Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations of the Administrative Complaint, Gerald Schultz was a real estate broker holding License #0215135 and active firm broker for Choice Rentals and Realty Corporation (formerly Choice Rentals, Inc., and hereinafter "Choice Rentals"), which was a corporate broker holding License #0195222. Rosemary Hufcut entered into a contract with Choice Rentals on July 30, 1980, for Choice Rentals to provide her with rental information based upon criteria she gave Choice Rentals. Hufcut paid a fee of $50 to Choice Rentals for its services. Hufcut was looking for an apartment for herself and her two daughters. She specified she wanted a good neighborhood with good schools. Hufcut was given rental data by Choice Rentals and, with her father, visited a number of the apartments listed. The apartments were not suitable. On the following day, Hufcut requested a refund and submitted a written request for a refund on August 6, 1980. On August 26, 1980, Hufcut's refund request was denied by a letter from Choice Rentals (Petitioner's Exhibit #6). This letter provided in part: Refusal to accept available rental properties meeting the requirements as set forth in your contract with us, does not constitute cancellation of contractual agreement. (This is pursuant to the Florida Law regarding "obtaining a rental".) note - produced available rental property meeting the requirements stated on contract. Hufcut has never received a refund from Choice Rentals. The Board introduced Petitioner's Exhibits #1 through #6, which were received in evidence.
Recommendation Having found the Respondents guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Board of Real Estate suspend the licenses of Respondents for ten years. DONE and ORDERED this 25th day of March, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Theodore J. Silver, Esquire 9445 Bird Road Miami, Florida 33165 Mr. Gerald Schultz c/o John Hume, Esquire 5100 North Federal Highway, Suite 405 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33308 Choice Rentals & Realty 3367 North Federal Highway Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33308 C. B. Stafford, Executive Director Board of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Samuel Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is Central Phosphates, Inc. ("CPI"), a Delaware corporation, engaged in the business of processing phosphate and manufacturing phosphate fertilizer. Petitioner rents and operates a phosphate fertilizer processing plant which is located in the vicinity of Plant City, Florida (the "Plant"). At issue in this proceeding is whether a sales tax under Section 212.05, Florida Statutes (1977), is due on the rental of the Plant. The Plant was constructed in 1974. The construction was financed in an arrangement involving CF Realty, a sister company of CPI which is wholly owned along with CPI by CF Industries, Inc. CF Realty originally purchased the equipment and other personal property that constitute the Plant from certain contractors. CF Realty then sold the Plant to Plantlease Corporation ("Plantlease"), a New York for profit corporation. Plantlease is a wholly owned subsidiary of Morgan Guarantee Company, a New York lending institution. Plantlease was organized solely and specifically to acquire title to the Plant and to lease the Plant back to CPI, which would operate the Plant. Plantlease paid for the Plant by assuming CF Realty's indebtedness on the construction loan and by paying some additional cash. Plantlease then leased the Plant to CPI for an initial term of 15 years. At the end of this initial term CPI has the right to elect to extend the lease for an additional two years or it may elect to purchase the Plant from Plantlease. At the end of the first extended term, CPI has the option of renewing the lease for a second renewal term of two years, or purchasing the Plant. If the lease is extended to the full 19 years, CPI is entitled to purchase the Plant at the end of that term. CPI makes quarterly rental payments to Plantlease pursuant to the lease. Since the first payment of rent in May, 1975, CPI has also been paying to Plantlease a sales tax of four percent of the amount of each payment pursuant to Section 212.05, Florida Statutes (1977). Plantlease, in turn, has remitted these payments to the Florida Department of Revenue with which it has registered as a dealer. Plantlease, as a potential claimant of a refund of the allegedly erroneously paid rental tax, has waived its right to a refund as reflected in its letter dated May 4, 1978, to the Florida Department of Revenue. Since May, 1975, CPI has paid sales taxes into the State Treasury in the amount of $861,322.55 which rental tax along with all other rental tax payments paid on the Plant since May, 1978, would be refunded if CPI were not liable for the rental tax. On May 8, 1978, CPI filed an Application for Refund with the Comptroller's Office of the State of Florida seeking a refund of the amount allegedly erroneously paid by CPI to the State Treasury and giving reasons for the claim for a refund. CPI bases its claim for a refund on the grounds that the Plantlease rental of the Plant to CPI constitutes an occasional or isolated sales transaction under Section 212.02 (9), Florida Statutes (1977). By letter dated May 30, 1978, the Comptroller's Office denied CPI's Application for Refund and determined that CPI's transaction with Plantlease was not exempt from Section 212.05, Florida Statutes (1977), and the regulations pursuant thereto. On or about July 7, 1978, CPI timely filed a Petition for a Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (1977), hearing on the issue of whether, for aforementioned reasons, a refund was due on the sales tax paid on the Plant. By application dated May 9, 1975, and received by respondent on May 12, 1975, Plantlease applied to respondent for a certificate of registration to engage in or conduct business as a dealer. Item 10 on the form application calls for "Type of Business." In the blank provided, Plantlease's agent has supplied "Rental of personal property." Underneath the blank, in parentheses, are examples of types of businesses, "Grocery, hardware, jewelry " Exhibit A-I, attached to Joint Exhibit No. 2. The foregoing findings of fact should be read in conjunction with the statement required by Stuckey's of Eastman, Georgia v. Department of Transportation, 340 So.2d 119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), which is attached as an appendix to the recommended order.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent deny petitioner's application for refund. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of January, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 APPENDIX Except for the final paragraph, the findings of fact in the recommended order are based on the parties' stipulation, which was received as joint exhibit No. 2. Paragraphs one, two, three, five, nine and ten of petitioner's proposed findings of fact have been adopted in toto. The first sentence of paragraph four of petitioner's proposed findings of fact has been rejected as not being supported by the evidence. The second sentence has been adopted, in substance. Paragraph six of petitioner's proposed findings of fact has been adopted except for the second sentence, which is actually a proposed conclusion of law. Paragraph seven of petitioner's proposed findings of fact has been adopted, in substance. Paragraph eight of petitioner's proposed findings of fact has been adopted except for the second sentence, which is actually a proposed conclusion of law. Paragraphs eleven and twelve of petitioner's proposed findings of fact have been rejected as contrary to the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles Alvarez, Esquire Gary P. Sams, Esquire Mahoney, Hadlow & Adams Post Office Box 5617 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Linda C. Procta, Esquire Harold F. X. Purnell, Esquire Assistant Attorneys General The Capitol, Room LL04 Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is entitled to an "in lieu" payment under the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (42 U.S.C. 4622) as implemented by I. M. 80-1-71 and amended by P. M. 81-1.2.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Florida department of Transportation, because of the proposed widening of State Road 61, Thomasville Road in Tallahassee, Florida, notified Petitioner in the spring of 1974 that the property on which the business was located was to be taken by the Respondent for road purposes. Petitioner was offered, but did not accept, relocation assistance to move his business to another location or to reimburse him in the amount that a never would charge. Other relocation assistance by the Respondent to find sites which would be appropriate for Petitioner's business was offered and four such sites were presented to Petitioner. Petitioner found the sites undesirable and has located a site at which he intends to move his business. Petitioner contends that the location on Thomasville Road is a good location; that he acquires "walk-in" business from time to time; that the sign on the building is of a type consistent with the limited type of advertising available to members of his profession and is beneficial to him; that the building he rents on Thomasville Road has additional space in which he at one time did rent to other interests, but which rental possibilities were foreclosed upon the general public knowledge that the Respondent would widen Thomasville Road and in the process remove the rental building. Petitioner operates his business from the location and shows that the operation of his consultant service is his sole business. The Petitioner filed for in lieu payments after refusing to accept relocation assistance for the moving of his business Petitioner contends: that nothing in the Act states or implies that a displaced person is required to accept relocation assistance if it is economically unsound; that the Respondent failed to sustain the burden of proof that Petitioner is not entitled to "in lieu" payment under the Act. Respondent contends: that the Petitioner failed to show he is entitled to "in lieu" payments under the Act; that the losses such as production costs, rental income, and advertising possibilities are not within the contemplation of the Act.
