The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint and the penalties, if any, that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a veterinarian licensed in the State of Florida. On October 8, 1990, Respondent received pari-mutuel wagering occupational license number 0364610-1046 from the Petitioner. Respondent held this pari-mutuel wagering occupational license at all times pertinent to this proceeding. Petitioner is the State agency responsible for the regulation of the horse racing industry in the State of Florida. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent worked as a racetrack veterinarian at Pompano Harness Track (Pompano Track) in Pompano Beach, Florida. James Gabriel is a sixteen year veteran of the Fort Lauderdale, Florida, Police Department. During the latter part of 1992, Officer Gabriel began an undercover investigation at Pompano Track as part of his duties with the Metropolitan Organized Crime Intelligence Unit. Officer Gabriel posed as a convicted felon who was the owner of the horse Yankee Roughneck. Horse owner Herman Berger registered Yankee Roughneck in his (Berger's) name since as a convicted felon, Officer Gabriel's undercover persona would not be allowed to register as the true owner. Mr. Berger was a target of Officer Gabriel's undercover investigation and did not know that Officer Gabriel was in fact a police officer. Officer Gabriel and Mr. Berger were in contact with one another on almost a daily basis between November 1992 and May 1993. Mr. Berger owned the horse You've Got The Time. Officer Gabriel's undercover investigation lasted approximately one year and was electronically monitored so that conversations in which Officer Gabriel was a part were tape recorded without the knowledge of the other participants in the conversation. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Yankee Roughneck and You've Got The Time were standard bred horses that raced at Pompano Track. On the morning of May 24, 1993, Officer Gabriel met with Mr. Berger and discussed having Respondent give Yankee Roughneck a substance to make him run faster. Mr. Berger referred to the substance to be given to Yankee Roughneck as being a "malt". A malt is also known as a "milkshake" and as an "ionic boost". Later that same day Officer Gabriel came into contact with Respondent when Respondent arrived at Pompano Track at the stable of Charlie Giamanco, the trainer of Yankee Roughneck. Respondent was at the stable to treat Yankee Roughneck for an injury that occurred when the rail of a jog cart broke and a splinter stabbed Yankee Roughneck in the shoulder. Officer Gabriel was in the presence of Mr. Berger and Mr. Giamanco when Respondent arrived at the stable. Respondent did not know Officer Gabriel, but he knew that Officer Gabriel was a colleague of Mr. Berger. Officer Gabriel engaged in a conversation with Respondent which was electronically monitored by equipment in good working order. The following conversation among Respondent (P.P.), Officer Gabriel (J.G.), Mr. Berger (H.B.), and Mr. Giamanco (C.G.) was taped. This conversation pertains to racing Yankee Roughneck and ways to enhance the horse's performance. P.P.: If the horse the ah, had he been milkshaked before did he race well when he was milkshaked? Not every horse races well when they get bagged. (Unintelligible.) H.B.: He came, he raced but not the way he supposed (sic) to. P.P.: I'll speak with Charlie tomorrow morning. Well the only thing to do is to try it one start. H.B.: Yes. P.P.: Not (sic) that expensive to do. (Unintelligible.) H.B.: Exactly. P.P.: If the horse improves. H.B.: Alright (sic). J.G.: How long does it take before we do something like that for (unintelligible). P.P.: Two and a half hours before the race. Thereafter, Respondent made the following statement: P.P.: OK, the same thing that we used to, when we used to pass the tube, you know, but now, we can't pass the tube. What we're doing is giving it orally. Mix the stuff up put it in their dose syringe. Put it on the back of their tongue a hundred and eighty c.c. and (unintelligible) even in the states where they have the black box, it won't test positive, pass the stomach tube and dump that whole big load in him shows on the box. Subsequently in the conversation, the following dialogue occurred: H.B.: And we going (sic) to do for Yankee Roughneck (unintelligible). J.G.: Well, what day do we want to do that? When we find out when he's, I think he's in Thursday. P.P.: Okay. H.B.: We'll find out today. P.P.: (Unintelligible) check with Charlie and the day he gets in. H.B.: Yeah. The milkshake referred to by Respondent and by the other participants in this conversation is a liquid concoction that includes a mixture of sodium bicarbonate. As described by Respondent, the mixture would thereafter be given the horse by dose syringe. This mixture is given to a racehorse in the hopes of enhancing the horse's performance during the race. In the amounts discussed by Respondent, sodium bicarbonate meets the definition of a "medicine" within the meaning of Section 550.235(2), and Section 550.2415(1)(a) and (8), Florida Statutes. The evidence established that sodium bicarbonate raises the ph level in the horse beyond the normal physiological range and can be expected to delay muscle fatigue in a horse by buffering the buildup of lactic acid in the muscle during periods of exercise. The horse can be expected to run faster because the onset of fatigue will be delayed. An improvement of one to two seconds can be expected in the horse's racing time, which equates to approximately five lengths in a harness race. Sodium bicarbonate is also administered to racehorses to prevent a condition formally known as exertional rhabdomyolisis and informally referred to as "tying up". The onetime administration of sodium bicarbonate shortly before race time under the facts of this case was to enhance the horse's performance and not to prevent tying up. If the prevention of tying up had been the goal, small amounts of sodium bicarbonate would had been added to the horse's food over an extended period of time. The Respondent's reference to the "black box" in the taped conversation is to a device employed by many race tracks to test whether a horse has been "milkshaked" or otherwise improperly medicated. Pompano Track did not use a blackbox. The Respondent's reference to "tubing" a horse is a prohibited practice whereby a stomach tube is passed through the horse's mouth and into the stomach. The "milkshake" is thereby pumped directly into the horse's stomach. The tubing of a race horses is a practice prohibited by rule adopted by Petitioner. The tubing rule was adopted by Petitioner in an effort to stop the practice of tubing horses by grooms or trainers who have inadequate training and to prevent the practice of milkshaking horses. Typically, more of the concoction would be administered by tubing than by using the dose syringe. The evidence established that the amount of sodium bicarbonate discussed by Respondent is sufficient to enhance the horse's performance. Administering the "milkshake" by syringe, as Respondent said he would do, would not violate Petitioner's rule against tubing a horse. Administering the "milkshake" by syringe, as Respondent said he would do, would constitute the administration of a medication within twenty-four hours of a race in violation of Section 550.2415(8), Florida Statutes. The Thursday referred to in the conversation is May 27, 1993, the day that Yankee Roughneck was next scheduled to race. On May 27, 1993, Dr. Michael Carinda, a veterinarian who was in practice with Respondent, brought a "milkshake" to Yankee Roughneck's stable. A groom thereafter administered the milkshake to Yankee Roughneck in the manner described by Respondent. Yankee Roughneck placed third in his race, but he ran slightly slower than he had in his previous race. The evidence did not establish that Respondent agreed to "milkshake" the horse You've Got The Time within twenty-four hours of a race.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order that adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained herein. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's Final Order find Respondent not guilty of the offenses alleged in Counts One, Four, Five, and Six of the Amended Administrative Complaint. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's Final Order find Respondent guilty of the offenses alleged in Counts Two and Three, suspend Respondent's occupational license for a period of one year, and assess against Respondent an administrative fine in the amount of $2,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of December 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-5993 The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 20, 21, 26, and 30 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 11 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order and are rejected in part as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, and 46 are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 36 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 40 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order, but are rejected in part as being argument that is subordinate to the findings made. The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 11, and 15 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 5 and 8 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The composition of the concoction referred to as a "milkshake" was described in the Amended Administrative Complaint and was established at the formal hearing. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 6 are rejected as being contrary to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 7 are subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 8, 12, and 13 are rejected as being argument. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 9 and 10 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached or as being contrary to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 14 and 16 are rejected as being argument that is contrary to the conclusions reached or to the findings made. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard A. Grumberg, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Karen C. Amlong, Esquire William Amlong, Esquire Amlong and Amlong 500 Northeast 4th Street, 2nd Floor Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Dr. Paul R. Plante 1450 Southwest Third Street Pompano Beach, Florida 33069 William E. Tabor, Director Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Jack McRay, Acting General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Florida Administrative Code Rules 61D-6.007 and/or 61D-6.012 constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioners, Charles L. McClellan and Natasha Nemeth, hold suspended Pari-Mutuel Wagering Individual Occupational Licenses that authorize them to train racing greyhounds. As licensees, Petitioners are subject to the provisions of chapter 550, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated thereunder, specifically chapter 61D-6. The Division is a state agency delegated the responsibility for the implementation and enforcement of Florida’s pari-mutuel laws under chapter 550, including the licensing and regulation of all pari-mutuel activities in the state. As licensees subject to disciplinary action by the Division, Petitioners have standing to bring this action. Section 550.2415(1)(a), Florida Statutes, prohibits the racing of an animal that has been impermissibly medicated or determined to have a prohibited substance in its system. To enforce section 550.2415, Division employees collect urine samples from racing greyhounds at the track prior to the greyhounds’ race. Fla. Admin. Code R. 61D-6.005(2). These samples are secured and shipped to the University of Florida Racing Laboratory (“UF Lab”) to be tested for impermissible substances. The Division and the UF Lab have entered into a contract pursuant to which the UF Lab conducts the drug testing analysis for all of the urine samples collected from racing animals at pari-mutuel tracks in Florida. At all relevant times, each of the Petitioners was working as the trainer of record for racing greyhounds in the Jacksonville area. The Division collected urine samples from Petitioners’ greyhounds and sent them to the UF Lab for testing. The UF Lab tested the urine samples and reported a total of 24 drug positives for benzoylecgonine (“BZE”) and/or ecgonine methyl ester (“EME”), both of which are metabolites of cocaine. Margaret Wilding, associate director of the UF Lab, testified that the lab currently reports as “positive” any reading for cocaine metabolites at or above 10 nanograms per milliliter (“ng/mL”), the UF Lab’s current limit of quantification. The Division filed Administrative Complaints against Petitioners alleging that they were the trainers of record for racing greyhounds whose urine was collected, tested, and found to contain BZE and/or EME. The proposed penalty would be imposed pursuant to rule 61D-6.012. Those complaints were referred to DOAH and are being held in abeyance pending the outcome of this proceeding.1/ Section 550.2415(1) provides, in relevant part: The racing of an animal that has been