c. The Plan further specifies for the latter that: Residential development in the agricultural area is restricted to one-single family residence per gross 20-acre tract. [N]o development shall be permitted which divides landholdings into lots, parcels or other units of less than 20 gross acres. Acreage may be split for bona fide agricultural uses into parcels no smaller than 20 gross acres. . . . Residential subdivisions at a density or intensity or greater than one single- family dwelling unit per 20 gross acre lot shall not be allowed. (CGMP, § 4.4.M.1.a.) Throughout the Plan, residential development on lots of 2 acres or more is consistently referred to as "rural" development (even within the SUSD), while residential development on smaller lots is consistently referred to as "urban" and must be in either the PUSD or SUSD. It was undisputed that the County's adoption of such a distinction between urban and rural residential lots was a professionally acceptable planning practice. Preservation of the County's agricultural lands is a goal of the Plan. See CGMP, § 4.4.L.1. It is also later stated in a policy related to the allocation of land: Through its planning, capital improvements, cooperative extension, regulatory and intergovernmental coordination activities, Martin County shall continue to protect agriculture as a viable economic use of land. (CGMP, § 4.4.M.1.b.) Preservation of conservation and open space areas within the County is the subject of an entire element of the Plan. See CGMP, Chap. 9.4 The County's goal is "to effectively manage, conserve, and preserve the natural resources of Martin County, giving consideration to an equitable balance of public and private property rights. These resources include air, water, soils, habitat, fisheries, and wildlife, with special emphasis on restoring the St. Lucie Estuary and the Indian River Lagoon." CGMP, § 9.4.A. Preservation of conservation and open space areas is also addressed in numerous other objectives and policies throughout the several elements of the Plan and is a predominant theme of the entire Plan. The provision of "urban public facilities and services" is expressly limited by a policy to the County's urban service districts "in order to preserve agricultural lands and provide maximum protection to the farmer from encroachment by urban uses." CGMP, § 4.4.L.1.a. The Plan defines the term "public urban facilities and services" as "regional water supply and wastewater treatment/disposal systems, solid waste collection services, acceptable response times for sheriff and emergency services, reasonably accessible community park and related recreational facilities, schools and the transportation network." CGMP, § 4.1.B.4. However, the term is often used in the Plan in a rearranged or abbreviated manner, such as "urban public facilities and services" (§ 4.4.G.1.f.(7)), "public facilities and services" (§ 4.4.G and § 4.4.G.1.f.), "public services and facilities" (§ 4.4.G.1.i.), "public urban facilities" (§ 4.4.G.1.c.), "public urban facilities" (§ 4.4.G.1.i.), or merely "public facilities (§ 4.4.G.1.) or "urban services " (§ 4.4.G.2.a.). LPIA Provisions The LPIA adds a new objective and new policies under the Future Land Use Element goal addressing "natural resource protection," which provides: Martin County shall protect all the natural resource systems of the County from the adverse impacts of development, provide for continued growth in population and economy and recognize the inter-relationship between the maintenance of urban support infrastructure in waste management, air and water quality, and the coastal zone environmental quality. (CGMP, § 4.4.E.) To the existing 6 objectives under that goal, the LPIA adds a seventh which states: Martin County shall create opportunities for the permanent preservation of contiguous open space, environmentally sensitive land and agricultural land uses while maintaining residential capacity as it existed on January 1, 2007. For the purposes of Section 4.4.E.7., and supporting paragraphs, the definition of open space, found in Section 9.4.A.11., CGMP, shall not include roads, highways and their median strips and berms. This objective is intended to encourage the conveyance of fee simple title of land listed for public acquisition by state, regional or local environmental or governmental agencies or land trusts. Lands listed for acquisition include, but are not be limited to [sic], land designated for public acquisition under the Save Our Rivers program, the Indian River Lagoon, North Palm Beach, and the Lake Okeechobee portions of the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP), as well as Northern Everglades and Estuaries Protection Program. The overall purpose of the LPIA is to encourage the owners of tracts of land outside the urban service districts that are at least 500 acres to choose a different pattern of development than the Plan now allows, by allowing a substantial reduction in the minimum lot size so that the development may be "clustered" on a smaller "footprint" within the overall tract of land, but only if at least 50% of the entire tract is "set aside" permanently for conservation, open space, or agricultural use and stripped of its potential for future development. This approach, it is hoped, will make it easier and cheaper for the County and other governmental entities to acquire the large tracts of land they desire to use for the CERP and other conservation projects. The LPIA does not allow for more development than is allowed under the Plan currently. It allows the same amount of development to be arranged on a tract of land in a different pattern than is currently allowed. It accomplishes this primarily through the combination of a change in the minimum lot size from "20 acres" to "over 2 acres" with a new allowance for "clustering" the smaller lots on a portion of an overall tract of land rather than having an equal number of larger lots spread throughout the entire tract of land. The LPIA adopts six policies to accomplish the new objective: Policy (7)a. provides for the protection of the land "set aside" to be conveyed or subject to an easement in favor of a combination of the County, the South Florida Water Management District, and a third entity, chosen from among the other governmental or not-for-profit conservation- oriented organizational entities listed in the policy. Policy (7)b. requires that a combination of a comprehensive plan amendment and a PUD agreement be used for the change in the development characteristics of the land. The PUD agreement would address the portion of the tract subject to development and not "set aside," while the plan amendment would address (at a minimum) the remaining portion of the tract which is permanently "set aside" for conservation, open space, or agricultural use and would no longer have any potential for residential development. Policy (7)c. provides additional specificity concerning the subject matters that would be addressed by the comprehensive plan amendment, such as any required change in land use designation for the set-aside portion of the tract of land, and if it remains designated for agricultural use, the removal of any potential for development. Policy (7)d. primarily provides additional specificity concerning the subject matters that would be addressed by the PUD agreement, setting minimum requirements to be met such as the tract having to be a minimum of 500 acres in size; the development being "fiscally neutral to existing taxpayers"; the lots having to be more than 2 acres in size; the inability to develop in environmentally sensitive areas on the tract; and the acknowledgment of a permanent restriction against any future increase of density on the tract. The policy also essentially repeats some of the requirements enunciated in the second and third policies regarding the conveyance of title or easement and the required comprehensive plan amendment, and addresses who pays the closing costs for the set-aside portion of the tract. Policy (7)e. establishes additional requirements specifically applicable to land that has been "listed for acquisition by state, regional, or local agencies as part of an established conservation program." Policy (7)f. enumerates the "site specific benefits" that the second policy states the County must consider when deciding whether to approve an application for development under the optional pattern allowed by the LPIA, such as whether more than the minimum 50% of the tract will be "set aside" permanently, whether the location fills "gaps in natural systems, wildlife corridors, greenways and trails," or whether buffers are provided along roads "to limit access and to protect vistas." The LPIA requirement for at least 50% of an entire tract being set aside for one of the three public purposes, when coupled with other requirements of the Plan such as establishment of construction setback distances, preservation of wetlands and creation of buffers around wetlands, preservation of certain uplands, would result in more than 50% of an undeveloped tract of land remaining in an undeveloped state and at least 50% of agricultural land remaining in agricultural use. Meaning and Predictability of LPIA Standards Petitioners contend that the LPIA fails to establish meaningful and predictable standards in numerous respects. No Guide to Location and Pattern of Development Petitioners contend that the LPIA fails to establish meaningful and predictable standards essentially because it does not identify the lands to be preserved and developed, leaving the results up to the choice of landowners to make proposals and Martin County's case-by-case decisions on future development proposals. See PPRO, ¶¶52-53. However, the goals of the LPIA are quite clear, and there is no basis to speculate that Martin County will make decisions contrary to those goals--for example, by approving PUDs or agricultural uses on the most environmentally-sensitive part of tract, ignoring the importance of environmentally-sensitive and agricultural lands and the impact of development patterns on them, and ignoring the impact of the pattern of development under the LPIA on rural character. Petitioners also criticize the LPIA for not being clear "whether a subject property must be in single ownership." (PPRO, ¶61.) However, it is not clear why that omission would be pertinent. Undefined Increase in Maximum Density Petitioners contend that, in four ways, the LPIA increases maximum density in the Agricultural category without defining the amount of the increase. Waiver of Density Limits Clearly, the LPIA exempts the PUD option from "the agricultural land use policies in Section 4.4.M.1.a. pertaining to the 20 acre lot size . . . ." LPIA § 4.4.E.7.d.(8). Contrary to Petitioners' contention, that does not eliminate density standards. Residential lots must be greater than two acres. See LPIA § 4.4.E.7.d.(3). Maintenance of Residential Capacity Petitioners contend the LPIA increases density because its objective is to "create opportunities for the permanent preservation of contiguous open space, environmentally sensitive land and agricultural land uses while maintaining residential capacity as it existed on January 1, 2007." LPIA § 4.4.E.7. (Emphasis added.) Petitioners complain that County-wide residential capacity on that date is not identified and that the objective requires residential capacity in Agricultural lands to increase as it decreases elsewhere in the County. This interpretation is unreasonable. The County's interpretation, that residential units lost by preservation are to be maintained by clustering on the remaining Agricultural lands, is more reasonable. Transfer of Wetland Density Petitioners contend that the LPIA increases density by allowing transfer of wetland density in the Agricultural future land use category. See LPIA § 4.4E.7.d.(7). Under the Plan before the LPIA, up to half of wetland density can be transferred to uplands in a PUD. See CGMP § 9.4A7.b.(8). PUDs were not allowed in Agricultural lands before the LPIA. But Petitioners did not prove that allowing the transfer and clustering of residential units into a PUD on Agricultural lands under the LPIA would change the total number of residential units already allowed in Agricultural lands (at one unit per 20 acres). Alleged Failure to Remove Density from All Non-PUD Land Petitioners contend that the LPIA increases density by not stripping residential units from all so-called non-PUD land. Contrary to this contention, the more reasonable interpretation is that land not set aside for permanent preservation in a proposal made under the LPIA must be part of the proposed PUD. In any event, even if an LPIA proposal could include land that is neither set aside for preservation nor part of the PUD land, no residential units is such land would be transferred to the PUD, and failure to strip such land of its residential units would not affect the total number of units associated with the LPIA proposal. Petitioners also contend that the LPIA allows text amendments to increase density on land set aside for preservation under the LPIA because it specifies that such land must be changed on the FLUM and will not be eligible for "any additional [FLUM] amendment which increases residential density or intensity of use . . . ." LPIA § 4.4E.7.d.(7). The negative implication Petitioners draw from this language is contrary to the intent of the LPIA and is not warranted. Even if text amendments are not prohibited, they would apply to all land in a particular land use category, not just to land set aside under the LPIA. Subsequent Plan Amendments Not Required for PUD Petitioners contend that the LPIA "is unclear as to whether a PUD can be approved without a subsequent plan amendment specifically authorizing the two-acre lot subdivision site plan." PPRO, ¶80. This contention supposedly arises from the language of LPIA § 4.4.E.7.c.: "The Comprehensive Plan amendment that is part of a joint Plan Amendment and concurrent PUD application submitted under this objective must address the land use designation on the land set aside in perpetuity as contiguous open space, environmentally sensitive land and/or agricultural land uses in the following manner: . . . ." (Emphasis added in PPRO, ¶82.) The negative implication Petitioners draw from this language is contrary to the intent of the LPIA and is not warranted. It ignores LPIA § 4.4.E.7.d.(7): "The Comprehensive Plan amendment filed concurrently with the PUD application shall allow the site-specific clustering of density in one portion of the total subject site, including the transfer of full density of any wetlands on the site, at a density that shall not exceed one unit per twenty acres for the total site prior to conveyance. . . . The Plan amendment shall further specify that neither the land conveyed nor the land controlled by the PUD agreement shall be eligible for any additional [FLUM] amendment which increases residential density or intensity of use . . . ." While LPIA § 4.4.E.7.d.