Findings Of Fact The instant proceeding arises over the application of the Florida documentary stamp tax law, Chapter 201 of the Florida Statutes, to transactions in which customers bought lots from Sandy Development Company and homes from Shubert Construction Company. Documentary stamp taxes and surtaxes have been paid on these transactions reflecting only the price of the lot. The Petitioners assert that the amounts already paid are the proper amounts due. The Respondent, Department of Revenue, asserts that the taxes and surtaxes are due upon the price of the home and lot together. The Department has issued a proposed notice of assessment against the Petitioners which reflects the amount due for additional taxes and surtaxes if the Department's position is upheld, plus an amount levied as a tax penalty, which amounts total $2,449.70. This Proposed Notice of Assessment and the schedule by which it was computed are included as Exhibit "A" to this stipulation. The mathematical computations underlying this assessment are not in dispute. The Petitioner Jerome Parker is the sole stockholder and sole employee of the Petitioner Sandy Development Company (hereinafter "Sandy"). Sandy is engaged in the business of buying vacant land and selling parcels of that land to individuals to use as home building sites. This land is located in Pasco County, Florida. Sandy has been engaged in this business since its incorporation in 1973, and has engaged in no other type of business. The Shubert Construction Company (hereinafter "Shubert") employs the Petitioner Jerome Parker as its Assistant Secretary and Branch Manager. Parker runs the Shubert branch office in Pasco County, with the help of one secretarial employee. Parker is Shubert's authorized agent for soliciting customers, negotiating and signing construction contracts, and arranging for financing for prospective home buyers. All of Shubert's construction business in Pasco County is conducted through Parker's office. Shubert maintains one other office, located outside Pasco County. Customers wishing to purchase a home and lot have come to Parker's office, which is located at the Shubert Construction Company, 1520 1st Street, Zephyrhills, Florida. Some of these customers already have lots selected, and Parker makes no attempt to sell lots to those customers. Customers who do not already have lots selected are solicited by Parker to consider purchasing a lot from listings maintained by him. Parker keeps at his office listings and maps of lots which are available for sale to home buyers by Sandy, Shubert, and certain third parties. If the customer expresses an interest in a lot or subdivision owned by Sandy or Shubert, Parker proceeds with the initial steps in selling that customer a lot (i.e., a credit check). If the customer expresses interest in a lot or subdivision owned by a third party, Parker refers the customer to that third party. All of the sales by Sandy, with a few exceptions, originated in this manner at Parker's office. Customers buying lots from Sandy return to Parker's office at the Shubert Construction Company after the credit check is completed. The purpose of this second visit is to have the customer sign a loan application to finance both the home and the land, and an option and acceptance of option for the land, conditioned upon the lender's extension of credit. These papers, copies of which appear as Exhibit "B" to this stipulation, are then routinely forwarded to the lender by Parker, acting as agent for both Shubert and Sandy. The Exhibit reflects that the loan application is for a single sum covering home and lot. The customers sign one note and one mortgage for both home and lot and make lump sum installment payments to the lender without dividing those payments into separate accounts for home and lot. It is the practice of the lender, however, to issue separate checks to Sandy and Shubert for the lot and home, respectively. Although persons buying lots from Sandy are not legally obligated to buy a home from Shubert, they have nevertheless done so in every case. Some 38 individual customers have purchased lots from Sandy, and all have contracted for the purchase of a home from Shubert built upon the land purchased from Sandy. In the course of selling a lot belonging to Sandy along with a home from Shubert, Jerome Parker normally identified Sandy as the seller of the lot, but this information was not emphasized to the customer. The enclosed affidavits from customers of Parker's indicate whether they sought to purchase a home, a lot, or both, and whether they believed the seller to be a single enterprise or two enterprises. Upon learning of a customer who wished to purchase both a lot and a home, Jerome Parker formed the intent to sell, through his two agency capacities, both a lot and a home to that customer. Shubert owns no interest in Sandy, and Sandy owns no interest in Shubert. The only link between the companies is through their mutual agent and employee Jerome Parker. Parker owns no interest in Shubert Construction Company. This Stipulation includes Exhibits "A" and "B" referred to above, and in addition Exhibit "C" consisting of affidavits relating to the intentions and beliefs of Sandy's customers, and Exhibit "D" consisting of copies of notes and mortgages signed by Sandy's customers, and/or affidavits relating to the handling of the notes and mortgages by the Farmers Home Administration. The parties do not waive objections on the grounds of relevancy or materiality to the materials included in the Exhibits. The only question remaining to be resolved is whether the transactions described above are taxable under Florida Statutes, sections 201.02 and 201.021 based on the price of the lot alone, or upon the price of the lot and the home. Petitioner and Respondent reserve the right to introduce testimony not inconsistent with the foregoing. All documents used in the transactions here under consideration are prepared on forms provided by Farmers Home Administration (FHA) of the Department of Agriculture. These include the Option to Purchase, Construction Contract, and all notes and mortgages. The Option to Purchase provides it is given to enable buyer to obtain an FHA loan and such offer is void if buyer is unable to obtain a loan from FHA. At the time of closing purchaser executes a note for the full amount of the loan for home and lot secured by a mortgage on the lot. At this time the construction of the home has not commenced although the buyer has in effect borrowed funds to purchase the lot and pay for the construction of his home. Construction funds are disbursed to the builder by FHA in draws as the construction of the home progresses. Upon completion of the home the final draw is paid to the builder and buyer presumably takes possession. No evidence was presented regarding the payment to the seller for the price of the lot, which is separately stated on documents forwarded to FHA, however nothing was presented to indicate the seller was not paid at the time of closing, which would be the normal procedure. From the testimony that after closing Sandy Development had no claim to the lot, it would be presumed that Sandy had been paid for the lot.
