Findings Of Fact Petitioner, John F. Morack, is a member of the Teachers Retirement System (TRS). The TRS is administered by respondent, Department of Administration, Division of Retirement (Division). On April 18, 1988, petitioner began working for a new employer and concurrently filled out an application form to enroll in the Florida Retirement System (FRS), a plan also administered by the Division. By letter dated June 27, 1988, the Division, through its chief of bureau of enrollment and contributions, Tom F. Wooten, denied the request on the ground Morack failed to qualify for such a transfer. Dissatisfied with the agency's decision, Morack initiated this proceeding. Petitioner first enrolled in the TRS on September 18, 1970, when he began employment as a dean at Broward Community College. At that time, he had no option to enroll in any retirement program except the TRS. Under the TRS, an employee did not have to make contributions to social security and earned "points" for calculating retirement benefits at a rate of 2% for each year of creditable service. In contrast, under the FRS, which was established in late 1970, members earned benefits at a rate of only 1.6% per year but were participants in the social security program. Finally, a TRS member could not purchase credit for wartime military service unless he was an employee at the time he entered the military service and was merely on a leave of absence. On the other hand, an FRS member could purchase credit for military service after ten years of creditable service as long as such military service occurred during wartime. When the FRS was established in late 1970, members of the TRS were given the option of transferring to the newly created FRS or remaining on TRS. Morack executed a ballot on October 15, 1970 expressing his desire to remain on the TRS. In November 1974, the Division offered all TRS members an open enrollment period to change from TRS to FRS. Morack elected again to remain on the TRS. In the latter part of 1978, the Division offered TRS members a second open enrollment period to switch retirement systems. On November 21, 1978, Morack declined to accept this offer. On January 1, 1979 Morack accepted employment with the Department of Education (DOE) in Tallahassee but continued his membership in the TRS. He remained with the DOE until July 1981 when he accepted a position in the State of Texas. However, because Morack intended to eventually return to Florida, he left his contributions in the fund. Approximately two years later, petitioner returned to Florida and accepted a position at Florida Atlantic University (FAU) in Boca Raton as assistant vice president effective July 11, 1983. About the same time, he prepared the following letter on a FAU letterhead. To Whom it May Concern: This is to indicate that I elect remaining in TRS rather than FRS. (Signature) John F. Morack The letter was received by the Division on July 19, 1983, and the enrollment form was processed on November 2, 1983. Although Morack stated that he was told by an FAU official that he could not transfer plans at that time, there is no competent evidence of record to support this claim since the testimony is hearsay in nature. On November 18, 1985, Morack requested the Division to audit his account for the purpose of determining how much it would cost to purchase his Korean War military service. On January 24, 1986, the Division advised Morack by memorandum that because he had "no membership time prior to (his) military service, that service is not creditable under the provisions of the Teachers' Retirement System." During the next two years Morack requested two audits on his account to determine retirement benefits assuming a termination of employment on July 31, 1987 and June 30, 1988, respectively. On April 14, 1988, Morack ended his employment with FAU and began working on April 18, 1988, or four days later, at Palm Beach Junior College (PBJC) as construction manager for the performing arts center. When he began working at PBJC he executed Division Form M10 and reflected his desire to be enrolled in the FRS. As noted earlier, this request was denied, and Morack remains in the TRS. The denial was based on a Division rule that requires at least a thirty day break in service with the state in order to change retirement plans after returning to state employment. Because Morack's break in service was only four days, he did not meet the requirement of the rule. At hearing and on deposition, Morack acknowledged he had several earlier opportunities to transfer to the FRS but declined since he never had the benefits of the FRS explained by school personnel. As retirement age crept closer, petitioner began investigating the differences between the TRS and FRS and learned that the latter plan was more beneficial to him. This was because the FRS would allow him to purchase almost four years of military service, a higher base salary would be used to compute benefits, he could participate in social security, and there would be no social security offset against his retirement benefits. Also, petitioner complained that school personnel were not well versed in retirement plans and either were unaware of alternative options or failed to adequately explain them. As an example, Morack points out that when he returned from Texas in 1983 he was not told by FAU personnel about the change in the law now codified as subsection 121.051(1)(c). Finally he thinks it unfair that the Division counts four days employment in a month as a full month's creditable service for computing benefits but will not count his four days break in service in April 1988 as a full month for computing the time between jobs.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that petitioner's request to change retirement plans be DENIED. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of November, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of November, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-4183 Respondent: 1. Covered in finding of fact 6. 2-4. Covered in finding of fact 7. 5. Covered in finding of fact 10. 6-7. Covered in finding of fact 11. Covered in findings of fact 8 and 11. Covered in findings of fact 1 and 10. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. John F. Morack 10474 Green Trail Drive Boynton Beach, Florida 33436 Stanley M. Danek, Esquire 440 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Andrew J. McMullian, III State Retirement Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Adis Maria Vila Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire general Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to purchase leave of absence retirement credit on behalf of James Gapinski, Petitioner's ex- husband and a deceased member of the Florida Retirement System.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Geraldine Gapinski, is the former spouse of James Gapinski, deceased. At the time of his death, Mr. Gapinski was an employee of Florida State University and a "vested" Florida Retirement Service (FRS) member. Petitioner is an employee of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) and an active member of FRS. Mr. Gapinski was continuously employed by Florida's Univeristy System from approximately 1970, until his death on November 20, 2000, with the exception of a period from September 10, 1976 to June 9, 1977, during which period he took an approved leave of absence. During the period September 10, 1976 to June 9, 1977, no contributions were made by Mr. Gapinski or on Mr. Gapinski's behalf to FRS toward his accruing retirement benefits and he earned no creditable service in FRS for this eight month period he was on his leave of absence. On May 4, 2000, Mr. Gapinski requested an audit and estimate of retirement benefits from Respondent. At the time of his request for an audit and estimate, Mr. Gapinski and Petitioner had begun a dissolution of marriage proceeding (divorce). At all times material, each litigant had independent legal counsel, and each lawyer was aware that Mr. Gapinski's FRS benefits were "on the table" for division of the marital estate in the course of the divorce proceedings. At all times material, Mr. Gapinski was terminally ill with cancer. On September 14, 2000, Mr. Gapinski applied for participation in the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP). His application (DROP Form DP11) requested a DROP "begin date" of September 1, 2000, and designated each of Mr. Gapinski's two adult daughters as 50 percent primary beneficiaries. Petitioner, who at that time was still married to Mr. Gapinski, was not even designated a secondary beneficiary. The application, which Mr. Gapinski signed, stated in pertinent part, I understand that the earliest date my participation in the DROP can begin is the first date I reach my normal retirement date as determined by law . . . I cannot add additional service, change options, or change my type of retirement after my DROP begin date (emphasis in original). The application also specified eight required acts before Mr. Gapinski could retire and become a DROP participant, including, but not limited to, 4. A check payable to FRS for any amount you owe, or a written statement that you do not wish to claim the service . . . . On September 15, 2000, Respondent provided James Gapinski with two estimates of benefits. Estimate No. 1 showed the benefit Mr. Gapinski would be entitled to if he chose to purchase the one year leave of absence for $6,820.52, providing for a DROP beginning date of September 1, 2000. This estimate further advised that 6.5 percent per annum would be posted on June 30, 2001. It also stated, Comments: The amount due is to purchase service for your leave of absence from September 10, 1976 to June 9, 1977. This amount must be paid for a DROP begin date of September 1, 2000. Mr. Gapinski was also notified of the need to purchase his leave of absence credit in a letter from Respondent dated September 15, 2001, stating, in pertinent part, as follows: The following items are pending. The amount due is to purchase service for your leave of absence from September 10, 1976 to June 9, 1977. If you do not elect to pay the above amount due and purchase the service it represents, we must have written notification of your intent. * * * Completion of the Option Selection for FRS members, . . . AFTER YOUR FIRST MONTH OF DROP PARTICIPATION YOU CANNOT ADD ADDITIONAL SERVICE, CHANGE OPTIONS, CHANGE YOUR DROP BEGIN DATE OR CHANGE YOUR TYPE OF RETIREMENT. * * * Estimate No. 2 sent to Mr. Gapinski on September 15, 2000, showed the benefit Mr. Gapinski would be entitled to if he chose not to purchase his leave of absence and waited until March 1, 2001, to participate in DROP, when he would accrue 30 years of service without counting the gap left by his 1976-1977 leave of absence. This estimate also stated: Comments: This estimate does not include the purchase of your leave of absence and is provided for comparison purposes. It is provided for DROP purposes with a March 1, 2001, DROP begin date (see the enclosed DROP brochure). If you do not elect to pay the amount due and purchase the service it represents, we must have written notice of your intent. Apparently, neither attorney ever saw any of the foregoing papers. The thrust of Petitioner's attorney's actions and advice was to obtain survivorship retirement benefits, not necessarily DROP benefits, for Petitioner. On October 23, 2000, Petitioner's attorney was told by telephone by Ms. Ferguson, a representative of Respondent, that Petitioner must make a non-party request to release Mr. Gapinski's retirement information to her. So far as this record shows, no third party request was ever made, but that day, Petitioner's attorney and Ferguson also generally discussed retirement pay-out options that Mr. Gapinski could elect, and Petitioner's attorney was generally aware that the DROP process was not complete. On October 24, 2000, Petitioner's attorney discussed by telephone, retirement, divorce, and survivorship benefit issues and life insurance payment options with Ms. Hudson, a representative of Respondent. On October 26, 2000, Petitioner's attorney discussed, by telephone, retirement options and steps to be taken, with both Ms. Ferguson and Mr. Helms, another of Respondent's representatives. Mr. Helms told her the DROP application was not complete but if the couple were still married, Option No. 3 would give the most benefit for survivorship benefits. During the October 2000, conversations, Petitioner's attorney made each of Respondent's representatives aware of the impending divorce and of Mr. Gapinski's impending death, but the attorney