(7) discusses land that is conveyed, it is reasonably clear that a Plan amendment addressing the PUD also would be required for lands that are set aside using one of the other mechanisms specified in the LPIA. Public Benefit Criteria Petitioners contend that LPIA Section 4.4.E.7.b. and f. gives the County "unfettered discretion to reject or approve a PUD 'for any reason.'" PPRO, ¶90. Those sections provide that approval of a PUD will be based on consideration of "significant site-specific public benefits," some of which are listed. While it is true that the LPIA gives the County discretion to grant or approve a PUD based on its consideration of those factors, Petitioners did not prove "unfettered discretion." First, minimum requirements under the LPIA first must be met. Second, the list of public benefits gives some guidance as to the kinds of additional public benefits that will justify approval of a PUD. Petitioners did not prove that a comprehensive plan provision allowing for PUD zoning need be any more specific to be implemented in a consistent manner. Protection of Land Set Aside Petitioners contend that the LPIA fails to protect land set aside under the LPIA because it does not identify the land most appropriate for preservation or require that it be set aside. This contention ignores the objective to encourage conveyance of "land listed for public acquisition by state, regional or local agencies as part of established conservation programs" which "include, but are not be [sic] limited to land designated for public acquisition under" several named public acquisition programs. LPIA § 4.4.E.7. It also ignores the policy: "No development in the PUD shall be allowed on unique, threatened or rare habitat, or other environmentally sensitive lands that are critical to the support of listed plant or animal species . . . ." LPIA § 4.4.E.7.d.(4). It also ignores the policy that "PUDs that include land listed for acquisition by state, regional or local agencies as part of an established conservation program shall be subject to . . . additional requirements": including fee simple conveyance of at least half of such land; and no development in the PUD on such land "unless the land has been previously impacted by agricultural activities and the proposed development is determined to be inconsequential to the implementation and success of the conservation program . . . ." LPIA § 4.4.E.7.e.(1)-(2). In addition, various means of protecting such lands are several of the listed "additional significant site-specific benefits" of a PUD proposal to be considered in the approval process. See LPIA § 4.4.E.7.f. Petitioners contend that the LPIA fails to "require set-aside lands to be contiguous to other farmland, open space, or natural lands" and "contiguous, functional, and connected to adjacent and regional systems." PPRO, ¶¶102-98 [sic]. These contentions ignore the objective to "create opportunities for the permanent preservation of contiguous open space, environmentally sensitive land and agricultural land uses. . . ." LPIA § 4.4.E.7. They also ignore that land in public acquisition programs ideally is contiguous to other open space and natural lands. Petitioners did not prove their contention in PPRO ¶97 [sic] that it is necessary to specify the public acquisition programs for the LPIA to be implemented in a consistent manner. Petitioners contend that the LPIA fails to define the "perpetual easement" mechanism allowed in LPIA Section 4.E.7.a. for setting aside land in lieu of fee simple conveyance. See PPRO, ¶103. This contention ignores the policy in LPIA Section 4.E.7.d.(5) to use perpetual easements as a means of enforcing the prohibition against increasing residential density or intensity of use by FLUM amendments, as well as the policy in LPIA Section 4.E.7.d.(6) to use perpetual easements "to restrict future uses and ensure the government agencies or other entities holding fee simple title do not sell or develop the property inconsistent with this policy or the approved uses within the PUD Agreement." Petitioners did not prove their contention in PPRO ¶103 that it is necessary to further define "perpetual easement" for the LPIA to be implemented in a consistent manner. Petitioners contend in PPRO ¶¶105 and 107 that the LPIA fails to define the "agricultural uses" to be preserved in LPIA Section 4.4.E.7.c.(3) and allows the County to "specify allowed uses" without limitation and with "no certainty that farmland will be protected as farmland by easement." (Emphasis in PPRO ¶105.) Petitioners contend that everything allowed in the Agricultural category under the Plan will be allowed. See PPRO ¶107. Contrary to Petitioners' contention, it is reasonably clear that, while the language of LPIA Section 4.4.E.7.c.(3) contains a typographical error, the policy clearly is to maintain existing agricultural uses, not to allow intensification of agricultural use or expansion into "non-farm" uses that might be allowed in the Agricultural category. Alleged Threat to IRL and CERP Lands Petitioners contend that, by making development under its PUD option more marketable, the LPIA will encourage PUDs that do not protect and that fragment IRL and CERP lands. Petitioners did not prove that such a result is likely. Petitioners contend that the adverse impacts on IRL and CERP lands is more than speculation in part because of the wording of the policy in LPIA Section 4.4.E.7.c.(2), which is misstated in PPRO ¶114 and actually states: "If the land to be protected and maintained in perpetuity is land that is part of the North Palm Beach, and the Lake Okeechobee portions of the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP), as well as Northern Everglades and Estuaries Protection Program, the plan amendment must include a future land use amendment to change the Future Land Use Designation to Institutional-Public Conservation." The language used in the policy is poor. But Petitioners' interpretation--that only land set aside for protection that is part of all of the described CERP projects will be protected--is absurd since no such land exists. That interpretation and Petitioners' interpretation that no IRL lands are protected under the LPIA ignore and are contrary to the language and intent of the objective stated in LPIA Section 4.4.E.7. and of the policies stated in Section 4.4.E.7.a., c.(1), and d.(5). The County's interpretation, that CERP and IRL lands are eligible for protection, is more reasonable. Definition of Critical Habitat Petitioners contend that LPIA Section 4.4.E.7.d.(4) does not provide a meaningful or predictable standard because the term "critical to the support of listed plant or animal species" is not better defined. Actually, PUD development is prohibited "on unique, threatened or rare habitat, or other environmentally sensitive lands that are critical to the support of listed plant or animal species." While the policy could have been better defined, Petitioners did not prove that a better definition is necessary for the LPIA to be implemented in a consistent manner. Petitioners contend that, regardless of the "critical habitat" definition, the policy language in LPIA Section 4.4.E.7.e.(2) "guts" Section 4.4.E.7.d.(4) by prohibiting PUD development "on land listed for acquisition . . . unless the land has been previously impacted by agricultural activities " Actually, the policy continues to state that the exception only applies if "the proposed development is determined to be inconsequential to the implementation and success of the conservation program . . . ." Petitioners' interpretation, that the policy allows PUD development on virtually all Agricultural lands, is unreasonable and contrary to the language and intent of the LPIA. The County's interpretation is more reasonable and is reasonably clear. It allows for distinctions among the various kinds of agricultural activities, which the Plan already recognizes. See, e.g., CGMP § 4.2.A.6.b.(8) ("Many low intensity agricultural uses such as range (pasture) land can be compatible with environmentally significant resource areas.") For these reasons, Petitioners did not prove that LPIA Section 4.4.E.7.e.(2) "guts" Section 4.4.E.7.d.(4), or that the LPIA cannot be implemented in a consistent manner. LPIA and Urban Sprawl In part based on unreasonable interpretations of the LPIA's objective and policy language, Petitioners contend that Martin County's Comprehensive Plan as amended by the LPIA no longer discourages urban sprawl and that the LPIA encourages urban sprawl. In part because the interpretations were unreasonable, Petitioners' urban sprawl contentions were not proven. Even if the LPIA results in a proliferation of PUDs with clusters of residences on lots slightly larger than two acres, which is the minimum lot size, it would not equate to urban (or suburban) sprawl. Assuming PUDs based on 500-acre tracts, it would result in a cluster of 25 homes within a 500-acre rural area. The LPIA does not plan for the extension of urban services to those homes and does not provide for or allow any new commercial or industrial development. Both the LPIA and the rest of the CGMP include provisions, most notably those related to the urban service districts, to reasonably ensure that urban sprawl will not result. To the extent that the LPIA triggers the first primary indicator of urban sprawl in Florida Administrative Code Rule5 9J-5.006(5)(g) ("designates for development substantial areas of the jurisdiction for low-intensity, low density or single use development or uses in excess of demonstrated need"), the Agricultural lands designation already does. Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA triggers the second primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g) ("[p]romotes, allows or designates significant amounts of urban development to occur in rural areas at substantial distances from existing urban areas while leaping over undeveloped lands which are available and suitable for development"). The development promoted, allowed, or designated by the LPIA is not "urban" and does not "leap over undeveloped lands which are available and suitable for development." It allowed for development already promoted, allowed, and designated to arrange itself differently in a rural area. Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA triggers the third primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g) (designation of urban development in "radial, strip, isolated or ribbon patterns generally emanating from existing urban development"). Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA triggers the fourth primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g) (promotes premature conversion of rural land to other uses, thereby failing to adequately protect and conserve natural resources). To the contrary, its primary purpose is to protect and conserve natural resources and rural land. Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA triggers the fifth primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g) (fails to adequately protect "adjacent agricultural areas" as well as "passive agricultural activities and dormant, unique and prime farmlands and soils"). Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA triggers either the sixth or seventh primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g) (fails to maximize use of existing and future public facilities and services). Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA triggers the eighth primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g) ("[a]llows for land use patterns or timing which disproportionately increase the cost in time, money and energy, of providing and maintaining facilities and services"). Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA triggers the ninth primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g) ("[f]ails to provide a clear separation between rural and urban uses"). Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA triggers the tenth primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g) ("[d]iscourages or inhibits infill development or redevelopment of existing neighborhoods and communities"). Although LPIA PUDs obviously would not be infill or redevelopment, it was not proven that they will discourage or inhibit infill and redevelopment. To the extent that the LPIA triggers the eleventh primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g) ("[f]ails to encourage an attractive and functional mix of uses"), the Agricultural lands designation already does. To the extent that the LPIA triggers the twelfth primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g) ("[r]esults in poor accessibility among linked or related uses"), the Agricultural lands designation already does. Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA triggers the thirteenth primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J- 5.006(5)(g) ("[r]esults in the loss of significant amounts of functional open space"). The LPIA does not exacerbate the two already-existing indicators of urban sprawl, but Petitioners still contend that the indicators are triggered by the LPIA essentially because development will proceed more quickly under the LPIA. This contention was not proven. Even if it were, Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA encourages the proliferation of urban sprawl or that the CGMP, as amended by the LPIA, fails to discourage the proliferation of urban sprawl. LPIA Data and Analysis Petitioners contend that the LPIA is not supported by data and analysis because the County explained it as a necessary response to the proliferation of 20-acre ranchette developments whereas only 75 have been built and only 15 have certificates of occupancy. Actually, the ranchette developments were only one reason for the LPIA, and the data and analysis showed 13 approved developments as of mid-September 2007, and three more approvals plus two pending applications for approval a year later. Petitioners also contend that the LPIA is not supported by data and analysis essentially because the LPIA implements some but not all of the recommendations in the various reports and studies cited by the County as part of the data and analysis. Petitioners also contend that the LPIA is not supported by data and analysis essentially because the LPIA does not conform to some recommendations in the various reports and studies cited by the County as part of the data and analysis. However, Petitioners base their contentions largely on unreasonable interpretations of the language of the objective and policies of the LPIA. In addition, the data and analysis they point to essentially reflect merely that planners disagree on the best plan for the Agricultural lands. Petitioners also contend that the LPIA is not supported by data and analysis essentially because the LPIA is not identical to the Atlantic Ridge project amendment. While all agree that the Atlantic Ridge project is a resounding success story, it is unique. The obvious and understandable inability to instantaneously duplicate Atlantic Ridge to the greatest extent possible in the Agricultural lands should not prevent the County from taking any action in its direction, such as the LPIA. Taken together, the