The Issue The two issues raised in this proceeding are: (1) whether the basis and reason Respondent, Vestcor Companies, d/b/a Madalyn Landings (Vestcor), terminated Petitioner, Carlos Gomez's (Petitioner), employment on June 28, 2002, was in retaliation for Petitioner's protected conduct during his normal course of employment; and (2) whether Vestcor committed unlawful housing practice by permitting Vestcor employees without families to reside on its property, Madalyn Landing Apartments, without paying rent, while requiring Vestcor employees with families to pay rent in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended, and Chapter 760.23, Florida Statutes (2002).
Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the demeanor and candor of each witness while testifying, exhibits offered in support of and in opposition to the respective position of the parties received in evidence, stipulations of the parties, evidentiary rulings made pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes (2002), and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant, material, and substantial facts are determined: Petitioner filed charges of housing discrimination against Vestcor with the Commission on August 30, 2002. Petitioner alleged that Vestcor discriminated against him based on his familial status and his June 28, 2002, termination was in retaliation for filing the charge of discrimination. Vestcor denied the allegations and contended that Petitioner's termination was for cause. Additionally, Vestcor maintained Petitioner relinquished his claim of retaliation before the final hearing; and under oath during his deposition, asserted he would not pursue a claim for retaliation. Petitioner was permitted to proffer evidence of retaliation because Vestcor terminated his employment. The Commission's Notice was issued on January 7, 2005. The parties agree that Petitioner was hired by Vestcor on June 25, 2001, as a leasing consultant agent for Madalyn Landing Apartments located in Palm Bay, Florida. Petitioner's job responsibilities as a leasing consultant agent included showing the property, leasing the property (apartment units), and assisting with tenant relations by responding to concerns and questions, and preparing and following up on maintenance orders. Petitioner had access to keys to all apartments on site. At the time of his hire, Petitioner was, as was all of Vestcor employees, given a copy of Vestcor's Employee Handbook. This handbook is required reading for each employee for personal information and familiarity with company policies and procedures, to include the company requirement that each employee personally telephone and speak with his/her supervisor when the employee, for whatever reason, could not appear at work as scheduled, which is a basis and cause for termination. The parties agree that Vestcor's handbook, among other things, contains company policies regarding equal employment; prohibition against unlawful conduct and appropriate workplace conduct; procedures for handling employee problems and complaints associated with their employment; and procedures for reporting illness or absences from work, which include personal notification to supervisors, and not messages left on the answering service. Failure to comply with employment reporting polices may result in progressive disciplinary action. The parties agree that employee benefits were also contained in the handbook. One such employee benefit, at issue in this proceeding, is the live-on-site benefit. The live-on- site benefit first requires eligible employees to complete a 90-day orientation period, meet the rental criteria for a tax credit property, and be a full-time employee. The eligible employee must pay all applicable security deposits and utility expenses for the live-on-site unit. Rent-free, live-on-site benefits are available only to employees who occupy the positions of (1) site community managers, (2) maintenance supervisors, and (3) courtesy officers. These individuals received a free two-bedroom, two-bathroom apartment at the apartment complex in which they work as part of their employment compensation package. The rent-free, live-on-site benefit is not available for Vestcor's leasing consultant agent employees, such as Petitioner. On or about July 3, 2001, Petitioner entered into a lease agreement with Vestcor to move into Apartment No. 202-24 located at Madalyn Landing Apartments. The lease agreement ended on January 31, 2002. The lease agreement set forth terms that Petitioner was to receive a $50.00 monthly rental concession, which became effective on September 3, 2001. Although he was eligible for the 25-percent monthly rental concession, to have given Petitioner the full 25 percent of his monthly rental cost would have over-qualified Petitioner based upon Madalyn Landing Apartment's tax credit property status. Petitioner and Vestcor agreed he would receive a $50.00 monthly rental concession, thereby qualifying him as a resident on the property. Petitioner understood and accepted the fact that he did not qualify for rent-free, live-on-site benefits because of his employment status as a leasing consultant agent. Petitioner understood and accepted Vestcor's $50.00 monthly rental concession because of his employment status as a leasing consultant agent. The rental concession meant Petitioner's regular monthly rental would be reduced by $50.00 each month. On September 1, 2001, Henry Oliver was hired by Vestcor as a maintenance technician. Maintenance technicians do not qualify for rent-free, live-on-site benefits. At the time of his hire, Mr. Oliver did not live on site. As with other employees, to become eligible for the standard 25-percent monthly rental concession benefits, Mr. Oliver was required to complete a 90-day orientation period, meet the rental criteria for a tax credit property, be a full-time employee, and pay all applicable security deposits and utility expenses for the unit. On November 13, 2001, Michael Gomez, the brother of Petitioner (Mr. Gomez), commenced his employment with Vestcor as a groundskeeper. Groundskeepers did not meet the qualifications for rent-free, live-on-site benefits. At the time of his hire, Mr. Gomez did not live on site. As with other employees, to become eligible for the standard 25-percent monthly rental concession benefits, Mr. Gomez was required to complete a 90-day orientation period, meet the rental criteria for a tax credit property, be a full-time employee, and pay all applicable security deposits and utility expenses for the unit. On November 21, 2001, 81 days after his hire, Mr. Oliver commenced his lease application process to reside in Apartment No. 203-44 at Madalyn Landing Apartments. Mr. Oliver's leasing consultant agent was Petitioner in this cause. Like other eligible Vestcor employees and as a part of the lease application process, Mr. Oliver completed all required paperwork, which included, but not limited to, completing a credit check, employment verification, and income test to ensure that he was qualified to reside at Madalyn Landing Apartments. Fifteen days later, on November 28, 2001, Mr. Gomez commenced his lease application process to reside in Apartment No. 206-24 at Madalyn Landing Apartments. As part of the leasing process, Mr. Gomez, as other eligible Vestcor employees who intend to reside on Vestcor property, completed all necessary paperwork including, but not limited to, a credit check and employment verification and income test to ensure he was qualified to reside at Madalyn Landing Apartments. Included in the paperwork was a list of rental criteria requiring Mr. Gomez to execute a lease agreement to obligate himself to pay the required rent payment, consent to a credit check, pay an application fee and required security deposit, and agree not to take possession of an apartment until all supporting paperwork was completed and approved. Mr. Gomez's leasing consultant was Petitioner. On December 28, 2001, Petitioner signed a Notice to Vacate Apartment No. 206-24, effective February 1, 2002. The Notice to