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FLORIDA ENGINEERS MANAGEMENT CORPORATION vs W. R. COVER, P. E., 00-002615 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lakeland, Florida Jun. 27, 2000 Number: 00-002615 Latest Update: Dec. 26, 2024
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JUNE BHEBE vs SOUTH FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, 92-003101 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida May 20, 1992 Number: 92-003101 Latest Update: Jun. 24, 1993

Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, the following Findings of Fact are made: An Overview of Petitioner's Employment with the District Petitioner was employed by the District from June of 1988, until his termination, which was effective January 14, 1992. Prior to his termination he had an unblemished disciplinary record. Petitioner was initially hired by the District as a Construction Representative. In January of 1989, he assumed the duties of a Regulatory Professional I. He was promoted in 1990 to a Regulatory Professional II, a position he held until he was terminated. At the time of his termination, Petitioner had attained regular employee status inasmuch as he had successfully completed his probationary period. As a Regulatory Professional II, Petitioner was responsible for monitoring the public's compliance with the District's regulatory programs, a task that involved the exercise of considerable discretion with minimal supervision as well as frequent and substantial contact with citizens in his assigned territory, which covered all of Okeechobee and St. Lucie Counties and parts of Glades and Highlands Counties. Petitioner also supervised one subordinate employee, Donald Hagan, a Regulatory Professional I, who assisted Petitioner in his monitoring activities. Petitioner was assigned a District vehicle for official use during the workday. After hours, the vehicle was secured in the parking lot outside the District field station in Okeechobee where Petitioner was headquartered. Petitioner worked an eight-hour day. His normal work hours were 7:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., however, he occasionally deviated from this schedule when necessary to accommodate his workload. In addition to a lunch break, Petitioner was allowed to take two 15 minute work breaks during his eight-hour workday, one in the morning and one in the afternoon. He was permitted to take these breaks whether he was in the field station or out in the field. In September and most of October of 1991, Petitioner's immediate supervisor was Edward Maciejko. Maciejko was headquartered in West Palm Beach, approximately 60 to 65 miles from the Okeechobee field station out of which Petitioner worked. On October 23, 1991, Alan Goldstein became Petitioner's immediate supervisor. Goldstein's work station was located in Okeechobee approximately three miles from Petitioner's work station. Goldstein remained Petitioner's immediate supervisor until Petitioner's termination. The Employee Handbook The District has an Employee Handbook that is designed to provide information and guidance to District employees regarding employment-related matters. As do all new District employees, Petitioner received a copy of the Employee Handbook upon being hired and its contents were reviewed with him during his orientation. The Employee Handbook contains the District's Attendance and Leave Policy (Policy No. 300), which addresses the subjects of "normal work hours" and "work breaks" as follows: NORMAL WORK HOURS All full-time regular and initial probationary employees shall perform their assigned duties for 40 hours each work week unless otherwise authorized. All part-time regular and temporary employees shall perform their assigned duties for the total number of hours for which compensation is received. The normal workday shall be 8 hours unless otherwise authorized by the employee's Division Director. WORK BREAKS All District employees are provided one work break during the first half of their workday and one work break during the second half of their workday, except in extreme emergency. No single work break shall exceed 15 minutes. An employee is not permitted to accumulate unused work breaks nor may the work break be used to cover an employee's late arrival or early departure from duty. All employees shall take a minimum of one half hour lunch break each workday. The following discussion is found in the Employee Handbook concerning the "Code of Ethics:" Florida has been a leader among the states in establishing ethical standards for public officials and employees and recognizing the right of her people to protect the public trust against abuse. Our state constitution was revised in 1968 to require that (a)a code of ethics for all state employees and non-judicial officers prohibiting conflict between public duty and private interests shall be prescribed by law. Art III, Sec. 18, Fla. Constitution. The "Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees" by which the Legislature carried out this constitutional mandate is found in Chapter 112 (Part III) of the Florida Statutes. The purpose of the Code is to ensure that public officials and employees conduct themselves independently and impartially, not using their offices or positions for private gains other than remuneration provided by law and to avoid conflicts between public duties and private interest. . . . The standards of conduct summarized below generally apply to all District employees. The types of conduct prohibited are: Gifts- No public employee shall solicit or accept anything of value- including a gift, loan, reward, promise of future employment, favor, or service- that is based on any understanding that the vote, official action, or judgment of the employee would be influenced by such gift. Sec. 112.313(2), Fla. Stat. (1991). Unauthorized Compensation- No public employee or his/her spouse or minor child shall accept any compensation, payment or thing of value which, with the exercise of reasonable care, is known or should be known to influence the official action of such employee. Sec. 112.313(4), Fla. Stat. (1991). Doing Business with One's Agency- No public employee acting as a purchasing agent or acting in his/her official capacity shall, directly or indirectly, purchase, rent, or lease any realty, goods, or services from a business entity in which his/her spouse, or child is an officer, partner, director, or proprietor, or in which his/her spouse, or child (or any combination of them) has a material interest. Nor shall a public employee, acting in a private capacity, rent, lease, or sell any realty, goods or services to his/her own agency. Sec. 112.313(3), Fla. Stat. (1991). Conflicting Employment or Contractual Relationship- No public employee shall hold any employment or contractual relationship with any business entity or agency which is subject to the regulation of, or doing business with, the employee's agency. Nor shall an employee hold any employment or contractual relationship which will pose a recurring conflict between his/her private interests and his/her public duties or which would impede the full and faithful discharge of his/her duties. Sec. 112.313(7), Fla. Stat. (1991). Exemptions- Under certain circumstances the prohibitions of subsections (3) and (7) of Section 112.313, Florida Statutes, may not apply. Misuse of Public Position- No public employee shall corruptly use or attempt to use his/her official position or any property or resource within his/her trust, or perform his/her official duties, to obtain a special privilege, benefit or exemption for himself/ herself or others. Sec. 112.313(6), Fla. Stat. (1991). Disclosure or Use Of Certain Information- No public employee shall disclose or use information not available to the general public and gained by reason of his/her public position for his/her personal gain or benefit or the gain or benefit of others. Sec. 112.313(8), Fla. Stat.(1991). More specific ethics laws address financial disclosure and the reporting requirements which apply to Governing Board members, senior management, and employees with contracting authority. The above information has been provided to help you understand State Ethics Laws. The District supports and enforces these laws to the best of its ability and expects each employee to conduct their activities in a lawful manner. Conflicts of interest may be avoided by greater awareness of these Ethics Laws. If you are in doubt about the applicability of the ethics laws to your own circumstances or the circumstances of a subordinate or co-worker, contact the District's Office of Counsel. They will answer your questions or assist you in obtaining an opinion from the Commission on Ethics. Also included in the Employee Handbook is the District's Corrective Action Policy (Policy No. 803), which establishes standards governing non- executive employee conduct and discipline. Section F. of Policy No. 803 lists those acts of misconduct for which a non-executive District employee who has attained regular status may be disciplined. It provides in pertinent part as follows: The following forms of misconduct are unacceptable and subject an employee to corrective action based on the particular circumstances surrounding the incident. The list is provided merely as examples and is not intended to be all inclusive. The identification of these examples does not preclude the District's right to discipline or dismiss employees for other causes, including acts of misconduct which breach the requirements inherent in the employment relationship. 1. Unbecoming conduct: Any action or conduct by an employee which impedes the District's efforts, brings discredit on the District, impairs the operation or efficiency of the District or any employee, or impairs the employee's ability to perform his or her job. . . . 5. Absence Without Authorized Leave: Failure to obtain approval from the proper authority prior to any absence from work, except in the case of an emergency, illness or accident which requires the employee to be absent prior to receiving approval; Inexcusable or repeated failure to notify the appropriate Supervisor or division office of absence, due to sickness, within ten (10) minutes from the start of the normal work day; Being more than ten (10) minutes late to work for an inexcusable reason or on a repeated basis without notifying the appropriate Supervisor, or division office. . . . Unauthorized Use of District Property, Services, Equipment or Personnel: The use of any District property, services, equipment or personnel for any purpose other than District business. Employees shall be required to reimburse the District for the cost incurred by the District as a result of the unauthorized use of equipment or property. Improper or Careless Use of District Property, Including Vehicles: Failure to care for or properly use District property or equipment such as the failure to observe the proper speed limit while driving a District vehicle. . . . 