The Issue Whether Respondents Alfred Homes and Felicia Homes Foster1 subjected Petitioner Nidia Cruz to discriminatory housing practices based on Ms. Cruz’s national origin, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, part II, Florida Statutes (FHA).
Findings Of Fact Ms. Cruz, who is Hispanic in national origin, rented and occupied a mobile home at lot #9 in Pine Grove Trailer Park (Pine Grove), in an unincorporated area adjacent to Fernandina Beach, Florida. Respondent Alfred Homes owns Pine Grove. His daughter, Respondent Felicia Homes Foster, oversees the business operations of Pine Grove. Ms. Foster lives in a mobile home at Pine Grove, and owns two other mobile homes that are rental units. Ms. Cruz rented one of these mobile homes from Ms. Foster. The remaining mobile homes in Pine Grove are owner-occupied, with those owners renting their lots from Respondents. Neither party could produce a lease between Respondents and Petitioner concerning the mobile home. Based on the parties’ testimony and other evidence presented at the final hearing, the undersigned finds that Petitioner’s tenancy for the mobile home commenced on or about October 15, 2016, for an approximately one-year term ending November 30, 2017. Respondents charged a $500 security deposit, and $600 per month for rent, which included water and sanitary sewer that Pine Grove’s well and septic system provided. Ms. Cruz was responsible for electrical services to the mobile home. After the expiration of the lease on November 30, 2017, the parties did not renew the lease, and Ms. Cruz continued to occupy the mobile home under a month-to-month agreement, until she vacated the mobile home on or about September 29, 2018. Ms. Cruz sought out Respondents to rent a mobile home, as her previous landlord had terminated the lease for her previous residence because of her unauthorized possession of pets. Ms. Foster informed Ms. Cruz that she had an available mobile home to rent, but as the previous tenants had just moved out, she needed to make repairs to the mobile home before it could be occupied. Ms. Cruz requested to move in immediately while the Respondents repaired the mobile home, because she and her daughter were, at that point, homeless. Respondents employed Michael Hamilton to repair and provide maintenance work to the mobile homes in Pine Grove. Mr. Hamilton worked for Respondents on weekends, as he had a full-time job during the week. Within approximately one month of Ms. Cruz moving into her mobile home, Mr. Hamilton made the needed repairs to its interior, including replacing the refrigerator, carpet, commode, and door locks. After moving into the mobile home, Ms. Cruz was involved in an incident at a nearby McDonald’s restaurant with an employee. That employee, Theresa McKenzie, was a tenant of Pine Grove and resided in lot #10, which was adjacent to Ms. Cruz’s mobile home. Ms. Cruz and her daughter, Ms. Burgos, complained to Ms. Foster that Ms. McKenzie and her co-tenant Earnest Roberts made loud, harassing, and defamatory statements about Ms. Cruz and her national origin. Respondents, individually, warned Ms. McKenzie and Mr. Roberts to refrain from calling Ms. Cruz and Ms. Burgos names. The feud between Ms. Cruz and Ms. McKenzie was interrupted when Ms. Cruz was arrested on November 18, 2016. Ms. Cruz was charged with, among other offenses, aggravated stalking arising from a violation of an order of protection and filing a false police report. The victim of these offenses was a previous landlord from whom Ms. Cruz had rented a room. While in pretrial detention, a psychologist evaluated Ms. Cruz, and determined her to be incompetent to proceed in the criminal proceeding. The trial court subsequently committed Ms. Cruz to a mental health facility, and she pled guilty to filing a false police report. The trial court sentenced Ms. Cruz to a split sentence of two years with special conditions, which included enrollment into the mental health court program. After acceptance into the mental health court program, Ms. Cruz was released from the Nassau County Jail. On February 13, 2017, Ms. Foster hand delivered a letter to Ms. McKenzie and Mr. Roberts, which warned them that if they did not refrain from verbal attacks against Ms. Cruz, Respondents would evict them from Pine Grove and obtain a no trespassing order. Chris Cummings, who was a Pine Grove resident at lot #4, testified he was aware of the incident at McDonald’s involving Ms. Cruz and Ms. McKenzie, as his wife also worked at that McDonald’s. Mr. Cummings observed, but could not hear, Ms. Cruz and Ms. McKenzie “squaring off” against each other. Mr. Cummings recounted that he observed Ms. Cruz lift her skirt and bend over, in a manner that he interpreted to mean that Ms. McKenize could kiss her rear end. In August 2017, Hurricane Irma caused a large branch from a pine tree to fall on top of Ms. Cruz’s mobile home, puncturing the exterior metal skin of the mobile home’s roof, which allowed water to intrude into the interior of the mobile home. The water intrusion caused significant damage to the ceilings, walls, and floor coverings of the mobile home. It is undisputed that Hurricane Irma inflicted serious damage to the mobile home, and that Ms. Cruz resorted to using buckets to catch water leaking from the roof. Shortly after Hurricane Irma passed, Mr. Hamilton placed a tarp over the top of the mobile home to stop the water intrusion. He then began repairs to Ms. Cruz’s mobile home over the course of several weekends, which included removing and replacing damaged sheet rock, patching the metal roof, and installing new carpet and linoleum flooring. Mr. Hamilton testified that Ms. Cruz, on several occasions, frustrated his ability to complete these repairs by denying him entry into the mobile home. Ms. Cruz presented evidence that her mobile home required extensive repairs upon moving in, and that it sustained severe damage from Hurricane Irma. However, she presented no credible evidence to rebut the testimony that Mr. Hamilton, on behalf of Respondents, completed all necessary repairs. Additionally, Ms. Cruz presented no credible evidence that Respondents treated her differently than other Pine Grove tenants in responding to and completing