The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner overpaid Respondent Medicaid funds, for which Section 409.913(10), Florida Statutes (2002), authorizes Petitioner to seek repayment from Respondent.
Findings Of Fact During 1998, Respondent was an authorized Medicaid provider, pursuant to Medicaid provider number 105425200, and was a party to a valid Medicaid Provider Agreement with Petitioner. Respondent filed claims with Petitioner for payment, under the Medicaid program, for the goods and services that are the subject of the audit described below, and Petitioner paid Respondent for these claims. The audit period in this case is 1998. During 1998, Respondent submitted to Petitioner 36,257 claims for nearly 5.5 million units of over one thousand types of drugs. These claims totaled $3,075,449.88, which Petitioner paid Respondent. On June 2, 1999, Petitioner sent a letter to Respondent informing it of a review of its pharmacy claims for 1998. The letter requests documentation of all purchases of 12 named drugs for 1998 and documentation of all credits for these drugs during the same period. The letter states that acceptable documentation includes itemized wholesaler sales history reports, itemized manufacturer sales history reports, itemized invoices, and credit return receipts. By letter dated June 5, 1999, Respondent provided the requested information. By letter dated June 23, 2000, Petitioner advised Respondent that it had examined the paid Medicaid claims for 1998 and the acquisition documentation that Respondent had provided in June 1999. The letter states: "You have failed to provide adequate documentation to the effect that the available quantity of certain drugs of given strength was as great as the quantity of those drugs billed to and reimbursed by Medicaid.” Thus, Petitioner made a "provisional" determination that it had overpaid Respondent $1,092,205.32. The letter invites Respondent to provide additional information to reduce the overpayment determination. The June 23 letter contains an Overpayment Attachment that lists ten of the twelve drugs for which Petitioner had sought documentation in its earlier letter. For each of these ten drugs, the Overpayment Attachment lists the generic code, number of units for which Medicaid paid, the total amount of Medicaid payments, the total units documented by Respondent to have been available during the relevant period, and the number of units for which Respondent provided no availability documentation. The Overpayment Attachment also calculates the amount of Medicaid payments attributable to the unavailable units and the total overpayment, which is $1,092,205.32. The overpayment calculations described in the preceding paragraph assume that all available units of the audited drugs were sold to Medicaid patients. The effect of this improbable scenario reduces the amount of the overpayment. The overpayment calculations attempt no extrapolation of overpayments on the over 10,000 other drugs for which Respondent received Medicaid payments during 1998. The effect of limiting the overpayment calculation to the ten listed drugs reduces the amount of the overpayment. However, the ten listed drugs are the drugs that generated the most Medicaid payments to Respondent and account for over one-third of the total Medicaid payments during the relevant period. Respondent provided additional information to Petitioner on August 30 and November 3, 2000. However, after examining the information, Petitioner advised Respondent, by letter dated April 8, 2002, that its final determination was that Respondent owed $1,096,489.77 due to its receipt of Medicaid overpayments. The overpayment increased by over $4000 due to the determination that Respondent's records documented 1000 fewer available units of two dosages of Risperdone than Petitioner had previously determined.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order directing Respondent to pay Petitioner $1,096,489.77, plus interest, to repay overpayments that it received from the Medicaid program for the sale of drugs in 1998. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of November, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Rhonda M. Medows, M.D., Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3116 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Valda Clark Christian, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Grant P. Dearborn Assistant General Counsel Building 3, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5407 Jose M. Herrera Jose M. Herrera, P.A. 1401 Ponce de Leon Boulevard Suite 200 Coral Gables, Florida 33134
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner must reimburse Respondent an amount up to $1,048,242.62, which sum Petitioner received from the Florida Medicaid Program in payment of claims arising from Petitioner's treating of pediatric patients between October 28, 2000 and October 25, 2002. Respondent alleges that the amount in controversy represents an overpayment arising from Petitioner's submission of claims that were not covered by Medicaid, in whole or in part.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Agency for Health Care Administration ("AHCA" or the "Agency") is the state agency responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid Program ("Medicaid"). Petitioner The Children's Office, Inc. ("TCO") was, at all relevant times, a Medicaid provider authorized to receive reimbursement for covered services rendered to Medicaid beneficiaries. From time to time, therefore, TCO had entered into various written contracts with the Agency, which will be referred to collectively as the "Provider Agreement." Exercising its statutory authority to oversee the integrity of Medicaid, the Agency conducted a review or audit of TCO's medical records to verify that claims paid by Medicaid during the period from October 28, 2000 to October 25, 2002 (the "Audit Period") had not exceeded authorized amounts. During the Audit Period, TCO had submitted 30,193 claims for services rendered to 3,148 patients (or recipients), on which Medicaid had paid a total of $1,593,881.86. Rather than examine the records of all 3,148 recipients served, the Agency selected a sample of 30 patients, whose records were reviewed first by a nurse consultant, and then by a physician "peer reviewer." TCO had submitted 260 claims during the Audit Period in connection with the 30 patients in the sample population. Medicaid had paid a total of $13,582.78 on these claims. The Agency's reviewers determined that, for various reasons, TCO had received a total of $9,740.10 in reimbursement of claims in the sample for services not covered by Medicaid, in whole or in part. Having discovered this "empirical overpayment" of $9,740.10, the Agency employed a statistical formula to ascertain the "probable total overpayment" that TCO had received from Medicaid in connection with the 30,193 claims presented during the Audit Period.1 (TCO does not dispute the methodology that AHCA used in determining the probable total overpayment based on the empirical overpayment associated with the sample population. The parties agreed at hearing that if the undersigned were to find that the empirical overpayment should be adjusted, then the Agency——not the undersigned——would recalculate the probable total overpayment using the same statistical formula.) The statistical analysis revealed a probable total overpayment of $1,048,242.62. This is the amount that AHCA seeks to recoup from TCO. TCO's resistance to the Agency's proposed action proceeds along two main fronts. One involves systemic or global challenges to the audit as a whole, the aim being to land a knockout blow that would preclude that Agency from recouping any amount. The other entails fact-specific disputes about the reimbursement of individual claims in the sample, the goal being to reduce the empirical overpayment——and thereby reduce the probable total overpayment.2 The Systemic Challenges TCO's systemic challenges to the audit are largely, if not exclusively, legal in nature. Indeed, the relevant facts are not in dispute. The factual bases (including the pertinent statutory and regulatory language) for TCO's arguments are set forth below. 1. Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-1.010(22) provides as follows: (22) "Audit" means: an examination of "records for audit" supporting amounts reported in the annual cost report or in order to determine the correctness and propriety of the report; or an analysis of "records for audit" supporting a provider's claim activity for a recipient's services during a year or less of claims activity in order to determine whether Medicaid payments are or were due and the amounts thereof, with claim activity for each separate year constituting a separate audit. The term "audit" also comprehends discussions and interviews related to said examination or analysis. Also see "records for audit."[3] (Emphasis added.) TCO asserts that the foregoing definition of the term "audit" limits AHCA to reviewing periods of no greater than one year at a time, per provider, when investigating possible fraud, abuse, or overpayment as part of its Medicaid oversight responsibility. Because the Audit Period is approximately two years, TCO argues that the audit should be deemed void.4 2. Section 409.9131(5)(a), Florida Statutes, requires that the Agency, in making a determination of overpayment to a physician, must, among other things, "make every effort to consider the physician's patient case mix, including, but not limited to, patient age and whether individual patients are clients of the Children's Medical Services Network." Many of TCO's patients were clients of the Children's Medical Services Network ("CMS"), a fact that, TCO contends, the Agency's reviewers failed adequately to take into account. Though the evidence on this issue is limited, the undersigned agrees with TCO——and finds——that, in general, AHCA's reviewers placed little weight on whether a particular patient participated in CMS. The Agency did, however, consider TCO's overall "case mix" and factors relevant thereto. The undersigned determines, as a matter of fact, that the Agency put forth a reasonable effort under the circumstances to "consider [TCO's] patient case mix" in accordance with the statute. The undersigned further determines that, in any event, "case mix" considerations are not dispositive of the disputed reimbursement issues at hand. 3. Section 409.913(5), Florida Statutes, provides that all Medicaid providers are subject to having goods and services that are paid for by the Medicaid program reviewed by an appropriate peer-review organization designated by the agency. The written findings of the applicable peer- review organization are admissible in any court or administrative proceeding as evidence of medical necessity or the lack thereof. (Emphasis added.) Section 409.9131(5)(b), Florida Statutes, adds that "when the agency's preliminary analysis indicates that an evaluation of the medical necessity, appropriateness, and quality of care needs to be undertaken to determine a potential overpayment" to a physician, the Agency must refer the claims at issue for "peer review." The term "peer review" is defined, for purposes of Section 409.9131, as follows: "Peer review" means an evaluation of the professional practices of a Medicaid physician provider by a peer or peers in order to assess the medical necessity, appropriateness, and quality of care provided, as such care is compared to that customarily furnished by the physician's peers and to recognized health care standards, and, in cases involving determination of medical necessity, to determine whether the documentation in the physician's records is adequate. § 409.9131(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). TCO argues that Section 409.913(5) "clearly requires" the use of a peer-review organization (rather than an individual peer) when auditing "non-physician claims," and it contends that this "requirement" should be held applicable, as well, to the review of physician service claims pursuant to Section 409.9131(5). In this case, the peer review of physician service claims was performed, not by an organization, but by Dr. Larry Deeb, a Florida-licensed pediatrician. Thus, TCO urges that the audit be declared invalid in its entirety. 4. It is undisputed that approximately four years elapsed from the beginning of the Audit Period to the issuance, on November 30, 2004, of the Final Agency Audit Report, which latter gave TCO a clear point of entry to challenge the Agency's overpayment determination. TCO contends that this four-year "delay" was prejudicial to TCO's ability to defend against AHCA's recoupment effort. Thus, TCO argues that this proceeding should be deemed time-barred. 5. TCO asserts, and AHCA did not genuinely dispute, that the medical records provided to the Agency during the audit reveal a number of Medicaid compensable services for which TCO never submitted claims. TCO argues that if an investigation into possible Medicaid overpayments yields information demonstrating the existence of valid, yet unmade claims, then the Agency is under a legal duty either to pay those claims or set them off against any overpayment that might be found. The Fact-Specific Disputes In addition to challenging the validity of the audit as a whole, TCO disputes, in the alternative, the Agency's determinations regarding 13 specific claims; it also urges that several miscellaneous adjustments be made as well.5 These will be examined below. First, however, it is necessary to make some preliminary findings, to place the disputed claims in context. The disputed claims involve what are known as "evaluation and management services" ("E/M services") provided in the doctor's office or other outpatient setting to new or established patients. E/M services are billed to Medicaid using codes that reflect the intensity level of service provided. The codes are called "CPT codes"——"CPT" being short for Current Procedural Terminology. Medicaid reimburses providers for E/M services pursuant to fee schedules that specify the amount payable for each level of service according to the CPT codes. It is the provider's responsibility, in presenting a claim to Medicaid for payment, to determine the appropriate CPT code for the service provided. Medicaid generally pays claims upon receipt, without second-guessing the provider's judgment regarding the level of care. When the Agency conducts an investigation to determine possible overpayment to a provider, however, one thing it might review is whether the provider's claims were properly "coded"—— that is, whether the CPT codes on the bills accurately reflected the level of service provided to the patients, as documented in the medical records. If the Agency determines that the level of service provided was lower than that claimed, then it will "downcode" the claim to the proper level and seek to recoup from the provider, as an overpayment, the difference between what Medicaid paid on the claim as originally coded and what it would have paid on the claim as downcoded. In this case, each of the 13 disputed claim determinations involves a downcode with which TCO disagrees. The following CPT codes are relevant to the claims in dispute: NEW PATIENT 99201 Office and other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of a new patient, which requires these three key components: ? a problem focused history;? a problem focused examination;and? straightforward medical decision making. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problems are self limited or minor. Physicians typically spend 10 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. 99202 Office and other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of a new patient, which requires these three key components: ? an expanded problem focused history;? an expanded problem focused examination; and? straightforward medical decision making. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problems are low to moderate severity. Physicians typically spend 20 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. 99203 Office and other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of a new patient, which requires these three key components:? a detailed history;? a detailed examination; and? medical decision making of low complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problems are of moderate severity. Physicians typically spend 30 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. 