impermissibly medicated or determined to have a prohibited substance present is prohibited. It is a violation of this section for a person to impermissibly medicate an animal or for an animal to have a prohibited substance present resulting in a positive test for such medications or substances based on samples taken from the animal before or immediately after the racing of that animal. . . . It is a violation of this section for a race-day specimen to contain a level of a naturally occurring substance which exceeds normal physiological concentrations. The division may solicit input from the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services and adopt rules that specify normal physiological concentrations of naturally occurring substances in the natural untreated animal and rules that specify acceptable levels of environmental contaminants and trace levels of substances in test samples. The finding of a prohibited substance in a race-day specimen constitutes prima facie evidence that the substance was administered and was carried in the body of the animal while participating in the race. Section 550.2415(2) provides that the Division may take administrative action against an occupational licensee “responsible pursuant to rule of the division for the condition of an animal that has been impermissibly medicated or drugged in violation of this section.” Rule 61D-6.002(1) provides that the trainer of record “shall be responsible for and be the absolute insurer of the condition of the . . . racing greyhounds” that he or she enters in a race.2/ Section 550.2415(7) provides as follows: (7)(a) In order to protect the safety and welfare of racing animals and the integrity of the races in which the animals participate, the division shall adopt rules establishing the conditions of use and maximum concentrations of medications, drugs, and naturally occurring substances identified in the Controlled Therapeutic Medication Schedule, Version 2.1, revised April 17, 2014, adopted by the Association of Racing Commissioners International, Inc. [referenced herein as the ARCI Medication Schedule].[3/] Controlled therapeutic medications include only the specific medications and concentrations allowed in biological samples which have been approved by the Association of Racing Commissioners International, Inc., as controlled therapeutic medications. The division rules must designate the appropriate biological specimens by which the administration of medications, drugs, and naturally occurring substances is monitored and must determine the testing methodologies, including measurement uncertainties, for screening such specimens to confirm the presence of medications, drugs, and naturally occurring substances. The division rules must include a classification system for drugs and substances and a corresponding penalty schedule for violations which incorporates the Uniform Classification Guidelines for Foreign Substances, Version 8.0, revised December 2014, by the Association of Racing Commissioners International, Inc. [referenced herein as the ARCI Guidelines].[4/] The division shall adopt laboratory screening limits approved by the Association of Racing Commissioners International, Inc., for drugs and medications that are not included as controlled therapeutic medications, the presence of which in a sample may result in a violation of this section. The division rules must include conditions for the use of furosemide to treat exercise-induced pulmonary hemorrhage. The division may solicit input from the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services in adopting the rules required under this subsection. Such rules must be adopted before January 1, 2016. This section does not prohibit the use of vitamins, minerals, or naturally occurring substances so long as none exceeds the normal physiological concentration in a race-day specimen. Section 550.2415 does not define “medication,” “impermissibly medicated,” “prohibited substance,” “drug,” “naturally occurring substance,” “environmental contaminant,” or “laboratory screening limits,” except by reference to publications issued by the Association of Racing Commissioners International, Inc. (“ARCI”). ARCI is the umbrella organization of the official governing bodies for professional horse and greyhound racing in the United States. ARCI sets standards for racing regulation, medication policy, drug testing laboratories, and other matters pertaining to racing for participating jurisdictions. The ARCI “Uniform Classification Guidelines for Foreign Substances and Recommended Penalties and Model Rule” (“ARCI Guidelines”) are intended to assist stewards, hearing officers, and racing commissioners in evaluating the seriousness of alleged violations of medication and prohibited substance rules in racing jurisdictions. The ARCI Guidelines employ a “Drug Classification Scheme” based on pharmacology, drug use patterns, and the appropriateness of a drug for use in the racing animal.5/ Drugs that are known to be potent stimulants or depressants are placed in higher classes, while those that have (or would be expected to have) little effect on the outcome of a race are placed in lower classes. Drugs that are clearly not intended for use in racing animals are placed in higher classes, particularly if they may affect the outcome of a race. The ARCI Guidelines do not set screening limits or testing thresholds for any of the listed substances. The ARCI Guidelines classify cocaine and/or its metabolites as “Class 1 drugs” which are defined as: [S]timulant and depressant drugs that have the highest potential to affect performance and that have no generally accepted medical use in the racing horse. Many of these agents are Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) schedule II substances. These include the following drugs and their metabolites: Opiates, opium derivatives, synthetic opioids, and psychoactive drugs, amphetamines and amphetamine-like drugs as well as related drugs. . . . The ARCI Guidelines state that Class 1 drugs “have no generally accepted medical use in the racing horse and their pharmacologic potential for altering the performance of a racing horse is very high.” Rule 61D-6.007, titled “Permitted Medications for Racing Greyhounds,” provides as follows: The following medications are permitted to be administered to racing greyhounds in the dosages and under the conditions listed below: The administration of testosterone or testosterone-like substances, when used for the control of estrus in female racing greyhounds, is permitted, subject to the following conditions: Track veterinarians may administer injectable testosterone on the grounds of the permitholder to female racing greyhounds for the control of estrus. Kennel owners may use their regular Florida licensed veterinarian or may enter into a collective agreement for the services of a Florida licensed veterinarian to administer injectable testosterone to female racing greyhounds for the control of estrus. The administration of oral testosterone shall be permitted provided it is validly prescribed and properly labeled. Veterinarians that administer injectable or oral testosterone shall be responsible for maintaining security, inventory, and a retrievable records/log in accordance with the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) regulations pertaining to a Schedule III drug under the federal Controlled Substances Act and shall be accountable for all syringes and needles used therewith and their disposal in accordance with approved biomedical hazardous waste methods. Sulfa drug(s) is/are permitted to be administered to a racing greyhound providing: The racing greyhound is under the care of a veterinarian currently licensed pursuant to Chapters 474 and 550, Florida Statutes; and The sulfa drug(s) is/are prescribed by a veterinarian currently licensed pursuant to Chapters 474 and 550, Florida Statutes; and The sulfa drug(s) is/are not administered within 24 hours prior to the officially scheduled post time of the race. The following permitted medications shall not be reported by the racing laboratory to the division as a violation of Section 550.2415, F.S.: The detection of caffeine at a urinary concentration less than or equal to 200 nanograms per milliliter; The detection of theophylline and theobromine at a urinary concentration less than or equal to 400 nanograms per milliliter; The detection of procaine at a urinary concentration less than or equal to 2 micrograms per milliliter; and The detection of flunixin at a urinary concentration less than or equal to 250 nanograms per milliliter. All prescription medication, regardless of method of administration, shall be safeguarded under lock and key when not being actively administered. Rule 61D-6.012, titled “Penalty Guidelines for Class I-V Drug Violations in Greyhounds,” provides as follows: The penalties in this rule shall be imposed when the Division finds that the following substances have been identified by the state laboratory in a urine sample or blood sample collected from a greyhound participating in a pari-mutuel event: (a) Any drug or medication that: Is not approved for veterinary use in the United States by the Food and Drug Administration; Cannot be detected by the state laboratory in a urine or blood sample unless the medication was administered within 24 hours of the race; or Is detected in urine or blood concentrations that indicate a level of dosage that would constitute a threat to the health and safety of the greyhound. First violation of this chapter Any subsequent violation of this chapter $1,000 to $2,500 fine and suspension of license zero to one year, or revocation of license; $2,500 to $5,000 fine and revocation of license. The penalty for any medication or drug which is not described in subsection (1) above shall be based upon the classification of the medication or drug found in the Uniform Classification Guidelines for Foreign Substances, revised December 2014, as promulgated by the Association of Racing Commissioners International, Inc., which is hereby incorporated and adopted by reference, https://www.flrules.org/Gateway/ reference.asp?No=Ref-06400. A copy of this document may be obtained at www.myfloridalicense.com/dbpr/pmw or by contacting the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, 2601 Blair Stone Road, Tallahassee, Florida 32399. The penalty schedule shall be as follows: Class I substances: First violation of this chapter $500 to $1,000 fine and suspension of license zero to one year, or revocation of license; Any subsequent violation of this chapter $1,000 to $5,000 fine and suspension of license no less than one year, or revocation of license. Class II substances: First violation of this chapter $100 to $1,000 fine and suspension of license zero to 30 days; Second violation of this chapter $250 to $1,000 fine and suspension of license no less than 30 days, or revocation of license; Third violation or any subsequent violation of this chapter $500 to $1,000 fine and suspension of license no less than 60 days, or revocation of license. Class III substances: First violation of this chapter $50 to $500 fine; Second violation of this chapter Third violation or any subsequent violation of this chapter $150 to $750 fine and suspension of license zero to 30 days; $250 to $1,000 fine and suspension of license zero to 60 days. Class IV or V substances: First violation of this chapter $50 to $250 fine; Second violation of this chapter Third or subsequent violation of this chapter $100 to $500 fine; $200 to $1,000 fine and suspension of license zero to 30 days. The Division may consider mitigation or aggravation to deviate from these penalty guidelines. Circumstances which may be considered for the purposes of mitigation or aggravation of any penalty shall include the following: The impact of the offense to the integrity of the pari-mutuel industry. The danger to the public and/or racing animals. The number of repetitions of offenses. The time periods between offenses. The number of complaints filed against the licensee or permitholder, which have resulted in prior discipline. The length of time the licensee or permitholder has practiced. The deterrent effect of the penalty imposed. Any efforts at rehabilitation. Any other mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Absent mitigating circumstances, the division judge or the division shall order the return of any purse, prize, or award from any pari-mutuel event for redistribution when a postive test for a drug or medication described in paragraphs (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c), (2)(a), or (2)(b) is reported by the state laboratory and confirmed through the hearing process. The judges or the division shall specify in writing the reasons for requiring the return of any purse, prize, or award for redistribution when the positive test of a drug or medication reported by the state laboratory is not described in paragraphs (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c), (2)(a), or (2)(b) of this rule. Nothing in this rule modifies the provisions of Rule 61D-6.008 or 61D-3.002, F.A.C., or rules promulgated under Section 550.2415, F.S. Count II of the Petition alleges that the challenged rules arbitrarily and capriciously fail to address environmental