11. Lying or Failure to Give Truthful or Requested Information: Oral or written statements that are deliberately inaccurate, incorrect or misleading but which do not constitute falsification of records. This includes lying or failure to provide information during an internal investigation. . . . 24. Violation or Disregard of Safety Practices: The failure to follow established safety practices as outlined in the District's Accident Prevention Manual. This includes failure to report any injury or accident; the performance of unsafe acts; or the failure to wear or use appropriate safety equipment. . . . Negligence: The failure to use ordinary or reasonable care, caution, attention, diligence or discretion in the performance of assigned duties and responsibilities. Falsification of a District Record: The intentional issuance of a false or incomplete report or record, either oral or written, or the intentional failure to issue a record regarding the performance of work duties, attendance, injury, illness, job qualifications or other work related matters. Policy No. 803 specifically provides for four basic types of "corrective action" to deal with acts of misconduct. They are, in order of severity: oral reprimand (OR); written reprimand (WR); suspension (S); and dismissal (D). In determining the appropriate "corrective action" to be taken in a particular situation, supervisory personnel must follow the "standards" set forth in Section G. of Policy No. 803, which provides as follows: This section has been established as a guide for use by Supervisors to help ensure that all employees receive similar treatment in like circumstances. The guidelines on severity of corrective action outlined in Section H. is not meant to be an exhaustive listing of all possible acts of misconduct or forms of corrective action. Appropriate corrective action of unlisted acts of misconduct may be derived by comparing the nature and seriousness of the offense to those listed in Section H. In many cases, the guidelines on severity of corrective action are based on the number of occurrences and the seriousness of the offense and are presented as a range of action which covers more than one form of corrective action. The use of a particular form of corrective action is not mandatory simply because it is listed in Section H. Realizing that some of the offenses listed will be more or less serious in certain cases, the supervisor taking the corrective action shall utilize good judgment in light of all available facts. The corrective action selected must ultimately be appropriate in light of the particular circumstances surrounding the incident and the employee's past performance and conduct record. For example, even for offenses where dismissal is not indicated for a first offense, dismissal on a first occurrence may be assessed for an aggravated offense or a continuous pattern of misconduct. Similarly, where dismissal is indicated, a less severe form of corrective action may be taken. This action may be taken so long as it is more severe than that given in the most recent prior occurrence that is still active, and is reasonably consistent with other cases of misconduct for other employees. Temporary and initial probationary employees may be suspended or dismissed without regard to the standards of corrective action. In determining the severity of corrective action to be applied, the authorized Supervisor should take into account the following variables: The severity of the specific act of misconduct. The circumstances under which the violation occurred. The consequences of the employee's actions in regard to its affect on the District operation and on other employees. The guidelines on severity of corrective action outlined in Section H. of this policy. The overall work record of the employee; length of employment; and the employee's prior history of other similar or unrelated corrective actions, including active and inactive offenses. The length of time since earlier corrective action, the similarity or dissimilarity of the offense, and the severity of earlier offenses. The following are among "the guidelines on severity of corrective action outlined in Section H." of Policy No. 803: 1. Unbecoming conduct: 1st occurrence- WR, S or D . . 5. Absence Without Authorized Leave (Does not affect scheduling or work of others): 1st occurrence- OR; 2nd occurrence- WR . . Unauthorized Use of District Property, Services, Equipment, or Personnel (With intent to obtain personal gain: 1) Cost to District of less than $50.00): 1st occurrence- S; 2nd occurrence- S or D; 3rd occurrence: D Unauthorized Use of District Property, Services, Equipment, or Personnel (With intent to obtain personal gain: 2) Cost to District of more than $50.00): 1st occurrence- S or D; 2nd occurrence- D Improper or Careless Use of District Property (Not involving personal injury or property damage): 1st occurrence: OR . . . 11. Lying or Failure to Give Truthful or Requested Information: 1st occurrence- WR or S; 2nd occurrence- S or D; 3rd occurrence- D . . . 24. Violation or Disregard of Safety Practices (Not involving personal injury or property damage): 1st occurrence- OR . . . Negligence (Not involving personal injury or property damage): 1st occurrence- OR . . . Falsification of District Record: 1st occurrence- S or D; 2nd occurrence- D The Accident and Related Events In the latter part of September of 1991, Petitioner's personal vehicle was in an automotive repair shop in Stuart. On September 17, 1991, at Petitioner's request, Donald Hagan, Petitioner's subordinate, drove Petitioner to the repair shop in Stuart, which was outside of their assigned territory, in a District vehicle. The purpose of the trip was to ascertain whether the repairs on Petitioner's personal vehicle had been completed. Upon his arrival at the repair shop, Petitioner was advised that the necessary parts had not come in and that therefore it would be another week until he would be able to pick up his vehicle. A week later, on September 24, 1991, at approximately 1:00 p.m., Hagan was in his District vehicle in the parking lot outside the Okeechobee field station when Petitioner walked up to him. Petitioner told Hagan that the repairs on Petitioner's personal vehicle had been completed. He then asked if Hagan would give him a ride to the repair shop in Stuart so that he could pick up the vehicle. Hagan responded in the affirmative. Petitioner thereupon entered Hagan's District vehicle and sat down in the front passenger seat. After Petitioner was situated, Hagan drove off, headed in the direction of the repair shop. Before reaching their destination, Hagan and Petitioner were involved in an automobile accident when Hagan lost control of the vehicle and it ended up in a ditch. The vehicle was damaged and it was towed to West Palm Beach for repairs. Hagan sustained two fractured ribs as a result of the accident. Petitioner was also injured, but not as seriously as Hagan. Both received medical treatment for their injuries. Hagan's and Petitioner's ill-fated trip did not have any District- related purpose. Nonetheless, following the accident, Petitioner reported otherwise, notwithstanding that he knew that he was providing false information to the District. On the night of the accident, he told his then immediate supervisor, Edward Maciejko, over the telephone that he and Hagan were on their way to conduct an inspection of distressed cypress trees in St. Lucie County when the accident occurred. Petitioner also prepared an accident report in which he made the same misrepresentation. A workers' compensation claim was filed on behalf of Petitioner in reliance upon this misrepresentation. Initially, Hagan corroborated Petitioner's story about the purpose of their September 24, 1991, trip. Later, however, he told supervisory personnel the truth about the matter. For his part in the incident and the subsequent cover-up, he was reprimanded and received a two-day suspension. On two occasions following Hagan's revelation regarding the true purpose of the trip, Petitioner was provided an opportunity by Alan Goldstein, who had recently become Petitioner's immediate supervisor and was looking into allegations of misconduct against Petitioner, to recant the statements he had previously made regarding the matter. Petitioner, however, declined to do so and instead repeated what he had said earlier on the subject. 2/ The Speeding Ticket and Related Events On October 3, 1991, while driving his District vehicle to a work- related meeting in Lake Placid, Florida, to which he did not want to be late, Petitioner was stopped by a Florida Highway Patrol trooper and given a traffic citation for travelling 84 miles per hour in a 55-mile per hour zone. Petitioner had exceeded the posted 55-mile per hour speed limit, but by less than the trooper indicated on the citation. Nonetheless, for convenience sake, Petitioner did not contest the citation. On the day he received the citation, Petitioner telephoned Edward Maciejko, who was still his immediate supervisor at the time, and told Maciejko that he had been "flagged down" by a trooper earlier that day while on his way to Lake Placid in his District vehicle. Subsequently, during an investigation of alleged wrongdoing on Petitioner's part conducted after Alan Goldstein, had become Petitioner's immediate supervisor, Goldstein asked Petitioner if he had informed Maciejko about the traffic citation he had received on October 3, 1991. Petitioner responded in the affirmative to this inquiry. To the best of his recollection, he had so informed Maciejko and therefore believed that he was being truthful in his response to Goldstein's inquiry. The Loan and Related Events Dry Lake Dairy (Dairy) is an Okeechobee dairy farm that has been owned and operated by the Rucks family since 1958. J. Boyd Rucks is President of the Dairy. As President, it is his responsibility to deal with governmental agencies that exercise regulatory authority over the Dairy and its operations. The District is one of these governmental agencies. In or sometime prior to 1990, the Dairy received a surface water management permit from the District. It subsequently obtained a modification to the permit to engage in a ditch clearing operation. In November of 1990, the District issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) alleging that the Dairy had violated the terms of its permit. Petitioner was actively involved in the investigation that led to the issuance of the NOV. Following the issuance of the NOV, it was his responsibility to make sure that the necessary steps were being taken by the Dairy to correct the problems identified in the NOV. At first, he visited the Dairy on a regular basis to monitor its compliance efforts. Thereafter, these regular visits ceased and his monitoring activities were confined to flying over the Dairy during his monthly aerial inspection of his territory. By the middle of October of 1991, the Dairy had made substantial progress toward correcting the violation with which it had been charged by the District, but the matter had not been finally resolved. 