99204 Office and other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of a new patient, which requires these three key components: ? a comprehensive history;? a comprehensive examination; and? medical decision making of moderate complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problems are low to moderate severity. Physicians typically spend 45 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. 99205 Office and other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of a new patient, which requires these three key components: ? a comprehensive history;? a comprehensive examination; and? medical decision making of high complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problems are moderate to high severity. Physicians typically spend 60 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. ESTABLISHED PATIENT 99211 Office and other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of an established patient, that may not require the presence of a physician. Usually the presenting problem(s) are minimal. Typically, 5 minutes are spent performing or supervising these services. 99212 Office and other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of an established patient, which requires at least two of these three key components: ? a problem focused history;? a problem focused examination; and? straightforward medical decision making. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problems are self limited or minor. Physicians typically spend 10 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. 99213 Office and other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of an established patient, which requires at least two of these three key components:? an expanded problem focusedhistory;? an expanded problem focused examination; and? straightforward medical decision making. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problems are low to moderate severity. Physicians typically spend 15 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. 99214 Office and other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of an established patient, which requires at least two of these three key components: ? a detailed history;? a detailed examination; and? medical decision making of moderate complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problems are of moderate severity. Physicians typically spend 25 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. 99215 Office and other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of an established patient, which requires at least two of these three key components: ? a comprehensive history;? a comprehensive examination; and? medical decision making of moderate complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problems are low to moderate severity. Physicians typically spend 40 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. American Medical Association, Evaluation and Management (E/M) Services Guidelines at 9-10 (2001). Turning now to the 13 disputed claims, the following is a summary discussion of each, sorted by recipient and date of service. Recipient No. 2 Date of Service ("DOS") 03/05/01. Nurse Practitioner Beverly Armstrong saw this patient, then aged 10, on March 5, 2001, because he was experiencing nasal drainage and a cough. Ms. Armstrong diagnosed sinusitis and bronchitis and prescribed appropriate medications for those conditions. The child is profoundly developmentally delayed, which complicated the examination and medical decision-making process. TCO billed this visit to Medicaid under CPT Code 99215——the highest level of E/M services for an established patient——and was reimbursed $60.95. It is undisputed, however, that Medicaid does not permit an advanced registered nurse practitioner ("ARNP") to bill any visit at the 99215 level. (If a physician co-signs the medical record, then the claim can be properly submitted as a 99215 visit, but that did not happen on this claim or any other disputed claim here involving the services of an ARNP.) Thus, there is no dispute that this claim must be downcoded. The Agency contends that the claim properly should be reimbursed as a 99213 visit; TCO contends that 99214 is the correct level of service. It is concluded that this visit met the criteria for reimbursement at the 99214 level. The Medicaid fee for ARNP services in connection with a 99214-level visit was $32.82 in March 2001, which is $28.13 less than Medicaid paid on this claim. The Agency based its probable total overpayment determination on an alleged overcharge of $35.90. Thus, the empirical overpayment should be reduced by $7.77. DOS 05/16/02. This patient was seen by Dr. Barbara Chamberlain on May 16, 2005, because he was having difficulty sleeping and was waking up scared. TCO submitted the claim for this visit to Medicaid under CPT Code 99214 and was reimbursed the established fee for that level of service. During the instant audit, the Agency downcoded the visit to 99213, resulting in an alleged overpayment of $15.71 on the claim. At hearing, however, the Agency's counsel conceded that, in view of Dr. Deeb's deposition testimony, the claim had been properly coded as a 99214 visit. Therefore, the empirical overpayment should be reduced by $15.71. Recipient No. 13 DOS 11/01/00. This patient, aged 4, presented on November 1, 2000, with a cough and fever, and was seen by Nurse Armstrong, who diagnosed bronchitis and prescribed treatment therefor. TCO presented this claim to Medicaid as a 99215 visit, which was improper because ARNP services are not authorized for payment at such level, and was reimbursed $59.43. AHCA contends that the claim should be downcoded to 99213, giving rise to an alleged overpayment of $34.38. The undersigned determines, however, that 99214 is the proper code, based on the overall complexity of the case as reflected in the medical records. The appropriate reimbursement, therefore, is $31.85, resulting in an overpayment on this claim of $27.58. The empirical overpayment should, accordingly, be reduced by $6.80. DOS 04/27/01. The patient was seen by Nurse Armstrong on April 27, 2001, complaining of fever and a recent history of vomiting and diarrhea. He was diagnosed with a middle ear infection and allergic rhinitis. After the visit, on the night of April 27, a call was made on this patient's behalf to the on- call nurse to report an ongoing high fever; the patient was encouraged to go to the emergency room for treatment. TCO improperly billed this claim for nursing services as a 99215 visit and was paid $60.95. The undersigned is persuaded by Dr. Deeb's deposition testimony that the appropriate service level on this claim is 99213, as the Agency contends. When it calculated the probable total overpayment, however, the Agency assumed, incorrectly, that the fee for ARNP services on a 99213 claim in April 2001 was $25.05. In fact, such claims were reimbursed at the rate of $21.03 per visit. Thus, for this claim, the empirical overpayment should be increased by $4.02. DOS 04/30/01. The patient presented again on April 30, 2001, with a high fever and nasal congestion. He was seen by Nurse Armstrong, who ordered blood and urine tests and prescribed additional treatment. TCO billed the visit, improperly, as a 99215 and was paid $60.95. Based on the medical records, which document a high fever that was not responding as expected to treatment, the undersigned determines that 99214 is the proper code for this visit. The applicable fee for such a visit, at the time, was $32.82. Thus, the overpayment on this claim is $28.13, not $35.90 as AHCA alleged. The empirical overpayment should be reduced by $7.77. Recipient No. 17 Nurse Armstrong saw this three-year-old on November 29, 2000. The patient came in with redness and swelling of the eyelid. The ARNP referred the patient to an ophthalmologist. TCO submitted a claim to Medicaid, reporting the visit under CPT Code 99215, which was improper because, to repeat for emphasis, nursing services cannot be billed at this level——a point that TCO conceded at hearing. Medicaid paid TCO $59.43 for the visit. The Agency asserts, and the undersigned finds, that this claim should be reimbursed at the 99213 level. The key fact here is that the patient was referred to a specialist. While this was no doubt an appropriate disposition, deciding to make a routine referral to an eye doctor for evaluation of a possible eye infection or injury should be a relatively easy medical task. The fee for ARNP services on a 99213 claim was $20.80 in November 2000. In calculating