contamination of racing greyhound urine samples. It also alleges that the rules deprive racing greyhound trainers of due process, are vague in that they fail to establish adequate standards for agency decisions, and vest unbridled discretion in the agency. Finally, it alleges that the rules exceed and contravene the Division’s delegated legislative authority. Petitioners point out that section 550.2415(1)(b) acknowledges the presence of “naturally occurring substances” and “environmental contaminants” in an animal. The statute authorizes the Division to adopt rules that specify “normal physiological concentrations” of naturally occurring substances and that specify acceptable levels of environmental contaminants. Petitioners also observe that section 550.2415(7)(c) requires the Division to adopt rules that include a classification system for “drugs and substances” and a corresponding penalty schedule for violations in accordance with the ARCI Guidelines. The Division is also required to adopt ARCI-approved “laboratory screening limits” for drugs and medications that are not classified as controlled therapeutic medications. Petitioners note that, despite the statutory language, rule 61D-6.007 provides screening limits for only a few foreign substances. The rule addresses permitted administrations of testosterone and sulfa drugs to racing greyhounds and provides screening limits for caffeine, theophylline, procaine, and flunixin. Petitioners contend that this list is inconsistent with the ARCI Medication Schedule, which lists 26 medications and their recommended screening limits for the urine samples of racing animals. Petitioners further note that rule 61D-6.012 establishes a penalty schedule that incorporates the ARCI Guidelines without regard to the amount of the substance found in the urine sample. The Division counters that its rule follows the ARCI Guidelines, which do not contain laboratory screening limits (or thresholds) for cocaine, BZE, or EME. Cocaine, BZE, and EME are also not identified within the ARCI Medication Schedule. The Division reads the exclusions of laboratory screening limits for cocaine as evidencing ARCI’s “zero tolerance policy” for the presence of cocaine and its metabolites in the race-day sample of a racing animal. Rule 61D-6.012 incorporates the ARCI Guidelines and therefore the same “zero tolerance policy” for the presence of cocaine, BZE, and EME that the Division presumes, both the ARCI Guidelines and ARCI Medication Schedule recommend. However, the only laboratory screening limits found in any of the ARCI materials are those related to the 26 “controlled therapeutic medications” listed in the ARCI Medication Schedule. The ARCI Guidelines list approximately 750 “drugs/substances” and contain screening limits for none of them. Thus, the Division’s point about “zero tolerance” for cocaine based on the ARCI documents could be made as to several hundred other drugs/substances, including several items for which the Division’s own rule 6D-6.007(3) establishes screening limits well above zero.6/ The ARCI Schedule recommends that cocaine, almost alone among Class 1 drugs,7/ be given a “Class B” penalty rather than the typical “Class A” penalty. The ARCI-recommended Class B penalty for a licensed trainer’s first offense is a minimum 15-day suspension and $500 fine, absent mitigating circumstances. The presence of aggravating factors can increase the penalty to a 60-day suspension and a fine of $1,000. In contrast, the ARCI-recommended Class A penalty for a first offense is a minimum one-year suspension and minimum fine of $10,000. Aggravating factors can increase the Class A penalty to a three-year suspension and a fine of $25,000. The lesser recommended penalty indicates that if ARCI has singled out cocaine, it has been for more lenient treatment, and not for harsher treatment than for other Class 1 drugs. Dr. Cynthia Cole is a veterinarian and pharmacologist, who acted as the director of the UF Lab from 2003 to 2006. Dr. Cole testified that BZE and EME are “naturally occurring substances,” in the strict sense that they are metabolites of cocaine and would be naturally produced by any animal that has ingested cocaine. Dr. Cole also conceded that levels of cocaine below 100 (ng/mL) would be very unlikely to have any effect on a racing animal’s performance, and that such low levels could be the result of environmental contamination. Of the 24 positive tests cited against Petitioners, the highest concentration of a cocaine metabolite was 36.5 ng/mL. Even that appeared to be an outlier, as most of the concentrations were in the range of 10 to 15 ng/mL. Dr. Thomas Tobin, a veterinarian, pharmacologist, and toxicologist, testified that trace amounts of cocaine are present virtually everywhere in North American human society. Dr. Tobin stated that less than 50 ng/mL of urinary BZE is indicative of nothing more than that the subject lives in North America. Dr. Tobin testified that a very small concentration of cocaine metabolites in the urine is likely attributable to environmental contamination. Dr. Tobin stated that when the concentration is below pharmacological significance, it should not be called a positive. He noted that in human drug testing, a sample is first screened at 150 ng/mL and then confirmed at 100 ng/mL, at which point it is reported as positive. Dr. Tobin could think of no scientific reason why there should be a regulatory reporting threshold for humans but not for racing animals. Cocaine is rapidly absorbed and metabolized, and may enter a dog’s body through the mouth, the mucous membranes, or through the skin. Dr. Tobin opined that the very small concentrations of cocaine metabolites found in Petitioners’ greyhounds suggest exposure to the drug via touch, soon before the urine sample was taken. He found this significant because of the manner in which urine is collected from racing greyhounds in Florida. Shortly before the first race begins for each 15-race card, greyhound trainers customarily arrive at the track detention facility with their greyhounds for weigh-in. The trainers then leave their greyhounds in the care of track personnel. Between weigh-in and the end of a greyhound's race, the dog has no physical contact with its trainer, while it has extensive contact with track personnel. After weigh-in, and approximately 30 minutes before the first race begins, track personnel identified as "lead- outs," take the greyhounds into a locked area called a "ginny pit." Track personnel supervise the dogs in this area; trainers and owners are not allowed to be present. The urine sampling of a racing greyhound takes place just prior to the greyhound's scheduled race. Depending on when a greyhound is scheduled to race, its urine may be sampled several hours after its last contact with its trainer. Veterinarian assistants employed by the Division catch racing greyhounds' urine during the sampling process. The Division does not drug-test its veterinarian assistants. David Tiffany is the quality assurance manager for the UF Lab. Mr. Tiffany testified in agreement with Ms. Wilding that the UF Lab’s current limit of quantification for cocaine, also called a “decision limit” or “cut-off,” is 10 ng/mL. Mr. Tiffany uses the term “cut-off” to describe the detection level at which the lab has informally decided not to expend the effort required to establish the quantity of a substance at a lower level. Mr. Tiffany stated that the UF Lab is able to detect cocaine down to 5 ng/mL, and that this “limit of detection”--the smallest concentration of a substance that can be confidently identified by a testing methodology--is one factor in determining the limit of quantification. He testified that several factors influence the ability to confidently see a drug all the way down to its limit of detection, including “noise” (other compounds) in the sample, and whether the testing instrument is in need of service and recalibration. Mr. Tiffany wrote the UF Lab’s procedures for determining measurement uncertainty. He explained that multiple measurements of an item yield small variations. The degree of that variation is the “precision of measurement.” The lab looks at various factors that affect the variation and sets a range of measurement uncertainty, i.e., the probability that the measurement for a certain substance will fall between an upper and a lower limit. Mr. Tiffany stated that the common level of a range is a 95-percent probability that the value of the sample is within the range. The standard format is to state the concentration of the substance, plus or minus the value of the range of measurement uncertainty. Mr. Tiffany testified that the UF Lab calculates and attaches to its report a measurement of uncertainty only when dealing with a “threshold drug,” meaning a drug for which a statute or rule sets an allowable level. For such drugs, the lab must be certain that the entire range of variation sits above the threshold. If the value of the measurement minus the measurement of uncertainty still exceeds the threshold, the lab calls it a positive finding. The UF Lab does not report a measurement of uncertainty for cocaine and its metabolites because no rule or statute sets a threshold for cocaine. Mr. Tiffany stated that a measurement of uncertainty is not needed to detect the mere presence of a substance, as opposed to making a precise measurement of the quantity of that substance. The lab can determine that something is present without giving it a number. Mr. Tiffany testified that the UF Lab used to simply report the qualitative results of its tests for cocaine, but that the Division then would ask whether there was a lot or a little cocaine in the sample. As an aid to the Division, the lab began reporting quantitative results for cocaine, with the proviso that the reported amounts were estimates. At some point, the lab began restricting its “positive” reports for cocaine metabolites to those results that met or exceeded the lab’s limit of quantification, 10 ng/mL. Ms. Wilding and Mr. Tiffany resisted calling this 10 ng/mL line a “threshold” because a “threshold” is an allowable level of a substance established by statute or rule. However, as a practical matter, the Division has allowed the limit of quantification for cocaine metabolites to act as a threshold for taking action against a licensee. If the Division’s policy were actually “zero tolerance,” it would require the UF Lab to report cocaine down to its limit of detection and would discipline licensees accordingly. In either event, the laboratory screening limit should be reflected in the Division’s rules, as required by section 550.2415(7)(c). It was never explained at the hearing how the UF Lab knows which drugs are “threshold” drugs for purposes of reporting positive results to the Division. The Division’s annual report includes a listing of positive drug tests for the previous fiscal year. Apart from cocaine and its metabolites, the drugs found in the positive drug tests for fiscal years 2014-2015 and 2015-2016 were: acepromazine metabolite; methylprednisolone; amphetamine; betamethasone; caffeine; theophylline; theobromine; clenbuterol; dexamethasone; methocarbamol; phenylbutazone; 5-hydroxy dantrolene; despropionyl fentanyl; xylazine; dextrorphan; dimethyl sulfoxide; firocoxib; flunixin; ketoprofen; glycopyrrolate; ibuprofen; isoflupredone; methylprednisolone; triamcinolone acetonide; ketoprofen; lidocaine; 3-hydroxy lidocaine; mepivacaine; 3-hydroxy mepivacaine; omeprazole sulfide; oxycodone; oxymorphone; procaine; testosterone; nandrolone; boldenone; carprofen; isoxsuprine; naproxen; and zipaterol. Apart from caffeine, theophylline, theobromine, procaine, and flunixin, the Division’s rules (and the record of this proceeding) are silent as to the laboratory screening limits for these drugs. There appear to be three possibilities: the Division informally provided the UF Lab with a screening limit for these drugs; the Division instructed the UF Lab to report positive tests down to the limit of detection, i.e., “zero tolerance,” for these drugs; or the UF Lab was allowed to set its own “screening limit” by way of its limit of quantification, as Mr. Tiffany testified has been done for cocaine. However, the Division offered no evidence in support of any of the possibilities. Mr. Tiffany testified that measurements of uncertainty vary between labs and can change within a single lab upon review of the methodologies and current equipment. Mr. Tiffany testified that there is no technical reason why the UF Lab could not report measurement uncertainties for BZE and EME if the Division requested that information. He believed that adopting the current UF Lab’s measurement of uncertainty in a Division rule would become a “false restriction on the data,” as it would become a limitation on the lab’s ability to lower the uncertainty measurement with new equipment and techniques.8/ Several jurisdictions have established screening limits for BZE in racehorses. New Mexico, Ohio, Illinois, and Oklahoma prohibit disciplinary action unless the test sample results exceed 150 ng/mL. The state of Washington has set the screening limit at 50 ng/mL. Illinois and Oklahoma refer to BZE under the heading “environmental contaminants.” New Mexico references BZE under the heading “environmental contaminants and substances of human use.” Washington lists BZE under the heading “environmental substances.” Petitioners contend that the Division has effectively delegated to the UF Lab the setting of a threshold or screening limit for cocaine and its metabolites. The UF Lab’s limit of quantification operates as the screening limit for disciplinary action taken by the Division, and is subject to change whenever the lab alters its equipment or methods. In support of their contention, Petitioners point out that in 2014, the UF Lab employed a more sensitive testing technology than it currently uses, which resulted in the prosecution of a greyhound trainer whose dog’s urine yielded only 3.7 ng/mL of BZE. Petitioners argue that this 2014 case demonstrates that the lab’s limit of quantification serves as a de facto substitute for the screening limits that section 550.2415(7)(c) requires the Division to adopt by rule.9/ The evidence fully supports Petitioners’ argument on this point. In summary, section 550.2415(7) places several mandatory rulemaking requirements on the Division. Paragraph (a) expressly directs the Division to adopt rules establishing the conditions of use and maximum concentrations of “medications, drugs, and naturally occurring substances” identified in the ARCI Medication Schedule, to ensure “the safety and welfare of racing animals.” “Controlled therapeutic medications” are limited to those medications and allowable concentrations as identified and approved by ARCI. The Division has not implemented this directive as to greyhounds. Rule 61D-6.007(3) prescribes allowable dosages for caffeine, theophylline, theobromine, procaine, and flunixin, of which only flunixin is listed in the ARCI Medication Schedule. The ARCI Medication Schedule lists dosage thresholds, withdrawal guidelines and dosing specifications for 26 “controlled therapeutic medications.” The ARCI Guidelines include caffeine (Drug Class 2, Penalty Class B), theophylline (Drug Class 3, Penalty Class B), theobromine (Drug Class 4, Penalty Class B), and procaine (Drug Class 3, Penalty Class B).10/ In its Proposed Final Order, the Division argues, for the first time, that the ARCI Medication Schedule does not apply to greyhounds at all. It concedes that section 550.2415(7)(a) mandates the adoption of rules establishing thresholds for medications, drugs, and naturally occurring substances identified in the ARCI Medication Schedule, but argues that this provision applies only to racehorses. The Division has adopted rule 61D-6.008, applying the ARCI Medication Schedule to horses, but has not done so for greyhounds.11/ The Division’s assertion is not supported by the statute. In fact, section 550.2415(7)(a) is not limited to horses but expressly states that it applies to “racing animals.” The only textual support of any kind the Division offers is the assertion that the full title of the ARCI Medication Schedule is “ARCI Controlled Therapeutic Medication Schedule for Horses-- Version 2.1.” The copy of the ARCI Medication Schedule entered into evidence in this proceeding does not contain the words “for Horses,” or any language excluding greyhounds. Even if the ARCI Medication Schedule were limited to horses, the same point could be made as to the ARCI Guidelines, the classification definitions of which describe the impact of the listed drugs on “the racing horse.” The Division makes much of the fact that the word “greyhound” does not even appear in the ARCI Medication Schedule; neither does the word occur in the ARCI Guidelines. The record evidence in no way supports the Division’s contention that the statute’s provisions as to the ARCI Medication Schedule are inapplicable to greyhounds. Section 550.2415(7)(b) expressly directs the Division to adopt rules that designate the appropriate biological specimens for testing and that “determine the testing methodologies, including measurement uncertainties, for screening such specimens” for medications, drugs, and naturally occurring substances. (emphasis added). The Division has not implemented this directive. As set forth in the above Findings of Fact, the Division has left it to the UF Lab to establish measurement uncertainties. The UF Lab determines measurement uncertainties only for threshold substances, and these measurement uncertainties change over time. While the Division offered a cogent and reasonable explanation as to why it makes sense for the UF Lab to set measurement uncertainties, the statute does not give the Division discretion to entirely delegate this responsibility to another entity. The Division’s rules must determine the testing methodologies, including measurement uncertainties, not hand off that determination to a laboratory. The Division’s rules must make this determination for all “medications, drugs, and naturally occurring substances” that are screened by the lab, not only those substances it and/or the UF Lab deem “threshold” substances.12/ Section 550.2415(7)(c) expressly directs the Division to adopt rules that include a classification system for “drugs and substances” and a corresponding penalty schedule for violations. The classification system and penalty schedules must incorporate the ARCI Guidelines. The Division has implemented this requirement in rule 61D-6.012(2), which expressly adopts the classifications of the ARCI Guidelines and sets forth penalties based on the ARCI classifications. However, section 550.2415(7)(c) also expressly directs the Division to adopt rules that include laboratory screening limits approved by ARCI for drugs and medications that are not included in ARCI’s Medication Schedule as “controlled therapeutic medications.” The statute states that the presence of such drugs and medications in a sample “may result in a violation of this section.” The Division has not implemented this requirement. The ARCI Guidelines do not approve laboratory screening limits for drugs and medications other than “controlled therapeutic medications.” The Division has argued that the lack of screening limits for cocaine and its metabolites is evidence that ARCI supports a “zero tolerance” policy for cocaine. However, the same argument would apply to any of several hundred substances listed in the ARCI Guidelines that are not also listed as “controlled therapeutic medications” in the ARCI Medication Schedule. The Division has offered no principled distinction between cocaine and, for example, caffeine. Caffeine also appears in the ARCI Guidelines, with the same recommended penalty as cocaine. The ARCI Guidelines prescribe no screening limit for caffeine. Caffeine is not a controlled therapeutic medication. By the Division’s stated rationale, caffeine should be a “zero tolerance” substance. However, rule 61D-6.007(3)(a) allows up to 200 ng/mL of caffeine in the urine before the lab must report the finding to the Division. It could be objected that caffeine is merely a Class 2 drug, unlike cocaine, which is Class 1 and has no generally accepted medical use in racing animals. However, rule 61D- 6.012(2) provides penalties for substances all the way down to Class 5. If there were a “zero tolerance” policy for caffeine, a prosecution for a Class 2 substance violation could result in a $1,000 fine and a 30-day suspension. Fla. Admin. Code R. 61D- 6.012(2)(b). The point remains that neither the Division’s rule nor the Division’s arguments at hearing articulate a principled distinction as to which substances the Division will, in practice,13/ treat with a “zero tolerance” policy. The literal terms of the laboratory screening limits portion of section 550.2415(7)(c) require the Division to obtain ARCI’s approval of a list of laboratory screening limits for drugs and medications that are not included as controlled therapeutic medications. Despite the mandatory language of the statute, nothing in the record suggests that the Division has made any effort to implement this provision, either by submitting a list to ARCI or even by making an inquiry to ARCI as to whether it would consider such a submission. Rather, the Division has passively chosen to interpret the lack of ARCI- approved laboratory screening limits as endorsing a “zero tolerance” policy for all ARCI Guideline substances not included in the ARCI Medication Schedule. It is patently arbitrary for the Division to use the lack of screening limits as an opportunity to pick cocaine from among 700-plus substances in the ARCI Guidelines for “zero tolerance” treatment. Some distinguishing principle must be articulated to separate cocaine from the other substances in the ARCI Guidelines, given the lack of evidence that the Division in fact treats all drugs and substances that are not on the ARCI Medication Schedule with a “zero tolerance” policy. The Division could eliminate this ambiguity by following its statutory directive to adopt a rule setting laboratory screening limits for drugs and medications that are not included as controlled therapeutic medications. Section 550.2415(1) includes some permissive rulemaking actions that the Division may choose to take. Paragraph (1)(b) provides that the Division may solicit input from the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services and may adopt rules that specify “normal physiological concentrations of naturally occurring substances in the natural untreated animal.” The Division also may adopt rules that specify acceptable levels of environmental contaminants and trace levels of substances in test samples. Several other states have chosen to treat BZE as an environmental contaminant and to set acceptable concentration levels for the drug in the system of a racing animal. This practice appears sensible and consistent with the accepted science, but the statute does not require the Division to follow it. However, the Division fails to adopt rules at its own enforcement peril.14/ In its Proposed Final Order, the Division uses paragraph (1)(b) to defend its failure to adopt thresholds for cocaine and its metabolites, arguing that the statute is permissive as to adopting rules that establish screening limits for environmental contaminants such as cocaine. Throughout the hearing, the Division resisted the notion that BZE or EME are environmental contaminants, and thus its late embrace of that categorization is somewhat disingenuous. In any event, the Division fails to read paragraph (1)(b) in its entirety. The first sentence provides: “It is a violation of this section for a race-day specimen to contain a level of a naturally occurring substance which exceeds normal physiological concentrations.” To find a violation, the Division must first determine what level of a naturally occurring substance is excessive. Due process for the licensee requires no less. The Division fails to explain how it can enforce the quoted prohibition without a rule that specifies “acceptable levels of environmental contaminants and trace levels of substances in test samples.” However, the permissive language of the statute gives the Division discretion to avoid such an explanation until it attempts to enforce the prohibition. A rule is not required. Finally, the Division attempts to justify its failure to establish screening limits by reference to section 550.2415(13), which provides: The division may implement by rule medication levels for racing greyhounds recommended by the University of Florida College of Veterinary Medicine developed pursuant to an agreement between the Division of Pari-mutuel Wagering and the University of Florida College of Veterinary Medicine. The University of Florida College of Veterinary Medicine may provide written notification to the division that it has completed research or review on a particular drug pursuant to the agreement and when the College of Veterinary Medicine has completed a final report of its findings, conclusions, and recommendations to the division. The Division argues that subsection (13) means that any medication levels adopted in the Division’s rules must be based on a recommendation from the UF Lab, and that the UF Lab has not recommended a threshold for cocaine or its metabolites. The Division argues that it would be an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority to adopt any threshold for racing greyhounds without a recommendation from the UF Lab. This argument is not well taken. Subsection (13) does not refer narrowly to the UF Lab but to the University of Florida College of Veterinary Medicine (“College”). The statute contemplates a contract between the Division and the College under which the College would use its medical knowledge to recommend “medication levels for racing greyhounds.” There is at least an implication that a medical opinion beyond the laboratory testing expertise of the UF Lab is contemplated. Also, subsection (13) is entirely permissive. It allows the Division to implement by rule medication levels recommended by the College, should the Division and the College choose to enter into a contract for that purpose. If the Division’s argument were accepted, then it could evade any responsibility for adopting rules by the simple expedient of never entering a contract with the College. In fact, nothing in the language of subsection (13) exempts the Division from the mandatory rulemaking requirements of subsection (7).