data and analysis are adequate to support the LPIA. LPIA and TCRPC Regional Policy Plan Petitioners contend that the LPIA is inconsistent with the TCRPC's Strategic Regional Policy Plan (SRPP). The TCRPC's SRPP was not introduced in evidence, but the TCRPC's Executive Director testified and sponsored the TCRPC's report on the LPIA and the SUSDA. The TCRPC's findings on consistency with its SRPP were not contradicted. According to the TCRPC, the LPIA is inconsistent with the TCRPC's Strategic Regional Policy Plan (SRPP) Policies 2.1.1.1 and 2.1.1.2, which are to determine areas that are environmentally significant and to map, acquire, and manage them. The LPIA does not do this. According to the TCRPC, the LPIA is inconsistent with the TCRPC's SRPP Goal 1.1, which requires sustainable countryside development in urban enclaves, such as towns and villages, with mixed-use and appropriate densities between 4-10 units per acre, on strategically selected locations while preserving contiguous, targeted land identified through SRPP Policies 2.1.1.1 and 2.1.1.2. The LPIA does not do this. According to the TCRPC, the LPIA is inconsistent with the TCRPC's SRPP Policy 15.1.3.1, which is to increase the clarity of local land use plans so that preferred forms of development can be pre-approved. Instead, the LPIA uses the case-by-case PUD approval process to determine the ultimate development patterns for the Agricultural lands. The inconsistency with SRPP Policy 15.1.3.1 is the only LPIA inconsistency not already equally present in the existing CGMP. The TCRPC's concern as to the other inconsistencies is that the LPIA will make residential development in the Agricultural lands more marketable and increase the rate of residential growth in a manner inconsistent with SRPP Goal 1.1 and Policies 2.1.1.1 and 2.1.1.2. Internal Consistency of the LPIA Petitioners contend that the LPIA is inconsistent with CGMP Sections 1.6 and 1.11.A. for being inconsistent with the TCRPC's SRPP. CGMP Section 1.6 states that "elements of the [CGMP] shall be consistent and coordinated with policies of [various entities, including the TCRPC]. Petitioners did not prove that the County does not interpret that provision to require internal consistency and coordination with the other entities' policies, or that such an interpretation would be incorrect. CGMP Section 1.11.A. refers to amendment procedures. Essentially, it states that plan amendments must be "in compliance." There was no evidence that the County intended it to require strict and absolute consistency with the TCRPC's SRPP, or any evidence to prove that it would be incorrect for the County to interpret it not to. Petitioners also contend that the LPIA is inconsistent with CGMP Section 1.11.K., which also refers to amendment procedure. Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA is inconsistent with CGMP Section 1.11.K. for not having concurrently-processed land development regulations (LDRs) since concurrently-processed LDRs are only required "[t]o the extent necessary to implement a proposed amendment," and Petitioners did not prove that concurrently-processed LDRs are necessary. Petitioners also contend that the LPIA is inconsistent with numerous other provisions of the CGMP. These contentions were not proven. Most, if not all, were based on unreasonable interpretations of the LPIA. SUSDA Provisions The SUSDA amends the text of the future land use element, the sanitary sewer services element, and the potable water services element of the Plan. As amended, the Plan would allow owners of real property within the SUSD to apply for connection to regional water and sewer service rather than be limited to using individual potable water wells and individual septic tanks, provided all costs of connection to the public services would be paid by the owner. The policy of SUSDA Section 4.4.G.2.g. expressly states: The County Commission has determined that it is in the best interest of the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of Martin County that regional water and sewer services be made available to properties within the [SUSD], in order to: (1) Protect our natural resources . . . from the negative impacts of onsite sewage disposal (septic) systems and private wells to serve individual residential units; (2) Provide fire protection; [and] (3) Provide safe drinking water. The policy of SUSDA Section 4.4.G.2.h. requires that the extension of any such services to properties within the SUSD must have Board approval, which cannot occur unless the Board finds that certain enumerated criteria have been met, including: Regional utility services may be provided to properties within the [SUSD] upon the request of the affected property owner, and upon payment of the required costs for connection to the regional system. Such services may only be provided by a regional utility, public or private, within a service area shown on Figure 11-2. Package plants for the provision of utility service are prohibited except under the provisions of the [CGMP]. The regional utility must demonstrate the treatment facility has capacity for the proposed connection and priority has been given to projects within the [PUSD]. Extension of utility services shall not be construed to imply support for any increase in the residential density of the property inside the [SUSD]. Property lying outside the Urban Service Districts . . . shall not receive utility service from a regional wastewater system. Extension of utility service outside the Urban Service Districts shall be prohibited. Development within the [SUSD] shall maintain lot sizes that exceed one-half acres. The SUSDA also contains new charts added to both the sanitary sewer services element and the potable water services element that display the numerical capacity of the regional water and sewer systems to handle additional customers upon extension of lines to the SUSD. See SUSDA Tables 10-3 through 10-6 and 11- 12 through 11-15. There was no credible evidence of any likelihood that the adoption of the SUSDA would allow the further extensions of water and sewer lines from the SUSD to properties outside the urban service districts. The testimony offered by Petitioners was speculative at best and depended upon an unproven assumption that the County would violate the explicit provisions of the SUSDA prohibiting such extension of services. See SUSDA §§ 4.4.G.2.h.(6)-(7) and 4.5.H. Meaning and Predictability of SUSDA Standards Petitioners contend that the SUSDA's standards are not meaningful or predictable because of the undefined term "central water and sewer" in the policy in SUSDA Section 4.4.G.2.a. Petitioners contend that "central water and sewer" can be interpreted to mean something other than a regional utility, and that the SUSDA can be interpreted to allow regional utility, package plant, and other similar types of utility systems serving two or more houses outside the urban services districts. Petitioners' interpretations are unreasonable and contrary to the language and intent of the SUSDA. Petitioners' evidence was speculative and depended on an unproven assumption that the County would violate the explicit provisions of the SUSDA prohibiting package treatment plants in the SUSD. See SUSDA § 4.4.G.2.h.(3) and § 4.5.H. In addition, the evidence was that package treatment plants may no longer be economically feasible. The County's interpretation is more reasonable--"central water and sewer," as used in SUSDA Section 4.4.G.2.a., means the provision of regional utility services by Martin County in the SUSD, and no such facilities may be provided outside the urban service districts. SUSDA Data and Analysis Petitioners contend that the data and analysis do not support the SUSDA essentially because they do not establish "any actual health, safety, or welfare problems." PPRO, ¶208. The absence of proof of actual health, safety, or welfare problems is not fatal in view of the rest of the data and analysis supporting the SUSDA. Since the creation of the SUSD in 1992, development in the PUSD has resulted in the extension of water and sewer lines up to the border between the PUSD and the SUSD. In effect, the intended SUSD transition area has transitioned. Meanwhile, the regional water and sewer utilities serving the County now have the necessary capacity to serve the PUSD and the SUSD. Improved fire protection in the SUSD is a benefit of regional water service, allowing installation of community fire hydrants. Without it, developers in the SUSD must rely on installed sprinklers and emergency generators and water drawn from nearby lakes or installed water tanks. While regional water service can fail temporarily in major storms, and the data and analysis did not include actual instances of fire damage cause by the lack of regional water service in the SUSD, regional water service generally provides more reliable and less costly fire protection. While the data and analysis do not establish that developers and property owners in the SUSD have not been able to permit potable water wells, regional water service generally is better, more reliable, and less costly. The data and analysis did include actual instances of home owners having to install expensive water treatment systems due to increasing chloride levels in their potable water wells. Connection to regional water service would eliminate those costs and concerns. While the data and analysis do not establish that developers and property owners in the SUSD have not been able to permit septic tanks systems for onsite sewage treatment (i.e., systems that meet environmental and health standards), such systems can fail if improperly installed, maintained, and repaired. If they fail, nutrients such as nitrogen and phosphorus can leach into and harm the groundwater and nearby surface waters. The North Fork of the Loxahatchee River, which is nutrient-impaired, probably would benefit from elimination of septic tanks. Regional sewer service generally is better for the environmental and public health. The data and analysis suggest that allowing regional water and sewer service in the SUSD, with the SUSDA's requirement for developers to pay the cost of installation, probably will save the County money in the long run. It will be a significant cost to the County if it has to install water and sewer lines post-development. Petitioners attack the credibility of the data and analysis supporting the SUSDA because regional water and sewer service is optional in the SUSD. But there were data and analysis that, even if regional water and sewer service in the SUSD is preferable, there are valid reasons to make it optional at this time. Alleged Environmental Impact of the SUSDA Petitioners contend that the SUSDA will have negative environmental impacts in part from a proliferation of package treatment plants in the SUSD, which is discouraged in CGMP Section 4.4. See PPRO, ¶¶221, 223. This contention is based on Petitioners' unreasonable interpretations of two sentences of the SUSDA. SUSDA Section 4.5.G. prohibits interim water systems outside the urban service districts and allows them, with conditions, in the PUSD where connection to a regional utility is not feasible. Petitioners interpret these two sentences to mean that interim water systems are allowed, without conditions, in the SUSD. The County's interpretation is more reasonable. Since the SUSDA makes connection to the regional utilities optional, there is no need for interim water systems in the SUSDA, and the SUSDA should not be construed to allow them there. Petitioners contend that the SUSDA will have negative environmental impacts in part essentially because increased development results in increased pollution. See PPRO, ¶228. To the extent true, it would be equally or more true of similar development without regional water and sewer services. SUSDA and Urban Sprawl Petitioners contend, in part due to their unreasonable interpretations of the objective in SUSDA Section 4.4.G.2.a., that Martin County's Comprehensive Plan as amended by the SUSDA, no longer discourages urban sprawl and that the SUSDA encourages urban sprawl. In part due to the unreasonableness of Petitioners' interpretation of the SUSDA, Petitioners' urban sprawl contentions were not proven. It is unlikely that the SUSDA will encourage urban sprawl. Petitioners also contend that the SUSDA will encourage urban sprawl simply by allowing denser development in the 5,000- 6,000 acres of the SUSDA not yet developed. This contention is contrary to the SUSDA policy: "Extension of utility services shall not be construed to imply support for any increase in residential density of the property inside the [SUSD]." SUSDA § 4.4.G.2.h.(5). Even if the SUSDA increased density in the SUSDA, increase in density itself does not promote urban sprawl. To the contrary, it is possible for increased density to discourage urban sprawl. Petitioners did not prove that increasing density in the SUSDA itself encourages urban sprawl or that, with the SUSDA, the CGMP will discourage urban sprawl less. Petitioners contend that the SUSDA will create pressures to develop areas that border the SUSD, leaping over areas suitable for urban development. See PPRO, ¶¶236-237. This contention actually devalues the very urban service district concept Petitioners seek to defend and can be said about any urban district boundary. Currently, there are many places where the PUSD borders the Agricultural lands. The pressures created by the SUSDA will be no greater than the pressures that have existed in those places all along. Petitioners contend that the SUSDA will increase costs to the County essentially because, notwithstanding SUSDA's requirement that developers pay the cost of connection, development will not pay for itself in the long run (taking into account costs of operations, maintenance, and repair.) To the extent true, it can be said of all development and does not prove that the SUSDA encourages urban sprawl. Petitioners did not prove that the SUSDA triggers any of the indicators of urban sprawl; did not prove that the SUSDA encourages the proliferation of urban sprawl; and did not prove that the CGMP, as amended by the SUSDA, fails to discourage the proliferation of urban sprawl. Internal Consistency of the SUSDA Petitioners contend that the SUSDA is internally inconsistent with CGMP Section 4.4.G.1.i., which gives priority in the provision and funding of water and sewer services to the PUSD, essentially because the data and analysis ensure that water demands in the PUSD can be met through 2025. The lack of data and analysis at present to ensure that water demands in the PUSD can be met beyond 2025 does not prove that priority will not be given to the needs of the PUSD.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order determining that the LPIA and the SUSDA are "in compliance." DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of April, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of April, 2009.
The Issue The issue is whether the plan amendment adopted by Escambia County (County) by Ordinance No. 2017-53 on September 7, 2017, is in compliance.