the probable total overpayment, the Agency incorrectly assumed that the applicable fee was $25.05. Thus, the empirical overpayment should be increased by $4.25 to account for this claim, properly adjusted. Recipient No. 18 DOS 07/17/02. This patient, aged 5, was seen by Dr. Chamberlain on July 17, 2002, for treatment of a cough and low- grade fever. The doctor diagnosed pharyngitis and prescribed an antibiotic. TCO billed Medicaid for a 99215 visit and was reimbursed $63.37. The Agency contends that this claim should be downcoded to 99213. The undersigned agrees, because the medical record documents a routine visit involving a straightforward diagnosis and plan of treatment. Thus, there should be no change to the empirical overpayment on account of this claim. DOS 08/08/02. Dr. Chamberlain saw this patient on August 8, 2002, because he had a fever. The doctor again diagnosed pharyngitis and offered an antibiotic injection, which the patient's mother refused. Dr. Chamberlain spent additional time counseling the mother, but she continued to decline the recommended treatment, against medical advice. TCO presented a claim to Medicaid for a 99214 visit. The Agency urges that this visit be downcoded to 99213, creating an alleged overpayment of $15.71. The undersigned finds, however, that 99214 was the appropriate code for this claim, primarily because of the need for additional counseling as a result of the mother's refusal of treatment. Thus, the empirical overpayment should be reduced by $15.71 for this claim. Patient No. 19 DOS 05/17/02. Nurse Armstrong saw this medically complex three-year-old as a new patient on May 17, 2002. The medical record does not document the specific medical complaint that drove the visit, but states that the patient wanted a nebulizer machine. The nurse examined the patient in some detail and decided to stay the course charted by other providers, directing that the patient continue taking the same medications. TCO reported the visit to Medicaid as a 99205 claim and received $85.00. This was improper on its face because nursing services cannot be billed at this level. The Agency contends that the claim should be downcoded to 99203, and the undersigned agrees. Based on the evidence presented, it is found that the medical decision-making required for this visit should not have exceeded a low level of complexity, especially since no material changes were made to the preexisting treatment plan. The fee for ARNP services on a 99203 visit was $40.23 in May 2002, not $38.70 as shown in the Agency's work papers. Consequently, the empirical overpayment should be reduced by $1.53 to reflect the adjustment of this claim. DOS 06/05/02. Dr. Chamberlain saw the patient on June 5, 2002, because she was vomiting, sleeping too much, and experiencing a loss of appetite. The doctor ordered emergency blood work, which revealed that one of the medications that the patient was taking had reached a toxic level in her bloodstream. This was a potentially life-threatening situation that required prompt medical attention. TCO billed this visit at the 99215 level. AHCA argues that the claim should be downcoded to 99213, at which level an alleged overpayment of $30.81 would result. The undersigned agrees with TCO, however, that 99215 was the proper code under the circumstances. The empirical overpayment should be reduced by $30.81 for this claim. DOS 07/08/02. The patient was seen by Dr. Chamberlain on July 8, 2002, for a "pre-op" examination ahead of a scheduled surgery to repair a hernia. The visit was billed to Medicaid as a 99215 claim, and TCO received $63.37. In this proceeding, TCO has conceded that 99215 was excessive, but it presses for a downcode only to 99214. The Agency asserts that 99213 is the proper code for this claim. The undersigned is persuaded that this focused pre-op examination should not have required a level of care beyond 99213. In July 2002, the fee for a physician's services on a 99213 visit was $32.56. The overpayment on this claim therefore is $30.81. Because the Agency mistakenly recorded the overpayment as $37.32 in its work papers and used that figure in calculating the probable total overpayment, the empirical overpayment should be reduced by $6.51. DOS 07/25/02. On this day, the medical records show that the patient was seen by Nurse Armstrong for "labs only" and to have a form completed for school. TCO submitted a claim to Medicaid for a 99215 visit (which was facially improper) and was reimbursed $63.37. AHCA now seeks to deny the claim in its entirety based on the absence of a medical record. Yet, as TCO points out, there is a record of this visit. It reflects that minimal services were performed and no examination of the patient was conducted. Thus, the claim should be downcoded to 99211. For ARNP services at this level, Medicaid paid $10.37 at the relevant time. Thus, the empirical overpayment should be reduced by $10.37 to account for this claim. DOS 09/04/02. Nurse Armstrong saw the patient, who presented with a fever and cough, on September 4, 2002. This visit took place a couple of weeks after the patient's hernia had been surgically repaired. The nurse diagnosed pharyngitis or tonsillitis. TCO presented the claim to Medicaid, improperly, as a level 99215 visit and received $63.37. AHCA contends that the claim should be downcoded to 99213. This would have been the appropriate code, the undersigned believes, but for the fact that the child had recently undergone surgery, which added an element of complexity to the case. The undersigned finds that the proper code for this claim is 99214. At the time, Medicaid paid $34.52 for ARNP services on a 99214 claim. Thus, the overpayment on this claim is $28.85. Because AHCA based its determination of the probable total overpayment on an alleged overpayment of $37.32 on this claim, the empirical overpayment should be reduced by $8.47. Miscellaneous Adjustments TCO has identified a number of alleged errors in the Agency's work papers, which will be discussed below. Recipient No. 15, DOS 12/07/00. This claim for a doctor's services was coded 99664. Medicaid paid TCO $8.00 on the claim. As part of the audit, AHCA reduced the allowable fee to $6.40, because the services at issue were in fact performed by an ARNP. This created an alleged overpayment on the claim of $1.60. TCO does not dispute that an ARNP performed the services; it asserts that the applicable fee is more than $6.40. TCO is correct. The fee for ARNP services on a 99664 claim was, in December 2000, $8.57. Thus, the empirical overpayment should be reduced by $2.17 (0.57 + 1.60). Recipient No. 30, DOS 05/03/02. TCO billed Medicaid for a doctor's services at the 99203 level and was reimbursed $50.30. AHCA determined in the audit that an ARNP actually performed the services in question and reduced the allowable fee to $40.24, resulting in an alleged overpayment of $10.06. The applicable ARNP fee schedule shows an allowable fee of $40.23. Thus, the empirical overpayment should be increased by 0.01 to account for this claim. Recipient No. 18, DOS 08/09/02. TCO correctly notes that, contrary to the Agency's allegation, there is a medical record for this visit, which shows that the ARNP gave the patient a shot of antibiotic medicine. Thus, while the Agency properly determined that TCO's claim for a physician's services at level 99215 resulted in an overpayment, it should have downcoded the claim to 99211, rather than denied the claim in its entirety, and allowed reimbursement at the ARNP fee of $10.37. Accordingly, the empirical overpayment should be reduced by $10.37. Recipient No. 17, DOS 07/10/01. TCO has identified a typographical error in a one of the Agency's work papers, where the date of service for this claim incorrectly was recorded as July 10, 2000, instead of July 10, 2001. This error did not affect the overpayment calculations, however, and thus no adjustment to the empirical overpayment is required. Recipient No. 22, DOS 09/03/02. TCO alleges that the allowed fee of $48.27 "is wrong." According to the applicable fee schedule, however, this is indeed the correct figure. Therefore, no change in the Agency's calculations is warranted. Recipient No. 23, DOS 08/07/02. TCO points out that a work paper of the Agency fails to mention the allowed CPT Code for this claim. The omission had no effect on the Agency's overpayment