The Issue The Petitioner has accused the Respondent, Frank Rudolph Solimena, with a violation of Rule 7E-1.06(11)(a) Florida Administrative Code, which reads: "The running of a horse in a race with any narcotic, stimulant, depressant or local anesthetic is prohibited. If the stewards shall find that any narcotic, stimulant, depressant or local anesthetic has been administered or attempted to be administered, internally or externally, to a horse before a race, such stewards shall impose such punishment and take such other action as they may deem proper under any of the rules, including reference to the Division, against every person found by them to have admini- stered, or to have attempted to administer, or to have caused to be administered, or to have caused an attempt to administer, or to have conspired with another person to administer, such narcotic, stimulant, depressant or local anesthetic. If the Division laboratory shall find a positive identification of such medication, such finding shall constitute prima facie evidence that such horse raced with the medication in its system." Under the accusation, the Respondent is made responsible pursuant to the provisions of Rule 7E-1.18(3), Florida Administrative Code, referred to herein as the absolute insurer's rule, which provides that: "The trainer shall be responsible for, and be the insurer of the condition of the horses he enters. Trainers are presumed to know the rules of the Division." Specifically, Respondent Solimena is accused under facts that allege that during the period from October 6 through October 30, 1978 horses trained by the Respondent were entered and ran in five separate races at Calder race course. Subsequent to each race a urine specimen was taken from each horse and that each specimen was analyzed by the Petitioner's laboratory. It is further alleged that the Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering laboratory reported the results of the tests and that each report showed that each urine sample contained Despropionyl Fentanyl, which is classified as a derivative of Fentanyl, a narcotic compound.
Findings Of Fact This cause comes on for consideration based upon a Notice to Show Cause (Administrative Complaint) filed by the Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, against Frank Rudolph Solimena. At all times pertinent to the Notice to Show Cause, Frank Rudolph Solimena was the holder of license Nos. K-00257 and K-00863, issued by the Petitioner to the Respondent, Frank Rudolph Solimena, enabling Solimena to operate as horse trainer and horse owner, respectively, at the several race tracks located in the State of Florida. The Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, is an agency of the State of Florida charged with the duty of the regulation of, among other things, the matters pertaining to thoroughbred horse racing in the State of Florida. The authority for such regulation is found in Chapter 550, Florida Statutes, and those rules promulgated to enforce the provisions of that chapter. Within that body of rules, are Rules 7E-1.06(11)(a) and 7E-1.18(3), Florida Administrative code, alluded to in the issues statement of this Recommended Order. Those rules as set out in the issues statement shall serve as a basis for determining the facts and reaching the legal conclusions necessary to formulate a decision in this matter and official recognition is taken of the aforementioned rules. The facts in this case show that the Respondent, Frank Rudolph Solimena, was acting as a horse trainer on October 6, 1978, at the Calder Race Course in Broward County, Florida. On that date, Myth Master, a horse trained by the Respondent, ran in the second race and finished in second position. Following the race, and on the same date, a urine specimen was taken from the horse, Myth Master. That urine specimen was subsequently analyzed through a series of tests and the test directed to the urine sample revealed a positive identification of a substance known as Despropionyl Fentanyl, which is classified as a derivative of Fentanyl, a narcotic. The process which occurred in Myth Master after he received the Fentanyl, was that the Fentanyl was metabolized in the horse's system to become Despropionyl Fentanyl, and that latter substance acted as a central nervous system stimulant in the horse during the course of the race. The narcotic Fentanyl, carries the trade name, Sublimaze. The facts in this case show that the Respondent, Frank Rudolph Solimena, was acting as a horse trainer on October 13, 1978, at the Calder Race Course in Broward County, Florida. On that date, Turbine Powered, a horse trained by the Respondent, ran in the fourth race and finished in second place. Following the race, and on the same date, a urine specimen was taken from the horse, Turbine Powered. That urine specimen was subsequently analyzed through a series of tests and the test directed to the urine sample revealed a positive identification of a substance known as Despropionyl Fentanyl, which is classified as a derivative of Fentanyl, a narcotic. The process which occurred in Turbine Powered after he received the Fentanyl, was that the Fentanyl was metabolized in the horse's system to become Despropionyl Fentanyl, and that latter substance acted as a central nervous system stimulant in the horse during the course of the race. The narcotic Fentanyl, carries the trade name, Sublimaze. The facts in this case show that the Respondent, Frank Rudolph Solimena, was acting as a horse trainer on October 26, 1978, at the Calder Race Course in Broward County, Florida. On that date, Myth Master, a horse trained by the Respondent, ran in the tenth race and finished in second place. Following the race, and on the same date, a urine specimen was taken from the horse, Myth Master. That urine specimen was subsequently analyzed through a series of tests and the test directed to the urine sample revealed a positive identification of a substance known as Despropionyl Fentanyl, which is classified as a derivative of Fentanyl, a narcotic. The process which occurred in Myth Master after he received the Fentanyl, was that that Fentanyl was metabolized in the horse's system to become Despropionyl Fentanyl, and that latter substances acted as a central nervous system stimulant in the horse during the course of the race. The narcotic, Fentanyl, carries the trade name, Sublimaze. The facts in this case show that the Respondent, Frank Rudolph Solimena, was acting as a horse trainer on October 28, 1978, at the Calder Race Course in Broward County, Florida. On that date, Ladrillazo, a horse trained by the Respondent, ran in the sixth race and finished in first place. Following the race, and on the same date, a urine specimen was taken from the horse, Ladrillazo. That urine specimen was subsequently analyzed through a series of tests and the test directed to the urine sample revealed a positive identification of a substance known as Despropionyl Fentanyl, which is classified as a derivative of Fentanyl, a narcotic. The process which occurred in Ladrillazo after he received the Fentanyl, was that that Fentanyl was metabolized in the horse's system to become Despropionyl Fentanyl, and that latter substances acted as a central nervous system stimulant in the horse during the course of the race. The narcotic, Fentanyl, carries the trade name, Sublimaze. The facts in this case show that the Respondent, Frank Rudolph Solimena, was acting as a horse trainer on October 30, 1978, at the Calder Race Course in Broward County, Florida. On that date, Triple Rhythm, a horse trained by the Respondent, ran in the eighth race and finished in second place. Following the race, and on the same date, a urine specimen was taken from the horse, Triple Rhythm. That urine specimen was subsequently analyzed through a series of tests and the test directed to the urine sample revealed a positive identification of a substance known as Despropionyl Fentanyl, which is classified as a derivative of Fentanyl, a narcotic. The process which occurred in Triple Rhythm after he received the Fentanyl, was that that Fentanyl was metabolized in the horse's system to become Despropionyl Fentanyl, and that latter substances acted as a central nervous system stimulant in the horse during the course of the race. The narcotic, Fentanyl, carries the trade name, Sublimaze. Each of the horses referred to above was under the care and treatment of Carl J. Meyer, D.V.M., on the dates of the races in question. In addition to treating the horses that are the subject to this complaint, Dr. Meyer had treated other horses for which the Respondent was the trainer, beginning in 1976 and continuing through October of 1978. One of the conditions for which the disputed horses reportedly received treatment was a condition described by Dr. Meyer as Myopathy, and this treatment form was administered to each of the questioned horses on the date of the disputed race event. According to dr. Meyer, Myopathy is a treatment for muscle soreness and is a type of acupuncture in which needles are injected at pressure points over the sore muscles and authorized medications are injected into those muscle areas, to include ACTH, Steroids and Lasix. When the Respondent received one of the billing statements from Dr. Meyer which indicated that horses that were being trained by the Respondent had been treated for Myopathy, the Respondent inquired of Dr. Meyer what Myopathy treatments consisted of. Dr. Meyer replied that you take a needle and put in certain pressure points in the muscle to relieve bursitis and/or pressure. When questioned in the course of the hearing about further details of the treatment for Myopathy, Dr. Meyer was unable to give a satisfactory explanation of the origins of the treatment for Myopathy and literature related to that treatment which might have been published through research in veterinary medicine. Within the same time frame that Dr. Meyer claimed to be treating the subject horses for Myopathy, he had purchased the substance, Sublimaze, and by his testimony stated that this narcotic had been used on horses other than those involved in this accusation. The use in the unrelated group of horses was as a pre-anesthetic agent and to treat colic conditions. He claimed to use 10 milligrams as a pre-anesthetic dose and as much as 25 milligrams over a period of time to control the colic condition. The utilization of Sublimaze as a pre-anesthetic agent and for treatment for colic was disputed in the course of the hearing by the testimony of Dr. George Maylin, D.V.M., who also has a Ph.D. in pharmacology. At the time Dr. Maylin gave his testimony, he was an associate professor of toxicology at the New York State College of Veterinary Medicine, Cornell University, Ithica, New York. Dr. Maylin has done extensive research on the effect of Sublimaze as a pre-anesthetic agent and concludes that it is not a predictable anesthetic agent, and that a 10 milligram dosage would not have a desired effect in its use as a pre-anesthetic agent. In dr. Maylin's opinion, 50 milligrams would be the indicated amount. In addition, Dr. Maylins' testing of Sublimaze in a colic model situation pointed out the ineffectiveness of Sublimaze as an analgesic in those colic cases. Finally, Dr. Maylin does not believe that 25 milligrams of Sublimaze over an extended period of time could be effective in treating the colic condition. Other trainers had horses which had been treated by Dr. Meyer around the same time period as those horses of the Respondent, which are the subject of this hearing. Those trainers are Ohayneo Reyes and Edward E. Plesa. Both Reyes and Plesa questioned Dr. Meyer on the subject of Meyer injecting Sublimaze in their race horses. These questions were asked following accusations placed against those trainers for violations similar to those in the current case of the Respondent. The answers given to Reyes and Plesa by Dr. Meyer indicated that he had in fact injected the horses with Sublimaze, but he told them not to worry because the substance could not be detected. Dr. Meyer also testified in the coarse of the hearing that he had placed wagers on some of the horses being treated for Myopathy. An analysis of the evidence leads to the factual conclusion that Dr. Meyer infused each of the horses for which the Respondent stands accused through this Notice to Show Cause, with Sublimaze, otherwise identified as Fentanyl; and that he gave these injections under the guise of a treatment for Myopathy, when in fact the so-called treatment for Myopathy was a ruse to enable Dr. Meyer to administer the Sublimaze. Those acts by Dr. Meyer directed to the horses of the Respondent involved in this accusation, were unknown to the Respondent at the time the injections were administered and nothing that had transpired prior to those administrations placed the Respondent in the position of having reason to believe that Dr. Meyer was pursuing this course of conduct. In summary, although the horses in question ran in the subject races while under the effects of Fentanyl, metabolized to become Despropionyl Fentanyl, it was not through any acts of the Respondent.