did not specifically inquire how soon the lapsed time payment must be made and none of Respondent's representatives volunteered information on that issue. At Mr. Gapinski's request, the divorce proceeding was bifurcated. Prior to the divorce, Petitioner's attorney had done independent research and was aware that Mr. Gapinski had to pay the $6,820.52, in order to perfect the DROP program and in order to complete 30 years of creditable service in order to be eligible for survivorship benefits on his retirement. This information was communicated to Petitioner by her attorney and whether or not Petitioner would be willing to pay half the amount was discussed. Petitioner stated she would be willing to pay half the amount owed. As a condition to her agreement to bifurcate the divorce proceeding, that is, as a condition to letting Mr. Gapinski out of the marriage but reserving jurisdiction in the Circuit Court to resolve certain disputes concerning assets and entitlements, Petitioner required that the couple enter into an "Agreement" on October 27, 2000, which provided, in pertinent part, as follows: BIFURCATION: The Husband shall be entitled to bifurcation of the dissolution action. The marriage of the parties shall be dissolved with the Court reserving on all remaining unresolved issues not addressed in this agreement. In light of the Husband's health, the Wife shall schedule and appear at an ex parte hearing to dissolve the marriage, to obtain Court-ordered approval of this agreement, and to ensure the Court's reservation of jurisdiction to hear any and all issues pertinent to support and the division of property not yet settled by the parties. * * * B. The Wife further agrees that all marital assets awarded to her in this cause (including proceeds from the Husband's retirement and life insurance in the event the Husband predeceases her), shall be placed in an inter vivos trust, from which she may draw living, personal, and medical expenses, during her life, with the parties' adult daughters named as the irrevocable beneficiaries of the remainder of such trust. C. The Husband agrees to bequeath sufficient marital assets, awarded to him in this cause, to the parties' adult daughters to aid in their comfort and support. HUSBAND'S RETIREMENT: The Husband shall elect an option on his retirement with the State of Florida that provides for survivorship benefits for the benefit of the Wife. The wife shall be entitled to all such retirement survivorship benefits which, like the other assets she receives in this bifurcated action, shall be placed in an inter vivos trust for her living, personal and medical expenses, during her life, with the adult daughters as irrevocable beneficiaries of the remainder of the trust. The Husband shall, simultaneously with the signing of the agreement, execute such documents as are necessary to create retirement survivorship benefits in accordance with this term. Should the Husband fail to execute the survivorship option on his retirement or should he ever change such option in contravention of this term, the Husband agrees that the obligation of this term is binding upon his estate, which estate shall be responsible for paying such retirement survivorship benefits to the Wife. The Agreement could have, but did not, specifically require that the leave of absence be purchased by either Mr. Gapinski or Petitioner. Petitioner's and Mr. Gapinski's Agreement does not bind the Respondent, which was in no way privy to that Agreement. Petitioner and Mr. Gapinski's marriage was dissolved on November 1, 2000. Petitioner's attorney provided Mr. Gapinski, through his counsel, with DROP forms (FST-12 and FRS-11o). On November 1, 2000, Mr. Gapinski executed Option 2 for his DROP retirement on these forms, naming Petitioner as his sole primary beneficiary and negating his prior designation of his adult daughters as beneficiaries. Option No. 2 provides for a reduced monthly benefit payable for the FRS member's (Mr. Gapinski's) lifetime. If the member dies before receiving 120 monthly payments, his designated beneficiary (Petitioner) would receive a monthly benefit in the same amount until the monthly benefit payments to both of them equaled 120 monthly payments, when payments would terminate. Option No. 2 is available for regular service retirements as well as DROP retirements. Option No. 3 is also available for regular service retirements and DROP retirements. Option No. 3 would have provided a reduced monthly benefit payable for Mr. Gapinski's lifetime, and upon his death, his joint annuitant, if living, would receive a lifetime monthly benefit payment in the same amount as Mr. Gapinski was receiving. Then, no further benefits would be payable after both he and his joint annuitant were deceased. There are exceptions to the foregoing general description, none of which matter to the case at bar. Option No. 3 would clearly provide more money to Petitioner if she were eligible. On November 2, 2000, Petitioner's attorney had three short telephone conversations with Mr. Helms, who opined that since Mr. Gapinski had signed up for DROP while the couple were still married, Petitioner could still get Option No. 3, with DROP retroactive to September 1, 2000, but that the leave of absence must be paid for. Apparently, Petitioner's attorney did not ask what would happen if the gap was not paid for before Mr. Gapinski died and no representative of Respondent volunteered that information. The thrust of Petitioner's case continued to be to persuade Mr. Gapinski to pay the whole amount due and to change his Option election to No. 3. On or about November 3, 2000, Mr. Helms sent an estimate letter based on selecting a September 1, 2000, retirement date with Option No. 1, to Mr. Gapinski. This estimate letter stated Mr. Gapinski had 30.11 years of creditable service. It did not mention DROP or any pay back. It did state that no lump sum retirement or cash value payments were available. (Second page of attachment to Exhibit P-11). On November 3, 2000, Petitioner's attorney wrote Mr. Gapinski's attorney that Mr. Gapinski was considered by Respondent to be in the DROP program as of September 1, 2000, not March 1, 2001, as supposed before the divorce, but he had not bought back his leave by paying $6,820.52, and requested that Mr. Gapinski change his Option Election Form to Option No. 3 and authorize the payment of the $6,820.52 to Respondent. On or about November 9, 2000, Petitioner's attorney sent the already-executed FST-12 (Beneficiary Designation Form) and FRS-11o (Option Selection for FRS Members) showing Option No. 2 to Respondent. Mr. Helms acknowledged receipt. On or about November 9, 2000, Mr. Helms told Petitioner's attorney that the forms were correct and anyone could pay the $6,820.52. The attorney felt Mr. Gapinski was enrolled in DROP but that the $6,820.52 was still needed. On November 15, 2000, Petitioner's attorney sent Mr. Helms a letter memorializing their conversation, in which Mr. Helms had indicated it was not necessary for Petitioner to sign below the Option No. 2 selection paragraph on FRS 11o as long as she was aware of the option Mr. Gapinski had selected. On November 20, 2000, Mr. Gapinski passed away without anyone having purchased his leave of absence credit. Mr. Gapinski was only 57 years of age when he died. DROP retirement or regular service retirement with full benefits is possible at 62 years of age or upon attaining 30 years of creditable service. Mr. Gapinski remained in regular employment until his death. Because he had not purchased the leave of absence credit, Mr. Gapinski died with only 29 years and 9 months of creditable service for purposes of retirement. In other words, he was 3 months and ten days short of the 30-year retirement mark necessary to activate DROP or regular service retirement. Petitioner never communicated directly with Respondent until after Mr. Gapinski's death. Mr. Gapinski's will provided for the effective disinheritance of Petitioner to the extent provided by law. On December 14, 2000, Petitioner's attorney spoke by telephone with Mr. Helms, who told her he thought Petitioner could still pay the leave of absence money but he would call her back. On December 15, 2000, Stanley Colvin, another of Respondent's representatives, telephoned Petitioner's attorney to say Petitioner could not pay the amount after Mr. Gapinski's death. At no time prior to Mr. Gapinski's death did any representative of Respondent affirmatively represent to anyone that Petitioner could pay the money after Mr. Gapinski's death or the conditions under which no benefits would be paid or specifically what would happen if Mr. Gapinski died before the money was paid by someone. By a December 15, 2000, letter, Respondent notified Petitioner that since Mr. Gapinski had elected not to purchase the leave of absence, he could not have reached the required 30 years of service necessary to participate in the DROP program until March 1, 2001. It further stated that since Mr. Gapinski's death occurred before completion of the required months necessary to participate in DROP, his DROP application was cancelled and his choice of Option No. 2 was nullified. Moreover, Mr. Gapinski was viewed as an active FRS member on the date of his death, and because Petitioner, though designated as his beneficiary was not also a joint annuitant, she could only receive a refund of Mr. Gapinski's retirement contributions in the amount of $4,719.19,and was not eligible to receive Option No. 3. Respondent did not send a similar letter to prior beneficiaries, the decedent, or his estate/personal representatives. Petitioner requested a review, and on February 2, 2001, Respondent issued its proposed final agency action letter, to the same effect as the December 15, 2000, letter. Respondent did not send a similar proposed final agency action letter to prior beneficiaries, the decedent, or his estate/personal representatives. However, the undersigned notes that Mr. Gapinski's adult daughters, who also were his joint personal representatives, were present in the courtroom on September 24, 2001, the first day of hearing. As of the second day of hearing on October 21, 2001, the estate had been closed and the personal representatives had been discharged. Mr. Larry Hunnicutt, Benefits Administrator for the Bureau of Retirement Calculations, Division of Retirement, testified by deposition. He indicated that Respondent Division of Retirement has no rules in place specifically addressing DROP. Therefore, in DROP cases, Respondent interprets and applies Chapter 121, Florida Statutes, and the existing rules addressing regular service retirement. In practice, Respondent gives DROP applicants a 90-day grace period from the date of application in which to finalize all the outstanding documents or other requirements for DROP eligibility, including payments of amounts due, even though there are no provisions in place authorizing a grace period for DROP applicants. If there are money amounts due, the member must pay up during this period. If the member fails to pay up during this period, the DROP application and the option selected for DROP is cancelled by a certified letter, but the designated beneficiary remains intact. Herein, because the amounts were not paid before Mr. Gapinski died, and because it would serve no purpose to notify the decedent, who could no longer complete his DROP requirements, Respondent did not send the deceased member a cancellation of his DROP application and Option No. 2 selection. Rather, it treated the DROP application and option selection as null and void and notified his ex-wife, the designated beneficiary, of what Respondent understood to be her rights. In this notification, Respondent applied the statutes as its personnel understood them to apply to a member who dies in active service prior to reaching either 62 years of age or 30 years of creditable service. Respondent would have permitted Petitioner to pay the money on Mr. Gapinski's behalf only during his lifetime. If the amount due had been paid, and Petitioner were qualified for Option No. 2, she would receive approximately $500,000 plus cost of living increases as opposed to $4,719.19. She would receive considerably more if she qualified for Option No. 3.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement enter a final order denying Petitioner's request to purchase leave of absence credit on the account of James Gapinski. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of December, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of December, 2001.
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 57.105(5), Florida Statutes, and, if so, what amount?