calculations. Recipient No. 26, DOS 07/20/01. TCO notes a typographical error in a work paper that had no effect on the Agency's overpayment calculations. Recipient No. 26, DOS 03/13/01. TCO notes a typographical error in a work paper that had no effect on the Agency's overpayment calculations. Other Discrepancies In the course of reviewing the Agency's work papers and the medical records in evidence, the undersigned discovered several minor discrepancies that should be corrected in recalculating the probable total overpayment. Recipient No. 2. The total alleged overpayment for this patient, before making any of the adjustments described above, is $1,571.93, not $1,594.42, which latter figure was used by the Agency in determining the probable total overpayment. Therefore, the empirical overpayment should be reduced by $22.49. Recipient No. 5. The total alleged overpayment for this patient, before making any of the adjustments described above, is $27.63, not $26.38, which latter figure was used by the Agency in determining the probable total overpayment. Therefore, the empirical overpayment should be increased by $1.25. Recipient No. 15. The total alleged overpayment for this patient, before making any of the adjustments described above, is $367.35, not $372.44, which latter figure was used by the Agency in determining the probable total overpayment. Therefore, the empirical overpayment should be reduced by $5.09. Recipient No. 30. The total alleged overpayment for this patient, before making any of the adjustments described above, is $42.62, not $44.16, which latter figure was used by the Agency in determining the probable total overpayment. Therefore, the empirical overpayment should be reduced by $1.54. Summary The Agency based its determination of the probable total overpayment on an empirical overpayment of $9,740.10. In accordance with the foregoing findings, it is determined that this figure should be increased by a total of $9.53, and reduced by a total of $153.11, making a net empirical overpayment of $9,596.52. In other words, the undersigned finds that, of the $13,582.78 which TCO received from Medicaid for the 260 total claims submitted during the Audit Period in connection with medical services provided to the sample population of 30 patients, $9,596.52 constituted an overpayment. Thus, it is this figure——$9,596.52——that should be used in calculating the probable total overpayment arising from the 30,193 claims presented during the Audit Period, for which Medicaid paid TCO a grand total of $1,593,881.86.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency recalculate the probable total overpayment using the statistical formula previously employed but substituting $9,596.52 in place of $9,740.10 as the empirical overpayment, and enter a final order requiring TCO to repay the Agency the principal amount determined through such recalculation. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of February, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of February, 2006.
The Issue The issue to be determined is what amount of the $10,652.23 Medicaid lien held by Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration ("Respondent" or "Agency"), is recoverable by Respondent from the $65,000.00 settlement reached by Petitioner, Tya-Marie Savain ("Petitioner" or "Savain"), in her related personal injury action.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulation between the parties, the evidence presented and the record as a whole, the undersigned makes the following findings of fact: On the afternoon of May 27, 2015, Petitioner, who was 19 years of age, was a pedestrian walking northbound across Forrest Hill Boulevard in West Palm Beach, Florida. As she was crossing the road in daylight, she was hit by a vehicle operated by Kenneth Knowles. (JPHS p. 5, ¶ 1). As a result of the collision, Petitioner suffered a fractured femur requiring open reduction internal fixation to repair her leg and a second surgery to remove the medical hardware. Petitioner suffered additional injuries (during the accident), including a left eye laceration, and road rash with scarring on her hands, elbows, chin, ears, forehead, mouth, and other body parts. (JPHS p. 5, ¶ 2). Respondent expended $10,652.23 in medical assistance through its Medicaid program for the benefit of Petitioner related to her fractured femur and the two resulting surgeries caused in the accident. (JPHS p. 5, ¶ 4). Petitioner’s extensive injuries necessitated surgery and resulted in significant medical treatment and related medical expenses (see, e.g., Pet. Exs. 2-12, 23). Petitioner brought a personal injury action for negligence against the liable third party and driver, Kenneth Knowles, in Palm Beach County, Florida. Kenneth Knowles had bodily injury coverage with Allstate Insurance Company in the amount of $15,000.00. Knowles paid an additional $50,000.00 out of his pocket resulting in a gross settlement of $65,000.00 for the personal injury claim brought by Savain.4/ (JPHS p. 5, ¶ 3). Following resolution of Petitioner’s personal injury action, her counsel advised the Agency of the settlement through correspondence dated April 10, 2017. Counsel explained to the Agency that Savain would not be recovering the full value of her damages and requested that Respondent accept a reduced amount in full satisfaction of its Medicaid lien. (JPHS p. 5, ¶ 6). Respondent replied to Petitioner’s counsel in writing on June 22, 2017, and stated that Medicaid would not accept any reduction from the full lien amount of $10,652.23. (JPHS p. 6, ¶ 8). There was no evidence that the Agency participated in, approved of, or was consulted concerning Petitioner’s settlement with Kenneth Knowles. In addition to the Medicaid lien, Petitioner had total medical bills of $182,660.42, and has outstanding bills and liens (excluding Respondent’s Medicaid lien) totaling $38,899.51. Accordingly, Petitioner’s total outstanding past medical expenses, including the Agency’s Medicaid lien is $49,551.74. (JPHS p. 6, ¶ 7). Both parties stipulated that the application of the formula at section 409.910(11)(f) to Petitioner’s $65,000.00 settlement requires payment to the Agency in the amount of $10,652.23 in satisfaction of its Medicaid lien. (JPHS p. 5, ¶ 5). There was no evidence presented to prove or suggest that the Agency provided a lesser amount of medical assistance than the $10,652.23 it asserted it had expended. Further, there was no evidence presented to prove what portion of the $65,000.00 settlement was allocated by Petitioner and Kenneth Knowles to her past medical expenses.5/ The affidavit of Attorney Eric Morales, proffered by Petitioner, opined that the "value" of Petitioner’s claim was between $550,000.00 and $750,000.00. (Pet. Ex. 24). These figures supposedly represent the total sum of Petitioner’s range of damages. Morales was of the opinion that the settlement reached by Petitioner represented five percent, on the high end, and 3.6 percent, on the low end, of the actual value of her claim.6/ The undersigned finds and concludes that the affidavit is an out-of-court statement used to prove the truth of the matters asserted in it. It does not supplement or explain other admissible evidence, and Petitioner has advanced no case authority or exception to the hearsay rule which would permit its use or consideration by the undersigned. Morales’s affidavit is classic hearsay. See Fortune v. Fortune, 61 So. 3d 441 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011); and B.C.S., S.R.L. v. Wise, 910 So. 2d 871, 874 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). As such, it cannot be considered or used by the undersigned to establish or support any findings of fact in this case and is stricken from consideration or use by the undersigned. Petitioner, therefore, did not present any admissible evidence to support a finding of the actual value of her personal injury claim or to support the "pro-rata" or "proportionality" formula she advanced through her counsel’s arguments.7/ To reiterate, there was no evidence presented by Petitioner to prove that (1) a lesser portion of the total recovery should be allocated as reimbursement for past medical expenses than the amount calculated by the Agency, or (2) that Medicaid provided a lesser amount of medical assistance than the $10,652.23 asserted by the Agency.