Findings Of Fact Background Petitioner owns real property and resides in the County. She submitted written comments to the County during the adoption phase of the amendment. She is an affected person within the meaning of section 163.3184(1)(a), Florida Statutes. The County is a local government that is subject to the requirements of chapter 163, Florida Statutes. A sector plan is the process in which the local government engages in long-term planning for an area of at least 5,000 acres. §§ 163.3164(42) and 163.3245(1), Fla. Stat. It involves two levels of planning: a) a long-term master plan, and b) a Detailed Specific Area Plan (DSAP), which implements the master plan. A DSAP is created for an area that is at least 1,000 acres and identifies the distribution, extent, and location of future uses and public facilities. § 163.3245(3), Fla. Stat. While the DSAP is created by a local development order that is not subject to state compliance review, an amendment to an adopted sector plan is a plan amendment reviewed under the State Coordinated Review process. § 163.3184(2)(c), Fla. Stat. The development standards in the DSAP are separate and distinct from the development standards in non-sector plan properties. On June 3, 2010, the County approved Ordinance No. 2010-16, which adopted Evaluation and Appraisal Report-based amendments to the Plan, including a new Optional Sector Plan (OSP). The Ordinance was challenged by the Department of Community Affairs (DCA) and assigned DOAH Case No. 10-6857GM. In response to the DCA challenge, on February 3, 2011, the County adopted Ordinance No. 2011-3 as a stipulated remedial amendment. The Ordinance establishes a long-term master plan for central Escambia County known as the Mid-West Escambia County Sector Plan (Sector Plan). The Sector Plan is comprised of approximately 15,000 acres, north of Interstate 10, west of Highway 29, and south of Highway 196. The area is depicted on the Future Land Use Map (FLUM) as the OSP. The DCA determined the Ordinance to be in compliance. To implement the long-term master plan, on September 9, 2011, the County adopted Ordinance No. 2011-29, which establishes two DSAPs: Muskogee DSAP and Jacks Branch DSAP. Petitioner's residence and the subject property are located within the Jacks Branch DSAP. State compliance review of that action under section 163.3184(3) or (4) was not required. In 2011, the Legislature created the right to opt out or withdraw from a sector plan. See § 163.3245(8), Fla. Stat. This can be accomplished "only with the approval of the local government by plan amendment adopted and reviewed pursuant to s. 163.3184." Id. In response to the statutory amendment, the County adopted a plan amendment which provides that any additions to, or deletions from, a DSAP must follow the established procedures in the Plan. See Ex. 40, p. 14. In order to consolidate the County zoning districts, on April 16, 2015, the County adopted Ordinance No. 2015-12, which repealed the entire Land Development Code (LDC) and replaced it with a new LDC, which has a county-wide rezoning plan. After the first (and only) application to opt out of the Sector Plan was filed by a property owner, on March 16, 2017, the County amended the LDC through Ordinance No. 2017-14, which establishes seven criteria for evaluating this type of request. See LDC, § 2-7.4. The Ordinance was not challenged. According to the County, the criteria were actually drafted by the Department of Economic Opportunity (DEO) and require it to consider the following: All standard Comprehensive Plan map criteria; Comprehensive Plan requirement for changes to an existing DSAP; The size of the subject parcel in relation to the individual DSAP land use category and in relation to the overall Sector Plan, to specifically include the aggregate acreage of any previously granted opt-outs; The existing transportation infrastructure and any impact the proposed opt-out may have on the capacity of the infrastructure; The underlying existing zoning category and its compatibility with surrounding DSAP land use designations; The consistency of the requested future land use designation with the underlying zoning; and The previous future land use designation. Besides the foregoing criteria, subsection 2-7.4(b) provides that when the County reviews an opt-out application: [t]o the extent possible, the staff analysis and the reviewing bodies shall consider whether the applicant lost development rights or was effectively downzoned as part of the Sector Plan adoption. The Board may take into consideration any other relevant factors in making its determination related to the request. Once a parcel is removed from the County's Sector Plan, the underlying zoning that was in effect when the Sector Plan was created remains the same, but a new future land use (FLU) category must be assigned to the property by a plan amendment. § 163.3245(8), Fla. Stat. Withdrawing from a DSAP does not modify the DSAP because the DSAP is the development standard itself. The Property The parcel lies on the eastern edge of the DSAP about ten miles north of Interstate 10 on the northwest corner of Highway 29 and Neal Road. Highway 29 is a major four-lane arterial road running in a north-south direction with a median in the middle. The road is maintained by the state. Neal Road is a small, two-lane County road that intersects with Highway 29 from the west and provides access to a residential area where Petitioner resides. Existing commercial development is located on the east side of Highway 29. Most recently, a Family Dollar Store was developed directly across the street from the property. Currently, the parcel is vacant and lies in the Conservation Neighborhood District, which permits a maximum density of three dwelling units per gross acre and is the lowest density of residential development allowed in the Sector Plan. Only residential uses are allowed in the district, which is intended to treat stormwater and preserve open space and wildlife. Based on maps of the area, Petitioner's property appears to be no more than one-half mile west of the subject property. The character of the area in Petitioner's neighborhood is low-density residential development. Before the Sector Plan was adopted, the assigned land use on the parcel was MU-S. This use is intended for "a mix of residential and non-residential uses while promoting compatible infill development and the separation of urban and suburban land uses." Its express purpose is to serve as a mixed-use area. As described by a County witness, "the mixed-use aspect of it allows a non-residential component first, but, again, it's predominately residential, low-density residential." The range of allowable uses includes residential, retail services, professional office, recreational facilities, and public and civic, with a maximum intensity of a 1.0 floor area ratio. Until the Sector Plan was created, the parcel was zoned as Gateway Business District (GBD). Under the new rezoning plan established in 2015, all parcels outside the Sector Plan which were zoned GBD were consolidated with similar zoning categories into the new district of Heavy Commercial/ Light Industrial (HC/LI). Permitted uses under this district are residential, retail sales, retail services, public and civic, recreation and entertainment, industrial and related, agricultural and related, and "other uses," such as billboards, outdoor sales, trade shops, warehouses, and the like. Once a parcel is withdrawn from the Sector Plan, it retains the underlying zoning in effect when the DSAP was established. Because the new zoning scheme consolidates GBD into HC/LI, the parcel will revert to HC/LI. Therefore, the zoning and land use will be the same as they were before the Sector Plan was created. This combination is not unusual, as there are "multiple parcels" outside the DSAP that have this zoning/land use pairing. The Challenged Amendment In June 2016, the property owner filed an application with the County requesting that his parcel be removed from the Mid-West Sector Plan. At that time, neither the County nor the applicant realized that a new land use must be assigned. Consequently, no request for a new land use was made. Because this was the first time an opt-out application had been filed with any local government, the County had a series of meetings with DEO seeking guidance on how to proceed. It was told by DEO that the opt-out application and a FLU change should be processed in the same manner as a FLUM amendment and then reviewed under the State Coordinated Review process. DEO also provided suggested criteria that should be considered when processing such an application. These criteria were adopted as new LDC section 2-7.4. The County followed all steps suggested by DEO. DEO instructed the County to require a second application from the property owner, which included a request for a new land use category. After the second application was filed, the County began the process of determining whether the application satisfied the opt-out criteria in section 2-7.4 and relevant Plan requirements. The second application addressed the FLU requirement and contained the analysis required for each component of the Plan. A future land use of Mixed-Use Urban (MU-U) was initially requested by the owner. This category is consistent with HC/LI zoning, but is a much more intense land use category than MU-S. Because of concerns that the MU-U land use would not be compatible with the surrounding neighborhood in the DSAP, the County changed the proposed new land use to MU-S, the use assigned to the property before the Sector Plan was adopted. MU-S is the same land use assigned to other non-Sector Plan parcels surrounding the subject property, and there are non- industrial uses within the HC/LI zoning district that are consistent with MU-S. If the application is approved, only 25 potential residential units will be removed from the total Sector Plan, and the reduction in total developable area will be de minimis. Except for a change to the DSAP map and the acreage table, no changes to the text of the DSAP are made. During the application process, the County addressed natural resources, wetlands, historically significant sites, and impacts on the environment. The County also evaluated the application in light of the criteria found in section 2-7.4 and determined that, as a whole, it satisfied those requirements. See Cnty. Ex. 34, pp. 28-39. Because a proposed use of the property was not submitted with the application, an analysis of a specific use was not made. When a site plan to develop the property is filed, the proposed use will be evaluated by the Development Review Committee, and then by the Board of County Commissioners. That review will ensure that the intended development will not be inconsistent with the zoning district and land use assigned to the parcel. The opt-out request was debated extensively during a series of ten public hearings that began in September 2016. Members of the public were allowed to speak for or against the proposal. On September 7, 2017, the County voted to amend the Plan by (a) allowing the parcel to withdraw from the OSP, removing the Sector Plan overlay on the parcel, and amending the FLUM by assigning the property a MU-S land use designation. No other changes were made. The amendment does not create a remnant area or fragmented DSAP. The amendment was transmitted to DEO for review under the State Coordinated Review process. DEO determined it met the requirements of chapter 163 for compliance purposes. The State Coordinated Review is more comprehensive than the Expedited Review process under section 163.3184(3). On November 8, 2017, a Notice of Intent to find the amendment in compliance was issued by DEO. See Cnty. Ex. 39. Petitioner filed her Petition within 30 days after the Ordinance was adopted, but before DEO issued its Notice of Intent. Therefore, it was timely. Besides DEO's review, the Department of Transportation and Department of Education reviewed the proposal for impacts on transportation and school concurrency, respectively. No further information was requested from the County by any agency. Petitioner's Objections In the parties' Pre-hearing Stipulation, Petitioner raises a procedural objection to the manner in which the withdrawal application was adopted. She also alleges generally that the amendment creates inconsistent and incompatible zoning and future land use pairing in violation of sections 163.3177(2) and 163.3194(1); is inconsistent with the FLU Element; conflicts with statutory provisions regarding compatibility of adjacent land uses; and lacks sufficient data and analysis required by section 163.3177(1)(f). These contentions, and others not directly related to a compliance challenge, are addressed below. Petitioner first contends an opt-out application must be adopted by a local development order, rather than by a plan amendment. She argues the County erred by not providing her the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses at the adoption hearing and failing to subject the proposal to more "intense review and analysis." The quasi-judicial process requires strict scrutiny of a local government's action, rather than a fairly debatable standard of review, and provides third parties the right to challenge the local government's decision in circuit court, rather than in a section 163.3184 proceeding. This contention has been rejected and is addressed in the Conclusions of Law. Petitioner contends approval of the application will lead to further requests by other property owners to opt out of the Sector Plan. Currently, there are over 1,000 property owners in the Sector Plan. During the County hearings, staff identified 24 or 25 other properties that might choose to file an opt-out application in the future. Whether those owners will do so is no more than speculation at this point. The County responds that it will evaluate each application on a case-by- case basis. A case-by-case analysis is necessary because an application involving a large parcel of property would clearly have a different analysis than one which involves only 8.67 acres. More importantly, because the opt-out process is a statutory right created by the Legislature, the County is obligated to consider every opt-out application filed, and if it satisfies the applicable criteria, it must be approved. In any event, there is nothing in sections 163.3184 or 163.3245 which requires the local government to deny an application merely because another property owner might file a similar application at some point in the future. Petitioner contends the County acted "unreasonably" because it did not establish opt-out criteria until after the application was filed. The County's action was reasonable under the circumstances because it had no standards or precedent for reviewing this type of application; at the direction of DEO, the criteria were adopted before final action on the application was taken; and the criteria were considered by the County. Petitioner contends the criteria in section 2-7.4 are vague and lack specific, objective evaluation standards. However, Ordinance No. 2017-14 was never challenged and is presumed to be valid. Petitioner contends HC/LI zoning is inconsistent with the MU-S land use and violates sections 163.3177(2) and 163.3194(1)(b).1/ Those provisions require generally that zoning regulations and land uses be consistent with one another and the elements of the Plan. The zoning and land use will be the same as existed before the Sector Plan was adopted. They correlate with the zoning and land use on numerous other non-Sector Plan parcels in the immediate area and throughout the County. MU-S contemplates a mixed-use area, while HC/LI contains a variety of residential, commercial, and industrial uses. Although industrial uses are inconsistent with the land use, see Endnote 1, there are many other uses within the zoning district that are compatible with MU-S. It is fairly debatable that the zoning and land use designation are compatible. FLU Objective 1.3 provides that future land use designations should "discourage urban sprawl, promote mixed use, compact development in urban areas, and support development compatible with the protection and preservation of rural areas." By allowing more intensive development next to the Conservation Neighborhood District, Petitioner contends the plan amendment is inconsistent with this directive because it encourages urban sprawl. "Sprawl" is defined in chapter 3 of the Plan as [h]aphazard growth of dispersed, leap- frog and strip development in suburbs and rural areas and along highways; typically, sprawl is automobile-dependent, single use, resource-consuming, and low-density development in previously rural areas and disconnected from existing development and infrastructure. The parcels on the east side of Highway 29 have similar zoning and land uses as the subject property and are interspersed with commercial development. Therefore, future development on the subject property would not be "disconnected from existing development and infrastructure," and it would not leap-frog into non-developed areas. It is fairly debatable that the plan amendment does not encourage urban sprawl. Petitioner contends the underlying zoning on the parcel is incompatible with the land use in her neighborhood. Although the County considered this issue, it points out that the Sector Plan and Comprehensive Plan have different development standards, and therefore there is no requirement that it consider the compatibility of non-Sector Plan property with property in the DSAP. Moreover, to restore the property rights that an owner once had, when the withdrawal application is approved, the property should revert to the underlying zoning in existence when the Sector Plan was established. Notwithstanding the foregoing, LDC section 2-7.4(a)5. requires that when reviewing an opt-out application, the County must consider "[t]he underlying existing zoning category and its compatibility with surrounding DSAP land use designations." To this end, the County addressed this factor by assigning a less intense MU-S land use to the parcel so that more intense uses allowed by HC/LI would be prohibited or minimized. It is fairly datable that the underlying zoning will be compatible with the neighboring area. Petitioner contends the amendment is not supported by data and analysis, as required by section 163.3177(1)(f). Prior to adopting the amendment, the County staff made a qualitative and quantitative analysis of impacts on natural resources, wetlands, historically significant sites, the environment, and adjacent lands. Because Highway 29 is a state road, the County has limited planning responsibilities for traffic impacts. Even so, a limited analysis of traffic impacts is found in County Exhibit 17. In addition, the Department of Transportation performed a more complete analysis of traffic impacts attributable to the amendment. Because the parcel is currently vacant, traffic impacts on Neal Road cannot be fully analyzed until a site plan is filed. A review of school concurrency issues was performed by the Department of Education and no adverse comments were submitted. The County verified that Emerald Coast Utility Authority had available water, sewer, and garbage capacity to serve the parcel. Finally, the County took into account the fact that removal of such a small parcel from the edge of the eastern side of the Sector Plan would have minimal, if any, effect on the Sector Plan goals and objectives. It is fairly debatable that the amendment is supported by relevant and appropriate data and analysis. All other contentions not specifically discussed have been considered and rejected.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Economic Opportunity enter a final order determining that the plan amendment adopted by Ordinance No. 2017-53 is in compliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of May, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of May, 2018.