Findings Of Fact The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this proceeding. § 57.105(5), Fla. Stat.; and Order and Mandate in Case No. 1D04-4167, First District Court of Appeal. Section 57.105(5), Florida Statutes, reads as follows: (5) In administrative proceedings under chapter 120, an administrative law judge shall award a reasonable attorney's fee and damages to be paid to the prevailing party in equal amounts by the losing party and a losing party's attorney or qualified representative in the same manner and upon the same basis as provided in subsections (1)-(4). Such award shall be a final order subject to judicial review pursuant to s. 120.68. If the losing party is an agency as defined in s. 120.52(1), the award to the prevailing party shall be against and paid by the agency. A voluntary dismissal by a nonprevailing party does not divest the administrative law judge of jurisdiction to make the award described in this subsection. Subsection (5) of Section 57.105, Florida Statutes, directs the undersigned to the preceding subsections which set forth standards to be applied in the analysis of entitlement to attorney’s fees. Subsection (1) provides that reasonable attorney’s fees shall be awarded to the prevailing party to be paid by the losing party where the losing party or the losing party’s attorney knew or should have known that a claim or defense, when initially presented to the administrative tribunal or at any time before the administrative hearing, “[w]as not supported by the material facts necessary to establish the claim or defense or [w]ould not be supported by the application of then-existing law to those material facts.” The standards set forth in Subsection (1) and incorporated by reference in Subsection (5) were the result of an amendment to Section 57.105, Florida Statutes, in 1999. s. 4, Ch. 99-225, Laws of Florida. Prior to that amendment, the statute provided for the award of attorney’s fees when “there was a complete absence of justiciable issue of either law or fact raised by the complaint or defense of the losing party.” These new standards became applicable to administrative hearings in 2003 by s. 9, Ch. 2003-94, Laws of Florida, with an effective date of June 4, 2003. Petitioner filed his Petition for Administrative Hearing in September 2003. Accordingly, the newer standards of Section 57.105, Florida Statutes, apply to this case. In the case of Wendy’s v. Vandergriff, 865 So. 2d 520, (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), the court discussed the legislative changes to Section 57.105: [T]his statute was amended in 1999 as part of the 1999 Tort Reform Act in an effort to reduce frivolous litigation and thereby to decrease the cost imposed on the civil justice system by broadening the remedies that were previously available. See Ch. 99- 225, s. 4, Laws of Florida. Unlike its predecessor, the 1999 version of the statute no longer requires a party to show a complete absence of a justiciable issue of fact or law, but instead allows recovery of fees for any claims or defenses that are unsupported. (Citations omitted) However, this Court cautioned that section 57.105 must be applied carefully to ensure that it serves the purpose for which it was intended, which was to deter frivolous pleadings. (Citations omitted) In determining whether a party is entitled to statutory attorney's fees under section 57.105, Florida Statutes, frivolousness is determined when the claim or defense was initially filed; if the claim or defense is not initially frivolous, the court must then determine whether the claim or defense became frivolous after the suit was filed. (Citation omitted) In so doing, the court determines if the party or its counsel knew or should have known that the claim or defense asserted was not supported by the facts or an application of existing law.(Citation omitted) An award of fees is not always appropriate under section 57.105, even when the party seeking fees was successful in obtaining the dismissal of the action or summary judgment in an action. (Citation omitted) Wendy's v. Vandergriff, 865 So. 2d 520, 523. The court in Wendy’s recognized that the new standard is difficult to define and must be applied on a case-by-case basis: While the revised statute incorporates the ‘not supported by the material facts or would not be supported by application of then-existing law to those material facts’ standard instead of the ‘frivolous’ standard of the earlier statute, an all encompassing definition of the new standard defies us. It is clear that the bar for imposition of sanctions has been lowered, but just how far it has been lowered is an open question requiring a case by case analysis. Wendy’s v. Vandergriff, 865 So. 2d 520, 524 citing Mullins v. Kennelly, 847 So. 2d at 1155, n.4. (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). More recently, the First District Court of Appeal further described the legislative change: The 1999 version lowered the bar a party must overcome before becoming entitled to attorney’s fees pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes . . . Significantly, the 1999 version of 57.105 ‘applies to any claim or defense, and does not require that the entire action be frivolous.’ Albritton v. Ferrera, 913 So. 2d 5, 6 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), quoting Mullins v. Kennelly, supra. The Florida Supreme Court has noted that the 1999 amendments to Section 57.105, Florida Statutes, “greatly expand the statute’s potential use.” Boca Burger, Inc. v. Richard Forum, 912 So. 2d 561, 570, (Fla. 2005). The phrase “supported by the material facts” found in Section 57.105(1)(a), Florida Statutes, was defined by the court in Albritton to mean that the “party possesses admissible evidence sufficient to establish the fact if accepted by the finder of fact.” Albritton, 913 So. 2d 5, at 7, n.1. Therefore, the first question is whether FAMU or its attorneys knew or should have known that its defense of Dr. Jain’s claim was not supported by the material facts necessary to establish the defense when the case was initially filed or at any time before trial. That is, did FAMU possess admissible evidence sufficient to establish its defense. The parties filed a Pretrial Stipulation the day before the hearing. The Pretrial Stipulation characterized FAMU’s position as follows: It is the position of the University that Dr. Babu Jain retired at the close of business on May 30, 2003, pursuant to the provision of the DROP retirement program. Dr. Jain did not have the right, nor the authority, to unilaterally rescind his resignation and retirement date. In a letter dated May 5, 2003, the Division of Retirement informed Dr. Jain that it was providing him with the “DROP VOID” form that had to be signed by himself and the University, for his participation in DROP to be rescinded. No University official signed that form nor agreed to rescind his retirement. On May 30, 2003, Dr. Babu Jain knew that his retirement through DROP had not been voided and that he had in-fact retired. The University included the position that Dr. Jain occupied in its vacancy announcement in the ‘Chronicle of Higher Education.’ The University, through Dr. Larry Robinson notified Dr. Jain that his retirement rescission was not accepted. Dr. Jain did not work past May 30, 2003. Finally, there was never a ‘meeting of the minds’, nor any other agreement between the University and Dr. Jain to void his retirement commitment. It [is] the University’s position that Dr. Babu Jain retired from Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University effective at the close of business on May 30, 2003. Pretrial Stipulation at 14-15. (emphasis in original) The material facts known by FAMU necessary to establish its defense against Petitioner's claim at the time the case was filed included: Petitioner’s initial Notice of Election to Participate in DROP and Resignation of Employment in which Dr. Jain resigned effective the date he terminated from DROP (designated as May 30, 2003); Dr. Robinson’s letter dated May 27, 2003, which asserted that the University was not in agreement with Dr. Jain's decision and that the decision to terminate from DROP is a mutual one; Dr. Robinson's letter of May 30, 2003, which informed Dr. Jain that the two summer semester employment contracts were issued to him in error and informing Dr. Jain that he would be paid through May 30, 2003, his designated DROP date; the refusal of anyone from FAMU to sign the DROP-VOID form provided to Dr. Jain by the Division of Retirement; the reassignment of another instructor to take over Dr. Jain’s classes the first Monday following the designated DROP termination date; and the Refund of Overpayment of Salary Form and resulting salary deduction from Dr. Jain’s sick leave payout. It is difficult to determine what, if any, additional facts FAMU learned through discovery. That is, whether deposition testimony of FAMU officials enlightened FAMU or its attorneys as to material facts not known at the time the case was filed by Dr. Jain, is not readily apparent. However, a review of the pre-trial depositions reveals material facts which supported FAMU’s defense that the summer contracts were issued in error and that there was no meeting of the minds between the parties regarding voiding Dr. Jain’s DROP participation. In particular, Dr. Robinson, Provost and Vice- President for Academic Affairs, testified in deposition that when he signed Dr. Jain’s summer employment contracts on May 20, 2003, he had no knowledge of Dr. Jain’s participation in the DROP program; that he first became aware that Dr. Jain was in DROP with a DROP termination date of May 30, 2003, upon receiving a May 21, 2003, memorandum from Nellie Woodruff, Director of the FAMU Personnel Office; and that Dean Larry Rivers did not have the authority to issue work assignments for any of his faculty beyond their DROP dates. Additionally, Dr. Henry Williams, Assistant Dean for Science and Technology, testified in deposition that when he signed the Recommendation for Summer Employment on May 5, 2003, which recommended Dr. Jain for teaching summer courses beginning May 12, 2003, he was unaware that there was a 30-day window during which a DROP participant could not be employed. Obviously, when the undersigned weighed all of the evidence, including evidence presented at hearing which is not part of this analysis, it was determined that the preponderance of the evidence was in favor of Dr. Jain’s position. However, that is not the standard to be applied here. The undersigned concludes that at the time the case was filed and prior to the commencement of the hearing, FAMU possessed admissible evidence sufficient to establish the fact that it did not give written agreement to his decision to abandon DROP and resume employment if accepted by the finder of fact. While the finder of fact ultimately did not agree with FAMU, FAMU possessed the material facts necessary to establish the defense, i.e., admissible evidence sufficient to establish the fact if accepted by the trier of fact, when the case was filed and prior to the final hearing. The second question is whether FAMU’s defense would not be supported by the application of then existing law to those material facts, when the case was initially filed or at any time before the final hearing. In the Pretrial Stipulation, the parties referenced Sections 121.091(13) and 121.021(39), Florida Statutes, as provisions of law relevant to the determination of the issues in the case.2/ These statutory provisions were also referenced by the undersigned in the Recommended Order as “two competing statutory provisions.” Recommended Order at 15. Subsection 121.091(13), Florida Statutes, establishing the DROP program, was created by s. 8, Ch. 97-180, Laws of Florida, with an effective date of January 1, 1999.3/ Section 121.091(13), Florida Statutes (2003), read as follows: DEFERRED RETIREMENT OPTION PROGRAM.--In general, and subject to the provisions of this section, the Deferred Retirement Option Program, hereinafter referred to as the DROP, is a program under which an eligible member of the Florida Retirement System may elect to participate, deferring receipt of retirement benefits while continuing employment with his or her Florida Retirement System employer. The deferred monthly benefits shall accrue in the System Trust Fund on behalf of the participant, plus interest compounded monthly, for the specified period of the DROP participation, as provided in paragraph (c). Upon termination of employment, the participant shall receive the total DROP benefits and begin to receive the previously determined normal retirement benefits. Participation in the DROP does not guarantee employment for the specified period of DROP. Participation in the DROP by an eligible member beyond the initial 60-month period as authorized in this subsection shall be on an annual contractual basis for all participants. Section 121.021(39)(b), Florida Statutes (2003), read as follows: 'Termination' for a member electing to participate under the Deferred Retirement Option Program occurs when the Deferred Retirement Option Program participant ceases all employment relationships with employers under this system in accordance with s. 121.091(13), but in the event the Deferred Retirement Option Program participant should be employed by any such employer within the next calendar month, termination will be deemed not to have occurred, except as provided in s. 121.091(13)(b)4.c. A leave of absence shall constitute a continuation of the employment relationship. Unlike the situation in Albritton, supra, the DROP program was relatively new and the statutes creating the same were not well established provisions of law. Dr. Jain was in the first “class” of DROP for FAMU. FAMU and its lawyers did not have the benefit of established case law that discussed DROP and its provisions when this case was filed or at any time before the hearing. While general contract law also came into play, it had to be considered in the context of the DROP program, which had no precedent of case law. FAMU argues in its Response to the Motion for Attorney's Fees that it interpreted the provision in Section 121.091(13), Florida Statutes, that requires written approval of the employer to be either the DROP VOID form provided by the Division of Retirement or a written document, executed by the designated University official, specifically approving Petitioner's decision. "The University did not believe the employment contracts that were issued to Petitioner in error, would constitute written approval." FAMU's Response at 5. This argument is consistent with the position FAMU took in the Pretrial Statement quoted above, that there was never a meeting of the minds "or any other agreement" that Dr. Jain's retirement rescission was accepted. A critical conclusion in the Recommended Order is found in paragraph 38: "Moreover, while the FAMU administration did not sign the DROP-VOID form, the contracts issued to Dr. Jain constitute written approval of Dr. Jain's employer regarding modification of his termination date." FAMU also took the position in the Pretrial Stipulation that Dr. Jain did not work past May 30, 2003, based upon the material facts recited above. Under that reading of the facts, Dr. Jain did not work during the next calendar month after DROP, and, therefore terminated employment consistent with the definition of "termination" in Section 121.021(39)(b), Florida Statutes. Again, while the undersigned did not agree with FAMU's application of the material facts to the then-existing law, FAMU's interpretation was not completely without merit. See Mullins v. Kennerly, 847 So. 2d 1151, 1155. (Case completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by reasonable argument for extension, modification or reversal of existing law is a guideline for determining if an action is frivolous.) Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that at the time the case was filed and prior to the commencement of the hearing, FAMU did not know and could not be expected to know that its defense would not be supported by the application of then-existing law to the material facts necessary to establish the defense. Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is ORDERED: Petitioner’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is denied. DONE AND ORDERED this 1st day of March, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 2006.
The Issue The issue addressed in this proceeding is whether Petitioner is entitled to retain retirement benefits received by him during the time periods May 19, 1983, through December 31, 1983; May 18, 1984, through December 31, 1984; and May 17, 1985 through June 30, 1985.
Findings Of Fact On June 26 and 27, 1990, respectively, the Respondent and the Petitioner submitted to the Hearing Officer their proposed Findings of Fact. In the Appendix to the Recommended Order the Hearing Officer submitted recommended rulings thereon. The following constitutes the rulings in this Final Order on those proposed Findings of Fact. The Petitioner's proposed Findings of Fact Nos. 1, 2, and 3 are hereby accepted and adopted in that they are supported by competent, substantial evidence. The Petitioner's proposed Finding of Fact No. 4 is hereby rejected as an ultimate finding of fact in that it a recitation of isolated bits and pieces of testimony of witnesses, and it is not proper as an ultimate finding of fact. The Petitioner's proposed Finding of Fact No. 5 is hereby rejected upon the authority of Cantor v. Cochran, 184 So.2d 173 (Fla.), in that it is based upon statements of the parties as to the working relationship, which under the Cantor case is not competent evidence. The Petitioner's proposed Finding of Fact No. 6 is hereby rejected upon the grounds and for the reason stated in Paragraph No. 3. The Petitioner's proposed Finding of Fact No. 7 is accepted to the extent that on November 1, 1984, the Petitioner was an employee of the Union County School Board, and continued as such through June 30, 1987, but the remainder of that proposed Finding of Fact No. 7 is hereby rejected in that it is based on the statements and arrangements of the parties, which, based upon the Cantor case do not constitute competent evidence. The Petitioner's proposed Findings of Fact Nos. 8, 9, and 11, are hereby rejected in that each of them is ambiguous, irrelevant, not based upon any competent substantial evidence in the record, and do not serve to either prove or disapprove any of the issues in this cause. The Petitioner's proposed Finding of Fact No. 10, is hereby rejected in that is erroneous as to the dates in question and as to the number of hours in the School Board workweek. The dates in 1983, 1984, and 1985, during which the Petitioner's retirement benefits had been suspended because of exceeding the 780-hour work limitation were as follows: May 19, 1983, through December 31, 1983; May 18, 1984, through December 31, 1984; and May 17, 1985, through June 30, 1985. The Respondent's proposed Finding of Fact Nos. 1 through 8 are each hereby accepted and adopted in that they are each based upon competent, substantial evidence.