The Issue The issue to be determined is the amount payable to the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA or Respondent) in satisfaction of its $157,983.63 Medicaid lien asserted against medical malpractice settlement proceeds received by Hunter Lamendola (Hunter), a minor, by and through his mother and natural guardian, Ashley Lamendola (Petitioner).
Findings Of Fact On June 26, 2012, Petitioner presented to the hospital with a history of contractions for six hours prior to her arrival at the hospital. She had been placed on bed rest for gestational hypertension five days prior to arriving at the hospital. When she arrived, she had hypertension. Petitioner was admitted to the labor and delivery unit at 8:33 p.m. Petitioner was placed on a fetal monitor and progressed through her course of labor. Her initial fetal monitoring showed the baby was healthy and well-oxygenated, however, throughout the course of labor, the fetal monitor exhibited signs that the baby was in significant distress. At 4:01 a.m. on June 27, 2012, Petitioner was given an epidural, and after a course of labor, Hunter was delivered at 3:47 p.m. through an operative vaginal delivery. Hunter suffered permanent and catastrophic brain damage during his birth. As a result, Hunter is unable to eat, speak, toilet, ambulate, or care for himself in any manner. Hunter’s medical care related to the delivery was paid by Medicaid. The Medicaid program through AHCA provided $157,983.63 in benefits. The Medicaid program through the Department of Health Children’s Medical Services Title XIX MMA – Pedicare (DOH), provided $26,189.66 in benefits; the Medicaid program through a Medicaid-managed care organization, known as Amerigroup Community Care (Amerigroup), provided $51,696.99 in benefits; and the Medicaid program through a Medicaid-managed care organization, known as WellCare of Florida (WellCare), provided $13,239.19 in benefits. Accordingly, the sum of these Medicaid benefits, $249,109.47, constituted Hunter’s entire claim for past medical expenses. Petitioner brought a medical malpractice action against the medical providers and staff responsible for Hunter’s care (Defendant medical providers) to recover all of Hunter’s damages, as well as her own individual damages associated with Hunter’s injuries. The medical malpractice lawsuit was settled through a series of confidential settlements totaling $10,000,000 and this settlement was approved by the Court. During the pendency of Hunter’s medical malpractice action, AHCA was notified of the action, and AHCA asserted a $157,983.63 Medicaid lien against Hunter’s cause of action and settlement of that action. AHCA, through the Medicaid program, spent $157,983.63 on behalf of Hunter, all of which represents expenditures paid for Hunter’s past medical expenses. No portion of the $157,983.63 paid through the Medicaid program on behalf of Hunter represent expenditures for future medical expenses, and Medicaid did not make payments in advance for medical care. Application of the formula set forth in section 409.910(11)(f), Florida Statutes, to Hunter’s settlement requires payment to AHCA of the full $157,983.63 Medicaid lien. Petitioner has deposited the full Medicaid lien amount in an interest-bearing account for the benefit of AHCA pending an administrative determination of AHCA’s rights, and this constitutes “final agency action” for purposes of chapter 120, Florida Statutes, pursuant to section 409.910(17). At the final hearing, Mr. Harwin, who represented Hunter and his family in the underlying medical malpractice action, testified, and was accepted, without objection, as an expert in the valuation of damages suffered by injured parties. Mr. Harwin is a member of several trial attorney associations, stays abreast of jury verdicts relative to birth injuries, and ascertains the value of damages suffered by injured parties as a routine part of his practice. Mr. Harwin was familiar with and explained Hunter’s catastrophic brain injury giving rise to Petitioner’s claim. He also explained that, as a result of Hunter’s injury, Hunter is blind, fed through a feeding tube, unable to control his arms, legs or head, and suffers between six to eight seizures per day. Mr. Harwin testified that Hunter’s injury has also had a devastating impact on Hunter’s mother, Ashley Lamendola. According Mr. Harwin, considering Hunter’s past medical expenses, a life care plan for Hunter’s care prepared by an economist, and the extent of non-economic damages, and in light of determinations of mock juries and a jury consultant in this case, as well as Mr. Harwin’s familiarity with jury verdicts reached in similar cases, Hunter and his mother’s damages have a value in excess of $35,000,000. Mr. Harwin’s testimony as to the value of Petitioner’s claim was credible and is accepted. Petitioner also presented the testimony of Mr. Barrett, who was accepted as an expert in the valuation of damages. Mr. Barrett has been accepted as an expert in valuation of damages in a number of other Medicaid lien cases before DOAH. Mr. Barrett has been a trial attorney for 41 years, with a primary focus on plaintiff personal injury cases, including medical malpractice, medical products liability, and pharmaceutical products liability. Mr. Barrett stays abreast of jury verdicts and often makes assessments concerning the value of damages suffered by injured parties. After familiarizing himself with Hunter’s injuries through review of pertinent medical records and Petitioner’s exhibits, Mr. Barrett offered his opinion, based upon his professional training and experience, as well as review of comparable jury verdicts, that a conservative value of the damages suffered would be “$35,000,000 to $50,000,000.” Mr. Barrett’s testimony as to the value of Petitioner’s claim was credible and is accepted. AHCA did not call any witnesses, present any evidence as to the value of Petitioner’s claim, or propose a differing valuation of the damages. Based upon the unrebutted evidence presented by Petitioner’s experts, it is found that a conservative value of Petitioner’s claim is $35,000,000. Attorney’s fees for the underlying medical malpractice case leading to Petitioner’s $10,000,000.00 settlement totaled $4,500,000.00, with costs of $490,486.33. While the formula under section 409.910(11)(f) determines amounts distributable to Medicaid after attorney’s fees and taxable costs, there is no language in section 409.910(17)(b) suggesting that attorney’s fees or costs should be subtracted from settlement proceeds in determining whether a lesser portion of the total recovery should be allocated to reimburse Medicaid. Costs and attorney’s fees are not an element of Petitioner’s damages and were not subtracted from the settlement proceeds in determining whether a lesser portion of the total recovery should be allocated to AHCA’s Medicaid lien. Considering the valuation of Petitioner’s claim at $35,000,000.00, Petitioner’s $10,000,000.00 settlement represents only a 10/35ths recovery of Petitioner’s damages. Multiplying that same 10/35 fraction to the $157,983.63 paid by AHCA through the Medicaid program for past medical expenses results in the proportional sum of $45,138.18 from the settlement proceeds available to satisfy AHCA’s Medicaid lien.