3/ At the time, Petitioner needed to borrow $500.00. Notwithstanding that the enforcement action against the Dairy, in which he played an integral role, was still ongoing, Petitioner ill-advisedly decided to approach the Dairy's President and its representative in its dealings with the District, J. Boyd Rucks, about loaning him the money. Petitioner knew Rucks through Petitioner's work with the District. Their relationship was purely a professional one. They did not socialize. While Rucks, on behalf of the Dairy, often made cash advances to its employees, neither he nor the Dairy was in the business of making loans to members of the general public. Never before had either of them made a loan to a District employee. At around noon on October 14, 1991, Petitioner was in his District vehicle on his way back from a field inspection when he stopped by Rucks' home and asked Rucks if he would lend Petitioner $500.00. Rucks told Petitioner that he would have to discuss the matter with other members of his family and that Petitioner should return later in the day for an answer. At around 3:30 or 4:00 p.m. that afternoon, Petitioner returned to Rucks' home in his District vehicle. 4/ Having obtained the approval of the family members to whom he had spoken, Rucks gave Petitioner $500.00 from the Dairy's petty cash fund. Petitioner was to repay the money within ten days. There was no interest charged. Petitioner did not believe that he was doing anything wrong in soliciting and accepting this loan from Rucks. There was no understanding on the part of either Petitioner or Rucks that the making of this loan to Petitioner would in any way influence Petitioner in the discharge of his duties as an employee of the District. Petitioner never suggested, nor did Rucks expect, that the Dairy would receive favorable treatment in its dealings with the District as a result of the loan. The two viewed the transaction as a personal matter unrelated to District business. Because of illness that required hospitalization, Petitioner was unable to repay the loan within ten days. The loan was repaid in full within three weeks. Petitioner's Personal Circumstances During the period of time in which the alleged acts of misconduct in the instant case were committed, Petitioner was experiencing a significant amount of stress in his personal life. He was having money problems. In addition, his relationship with his wife was deteriorating. The day after he received the loan from Rucks, Petitioner was admitted to a psychiatric hospital for treatment. He remained hospitalized for two weeks.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the District enter a final order (1) finding that disciplinary action, in the form of a suspension covering the period from January 9, 1992, to the date of the issuance of said final order, should be taken against Petitioner, but based only upon those acts of misconduct described in Conclusion of Law 70 of this Recommended Order, (2) reducing Petitioner's dismissal to such a suspension, and (3) reinstating Petitioner to the position he previously held or a comparable position. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 26th day of October, 1992. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of October, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-3101 The following are the Hearing Officer's specific rulings on what the parties have labelled as "findings of facts" in their proposed recommended orders: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted and incorporated in substance, although not necessarily repeated verbatim, in this Recommended Order. To the extent that this proposed finding states that "[e]mployees receive the Handbook at new employee orientation," it has been accepted and incorporated in substance. Otherwise, it has been rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. First sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Second sentence: Rejected because it is more in the nature of a summary of testimony adduced at hearing than a finding of fact based upon such testimony; Third sentence: Rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. 4-7. Accepted and incorporated in substance. 8. First and second sentences: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Third sentence: Rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. 9-11. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. To the extent that this proposed finding references Edward Muldowney's participation in the internal investigation and Muldowney's "extensive investigative experience," it has been rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. Otherwise, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. 15-16. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. 20-22. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected as a finding of fact because it is more in the nature of legal argument. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected because it is not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. 25a.-25b. To the extent that these proposed findings state that Petitioner was absent during non-break periods of the workday on September 24, 1991, and on October 14, 1991, without the authorization and approval of the appropriate authority, they have been rejected because they are not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. Otherwise, they have been adopted and incorporated in substance. 25c.-26a. Accepted and incorporated in substance. 26b. Last sentence: Rejected because it is not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence; Remaining sentences: Accepted and incorporated in substance. 26c. Last sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Remaining sentences: Rejected because they are more in the nature of summaries of testimony adduced at hearing than findings of fact based upon such testimony. 26d. Accepted and incorporated in substance. 26e. First and second sentences: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Third sentence: Rejected because it is not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. 26f. Accepted and incorporated in substance. This proposed finding, which states that Petitioner lied or failed to give truthful or requested information on six, rather than three, occasions, has been rejected because it is not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. 27a. Accepted and incorporated in substance. 27b. First, second and sixth sentences: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Third and fourth sentences: To the extent that these proposed findings state that Goldstein "specifically asked [Petitioner] if any part of the trip on the day of the accident was for personal reasons" and Petitioner "lied when he responded 'no'" to this question, they have been accepted and incorporated in substance. Otherwise, they have been rejected because they are not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. 27c. To the extent that this proposed finding states that Goldstein talked to Petitioner about the September 17, 1991, trip to Stuart during the discussion referenced therein, it has been rejected because it is not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. Otherwise, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance. 27e. Last sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Remaining sentences: Rejected because they are not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. Accepted and incorporated in substance. First, second, third and sixth sentences: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Fourth sentence: To the extent that this proposed finding states that Hagan "was a passenger in the vehicle at the time," it has been rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. Otherwise, it has been rejected because it is more in the nature of a summary of testimony adduced at hearing than a finding of fact based on such testimony; Fifth sentence: Rejected because it is more in the nature of a summary of testimony adduced at hearing than a finding of fact based on such testimony. 30-32d. Accepted and incorporated in substance. 32e. First sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Second sentence: To the extent that this proposed suggests that Petitioner did not perform "his regulatory functions, including those at the Dry Lake Dairy, in an unbiased manner" as a result of the loan, it has been rejected because it is not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. Otherwise, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance. 10/ Third and fourth sentences: Rejected because they are not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. 11/ 33-33b. Rejected because they concern alleged misconduct outside the scope of the charges specified in the notice of termination. 33c. Rejected because it is more in the nature of a summary of testimony adduced at hearing than a finding of fact based upon such testimony. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted and incorporated in substance. To the extent that this proposed finding states that Petitioner's assigned territory included Martin County, it has been rejected because it is not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. Otherwise, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance. To the extent that this proposed finding recites verbatim the "Grievance Resolution," it has been rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. To the extent that this proposed finding states that Respondent was "summarily" dismissed upon given his notice of termination without the opportunity to respond and that he never before "had an evaluation which was less than satisfactory," it has been rejected because it is not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. To the extent that this proposed finding states that Petitioner was deprived of "due process," that he was terminated "arbitrarily" and that the charges against him "are so vague as to make them void," it has been rejected as a finding of fact because it is more in the nature of legal argument. Otherwise, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance.

Florida Laws (6) 112.312112.313120.52120.57373.044373.079
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REED LANDSCAPING, INC. vs MINORITY ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT, 95-005684 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Nov. 20, 1995 Number: 95-005684 Latest Update: Jul. 24, 1996

The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the Petitioner is entitled to certification as a minority business enterprise.