Vacate was placed in Vestcor's office files. Petitioner's reasons for vacating his apartment stated he "needed a yard, garage, more space, a big family room, and some privacy." Thirty-four days later, February 1, 2002, Mr. Gomez moved into Apartment No. 206-24 at Madalyn Landing Apartments without the approval or knowledge of Vestcor management. On January 9, 2002, a "Corrective Action Notice" was placed in Petitioner's employee file by his supervisor, Genea Closs. The notice cited two violations of Vestcor's policies and procedures. Specifically, his supervisor noted Petitioner did not collect administration fees from two unidentified rental units, and he had taken an unidentified resident's rental check home with him, rather than directly to the office as required by policy. As a direct result of those policy violations, Ms. Closs placed Petitioner on 180 days' probation and instructed him to re-read all Vestcor employees' handbook and manuals. Petitioner acknowledged receiving and understanding the warning. At the time she took the above action against Petitioner, there is no evidence that Ms. Closs had knowledge of Petitioner's past or present efforts to gather statements and other information from Mr. Gomez and/or Mr. Oliver in anticipation and preparation for his subsequent filing of claims of discrimination against Vestcor. Also, on January 9, 2002, Petitioner was notified that his brother, Mr. Gomez, did not qualify to reside at Madalyn Landing Apartments because of insufficient credit. Further, Petitioner was advised that should Mr. Gomez wish to continue with the application process, he would need a co-signer on his lease agreement or pay an additional security deposit. Mr. Gomez produced an unidentified co-signer, who also completed a lease application. On January 30, 2002, the lease application submitted by Mr. Gomez's co-signor was denied. As a result of the denial of Mr. Gomez's co-signor lease application, Vestcor did not approve Mr. Gomez's lease application. When he was made aware that his co-signor's application was denied and of management's request for him to pay an additional security deposit, as was previously agreed, Mr. Gomez refused to pay the additional security deposit. As a direct result of his refusal, his lease application was never approved, and he was not authorized by Vestcor to move into any Madalyn Landing's rental apartment units. At some unspecified time thereafter, Vestcor's management became aware that Mr. Gomez had moved into Apartment No. 206-24, even though he was never approved or authorized to move into an on site apartment. Vestcor's management ordered Mr. Gomez to remove his belongings from Apartment No. 206-24. Subsequent to the removal order, Mr. Gomez moved his belongings from Apartment No. 206-24 into Apartment No. 103-20. Mr. Gomez's move into Apartment No. 103-20, as was his move into Apartment No. 206-04, was without approval and/or authorization from Vestcor's management. Upon learning that his belonging had been placed in Apartment No. 103-20, Mr. Gomez was again instructed by management to remove his belongings. After he failed and refused to move his belongings from Apartment No. 103-20, Vestcor's management entered the apartment and gathered and discarded Mr. Gomez's belongings. As a leasing contract agent, Petitioner had access to keys to all vacant apartments. His brother, Mr. Gomez, who was a groundskeeper, did not have access to keys to any apartment, save the one he occupied. Any apartment occupied by Ms. Gomez after his Notice to Vacate Apartment No. 103-20 was without the knowledge or approval of Vestcor and in violation of Vestcor's policies and procedures. Therefore, any period of apartment occupancy by Mr. Gomez was not discriminatory against Petitioner (rent-free and/or reduced rent), but was a direct violation of Vestcor's policies. On February 10, 2002, Mr. Oliver signed a one-year lease agreement with Vestcor. Mr. Oliver's lease agreement reflected a 25-percent employee rental concession. Throughout Mr. Oliver's occupancy of Apartment No. 203-64 and pursuant to his lease agreement duration, Mr. Oliver's rental history reflected his monthly payment of $413.00. There is no evidence that Mr. Oliver lived on site without paying rent or that Vestcor authorized or permitted Mr. Oliver to live on site without paying rent, as alleged by Petitioner. On June 2, 2002, Ms. Closs completed Petitioner's annual performance appraisal report. Performance ratings range from a one -- below expectations, to a four -- exceeds expectations. Petitioner received ratings in the categories appraised as follows: Leasing skills -- 4; Administrative skills -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in paperwork, computer updating, and policy adherence; Marketing skills -- 4, with comments that Petitioner had a flair for finding the right markets; Community awareness -- 3, with no comment; Professionalism -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in paperwork reporting; Dependability -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in attendance; Interpersonal skills -- 3, with no comments; Judgment/Decision-making -- 3, with no comments; Quality of Work -- 2, with comments that work lacked accuracy; Initiative -- 4, with no comment; Customer service -- 3, with no comments; Team work -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in the area of resident confidence; Company loyalty -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in adherence to company policy and procedures; and Training and development -- 3, with no comments. Petitioner's Overall rating was 2.5, with comments that there was "room for improvement." On June 27, 2002, while on 180 days' probation that began on January 9, 2002, Petitioner failed to report to work and failed to report his absence to his supervisor, Ms. Closs, by a person-to-person telephone call. This conduct constituted a violation of Vestcor's policy requiring all its employees to personally contact their supervisor when late and/or absent from work and prohibited leaving messages on the community answering service machine. On June 28, 2002, Petitioner reported to work. Ms. Closs, his supervisor, informed Petitioner of his termination of employment with Vestcor for failure to report to work (i.e. job abandonment) and for probation violation, as he had been warned on January 9, 2002, what would happen should a policy violation re-occur. It was after his June 28, 2002, termination that Petitioner began his personal investigation and gathering of information (i.e., interviews and statements from other Vestcor employees) in preparation to file this complaint. Considering the findings favorable to Petitioner, he failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation by Vestcor, when they terminated his employment on June 28, 2002. Considering the findings of record favorable to Petitioner, he failed to establish a prima facie case of housing and/or rental adjustment discrimination by Vestcor, based upon familial status of himself or any other employer. Petitioner failed to prove Vestcor knowingly and/or intentionally permitted, approved, or allowed either Mr. Gomez or Mr. Oliver to live on site without a completed and approved application followed by appropriate rent adjustments according to their employment status and keeping within the tax credit requirement, while requiring Vestcor employees with families (or different employment status) to pay a different monthly rent in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. Petitioner failed to prove his termination on June 28, 2002, was in retaliation for his actions and conduct other than his personal violation, while on probation, of Vestcor's policies and procedures.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED the Florida Commission on Human Rights enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief alleging discrimination filed by Petitioner, Carlos Gomez. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of August, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 2005.