The Issue What is the amount from Petitioners' settlement proceeds that should be paid to satisfy Respondent's Medicaid lien under section 409.910, Florida Statutes (2013)?1/
Findings Of Fact By Order entered August 15, 2013, the Circuit Court of the Twelfth Judicial Circuit, in and for Manatee County, Florida, appointed Robert Gibbons and Robert Gibbons, Jr., as joint plenary guardians of Georgia-Rose Gibbons. On April 6, 2012, Georgia-Rose Gibbons (Ms. Gibbons), who was a college freshman at the time, sustained numerous severe and permanent injuries, including a traumatic head injury, when she was struck by a motor vehicle while walking across a multi-lane road. Ms. Gibbons is totally incapacitated and currently resides in a nursing home. As of the date of this Order, Ms. Gibbons has a rated life expectancy of approximately 47 additional years. At the final hearing, Petitioners presented the testimony of Jeffrey A. Luhrsen, an attorney with extensive experience representing injured claimants in personal injury litigation. Mr. Luhrsen has practiced law in the State of Florida for more than twenty years and has tried multiple personal injury cases to jury verdict. Mr. Luhrsen opined that based upon a reasonable degree of certainty, and taking into consideration issues of comparative fault, $20,000,000 is the value of Ms. Gibbons' claim. AHCA did not offer evidence to the contrary. Mr. Luhrsen also credibly opined that the $400,000 settlement (explained below), which Ms. Gibbons received as a consequence of her injuries, did not fully compensate Ms. Gibbons for her damages. Mr. Luhrsen's opinions are accepted. The operator of the vehicle that collided with Ms. Gibbons was uninsured. Pursuant to an automobile insurance policy with AAA Auto Club South Insurance Company, Ms. Gibbons was insured in the amount of $400,000.00 against personal injury resulting from the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by an uninsured motorist. By correspondence dated September 19, 2013, Respondent informed Petitioners' personal injury attorney (PI attorney) that $220,519.42 is the amount of Respondent's Medicaid lien. In response, Petitioners' PI attorney, by correspondence dated October 3, 2013, advised Respondent that Ms. Gibbon's uninsured motorist claim against AAA was settled, pending approval of the Circuit Court, for $400,000. A copy of the proposed limited release and settlement agreement was included with the correspondence. The Circuit Court approved the settlement agreement on October 4, 2013. On October 17, 2013, Petitioners' PI attorney provided Respondent with copies of the Circuit Court's Order Granting Authority to Settle Claim on Behalf of Ward, and the executed Limited Release and Settlement Agreement. Respondent neither joined in the settlement nor participated in any way in settlement negotiations. The Limited Release and Settlement Agreement provides in part as follows: For and in consideration of the payment of $400,000, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the Releasors being of lawful age, do hereby release, acquit and forever discharge, AAA AUTO CLUB, limited to the uninsured/underinsured liability limits of the Subject Policy, of or in any way growing out of any and all known or unknown personal injuries result[ing] from, related to and/or arising out of the Subject Accident. The Releasors acknowledge that the damages sustained as a result of the Subject Accident are permanent and that recovery therefrom is uncertain and indefinite. * * * 8. It is understood and agreed that this is a partial release and settlement agreement and that the payment referenced herein does not fully compensate the Releasors for the damages arising out of or related to the Subject Accident. . . . * * * 11. Although this settlement does not fully compensate GEORGIA ROSE GIBBONS for all the damages she has suffered, this settlement shall operate as a full and complete Release as to the Releasees without regard to this settlement only compensating GEORGIA ROSE GIBBONS for a fraction of the total monetary value of her damages. The Releasees in this settlement are specifically not compensating one element of damage disproportionately from any other element of damage. Given the nature of the injuries suffered by GEORGIA ROSE GIBBONS, the value of the damages associated with those injuries, and the limited ability of this settlement to compensate even a fraction of GEORGIA ROSE GIBBONS' damages, the parties have agreed to an allocation of the settlement. The parties agree that a fair assessment would place 20% of her total claim for damages as past and future medical expenses, and the remaining 80% of her total claim for damages for other economic damages and non-economic damages. Accordingly, the parties have allocated 20% of the settlement, $80,000, to past and future medical expenses and the remainder of the settlement, $320,000, towards satisfaction of other damages.2/ Respondent, pursuant to section 409.910(11)(f), calculates the amount that it is to be paid to satisfy its lien as follows: $400,000 less 25% (attorney fees) is $300,000; $300,000 less $11,029.89 in taxable costs is $288,970.01; $288,970.01 divided by 2 is $144,485.01, which is less than Respondent paid for Ms. Gibbons' treatment. Accordingly, Respondent seeks $144,485.01 in satisfaction of its Medicaid lien.3/ For the period mid-September 2013 through January 5, 2014, Medicaid paid $14,402.94 in additional medical assistance benefits on behalf of Ms. Gibbons. There is no evidence of record indicating that Respondent amended its lien to reflect the additional benefits paid.