Findings Of Fact Iris Reed and her husband, Mark Reed, own and operate a business known as Reed Landscaping, Inc., the Petitioner in this cause. Mrs. Reed is an American woman and owns 60 percent of the subject business. Her husband owns the remaining 40 percent. The Reeds previously owned a lawn maintenance business in New York but moved to Florida several years ago and started doing business as "Landscaping and Lawn Maintenance by Mark." Eventually, approximately 1992, "Landscaping and Lawn Maintenance by Mark" changed its name to Reed Landscaping, Inc. As to Petitioner and all former entities, Mrs. Reed has held an office position with the company while Mr. Reed has operated the field crew or crews. Mr. Reed has the experience and expertise necessary to handle the work at each site for the business. On the other hand, Mrs. Reed has the office and management skills to direct the "paperwork" side of the business. This includes insurance matters and personnel for the office. Mrs. Reed is particularly active in this business since she put up the capital that largely funded the business enterprise. Although her personal financial investment is primarily at risk, creditors and bonding companies require both Reeds to sign for the company and to be individually obligated as well. Mrs. Reed serves as President/Treasurer of the Petitioner and Mr. Reed is Vice-President/Secretary. Both are authorized to sign bank checks for the company. Mr. Reed has formal training and education in landscape architecture and horticulture as well as extensive experience in this field. Mrs. Reed is responsible for many decisions for the company but relies on the opinions of others and delegates, where appropriate, duties to others as well. Among the delegated duties are: all field work for the company (delegated to Mr. Reed, another foreman, or to crews working a job); estimating or preparing bids (an estimator helps with bids); bookkeeping; contract review; and purchasing (some of which she does herself with input from others). As to each delegated area, however, the Reeds stress teamwork; that they are all working together for the common good of the company.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Petitioner's application for certification as a minority business enterprise be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of May, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of May, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-5684 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner: None submitted. Iris Reed on behalf of Petitioner submitted a letter summary of her position concerning the hearing which, if intended to be a presentation of fact, is rejected as argument or comment not in a form readily reviewable for either acceptance or rejection as required by rule. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent: Paragraphs 1 and 2 are accepted. Paragraph 3 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraphs 4 and 5 are accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph L. Shields Senior Attorney Commission on Minority Economic & Business Development 107 West Gaines Street 201 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2005 Iris F. Reed, Pro se 951 Southwest 121st Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33325 Veronica Anderson Executive Administrator Commission on Minority Economic & Business Development 107 West Gaines Street 201 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2005

Florida Laws (1) 288.703
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DORA INDUSTRIES, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, MINORITY BUSINESS ADVOCACY AND ASSISTANCE OFFICE, 96-000264 (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Jan. 10, 1996 Number: 96-000264 Latest Update: Nov. 18, 1996

The Issue Whether Petitioner should be granted certification as a Minority Business Enterprise.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Dora Industries, Inc. (Dora Industries), was started in 1989 by Sandra Roth (Roth), an American woman. Roth owns all of the company. Initially, Dora Industries bought janitorial and maintenance products from other companies and sold the products as a distributor. Roth graduated from Hunter College with a degree in graphic arts. From 1979 to 1985, she worked for Union Carbide in North Carolina doing research for the chemical division. She was later placed in charge of dealing with third world countries on ways to use chemicals in agriculture. In 1986, Roth went to work for Gold Coast Chemical Corporation (Gold Coast Corporation), which was owned by Eli Finkleberg. Her role at Gold Coast Corporation included doing the paperwork necessary for registering the chemicals manufactured by Gold Coast Corporations with the appropriate regulatory agency. In 1989, Roth formed Dora Industries and married Eli Finkleberg. Dora Industries purchased some of its products from Gold Coast Corporation. Due to ill health, Eli Finkleberg put Gold Coast Corporation up for sale in 1993. The company was advertised for sale in trade magazines. Using funds which Roth had acquired from the dissolution of a previous marriage, she purchased the manufacturing operations of Gold Coast Corporation in 1993. The purchase price was $96,000, which consisted of $47,091 in cash and the remainder in the assumption and payment of certain leases and contracts. In addition, Roth agreed to renegotiate the lease of the real property on which Gold Coast Corporation was housed to include the costs of clean up for hazardous materials which were found in the ground underneath the Gold Coast Corporation warehouse. The landlord attributed the presence of the hazardous materials to Gold Coast Corporation. The estimated cost of the clean up was not to exceed $200,000. The inventory of Gold Coast Corporation was not included in the sale. However, the inventory remained in the warehouse previously occupied by Gold Coast Corporation and was handled for Gold Coast Corporation by Dora Industries d/b/a Gold Coast Chemical Products (Gold Coast Products). After the inventory was sold Gold Coast Corporation no longer sold any products and has not actively sold chemicals for the last two years. Currently Dora Industries is manufacturing chemical cleaning products, distributing its own products and the products of other companies, and exporting products. Eli Finkleberg is the treasurer and a salaried employee of Dora Industries. His responsibilities include interviewing applicants for sales positions, running the sales division of the company, overseeing the sales manager, and supervising the office staff. His annual salary is approximately $35,000. Due to his poor health, he works between four and six hours a day. Jerome Berman is the general manager in charge of operations for Dora Industries. Mr. Berman owned and ran a chemical company for 23 years prior to coming to work for Dora Industries. His responsibilities include ordering all materials and supplies used in the production of and resale of industrial supplies, hiring and firing of all warehouse and distribution personnel, complying with governmental regulations, bidding, and supervising the warehouse and productions. Mr. Berman's annual salary is $57,000. Both Mr. Berman and Mr. Finkleberg have the authority to sign checks on the Dora Industries account. Mr. Berman's authority is limited to $5,000. Roth is responsible for making major purchases for the business such as a telephone system which she recently acquired. Roth employs a chemist who is responsible for the formulas used in the manufacture of the chemical products. This is the third chemist which Roth has employed since she started Dora Industries. Some of the formulas are given to Dora Industries by the suppliers of the raw materials, and some formulas are developed by the chemist. Roth does not have the expertise to develop formulas but she does have the expertise to manufacture a batch of products using a formula. Each day Roth discusses the sales and operations with Mr. Finkleberg and Mr. Berman, respectively. In the hiring of sales personnel, Roth meets the applicants which have been interviewed by Mr. Finkleberg and makes the final decision on who to hire. Roth has delegated the hiring of the hourly wage personnel in the warehouse to Mr. Berman. According to Berman, he advises Roth who he intends to hire in case she should have an objection. Mr. Berman has to report the reasons that he fires personnel to Roth. Roth did the bidding for the company before Mr. Berman was hired. Mr. Berman follows a set formula of cost plus a percentage of profit in the bidding process and requests permission from Roth before making any significant deviations from the formula. Eli Finkleberg owns Trout and Associates, which is a telemarketing firm selling cleaning chemicals to companies outside of Florida. Trout and Associates has one full-time employee and one part-time employee. The full-time employee is housed in an office in the building occupied by Dora Industries. Trout and Associates buys some of its products from Dora Industries for resale.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered granting Petitioner certification as a minority business enterprise. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of October, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of October, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Lorenzo Ramunno, Esquire 1882 North University Drive Plantation, Florida 33322 Joseph L. Shields, Senior Attorney Office of the General Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security, Division of Minority Business Advocacy and Assistance Office 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast Hartman Building, Suite 307 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2189 Douglas L. Jamerson, Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security 2012 Capital Circle Southeast 303 Hartman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Edward A. Dion, General Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security 2012 Capital Circle Southeast 303 Hartman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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CHARLES E BURKETT AND ASSOCIATES, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 92-003644RX (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jun. 19, 1992 Number: 92-003644RX Latest Update: Apr. 25, 1996

Findings Of Fact The Florida Department of Transportation is the state agency charged with the responsibility to develop and adopt criteria for a DBE program, and administer the DBE program. Burkett is a Florida corporation whose sole stockholder is a white female American. She meets the criteria of a socially and economically disadvantaged individual. Burkett applied for certification as a DBE on July 12, 1991, and on October 1, 1991, the Department denied Burkett certification. Burkett submitted additional information and made changes in its internal organization to better conform to the Department's requirements; however, the Department has denied Burkett the designation based upon the owner's lack of expertise in the critical areas of the firm's operation, to wit; she does not possess education or experience in engineering. The parties stipulate that Burkett is substantially effected by the rules being challenged, and possesses standing to bring this rule challenge. In determining the qualifications of an applicant for DBE status, the Department utilizes Sections 334.044(2), 337.137, 339.05, and 339.0805, Florida Statutes; 49 CFR Part 23; the United States Department of Transportation administrative decisions; guidelines and training manuals from USDOT or the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA); and its own rules. At the recommendation of a representative from FHWA, the Department amended the rules being challenged regarding qualifications for DBE certification to explicate the requirement for ownership control, as required by Section 339.0805(1),(c), supra, and 49 CFR Part 23.53, to include the concept of "expertise in critical areas of operation of the business" which is required by the USDOT. The terms "expertise" and "critical areas of operation" are not defined in the Florida Statutes or DOT's rules. The DOT interprets "critical areas of operation" to mean the technical area in which the DBE certification is being sought. Management limited to the day-to-day normal business operations is not considered to be a "critical area of operation." The DOT's evaluation of "expertise" changes from business to business based upon the applicant's type of work. The department expects to see education and experience on the part of the disadvantaged owner in the technical area of operations of the business. The Department denied the Petitioner DBE certification because the disadvantaged owner did not possess engineering experience or education.

USC (2) 49 CFR 2349 CFR 23.53 Florida Laws (7) 119.07120.56120.68334.044337.139339.05339.0805 Florida Administrative Code (1) 14-78.005
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D.I.C. COMMERCIAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION vs DEPARTMENT OF GENERAL SERVICES, 92-002370BID (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Apr. 15, 1992 Number: 92-002370BID Latest Update: Feb. 08, 1993

The Issue The issue presented is whether the Department acted fraudulently, arbitrarily, illegally, or dishonestly in proposing to award to Intervenor, The Weitz Company, Inc., a contract for Project No. DGS-88114000.