Recommendation It is accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That the Division enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner was overpaid retirement benefits for the time periods of May 25, 1985 through June 30, 1985, in the amount of $3024.66. DONE and ORDERED this 31st day of August, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 1990.
The Issue Whether the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement (“the Department”) should be equitably estopped from requiring Michael A. Fewless to return $541,780.03 of retirement benefits.
Findings Of Fact The following findings are based on witness testimony, exhibits, and information subject to official recognition. FRS and the Termination Requirement FRS is a qualified plan under section 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code and has over 500,000 active pension plan members. The Department administers FRS so that it will maintain its status as a qualified pension plan under the Internal Revenue Code. Section 121.091(13), Florida Statutes (2018),1/ describes the benefits available to FRS members through the “Deferred Retirement Option Program (“DROP”): In general, and subject to this section, the Deferred Retirement Option Program, hereinafter referred to as DROP, is a program under which an eligible member of the Florida Retirement System may elect to participate, deferring receipt of retirement benefits while continuing employment with his or her Florida Retirement System employer. The deferred monthly benefits shall accrue in the Florida Retirement System on behalf of the member, plus interest compounded monthly, for the specified period of the DROP participation, as provided in paragraph (c). Upon termination of employment, the member shall receive the total DROP benefits and begin to receive the previously determined normal retirement benefits. Section 121.091 specifies that “[b]enefits may not be paid under this section unless the member has terminated employment as provided in s. 121.021(39)(a). ” Section 121.021(39)(a) generally provides that “termination” occurs when a member ceases all employment relationships with participating employers. However, “if a member is employed by any such employer within the next 6 calendar months, termination shall be deemed not to have occurred.” § 121.021(39)(a)2., Fla. Stat. Moreover, the employee and the re-employing FRS agency will be jointly and severally liable for reimbursing any retirement benefits paid to the employee. § 121.091(9)(c)3., Fla. Stat.2/ The termination requirement is essential to the FRS maintaining its status as a qualified plan under IRS regulations. As a qualified plan, taxes on FRS benefits are deferred.3/ The Department’s position is that after an entity becomes a participating employer, all new hires within covered categories are “compulsory members” of the FRS. If an entity has a local pension plan, then that entity must either close the plan before joining FRS or keep the plan open for members who exercise their right to remain in that plan. However, even if the entity chooses to keep the local plan open for current members, the local plan is closed to new members. The City of Fruitland Park, Florida (“Fruitland Park”), became an FRS employer on February 1, 2015. The mayor and commissioners of Fruitland Park passed a resolution on November 20, 2014, providing in pertinent part, that: It is hereby declared to be the policy and purpose of the City Commission of Fruitland Park, Florida that all of its General Employees and police officers, except those excluded by law, shall participate in the Florida Retirement System as authorized by Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. All General Employees and police officers shall be compulsory members of the Florida Retirement System as of the effective date of participation in the Florida Retirement System so stated therein. (emphasis added). The Department notified Fruitland Park during its enrollment into FRS that all new hires were compulsory members of FRS for covered groups. Facts Specific to the Instant Case After graduating from the Central Florida Police Academy in 1985, Mr. Fewless began working for the Orange County Sheriff’s Office (“OCSO”) as a deputy sheriff and patrolled what he describes as “the worst area of Orange County.”4/ After five years, Mr. Fewless transferred into the detective bureau in OCSO’s criminal investigations division. Mr. Fewless received a promotion to corporal two years later and returned to patrolling.5/ Mr. Fewless soon received a transfer to OCSO’s special investigation’s division and worked in the gang enforcement unit.6/ It was not long before he was promoted to sergeant and sent “back to the road.” After 10 months, OCSO asked Mr. Fewless to take over the gang enforcement unit where he was promoted to lieutenant and ultimately to captain.7/ During his tenure as a captain, Mr. Fewless was in charge of OCSO’s internal affairs unit for five or six years. Mr. Fewless concluded his nearly 30-year tenure with OCSO as the director of the Fusion Center and the Captain of the criminal intelligence section.8/ In sum, Mr. Fewless’s service with OCSO was exemplary, and he was never the subject of any disciplinary actions. Mr. Fewless entered the DROP program on June 1, 2011. As a result, he was scheduled to complete his DROP tenure and retire on May 31, 2016. On June 1, 2011, Mr. Fewless signed a standardized FRS document entitled “Notice of Election to Participate in the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) and Resignation of Employment.” That document contained the following provisions: I elect to participate in the DROP in accordance with s. 121.091(13), Florida Statutes (F.S.), as indicated below, and resign my employment on the date I terminate from the DROP. I understand that the earliest date my participation in the DROP can begin is the first date I reach normal retirement date as determined by law and that my DROP participation cannot exceed a maximum of 60 months from the date I reach my normal retirement date, although I may elect to participate for less than 60 months. Participation in the DROP does not guarantee my employment for the DROP period. I understand that I must terminate all employment with FRS employers to receive a monthly retirement benefit and my DROP benefit under Chapter 121, F.S. Termination requirements for elected officers are different as specified in s. 121.091(13)(b)(4), F.S. I cannot add service, change options, change my type of retirement or elect the Investment Plan after my DROP begin date. I have read and understand the DROP Accrual and Distribution information provided with this form. Mr. Fewless realized by 2015 that he was not ready to leave law enforcement. However, he was scheduled to retire from OCSO by May 31, 2016. Mr. Fewless had several friends who left OCSO as captains and took police chief positions with municipalities in Florida. Therefore, in anticipation of a lengthy job search, he began looking for such a position in approximately March of 2015. Mr. Fewless applied to become Fruitland Park’s police chief on March 26, 2015, and was offered the job in June of 2015 by Fruitland Park’s city manager, Gary LaVenia. Mr. Fewless learned from Mr. LaVenia that Fruitland Park had joined FRS and told him that he could not work within the FRS system. Mr. LaVenia then erroneously told Mr. Fewless that he would not be violating any FRS conditions (and thus forfeiting his DROP payout) because Fruitland Park had a separate city pension plan into which Mr. Fewless could be enrolled. As noted above, Fruitland Park had passed a resolution mandating that “[a]ll General Employees and police officers shall be compulsory members of the Florida Retirement System as of the effective date of participation in the Florida Retirement System. ” While Mr. Fewless was pleased with what Mr. LaVenia told him, he called an FRS hotline on July 9, 2015, in order to verify that he would not be endangering his retirement benefits by accepting the police chief position with Fruitland Park. Mr. Fewless’s question was routed to David Kent, and Mr. Fewless described how he was going to work for Fruitland Park and that Fruitland Park was an FRS employer. Mr. Kent told Mr. Fewless that he could go to work for Fruitland Park immediately without violating any FRS requirements so long as he was not enrolled into the FRS system. Instead of being an FRS enrollee, Mr. Kent stated that Mr. Fewless could enroll into Fruitland Park’s pension plan or enter a third-party contract.9/ Mr. Fewless assumed that Mr. Kent was an FRS expert and remembers that Mr. Kent sounded very confident in the information he relayed over the telephone. On July 14, 2015, Mr. Fewless filled out and signed a form entitled “Florida Retirement Systems Pension Plan Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) Termination Notification.” The form indicates that Mr. Fewless would be ending his employment with OCSO on August 1, 2015. In addition, the form notified Mr. Fewless of the requirements associated with receiving his accumulated DROP and monthly benefits: According to our records, your DROP termination date is 08/01/2015. You must terminate all Florida Retirement System (FRS) employment to receive your accumulated DROP benefits and begin your monthly retirement benefits. You and your employer’s authorized representative must complete this form certifying your DROP employment termination. Termination Requirement: In order to satisfy your employment termination requirement, you must terminate all employment relationships with all participating FRS employers for the first 6 calendar months after your DROP termination date. Termination requirement means you cannot remain employed or become employed with any FRS covered employer in a position covered or noncovered by retirement for the first 6 calendar months following your DROP termination date. This includes but is not limited to: part-time work, temporary work, other personal services (OPS), substitute teaching, adjunct professor or non-Division approved contractual services. Reemployment Limitation: You may return to work for a participating FRS employer during the 7th – 12th calendar months following your DROP termination date, but your monthly retirement benefit will be suspended for those months you are employed. There are no reemployment limitations after the 12th calendar month following your DROP termination date. If you fail to meet the termination requirement, you will void (cancel) your retirement and DROP participation and you must repay all retirement benefits received (including accumulated DROP benefits). If you void your retirement, your employer will be responsible for making retroactive retirement contributions and you will be awarded service credit for the period during which you were in DROP through your new employment termination date. You must apply to establish a future retirement date. Your eligibility for DROP participation will be determined by your future retirement date and you may lose your eligibility to participate in DROP.[10/] (emphasis in original). Mr. Fewless’s Reliance on the Representations Made to Him Mr. Fewless placed complete trust in the representations made during his July 9, 2015, phone call to the FRS hotline and during his discussions with Fruitland Park’s city manager. When he left OCSO and accepted the police chief position with Fruitland Park, Mr. Fewless took a $33,000.00 annual pay cut and stood to receive $70,000.00 less from his DROP payout. It is highly unlikely he would have accepted those circumstances if he did not have a good faith basis for believing he was utilizing an exception to the termination requirement. In the months preceding his departure from OCSO, Mr. Fewless’s wife was being treated for a brain tumor. Following her surgery in May of 2015 and subsequent radiation treatment, Ms. Fewless returned to work for a month or two. However, given that the retirement checks Mr. Fewless had begun to receive were roughly equivalent to what Ms. Fewless had been earning, she decided to retire in order to spend more time with their grandchildren. During this timeframe, Mr. and Ms. Fewless decided to build their “dream home,” and Ms. Fewless designed it. They used a $318,000.00 lump sum payment from FRS to significantly lower their monthly house payment. Those actions would not have been taken if Mr. Fewless had suspected that there was any uncertainty pertaining to his retirement benefits. The Department Discovers the Termination Violation In November of 2017, the Department’s Office of the Inspector General conducted an audit to assess Fruitland Park’s compliance with FRS requirements. This audit was conducted in the regular course of the Department’s business and was not initiated because of any suspicion of noncompliance. The resulting audit report contained the following findings: (a) Fruitland Park had failed to report part-time employees since joining FRS; (b) Fruitland Park had failed to report Mr. Fewless as an employee covered by FRS; (c) Mr. Fewless’s employment with Fruitland Park amounted to a violation of FRS’s reemployment provisions; and (d) Fruitland Park failed to correctly report retirees filling regularly established positions. Because he had failed to satisfy the termination