The Issue The issue to be decided is the amount payable to Respondent in satisfaction of the Agency’s Medicaid lien from a settlement, judgment, or award received by Petitioner from a third-party under section 409.910(17), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On June 7, 2005, 14-year-old Michael Mobley attended a beach party. The party occurred on, near, or about the beach premises of a hotel. Michael became intoxicated through consumption of alcohol, and drowned in the Gulf of Mexico. He was revived but suffered brain damage, leaving him unable to communicate, ambulate, eat, toilet, or care for himself in any manner. Michael is now dependent on his father for all aspects of his daily life. As a result of this incident, Michael suffered both economic and noneconomic damages. These damages included, at least, physical and mental pain and suffering, past and future medical expenses, disability, impairment in earning capacity, and loss of quality and enjoyment of life. Michael’s parents also suffered damages. Michael’s father’s employer maintained a self-funded Employee Benefit Plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA Plan). The Florida Statutes provide that Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA), is the Florida state agency authorized to administer Florida’s Medicaid program. § 409.902, Fla. Stat.1/ Michael’s past medical care related to his injury was provided through health benefits from the ERISA Plan administered through CIGNA HealthCare and Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey, and the Florida Medicaid program. The health benefits extended to Michael through his father’s employer totaled $515,860.29. The Florida Medicaid program provided $111,943.89 in benefits. The combined amount of medical benefits Michael received as a result of his injury is $627,804.18. The ERISA Plan provided the employer (through its administrators CIGNA and Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield), with subrogation and reimbursement rights which provided entitlement to reimbursement from any settlement of 100 percent of what the plan had paid. ACS Recovery Services represented CIGNA and Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield, the administrators of the Employee Benefit Plan, and on behalf of these clients ACS Recovery Services asserted a $515,860.29 claim against any settlement Michael received. The Florida Statutes provide that Medicaid shall also be reimbursed for medical assistance that it has provided if resources of a liable third party become available. § 409.910(1), Fla. Stat. In 2006, Michael’s parents, David Mobley and Brenda Allerheiligen, brought a lawsuit in Okaloosa County Circuit Court to recover all of Michael’s damages. By letter dated May 24, 2011, Petitioner’s attorney sent AHCA a Letter of Representation requesting the amount of any Medicaid lien and the itemization of charges. The letter also invited AHCA to participate in litigation of the claim or in settlement negotiations. AHCA through ACS Recovery Services by letter of June 9, 2011, asserted a Medicaid lien against any settlement in the amount of $111,943.89. Testimony at hearing established that a conservative “pure value” of Michael’s economic damage claims in the case, before consideration of such factors as comparative fault, application of the alcohol statute, a defendant’s bankruptcy, and the novel theories of legal liability, was $15 million. A Joint Petition for Approval of Settlement was filed in the Circuit Court in and for Okaloosa County, Florida, on or about June 14, 2012. It stated that although the damages Michael received far exceeded the sum of $500,000, the parties had agreed to fully resolve the action for that amount in light of the parties’ respective assessments of the strengths and weaknesses of their cases. The Petition specifically alluded to pending bankruptcy proceedings, summary judgment dismissal of claims premised upon a duty to provide lifeguarding services, Plaintiff’s remaining theories of liability, available defenses, specifically including the statutory “alcohol defense” as interpreted by the Florida courts, and anticipated costs of trial and appeal. The Petition also stated: “Plaintiff’s claim for past medical expenses related to the incident total $627,804.18. This claim consists of $515,860.29 paid by a self-funded ERISA plan and $111,943.89 paid by Medicaid.” As an attached exhibit, the Petition incorporated a Distribution Sheet/Closing Statement which allocated the $500,000 total recovery among the categories of attorneys’ fees, costs, outside attorneys’ fees, lien/subrogation/medical expenses, and net proceeds to client. The Distribution Sheet allocated $140,717.54 to “lien/subrogation/medical expenses,” subdivided into $120,000.00 to Blue Cross Blue Shield of Florida/CIGNA and $20,717.54 to Medicaid Lien. The proposed settlement did not further describe the $331,365.65 amount identified as “net proceeds to client,” or allocate that amount among distinct claims or categories of damages, such as physical or mental pain and suffering, future medical costs discounted to present value, disability, impairment in earning capacity, or loss of quality and enjoyment of life. Under the Joint Petition for Approval of Settlement, most of the total recovery thus remains uncategorized as to the type of damages it represents. The Joint Petition for Approval of Settlement was submitted on behalf of the Defendants and Plaintiffs in the lawsuit, including Michael Mobley, Petitioner here. Respondent did not participate in settlement negotiations or join in the Release, and no one represented its interests in the negotiations. The Agency has not otherwise executed a release of the lien. A Release was signed by the Plaintiffs contingent upon court approval of the Petition for Approval of Settlement. The court approved the settlement, with the exception of the Medicaid lien, pending an administrative determination of the amount of the lien to be paid. This $500,000 settlement is the only settlement received and is the subject of AHCA’s claim lien. In regard to the $500,000 settlement: Michael’s parents, Brenda Allerheiligen and David Mobley waived any claim to the settlement funds in compensation for their individual claims associated with their son’s injuries; The law firm of Levin, Papantonio, Mitchell, Rafferty & Proctor, P.A., agreed to waive its fees associated with its representation of Michael and his parents; The law firm of Levin, Papantonio, Mitchell, Rafferty & Proctor, P.A., agreed to reduce its reimbursement of the $60,541.22 in costs it advanced in the litigation of the case by 75% and accept $15,135.31 in full payment of its advanced costs; and ACS Recovery Services on behalf of CIGNA and Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield agreed to reduce its $515,860.29 ERISA reimbursement claim asserted against the settlement and accept $120,000 in satisfaction of its $515,860.29 claim. AHCA is seeking reimbursement of $111,943.89 from the $500,000 settlement in satisfaction of its $111,943.89 Medicaid lien. AHCA correctly computed the lien amount pursuant to statutory formula. Deducting 25 percent for attorney’s fees and $60,541.22 taxable costs from the $500,000.00 recovery leaves a sum of $314,458.78, half of which is $157,229.39. In this case, application of the formula therefore results in a statutory lien amount of $111.943.89, the amount actually paid. § 409.910(17), Fla. Stat. The settlement agreement allocated $120,000.00 to be paid to the ERISA plan in partial reimbursement of the $515,860.29 it had paid for medical expenses. This amount must be added to the amount of $20,717.54 allocated for other medical expenses paid by Medicaid, to reflect a total amount of $140,717.54 allocated for past medical expenses in the settlement. The $500,000 total recovery represents approximately 3.3 percent of the $15 million total economic damages. The $20,717.54 allocated to “Medicaid Lien” in the distribution sheet of the settlement represents approximately 3.3 percent of the $627,804.18 of total past medical expenses. The sum of $3,694.15 represents approximately 3.3 percent of the $111,943.89 in medical costs paid by Medicaid. The Petitioner has deposited the full Medicaid lien amount in an interest-bearing account for the benefit of AHCA pending an administrative determination of AHCA’S rights. The parties have stipulated that this constitutes “final agency action” for purposes of chapter 120, pursuant to section 409.910(17). Petitioner filed his Petition on December 13, 2013, within 21 days after the Medicaid lien amount was deposited in an interest-bearing account for the benefit of AHCA. While the evidence presented as to the settlement agreement was not sufficient to show the full amount allocated to medical expenses, the evidence does show that the total recovery includes at least $140,717.54 allocated as reimbursement for past medical expenses, which was to be divided unevenly between the ERISA plan and Medicaid. Petitioner failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the statutory lien amount of $111,943.89 exceeds the amount actually recovered in the settlement for medical expenses.