Recommendation It is recommended that the action through the Notice to Show Cause against the Respondent, Frank Rudolph Solimena, be DISMISSED. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of August, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: W. S. Frates, Esquire Frates, Floyd, Pearson, Stewart, Richman & Greer, P.A. One Biscayne Tower, 25th Floor Miami, Florida 33131 David M. Maloney, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Joel S. Fass, Esquire Colodny and Fass 626 Northeast 124th Street North Miami, Florida 33181 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION DIVISION OF PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION, DIVISION OF PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 79-228 FRANK RUDOLPH SOLIMENA, Respondent. /
The Issue The two issues in this case are whether Respondent, as the trainer of record for two greyhounds; M's Shamrock, that first place finisher in the fourth race on November 7, 2001, and greyhound Lapislazuli, first place finisher in the fourteenth race on November 7, 2001, is legally responsible for the prohibited substance found in each greyhound's urine sample taken immediately after the races, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant and material to this proceeding, Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-mutuel Wagering (Division), created by Subsection 20.165(2)(f), Florida Statutes, is the agency responsible for regulation of the pari-mutuel wagering industry pursuant to Section 550.0251, Florida Statutes. At all times relevant and material to this proceeding, Respondent, Curtiss D. Hughes, was the holder of a pari-mutuel license issued by the Division. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club is a permit holder authorized to conduct greyhound racing and pari-mutuel wagering in the State of Florida. On November 7, 2001, Respondent was the trainer for a racing greyhound named M's Shamrock that finished first in the fourth race of the evening performance at Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club on that date. Immediately after each race the greyhounds who finish in the win, place and show positions are taken to the "cooling off" area where urine samples are taken by the Kennel's veterinarian assistant and urine sample collector. On November 7, 2001, Brandy Glaspey, veterinarian assistant, collected the urine sample of greyhound, M's Shamrock, and assigned, for identification purposes, number 738627 to M's Shamrock's urine sample. Urine sample 738627 was shipped to the University of Florida Racing Laboratory, Gainesville, Florida, where under the supervision of Dr. Ian R. Tebbett, Ph.D., professor and director of the racing laboratory at the University of Florida and qualified as an expert in forensic toxicology, it tested positive for illegal substance. On December 21, 2001, Respondent was the trainer for a racing greyhound named "Lapislazuli," which finished first in the fourteenth race of the matinee performance at Sanford- Orlando Kennel Club. Immediately after the race a urine sample was collected from Lapislazuli by Brandy Glaspey, veterinarian assistant, and assigned sample number 788210 for identification purposes. Urine sample numbered 788210 was shipped to the University of Florida Racing Laboratory, tested, and found to contain Benzoylecgonine, a metabolite of Cocaine. Cocaine is a Class 1 drug according to the Association of Racing Commissioners International classification system. Respondent testified that he did not administer the drug cocaine to greyhound, Lapislazuli, and he had never been cited for any prior drug violation while holding a Florida occupational license. Respondent's defense to the administrative complaint (Election of Right) alleged a possible breach of the "chain of custody" (from the end of the race, to bringing dogs to the ginny pit, to sample collection, to sample labeling, to sample examination and sample results) and a breach and/or lack of kennel security. There was no material evidence presented of a specific breach of security.
The Issue Whether Rule 61D-6.002(1), Florida Administrative Code, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Hennessey is the holder of an unrestricted U-1 Professional Pari-mutuel License authorizing him to train horses, which license is issued to Hennessey by the Department pursuant to the provisions of Section 550.105, Florida Statutes. Hennessey was charged in a hearing before the Stewards at Pompano Park with violating the provisions of Section 550.2415, Florida Statutes, regarding an impermissible drug found in a race horse entered to race by Hennessey. The disciplinary action was initiated by the Stewards against Hennessey after a post-race urine sample taken from a horse trained by Hennessey won a race at Pompano Park indicated the presence of two substances, caffeine and theophylline, a metabolite of caffeine. Hennessey testified at the hearing before the Stewards that he neither administered nor directed anyone to administer caffeine to the subject horse. Application of Rule 61D-6.002, Florida Administrative Code, makes Hennessey strictly liable for impermissible drugs found in horses he enters to race at pari-mutuel wagering facilities in the State of Florida. No evidence of willful administration of caffeine by Hennessey is known to exist. Warren is the holder of an unrestricted U-1 Professional Pari-mutuel License, License Number 0024037-1081, authorizing him to train horses. The license was issued to Warren by the Department pursuant to the provisions of Section 550.105, Florida Statutes. Warren was the trainer of record of a thoroughbred horse named "The Issue is Power," which won the fifth race conducted on November 12, 1999, in Miami, Florida, at the Tropical Park at Calder Race Meeting. After the race concluded, a urine sample, sample number 540322, was taken from "The Issue is Power" at the detention facility operated by the Department. Sample number 540322 was tested by the University of Florida Racing Laboratory, and that sample was found to contain benzoylecgonine, which is a metabolite of cocaine. The estimated concentration of benzoylecgonine was 50 to 54 nanograms per milliliter. Testing of sample number 540322 did not show the presence of egonine methyl ester, which is another metabolite of cocaine. Warren denies that he knowingly or intentionally administered cocaine to the horse "The Issue is Power" at any time. Application of Rule 61D-6.002, Florida Administrative Code, makes Warren strictly liable for impermissible drugs found in horses he enters at pari-mutuel wagering facilities in the State of Florida. No evidence of willful administration of cocaine by Warren is known to exist. Ms. Gangemi, is the holder of an unrestricted U-1 Professional Pari-mutuel License, License Number 0257328-1081, authorizing her to train horses. The license was issued to Ms. Gangemi, by the Department pursuant to the provisions of Section 550.105, Florida Statutes. Ms. Gangemi was the trainer of record of a thoroughbred horse named "Quanchotaug," which finished third in the ninth race race of the matinee performance conducted on July 11, 2000, in Miami, Florida, at Calder Race Course, Inc. After the race concluded a urine sample, sample number 658542, was taken from "Quanchotaug" at the detention facility operated by the Department. Sample number 658542 was tested by the University of Florida Racing Laboratory, and that sample was found to contain benzoylecgonine. The estimated concentration of benzoylecgonine was 10 nanograms per milliliter. A split sample analysis performed by the Center For Tox Services, an independent laboratory in Tempe, Arizona, confirmed the presence of benzoylecgonine in sample number 658542. The estimated concentration of benzoylecgonine was 2 nanograms per milliliter. Application of Rule 61D-6.002, Florida Administrative Code, makes Ms. Gangemi strictly liable for impermissible drugs found in horses she enters to race at pari-mutuel wagering facilities in the State of Florida. No evidence of willful administration of cocaine by Ms. Gangemi is known to exist. Testing of sample 658542 did not show the presence of egonine methyl ester. The administration or exposure of cocaine directly into the post-race urine sample of a horse could result in the presence of the metabolite benzoylecgonine. Pompano Park is authorized to conduct pari-mutuel wagering upon harness horse racing pursuant to a permit issued to it by the Department under Section 550.054, Florida Statutes. Tropical Park is authorized to conduct pari-mutuel wagering upon thoroughbred horse racing pursuant to a permit issued to it by the Department under Section 550.054, Florida Statutes. Calder Race Course is authorized to conduct pari-mutuel wagering upon thoroughbred horse racing pursuant to a permit issued to it by the Department pursuant to Section 550.054, Florida Statutes. Horse racing, at its best, is difficult to control, and would be practically impossible to regulate if every governing rule and regulation were made dependent for validity upon the knowledge or motives of the person charged with a violation. It would be almost impossible to prove guilty knowledge or intent in cases involving a reported positive test for an impermissible substance. Every consideration surrounding the business of operating a race track, and the racing of horses thereon, seems to call for firm and rigid rules placing responsibility and imposing penalties for their violation. The Department currently has six investigators assigned to cover 35 permitholders. The investigators are well known around the various race tracks they cover, which makes catching possible drug violations in the act almost impossible. The Department's investigators are generally notified of a drug confirmation about ten days after a race has been run. Given that there are so few investigators covering 35 tracks and the reports are received ten days after a race, it would be very difficult to successfully determine who administered a prohibited substance to a horse. The trainer is singularly the best individual to hold accountable for the condition of a horse. The trainer is either going to be with the horse at all times or one of his or her employees or contractors is going to be with the horse at all times, whether the horse is racing on an individual day or is merely stabled at the track. A trainer of racing horses is responsible for the animals' athletic conditioning. A trainer is also responsible for providing for the regular care of the horses he trains, including feeding and seeing to the medical needs of the horses. All persons who handle an animal prior to the running of a race are either employees of the track or Department or are employed by or in a professional relationship with the trainer. At no time prior to a race is a trainer or his employer prohibited from seeing to the security of the horse in the paddock. While there are other persons who come in contact with the horse prior to a race, the trainer due to his responsibility for the care and supervision of the animal stands in the best overall position to prevent improper medication of the horse. There is no practical alternative to holding the trainer of record responsible for the condition of the animals he enters to race. The Department's authority to require the return of a purse is insufficient to deter wrongdoers from attempting to affect the outcome of a race. The integrity of the pari-mutuel industry would suffer from the Department's inability to enforce statutes relating to the drugging of racing animals.