Findings Of Fact On February 18, 1992, Respondent Department of General Services issued its Invitation to Bid on Project No. DGS-88114000, the construction of the Fort Pierce Regional Service Center. The bid package contained a copy of the Department's Advertisement for Bids, together with the bid specifications, evaluation criteria, and criteria for award of the contract. The Department's Advertisement for Bids identified the project, advised that sealed bids would be received and opened at 2:00 p.m. on March 12, 1992, stated that the Bid Tabulation and Notice of Award Recommendation would be posted at 4:00 p.m. on that same date, and contained the following language: MINORITY PROGRAM: In accordance with Florida Statute 287.057(6), at least 21 percent of the project contracted amount will be expended with DGS certified minority business enterprises. If 21 percent is not attainable, the Division of Building Construction will recognize Good Faith Efforts by the Bidder. The Bidder is advised to review these requirements in the Section B-13B "Employment of and Reporting of DGS Certified Minority Business Enterprises Participation" immediately, in order to schedule the necessary tasks to accomplish Good Faith Efforts. Page 2 of the bid package was the Invitation to Bid form letter which contained the identical language as that quoted above. Section B-13B found on page 14 of the bid package under Instructions to Bidders provides as follows: B-13B EMPLOYMENT OF AND REPORTING OF DGS CERTIFIED MINORITY BUSINESS ENTERPRISE PARTICIPATION Florida Statute 287.042 and the Department of General Services Rules 13-8 and 13-9, encourages the employment of and requires the reporting of DGS Certified Minority Business Enterprise (MBE) participation in state contracting. The Department has as its goal to spend twenty-one percent (21 percent) of construction contracts with DGS certified minority business enterprises. The overall goal for construction contracts are as follows: 4 percent Black Americans 6 percent Hispanic Americans and 11 percent American Women The Division Director of the Division of Building Construction recognizes the need to take affirmative actions to insure that Minority and Women business enterprises and minority and women employees are given the opportunity to participate in the performance of the Division of Building Constructions' construction programs. This opportunity for full participation in our free enterprise system by traditionally, socially and economically disadvantaged persons is essential to obtain social nd [sic] economic equality and improve the functioning of the State economy. Accordingly, it is the policy of the Division of Building Construction to foster and promote the full participation of such individuals and business firms in the State's building construction program. The Contractor, by bidding on this Contract, acknowledges his understanding and support for the social policy herein stated and pledges to fully cooperate with the State in the implementation of this policy, and further to exert a good faith effort to solicit and obtain the participation of such individuals and firms as subcontractors, suppliers and employees on this Contract. Prior to the execution of a contract, the bidder shall provide the following information on his contract or subcontracts for all DGS certified minority business firms to be utilized on the project: * * * Contractor's Schedules of Values and Requests for Partial Payments shall also reflect the payments made to each MBE subcontractor, using the name, minority vendor code, type of business and amounts. The contractor shall make a good faith effort to use services or commodities of minority business enterprises by: Attending any presolicitation or prebid meetings that were scheduled by the division to inform minority business enterprises of contracting and subcontracting opportunities; Advertising in general circulation, trade association, and/or minority-focus media concerning the subcontracting opportunities; Providing written notice to a reasonable number of specific minority business enterprises that their interest in the contract was being solicited in sufficient time to allow the minority business enterprises to participate effectively; Following up initial solicitations of interest by contacting minority business enterprises or minority persons to determine with certainty whether the minority business enterprises or minority persons were interested; Selecting portions of the work to be performed by minority business enterprises in order to increase the likelihood of meeting the minority business enterprise goals, including, where appropriate, breaking down contracts into economically feasible units to facilitate minority business enterprise participation; Providing interested minority business enterprises or minority persons with adequate information about the plans, specifications, and requirements of the contract or the availability of jobs; Negotiating in good faith with interested minority business enterprises or minority persons, not rejecting minority business enterprises or minority persons as unqualified without sound reasons based on a through [sic] investigation of their capabilities; and Effectively using services of available minority community organizations; minority contractors' groups; local, state, and federal minority business assistance offices; and other organizations that provide assistance in the recruitment and placement of minority business enterprises or minority persons. Prior to the issuance of the Invitation to Bid, the St. Lucie County Democratic Executive Committee directed a letter to Governor Lawton Chiles concerning the high rate of unemployment in the construction industry in the Fort Pierce and St. Lucie County area. That letter requested that language be included in the invitation for bids for the Fort Pierce Regional Service Center specifying that priority be given to the available resident work force, first, from within the city of Fort Pierce and, second, from within St. Lucie County. That correspondence reached the Department of General Services, with the result that the following language was included within the bid specifications on page 14a: B-13C EMPLOYMENT OF LOCAL LABOR, SUBCONTRACTORS AND MATERIAL SUPPLIERS The procurement by General Contractors and Sub- contractors of persons for skilled and unskilled worker positions, the sub-contracting by General Contractors for Sub-contractor services and the purchase by General Contractors and Sub-contractors of materials, equipment, supplies and services is highly encouraged to the maximum extent possible, to be from persons residing within or businesses located within Ft. Pierce and St. Lucie County. A Pre-bid Conference was conducted on February 28, 1992. The Minutes from the Pre-bid Conference reflect that Addendum No. 1 to the bid specifications provided to potential bidders a copy of the Department's Minority Business Enterprise Construction Directory listing DGS-certified minority business enterprises as of December 1991. Those Minutes also contain the following entry: Highlights of front-end of Project Manual * * * Page 14, Paragraph B-13B for reporting minority participation stipulates 21 percent goal: 4 percent Black 6 percent Hispanic 11 percent American Women Contractors must thoroughly document their good effort. Procedure for documenting good effort can be obtained from Susan Hodge. * * * K. Page 89 - Post Bid Qualifications: Form is to be completed and submitted within 7 days after Bid Opening. A few of the lowest Bidders will probably be required to submit this form. At 2:00 p.m. on March 12, 1992, the Department received and opened eleven bids for the construction of the Fort Pierce Regional Service Center. Two of those bids were from Petitioner D. I. C. Commercial Construction Corp. (hereinafter "D.I.C.") and from Intervenor The Weitz Company, Inc., (hereinafter "Weitz"). At 3:00 p.m. on March 12 the Department posted its Bid Tabulation and Notice of Award Recommendation. That Bid Tabulation reflected that The Weitz Company of West Palm Beach submitted the lowest bid, in the amount of $5,545,800, and that D.I.C. Commercial Construction of Fort Pierce submitted the second lowest bid, in the amount of $5,553,600. The Bid Tabulation and Notice of Award Recommendation further provided as follows: This is to advise you that the Division of Building Construction, Department of General Services, State of Florida, Has recommended that the contract for the referenced project be awarded to the firm of: THE WEITZ COMPANY, INC. in the amount of $5,545,800.00, accepting the BASE BID AND ALTERNATE #1 AND #2, determined to be the lowest acceptable qualified bid. Any bidder disputing the contract award recommendation must file . . . . Written notice of protest within seventy-two (72) hours after posting of this notice. A formal written protest by petition in compliance with Rule 13-4.12, Florida Administrative Code, and Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, within ten (10) days after the date on which he filed the notice of protest. * * * The Executive Director of the Department of General Services, State of Florida plans to act on the above recommendation after expiration of the seventy-two (72) hour notice period. That proposed bid award took into consideration only the amount bid by each of the eleven bidders. In making its proposed bid award, the Department gave no consideration to its bid specifications that required the inclusion of at least 21 percent participation by subcontractors who were DGS-certified minority business enterprises (hereinafter "MBEs"), and which "highly encouraged to the maximum extent possible" the use of "persons residing within or businesses located within Ft. Pierce and St. Lucie County." On March 16, 1992, D.I.C. timely filed its Notice of Protest to the proposed award of the contract to Weitz. On March 26, 1992, D.I.C. timely filed its Formal Notice of Protest to that proposed bid award. Since the Weitz bid did not achieve the required 21 percent MBE participation, Weitz was required to submit documentation of its "good faith effort" to the Department along with other post-award qualification documentation. Weitz submitted its "good faith effort" documentation on March 16, 1992. Although the Department was aware that a Notice of Protest had been filed on March 16, the Department commenced its "good faith effort" review on March 17, 1992. Weitz's good faith submittal recited that it had achieved a total DGS- certified MBE participation of 13.6 percent in its attempt to reach the goal of at least 21 percent. Of the required classes of 4 percent Black Americans, 6 percent Hispanic Americans, and 11 percent American Women, Weitz reported it had achieved 3.2 percent, 8.9 percent, and 1.5 percent respectively. One of the MBEs included within the percentage of Hispanic Americans was improperly included since that minority subcontractor is an Asian subcontractor, which is a different certification classification and not one of the types of minorities specifically required to be included in this project. That Asian subcontractor represented almost one-half of the Hispanic participation claimed by Weitz. Accordingly, Weitz