any necessary repairs to other tenant’s mobile homes. Neither the passage of time, incarceration, nor the trauma of Hurricane Irma, ended the feud between Ms. Cruz and Ms. McKenzie. The Nassau County Sheriff’s Office had regular call-outs to Pine Grove regarding Ms. Cruz and Ms. McKenzie. The feud escalated when, on January 4, 2018, Ms. McKenzie filed a petition for an injunction for protection against Ms. Cruz, and the circuit court entered a temporary injunction that same day. The next day, January 5, 2018, Ms. Cruz and Ms. Burgos each filed petitions for an injunction for protection against Ms. McKenzie. Then, on January 16, 2018, Ms. Cruz sought a petition for an injunction for protection against Mr. Roberts, which the circuit court granted, as a temporary injunction, that same day. On January 17, 2018, the circuit court held a hearing on the petition against Ms. Cruz and Ms. Burgos’s petition against Ms. McKenzie, and on January 18, 2018, granted a final injunction in each case. On January 18, 2018, Ms. Burgos filed a petition for an injunction for protection against Mr. Roberts, which the circuit court denied. On January 24, 2018, the circuit court heard Ms. Cruz’s petitions against Ms. McKenzie and Mr. Roberts; the circuit court denied the injunction against Ms. McKenzie, but granted a final injunction against Mr. Roberts. On January 29 and February 9, 2018, the circuit court entered orders to show cause in Ms. Burgos’s injunction against Ms. McKenzie, and after hearing argument, dismissed them on February 15, 2018. Despite these multiple injunction proceedings, Ms. Cruz and Ms. McKenzie continued their feud. On January 22, 2018, Ms. Cruz was arrested for violation of the protection order in favor of Ms. McKenzie. Ms. Cruz’s arrest triggered a violation of her felony probation. While in pretrial detention, she was again evaluated by a psychologist, who determined her to be incompetent to proceed. The circuit court committed Ms. Cruz to a mental health facility. She subsequently returned to court and pled guilty to a violation of probation. The circuit court sentenced Ms. Cruz to a split sentence of time served, reinstated probation, and extended probation with an added special condition for 12 months. Ms. Cruz was released from the Nassau County Jail on July 27, 2018. On July 31, 2018, Ms. Foster hand delivered a notice to terminate the lease, stating that the lease will end on August 31, 2018, and that Ms. Cruz should vacate the mobile home no later than September 1, 2018. Ms. Cruz and Ms. Burgos continued to hold over in the mobile home until they moved out on September 29, 2018. Ms. Cruz failed to provide any credible evidence that Respondents, or Mr. Hamilton, made any disparaging statements to Ms. Cruz regarding her national origin. Ms. Cruz failed to provide any credible evidence that Respondents treated her less favorably than other tenants with regard to her feud with Ms. McKenzie. Put differently, Ms. Cruz failed to provide any credible evidence that Respondents treated any other tenant disputes differently than the way they treated the dispute between Ms. Cruz and Ms. McKenzie. Ms. Foster attempted to intervene on behalf of Ms. Cruz to end the feud, when she hand-delivered the letter to Ms. McKenzie on February 13, 2017, that threatened eviction. The credible evidence presented demonstrated that Ms. Cruz often created or exacerbated this feud, which ultimately led to her incarceration. Ms. Cruz failed to provide any credible evidence that Respondents’ decision to end the month-to-month holdover of the lease of the mobile home was based on her national origin, or that Respondents treated Ms. Cruz differently than any other tenants who resided at Pine Grove in ending the month-to-month holdover of a lease.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the undersigned hereby RECOMMENDS that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Nidia Cruz’s Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of July, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT J. TELFER III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of July, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Nidia Cruz Post Office Box 1923 Callahan, Florida 32011 (eServed) James Pratt O'Conner, Esquire James Pratt O'Conner, P.A. Post Office Box 471 Fernandina Beach, Florida 32035 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
The Issue The issue for determination was whether the Respondent, Trailer Estates Park and Recreation District (Trailer Estates), violated Section 760.23, Florida Statutes (1997), by subjecting the Petitioner, Steven S. Berryman (Berryman), to alleged discriminatory housing practices.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Steven S. Berryman (Berryman) failed to appear at final hearing, either in Tallahassee or in Tampa, Florida, and presented no evidence in support of the Petition for Relief. Berryman's original Complaint alleged housing discrimination but did not specify the basis of the discrimination. FCHR investigated the Complaint and issued a Determination of No Reasonable Cause. Berryman's Petition for Relief alleged housing discrimination but also did not specify the basis of the discrimination. Rather, the Petition for Relief alleged that Trailer Estates: "did not have enough votes to convert the park to 55 or older"; allowed a 39 year-old to live in the park; and allowed "young people to live in their park, however you have to be related to them or be a personal friend of theirs."