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with the duty of regulating, among other things, the harness horse racing industry in the State of Florida. On November 28, 1979, Charles Federman, holder of pari-mutuel trainer's license L-25378, trained and entered the standardbred horse, Hanker Chief, in the ninth race at Pompano Park in Florida, where Tourist Attractions, Inc., is licensed by the Florida Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering to conduct horse racing. The horse ran in the race and won. Following the race a urine specimen was taken from the horse by Division personnel. Following collection, the sample, was sealed and was placed in a locked refrigerator in the office of the detention barn where the samples are customarily stored until transportation to the Division laboratory. A card bearing number 56969 was filled out, and the top of the card bearing the same number was taped to the sample. The bottom of the card, also bearing the number 56969 was filled out by the collector of the sample to contain information pertinent to where, when, by whom, and from what horse the sample was taken. The sample was picked up at the detention barn by Division personnel and transported to the Division laboratory. The sample was analyzed by personnel at the Division laboratory by means of seven thin layer chromotographies, gas chromotography, and mass spectrometry. These analyses corresponded precisely with analyses by identical tests of a standard derived from Stadol, a drug marketed by Bristol Laboratories whose active ingredient is "butorphanol". Accordingly, it is specifically concluded that the facts of record in this proceeding support the conclusion that the laboratory analyses performed by Division personnel were accurate, and that those analyses establish a positive identification of "butorphanol" to have been contained in the urine specimen taken from Respondent's horse following the ninth race on November 28, 1979. Butorphanol is marketed as a salt, butorphanol tartrate, under the brand name Stadol, by Bristol Laboratories. Butorphanol is a narcotic with potent analgesic properties approximately equivalent to that of morphine, although its exact mechanism is unknown. Butorphanol acts as a "depressant", in that two milligrams depresses respiration to a degree equal to ten milligrams of morphine, but also has "stimulant" effects on the cardiovascular system. Butorphanol is not recommended for humans physically dependent on narcotics because it has a physical dependence liability, although admittedly low. In horses, butorphanol acts as an analgesic and, depending on dosage, it either depresses or stimulates a horse. The drug would be of use in harness racing for its potent pain killing effects if a horse were sore or lame, or for its depressant effects if a horse were high-strung and likely to break its gait. The smallest dosage of Stadol marketed by Bristol Laboratories is a 1 milliliter vial containing 1 milligram of butorphanol. In the smallest administrable injection, butorphanol produces narcotic effects. Respondent was present on November 15, 1979, at a meeting of all drivers held before the start of the meet during which the offense charged occurred. At that meeting, Division personnel announced to all drivers and trainers in attendance that Stadol was a prohibited substance and was not to be used. Drivers are required to attend meetings such as that held on November 15, 1979, meetings under the harness racing Rules. See, Rule 7E-4.21 (8), Florida Administrative Code. Respondent holds a driver's/trainer's license. In addition, notices were posted around the track advising that the use of Stadol was prohibited. In particular, such a notice was posted in the Racing Secretary's office where every horseman must go to eater a horse in a race. On the day of the race in question Respondent allowed a person identified by him as "Dr. Rites" to examine and treat Hanker Chief for a sore leg which had been causing the horse to limp. During the treatment, "Dr. Rites" gave the horse injections, which the Respondent understood to be Lasix and a "pain killer". "Dr. Ritos" was not, at that time, licensed by the Division as a veterinarian as required by Rule 7E-4.31(7), Florida Administrative Code. The parties to this proceeding each submitted proposed findings of fact for consideration by the Hearing Officer. To the extent that those proposed findings of fact have not been included in this order, they have been rejected as being either irrelevant to the issues involved in this proceeding, or as not having been supported by evidence of record.
The Issue The issue for disposition in this case is whether proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 61D-6.0052 (Proposed Rule) is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority as defined in section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida for-profit corporation operating at the Palm Beach Kennel Club (PBKC) in West Palm Beach, Florida. Petitioner’s members are owners of greyhounds that are raced at the PBKC. Of the 12 greyhound kennels that operate at PBKC, nine are current members of Petitioner. Petitioner’s members each hold licenses issued by the Division pursuant to chapter 550, Florida Statutes. Some of the PBKC kennel owners are themselves licensed greyhound trainers, and some employ licensed trainers. Petitioner’s Articles of Incorporation establish its purposes as including the promotion of “the welfare and care of greyhounds, . . . including, but not limited to, . . . promoting fair regulatory treatment of the greyhound industry.” The Division is the state agency charged with regulating pari-mutuel wagering activities in Florida pursuant to chapter 550. The Proposed Rule The full text of the Proposed Rule is as follows: 61D-6.0052 Procedures for Collecting Samples from Racing Greyhounds Designating Greyhounds for Sampling: Any greyhound the judges, division, track veterinarian, or authorized division representatives designate, shall be sent immediately prior to the race to the detention enclosure for examination by an authorized representative of the division for the taking of urine and/or other such samples as shall be directed for the monitoring and detection of both permissible and impermissible substances. When possible, a sample should be collected from two (2) greyhounds per race. When possible, greyhounds from more than one participating kennel should be sampled per performance. Additional greyhounds may also be sampled if designated by the judges, division, track veterinarian, or authorized division representatives. Collection of Samples: Urine and/or other samples shall be collected by an authorized representative of the division in an unused sample container supplied by the division, or its agent. Authorized representatives of the division shall wear unused gloves supplied by the division, or its agent, during sample collection until the sample container is sealed with its lid. Authorized representatives of the division shall use a sample card with a unique identifier to record the date of sample collection and the identification tattoo, microchip or name of the greyhound sampled or attempted to be sampled. The owner, trainer of record, or other authorized person is permitted to witness when the sample is collected from their greyhound. Failure of an owner, trainer of record or other authorized person to witness and/or sign the sample card shall not preclude the division from proceeding with sample analysis. Sealing and Labeling of Samples: As soon as possible after a sample is collected, the sample container shall be sealed with its lid. The sample container shall be labeled with the sample card’s unique identifier. Evidence tape shall be placed over both the sample container and lid on at least two sides. The authorized representative of the division that sealed the sample container shall initial the evidence tape on the sample container. Storing and Shipping of Samples: The samples shall be stored in a lockable freezer or container in a restricted area accessible by only authorized representatives of the division until the time of shipment. Upon the completion of packing the samples for shipment, the shipping container shall be locked. All appropriate forms for shipment shall be completed and included with the shipment to ensure correct delivery and identification of the contents. The samples shall be shipped to the laboratory under contract with the division for testing of the samples via the laboratory’s contracted common carrier. Authority of the Division: The division investigator or other authorized representative is authorized to confiscate any legend or proprietary drugs, medications, unlabeled medication, medication with altered labels, medicinal compounds (natural or synthetic) or other materials which are found on the grounds of greyhound race tracks and kennel compounds or in the possession of any person participating in or connected with greyhound racing, including veterinarians and trainers, and which are suspected of containing improper legend or proprietary drugs, medications, medicinal compounds (natural or synthetic) or other materials which are illegal or impermissible under these rules. Such legend or proprietary drugs, medications, unlabeled medication, medication with altered labels, medicinal compounds (natural or synthetic) or other materials shall be delivered to the laboratory under contract with the division for analysis. The division is authorized to confiscate any evidence that an illegal or impermissible legend or proprietary drug, medication, or medicinal compound (natural or synthetic) may have been administered to a racing animal. It is a violation of these rules for a licensee to threaten to interfere, actually interfere or prevent the taking of urine, blood, saliva or other samples authorized by Chapter 550, F.S. For such a violation, the division may impose any disciplinary penalties authorized by Chapter 550, F.S., or the rules promulgated thereunder. Rulemaking Authority 120.80(4)(a), 550.0251(3), 550.2415(12), (13) FS. Law Implemented 120.80(4)(a), 550.0251, 550.1155, 550.2415 FS. History–New . Issues for Disposition Section 120.56(2)(a) provides that “the agency has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed rule is not an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority as to the objections raised.” The “objections raised” as identified in the Joint Pre- hearing Stipulation are those that remain for disposition in this proceeding, with issues not preserved having been waived. See Palm Beach Polo Holdings, Inc. v. Broward Marine, Inc., 174 So. 3d 1037 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). As set forth in the recitation of “Petitioner’s Position,” the following issues are at issue: The proposed rule refers to urine and/or other samples in its text, yet only contains procedures for urine collection; The proposed rule fails to adequately detail necessary chain of custody procedures for sampling racing greyhounds; The proposed rule ignores basic scientific principles as to contamination; The proposed rule ignores basic scientific