The Issue The issues in this case are as follows: Was Respondent Daniel Oldfather legally responsible for accounting and refund? Were the refund provisions of the receipt form printed in type as required by Rule 21V-10.15, Florida Administrative Code? Was Richard Vanicek due a 75 percent refund? Was Vanicek due a complete refund because of inaccurate information given him? Did Vanicek make written demand for a refund, and was a written demand for the refund necessary?
Findings Of Fact In September of 1979, Sun Rentals and Management, Inc., was a corporate real estate broker holding license number 0208997 and doing business at 2703 East Oakland Park Boulevard in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. At that time, Victor Stevens was a licensed real estate salesperson employed by Sun Rentals. Stevens, as an employee of Sun Rentals, interviewed Richard D. Vanicek concerning Vanicek's rental needs. Vanicek entered into a contract with Sun Rentals (Petitioner's Exhibit number 1) under which he paid Sun Rentals $45 and Sun Rentals was to provide him with rental information on available rentals. Vanicek received a receipt (Petitioner's Exhibit number 3) which provided in pertinent part as follows: ... Notice, pursuant to Florida Law: If the rental information provided under this contract is not current or accurate in any material aspect, you may demand within 30 days of this contract date a return of your full fee paid. If you do not obtain a rental you are entitled to receive a return of 75 percent of the fee paid, if you make demand within 30 days of this contract date. ... It was agreed that the receipt was printed totally in ten-point type. Vanicek attempted to visit one of the listings provided to him by Sun Rentals. He encountered difficulty in locating the listing; however, his lack of familiarity with Fort Lauderdale may have contributed to his difficulties. Vanicek found a rental through his own efforts and requested a refund of 75 percent of his $45 fee by telephone. He made his request first to Stevens, who referred him to Daniel Oldfather pursuant to office policy. As a result of this referral Vanicek spoke with a man at Sun Rentals, who may have been Oldfather, and restated his request for a refund. His request was denied. Daniel Oldfather was the licensed broker/salesman for Sun Rentals during September, 1979. He was the office manager of Sun Rentals at that time. Martin Katz was broker for Sun Rentals in September of 1979 (Transcript; Page 261, L 21). Oldfather was the next man in authority at the office under Katz (Transcript; Page 235, L 6). Katz delegated to Oldfather the authority to make refunds. The rental forms, including the rental receipt form (Petitioner's Exhibit number 3), were submitted to the Board of Real Estate.
Recommendation Having found that Daniel Oldfather was not guilty of any of the allegations in the amended Administrative Complaint, it is recommended that Counts I, II and III against him be dismissed. Having found that Sun Rentals and Management, Inc., is not guilty of the allegations contained in Count III of the amended Administrative Complaint, it is recommended that Count III against Sun Rentals be dismissed. Having found that Sun Rentals is guilty of violating Sections 475.25(1)(d) and 475.453(1), Florida Statutes, it is recommended that the license of Sun Rentals be suspended for 60 days, during which time the officers and directors of said corporation may not engage in the practice of real estate sales or brokerage under their names or in any other corporate name. DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of May, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of May, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert F. Jordan, Esquire Post Office Box 14723 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33302 James Curran, Esquire 200 SE Sixth Street, Suite 301 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 C. B. Stafford, Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Samuel Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to reimbursement for expenses incurred in relocating and reestablishment of his small business pursuant to section 421.55, Florida Statutes (2009),1/ as implemented by Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-66.007, which, in turn, incorporates by reference the provisions of 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part 24, Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition for Federal and Federally-Assisted Programs (effective October 1, 2006),2/ and the Florida Department of Transportation Right of Way Manual 9.3.15, and, if Petitioner is entitled to reimbursement, the amount owed to him.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence and witnesses' testimony, the undersigned found the following facts: The Department is the state agency that has responsibility for paying certain relocation and reestablishment expenses of businesses that have been displaced because of a public transportation project. See § 421.55, Fla. Stat. Sometime in 1999 to 2000, Mr. Carey purchased eight rental units in Hillsborough County, Florida, as an investment property. Mr. Carey managed the rental property and testified that he would advertise vacancies through "word of mouth." The record shows that these rental units were rented weekly and included written and verbal leases. In 2005, the Department informed Mr. Carey that his rental property would be subject of an eminent domain taking and informed Mr. Carey about the law authorizing the Department to pay certain expenses in relocating and reestablishing a small business. On December 6, 2005, Mr. Carey filled out a Business Survey Questionnaire for the Department, stating his desire to relocate his rental business. The Department acquired Mr. Carey's property on April 18, 2009. By mid July 2009, Mr. Carey contacted Mr. Nappi to determine whether or not he was still eligible to receive relocation and reestablishment reimbursement for his small business. Mr. Nappi determined that Mr. Carey remained eligible to apply for reimbursement and informed him of that fact. On August 28, 2009, Mr. Carey purchased a replacement property located at 19002 Apian Way, Lutz, Florida, for $300,000.00. The replacement property contained a house that had been the homestead property of the prior owner. Mr. Carey credibly testified that the purpose of purchasing this replacement property was "to get back into the rental business" and that he advertised the replacement property for rent by "word of mouth." Receipts introduced into evidence show that Mr. Carey began making repairs and purchasing materials as early as the first week in September. Mr. Carey testified, on cross-examination, that he could not remember the exact date when he listed the replacement property for sale, or the exact date when he entered into a contract for the sale of the replacement property. Mr. Carey testified that he would speculate that the contract for sale of the replacement property occurred in early October 2009. On October 15, 2009, Mr. Nappi went to the replacement property with Mr. Carey to review the work that Mr. Carey had already begun on the replacement property and to discuss the expenses eligible for reimbursement. In reviewing Mr. Carey's claimed expenses, Mr. Nappi found that the following expenses would be eligible for reimbursement: (1) the drywall work detailed in Exhibit A; (2) $561.00 worth of the receipts of materials purchased from Home Depot; and (3) the painting expenses detailed in Exhibit C. Mr. Nappi also testified that in reviewing the claimed expenses that Mr. Carey would be eligible for reimbursement of a portion of the replacement property's ad valorem taxes. According to Mr. Nappi, Mr. Carey would have been eligible to receive the difference of the amount of the property taxes between the acquired property and the replacement property in the amount of $849.56. The only expenses that Mr. Nappi identified as not being reasonable were for hauling away yard waste contained in Exhibit D. According to Mr. Nappi, the Department questioned the amount of the charges and determined that an appropriate amount would