failed to achieve the required overall percentage and failed to achieve the required percentage in any of the three categories. Weitz's submittal also showed that it had included within its achieved percentages of participation subcontractors who were not yet DGS-certified, by listing three of those subcontractors under the heading of "pending minority certification." Although one of those did become certified by the time of the formal hearing in this cause, the other two have never applied for certification. Although the bid specifications use the language DGS-certified MBE subcontractors for inclusion in the 21 percent participation requirement, it is clear that D.I.C., Weitz, and the Department believed that the bid specifications meant certified or certifiable. The Department's policy is that the MBE must be certified by DGS, not on the date of bid submittal, but by the time that the Department enters into the construction contract with the prime contractor. It is also clear that the Department began tracking the efforts of Weitz's subcontractors to become certified by DGS and became involved in the certification process for Weitz's subcontractors who were not yet DGS-certified. Although Weitz had received 21 bids from DGS-certified MBEs, it chose to use the bids of only five. The bids of the others were rejected because Weitz had made the prior determination that it would use the bid of a DGS- certified MBE only if that subcontractor submitted the low bid for that particular portion of the work. In other words, Weitz's focus was on submitting the lowest possible bid rather than on submitting a bid which included the required MBE participation goal. On the other hand, when D.I.C. received and reviewed its bid package, it made the determination that the Department's requirement of at least 21 percent minority participation was easily achievable. Accordingly, D.I.C. did not prepare any "good faith effort" documentation since the bid specifications clearly stated that the Department would consider good faith efforts only if the 21 percent goal were not attainable. D.I.C. made the decision that it would include the required percentage, both overall and in each individual category, in its bid submittal and that, if it could not, it would simply not submit a bid on this construction project. D.I.C. included in its bid the bids of MBE subcontractors who it believed were either DGS-certified or certifiable for a total participation of 26.5 percent. Included within that overall participation D.I.C. exceeded the required percentage for Black Americans, exceeded the required participation for Hispanic Americans, and fell barely short of meeting the required participation for American Women. After D.I.C. filed its Notice of Protest, although the Department freely communicated with Weitz and Weitz's subcontractors in the Department's efforts to certify those subcontractors to be used by Weitz who were not certified, the Department ceased communication with D.I.C. and D.I.C.'s subcontractors. Further, the Division of Building Construction of the Department commenced and continued in its efforts to review Weitz's "good faith" submittal. The Department further rejected communication from the supervisor in its own Minority Business Enterprise Assistance Office regarding the Department's good faith efforts review. When conducting its good faith review, the Department looked only at the documentation submitted by Weitz. It made no effort to ascertain if there were things that Weitz could have done that Weitz chose not to do. Further, in conducting its good faith effort review, the Department reviewed Weitz's documentation under the belief that there was no specific MBE goal for this project. The Department's belief that there was no required MBE participation for this project, contrary to the bid specifications, was based upon the fact that the Legislature had given the Department a goal of at least 21 percent minority participation with the breakdown for the three categories of MBEs listed in the bid specifications as an overall Department goal. Although not disclosed in the bid specifications, the Department looked to meet its goal through the totality of its construction contracts and not pursuant to any individual contract. By March of 1992, the Department had already exceeded its statutorily-imposed goal by 140 percent for that fiscal year. Further, it was the Department's policy and practice to include in its reports to the Legislature concerning whether the Department had met its own statutorily- imposed MBE participation goal the participation of all minority subcontractors in all of the Department's construction contracts without regard to whether those subcontractors were DGS-certified by the time that the Department entered into those construction contracts with the prime contractors. In reviewing Weitz's good faith efforts, the Department utilized the criteria set forth in the bid specifications. It looked at each of the eight criteria listed in the bid specifications and then looked at the documentation submitted by Weitz to ascertain if there had been an effort to comply. The first criterion considers whether the contractor attended presolicitation meetings scheduled by the agency to inform minority business enterprises of the subcontracting opportunity. Since the Department held no such meeting regarding this construction project, none of the bidders could have met this criterion. The second criterion relates to advertising in general circulation, trade association, and/or minority-focus media. Weitz ran an ad one time only on Sunday, March 1, in the Palm Beach Post and in the Fort Lauderdale News/Sun- Sentinel. Weitz placed no other ads. The third criterion requires providing written notice to a reasonable number of specific minority business enterprises that their interest is being solicited in sufficient time to allow them to participate effectively. Weitz sent 98 letters throughout the state of Florida to MBEs listed in the Department's December 1991 directory. That letter was dated February 25, 1992. The fourth criterion requires following up initial solicitations by contacting MBEs or minority persons to determine with certainty whether they are interested. Weitz sent a follow-up letter dated March 4 to the same 98 addressees as its prior letter. The fifth criterion requires selecting portions of the work to be performed by MBEs to increase the likelihood of meeting the MBE goals, including, where appropriate, breaking down contracts into economically feasible units to facilitate MBE participation. Weitz's documentation reflected that the work of several trades had been broken down into smaller units. The sixth criterion requires providing interested MBEs or minority persons with adequate information about the plans, specifications, and requirements of the contract or the availability of jobs. The advertisement placed by Weitz gave no information other than that it was seeking bids from certified MBEs for construction of the Regional Service Center in Fort Pierce, that the bid deadline was March 12, and that plans were available for review at Weitz's office in West Palm Beach. The first letter sent by Weitz advised the recipient of the square footage of the project, that Weitz might assist subcontractors on their bonding requirement, and that plans were available for review at Weitz's office in West Palm Beach and at local plan rooms, or full sets of plans and specifications could be purchased from Weitz at a price of $300 a set. The letter further gave the names of two persons at Weitz's office who could be contacted. The follow-up letter sent by Weitz contained the same information. The seventh criterion requires negotiating in good faith with interested minority business enterprises or minority persons and not rejecting them as unqualified without sound reasons based upon a thorough investigation of their capabilities. The Weitz documentation contained a statement saying that it had not rejected any minorities as being unqualified. The eighth criterion requires effectively using services of available community organizations; minority contractors' groups; local, state, and federal minority business assistance offices; and other organizations that provide assistance in the recruitment and placement of minority business enterprises or minority persons. Weitz sent letters to six organizations in the state of Florida stating that it was seeking proposals for the Fort Pierce Regional Service Center, that it had contacted those companies listed in the December 1991 directory, that plans were available for review at Weitz's office in West Palm Beach and at local plan rooms, and that the recipients should refer any known interested persons to Weitz. It is clear that Weitz made an effort to obtain minority participation. It did not, however, use its "best ability and effort" to obtain minority participation. Weitz's efforts did result in the receipt of a substantial number of bids from DGS-certified MBEs. It does not, however, appear that Weitz used its best effort to assist interested MBEs to participate in the construction project since it did not use any subcontractor's bid unless it was the low bid. Weitz's documentation contains a copy of each of the letters sent to the 98 businesses in the state of Florida and also contains some notations of telephone contact between Weitz and some MBEs. The documentation does not support the proposition, however, that Weitz used its best efforts to work with individual MBEs to solicit their interest; to ascertain with certainty their level of interest; to make the plans and bid specifications available to them; to organize the scope of work into smaller units, if necessary, to enable MBEs to effectively participate in the bidding process; and, most importantly, to utilize bids received by those MBEs. Although the bid specifications specifically stated that the minority participation was to be at least 21 percent and, if that 21 percent was not attainable, the Department would consider good faith efforts, the Department made no independent determination of whether 21 percent DGS-certified MBE participation on this project was attainable. Contrary to the language of the bid specifications, the Department interpreted the criteria to be a requirement that the bidder either attain 21 percent or submit good faith efforts. Since Weitz was the apparent low bidder by price, and since Weitz did not achieve the 21 percent participation, the Department assumed that such level of participation could not be attained and that Weitz could instead submit its "good faith effort." Although a provision was specifically written into the bid specifications for this project that the bidders were encouraged to use local labor from the Fort Pierce and St. Lucie County areas, the Department developed no criteria by which to judge whether the bidders attempted to comply with that bid specification. Additionally, the Department failed to review the bids received for this construction project to see if efforts had been made to include local labor. In essence, this bid specification was ignored by the Department. Although Weitz included in its "good faith effort" submittal a statement that it would utilize local labor by using its own employees, Weitz is located in West Palm Beach, not in St. Lucie County or in Fort Pierce. Although Weitz further included a statement that it might utilize up to twelve companies located in that area, the Department made no determination as to the number of qualified companies located there. The Department was not aware of the fact that Weitz had solicited only by letter two DGS-certified subcontractors in St. Lucie County and only three DGS-certified subcontractors in surrounding counties. On the other hand, D.I.C. had expended extensive efforts to involve businesses in the Fort Pierce and St. Lucie County area. Although Weitz attached to its Petition to Intervene in this proceeding a list of St. Lucie County firms which were encouraged to submit bids and a list of other firms who employ a majority of St. Lucie County employees on projects located in Fort Pierce which were encouraged to submit bids, those documents were never presented to, or considered by, the Department when it evaluated Weitz's bid. Section B-21 of the bid specifications provides, in essence, that the contract would be awarded to the bidder submitting the lowest bid. Weitz's bid was slightly lower than that of D.I.C.