The Issue The issues in this case are (1) whether the City of Panama City's (the City) Small Scale Comprehensive Plan Amendment No. 04-20S adopted by Ordinance No. 1985 (the Plan Amendment) is "in compliance," as that term is defined by Section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and (2) whether the petition challenging the Plan Amendment should be dismissed as untimely.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Robert E. Moore owns a home and resides at 1310 Kristanna Drive, Panama City, Florida. The northwestern property line of Mr. Moore's home is adjacent to the northeastern corner of the Property. JE 7; PE 98-B at RM.2 There is an approximate 100-foot-wide Bay County maintained canal or drainage ditch (canal) that forms the northern boundary of the Property, see Endnote 1 and PE 50 at 7, which runs in an east-to-west direction at the northern portion of his home. This canal eventually leads to North Bay to the west.3 Goose Bayou is located south of the Property. Mr. Moore taught respiratory care at Gulf Coast Community College for approximately 23 years and is retired. His residence was affected by a hurricane which passed through the area in September 2004. He noticed water appearing half-way up his driveway, which is not on the canal. He is concerned with the placement of additional homes in this area in light of his experience with the water level after the recent storm event. (Generally, Mr. Moore stated that there is a two- foot difference between low and high tide in this area. T 133, 137.) Mr. Moore, as well as the other Petitioners, made oral and written comments to the City Commission during the Plan Amendment adoption hearings. See City's Unilateral Pre-Hearing Stipulation at 5, paragraph E.4.; T 213. The St. Andrews Bay Resource Management Association (RMA) was established in 1986 and is a citizen's organization devoted to the preservation of the quality of St. Andrews Bay and its surrounding ecosystems. T 194. (St. Andrews Bay is a larger body of water which includes North and West Bay and Goose Bayou. See generally JE 12, Map 1.) The RMA has approximately 100 members. The RMA uses, but does not own, an office on the Panama City Marine Institute campus located within the City. The RMA occasionally conducts seminars or conferences and offers several programs for citizens, e.g., sea turtle nest watch, a water sampling program (Baywatch), and a sea grass watch program. The RMA meets every month except during the summer. T 195-196. The RMA opposes the Plan Amendment, in part, because of concerns with the effect of development on what Ms. Shaffer characterized as the "pine islands." Linda Anne Yori owns and resides in a house at 908 Ashwood Circle, Panama City, Florida, which is "just off Kristanna" Drive and to the east. See PE 98-C at the blue X. She teaches middle school science at a local public school. She has observed the Property, and generally described the Property, and vacant property to the north, as "upland hammock with salt marsh." T 209. In general, Ms. Yori opposes the Plan Amendment because she "believe[d] the environmental impact would be too great." Mary Rose Smith owns and resides in a house on Ashwood Circle, Panama City, Florida, two houses away from Ms. Yori's residence. Ms. Smith regularly jogs throughout the neighborhood. She believed that there are approximately 400 homes in Candlewick Acres and six vacant lots remaining. T 214- 215. As a result of recent hurricanes in the area, she observed flooding approximately half-a-mile upland along Kristanna Drive from the west-end to the east (half a mile to the turn off to Ashwood). PE 98-D at the blue 1/2 designation and blue line. While she cannot say for certain where the water came from, she believed the water "came from the bay or the bayou." T 220. The Bay County Audubon Society (BCAS) conducts membership and board meetings within the City limits and also owns a piece of property in the City. BCAS has approximately 400 members. Members live within the City. BCAS is concerned with the environment and with "the density of the proposed development" and "access to the pine islands." T 409-411. The City is the local government unit responsible for approving the Plan Amendment at issue in this proceeding. § 163.3187(1)(c), Fla. Stat. The Application, Review, and Adoption of the Plan Amendment On or about May 11, 2004, James H. Slonina, P.E., the president of Panhandle Engineering, Inc., filed an application on behalf of Robert H. and Barbara B. Hansman, requesting the City to annex "approximately 9.9 acres including lots, paved roadways and bridged drives" and further requested a land use designation to allow proposed residential development." The Property, see Endnote 1, is designated on a Bay County parcel map. A flood zone map is also included, but lacks clarity. The Property is vacant. JE 13. The purpose of the annexation and request for land use designation "is to accommodate the development of a 13+/- lot single-family residential waterfront development adjacent to North Shore Subdivisions." The application also stated: To support the residential home sites, there are adequate adjacent public roadways and utilities. Due to the unique physical configuration of the property, traditional RLD lot standards may not [sic] applicable. While we would prefer to pursue an RLD-1 designation, the application is submitted contingent upon confirmation of an appropriate land use designation and an approval of the proposed project. If another course of action is available, which would allow for the development of 13+/- single-family residential lots on 9.9 acres, please advise. JE 13. (It is represented throughout this record that the land use designation is requested for approximately 6.8 acres rather that approximately 9.9 acres. See, e.g., JE 7 at 1; JE 11 at 12-13.) The application was reviewed, in part, by Mr. Thomasson. JE 7. The staff report4 dated July 30, 2004, stated that the request is to amend the City's FLUM from Conservation (as previously designated by Bay County) to RLD with a Zoning District classification of RLD-1. (The staff report referred to several permitted uses under RLD-1. JE 7 at 2. The permitted uses for RLD-1 are those contained in the City's "Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Code (LDRC)" at section 4-6.1.2.a. JE 4 at IV:8-9. However, the propriety of the RLD-1 Zoning District classification for the Property is not at issue in this proceeding. T 266.) The staff report also stated that the Property "is currently zoned conservation, abuts property to the North that is designated conservation Land Use category in the County and is just North of an existing Special Conservation Treatment Zone," which is indicated on a map on page 1 of the staff report. JE 7 at 1. The staff report stated that "[w]ater and sewer infrastructure and other urban services are available to this property." See T 286-287, 301-303, 307-308; JE 7 at 1. Under the background section, it is stated that "[t]he property has been seen as environmentally significant and has been the object of an effort to purchase for perpetual protection by a local land trust organization. It is adjacent to an existing development to the East." Id. The Plan provides that an RLD land use district "is intended to provide areas for the preservation of development of low-density neighborhoods consisting of single-family dwelling units on individual lots" with a density of "[n]o more than five dwelling units per acre." The allowed intensity is "[n]o more than 40% lot coverage as determined by dividing the impervious areas by the gross area of the site or lot." JE 3 at 1-2. The staff report contained findings of fact with citations to the Plan, including the Future Land Use Element, the Coastal Management Element, and the Conservation Element. References to the LDRC are also provided. See also T 285-311, 315-317, 320-321; JE 7 at 2-3. Thereafter, specific findings are made: Staff finds that this property, as a part of the St. Andrews estuary, serves as a breeding, nursery, feeding and refuge are for numerous marine creatures, birds and upland wildlife. The three pine and oak hammacks [sic] are a few of a rare estuarian resource. The marsh throughout the area serves as home for seagrass and other marine organisms that are integral with the biodiversity of the estuary. There also exists a [sic] archaeological sites [sic] consisting of an ancient Indian midden that has already been classified by the Director of the Florida State Division of Historical Resources as deservant [sic] of mitigation and potentially eligible for the National Historic Registry (see attached documentation). The site overall has a biotic community of nearly 90% of it [sic] total area. Staff findings are that this proposed Land Use Amendment is inconsistent with the above listed mandates of the Comp Plan. Staff also finds that the proposed Land Use is inconsistent with the LDR Code, in that it is not in harmony with the Comp Plan (Subsection 2-5.5.6.e. above), as well as the requirements of the environmental protection standards of Section 5-5. This decision hinges on the whether the City intends to enforce it's [sic] environmental protection standards of the Comp Plan and the LDR Code and if the site is seen as environmentally significant. JE 7 at 4 (italics in original). Ultimately, staff recommended approval only with the following conditions: 1.) that the fullness of the subject property be designated as a Conservation Special Treatment Zone [CSTZ][5] and that the pine and oak hammacks [sic](as referred to as "Pine Islands" in the Bay County Comp Plan) are prohibited from being developed; and 2.) that the area of the subject property that is beyond the mean high tide of the mainland portion, which specifically means the marshes/wetlands and the oak and pine hammacks [sic], shall be placed in a conservation easement and dedicated to either the City, or a third-party land trust or conservancy. JE 7 at 4. (Mr. Hammons, the City Manager, disagreed with the staff report, in part, because there was no data to support several findings. T 119-124.) On August 9, 2004, the Planning Board of Panama City met in regular session to consider the application. The request was to approve a small scale land use amendment to the FLUM of the Plan from Conservation (under the Bay County Comprehensive Plan) to RLD with a zoning classification of RLD-1 for the Property. JE 11 at 2. But see Finding of Fact 15. Mr. Fred Webb and Dr. Frasier Bingham were present on behalf of the applicant. Mr. Webb advised that the Bingham's and the Webb's owned the property which consisted of approximately 6.5 acres of uplands. But see Finding of Fact 29 regarding the ownership of the Property. In part, Mr. Webb stated that the grass beds would not be impacted and that there was no legitimate environmental complaint. Dr. Bingham stated that he is an ecologist, specializing in shallow water ecology. JE 11 at 3. He said his family had purchased the upland property in 1948 and the submerged land in the 1960s. Beginning in 1991, Dr. Bingham stated he tried to get the government to purchase the property, but to no avail. He also recounted attempts to obtain permits from DEP and the United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps). See, e.g., PE 60, 63-64.6 He believed that the bridge problem, identified by the Corps had been solved. JE 11 at 3 and 13. (There is no persuasive evidence in this record that the Corps has approved any permits for development of the Property.) Mr. Webb stated that all maintenance to the bridges and other utilities would be the responsibility of the association (for the developed Property) and not the City and that the City would only be responsible for police and fire. Id. at 4. Mr. Thomasson addressed the Planning Board. JE 11 at The staff report previously mentioned is incorporated in the minutes. Staff felt that the CSTZ designation would be the most appropriate designation due to the environmental issues and that the RLD-1 designation would be the least intense land use available under the Plan. Board member Pritchard inquired whether the application was incomplete "as it doesn't address the environmental issues." Mr. Thomasson stated the applicant did not believe there would be any environmental impact, while staff believed the property to be environmentally significant. JE 11 at 8. Dr. Bingham again addressed the Planning Board to refute the staff's findings of fact. Dr. Bingham said that "the wetlands would not be impacted, the grass beds would not be impacted, and the stormwater runoff already goes into the grass beds, which are, in his opinion, fine grass beds" and that "that 13 houses would not have any significant impact." He indicated that soils were not at issue and that the "property is sandy, not special." Id. at 9. Mr. Webb indicated that "they had evaluated the environmental aspects and added the raised bridges, swales, etc." JE 11 at 9. Numerous individuals spoke in opposition to the request. Apparently, by a show of hands "a large majority of those present were in opposition to the request." JE 11 at 12. It appears that two persons spoke in favor of the request. Id. at 9-11. Mr. Webb confirmed that the application requested approval of the land use designation and annexation for 6.8 acres. JE 11 at 12. He also advised that a limited liability corporation owned the 6.8 acres, while there are different owners of other parcels. Mr. Webb indicated that "only the uplands on the islands were being annexed," although "he was not sure the properties were 'islands' in legal terms." Id. at 13. Mr. Webb indicated that he was willing to indemnify the City against any legal expenses arising from this request. Id. The requested land use change was approved by a vote of three to two. Id. at 14. On September 28, 2004, the City Commission considered Ordinance No. 1985 pertaining to the requested land use designation change and Ordinance No. 1995 pertaining to the annexation of the Property. These Ordinances were read by title only as a first reading. JE 10 at 293-294. During this meeting, the minutes (JE 10) reflect that Mr. Webb stated that they would only be developing the upland islands and proposed to use bridges, which he says "the environmental regulatory community has considered to have almost no environmental impact. He said that the addition of thirteen single family residential homes to an area that has seven hundred homes will not materially affect level of service." JE 10 at 289. Several of the people who appeared before the Planning Board also appeared opposing the application for annexation and land use designation change. JE 10 at 290. Mr. Martin Jacobson, Planning and Zoning Manager for Bay County filed a formal letter of objection to the annexation. Id. Mr. Fred Beauchemin opposed the annexation and responded to eleven items which were discussed by Mr. Webb and Dr. Bingham during the Planning Board meeting, including representations of impacts to grass beds, wildlife resources, and soils. JE 10 at 290-292. Mr. Webb continued to feel that there would not be any destruction of the marshes. Id. at 292. Dr. Bingham again noted that he is a shallow water marine ecologist and felt that he was informed about the environmental situation on the Property. Id. at 293. After brief discussion by some of the Commissioners, Ordinance Nos. 1985 and 1995 were approved by a vote of three to two. JE 10 at 293-294. By a letter dated November 9, 2004, Daniel Shaw, A.I.C.P., memorialized the October 5, 2004, Bay County Commission's unanimous decision to contest the potential annexation of and land use change to the Property, referring to several provisions of the Bay County Comprehensive Plan. T 228; PE 69. Mr. Shaw opined that "[c]learly, development proposed for the annexed Pine Islands violates the County's Comprehensive Plan." PE 69 at 2. He further stated: What's more the proposed annexation also violates the City's Comprehensive Plan. City Policy 5-5.2, 