be $1,200.00 as opposed to the $2,450.00 sought by Mr. Carey. Consequently, the majority of the expenses claimed by Mr. Carey were eligible items for reimbursement. On November 4, 2009, the Department sent Mr. Carey a letter denying his eligibility to receive reimbursement for expenses in relocating and reestablishing his small rental business. The Department denied Mr. Carey's eligibility because the updated TRIM notice for the property tax, that Mr. Carey provided the Department, showed the replacement property was homestead property. Because the replacement property was homestead, the Department reasoned that Mr. Carey had not reestablished a small business. Mr. Carey informed Mr. Nappi that the replacement property was not homestead property and that the TRIM notice was wrong. In response, on November 9, 2009, Mr. Nappi wrote the Hillsborough County Tax Collector to determine whether or not Mr. Carey's replacement property was homestead property. On November 23, 2009, while the Department waited for a response from the Hillsborough County Tax Collector, Mr. Carey closed on the sale of the replacement property for $332,500.00. Mr. Carey did not inform the Department that the replacement property had been sold. In February 2010, the Hillsborough County Tax Collector informed the Department that the replacement property was not homestead. Also, the Department learned for the first time that Mr. Carey had sold the replacement property. After learning that Mr. Carey had sold the replacement property, Mr. Nappi contacted his supervisor Elbert Johnson (Mr. Johnson). Mr. Nappi informed Mr. Johnson that "it did not appear that the reestablishment status of the landlord had been in fact established[,]" and the claim would be denied. Mr. Nappi testified the Department attempted to determine whether or not Mr. Carey had reestablished his rental business by examining Mr. Carey's efforts to rent the replacement property. Mr. Nappi directed a right-of-way specialist for the Department to contact realtors, who were associated with the property, to determine if Mr. Carey had listed the property for rent; to contact the local newspaper to learn if the property had been advertised for rent; and to conduct an internet search of the property. According to Mr. Nappi, the realtor indicated that she was not aware of whether or not Mr. Carey listed the property for rent and learned nothing from the newspaper or internet search. Mr. Nappi admitted that the Department did not contact Mr. Carey to ask him about his efforts to rent the property. The Department did not contact Mr. Carey or ask him to provide any information about his efforts to rent the property. Consequently, the Department did not have before it any information concerning Mr. Carey's efforts as to "word of mouth" advertising of the property. Mr. Knight, the state administrator of Relocation Assistance, testified that asking Mr. Carey about his efforts to rent the property would have been helpful information to have in considering the reimbursement. However, Mr. Knight acknowledged that Mr. Carey's selling of the home prior to determination of whether or not he was entitled to reimbursement made the issue moot. In the Department's estimation, Mr. Carey had simply "flipped a house" and had not reestablished his business. On March 25, 2010, the Department informed Mr. Carey that it was denying his application for reimbursement because he was not eligible because he had not reestablished his small rental business at the replacement property.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order affirming its denial of Mr. Carey's application for reimbursement of reestablishment expenses. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of February, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S THOMAS P. CRAPPS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of February, 2011.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, as well as the pleadings on file, the following relevant facts are found: In the October 1, 1982 edition of the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 8, No. 39 at page 2685, notice was published of the respondent's proposed amendment of Rule 12A-1.61, entitled "Rental of Living Quarters, Sleeping or Housekeeping Accommodations." This notice contained the following language: "IF REQUESTED, A HEARING WILL BE HELD AT: TIME AND DATE: 9:00 a.m., October 22, 1982 PLACE: New Capitol, Lower Level" By letter dated October 7, 1982, the respondent received a request for a hearing and notification of an intent to appear at the hearing scheduled for 9:00 a.m. on October 22, 1982, for the purpose of protesting the proposed change in Rule 12A-1.61. This letter was not written by or on behalf of any of the petitioners in this proceeding. The respondent did not acknowledge that it received this request, nor did it schedule or hold the public hearing on October 22, 1982. On October 18 or 19, 1982, the petitioners in this proceeding filed with the respondent a "petition to convene separate proceeding pursuant to 120.54(16), Florida Statutes." Among other allegations, this petition states that: "3. Petitioners are particularly affected by the proposed rule and cannot adequately protect those interests merely by appearing at a public hearing. Petitioners intend to present extensive testimony from their own witnesses and from the staff of DOR. Requiring Petitioners to proceed at a hearing open to the public would so disrupt, hamper and frustrate Petitioners' presentation so as to unfairly restrain Petitioners' ability to adequately oppose adoption of the proposed rule. Petitioners must be afforded an individual proceeding where they would have complete and uninterrupted access to the staff of DOR and be able to present their own witnesses in an adversary-type proceeding, which cannot be done at a standard rule hearing. Only in this manner will Petitioners be afforded a fair hearing on the proposed rule. WHEREFORE Petitioners respectfully request that DOR suspend its rule- making proceedings and convene a separate proceeding under the pro- visions of Section 120.57." The respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition to convene a separate proceeding pursuant to Section 120.54(16) on or about October 25, 1982. In the October 29, 1982, edition of the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 8, No. 43, at page 2976, the following announcement appears: "The Department of Revenue announces that the hearing scheduled for October 22, 1982 on Rule 12A-1.61--Rental of Living Quarters, Sleeping or Housekeeping Accommodations, has been deferred for one month. Notice of this Proposed Rule was given in the Florida Administrative Weekly Vol. 8, No. 39, dated October 1, 1982, on pages 2686-2689." By "Final Order Denying Rule-Making Hearing and Draw-out Proceeding" dated November 8, 1982, nunc pro tunc to November 3, 1982, the respondent denied the petitioners' requests for a Section 120.54(3) and a Section 120.54(16) hearing. It was concluded that the requests were filed beyond 14 days from October 1, 1982, the date upon which notice of the proposed rule was published, and thus were untimely. It was found that since no timely request for a Section 120.54(3) hearing had been received by the respondent (a fact which the respondent now admits was erroneous), the respondent was not required to schedule such a hearing and, indeed, had not exercised its option to schedule such a hearing. Therefore, the respondent concluded that there existed no rulemaking proceeding from which to "draw-out" and the petition for a Section 120.54(16) proceeding was therefore moot. No reference was made in the respondent's order to the announcement which had appeared in the October 29, 1982, Florida Administrative Weekly that the October 22, 1982, hearing on Rule 12A-1.61 had been deferred for one month. The respondent's Order also concluded that the request for a draw-out proceeding, even had it been timely filed, was fatally defective for its failure to affirmatively demonstrate that a Section 120.54(3) rulemaking proceeding would not provide adequate opportunity to protect the petitioners' substantial interest. On