principles as to the timing of sampling; The proposed rule ignores basic scientific principles as to the temperature of a sample; The proposed rule fails to provide trainers and owners of an opportunity to witness their greyhounds' sampling; The proposed rule grants too much discretion to Respondent; Respondent failed to follow the applicable rulemaking procedures set forth in chapter 120; The proposed rule does not limit its application to urine; Stipulated Facts The following facts were stipulated by the parties: It is possible that a racing greyhound could become exposed to environmental substances during the time between the trainer relinquishing it at the track and the sampling. The reason that racing greyhounds are tattooed is for identification purposes. It is important to prevent contamination of a racing greyhound's sample. It is important to preserve the integrity of a racing greyhound's sample. The Proposed Rule does not require racing greyhound samples to be stored frozen. However, subsection (4)(a) of the Proposed Rule requires that the samples are stored in a lockable freezer or container. The Proposed Rule does not require that the racing greyhound samples be kept refrigerated. However, subsection (4)(a) of the Proposed Rule requires that samples be stored in a lockable freezer or container. The Proposed Rule does not contain any provisions for the drawing of blood, "other specimens," or other fluids from the racing greyhound. The Proposed Rule does not describe how all the individuals involved in the chain of custody of a racing greyhound sample record their involvement. The Proposed Rule contains a section entitled "Sealing and Labeling of Samples." The Proposed Rule does not describe the chain of custody for the taking of "other specimens" from the racing greyhound. The Proposed Rule does not describe the chain of custody procedures associated with materials confiscated under paragraph five of the Proposed Rule. Respondent published its Notice of Development of Rulemaking for Proposed Rule 61D-6.0052, F.A.C. (Notice of Development), on January 22, 2018. Respondent published its Notice of Proposed Rule 61D- 6.0052, F.A.C. (Notice of Proposed Rule), on January 29, 2018. Respondent's Notice of Proposed Rule 61D-6.0052, F.A.C., indicated it was approved by the agency head, Jonathan Zachem, on January 26, 2018, a mere [four] days after publication of Respondent's Notice of Development of Rulemaking for Proposed Rule 61D-6.0052, F.A.C. On February 6, 2018, a rule development workshop was requested for Proposed Rule 61D-6.0052, F.A.C. Respondent did not hold a rule development workshop for Proposed Rule 61D-6.0052, F.A.C. Respondent did not provide an explanation in writing as to why a workshop was unnecessary for Proposed Rule 61D-6.0052, F.A.C., other than Bryan A. Barber's letter of February 13, 2018. Facts Adduced at Hearing The purpose and effect of the Notice of Development was “to further clarify and describe the procedures performed by the Division in collecting samples from greyhounds and to create a rule specific to the greyhound sample collection. The Notice of Proposed Rule did not contain a statement of estimated regulatory costs imposed on small businesses. On February 6, 2018, Petitioner, through its representative, sent a letter to the Division requesting a rule development workshop. On February 13, 2018, the Division noted that the “rule development phase” ended with the publication of the Notice of Proposed Rule, and the request for a workshop was, therefore, untimely. There is no evidence that anyone provided the Division with information regarding a statement of estimated regulatory costs, or provided the Division with a proposal for a lower cost regulatory alternative. No one requested that a public hearing be held on the Proposed Rule. Racing greyhounds are delivered to the track by their owners or trainers prior to the commencement of their race card. Greyhounds racing during the matinee card are delivered at one time, and greyhounds racing during the evening card are delivered at a later time. The greyhounds are all weighed in about 60 to 90 minutes prior to the first race, regardless of the race in which a particular greyhound is scheduled to appear. After weigh-in, the greyhounds are handed over to the “lead-outs,” who are track employees, and taken to the ginny pit. Each greyhound is then placed in a numbered cage designating its race and position, and held there until its race is scheduled to commence. From the time an animal is given over to the lead-outs until its race is over, they are out of the control and sight of the owners and trainers. For greyhounds racing in the last race of a card, that period can be well in excess of four hours. Prior to each race, the race judge, Division, track veterinarian, or “authorized division representative” designates the greyhounds to be tested for that race. The process was not described, other than as described in the rule that “[w]hen possible, a sample should be collected from two (2) greyhounds per race. When possible, greyhounds from more than one participating kennel should be sampled per performance.” Mr. Ehrhardt testified that “ideally it’s blind and that you just pick one at random,” and that dogs from separate kennels be selected “to ensure that no one is singled out.” However, the Proposed Rule contains no criteria for the selection of an animal other than its being in the race. Even a requirement that the selection be random, and a mandatory selection of different kennels be made “when possible,” is sufficient to preclude an unfettered exercise of discretion in the selection of the greyhound. As it is, the selection of both dogs and kennels is completely within the discretion of the Division. Upon selection, the greyhounds are led to an open area to relieve themselves. At the Orange Park Kennel Club, the area is a restricted access grass and sand area surrounded by a chain link fence. There was no evidence as to other tracks, but there is little to suggest that the areas at other tracks are dissimilar. The process of collecting the sample involves watching the dog for a sign that it is ready to urinate, and then holding a plastic cup at the end of a stick, an “armed doohickey” as described by Mr. Ehrhardt, under the dog until it produces a sample. The sampler wears fresh gloves and uses an unused cup. When the sample is collected, the sampler places the lid on the container, labels the container, and places evidence tape “over both the sample container and lid on at least two sides.” After the sample cup is capped, labeled, and sealed, it is placed in a “lockable freezer or container in a restricted area.” Mr. Ehrhardt indicated that it was the Division’s intent that the freezer or container should be locked at all times that it is not being accessed to place samples in it, and that it should not be left unlocked. However, the plain language of the rule suggests otherwise. The lockable container is to be in a restricted area, but is only required to be locked “[u]pon completion of the packing of the samples for shipment.” Dr. Tobin testified that samples must be kept frozen or, at a minimum, refrigerated. Mr. Ehrhardt testified that once a sample is collected, it goes “straight to the freezer,” suggesting that freezing is the preferred method of storage. Failure to do so can result in degradation of the sample, bacterial growth, and, in certain cases, breakdown of substances into metabolites that would more closely mimic a prohibited substance in a dog’s urine. Petitioner argued that the timing of the sampling is problematic for another reason, other than the holding period for the greyhounds. Many owners and trainers have more than one dog racing during a card. The ginny pit and the finish line are at different ends of the track. Therefore, a trainer or owner may be collecting their dog(s) at the conclusion of a race at the same time the pre-race sample is being taken for the next race, making observation of the sampling difficult from a practical perspective. However, both Mr. Agganis and Mr. Chin acknowledged that there was nothing to directly prevent an owner or trainer from observing the sampling. Furthermore, there is nothing to prevent the owner or trainer, or even Petitioner’s members collectively, from having an employee or agent witness the sampling on their behalf, since the rule allows “[t]he owner, trainer of record, or other authorized person” to witness the sampling. In no fewer than 10 places in the Proposed Rule, actions are authorized to be taken by an “authorized representative” of the Division, or an “other authorized person.” The Proposed Rule does not identify who those representatives or persons might be, or how they may come to be authorized. Mr. Ehrhardt testified that the purpose of the less definitive description was “to figure out a way to make the rule flexible,” to meet the possibility that a “job title is going to change.” During Mr. Ehrhardt’s visit to the Orange Park greyhound racing facility, he was allowed into the restricted ginny pit area by “authorized personnel from the division,” who he described as “veterinarian assistants, chief inspector, investigators, people like that.” Petitioner objected to the lack of specificity because it provided no assurances that these individuals are competent, or held to any particular standard.
The Issue The issue presented herein concerns whether or not Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner, Michael Brown, on the basis of his race.
Findings Of Fact At the outset of the hearing herein, Respondents moved to dismiss the Petition herein based on a claimed lack of jurisdiction over the Respondents because of Petitioner's failure to allege that the Respondents were employers within the meaning of Section 760.02(6), Florida Statutes. Additionally, Respondent, William B. Bryant Company, alleged that the Petition was untimely in that it was not filed within 180 days of the occurrence of the alleged unlawful employment practice as set forth in Rule 22T-9.01(2), Florida Administrative Code. Respondent, William B. Bryant Company, introduced payroll records for all times relevant herein. 1/ An examination of those records reveals that Respondent William B. Bryant Company has not employed 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year. Based thereon, Respondent William B. Bryant Company is not an employer within the meaning of the Human Rights Act of 1977, as amended. Section 23.162(6) and 23.167(10), Florida Statutes (1981). Additionally, an examination of the Station Agreement entered into by and between Greyhound Lines, Inc., a California corporation with offices at 431 Greyhound Tower, Phoenix, Arizona, and William Boyd Bryant, d/b/a William B. Bryant Company, which has a contractual agreement to provide services at Respondent Greyhound Lines, Inc., Ocala, Florida terminal, is not an employer of either Michael Brown, Petitioner, or William B. Bryant Company. Based thereon, it is determined that Respondent Greyhound Lines, Inc. is not an employer of Petitioner within the The meaning of the Human Rights Act of 1977, as amended. Sections 23.162(6) and 23.167(1), Florida Statutes (1981).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petition filed herein. RECOMMENDED this 21st day of June, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of June, 1984.