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of January, 1999, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of January, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven Berryman 4307 Howard Drive Sykesville, Maryland 21784 Robert J. Gill, Esquire Diane K. McClellan, Esquire Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell 1549 Ringling Boulevard, Suite 160 Sarasota, Florida 34236 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 249 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 249 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful housing practice in violation of Section 760.23, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent operated Hickory Hill Mobile Home Park where tenants could rent spaces or lots for the placement of their mobile homes. By notice dated August 26, 1993, all tenants were notified of the closure of the park, effective one year from the date of the notice. On Friday, August 26, 1994, Respondent's representative, Patricia Tripp, preparing for the closure of the park, was notifying persons still in the park that their motor vehicles would have to be moved. She "tagged" cars with notices to owners to the effect that the cars must be moved or the cars would be towed after the conclusion of that day. Extensions were given by Tripp to those persons who requested them if their cars were going to be moved within a few days. At least one extension was granted to a white female tenant who informed Tripp that her car would be gone within a specific number of days of the deadline of August 26, 1994. On August 13, 1994, Petitioner, who is African-American and the former lessee of lot 31, purchased the trailer on lot 25 from the lessee of that lot. The lessee of lot 25 subsequently vacated the premises. Following his purchase, Petitioner then moved into the trailer on lot 25 without formally notifying Respondent. Petitioner moved his original trailer from lot 31 and from Respondent's park on August 18, 1994, continuing to reside at the trailer on lot 25. Under provisions of the form lease between Respondent and tenants of the park, tenants were required to park vehicles in the driveway to individual lots. No parking of vehicles on the street was permitted. Additionally, all motorized vehicles were required to meet state legal requirements to be operated in the park. On August 26, 1996, Petitioner still had a number of vehicles in the park, in addition to his newly acquired mobile home. The vehicles included a bus, manufactured in 1950; a 1978 pickup truck; a 1948 Chrysler automobile; and an ice cream truck. Some of the vehicles were not parked on Petitioner's lot. Tripp questioned Petitioner on August 26, 1994, regarding whether the vehicles belonged to Petitioner. Petitioner responded that they did. Tripp told him that the vehicles would need to be moved since the park was closing and informed him of the deadline. The discussion between the two became heated and eventually Tripp, who felt threatened by Petitioner's attitude and actions, left. Petitioner did not request an extension of the deadline with regard to his vehicles. On Monday, August 29, 1994, Petitioner's vehicles had not been towed. Around 2 p.m. in the afternoon, a tow truck arrived accompanied by a law enforcement officer. After verifying that Petitioner's vehicles met legal requirements and speaking with Respondents' representatives at the scene, the law enforcement officer left. None of Petitioner's vehicles were towed away. Petitioner eventually moved from the park on September 12, 1994, and Respondent's threat to tow Petitioner's vehicles was never realized. Petitioner suffered no quantifiable damages. FCHR's Determination Of No Reasonable Cause was issued on April 5, 1996, documenting FCHR's determination of the non-existence of reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory housing practice had occurred. Petitioner subsequently filed his Petition For Relief on May 10, 1995.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition For Relief. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of November, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of November, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Albert Jerome Lee Post Office Box 1232 Hawthorne, Florida 32640 Claude R. Moulton, Esquire Emmer Development Corporation 2801 Southwest Archer Road Gainesville, Florida 32608 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, Esquire Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact As of June 4, 1984, ten or more spaces in Southwinds Mobile Home Park were being leased by individuals who owned the mobile homes in which they resided on the property. Some of those ten or more residents were Beverly Leight, William Daniel, Frank Addison, Keith Hellstrom, Faye Koch, and Helen Sutton. As of May 25, 1986, ten or more spaces in Southwinds Mobile Home Park were being leased by individuals who owned the mobile homes in which they resided. On May 25, 1986, Johnny Owens owned the mobile home in which he resided on leased Lot 10. As of October 28, 1986, ten or more spaces in Southwinds Mobile Home Park were being leased by individuals who owned the mobile homes in which they resided. On that date, Charles and Pauline Murphy owned the mobile home in which they resided on leased Lot 26. Upon paying the annual fee for southwinds Mobile Home Park, pursuant to Section 723.007 F.S., for the period of October 2, 1987 through October 1, 1988, Respondent Hugh D. Rowles, the park owner, advised Petitioner agency that he had dropped below ten lots available for rent. Respondent had reached this stage by simply not leasing out lots to new tenants as lots were voluntarily vacated by old tenants, and a natural attrition had occurred. The Petitioner's Fees Section accepted Respondent's word on the matter without further investigation, and Petitioner sent Respondent no more statements for the payment of the annual fee. In its business and public records, Petitioner listed Respondent and his park as not under jurisdiction of Chapter 723 F.S. On December 27, 1988, Respondent Rowles still owned Southwinds Mobile Home Park. As of that date, Beverly Leight, William Daniel, Frank Addison, Keith Hellstrom, Faye Koch, Helen Sutton, Johnny Owens, and the Murphys (8 tenants) were still residing in their respective mobile homes on the lots they were leasing from Respondent in Southwinds Mobile Home Park, as described supra. On that date, Leight, who had sold the park to Respondent in 1980, and Daniel, Addison, Hellstrom, Koch, and Sutton had been residents of Southwinds Mobile Home Park for at least three and a half years each; Owens had been a resident approximately two and a half years, and the Murphys had been residents approximately two years. In the park there were also some mobile homes owned' by Respondent which were rented as units--lot and mobile home together. To those individuals who owned their mobile homes and were leasing lots in Southwinds Mobile