November 9, 1982, the Governor and Cabinet adopted challenged Rule 12A-1.61, 1/ after receiving comments from the petitioners and counsel for the petitioners in this case. The petitioners received notice that the Governor and Cabinet would take up the proposed rule on November 9, 1982, by way of a telephone call received approximately 24 hours before November ninth. No notice was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly that a public meeting would be held by the Department of Revenue on November 9, 1982, which was the second Tuesday of the month. Notices did appear in the October 8, October 22, and November 5, 1982 editions of the Florida Administrative Weekly that public meetings would be held respectively on October 22, November 3 and November 16, 1982. These notices state that the "Department of Revenue will act on matters duly presented on its Agenda, which may include approval of rules" and other matters. The rules which govern the organization and administration of the Department of Revenue provide that regular public meetings of the Governor and Cabinet to transact the business of the Department of Revenue shall be on the first and third Tuesdays of each month or at such other place or time as may be designated, and that a standard notice of the meeting must be published in the Florida Administrative Weekly at least seven (7) days in advance. Rule 12-1.03, Florida Administrative Code. Any agenda item "deferred must be re-agendaed for the next regularly scheduled meeting of the Governor and Cabinet unless a longer period of deferment is approved by a majority vote of the Governor and Cabinet." Rule 12-1.06, Florida Administrative Code. In summary form, the challenged rule provides, inter alia, that individual condominium units are considered, with certain exceptions, taxable transient rental facilities if rented for periods of less than six months in continuous duration. The rule purports to make owners and/or rental agents for owners of individually-owned condominium units liable for the collection and payment of the applicable sales tax due on the rental. The petitioners in this proceeding are owners and/or rental brokers or agents for owners of individually-owned condominium units in Sarasota, Florida. G & B Properties, Inc. and Sarasota Surf Vacation Rentals, Inc. each had over $1 million in gross rental revenues last year. Many, if not most, of their present leases and rental contracts were entered into prior to the effective date of the challenged rule and the five percent sales, or transient rental, tax was not incorporated into those rental contract terms. The challenged rule has or will cause certain changes in the operations of these petitioners. Additional staff and overtime work are required to notify lessees of the newly imposed tax. New bookkeeping materials are required to account for and handle the tax, and supplies on-hand can no longer be utilized. One real estate agent estimated the expense of changing his bookkeeping system to be $1,500. This agent also opined that a considerable block of renters has been lost due to the increased five percent charge and change in contract terms, and that there has been a loss of goodwill between himself, as a rental agent, and condominium owners and tenants who have entered into lease agreements in years past without the imposition of the tax. Prior to the adoption of the challenged rule, the respondent's rules did not address individual condominium units and a transient rental tax on such units was not collected from tenants, owners or rental agents by the Department of Revenue. The "summary of the estimate of economic impact of the rule" contained in the notice of the amendment of Rule 12A-1.61 appearing in the October 1, 1982, edition of the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 8, No. 39, page 2686, provides as follows: "None. The proposal contains amendments to existing rules and is predicated upon legislation enacted. The fiscal impact occurred upon the amendment to 212.03, F.S. by Chapter 97-359, Laws of Florida." The actual Economic Impact Statement prepared for the challenged amendment recites that the cost to the respondent of implementing the amendment is estimated at $15,122, and the "amount of paperwork is substantial." For the "estimated cost or economic benefit to persons directly affected by the proposed action," the Economic Impact Statement notes that the Revenue Estimating Conference has identified the revenue loss as $2,702,000. It lists those classes of persons (tenants) exempted from the tax as persons benefiting from the rule, and further states that the revenue loss of $2,702,000 will be offset by about $200,000 resulting from the taxable status of certain condominium rentals. The Economic Impact Statement provides that the rule "will not place any business at a competitive disadvantage, nor will it have any impact on the open market for employment." In its "statement of data and method used in calculating estimates," the Economic Impact Statement sets forth the basis for the $15,122 agency cost of promulgating and implementing the proposed rule. It then states that the "revenue impact is based on Revenue Estimating Conference consensus estimates." Neither the "Revenue Estimating Conference," its "consensus estimates" nor the basis or methodology utilized in its figures are further identified or explained in the respondent's Economic Impact Statement. According to the respondent's Director of Research, Planning and Budgeting, the Revenue Estimating Conference is an informal body under the Governor's office consisting of the State Economist and two legislative staff directors whose purpose is to develop revenue forecasts, impacts and estimates in a non-political environment. The figures utilized in the Economic Impact Statement for the challenged rule are taken directly from those utilized in connection with the passage of a 1979 amendment to Section 212.03, Florida Statutes, by Chapter 79-359, Laws of Florida. The respondent did not attempt to make its own estimate of revenues or costs or economic benefits to persons directly affected by the proposed rule, nor did the respondent request the Revenue Estimating Conference to revisit its 1979 estimate of economic impact. The instant petition challenging the validity of Rule 12A-1.61 was filed by the petitioners with the Division of Administrative Hearings on December 2, 1982. By Order of Assignment dated December 10, 1982, the undersigned was designated as the Hearing Officer. By letter dated December 14, 1982, the undersigned suggested a final hearing date of January 3, 1983. The undersigned was informed by telephone message from counsel for the petitioners that the parties were going to file a stipulation waiving the requirement that a hearing be held within thirty days. While a written stipulation was never received to this effect, it was the understanding of the undersigned that the parties did not desire to utilize the previously suggested hearing date of January 3, 1983. Through telephone conversations between the offices of the Division of Administrative Hearings and counsel for the petitioner, a hearing date of January 10, 1983, at 4:00 p.m. was originally made available and then was changed to January 14, 1983, because more hours were thought to be necessary to complete the hearing. On January 12, 1983, a notice of appearance as co- counsel for the respondent was filed, as was a Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, to Stay Proceeding on the ground that the Division of Administrative Hearings lacked jurisdiction to entertain this rule-challenge proceeding inasmuch as the hearing was not scheduled within the thirty days required by Section 120.56(2), Florida Statutes. Oral argument on this motion was heard prior to the commencement of the final hearing on January 14, 1983. Finding that counsel for the petitioner reasonably believed that respondent's counsel had agreed to waive the thirty-day hearing requirement and that respondent had not demonstrated that it had been prejudiced in any manner whatsoever by the four-day delay in commencing the final hearing, the Motion to Dismiss or Stay was denied.