--a difference of $7,800 on bids of over five and a half million dollars. D.I.C.'s bid could have been $60,000 lower if it had not sought to comply with the 21 percent MBE requirement set forth in the bid specifications. Its bid would have been lower if it had, like Weitz, rejected all bids from DGS-certified MBE subcontractors who were not also the lowest bidder in that particular trade. D.I.C.'s belief that the Department would require compliance with all provisions in the bid specifications caused D.I.C.'s bid to be higher than that of Weitz, which placed emphasis on the lowest price rather than the lowest price plus effective effort at meeting the MBE participation specification. By focusing on one bid specification and not on all of the bid specifications, the Department gave Weitz an unfair advantage over other bidders. By allowing Weitz to submit "good faith effort" rather than comply with the 21 percent minimum participation requirement, the Department, in essence, allowed Weitz to make a subjective determination that the 21 percent requirement was not attainable. It was the Department's duty under the bid specifications to make its own objective determination that the 21 percent bid specification was not attainable before the alternative consideration of "good faith effort" became relevant to the bid award recommendation. The Department could have, for example, looked at the other bids submitted to see if the other bidders had attained the 21 percent participation requirement. Under the Department's approach, i.e., relying solely on Weitz's representation and considering only Weitz's bid, it is possible that the other bidders attained the 21 percent requirement and that only Weitz did not comply with that bid specification. The Department's procedure rendered the 21 percent bid specification meaningless, which fact was not known in advance by all of the bidders. By failing to determine whether the goal for MBE participation set forth as a bid specification was attainable, the Department failed to determine whether Weitz had complied with all bid specification requirements. Accordingly, the Department did not in fact make a determination that Weitz was a responsive bidder by meeting all bid specifications. Further, the Department made no determination in fact as to whether any of the other bidders, including D.I.C., were responsive to the Department's own bid specifications. Accordingly, there has been no determination that Weitz, or any other bidder, is the lowest responsive bidder. Similarly, the Department made no determination as to whether Weitz had complied with Section B-13C of the bid specifications which provided that bidders were "highly encouraged to the maximum extent possible" to utilize persons residing within or businesses located within Fort Pierce and St. Lucie County. D.I.C., with offices in Fort Pierce, submitted a bid which included 67 percent local participation. Weitz, with offices in West Palm Beach, submitted a bid representing that it would utilize its own employees for 15 percent of the contract (a different bid specification) and represented that it would probably utilize up to a dozen local companies. Since it is clear that Weitz solicited subcontractors from all over the state of Florida, Weitz made no showing that it had attempted "to the maximum extent possible" to utilize persons and businesses from Fort Pierce and St. Lucie County. Additionally, Weitz's single advertisement in the two newspapers chosen by it does not show an intent to obtain local participation since the Fort Lauderdale News/Sun-Sentinel is not sold in either Fort Pierce or St. Lucie County and the Palm Beach Post is obtainable in Fort Pierce only at 7-11 convenience stores and in newspaper vending machines. The Department made no determination as to whether Weitz, or any other bidder, was responsive to this bid specification. Further, the Department did not advise bidders that it might not enforce this bid specification in the same manner that the Department did not advise all bidders that it might not enforce the 21 percent bid specification. In short, the procedures utilized by the Department in evaluating the bids submitted for this project did not afford fair and equal review of all bids submitted. Further, Weitz was given a competitive advantage by the Department's determination that Weitz should be given the bid award based solely on the Weitz bid being the lowest submitted.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered rejecting all bids on Project No. DGS- 88114000 for the Fort Pierce Regional Service Center. RECOMMENDED this 25th day of June, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of June, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-2370BID Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-4, 7-14, 17, 20, 29, 30, 33, 35, 36, 39, 43, 45-48, and 55 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 5, 6, 15, and 18 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the competent evidence in this cause. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 16, 21-28, 34, 37, 38, 40, 42, 49-52, and 54 have been rejected as being unnecessary to the issues involved herein. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 19 and 53 have been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues under consideration in this cause. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 31, 32, 41, and 44 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting argument of counsel, conclusions of law, or recitation of the testimony. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 11, 17, 19, 21, 22, 24-28, and 37 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 3, 5, 6, 20, 29, 31, 33, 35, 36, and 38-41 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the competent evidence in this cause. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 9, 10, 12-14, and 34 have been rejected as being unnecessary to the issues involved herein. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 15, 16, 18, 30, and 32 have been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues under consideration in this cause. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 23 has been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting argument of counsel, conclusions of law, or recitation of the testimony. Intervenor's proposed findings of fact numbered 1 and 10 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Intervenor's proposed findings of fact numbered 2, 3, 7, 12, 15, and 16 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the competent evidence in this cause. Intervenor's proposed findings of fact numbered 4-6, 8, 9, 11, 13, and 14 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting argument of counsel, conclusions of law, or recitation of the testimony. COPIES FURNISHED: Melinda S. Gentile, Esquire Ruden, Barnett, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A. 200 East Broward Boulevard Post Office Box 1900 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33302 Stephen S. Mathues, Esquire Department of General Services Knight Building, Suite 309 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Bruce G. Alexander, Esquire Boose Casey Ciklin Lubitz Martens McBane & O'Connell Suite 1900 515 North Flagler Drive Post Office Box 024626 West Palm Beach, Florida 33402 Neil H. Butler, Esquire Butler & Long, P.A. Post Office Box 839 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Ronald W. Thomas Executive Director Department of General Services Knight Building, Suite 307 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Susan Kirkland, General Counsel Department of General Services Knight Building, Suite 309 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950

Florida Laws (5) 120.53120.57287.042287.057553.63
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J. D. BLIGH CONSTRUCTION, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, 92-005694 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Sep. 21, 1992 Number: 92-005694 Latest Update: Mar. 29, 1994

Findings Of Fact J.D. Bligh Construction, Inc. (Petitioner), was incorporated and began doing business on or about February 18, 1974. Petitioner engaged in the construction business; erecting, repairing and remodeling buildings and structures; and performing public works. The majority of Petitioner's work is subcontracted out. At Petitioner's inception, Jack D. Bligh and his wife, Carol E. Bligh, were co-owners with each possessing 50 percent of the stock in the business. Jack Bligh was the President and the only Director. Petitioner was started as a family business. At all times material hereto, Jack Bligh was licensed as a certified Management contractor by the State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, Construction Industry Licensing Board. Petitioner is authorized by the State of Florida to engage in the construction business under his license. Petitioner had no employees other than Jack and Carol Bligh and subcontracted out work for which contracts were awarded or agreements entered into. All proposals for work and contract agreements on behalf of Petitioner were accepted and executed by Jack Bligh. Jack Bligh was the guarantor on behalf of Petitioner. For example, he was the guarantor for Petitioner's lease agreement for the site location of its business, dated June 15, 1988. Carol Bligh's duties with Petitioner were clerical and administrative, such as determining draw requests, ordering supplies and banking. She had no experience in the construction industry whether it was Management contracting or actual field experience. Jack Bligh, her husband, was responsible for the actual running of the business and handling the day-to-day operations of the business, such as contracting, estimating, bidding and hiring and firing subcontractors. On or about August 22, 1985, Jack and Carol Bligh formed J. D. Bligh Airport Construction, Inc., with Jack Bligh as the sole director and President, owning 