Home Park, Respondent sent a letter dated December 27, 1988, which provided in pertinent part: To those of you who own your own homes, I want to give you as much advance notice as possible. Sometime within the next few weeks, you will begin seeing land surveyors, soil testing people and others in the park. There is a VERY STRONG possibility that the property will be sold in JUNE of 1989. If and when the property is sold, there will NO LONGER be a trailer park here. It is STRONGLY SUGGESTED that you start making plans NOW for the removal of your trailer. If there is any way that I can assist you in relocating, I will be glad to help you. Until further notice, everything remains as usua1. After serving the letter f December 27, 1988, Respondent served the mobile home owners in Sothwinds Mobile Home Park with no other notice prior to June 1989. Faye Koch interpreted the letter of December 27, 1988 as requiring her to leave southwinds Mobile Home Park. Beverly Leight, on the other hand, understood it to mean that the park might be sold, but not that it definitely would be sold. In January 1989, Mr. Rowles offered Mrs. Koch $1,000 to leave the park by February 1, 1989. She moved out to a larger, better mobile home, after paying Respondent her overdue rent. Respondent rented the mobile home purchased from Mrs. Koch and the lot it was on, as a unit, to another person foil a short while. Rowles also purchased the mobile home of Keith Hellstrom for $1,000, which he likewise rented to someone else as a unit with his lot for a short time, He purchased Johnny Owens' mobile home for $1,000. Thereafter, Rowles sold each of these mobile homes at a loss. The Koch, Hellstrom, and Owens mobile homes were sold by Rowles for $100, $500, and $100, respectively. In March 1989, Respondent Rowles was contacted by a representative of Petitioner, apparently from the Enforcement Section, who had been contacted by Mrs. Leiht, and who advised Rowles of Petitioner agency's position that the tenancies of the remaining mobile home owners in Southwinds Mobile Home Park were subject to the protections of Chapter 723 F.S. Respondent advised Petitioner's representative that he did not regard his park as covered by Chapter 723 F.S. Respondent also requested Petitioner's representative to show Respond.ent that Chapter 723 FS was applicable to him and his park and advised the agency representative that, if he was subject to the agency's jurisdiction, he would comply. Respondent received no written response from the agency until the Notice to Show Cause was filed on July 18, 1989. On April 6, 1989, Respondent and his wife entered into a contract for the sale of the property comprising Southwinds Mobile Home Park to a third party. An addendum to the contract required Respondent to remove or pay for the removal of all personal property (that is, the mobile homes) located on the parcel upon being given thirty days notice from the third party buyer. The contract c6ntemplated that the property would continue to operate as rental property until the new owners elected to close it down or change its function. The closing on this contract for sale still had not occurred as of the date of formal hearing. The purchasers of the property comprising Southwinds Mobile Home Park have never given Respondent notice to remove any personal property from the park, nor has permitting of the property occurred such as would entitle the buyers to demand removal of such personal property. At the time Respondent entered into the April 6, 1989 contract for sale of Southwinds Mobile Home Park, only four mobile home owners were still leasing lots in the park. It may be inferred from the testimony as a whole that these were month to month tenancies. Respondent attempted to negotiate purchase of those four mobile homes. He did not suggest to any residents that they had any other options besides moving their mobile homes out of his park or selling them to him. Mrs. Leight held out for $2,500 and refused to move. She was joined in her refusal by Mr. Daniel, Ms. Sutton, and a Miss Warnock, all of whom were residing in their own mobile homes on Respondent's lots. On June 1, 1989, Respondent notified the fourmobile home owners remaining in Southwinds Mobile Home Park toremove their mobile homes no later than June 30, 1989. Thisnotification is in accord with the standards of Section 83.03(3)F.S. for month-to-month tenancies. At that point, Leight, Daniel, and Sutton were four-year residents There is noinformation as to Warnock's term of residency at southwindsMobile Home Park. On August 4, 1989, Respondent shut off waterservice to the mobile home owners remaining in southwinds MobileHome Park. As a result of Respondent's action, Beverly Leightwas compelled to move out of her mobile home in order to complywith health department requirements. In so doing, she incurredcosts of 4,486, for which she has not been reimbursed; however,she is one of the four remaining mobile homed owners (Leight,Daniel, Sutton, and Warnock) who left the subject property on orbefore October 30, 1989, pursuant to a stipulation with the Respondent whereby the Respondent deposited $10,000 with their attorney pending a judicial determination as to whether themobile home lot tenancies were governed by Chapter 723 or by Chapter 83, Parts II F.S. The Circuit Court action wherein the stipulation was filed had not yet resulted in such adetermination as of the date of formal hearing.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes enter a final order dismissing the Notice to Show Cause. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of March, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of March, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 89-4572 The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Petitioner's PFOF: Accepted: 1-17, 19. Rejected as mere characterization of testimony and argument of counsel: 18 (with footnote) Respondent' s PFOF: Accepted: 1-3, 5-10, 12 Except for irrelevant, immaterial, subordinate or unnecessary material, the following PFOF are accepted: 4 Rejected as containing a conclusion of law: 11 COPIES FURNISHED: Eric H. Miller Assistant General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 F.A. Ford, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box-48 DeLand, Florida 32721-0048 E. James Kearney, Director Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Stephen R. MacNamara, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Joseph A. Sole, General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 =================================================================