requirement, the Department notified Mr. Fewless via a letter issued on August 15, 2018, that: (a) his DROP retirement had been voided; (b) his membership in FRS would be retroactively reestablished11/; and (c) he was required to repay $541,780.03 of benefits. Mr. Fewless’s Reaction to Learning That He Had Violated the Termination Requirement Mr. Fewless learned on June 25, 2018, of the Department’s determination that he was in violation of the termination requirement. He responded on July 5, 2018, by writing the following letter to the Department: On the evening of, June 25, 2018, I was notified by Mr. Gary LaVenia, the City Manager for Fruitland Park, that he was contacted by members of the State of Florida’s DMS Inspector General’s office regarding a problem with my current retirement plan. No additional information was shared during this initial telephone conversation and we scheduled a meeting for the following day. On June 26, 2018, I met with Mr. Gary LaVenia, Ms. Diane Kolcan, Human Resource Director and Ms. Jeannine Racine, the Finance Director regarding this matter. I was advised that members of the Department of the Florida Retirement System told them that I was in violation of receiving my current retirement benefits because I failed to take a six month break between my retirement with the Orange County Sheriff’s Office and joining the City of Fruitland Park. I explained to them that there must be some mistake because I am not currently enrolled in the Florida Retirement System through the City of Fruitland Park. The City enrolled me in their “City” pension plan. Mr. LaVenia agreed with me and we closed the meeting with me advising them I would do some additional research on the matter. * * * I then reached out to Mr. Chris Carmody, an attorney with the Gray/Robinson Firm, whom I worked with on legislative issues in the past. . . . I explained to him that according to the Inspector General’s report, I needed to have a six month separation between the Orange County Sheriff’s Office and the City of Fruitland Park, because both agencies participated in the Florida Retirement System. Mr. Carmody still did not feel that was a violation because I was not enrolled in the FRS Plan with the City of Fruitland Park, but rather their independent City pension plan. I felt the same way; however he wanted to continue to research the issue. A few hours later I received a telephone call from Mr. Carmody indicating the problem appears to be that the “City” participates in the FRS Pension Plan and even though I do not, I would be prohibited from working there for the six month period. After hearing this news, I immediately contacted Ms. Amy Mercer, the Executive Director of the Florida Police Chief’s Association. I explained the dilemma to her and just like the previously mentioned individuals she said “so what did you do wrong, that sounds ok to me. ” Ms. Mercer said she would reach out to the two attorneys that support the Florida Police Chief’s Association to get their opinion of the situation. The following morning, Ms. Mercer advised me that according to Attorney Leonard Dietzen my actions were in violation of the Florida Retirement Pension Plan Rules. Mr. Dietzen explained to her that I needed a six month separation from my employment with the Florida Retirement System and the City of Fruitland Park, because the City participated in the FRS Pension plan. Therefore, based on the above information [and] the realization that an innocent mistake had been made, please let me explain my actions: * * * In either June or July of 2015, I officially interviewed for the position of Police Chief for the City of Fruitland Park. . . . Approximately one week after the interviews, I was offered the position of Police Chief for the City of Fruitland Park. In July of 2015, I contacted the official FRS Hotline regarding my potential decision to join the Fruitland Park Police Department. I informed them that I was currently employed with the Orange County Sheriff’s Office and enrolled in DROP. I advised them that I was considering accepting the position of police chief with the City of Fruitland Park; however I wanted to confirm with them that I would have no issues with my retirement. I explained that the City of Fruitland Park was currently an FRS department; however they also had a separate “City” pension plan which I was going to be placed in. I wanted to confirm that this would not negatively impact my retirement benefits. I was advised that as long as I was enrolled in the “City” pension plan, I would be fine. The FRS employee also added that he heard other “new chiefs” were doing an “independent contract” with the City for a one year period, but he assured me either way would be fine. I concluded my telephone conversation and proceeded forward. I then began the employee benefits negotiations process with Mr. LaVenia. At the time of the negotiations, I realized I would be receiving my Florida Retirement check on a monthly basis and my wife was also employed as the vice-president of the Orlando Union Rescue Mission in Orlando, Florida. Therefore money was not my primary concern for this position and I surrendered my much larger salary with the Orange County Sheriff’s Office to become the Chief of Police for Fruitland Park for $70,000 per year. I officially accepted the position with the City of Fruitland Park, and informed Mr. LaVenia that I could not participate in the Florida Retirement System; however according to the FRS Hotline employee I could be placed in the city pension plan or sign a contract for a one year period. Mr. LaVenia recommended that I be placed in the city pension plan and had the appropriate paperwork completed. * * * It is important to recognize that I felt I took all the necessary steps to act within the guidelines of the Florida Retirement System. After all, I had worked for over thirty years with the Orange County Sheriff’s Office with an impeccable record and with the intent of securing a retirement package that would protect my wife and family for life. In conclusion, I feel I have been let down by the system in two very key areas regarding this matter: In July 2015, not only was I preparing for retirement and a new job; but my wife was experiencing serious medical issues that required surgery and radiation treatments for months at Shands Hospital. Although my mind was focused on her condition, I still felt it was extremely important to contact the FRS Hotline regarding my potential new position. My desire was to make sure I did not do anything that would jeopardize the retirement plan I worked for my entire career. The advice I was given by the FRS Hotline employee/professional apparently was terrible. Not only did he indicate I could go under the “City” pension plan, he further recommended that other chiefs have decided to do a “contract” with the city for a one year period to account for the separation from the FRS system. Clearly had this employee indicated by any means that the position with Fruitland Park would or possibly could jeopardize my retirement, I would have run away from this opportunity . . . * * * In July and August of 2015, while I was completing the hiring process with the City of Fruitland Park, management and/or staff should have cautioned me about the potential risk to my Florida Retirement Pension if I proceeded with the process. * * * Clearly, whoever made the decision to proceed with processing me was unaware of two things. (1) I would be violating the six month separation rule if I stopped my employment with the Orange County Sheriff’s Office on August 1, 2015 and began employment with Fruitland Park one day later on August 2, 2015. (2) The only pension plan available to new employees with the City of Fruitland Park had to be the Florida Retirement System. * * * I now understand from going through this procedure that there [was] an unintended error in how I officially retired from the Orange County Sheriff’s Office and began my employment with the Fruitland Park Police Department. It is important to mention that Sheriff Kevin Beary and Sheriff Jerry Demings chose me to command their Professional Standards Division on two separate occasions because they knew I was a man of integrity and would always “do the right thing.” I had no intent to skirt the system and/or do anything unethical. I can assure you nobody raised a red flag over this position prior to this incident; and I would have immediately stopped my efforts had I been aware of this rule. Mr. Fewless’s Current Situation While working as Fruitland Park’s police chief, Mr. Fewless’s salary and retirement benefits totaled $12,000.00 a month. In order to avoid accumulating more penalties, Mr. Fewless retired from his police chief position with Fruitland Park on August 31, 2018. Mr. Fewless has not received any FRS benefits since September 1, 2018. There was a three-month period when he was receiving no money. Mr. Fewless has been employed by the Groveland Police Department since March 4, 2019. Mr. Fewless describes his current financial situation as “dire” and says he and his wife are “wiped out.” They may need to sell their “dream house,” and they borrowed $30,000.00 from their daughter in order to litigate the instant case. In addition, the contractor who built the Fewless’s dream home failed to pay subcontractors for $93,000.00 of work. While the Department notes that Mr. Fewless stands to receive a higher monthly benefit, he disputes that he is somehow in a better position: No, I am not in a better position. The $542,000 that will be taken away from me because of what clearly could have been handled with one phone call from a representative of FRS – the difference in pay between my former retirement salary and my new retirement salary based on the recalculations will go from $6,000 to $7,000 a month. That means in order for me to recoup the $542,000 that the state was referring to, I would have to work 542 months. I don’t think I’ll live that much longer, No. 1. And No. 2, that doesn’t take into consideration interest and everything else that was part of that, if that makes sense. Mr. Fewless has filed a lawsuit against Fruitland Park. Ultimate Findings of Fact12/ Mr. Fewless’s testimony about his July 9, 2015, phone call to the FRS hotline is more credible than Mr. Kent’s. Mr. Fewless’s descriptions of that phone call are very consistent, and the Department has not directed the undersigned to any instances in which an account of that phone call by Mr. Fewless differed from his testimony or his July 5, 2018, letter to the Department.13/ This finding is also based on Mr. Fewless’s demeanor during the final hearing. Moreover, Mr. Fewless was not attempting to “game the system.” Given Mr. Fewless’s exceptional record of public service, it is very unlikely that he would knowingly and intentionally attempt to engage in “double dipping” by violating the termination requirement. It is equally unlikely that Mr. Kent can accurately remember what he told Mr. Fewless during a single phone call on July 9, 2015. Rather than questioning Mr. Kent’s veracity, the undersigned is simply questioning his ability to recall the content of a single phone call that appears to have been unremarkable.14/ It is also difficult to believe that Mr. Fewless would accept the police chief position with Fruitland Park and build an expensive “dream house” after being told by Mr. Kent that he would be violating the termination requirement.15/ Mr. Fewless’s reliance on Mr. Kent’s statement was entirely reasonable given that the arrangement described by Mr. LaVenia sounded like an imminently plausible exception to the termination requirement. Mr. Fewless’s subsequent actions in reliance of that statement were extremely detrimental to himself and his family. Finally, the circumstances of the instant case are analogous to other cases in which appellate courts have held that the enhanced requirements for estopping the government had been satisfied. In other words, Mr. Kent’s misrepresentation amounted to more than mere negligence, the Department’s proposed action would result in a serious injustice, and the public interest would not be unduly harmed by Mr. Fewless retaining the retirement benefits he earned through his public service with OCSO.
Conclusions For Petitioner: Ryan Joshua Andrews, Esquire Brian O. Finnerty, Esquire Johana E. Nieves, Esquire The Law Offices of Steven R. Andrews, P.A. 822 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303 For Respondent: Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Sean W. Gillis, Esquire Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services Suite 160 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order rescinding its proposed action that Michael A. Fewless’s FRS DROP retirement be voided and that he be required to repay all retirement benefits as provided in Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S- 4.012. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of July, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of July, 2019.
The Issue The issue is whether payment of Petitioner's retirement benefits should have commenced after the filing of an application to retire with the Division of Retirement, with an effective date of April 1, 2004, or be retroactively changed to the date of his termination of employment, July 1, 2003.