49 percent of the stock, and Carol Bligh as Secretary, owning 51 percent of the stock. It was a wholly owned subsidiary and formed on the advice of their insurance agent and accountant for liability insurance purposes regarding a contract for work at the Fort Lauderdale International Airport, which at that time was a big project for Jack and Carol Bligh. In September 1988, Petitioner, as contractor, contracted with the Boca Raton Airport, Inc., d/b/a Boca Aviation to perform work at the airport at a cost of approximately $533,000. The subsidiary corporation, J. D. Bligh Airport Construction, Inc., was not used for this job. In July 1990, Petitioner entered into a contract as subcontractor to perform work at the Opa-Locka Airport at a cost of approximately $65,000. The subsidiary, J. D. Bligh Airport Construction, Inc., was also not used for this job. On or about August 8, 1990, J. D. Bligh Airport Construction, Inc., was changed to J. D. Bligh Caribbean Construction, Inc. The purpose of the name change was again for liability insurance purposes in order to perform work in St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands. The Blighs were rebuilding apartments damaged by Hurricane Hugo. Also, in September 1992, Petitioner again contracted with Boca Raton Airport to perform work at a cost of approximately $272,000. Carol Bligh executed the contract and the performance bond. For 17 years, Jack Bligh remained Petitioner's President until on or about January 15, 1991, at which time Carol Bligh became President. She was gratuitously given additional stock in the business by her husband for her long years of service and dedication to Petitioner. With this additional stock, Carol Bligh also became the minority/majority stockholder. When Carol Bligh became President of Petitioner and minority/majority owner with 51 percent in January 1991, her main duties and responsibilities did not change. She continued with the clerical and administrative aspect of Petitioner's Management contracting business. However, her duties and responsibilities also expanded to include dealing with bonding, securing lines of credit and insurance, setting-up workers compensation, assisting in policy- making, financial planning and operational procedures, and contract negotiations. On or about October 3, 1991, Carol Bligh's duties and responsibilities relating to hiring and firing were officially increased by Petitioner's directors to include hiring and firing of all personnel, including office and field personnel. In 1990, Carol and Jack Bligh's daughter, Janice Bligh, joined the business. Using his more than 17 years experience in the construction business, Jack Bligh began training her in Petitioner's contracting business, which included taking her to job sites for observation of the work being performed. Around mid-1991, Janice Bligh was placed in control of field supervision, estimating and bidding. For the past year and a half, Jack Bligh performed these functions only when she was unable to do so. Janice Bligh received her training as a field supervisor from her father, Jack Bligh, through observing him and the subcontractors. His supervision extends over the subcontractors since the majority of Petitioner's work is subcontracted out. Janice Bligh is taking courses in contracting and has completed three; one in estimating, one in plan reading and one in the South Florida Building Code. She is not currently licensed in the construction industry but eventually wants to take the State licensing examination to become a Management contractor but that is 2 1/2 to 3 years away. She has limited knowledge of the statutory requirements placed upon a Management contractor in terms of authorized scope of work and required liability coverage. Since Carol Bligh became Petitioner's President, proposals and agreements or contracts have been signed by either Janice Bligh or Carol Bligh. Also, bonding documents have been signed by Carol Bligh. Authorized signers and users on Petitioner's bank account are Carol, Jack and Janice Bligh, individually, with either one of them being authorized to execute bank documents on behalf of Petitioner. When Petitioner needed funds for operating expenses, they came from Carol and Jack Bligh. A promissory note dated April 15, 1992, from Petitioner to Carol Bligh was signed by Carol Bligh, as President, and came from funds in Carol and Jack Bligh's joint account. However, another promissory note dated June 30, 1992, involved funds loaned to the businesses from a business owned by Jack Bligh's father. Additionally, a promissory note dated April 15, 1993, was from Petitioner to Carol and Jack Bligh, equally. On or about December 1, 1992, Janice Bligh became a shareholder and officer of Petitioner's business, acquiring 2 percent of the stock from Jack Bligh, thereby leaving him with 47 percent of the stock. Carol Bligh retained 51 percent of the stock. Even though Janice Bligh was a shareholder and part owner of Petitioner, an indemnity agreement with a bonding surety dated February 23, 1993, was signed by Carol and Jack Bligh only. Also, the agreement reflected no differentiation of liability. As to wages, Petitioner's quarterly wage report dated April 17, 1991, reflects Jack Bligh's salary as $3,650, Carol Bligh's salary as $7,250, Janice Bligh's salary as $5,200, Jill Bligh's salary as $1,209 and Lawrence Massey's salary as $4,093.76. Jill Bligh is another daughter of Carol and Jack Bligh. She performs office work, run errands and answers the telephone. She is neither an officer nor a director. Petitioner's quarterly wage report dated July 12, 1991, reflects Jack Bligh's salary as $650, Carol Bligh's salary as $650, Janice Bligh's salary as $5,200, Jill Bligh's salary as $1,698 and Lawrence Massey's salary as $1,593.77. Petitioner's quarterly wage report dated October 15, 1991, reflects Jack Bligh's salary as $440, Carol Bligh's salary as $600, Janice Bligh's salary as $5,200 and Jill Bligh's salary as $1,804.50. Petitioner's quarterly wage report dated January 27, 1992, reflects Jack Bligh's salary as $390, Carol Bligh's salary as $300, Janice Bligh's salary as $2,400 and Jill Bligh's salary as $1,522.50. Carol Bligh testified that she and Jack Bligh reduced their salary to aid the business economically in the bad economic times of the construction industry. However, her testimony is not credible in light of the salary paid their daughter Jill Bligh in relationship to the work she performed. Petitioner applied for certification by Respondent as a minority business enterprise (MBE) on March 24, 1992. An initial review of the documentation provided by Petitioner indicated that Petitioner did not meet the criteria for MBE status; however, questions remained so a telephone interview with Carol Bligh was held in July 1992. Based on the documentation provided and the telephone interview, Petitioner was denied MBE status and notified by certified letter, dated July 14, 1992. Petitioner has been certified as a MBE by local governments.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services issue a Final Order denying J. D. Bligh Construction, Inc., certification as a Minority Business Enterprise. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 21st day of February 1994. ERROL H. POWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of February 1994.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57288.703489.119
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RIVER TRAILS, LTD. vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 85-000329RX (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-000329RX Latest Update: Apr. 08, 1985

Findings Of Fact Petitioner River Trails is the developer of a condominium community in Palm Beach County known as River Walk. River Walk is contiguous to and immediately adjacent to 2600 feet of South Florida Water Management District (hereinafter "SFWMD") property bordering Canal C-18 in Palm Beach County. The right- of-way adjacent to C-18 as well as the bottom of C-18 is owned by SFWMD. C-18 is not in an area designated as Outstanding Florida Waters. As required by Section 403.813(2), Florida Statutes, River Trails sought and obtained on January 12, 1984, a permit from the SFWMD to construct a dock and boat ramp in Canal C-18. The permit conveyed no property rights to River Trails. On October 12, 1984, River Trails asked DER to confirm that River Trails' proposed boat ramp qualified for an exemption pursuant to Section 403.813(2)(c), Florida Statutes. By letter dated December 20, 1984, DER informed River Trails that the proposed boat ramp did qualify for the exemption and, therefore did not require any permit from DER. On October 18, 1984, River Trails asked DER to confirm that River Trails' proposed dock of 1,000 square feet or less qualified for an exemption from DER's permitting authority pursuant to Section 403.813(2)(b), Florida Statutes. However, on November 30, 1984, DER informed River Trails that its proposed dock did not qualify for the exemption because there was already an existing dock on SFWMD property on Canal C-18. As authority for its position, DER cited the following sentence in DER Rule 17-4.04(9)(c), Florida Administrative Code: "A private dock is a single pier at a parcel of property." On the 2600 feet of SFWMD-owned right-of-way contiguous to River Trails, there are presently no docks. On SFWMD-owned right-of-way east of River Trails, between River Trails and the southwest fork of the Loxahatchee River, there are two docks approximately 300 feet apart located in front of single-family residences. DER contends all contiguous property owned by an individual, group or entity, including a water management district, constitutes a "parcel of property" and accordingly does not recognize River Trails' claim to an exemption because of the existence of these docks. Prior to River Trails' request that DER confirm River Trails' right to an exemption, DER had not interpreted water management district-owned right-of-ways to be a "parcel of property" within the meaning of Rule 17- 4.04(9)(c). In the past, the SFWMD has permitted numerous docks of less than 1,000 square feet on SFWMD-owned right- of-ways. Copies of these permits were routinely forwarded to DER. While these docks were and are on right-of-ways which DER now defines as a "parcel" within the meaning of Rule 17-4.04(9)(c), DER has not required permits for these docks. The DER employees who interpret the rule in question as part of their duties and whose depositions were introduced at hearing do not agree on the configuration which constitutes a single pier, on the degree of ownership or control required over a parcel of property by an applicant for an exemption, or on the definition of a parcel of property. DER has failed to adequately explain its deviation from past agency practice in interpreting SFWMD right-of- way as a parcel of property. But for DER's new interpretation of the term "parcel of property" found in Rule 17-4.04(9)(c), Florida Administrative Code, River Trails' proposed dock meets the statutory and rule requirements for an exemption from obtaining a permit from DER.

Florida Laws (5) 120.52120.54120.56120.68403.813
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