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of a discriminatory housing practice based on physical handicap, in violation of the Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20-760.37, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent owns and operates McGregor Mobile Home Park in Fort Myers. His wife serves as the office manager. In February 1995, Petitioner met with Respondent and his wife to discuss leasing or purchasing a mobile home at the park. The following month, Petitioner leased a mobile home with an option to purchase. In March 1996, Petitioner purchased the mobile home. At all material times, Petitioner has rented from Respondent a mobile home lot at McGregor Mobile Home Park. Within two months of purchasing the mobile home, Petitioner filed a complaint with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. The complaint concerned Respondent’s attempt to charge her for an extra person residing in Petitioner’s mobile home. Respondent claimed that she required the person for physical assistance. In May 1996, Petitioner had a fence built around her mobile home lot. She did not obtain a building permit or the permission of Respondent, as was required under the rules of the park. Four to six weeks later, Petitioner had a deck built, again without a building permit or the permission of Respondent. At the time of the construction of the fence and deck, Petitioner had complained to local media about conditions at the park. A local television station broadcast a story about the park. The Lee County building department inspected the park and, on July 15, 1996, cited Respondent for a number of violations for, among other things, Petitioner’s fence and deck. Respondent’s wife immediately told Petitioner to remove these items. The disputes between Petitioner and Respondent seem to involve nothing more than disputes between a mobile home park operator and a park resident. Petitioner produced no credible evidence of discrimination against her on any basis. It does not appear that Respondent treated her any differently than he has treated other park residents. Petitioner also produced no credible evidence of discrimination against her on the basis of physical handicap. Approximately half of the park residents are handicapped. Also, the nature of Petitioner’s handicap is not well defined. At the hearing, she walked with a cane and limped noticeably. However, in the nearly three years that she has resided at the park, she has never used a wheelchair and very rarely used a cane.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda Hurd 16 Circle Drive Fort Myers, Florida 33908 Terrence F. Lenick Terence F. Lenick, P.A. 12699 New Brittany Boulevard Fort Myers, Florida 33907 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issues in this case concern the attempt by Petitioner to collect $11,684.62 in attorneys fees and costs associated with the defense of the case of State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, Petitioner, vs. Donald L. Hilgeman and Marilyn Hilgeman, d/b/a DLH Enterprises; and Pat Montgomery, as park owners of Lake Waldena Resort, Respondents, DOAH Case No. 89-4100, and $931.50 in attorneys fees and costs attributable to the pursuit of the present case to collect those attorneys fees and costs attributable to the defense of the administrative prosecution. See Section 57.111, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this inquiry Petitioner was a mobile home park owner as defined by Section 723.003(7), Florida Statutes (1987). Petitioner, Marilyn Hilgeman, his former wife, and Pat Montgomery had administrative charges brought against them through a notice to show cause. In that notice to show cause those three individuals were identified as park owners of Lake Waldena Resort in Silver Springs, Florida. In particular the present Respondent charged the Petitioner and the others with violating Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes (1987) for having refused to meet with a designated mobile home owners committee within 30 days of giving notice of a lot rent increase and having been requested to conduct that meeting for purpose of discussing the reasons for the increase in the lot rental amount. The accused sought a formal hearing as envisioned by Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. That hearing was conducted by the undersigned and a recommended order entered on April 18, 1990, in the aforementioned DOAH Case No. 89-4100. For reasons set out in the conclusions of law found within the recommended order, the suggested disposition of that case was one which found the several Petitioners innocent of any wrong doing and called for the dismissal of the administrative prosecution. On July 25, 1990 the prosecuting agency entered its final order in DOAH Case No. 89-4100. It accepted the fact-finding in the recommended order; however, it modified the conclusions of law and recommended disposition. Unlike the recommended order, the final order in its conclusions of law specifically found that the present Petitioner and the others accused had violated Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes, wherein at page 17 it was held "Therefore, it is concluded Respondent violated Sections 723.037(3), Florida Statutes." The conclusions of law in the final order went on to say that in mitigation of the violation the prosecuting agency had considered the apparent confusion of those Respondents regarding the affect of Rule 7D-32.004(2), Florida Administrative Code, as it might influence the actions of the accused and in particular, the present Petitioner. In the final order concerning the mitigating affects of Rule 7D-32.004(2), Florida Administrative Code, it was decided that notwithstanding any misunderstanding the accused had as to the significance of the Rule it could not alter the statutory requirements of having a