Findings Of Fact On July 19, 1995, Petitioner applied for membership in the Special Risk Division of the Elected Officers' Class of the Florida Retirement System ("FRS"). On August 14, 1995, Respondent sent Petitioner a letter admitting him into FRS. On September 6, 1995, Sarabeth Snuggs, Chief of the Bureau of Enrollment and Contributions for Respondent, sent Petitioner a letter revoking his membership in FRS. On December 17, 1996, Petitioner wrote to Sarabeth Snuggs responding to Respondent's decision to revoke his membership in FRS. Petitioner cited Section 121.052(2)(d), Florida Statutes, which provides that membership in FRS includes "any constitutional county elected officer assuming office after July 1, 1981, including any sheriff." The Consolidated City of Jacksonville was created by the Florida Legislature with the enactment of Chapter 67-1320, Laws of Florida. Section 1.01 of the Jacksonville Charter provides that the county government of Duval County and the municipal government of the City of Jacksonville are consolidated into a single body politic. The Charter further provides that the consolidated government succeeds to and possesses all of the properties of the former government. After being denied membership in FRS, Petitioner and other members of the consolidated government and its instrumentalities worked diligently to convince Respondent to admit Petitioner into FRS. During Petitioner's attempts to be included in FRS, Respondent repeatedly took the position that Duval County did not exist as a county agency. In a letter to Petitioner dated January 15, 1997, Ms. Snuggs wrote that the consolidated Duval County government "chose to consolidate as a 'city' government." Mr. Keane worked with the Duval County Legislative Delegation to amend Chapter 121 to specifically clarify the fact that the Duval County Sheriff and Clerk of Court are constitutional officers entitled to participate in FRS. In 2002, the Florida Legislature adopted language to clarify the Duval County Sheriff and Clerk of Court's status with respect to FRS. In a letter dated June 24, 2002, Petitioner thanked Ms. Snuggs for recognizing his right to elect membership in FRS. Petitioner observed that, since he was in the last year of his second term as Sheriff (Duval County allows only two consecutive terms), he wanted confirmation of his "right to connect the previous seven (7) years of service as Sheriff." The June 24, 2002, letter also asked for "guidance" from Respondent. The purpose of the June 24, 2002, letter was for Petitioner to learn how Respondent intended to treat his first six years of service. Petitioner sought to avoid any problems since his retirement date was rapidly approaching. On October 10, 2002, Petitioner and Mr. George Dandelake, the Chief of the Budget and Management Division of the Sheriff's Office, wrote to Ms. Snuggs requesting a calculation of the amount of employer contributions required on Petitioner's behalf. The October 10 letter also requested that Respondent "identify what documents are required, in addition to the contribution amount which will be paid by the City, that must be supplied to the Florida Retirement System." Petitioner re-applied for membership in FRS, which was granted on June 1, 2002, after the effective date of the legislation designed to specifically admit the Duval County Sheriff and Clerk of Court into FRS. On June 18, 2003, twelve days before the expiration of his term of office, still not having received confirmation of the status of his prior service, Petitioner sent a letter to Ms. Snuggs advising that FRS had not recognized his service from 1995 through 2002. Petitioner again stated in the letter that he was terminating his position as Sheriff on June 30, 2003. Less than a week prior to the termination of his term, Petitioner received two "Statement[s] of Account" dated June 24, 2003, indicating that "you have until retirement to pay the amount due on your account." The statements further indicated that "when you become vested for monthly benefits, we will provide you an estimate of benefits with and without this service." According to the first Statement of Account, Petitioner was entitled to purchase prior service at the 1.6 percent multiplier rate for the FRS regular class. According to the second Statement of Account, Petitioner was entitled to purchase prior service at the 2.0 percent multiplier rate for the FRS special risk class. Neither Statement of Account was correct, as both failed to permit Petitioner to purchase service at the 3.0 percent rate for special risk, despite the fact that Petitioner had served a continuous and uninterrupted term as Sheriff. The Statement of Account did not advise Petitioner that he must submit a separate retirement application, Form FR-11, in order to preserve his retirement date. The statement did advise Petitioner that interest would be assessed at a rate of 6.5 percent. This warning appeared in bold face on the Statement of Account. The June 24, 2003, statements were the first time that Petitioner was supplied with the amount due to purchase service credit. Since neither statement applied the correct multiplier rate (3.0 percent) for all eight years of Petitioner's service as Sheriff, neither statement was correct. Recognizing that only six days remained prior to the expiration of Petitioner's term as Sheriff, Mr. Keane advised Petitioner to submit payment to Respondent on an expedited basis. After receiving the June 24, 2003, Statements of Account, Petitioner prepared a letter dated June 26, 2003, to Cal Ray, the Director of the Department of Administration and Finance for the Consolidated City of Jacksonville. In this letter, Petitioner requested an employer contribution in the amount of $163,554.32 to purchase his prior service. Petitioner further requested an expedited preparation of the check to ensure delivery to Respondent by July 1, 2003. The letter to Mr. Ray requested payment of the amounts that would have been periodically contributed by the City of Jacksonville if Respondent had been acknowledged as a participant in FRS in 1995. On June 27, 2003, three days prior to the expiration of his term of office, Petitioner drove from Jacksonville to Tallahassee to meet with Respondent's representatives, including Ms. Snuggs, regarding Petitioner's retirement. Mr. Dandelake accompanied Petitioner on this trip. At the June 27, 2003, meeting, Petitioner personally delivered a check to Respondent in the amount of $163,554.32. Respondent accepted the check and issued a written receipt signed by Sarabeth Snuggs. Petitioner was never told during the June 27, 2003, meeting with Respondent that he would forfeit benefits if he failed to complete an application. Respondent knew that Petitioner was leaving office on June 30, 2003. Respondent never discussed the filing of an application for retirement benefits at any time during the course of its conversations and correspondence with Petitioner. Petitioner was never told by Respondent to complete any forms to protect his rights to the 2.0 percent multiplier during the pendency of his dispute with Respondent. Petitioner was never provided any handbook, notice, statutes, or rules indicating he would forfeit benefits under any circumstances. When Petitioner left the June 27, 2003, meeting, both he and Mr. Dandelake understood that he was still engaged in a dispute with Respondent over his entitlement to the 3.0 percent multiplier. Petitioner knew that he was required to file an application in order to receive retirement benefits. Petitioner testified that if he had left the June 27 meeting with any indication that he would forfeit benefits by not filing an application, he would have filed something, with advice of counsel, to preserve his rights. Petitioner received an Estimate of Benefits via fax from Respondent on June 27, 2003, reflecting an annual benefit of $23,105.90. This statement valued 6.92 years of Petitioner's uninterrupted special risk service as Sheriff using the 2.0 percent multiplier, and 1.08 years of service as Sheriff using the 3.0 percent multiplier. The June 27, 2003, statement lists Petitioner's retirement date as July 1, 2003. The estimate does not warn Petitioner that he must do anything in order to preserve his July 2003 retirement date. The estimate states only that it is subject to "final verification of all factors." Petitioner's term of office as elected Sheriff ended on June 30, 2003. Petitioner's employment terminated when his term expired on that date. Respondent was aware of the dates of the expiration of Petitioner's term of office as well as his employment termination date. When Petitioner's employment terminated on June 30, 2003, it was unclear whether he would be credited with the 3.0 percent multiplier for his eight years of special risk service. Petitioner was not notified by Respondent prior to the expiration of his term as Sheriff on June 30, 2003, that he needed to submit a retirement application. The first time Petitioner was advised by Respondent of the need to file an application for retirement benefits was in the comment section of the Estimate of Retirement Benefits provided to him by letter dated March 4, 2004. The warning was printed in bold face type. The Estimate of Retirement Benefits dated June 27, 2003, did not include the bold face warning to file an application. Respondent was not provided with a Division of Retirement publication entitled "Preparing to Retire" prior to his leaving service on June 30, 2003. In fact, the copy of the publication offered into evidence by Respondent is dated "July 2003," subsequent to Petitioner's retirement. As the only member of FRS in his office in Jacksonville, Petitioner had no staff or employees trained in FRS or Florida retirement benefits. Petitioner was provided with a "Preparing to Retire" booklet in March 2004. On November 3, 2003, Florida Attorney General Opinion 2003-46 confirmed that Petitioner, as the elected Sheriff, was eligible for membership in the Elected Officer's Class of the Florida Retirement System. On December 31, 2003, and on January 16, 2004, Petitioner's counsel attempted to obtain clarification from Respondent regarding Petitioner's retirement benefits. The December 31, 2003, letter noted that the "extraordinary delay" in resolving the issue of Petitioner's benefits was at no time due to fault on the part of Petitioner. Respondent never refuted or disputed this statement. By letter dated March 4, 2004, Petitioner was finally advised by Respondent that he was entitled to be credited with the higher 3.0 percent multiplier for all eight years of his service as Sheriff. Petitioner noted that the March 4, 2004, Statement of Account, while properly applying the 3.0 percent multiplier, now had changed Petitioner's retirement date to April 2004 from the previous estimates showing a retirement date of July 2003. The March 4, 2004, statement included the bold face notice to Petitioner that he must file an application for retirement benefits. No prior notices or correspondence from Respondent had informed Petitioner that he must file Form FR-11 in order to retain his retirement date of July 1, 2003. After formally being notified that he would receive the 3.0 percent multiplier for all eight of his years of service as Sheriff, and after having received the notice that he must file Form FR-11, Petitioner submitted the form in April 2004. Respondent is a fiduciary charged with acting in the best interest of participants in FRS. Andy Snuggs, who travels around the state educating employers and employees in FRS, acknowledged that Petitioner was not responsible for the delay by Respondent in recognizing Petitioner's entitlement to the 3.0 percent multiplier. Mr. Snuggs acknowledged that he does not tell employees that they will forfeit benefits if they delay the filing of their applications. Petitioner received his first retirement check in May 2004 which was based upon the benefit established in March 2004 of $32,624.58 annually, not the $23,105.90 previously established by Respondent in June 2003. Petitioner has received no retroactive benefits for the period of July 1, 2003, through April 30, 2004. In a letter dated May 6, 2004, Petitioner stated that his acceptance of the first retirement check was not to be construed by Respondent of a waiver of his rights to retroactive benefits from July 1, 2003, forward.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner be awarded retirement benefits at the rate of 3.0 percent per year for his eight years of Elected Officer's Class of service, retroactive to July 1, 2003. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of July, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of July, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert D. Klausner, Esquire Klausner & Kaufman, P.A. 10059 Northwest 1st Court Plantation, Florida 33324 Robert B. Button, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-9000 Alberto Dominguez, General Counsel Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-9000
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application to participate in the Deferred Retirement Option Program should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: On August 24, 2001, Petitioner submitted to the Division a Florida Retirement System Application for Service Retirement and the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP), Form FRS DP-11. On the form, Petitioner indicated his name, social security number, birth date (June 22, 1946), his position title (guidance counselor), present Florida Retirement System employer (Miami-Dade County Public Schools), work phone, home phone, and home mailing address. These entries were followed by the a printed statement, which read as follows: I have resigned my employment on the date stated below and elect to participate in the DROP in accordance with Subsection 121.091(13), Florida Statutes (F.S.). My DROP participation cannot exceed a maximum of 60 months from the date I first reach my normal retirement date as determined by the Division of Retirement . I understand that I must terminate all employment with FRS employers to receive a monthly retirement benefit and my DROP benefit. I cannot add additional service, change options, or change my type of retirement after the DROP begin date. If I fail to terminate my employment in accordance with s. 121.021(39)(b), F.S., on my DROP termination date, my retirement will be null and void and my FRS membership shall be established retroactively to the date I began DROP. I have read and understand the DROP Accrual and Distribution information on the reverse side of this form. The "DROP begin date" and the "DROP termination and resignation date" that were filled in the form were August 1, 2001, and July 31, 2006, respectively. On the "Beneficiary Designation" portion of the form, Petitioner named his wife, Marianne F. Coto, as his "primary" beneficiary, and his daughter, Claudine Coto, as his "contingent" beneficiary. Their birth dates (but not their social security numbers) were noted on the form. At the bottom of the form was the following "Employer Certification," signed and dated (August 24, 2001), by Miami- Dade County Public Schools personnel officer, Maria Perez: This is to certify that the above named member will be enrolled as a DROP participant on the date stated and will terminate his or her employment on the date stated. On August 24, 2001, Petitioner also submitted to the Division a Florida Retirement System Notice of Election to Participate in the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) and Resignation of Employment, Form FRS DP-ELE. On the form, Petitioner indicated his name, social security number, birth date, his position title, present Florida Retirement System employer, work phone, home phone, and home mailing address. These entries were followed by a printed statement, which read as follows: Resignation From Employment to Participate in the DROP: I elect to participate in the DROP in accordance with Subsection 121.091(13), Florida Statutes (F.S.), as indicated below, and resign my employment on the date I terminate from the DROP. I understand that the earliest date my participation in the DROP can begin is the first date I reach my normal retirement date as determined by law and that my DROP participation cannot exceed a maximum of 60 months from the date I reach my normal retirement date, although I may elect to participate in the DROP for less than 60 months. Participation in the DROP does not guarantee my employment for the DROP period. I understand that I must terminate all employment with FRS employers to receive a monthly retirement benefit and my DROP benefit under Chapter 121, F.S. I cannot add additional service, change options, or change my type of retirement after my DROP begin date. On the form, Petitioner indicated that his "DROP begin date" and his "DROP termination and resignation date" were August 1, 2001, and July 31, 2006, respectively. Also on the form was an "Employer Certification," signed and dated (August 24, 2001), by Ms. Perez, the aforementioned Miami-Dade County Public Schools personnel officer, which was identical to the "Employer Certification" on the Form FRS DP-11 that Petitioner had submitted. Petitioner did not submit to the Division (along with Forms FRS DP-11 and DP-ELE) Form FRS 11o, on which he was required to indicate the form of payment of retirement benefits he desired. (Pursuant to the Division's Rule 60S-4.010, Florida Administrative Code, there are four optional forms of payment from which to choose.) Neither did Petitioner furnish the Division with any proof of age. In addition, Petitioner, in September of 1998, had submitted to the Division an Application to Purchase Retirement