5-5.3 related to preservation of Environmentally Significant Resources would prohibit the proposed development. The property is a part of the St. Andrews estuary, and serves as a breeding/refuge area for numerous marine creatures, birds and wildlife. The three pine and oak hammocks are a truly rare estuarine resource for Bay County and for the State of Florida. The marshlands contain valuable sea grass beds and are home to numerous marine creatures, which are integral to the biodiversity of the estuary. Finally, the property contains valuable archeological sites, consisting of ancient Indian middens that are classified by the State Division of Historical resources, and potentially eligible for the National Historic Register. I would concur with staff's memorandum of August 9, 2004, which cites numerous other examples of where the development would violate the City's plan. PE 69 at 2 (emphasis in original). Mr. Shaw also stated that the Property is located in the coastal high hazard area, within a "V" zone for flood regulations.7 He stated that "[t]hese designations argue for prohibiting development for public safety and infrastructure investment purposes." Again, Mr. Shaw stated that Bay County opposed the potential annexation and subsequent land use reclassification. PE 69 at 3. Mr. Shaw also testified during the final hearing and reaffirmed his prior position. T 232-245. Mr. Shaw stated that the Property, prior to annexation by the City, was designated Conservation under the Bay County Comprehensive Plan, which allows for limited residential use and the preservation of pine islands (an outright prohibition).8 He was not qualified, however, to make a determination whether any portion of the Property is a pine island. T 247. Mr. Shaw thinks that Bay County allows up to 15 units per acre in the coastal high hazard area. T 254. On November 9, 2004, the City Commission met and considered a final reading of Ordinance Nos. 1985 and 1995. Several people appeared opposing both ordinances including Mr. Moore, Ms. Smith, Ms. Yori, and others. JE 8 at 3-14; JE 9 at 3-5. Mr. Webb again addressed the City Commission and stated, in part, that "nothing in the marsh would be touched." He also indicated that he would fully indemnify the City in the event of a lawsuit. JE 8 at 14-21; JE 9 at 5. Dr. Bingham also addressed the Commission. JE 8 at He stated that he has designed an environmentally friendly community of 13 home sites. He indicated that he had a Ph.D. in shallow water marine ecology and attended Florida State University and the University of Miami. He said that he was thoroughly familiar with the Panama City area and had worked with a large list of groups as an ecologist. He reiterated that the homes sites will take up 6.8 acres and will be entirely uplands and no marshes or swamps. He said that he is trying to use one fifth of the property that he owns and "there are no wetlands involved in this particular operation that will be damaged." JE 8 at 23. He also indicated that there will be raised bridges constructed on the Property, and according to him, were suggested by the Corps. Id. After brief comments by several Commissioners, the Commission approved the annexation and land use designation change by a vote of three to two. JE 8 at 26-27, 30-31. Toward the end of the November 9, 2004, hearing, the City Attorney, Rowlett Bryant, advised that the minutes of the September 28, 2004, Commission meeting would be included with the minutes of the November 9, 2004, public hearing. In other words, the November 9, 2004, Commission meeting was the public hearing held on the application for the annexation and the land use designation change. JE 8 at 27-30. Mr. Bryant also noted that the Ordinance No. 1985, related to the land use designation, would be RLD-1 and that the prior reference to Special Treatment Conservation Zone in the title of Ordinance No. 1985, considered on September 28, 2004, was a recommendation of staff and was deleted from Ordinance No. 1985, which was approved by the City Commission on November 9, 2004. JE 8 at 31-32. Ordinance No. 1985, in fact, changed the land use designation of the Property (approximately 6.8 acres) "from Conservation (a Bay County Land Use designation) to Residential- Low Density-1 as described in Small Scale Amendment 04-S20." JE 1 at 2. However, Petitioners and the City agree that "[t]he city assigned a future land use map designation to the parcel of Residential Low Density in Ordinance No. 1985." See T 11, lines 10-23; Petitioners' Prehearing Stipulation at 2, IV.2. Data and Analysis As more fully discussed in the Conclusions of Law, "[t]he future land use plan shall be based upon surveys, studies, and data regarding the area, including the amount of land required to accommodate anticipated growth; the projected population of the area; the character of undeveloped land; the availability of public services; the need for redevelopment, including the renewal of blighted areas and the elimination of non-conforming uses which are inconsistent with the character of the community; the capability of uses on lands adjacent to or closely approximate to military installations; and, in rural communities, the need for job creation, capital investment, and economic development that will strengthen and diversify the community's economy." § 163.3177(6)(a), Fla. Stat. Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.006(2) provides for "land use analysis requirements" and requires, in part, that the future land use element "be based upon the following analyses which support the comprehensive plan pursuant to subsection 9J-5.005(2) F.A.C." Subsection 9J-5.006(2)(b) requires "[a]n analysis of the character and magnitude of existing vacant or undeveloped land in order to determine its suitability for use, including where available: 1. Gross vacant or undeveloped land area, as indicated in paragraph (1)(b); 2. Soils; 3. Topography; 4. Natural resources; and 5. Historic resources." Further, "all goals, objectives, policies, standards, finding and conclusions within the comprehensive plan and its support documents, and within plan amendments and their support documents, shall be based upon relevant and appropriate data and the analyses applicable to each element. To be based on data means to react to it in an appropriate way and to the extent necessary indicated by the data available on that particular subject at the time of adoption of the plan or plan amendment at issue." Fla. Admin. Code R. 9J-5.005(2)(a)(emphasis added). "Data are to be taken from professionally accepted existing sources, such as the United States Census, State Data Center, State University System of Florida, regional planning councils, water management districts, or existing technical studies. The data shall be the best available existing data, unless the local government desires original data or special studies." Fla. Admin. Code R. 9J-5.005(2)(c). Petitioners question whether the record contains relevant and appropriate data, which was existing and available on or before November 9, 2004, to support the Plan Amendment. Petitioners further question whether the analysis of that data is adequate. The application, JE 13, requested approval of annexation of and a change in the land use designation for, as amended, approximately 6.8 acres. Aside from identifying the parcel in question, in relation to Goose Bayou and the subdivision to the east, the application does not contain adequate data and analysis to support the Plan Amendment. Mr. Slonina, a professional engineer and expert in civil engineering, testified during the final hearing as to the due diligence he and his firm performed in support of filing the application with the City. T 424. Mr. Slonina has been on the Property many times. T 456. As part of the due diligence, Mr. Slonina analyzed the area proposed for development on the Property, which are the upland areas, and, in part, stated that these areas are primarily free draining sands and have fairly high percolation rates. T 425, 453. He also characterized upland areas as fairly clean sands and satisfactory for development in this area based on his experience. He also examined the upland and wetland soils to determine suitability for a "post and beam timbered bridge system" that would be pile supported over the wetlands bridging upland areas. He opined that the soils on the uplands were nothing unique and were suitable for low density residential and suitable to support the bridge system he described. T 428, 442, 458-459. See also P 50, Attachment A. Regarding utilities which might be available to the Property, during the due diligence phase, he identified, from utility maps, the location of the closest water and sewer which could serve the Property, adjacent to the Property to the east. He also analyzed the ability of fire protection to be provided to the Property and concluded that it was feasible. T 428-432, 460-461. See also JE 7 at 1 regarding "utility and other urban services availability" and P 50 at 14-16 for a discussion of "utilities." Mr. Slonina also opined that a stormwater system could reasonably be designed for the Property and that it was feasible to design a stormwater system that would capture stormwater runoff before it went into the bayou. T 432-435. Mr. Slonina examined flood zone information and determined that the Property was "very typical" and that the flood zone information available would not preclude residential development on the Property. T 434-435, 450. But see Endnote 7. From a traffic concurrency standpoint, he examined traffic engineering data on trip generation for 13 single-family homes and determined that there was adequate capacity for that additional loading on "the only roadway that connects to the [P]roperty." His traffic impact analysis was limited "through the residential streets." T 435-436, 439-441. Mark O. Friedemann, is the executive vice-president at the Phoenix Environmental Group, Inc., an environmental consulting firm. T 466. Mr. Friedemann was retained on or about January 7, 2005, by the City's counsel for the purpose of "doing a basic assessment of the property and whether it was suitable for some type of development, residential in particular." T 474-475. Prior to conducting a survey of the Property, aerial photographs, data from the Florida Natural Areas Inventory, and various maps were reviewed. Id. Mr. Friedemann and an assistant conducted a field survey of the Property on January 12, 2005. They collected basic water quality data, observed wildlife, conducted several soil observations pits, looked for scat, and examined the vegetative community on the Property. T 476. For the purpose of the survey, the Property was divided into areas 1 through 4, which are labeled on CE 5, Figure 2. T 478. These upland areas were the major focus of the assessment along with the interior (wetland/marsh) areas. T 478, 565. CE 5 at 2, Figure 2. Mr. Friedemann and his assistant arrived on the Property at approximately 9:00 am on January 12, 2005, during low tide. They left the Property as the tide was starting to return. T 517, 532, 548. Area one is a rectangular portion of the Property, which runs north to south and forms most of the eastern boundary of the Property and is adjacent to Candlewick Acres. Area two is another upland area which is in the northwest portion of the Property and west of area one. Area three is in the southwest portion of the Property and southwest of area two. Area four is a small upland portion, which is almost due south of area one in the southeastern portion of the Property. CE 5 at 2, Figure 2; see also Endnote 6. Mr. Friedemann accessed area two from area one by walking along a path/spoil pile, which runs east to west and forms part of the northern boundary of the Property (the approximately 100 foot canal is north of and adjacent to the path/spoil pile). He walked to area three by stepping across a small rivulet of no more than a foot in width. He walked to area four from area three, stepping over another small tidal- influenced rivulet that passed between areas three and four. He approached area one from area four walking across "a rather high area." Mr. Friedemann "did not get the impression that area two was surrounded" by wetlands, salt marsh, or tidal mud flats. T 479-481, 500, 517, 556-557. He stated that area three would be surrounded, but was unsure about area four. T 556-559. Some of the areas photographed would be potentially inundated during high tide. T 521-525. Mr. Friedemann's report also contained, in part: water quality data taken on January 12, 2005; and a list of species seen on the same date; a recent undated aerial of the Property and surrounding area, downloaded from the DEP website, which was also magnified; and several aerials (dated 1953, 1962, 1967, 1974, 1978, and 1986) of the Property including the surrounding areas. Mr. Friedemann opined, based on his review of aerials, that there may have been a timber operation ongoing on the Property in the past although he would not hazard a guess. T 540. The report also included several photographs taken of the four areas, during the site visit on January 12, 2005. CE 5 at x-xxii. Although he did not "review any set of plans," or have any opinion regarding any specific development proposal, Mr. Friedemann opined that based on his observations in the field, "there is a viable project that could be built on this parcel."9 T 482, 501-502, 511, 520. Mr. Friedemann provided an analysis of the Property by and through his testimony regarding photographs taken of the Property during his site visit. From a biological or ecological perspective, he did not observe anything on the Property which would preclude residential development. He further opined that what he observed was not unique in the panhandle of Florida. T 501-502. Mr. Friedemann did not conduct a wetland delineation of the Property. T 556. However, the record contains an infrared Conceptual Site Plan dated October 22, 2002, indicating vacant land to the north of the Property, and residential areas to the east of the Property and east of the vacant parcels to the north. This particular site plan provided for the approximate wetland boundaries of the Property identified as south parcel (4). PE 98-D and PE 50 at Exhibit 1. Mr. Friedemann indicated that he had not observed the Property during a hurricane, during periods of high wind, or during periods of a combination of high wind and high tide. He agreed that the tides in the United States can be lower during the winter than they are during the spring and that the highest tides may be experienced during the spring called neap tides. T 532-533. Mr. Friedemann was also referred to a December 30, 2004, document apparently prepared by Panhandle Engineering, Inc., sheet number 2 of 4, CE 16, which delineated 13 lots. T 533. See Endnote 6. (City Exhibit 16 was admitted into evidence as an authentic document; however, there was no testimony regarding the preparation of this document. T 535-537.) Comparing sheet 2 of 4 with Figure two of CE 5, area two is depicted as being surrounded by rush marsh and connected to area one and area three by drawn-in bridges. Compare PE 50, Attachment E, Sheet 1 of 2, dated July 31, 1998, depicting the Property with 13 lots configured, interspersed with a "conservation area" designation and Attachment A, Figure 4., Project Base Map, depicting upland areas on the Property, interspersed with a "marsh" designation with PE 98-D south parcel (4) and "approximate wetland boundary. See also Endnote Mr. Friedemann stated that the indication of rush marsh on sheet number 2 of 4 did not comport with his observations of the Property during his site visit. He was unaware of this drawing. T 534-538. Gail Easley, A.I.C.P., an expert in urban and regional planning, opined that the Plan Amendment was consistent with various provisions of the City's Plan, the State Comprehensive Plan, and the West Florida Regional Strategic Policy Plan. She also opined the Plan Amendment