meeting within 30 days of the notice of lot rental increase as described in Section 723.037(3), Florida Administrative Code (1987). The language within Rule 7D-32.004(2), Florida Administrative Code, stated: If requested to do so by the park owner or subdivision developer, the committee shall certify that it has been selected as described in Rule 7D-32.003, Florida Admin- istrative Code. This certification shall include a certificate of all members of the committee attesting to its proper formation under the statute and these rules. For reasons expressed in the recommended order that rule was seen as tolling the 30-day requirement for meeting expressed in Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes (1987) on the facts found in both the recommended and final orders. This was based upon a recognition that the present Petitioner had employed the rule in an attempt to gain a certification from the committee of mobile home owners prior to the conduct of a meeting to discuss the increase in lot rentals. Again, this belief that the rule tolled the requirement for conducting the meeting within 30 days of the notice of lot rental increase expressed in the recommended order was rejected in the final order. The final order controls absent further relief by resort to the appellate court process. In describing the reasons why the prosecution maintained that the rule could not alter the statutory requirement for holding a meeting within 30 days, the final order states that there are policy considerations that make it important for the committee and the park owner to meet within 30 days and those reasons concern the fact that the rent increase becomes effective within 90 days over the notice, the informational value of having the reasons explained for the lot increase as a prelude to any request to having a dispute about lot rental increases submitted to mediation within 30 days following the scheduled meeting. The final order goes on to describe, through its conclusions of law, that the meeting to discuss lot rental increase was not held until November 14, 1989 over a year after the notice of lot rental increase. That statement comes immediately before the conclusion of law that the present Petitioner had violated Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes. In the conclusions of law set out in the final order the prosecuting agency in its paragraph describing the mitigating circumstances acknowledges the possible confusion on the part of the accused as well as the mobile home owners committee when it describes, as did the recommended order, the filing of a complaint by the committee as a means of ostensibly preserving the right to have the meeting envisioned by Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes (1987), when taken against the background of the opportunity to have a credential check of mobile home owners committee members as envisioned by Rule 7D-32.004(2), Florida Administrative Code. This refers to the issue of whether a meeting could be held after 30 days from the notice of intended lot rental increase absent such a complaint. In the statement on mitigation the final order recognizes that the administrative prosecution was penal in nature and that Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes (1987) and Rule 7D-32.004(2), Florida Administrative Code needed to be read in context and should be strictly construed with ambiguities favoring the accused. The final order cites to State v. Pattishall, 99 Fla. 296, 126 So. 147 (1930) and Davis v. Dept. of Professional Regulation, 457 So.2d 1074 (Fla. 1DCA 1984). The treatment of those cases and the resolution of the dispute through final order is one which finds the accused in violation of Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes (1987), but mitigates the disposition in the way of the penalty based upon the reading given Pattishall and Davis, supra. That factual impression is given when the order in disposition is examined wherein it is stated through the final order, "Based upon the consideration of the facts found, the conclusions of law reached, and the mitigation evidence, it is ordered that the notice to show cause is hereby dismissed." On August 22, 1990, the present Petitioner noticed an appeal of the final order in the administrative prosecution but later abandoned that appeal before the court had the opportunity to speak to its merits. On October 22, 1990, the present Petitioner filed a petition for collection of attorneys fees and costs spoken to in the statement of issues. The petition for attorneys fees and costs were subjected to a motion to dismiss based upon a claim of untimeliness and that motion was denied by order of December 10, 1990. The present Respondent requested an evidentiary hearing as contemplated Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, and Rule 22I-6.035, Florida Administrative Code, and the evidentiary hearing was conducted on the date described before. When the present Petitioner abandoned his appeal to the District Court, he necessarily was placed in the position of arguing that the final order drawn by the prosecuting agency constituted the basis for the claim that he was a small business party who had prevailed in the dispute related to DOAH Case No. 89-4100. See Section 57.111(3)(c)1, Florida Statutes. Contrary to his assertion the final order as described in these facts did not favor the present Petitioner. Although the prosecuting agency did not choose to impose a penalty against the present Petitioner based upon its assessment of matters in mitigation and dismissed the case without exacting a penalty, it had found the present Petitioner in violation of a substantiative provision of law, i.e. Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes (1987). Thus, the disposition cannot be said to favor the present Petitioner. Having decided this mixed question of fact and law against the present Petitioner, it is not necessary to make findings of fact concerning whether the present Petitioner is a small business party as defined at Section 57.111(3)(d), Florida Statutes and whether the present Respondent was substantially justified in this administrative prosecution related to law and fact as contemplated by Sections 57.111(3)(e) and (4)(a), Florida Statutes, or to examine whether special circumstances exist that would make the award of attorneys fees and costs unjust.