Credit for a Leave of Absence, but had not yet paid the amount necessary to purchase the credit. Accordingly, by letter dated September 8, 2001, the Division advised Petitioner of the following: This will acknowledge receipt of your Application for Service Retirement and the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) You will be notified should we need additional information. If there is an amount due your account, please make your check payable to the Florida Retirement System (FRS) and reference your social security number on all future correspondence with this office. Date Received: 08/24/2001 Member SSN: . . . . Drop Begin Date: 08/2001 Drop End date: 07/31/2006 Amount Due, if any: $1,126.78 Option Selected: None The following items must be received. Please provide Birth date verification of joint annuitant if Option 3 or 4 is selected. (Read the enclosed Request for Proof of Age, BVR-1). Your birth date verification is required. (Read the enclosed Request for Proof of Age, BVR-1.) Completion of the Option Selection for FRS members, Form FRS-11o is required. The amount due is to purchase service for your leave of absence from 1975-76. If you do not elect to pay the above amount due and purchase the service it represents, we must have written notification of your intent. A Final Salary Certification, FC-1, with current year salary and terminal leave payments (excluding sick leave payments) must be received from your employer. Your employer is aware of this requirement. AFTER YOUR FIRST MONTH OF DROP PARTICIPATION YOU CANNOT ADD ADDITIONAL SERVICE, CHANGE OPTIONS, CHANGE YOUR DROP BEGIN DATE OR CHANGE YOUR TYPE OF RETIREMENT. Petitioner did not provide the Division with the items listed in the September 8, 2001, letter. The Division therefore sent Petitioner a follow-up letter, dated October 24, 2001, which read as follows: DROP RETIREMENT APPLICATION TO BE EFFECTIVE: 08/2001 The item(s) listed below must be received to complete your DROP application and retain the above retirement date: Please provide Birth date verification of joint annuitant if Option 3 or 4 is selected. (Read the enclosed Request for Proof of Age, BVR-1). Your birth date verification is required. (Read the enclosed Request for Proof of Age, BVR-1.) Completion of the Option Selection for FRS members, Form FRS-11o is required. Payment of $1,126.78. Please make your check payable to the Florida Retirement System and note your social security number on the face. Otherwise, provide a written statement indicating that you do not wish to purchase this service. Not having received any response from Petitioner, the Division sent Petitioner an identical letter on November 29, 2001. Still not having received any response from Petitioner, the Division sent Petitioner another letter, dated January 3, 2002, requesting that Petitioner provide the items that had been requested from him in the previous correspondence. The January 3, 2002, letter warned that the items "must be received immediately to avoid cancellation [of Petitioner's] DROP application." The items were not provided by Petitioner. Accordingly, the Division sent him the following letter, dated February 14, 2002: For your Florida Retirement System (FRS) Application for Service Retirement and Deferred Option Program (DROP), DP-11 to be effective 08/2001, the following item(s) previously requested, must be received within 21 calendar days from the date you receive this letter: Please provide Birth date verification of joint annuitant if Option 3 or 4 is selected. (Read the enclosed Request for Proof of Age, BVR-1). You should place your social security number on any documentation provided. Your birth date verification is required. (Read the enclosed Request for Proof of Age, BVR-1.) You should place your social security number on any documentation provided. Completion of the Option Selection for FRS members, Form FRS-11o is required. Payment of $1,126.78. Please make your check payable to the Florida Retirement System and note your social security number on the face. Otherwise, provide a written statement indicating that you do not wish to purchase this service. It is our intent to disapprove your application for the DROP if the requested information and documents are not received within the 21-day period. Should we disapprove your DROP application, the following will be applicable to you: You will be deemed to not have retired and the DROP application will be null and void. If you are eligible to participate in the DROP in the future, you will be required to submit a New Notice of Election to participate in the Deferred [Retirement] Option Program and Resignation of Employment and a new Application for Service Retirement and the Deferred Retirement Option Program during the 12-month period of your latest DROP eligibility date. You will be required to repay your employer for any annual leave payments you received as the result of applying for DROP. Your FRS membership will be reestablished retroactively to the effective date of DROP for which you applied. Your employer will be required to pay the FRS Trust Fund any difference between the DROP contributions and the contributions required for the applicable FRS class of membership. Also you submitted a Notice of Election to Participate in the Deferred Retirement Option Program and Resignation of Employment, DP-ELE, with a resignation date to take effect in the future. Because it is discretionary with the employer as to whether such resignation can be rescinded, you should contact your employer for further information. The beneficiary you designated on the retirement application you filed will remain in effect unless changed by you at a later date. Please call me if you have any questions. Petitioner received this February 14, 2002, letter from the Division on February 25, 2002, but, as of April 9, 2002, had not provided any of the items listed in the letter. Accordingly, on that date (April 9, 2002), Doug Cherry, the Division's Benefits Administrator, telephoned Ms. Perez, and asked her to attempt to make contact with Petitioner and remind him that that if he did not submit the items listed in the February 14, 2002, letter, his application to participate in DROP would be denied. On April 18, 2002, Ms. Perez faxed Mr. Cherry a copy of Petitioner's passport, along with a note that Petitioner would make additional submissions at a later date. No additional submissions were made by Petitioner. Accordingly, on May 29, 2002, the Division sent Petitioner the following letter: We have not received the items that were requested in our February 14th letter (copy enclosed) to you. Accordingly, your Florida Retirement System (FRS) Application for Service Retirement and the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP), DP-11, cannot be approved. Therefore, the following are applicable to you: You are deemed to not have retired and the DROP election is null and void. If you are eligible to participate in the DROP in the future, you will be required to submit a New Notice of Election to participate in the Deferred [Retirement] Option Program (DROP) and Resignation of Employment and a new Application for Service Retirement and the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) during the 12-month period of your latest DROP eligibility date. You will be required to repay your employer for any annual leave payments you received as the result of your having applied for the DROP. Your FRS membership is being reestablished retroactively to 08/2001, the date of your DROP participation. Your employer will be required to pay to the FRS Trust Fund the difference between the DROP contributions (12.50%) and the contributions required for the applicable FRS class of membership during the period you participated in the DROP. Also you submitted a Notice of Election to Participate in the Deferred Retirement Option Program and Resignation of Employment, DP-ELE, with a resignation date to take effect in the future. Because it is discretionary with the employer as to whether such resignation can be rescinded, you should contact your employer for further information. By copy of this letter, we are advising your employer that immediate action is required by the employer to correct your FRS retirement plan on the next payroll reported to the Division. Your employer will be billed for the appropriate FRS contribution adjustments, if any, based on you not having joined the DROP. This letter constitutes final agency action. If you do not agree with this decision and wish to appeal this action, you must file a formal petition for review in accordance with the enclosed Rule 28-106.201, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C.) within 21 days of receipt of this letter. Your petition should be filed with the Division of Retirement at the above address. Upon receipt of the petition, you will be notified by the Division or the Administrative Law Judge of all future proceedings and hearings. If you do not file an appeal within the 21-day period, you will waive your right to request a hearing or mediation in this matter in accordance with Rule 28-206.111, F.A.C. You may contact Doug Cherry at . . . should you desire additional information. Petitioner responded by sending the following letter to Mr. Cherry: I received a certified letter signed by Maurice Helms for Erin B. Sjostrom, which asks to contact you regarding a formal appeal to the action of your agency to cancel my D.R.O.P benefits for this 2001 to 2002 school year. Please allow this to serve as the formal appeal. Needless to say I am very frustrated and upset and would like to request your help to sort through this process. A bit of background history first I believe will help. I started working for Miami-Dade County Public Schools in 1970. At that time I was told it was necessary to be a U.S. citizen to be able to work as a teacher in the school system. I had already decided that and since I had officially turned 22, I became a naturalized U.S. citizen and submitted a copy of the Certificate of Naturalization to the School Board through the Dade County office. Where is that record and why am I being asked to produce it again after having accumulated 31 years of service and after I explained to the local retirement officer in charge, Maria Perez, that I had lost the original when I lost almost the entire contents of my house to Hurricane Andrew in 1992? Honestly since I had submitted [a] copy of my U.S. passport with birth-date and all other pertinent information and I also have my Florida Driver's License, which I have had since 1963 or so, and has been what I have used to verify my age and for identification purposes since I was a kid, (although now I am told by your office that this is not a valid acceptable proof, kindly explain why not?) I never thought it was necessary for me to obtain a copy of the Certificate of Naturalization (U.S. citizenship). Also please tell me why passport and driver's license and 31 years of continuous service on record is not sufficient. It is not as if I were trying to retire after a short time of service. I do have 31 years of service! I do not feel this is the right way to treat a dedicated teacher at the end of his career and I hope you agree with me and will help. To comply with the requirement of another piece of proof of age (which I fail to see the need of in my case where I already have 31 years of verifiable and documented service to Miami-Dade County Public Schools as stated before) I requested a copy of my child's birth certificate from the Bureau of Vital Statistics. This was also a frustrating experience. I requested one copy to be sent to me and one to Dade County Public Schools to the attention of Maria Perez. I was told that the copy would arrive in approximately 10 to 14 days. I have not yet received it. I assume that Ms. Perez never received it either. After thirty-one years of faithful service to the State of Florida, which you have on record, and my birth date established with you over 31 years ago, I find it ludicrous that, after having submitted my passport, having requested, although not having been able to get a copy from the Bureau of Vital Statistics, of my child's birth certificate within a number of days, that your office does not find this to be sufficient proof and that based on the technicality that you have only one instead of two forms of verification of my age, now you will cancel my D.R.O.P., which in essence means forfeiting close to $30,000 that I should have accumulated in my account. Please see the circumstances and kindly reconsider the action taken. I will be extremely grateful. Mr. Cherry responded to Petitioner's letter by sending the following letter, dated June 10, 2002, to Petitioner: This is in response to your letter received in our office on June 6th concerning cancellation of your DROP application. The letter from the Division dated May 29th canceling your DROP application was sent only after several prior notices were also sent. The birth date verification issue raised in your letter was only one of the pending items on your application. We sent an acknowledgment of your application dated September 8, 2001, informing you that we needed an option selection, your birth date verification, your spouse's birth date verification if you selected option 3 or 4 and either payment for your leave of absence or a statement that you did not wish to purchase the service. After receiving no response, we sent memos on October 24, 2001, November 29, 2001 and January 3, 2002, all requesting the same information. We never received any response to these notices. We then sent our February 14th letter by certified mail (which you signed for on February 25, 2002) informing you of our intent to cancel because your application was not complete. A copy of all of this correspondence is enclosed. Again, we received no response [to] this letter. Before sending our cancellation letter, I personally called the Dade School Board and asked them to contact you in one last effort to avoid cancellation. It was only then that we received (on April 18th) a copy of your passport but none of the other required documentation was submitted. After waiting until May 29th for the remaining items to be submitted, we sent the final cancellation letter. It was approximately eight months from our first notice to you of items pending on your application, to the May 29th letter of cancellation. That was certainly sufficient time to submit the needed information and also explain about the difficulty you might have obtaining additional birth date verification. However, during those eight months we had no contact or response from you despite our repeated notices. To summarize, your DROP application is not being cancelled because of birth date verification, but because you did not submit all of the items needed to complete your application, even though you had eight months to do so. Your letter will be forwarded to our Legal section and they will contact you concerning the appeal process. The "Legal Section," after receiving Petitioner's letter, referred the matter to DOAH.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division issue a final order denying Petitioner's application to participate in DROP. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of October, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of October, 2002.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, EVELYN S. WRIGHT, as an employee of Metropolitan Dade County and a member of the State and County Officers and Employees Retirement System, elected to transfer into the Florida Retirement System (FRS) effective December 1, 1970. (Exhibit 3) On April 10, 1972, Petitioner terminated her employment with Metropolitan Dade County and applied for FRS disability retirement benefits pursuant to Section 121.091(4), Florida Statutes, on May 22, 1972. (Exhibit 2) Petitioner's application for FRS disability retirement benefits was initially denied by the Administrator of the Florida Retirement System on August 21, 1972. (Exhibit 4) On January 6, 1975, Petitioner inquired of the Supervisor of the Respondent's Disability Determination Unit, Mr. David Ragsdale, as to the possibility of withdrawing the accumulated contributions in her retirement account. At this time, Petitioner, was advised by Mr. Ragsdale that a withdrawal of contributions would cancel her membership rights in the Florida Retirement System. (TR - p.9) Respondent forwarded to Petitioner, by letter dated January 7, 1975, the appropriate form for making application for a refund of accumulated retirement contributions. The transmittal letter specifically advised the Petitioner that, "Should you complete and return the enclosed card, M81, you would have no further rights or service credit with the Division of Retirement." (Exhibit 5) On January 14, 1975, Petitioner executed, and her employer verified, an application for refund of accumulated retirement contributions. The application form clearly stipulated: "I hereby make application for refund of my accumulated contributions in the Florida Retirement System. I do hereby waive for myself, my heirs and assignees all rights, title and interest in the Florida Retirement System." (Exhibit 6) Petitioner's application for refund of contributions was received by the Respondent on January 17, 1975. Respondent refunded to Petitioner her accumulated contributions in the amount of $3,056.02 by Voucher No. 237738, Warrant No. 0309435, dated January 28, 1975. (Exhibit 6) The attorney for Petitioner, John H. Abramson, was advised by the undersigned hearing officer by telephone that Leave to Take Deposition was granted. By letter from the said attorney the Division was notified that Petitioner's file was being closed.