The Issue The issue is whether Islamorada Ordinance 01-05, which amended Policy 1-2.4.7 of Islamorada's comprehensive plan, is in compliance, as provided by Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Islamorada, Village of Islands (Islamorada), was incorporated on December 31, 1997. At the time of its incorporation, the Monroe County comprehensive plan applied to requests for development orders in the jurisdiction of Islamorada. After conducting a number of public hearings and workshops, Islamorada adopted its initial comprehensive plan by Ordinance 00-09 on January 24, 2001 (Plan). On March 15, 2001, Respondent Department of Community Affairs (DCA) published its Notice of Intent to Find the Islamorada Comprehensive Plan not in compliance with Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes, which is the Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act (Act). DCA commenced Department of Community Affairs v. Islamorada, Village of Islands, DOAH Case No. 01-1216GM, to challenge the Plan. As the only parties to DOAH Case No. 01-1216GM, DCA and Islamorada entered into a Stipulated Settlement Agreement, under which Islamorada agreed to adopt certain remedial amendments. Consequently, on April 26, 2001, Islamorada adopted Ordinance 01-05, which contained the remedial amendments. On May 24, 2001, DCA published its Notice of Intent to Find the Comprehensive Plans and Remedial Comprehensive Plan Amendments in compliance with the Act. Consequently, on June 6, 2001, the Administrative Law Judge issued an Order Closing File in DOAH Case No. 01-1216GM. On the same day, Petitioner filed his Petition, which alleges that Policies 1-2.4.7 and 1-2.1.0 are not supported by data and analysis. Ordinance 01-05 did not change Policy 1-2.1.0. For the reasons noted in the Conclusions of Law, Petitioner therefore is unable to challenge Policy 1-2.1.0. With deletions stricken through and additions underlined, Ordinance 01-05 revised Policy 1-2.4.7 as follows: Policy 1-2.4.7: Limit Transient Rental Use of Residential Properties. Islamorada, Village of Islands shall continue to prohibit the transient rental use of 28 days or less, of residential properties within the Village, including properties located within the Residential Conservation (RC), Residential Low (RL), Residential Medium (RM), and Mixed Use (MU) Future Land Use categories, except in tourist commercial Zoning Districts as provided for under Policy 1-2.10 of this Plan. Transient rental use may be allowed continue in multi- family developments with 24-hour on-site security, excluding mobile home parks, in the Residential High (RH) FLUM categories based on an existing use as of May 1, 1999, upon a majority approval of all property owners within a mandatory owner association organized under Florida law, pursuant to the association requirements, and compliance with all applicable State regulations and Village codes. Property owners located in the RL, RM, RC and MU future land use categories with valid transient rental licenses as of May 1, 1999 will have until May 1, 2003 to cease rentals of 28 days or less. Owners of such properties shall register with the Village and shall demonstrate to the Village that: The transient use of 28 days or less of the property in question was existing as of May 1, 1999, and continues to exist; All State and local licenses necessary for the conduct of transient rental use of the property have been secured; and All impact fees have been paid. Property owners permitted transient rental use pursuant to this Policy shall lose their privileges and retire their licenses prior to May 2, 2003 upon: Transfer of ownership of the property at which the transient rental activity takes place; or A combination of two of the any of the following being recorded: Code Violations as determined by the Hearing Officer and/9or Sheriffs Field Contacts and/or substantiated written letters of complaint from neighbors submitted and on record with the Village. the property being determined by nonappealable Final Order on more than two (2) occasions to have violated the Village Code. After Islamorada adopted Ordinance 01-05, Petitioner filed his petition challenging Policy 1-2.4.7. After Petitioner filed his petition, Islamorada adopted Ordinance 01-11, which repealed the amendments contained in Ordinance 01-05 and restored Policy 1-2.4.7 to its original form. However, Islamorada adopted Ordinance 01-11 on July 24, 2001--three weeks prior to the start of the hearing in this case. DCA had not yet issued a notice of intent, and the amended plan language was therefore largely irrelevant in this case. For the same reasons, as explained in the Conclusions of Law, that Petitioner may not challenge Policy 1-2.1.10, he may not challenge Policy 1-2.4.7; Petitioner's challenge is limited to the revisions contained in Ordinance 01-05. The revisions contained in Ordinance 01-05 relax the restrictions governing transient rentals, as contained in the original Plan. In its original form, Policy 1-2.4.7 required the cessation of transient rentals not in compliance with the policy by the earliest of: a) May 1, 2003, b) the conveyance of the rental property, or c) a combination of two Code violations or verified neighborhood complaints. The revisions eliminate the conveyance as an event terminating the right to enter into transient rentals, so, after the adoption of Ordinance 01-05, affected property owners could convey residences without depriving their grantees of the right to make transient rentals prior to May 1, 2003. The revisions also eliminate verified neighborhood complaints as a basis for the loss, prior to May 1, 2003, of the right of affected property owners to make transient rentals prior to May 1, 2003. The ruling that Petitioner may not challenge Policy 1-2.4.7 in its original form moots Petitioner's case. It is evident that Petitioner does not oppose the relaxation of restrictions on transient rentals, as achieved by Ordinance 01-05. In any event, data and analysis amply support the decision of Islamorada to relax the restrictions that it had imposed upon transient rentals. Neighborhood complaints supply a nebulous standard, and substantiation of such complaints, without defining the extent of verification, provides little more guidance. Legal counsel supported the elimination of the restriction on conveyances. Given the close proximity of the ultimate compliance deadline, the restriction on conveyances probably did not substantially affect the market value of affected properties, so Islamorada could find data and analysis supporting the inclusion or exclusion of this condition shortening the timeframe for compliance upon the sale of an affected residence. Even if Petitioner had timely challenged Policy 1-2.4.7, in its original form, data and analysis support the planning decision of Islamorada to restrict transient rentals. Transient rentals in residential neighborhoods facilitate a constant churning of home occupants. To the extent that this process displaces longer-term occupancy, transient rentals impede the process by which neighborhoods and communities form and residents in these neighborhoods and communities connect with each other. The commodification of neighborhoods in the service of tourism provides positive economic development to those property owners seeking to make transient rentals. However, to some extent, these economic gains are offset by those residents who wish to sustain less economically intense lifestyles. The desires of such residents may be ill-served by local merchants who price their goods to the more economically intense lifestyle of the tourist or by the replacement of more prosaic retailers, such as hardware stores, with the more ephemeral retailers, such as t-shirt stores. To find support in data and analysis, the community envisioned by Islamorada in its Plan is not required to achieve the highest and best use for the greatest number of owners of property or the owners of the greatest area of property within the village's planning jurisdiction. On this record, data and analysis clearly support the planning decision initially made by Islamorada in adopting Policy 1-2.4.7, as well as the planning decision later made by Islamorada in relaxing the restrictions contained in this policy.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's challenge to Ordinance 01-05 and finding the amendments contained in the ordinance to be in compliance with Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of November, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven M. Seibert Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Cari L. Roth General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 325 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Charles Rossignol 253 Tollgate Boulevard Islamorada, Florida 33036 Nancy Stroud Weiss Serota Helfman Pastoriza & Guedes, P.A. 3107 Stirling Road, Suite 300 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33312 David L. Jordan Deputy General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 John R. Herin, Jr. Weiss, Serota, Helfman, Pastoriza & Guedes 2665 South Bayshore Drive Suite 420 Miami, Florida 33133