The Issue Whether the proposed repeal of Rule 61B-31.001(5), Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Further, whether certain agency policies constitute rules and violate the provisions of Section 120.535, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Florida Manufactured Housing Association, Inc. (FMHA) is a Florida not for profit corporation organized to represent the interests of the owners of approximately 750 mobile home parks. All of the parks owned by FMHA members are regulated by the Respondent. The FMHA's members will be substantially affected by the proposed repeal of the rule. The FMHA has standing to participate in his proceeding. The Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes (Respondent), is the state agency charged with implementation, administration and enforcement of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, relating to Mobile Home Park Lot Tenancies. The Federation of Mobile Home Owners of Florida, Inc. (Federation) is a Florida not for profit corporation organized to represent a substantial number of mobile home owners residing in Florida mobile home parks. The Federation's members will be substantially affected by the proposed repeal of the rule. The Federation has standing to participate in this proceeding. Insofar as is relevant to this case, a mobile home owner commonly rents a mobile home park lot upon which the home is placed. Pursuant to Section 723.011(1)(a), Florida Statutes, the owner of a mobile home park containing 26 or more lots must deliver a prospectus to the home owner prior to entering into an enforceable rental agreement for the mobile home lot. A mobile home park prospectus is intended to provide full and fair disclosure of the terms and conditions of residency and sets forth the regulations to which the home owner will be subjected after signing a lot rental agreement with the park owner. The prospectus must be filed with and approved by the Respondent. The challenged rule was adopted as Rule 7D-31.01(5), Florida Administrative Code, in 1985. Without alteration, it was subsequently renumbered as Rule 61B-31.001(5), Florida Administrative Code, and provides as follows: The Prospectus distributed to a home owner or prospective home owner shall be binding for the length of the tenancy, including any assumptions of that tenancy, and may not be changed except in the following circumstances: Amendments consented to by both the home owner and the park owner. Amendments to reflect new rules or rules that have been changed in accordance with procedures described in Chapter 723, F.S., and the prospectus. Amendments to reflect changes in the name of the owner of the park. Amendments to reflect changes in zoning. Amendments to reflect a change in the person authorized to receive notices and demands on the park owner's behalf. Amendments to reflect changes in the entity furnishing utility or other services. Amendments required by the Division. Amendments required as a result of revisions of Chapter 723, F.S. Amendments to add, delete or modify user fees for prospective home owners. Neither the statute nor the rule defines what is meant by the term "tenancy." Historically, the Respondent has taken the position that the prospectus was binding on the park owner and the mobile home owner until the mobile home no longer occupied the lot or the tenant was evicted, whichever occurred first. In other words, the "tenancy" existed for as long as the mobile home remained on the lot, and the prospectus was binding during the length of the "tenancy", including any assumptions of the "tenancy." However, several legal cases, most recently in 1992, have essentially stated that a mobile home "tenancy" exists for the period of time during which a mobile home rental agreement is effective. The effect of the legal decision is to permit Rule 61B-31.001(5), Florida Administrative Code, to be construed to provide that a prospectus is valid only for the period covered by a rental agreement. The Legislature has not adopted legislation subsequent to the case which would affect the substance of the decision. On January 20, 1995, the Respondent published notice of the proposed repeal of Rule 61B-31.001(5), Florida Administrative Code, in the Florida Administrative Weekly, Vol. 21, No. 3. The Respondent's purpose in repealing the rule is primarily to eliminate the language relating the period of validity for a prospectus to the "tenancy." Although the Respondent asserts that it has no current policy as to the period of validity for a prospectus, the Respondent acknowledges taking the continuing position that the prospectus is binding for longer than the period of a rental agreement. The Petitioner challenges the agency position as being an unpromulgated, and therefore invalid, rule. The Petitioner also challenges as being an unpromulgated and invalid rule, the Respondent's decision to discontinue the review and approval mechanism for amendments to any previously approved prospectus. The Respondent asserts that, notwithstanding prior practice, it has no statutory authority to review and approve amendments to a previously approved prospectus and that it will no longer do so.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Ameron Homes, Inc., discriminated against Petitioner, Carolyn Henke, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act; and, if so, the relief to which Petitioner is entitled.