The Issue Whether Petitioner must forfeit and repay distributions he received from the Deferred Retirement Option Program and subsequent monthly retirement benefits received as a consequence of his election to the position of County Commissioner of Jefferson County within six months of terminating state employment.
Findings Of Fact The Division of Retirement (Division) is, and was at the times material to this case, the state agency charged with the responsibility of administering the Florida Retirement System (FRS). Petitioner, John Nelson, was employed by the Department of Financial Services (DFS) from October 1977 through July 31, 2010. For the last five years of his employment with DFS, Petitioner participated in the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP). Prior to ending his DROP participation, Petitioner completed a DROP Termination Notification Form (DP-TERM Rev. 06/06) on April 23, 2010, confirming he would terminate employment on July 31, 2010. The DROP Termination Notification was also signed by a representative from FRS confirming Petitioner's employment termination date and reads in pertinent part: I understand that I cannot work for any Florida Retirement System (FRS) covered employer during the calendar month following my DROP termination date or my DROP participation will be null and void. If I fail to meet this requirement, I will forfeit my accumulated DROP benefit including interest. I also understand that I may not be reemployed by any FRS employer in any capacity including part-time, temporary, other personal services (OPS) or non-Division approved contractual services during the calendar month immediately following my DROP termination date. If I fail to meet this requirement, I will forfeit my accumulated DROP benefit, including interest retroactive to me enrollment date in the DROP. The above-referenced version of the DP-TERM (Revised 6/06) has been incorporated by reference into Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S-9.001(ee). Due to significant statutory changes made by the Legislature, the Division sent to Petitioner a second DROP Termination Notification, (Form DP-TERM revised 04/10) which he signed on June 9, 2010. The wording in the revised form reflected statutory changes which would take effect July 1, 2010. The revised form states in pertinent part: If your DROP termination date is on or after July 1, 2010: Your termination requirement means you cannot remain employed or become re-employed with any Florida Retirement System (FRS) covered employer during the FIRST SIX calendar months following your DROP termination date. This includes but is not limited to: Part-time work, temporary work, other personal services (OPS), substitute teaching or non-Division approved contractual services. During the 7th-12th calendar months following your DROP termination date, you may return to work for a participating FRS employer but must suspend your retirement benefit for any of these months your[sic] are employed. There are no reemployment exceptions during the reemployment limitation period. After the 12th calendar month following your DROP termination date, there are no employment restrictions. If you fail to meet the termination requirements noted above, you will void (cancel) your retirement and DROP participation, you must repay all retirement benefits received including your DROP accumulation, and you must apply to establish a future retirement date. If you void your retirement your employer will be responsible for making retroactive retirement contributions and you will be awarded service credit for the period during which you were in DROP through your new termination date. Your eligibility for DROP participation will be determined by your future retirement date and you may lose your eligibility to participate in DROP. (emphasis added). The revised form DP-TERM (Revised 04/10) has not yet been adopted as a rule. At the time of hearing, rulemaking had been initiated. Petitioner terminated his employment with DFS on the agreed termination date of July 31, 2010, and was no longer an employee of DFS after that date. Sometime between July 31, 2010, and November 2010, Petitioner was paid his accumulated DROP monies in the amount of $181,635.09, in the form of a direct rollover into an eligible retirement account. Petitioner was also paid monthly retirement benefits for the months of August through November 2010, in the total amount of $11,286.76. The Division deactivated Petitioner's monthly retirement benefits in December 2011. The total amount of retirement benefits paid to Petitioner after terminating employment with DFS is $191,921.85, which the Division seeks to recover. In April of 2010, at the urging of community members, Petitioner registered to run for public office in Jefferson County, Florida. He won the election and was sworn into office as a Jefferson County Commissioner on November 16, 2010. Tyler McNeill is the Chief Deputy Clerk and Human Resources Officer for Jefferson County. Following Petitioner's election as a County Commissioner, Mr. McNeill began to process a small packet of employment-related documents which he provides to elected officials. Mr. McNeill went to Petitioner's home on a Sunday evening to get the necessary papers signed. Prior to this meeting, Petitioner was unaware that Jefferson County participates in the FRS. Petitioner described his reaction to learning this as "shocking." When Mr. McNeill and Petitioner got to the FRS form, Petitioner did not want to sign it and informed Mr. McNeill of that. Mr. McNeill described Petitioner as appearing physically ill, shocked, and "so upset" upon learning that the County was an FRS participating employer. On November 22, 2010, Petitioner and Mr. McNeill called Ira Gaines, FRS Benefits Administrator, using a speakerphone. At the time they placed this call, Petitioner had not yet signed the employment documents supplied to him by Mr. McNeill, and Petitioner informed Mr. Gaines of this. During this conversation, Petitioner expressed his willingness to resign from office and refuse to accept payment from the County for his newly elected position. According to Mr. McNeill, Petitioner was not yet eligible to receive compensation from the County because the employment papers had not yet been processed. Mr. McNeill testified that he would have been able to discard the documents. During this telephone conversation, Mr. Gaines advised that Petitioner was legally a person employed by the County by virtue of his being sworn into office on November 16, 2010. Mr. Gaines equated bring sworn into office as being an employee. At hearing, Mr. Gaines reiterated his position: that he did not know any way Petitioner could not be enrolled in FRS when occupying an elected position. As a result of this telephone conversation with Mr. Gaines and in reliance on Mr. Gaines' advice, Mr. McNeill processed Petitioner's employment papers including the FRS reenrollment form. Mr. Gaines then began receiving salary payments for being a county commissioner. On December 6, 2010, Mr. Gaines sent a letter to Petitioner stating that his election to the position of County Commissioner had voided his DROP participation, and consequently, Petitioner would have to repay $181,635.09 for the DROP payment, and $11,286.76 in monthly retirement benefits. The letter further informed that Petitioner will continue to earn credit as an elected official in the Elected Officer's Class of FRS membership and that Petitioner's retirement account would be adjusted to reflect service from August 2005 through July 2010 (his DROP period) which he estimated would increase Petitioner's retirement benefits by $1,200 per month. In response to the December 6, 2010 letter, Petitioner appealed the voiding of his DROP participation. By letter dated February 1, 2011, the Division denied the request. The February 1, 2011 letter also informed Petitioner of his right to request a hearing, which gave rise to this proceeding.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Division of Retirement enter a final order rescinding the February 1, 2011, notification letter requiring reimbursement of Petitioner's DROP distribution and reimbursement of Petitioner's monthly retirement benefits from August 2010 through December 2010 when those benefits were discontinued; reinstating those monthly benefits beginning six months following the completion of Petitioner's DROP period, and nullifying Petitioner's reenrollment in the Elected Officers' Class of FRS membership. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of March, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of March, 2012.
The Issue Whether the effective date of Petitioner's retirement should be changed from May 1, 2002, to February 23, 2000, or, in the alternative, August 23, 2000, as requested by Petitioner.1
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole,2 the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a retired member of the Florida Retirement System, who turned 62 years of age earlier this year. He worked for the State of Florida for approximately 11 and a half years. He last worked for the State of Florida in February of 1983. On May 2, 1994, the Division received the following written inquiry, dated April 11, 1994, from Petitioner: I was employed by the state from June 1971 until February 1983. Please advise me when I would be eligible to receive retirement benefits and approximately how much my monthly benefits would be. Your assistance in this matter is greatly appreciated. The Division responded to Petitioner's inquiry by sending Petitioner two "Estimates of Retirement Benefit," one based on a retirement date of May 1, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as the "First Estimate") and the other based on a "deferred retirement at age 62" (hereinafter referred to as the "Second Estimate"), along with a pamphlet entitled, "Preparing to Retire" (hereinafter referred to as the "Pamphlet"). The First Estimate contained the following "comments" (at the bottom of the page): To retain a retirement date of 5/1/94, you must complete and return the enclosed application for service retirement, Form FR- 11, within thirty days of the date this estimate was mailed. The Second Estimate contained the following "comments" (at the bottom of the page): This estimate is based on a deferred retirement at age 62. Refer to the enclosed deferred retirement memorandum, DR-1, for additional information. The Pamphlet read, in pertinent part, as follows: If you are preparing to retire, you should take certain steps to ensure there will be no loss of benefits to you. Following are some suggestions. * * * 3. Apply For Retirement Benefits. Three to six months before your retirement complete an application for retirement, Form FR-11, which is available from either your personnel office or the Division of Retirement. Your personnel office must complete part 2 of the Form FR-11 and then they will forward the application to the Division. The Division will acknowledge receipt of your application for benefits and advise you of anything else needed to complete your application. * * * Effective Retirement Date- Your effective date of retirement is determined by your termination date and the date the Division receives your retirement application. You may make application for retirement within 6 months prior to your employment termination date. If your retirement application is received by the Division prior to termination of employment or within 30 calendar days thereafter, the effective date of the retirement will be the first day of the month following receipt of your application by the Division. You will not receive retroactive benefits for the months prior to the effective date of retirement. Remember, your application can be placed on file and any of the other requirements (such as option selection, birth date verification, payment of amount due your account, etc.) met at a later date. Petitioner did not "complete and return the enclosed application for service retirement." Petitioner next contacted the Division in April of 2002, this time by telephone. During this telephone conversation, he was advised that he could apply for retirement immediately. Petitioner requested a "Florida Retirement System Application for Service Retirement" form from the Division. Upon receiving it, he filled it out and sent the completed form to the Division. The Division received the completed form on April 26, 2002. On April 29, 2002, the Division sent Petitioner a letter "acknowledging receipt of [his] Application for Service Retirement" and advising him that his effective retirement date was "05/2002." In or around December of 2002, after receiving several monthly retirement payments from the Division, Petitioner requested that his retirement date be made retroactive to 1994 because he was not adequately advised by the Division, in 1994, that he was then eligible, upon proper application, to receive retirement benefits. By letter dated February 5, 2003, the Division advised Petitioner that it was unable to grant his request. By letter dated March 6, 2003, Petitioner "appeal[ed]" the Division's decision.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division issue a final order denying Petitioner's request that the effective date of his retirement be changed. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of July, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of July, 2003.