was supported by data and analysis regarding the suitability of the Property for the RLD land use designation. In support, Ms. Easley stated in part: Understanding that the amendment is not really permitting the use, but understanding that the amendment establishes the uses that are allowed as I testified earlier, the suitability data that is available in addition to the data and analysis here in the Comprehensive Plan includes the information from Panhandle Engineering about, more specifically about the availability of facilities and services and the suitability of soils for use of residential low density, as well as the analysis contained in Mr. Friedemann's report regarding environmental issues and the suitability of this site for residential low density. So I found plenty of evaluation of suitability. T 586. See also T 610-611. Ms. Easley also opined that the Plan Amendment does not threaten coastal and natural resources in violation of Florida Administrative Code Rules 9J-5.006, 9J-5.012, and 9J- 5.013, and Sections 163.3177 and 163.3178, Florida Statutes, because she considered the data and analysis in the Plan, "as well as the suitability and capability [sic] analysis that were submitted by Panhandle Engineering and Mr. Friedemann demonstrated that there was not a violation of these provisions." T 617. Ms. Easley also stated that there was adequate data to support a need for residential (RLD) development on the Property. See, e.g., T 584-585, 621-622, 629-630, 632-634. See also JE 3 at Future Land Use Data, 1-1 - 1-10. During cross-examination, Ms. Easley was asked to identify the particular Panhandle Engineering report which she reviewed to support her opinion. The report is not in evidence. However, Ms. Easley stated: "It was a report that they prepared that addressed issues of suitability of the site with regard to the availability of water, the availability of sewer, the capacity for water and sewer, soil conditions on the site, and traffic situations on the site. I'm sorry, I do not recall the date of that particular suitability analysis, but it was prepared by Panhandle Engineering, and I reviewed it as a part of my analysis." T 626. Ms. Easley was also asked to provide the source of her data and analysis about environmental conditions on the site and she replied: "Two places, there is information in the City's data and analysis with regard to the vacant land analysis, as well as general environmental conditions in or around the City, I reviewed that data and analysis that I mentioned earlier. I also saw information specific to this parcel from Mr. Friedemann's report." T 627. Ms. Easley indicated that there was no specific data and analysis contained in the City's Plan about the Property, although the Plan referenced areas adjacent to the City. T 628. Ms. Easley reiterated that natural resources are considered during the plan amendment process. It also occurs during permitting. T 642. She again stated: "The suitability analysis was contained in two different reports. As I testified earlier, Mr. Slonina's report from Panhandle Engineering addressed soils and soil suitability. And Mr. Friedemann's report looked at other kinds of environmental issues. I reviewed both of those reports and determined that suitability analysis had been preformed to support the plan amendment." T 643. According to Ms. Easley, if there were environmental reasons creating an inconsistency with Rule 9J-5, then such reasons could serve as a basis for denial. T 643. (Ms. Easley also opined that a land use change to the FLUM "is an assignment of a land use category and the associated density and intensity, it is not a development activity." See T 587, 651.) Mark Llewellyn, P.E., is the president of Genesis Group. In October 2002, Genesis Group completed a planning and engineering analysis (Genesis Report)10 for Chandler and Associates, who, in turn, had a contract with the DEP to prepare an appraisal report for the Goose Bayou Marsh Property.11 The Goose Bayou Marsh Property included four parcels, including the south parcel (4), which is the Property in question, two north parcels (2 and 3), and the middle parcel (1), which is north and northeast of and adjacent (the west one- third) to the Property. All the parcels are vacant. See PE 98- D, which also appears at PE 50, Exhibit 1. Mr. Llewellyn identified three peninsular islands on the Property (south parcel 4)(PE 98-D at the blue X's), which roughly correspond with areas one and two in Mr. Friedemann's report at CE 5 at 2, Figure 2. T 160-161. See also Endnote 6. The two eastern peninsular islands (area one) are connected to the upland to the east, Candlewick Acres. The third peninsular island, located in the northwest corner of the Property, can be accessed, according to Mr. Llewellyn, by a berm or other geographical feature to the north of the Property and south of the drainage canal. Id. See also T 397. There is one larger upland island and a smaller upland island toward the southwest and southern portions of the Property, which appear to be surrounded by wetlands, waters of the state, salt marsh, or tidal mud flats. T 160-164. Each peninsular island and upland island is less than 20 acres. Mr. Llewellyn's analysis is consistent with the approximate wetland boundaries identified in the Conceptual Site Plan, PE 98-D. Mr. Llewellyn opined that the Property could be developed as a single-family development without having an impact on the Property if it is designed and maintained properly. T 157, 172. See also Endnote 6. The Genesis Report provided an analysis of the four parcels. Apparently the south parcel (4), the Property, contained approximately 16.2 acres as follows: wetlands 9.8+/- acres; upland islands 3.5+/- acres; peninsula uplands 2.9+/- acres; or 6.4+/- acres of total uplands. T 163; PE 50 at 12. Parcels 1-4 are analyzed in light of several factors, including but not limited, to the Bay County Future Land Use and Comprehensive Plan. The following is an analysis of the Bay County Future Land Use and Comprehensive Plan as applied to the north parcels (2 and 3): The Bay County Comprehensive Management Plan identifies the North Parcel's Future Land Use Designation as Conservation. The purpose of this land use is to identify public and private lands held for conservation of natural features. Allowable uses for this designation are natural resource protection, flood control, wildlife habitat protection, passive of recreation, silviculture and residential densities up to 2DU/acre. Commercial development is prohibited for properties with this land use designation. Additionally, the upland islands located on these parcels fit the definition for "Pine Islands" as defined in the Bay County Comprehensive Plan. A Pine Island is defined as a small upland area generally 20 acres or less, usually characterized by typical pine flatwood vegetation, which are surrounded by waters of the State, wetlands, salt marsh, or tidal mud flats. The Bay County Comprehensive Plan prohibits development on any "Pine Island". This means that it will be extremely difficult to develop the upland areas located on this parcel. PE 50 at 2. See also PE 50 at 2 (II.B.) and 13 (IV.B.) regarding the Panama City Future Land Use. (The Genesis Report was prepared approximately two years prior to the City's annexation of the Property. The City did not annex the vacant land to the north (parcels 1-3), which is part of the subject of the Genesis Report.) Regarding the analysis of parcels 1, and 4, the Property, and referring to the Bay County Future Land Use and Comprehensive Plan, it is noted that "[t]he same issues apply to this parcel." PE 50 at 7 and 13. The Genesis Report discussed wetlands on the Property: The wetlands within the property consist of estuarine salt marshes, which are connected to Goose Bayou and West Bay. According to an environmental assessment prepared by Biological Research Associates (BRA) the marshes are tidally influenced and dominated by black rush. Other species include seaside goldenrod, seashore dropseed grass, sea purslane, glasswort, salt grass, marsh hay cord grass, sea lavender, Chinese tallow, saw grass, cork wood, and saltbrush. Additionally, the salt marsh is habitat for two listed bird species; the snowy egret and the little blue heron (see Attachment A). As previously stated, a wetland delineation has been completed for this parcel and accepted by FDEP and ACOE. PE 50 at 13. The Genesis Report also provided a brief discussion of flood plain and cultural resource considerations, and also provided an analysis of site planning and engineering, including access, utilities, owner site plan/lot lay out, and probable development costs. PE 50 at 13-15. Regarding south parcel 4, the Property, the Genesis Report concluded, in part, that "[t]his parcel has limited development potential." A cost estimate is provided. It is also concluded that water and sewer could be provided without incurring significant increases in development costs. "Development of the upland islands would require bridges, which significantly increases the development cost. There is no guarantee that the development within the wetlands would be permitted at this time." PE 50 at 16. The Genesis Report also included a report prepared by Biological Research Associates, which appears as Attachment A to PE 50. Mark Andrew Barth, vice president/senior ecologist for Biological Research Associates, was one of the two signatories to a section of the Genesis Report and also testified during the final hearing. T 175; PE 50, Attachment A. He reiterated that they prepared a preliminary environmental assessment for a proposed acquisition by a State agency. T 176, 180. (While unclear, it appears that his study area included the approximate western one-third of the Property, see, e.g., T 189; PE 50, Attachment A, Figures 1, 3-4, although other portions of the Property were studied. See, e.g., Finding of Fact 93.) Referring to PE 98-C and the Property (outlined in black) and the vacant land to the north outlined in red, Mr. Barth testified that they are "mainly comprised of salt marsh and scattered pine dominated islands." According to Mr. Barth, the term "pine islands," "describes isolated upland patches within the salt marsh." T 177. The salt marshes consist of vegetation that extends beyond the water level usually in very shallow water. T 178. The Property is part of an estuary system, Goose Bayou, for example. Id. See also T 381; JE 12 at IV-14-16 and Map 1. The salt marsh is inundated by saline or marine water as opposed to fresh water. T 178. One of the most significant features of an estuary system "is providing nursery grounds and habitat for marine and estuarine fish and wildlife." T 179. Mr. Barth considered the Property, south parcel 4, PE 98-D, to be environmentally sensitive in light of the combination of estuarine and upland areas which are undisturbed. T 185-186. Mr. Barth did not have enough information to assess specific impacts to the surrounding salt marsh and water in light of a proposed development on the Property. He felt it depended on the type of development. T 182. "Middens" have been found on the south side of the Property, in and around area 3 (CE 5 at 2, Figure 2). See, e.g., T 558-559; PE 50, Genesis Report at 13 and Attachment A at 6-7 and Attachment E, Figure 4, Project Base Map and Figure 5, PBY139 Base Map. Ultimate Findings of Fact Regarding Adequacy of Data and Analysis Ultimately, whether the Plan Amendment is based upon relevant and appropriate data and analysis is a close question. This is particularly true here where critical portions of Mr. Friedemann's analysis are based on information, e.g., Mr. Friedemann's photographs, collection of water quality samples, and observations of the Property (species seen and terrain), which post-dated the City's adoption of the Plan Amendment on November 9, 2004. As a result, his analysis of this information has been disregarded, notwithstanding the lack of an objection to the admissibility of his report, CE 5. See Conclusions of Law 110-114. (Mr. Friedemann also provided several aerials of the Property and surrounding area which pre-date the date of adoption of the Plan Amendment and have been considered along with his analysis of this data.) Also, to the extent that Ms. Easley relied on Mr. Friedemann's report (CE 5) and the post- adoption information collected by Mr. Friedemann and his analysis of that information, her opinions have also been disregarded. Nevertheless, Petitioners have the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence that the Plan Amendment is not based upon relevant and appropriate data and analysis, which Petitioners have not done. Accordingly, based on a review of the entire record in this proceeding, it is ultimately concluded that the Plan Amendment is based on relevant and appropriate data and analysis, except as otherwise stated herein. See § 163.3177(6)(a), Fla. Stat.; Fla. Admin. Code R. 9J-5.005(2), 9J-5.006(2), and 9J-5.012-.013. Consistency with the City's Plan, the West Florida Strategic Regional Policy Plan, the State Comprehensive Plan, and the City's Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Code Petitioners contend that the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with several provisions of the City's Plan: Future Land Use Element Policy 1.1.1.10; Coastal Management Element Goal 1, Objective 5.1, and Policies 5.1.1 and 5.1.3.3, and Goal 3; and Conservation Element Goal 1, Policies 6.6.2, 6.6.2.3, and 6.6.2.4. Petitioners contend that the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with several provisions of the LDRC: subsections 2- 5.5.6, 5-5.1, 5-5.2, 5-5.3, and 5-5.6.3.e. Petitioners also contend that the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with Section 187.201, Florida Statutes, and the West Florida Strategic Regional Policy Plan. The Plan Amendment changes the land use designation on the Property to RLD. The Plan Amendment is not a development order. See Strand v. Escambia County, Case No. 03-2980GM, 2003 WL 23012209, at *4 (DOAH Dec. 23, 2003; DCA Jan. 28, 2004), aff'd, 894 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). It does not authorize any development to occur on the Property. Further, a special treatment zone, as used in the City's Plan, is not a FLUM land use district. Based on the plain and ordinary meaning of the various Plan provisions at issue, the Plan Amendment does not alter or interfere with the City's ability to maintain the quality of coastal resources; restrict the City's ability to maintain regulatory or management techniques intended to protect coastal wetlands, water quality, wildlife habitat, and living marine resources, for example, or prohibit the construction of docks, piers, wharves, or similar structures; interfere with the City's ability to provide for or have available adequate areas for public waterfront access or to provide the circumstances necessary for the conservation, protection, and use of natural resources; or interfere with the City's ability to enforce guidelines in its LDRCs related to, for example, the protection and conservation of the natural functions of existing soils, wetlands, marine resources, estuarine shoreline, stormwater management, wildlife habitat, or flood zones. Petitioners did not prove that the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with cited portions of the City's Plan, the State Comprehensive Plan, and the West Florida Strategic Regional Policy Plan. Further, the Plan Amendment need not be consistent with the City's LDRCs because it is not the subject of "in compliance" review.12
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order concluding that the Plan Amendment, adopted by the City of Panama City in Ordinance No. 1985, is "in compliance" as defined in Section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of October, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES A. STAMPELOS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of October, 2005.
The Issue Whether an amendment to the Lee County Comprehensive Plan, adopted by Ordinance 15-10 on June 3, 2015, is “in compliance,” as that term is defined in section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2014).1/
Findings Of Fact Petitioners, Roger Thornberry, Georgette Lundquist, Steven Brodkin, Ruby Daniels, Rosalie Prestarri, and James Giedman, reside in and own property within Lee County. Petitioners submitted oral and written comments to Lee County concerning the challenged Plan Amendment during the period of time beginning with the transmittal hearing for the Plan Amendment and ending with the adoption of the Plan Amendment. Respondent, Lee County (the County), is a political subdivision of the State of Florida with the duty and responsibility to adopt and maintain a comprehensive growth management plan pursuant to section 163.3167, Florida Statutes (2015). Intervenors, RH Venture II, LLC; RH Venture III, LLC; and Greenpointe Communities, LLC (Greenpointe), are the owners and developers of the property which is subject to the Plan Amendment. Intervenors are the applicants for the Plan Amendment. The Lee County Comprehensive Plan (Comprehensive Plan) allocates future land uses based on community plans for 22 distinct communities within the County. The Fort Myers Shores planning community is located in eastern Lee County. Within Fort Myers Shores is a sub-community planning area known as Caloosahatchee Shores, which is located south of the Caloosahatchee River, east of Interstate 75 (I-75), and west of Hickey’s Creek. The southern boundary of Caloosahatchee Shores is the Orange River and State Road 82. Caloosahatchee Shores contains a mixture of future land use designations. The majority of the land is designated Suburban, Sub-Outlying Suburban, Rural, or Urban Community. The subject property is located in Caloosahatchee Shores within an existing 1,978-acre mixed-use golf community known as River Hall. Most of the existing development in River Hall was completed between 2004 and 2009 by the original developer, Landmar Group, which was then owned by Crescent Resources. Crescent Resources declared bankruptcy in 2009. Those portions of River Hall subject to the Plan Amendment were acquired by Greenpointe in 2010. The property subject to the Plan Amendment is approximately 585 acres of non-contiguous land within the existing mixed-use development. All of the property subject to the Plan Amendment is located within the Rural future land use category. The Plan Amendment changes the future land use category of the subject property from Rural to Sub-Outlying Suburban.2/ The density of development allowed in Rural is one dwelling unit per acre and the density of development allowed in Sub-Outlying Suburban is two units per acre. In 2001, the Lee County Board of County Commissioners (Lee County Commission) adopted procedures to encourage community planning aimed at specific neighborhood interests within the County. A coalition of property owners in Caloosahatchee Shores developed the Caloosahatchee Shores Community Plan (Community Plan) between 2001 and 2003. The Community Plan was incorporated into the Comprehensive Plan in 2003 and is codified as Future Land Use Element (FLUE) Goal 21 and its implementing objectives and policies. FLUE Goal 21 reads as follows: GOAL 21: CALOOSAHATCHEE SHORES: To protect the existing character, natural resources and quality of life in Caloosahatchee Shores, while promoting new development, redevelopment and maintaining a more rural identity for the neighborhoods east of I-75 by establishing minimum aesthetic requirements, planning the location and intensity of future commercial and residential uses, and providing incentives for redevelopment, mixed use development and pedestrian safe environments. This Goal and subsequent objectives and policies apply to the Caloosahatchee Shores boundaries as depicted on Map 1, page 2 of 8 in the Appendix. The Community Plan was amended in 2007 and again in 2009. Policy 21.1.5 was added to the Community Plan in 2009, and reads as follows: POLICY 21.1.5: One important aspect of the Caloosahatchee Shores Community Plan goal is to retain its’ [sic] rural character and rural land use where it currently exists. Therefore no land use map amendments to the remaining rural lands category will be permitted after May 15, 2009, unless a finding of overriding public necessity is made by three members of the Board of County Commissioners. It is undisputed that the Plan Amendment removes land from the Rural land use category. It is undisputed that the Lee County Commission did not make a finding of an “overriding public necessity” when it adopted the Plan Amendment. Petitioners allege the Plan Amendment is internally inconsistent with Policy 21.1.5 because the Lee County Commission did not make the requisite finding of an “overriding public necessity” to remove property from the Rural land use category.3/ Respondent and Intervenors argue that Policy 21.1.5 does not apply to the Plan Amendment because the existing development on the property subject to the Plan Amendment is not rural in either character or land use. Respondent and Intervenors introduced abundant evidence to establish that the property subject to the Plan Amendment is suburban development served by the full spectrum of urban services and devoid of any of the trappings of rural development, such as large-lot residential and agricultural uses. Respondent and Intervenors advocate an interpretation of Policy 21.1.5 which requires a finding of “overriding public necessity” only if a plan amendment removes property that exhibits rural character or rural land use from the Rural land use category. The County offered the testimony of Brandon Dunn, one of its principal planners. Mr. Dunn characterized the Policy as an “if/then statement”: if property in the Rural land use category (subject to a plan amendment) exhibits rural character and rural land use, then a finding of “overriding public necessity” is required. Under Mr. Dunn’s analysis, Policy 21.1.5 does not apply to the Plan Amendment because River Hall is a suburban community. Intervenors’ planning expert, Dr. David Depew, testified that the first sentence narrows the application of the second. Dr. Depew testified that the first sentence indicates “we aren’t talking about the category per se.”4/ Under Dr. Depew’s reading, the second sentence only applies to plan amendments which exhibit rural character or rural land use, rather than all plan amendments removing property from the Rural land use category. Neither Mr. Dunn’s nor Dr. Depew’s opinion is persuasive.5/ The interpretation advanced by both Respondent and Intervenors adds language to the second sentence of Policy 21.1.5 limiting its application to only those plan amendments which exhibit rural character and rural land use. The plain language of Policy 21.1.5 contains no such limitation. The policy directs the County to make a finding of an “overriding public necessity” as a prerequisite to removing land from the Rural land use category in Caloosahatchee Shores. The first sentence of Policy 21.1.5 does not constitute a limitation on the directive for a finding of an “overriding public necessity.”
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administration Commission enter a final order determining that the Lee County Plan Amendment, adopted by Ordinance 15-10 on June 3, 2015, is not “in compliance,” as that term is defined in section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of December, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of December, 2015.
The Issue Whether Escambia County Ordinance No. 2017-65 (Ordinance) adopted on November 30, 2017, amending the Heavy Commercial/Light Industrial (HC/LI) zoning district in the Escambia County Land Development Code (LDC) is consistent with the 2030 Escambia County Comprehensive Plan (Comp Plan). Whether Remedial Ordinance No. 2018-30 (Remedial Ordinance) adopted on August 2, 2018, alleviates any inconsistency in the Ordinance such that the HC/LI zoning district regulation is consistent with the Comp Plan.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner lives and owns property in Cantonment, Escambia County, Florida, in proximity to parcels of land impacted by the Ordinance and Remedial Ordinance. As such, the Petitioner would be subject to an increase in noise and traffic resulting from the Ordinance and Remedial Ordinance, as well as an adverse change in the character of her rural neighborhood. The County is a non-charter county and political subdivision of the State of Florida. The County is the affected local government and is subject to the requirements of chapter 163. DEO is the state land planning agency and has the duty to review and investigate petitions submitted under section 163.3213, challenging land development regulations adopted by local governments. The Ordinance was enacted to amend Part III of the County's LDC to address consistency of parcels zoned HC/LI with the MU-S FLU Category. The preamble to the Ordinance indicates a previous consolidation of zoning districts implemented on April 16, 2015, "did not eliminate all occurrences of zoning districts that appear to allow uses, density, or other intensities of use not authorized by the prevailing purposes and associated provisions of applicable future land use categories." The County's Board of County Commissioners (Board) found that "there are occurrences of HC/LI zoning within the MU-S future land use category," and "it is in the best interests of the health, safety, and welfare of the public to address any inconsistency created by HC/LI zoning within the MU-S future land use category." After the DEO's determination of partial inconsistency, the County adopted the Remedial Ordinance, which makes no reference to the April 15, 2015, consolidation of zoning districts in the preamble. In addition, the Remedial Ordinance amends the Ordinance to delete certain confusing references to parcels and their previous zoning as of April 15, 2015. Thus, the Remedial Ordinance is much clearer than the Ordinance in addressing the prior inconsistency created by HC/LI zoning within the MU-S FLU category. Mixed-Use Suburban Future Land Use Category The MU-S FLU is described in FLU Policy 1.3.1 of the Comp Plan as "[i]ntended for a mix of residential and non- residential uses while promoting compatible infill development and the separation of urban and suburban land uses." The MU-S FLU lists the range of allowable uses as "[r]esidential, retail sales & services, professional office, recreational facilities, public and civic, limited agriculture." The MU-S FLU prescribes standards, such as a residential maximum density of 25 dwelling units per acre (du/acre) and a non-residential maximum intensity floor area ration (FAR) of one. The MU-S FLU also describes the mix of land uses that the County intends to achieve for new development in relation to location, i.e., the distance from arterial roadways or transit corridors. Within one-quarter mile of arterial roadways or transit corridors: residential percentages of 8 to 25 percent; public, recreational and institutional percentages of 5 to 20 percent; non-residential uses such as retail service at 30 to 50 percent; and office at 25 to 50 percent. Beyond one-quarter mile of arterial roadways or transit corridors: residential percentages of 70 to 85 percent; public, recreational and institutional percentages of 10 to 25 percent; and non- residential percentages of 5 to 10 percent. The mix of land uses described by the Comp Plan MU-S FLU category can be implemented by multiple zoning districts in the LDC. Certain zoning districts within MU-S further the residential intentions of the FLU category and other zoning districts further the non-residential intentions of the MU-S FLU category. However, all zoning districts within MU-S contain some element of residential use. The Ordinance and Remedial Ordinance The Remedial Ordinance amended the purpose subsection (a) of section 3-2.11 of the County LDC by adding language that directly limited the "variety and intensity of non- residential uses within the HC/LI [zoning] district" by "the applicable FLU." This means that although various non- residential uses are permitted in the HC/LI zoning district, the FLU category in the Comp Plan determines the "variety and intensity" of those non-residential uses. The Ordinance had amended subsection (h) of section 3-1.3 of the County LDC to clarify that "[o]ne or more districts may implement the range of allowed uses of each FLU, but only at densities and intensities of use consistent with the established purposes and standards of the category." This clarification is consistent with FLU Policy 1.1.4 in the Comp Plan, which states that "[w]ithin a given future land use category, there will be one or more implementing zoning districts." The Remedial Ordinance amended the permitted uses in subsection (b) of section 3-2.11 of the County LDC by deleting the confusing reference to parcel sizes and their previous zoning as of April 15, 2015. In paragraph (6) of subsection 3-2.11(b), the Remedial Ordinance made clear that the listed "industrial and related uses" are not permitted "within MU-S." In general, the other permitted uses mirror the range of allowable uses in the MU-S FLU category. The Remedial Ordinance amended the conditional uses in subsection (c) of section 3-2.11 to make clear that the listed industrial and related conditional uses are not permitted within MU-S. The Ordinance added MU-S to the site and building requirements in subsection (d) of section 3-2.11 to require a maximum FAR of 1.0. The Remedial Ordinance also imposed a maximum structure height for "any parcel previously zoned GBD [Gateway Business District] and within the MU-S" of 50 feet, which is lower than the maximum of 150 feet for HC/LI zoning not within MU-S. The Remedial Ordinance amended the location criteria in subsection (e) of section 3-2.11 to limit "[a]ll new non- residential uses proposed within the HC/LI district" to parcels previously zoned GBD and within the MU-S FLU category that are located along and directly in front of "U.S. Highway 29 or State Road 95A." In addition, another location criterion limits new non-residential uses along arterial streets to within one-quarter mile of their intersection with an arterial street. The provisions of the Ordinance and Remedial Ordinance are consistent with the County Comp Plan. Petitioner's Objections The Petitioner contended that the HC/LI zoning regulation allows intensities and scales of commercial uses that are inconsistent with the character of a predominantly residential FLU like MU-S. The Petitioner based her contention on the Comp Plan definition of "suburban area" and argued that the Ordinance and Remedial Ordinance permitted uses, densities, and intensities that were not "suburban in nature." "Suburban area" is defined in the Comp Plan as "[a] predominantly low-density residential area located immediately outside of an urban area or a city and associated with it physically and socioeconomically." By contrast, "mixed-use" is defined in the Comp Plan as "any use that includes both residential and non-residential uses." See ch. 3, § 3.04, Escambia Cnty. Comp Plan. Contrary to the Petitioner's contention, the MU-S FLU category's primary focus is on a mix of uses in a suburban area. See Findings of Fact Nos. 6-8, above. Indeed, the FLU element of the Comp Plan expresses a purpose and intent to encourage mixed- use development. Also, the Petitioner's focus on the differences between the MU-S and Mixed-Use Urban (MU-U) FLU categories in the Comp Plan was misplaced. The premise that the HC/LI zoning district implements the MU-U FLU category better than it implements the MU-S FLU category was not the issue to be determined in this proceeding. Rather, it was whether the Ordinance, as amended by the Remedial Ordinance, amending the HC/LI zoning district in the LDC is consistent with the Comp Plan. All other contentions not specifically discussed have been considered and rejected.