Findings Of Fact On March 12, 2015, Petitioner entered into a contract with Ameron to build a new home in Micco, Florida. Petitioner selected Ameron because of the reasonable price it offered to construct her house, as well as the fact that Ameron could immediately begin work. The total contract price for Petitioner’s new house was $198,052. This figure included a base price of $170,000, plus “extras” that Petitioner requested in the amount of $27,552. Ameron completed construction of Petitioner’s house in September 2015. Petitioner moved into her home on September 25, 2015. She paid her final bill to Ameron on September 29, 2015. Petitioner complains that Ameron failed to construct her home using the required standard of care. She also maintains that Ameron overcharged her for certain building materials. Petitioner specifically alleges that the house Ameron built for her did not include several of the details, features, or “extras” that she specifically requested. Petitioner further asserts that she paid approximately $8,500 for items that should have been covered in her “extra” charges. Petitioner claims that she found a number of deficiencies when she moved in. Petitioner’s issues include: Storm shutters: Ameron provided storm shutters for Petitioner’s exterior windows as part of its standard contract. Petitioner represented that the shutters delivered to her home were made of steel. Petitioner explained that steel shutters are much too heavy for her to hang over her windows. Petitioner insisted that she should have been given aluminum shutters instead of steel shutters. Petitioner complained that Mr. Brognano never discussed the different types of shutters that Ameron could have offered with her contract. Flooring: Petitioner disliked the laminate flooring Ameron installed in her home as part of its standard contract. Therefore, she purchased wood-like, tile flooring on her own. Petitioner was upset that she had to pay an additional cost (above the “extras”) for the tile she selected (approximately $2,000). Kitchen cabinets: Petitioner was upset at the poor quality of her cabinets. Petitioner asserts that under her contract, she was entitled to select the cabinets for her kitchen. Instead, Petitioner declared that Ameron installed cabinets with a very cheap exterior coating. Petitioner testified that the finish on her cabinets is beginning to peel. Front door: Petitioner complains that her front door does not fit tightly into the doorframe. In addition, the front door needs to be adjusted to eliminate a gap at the bottom of the doorway. Sod and soil: Petitioner is upset that she had to pay extra for part of the sod laid around her home (approximately $1,000). Furthermore, after rain eroded soil away from her home, Petitioner believes that Ameron should have corrected the situation. General construction complaints: Petitioner complained about the general quality of her home, as well as its condition upon completion. Petitioner asserted that she found dust, nails, and gobs of plaster scattered throughout her house. Petitioner claims that she has plumbing and sewer issues. In addition, a ceiling register is broken and some grout and cement is cracked and worn away. Finally, Petitioner complains that Ameron failed to make several modifications she requested as she moved into her home. Petitioner alleges that Ameron inadequately or failed to include handicap accessible features in her bathroom. These features most notably included grab bars in her shower. Petitioner also asserted that Ameron failed to account for her disability when it installed the soap dish and fixtures in her shower. They are positioned too high for her to safely reach or adjust. (As explained below, at Petitioner’s request, Ameron hired and paid a third party to install grab bars in Petitioner’s shower. At the final hearing, Petitioner testified that, at this time, the grab bar is broken.) Petitioner believes that Ameron took advantage of her because she is a woman, elderly, alone, and handicapped. Petitioner asserts that when she expressed her frustration at the manner in which her house was built, Ameron never listened to her. Petitioner also believes that Ameron overcharged her for the inferior “extras” it added to her home. Petitioner asserts that Ameron would not have ignored her complaints if she was a man. Petitioner was 87 years old at the time of the final hearing. Respondent does not dispute that Petitioner suffers from a physical disability.4/ Petitioner testified that she sent her initial complaint to the Commission alleging a discriminatory housing practice by Ameron on October 31, 2016.5/ Ameron is owned by William and Todd Brognano. At the final hearing, William Brognano testified on Ameron’s behalf. Mr. Brognano relayed that Ameron has been building homes since 1981. Mr. Brognano asserted that Ameron has a fine reputation for the quality of the homes it constructs. Mr. Brognano expressed that Ameron builds between 100 and 170 homes a year. Ameron has built many homes for women and handicapped persons. Mr. Brognano denied building Petitioner’s home in a faulty manner. He further denied that Ameron discriminated against Petitioner in any way. Mr. Brognano explained that Petitioner contracted with Ameron to construct a single-family home for the base price of $170,000. In addition, Petitioner requested “extras” to her home in the amount of $27,552. These “extras” included certain enhancements and modifications, such as a two-foot addition to her bedroom, different laminate and tile for certain floors, walls, and countertops, additional lighting, a tile roof, and the relocation of several palm trees in her yard. Mr. Brognano asserted that all the standard features of Petitioner’s home, as well as each “extra” that Petitioner requested, were clearly itemized in her contract. In response to Petitioner’s specific complaints, Mr. Brognano offered the following: Windows: Mr. Brognano commented that all standard homes are built with windows and shutters that meet Florida Building Code requirements. Ameron could have installed impact windows on Petitioner’s house for an additional charge. However, Petitioner specifically declined impact windows because of the cost. Storm shutters: Mr. Brognano explained that Petitioner’s contract did not specify the type of storm shutters to include with her home. In addition, Petitioner specifically declined upgraded shutters because of the cost. Therefore, Mr. Brognano believed that Ameron initially provided steel shutters, which are standard. (Steel shutters are heavier, but stronger, than aluminum shutters.) However, Mr. Brognano testified that after Petitioner notified Ameron of her desire for aluminum shutters, Ameron agreed to arrange for a third-party shutter company to deliver aluminum shutters to Petitioner’s home at no extra charge. (The bill from the company that supplied the shutters referenced “aluminum” shutters. However, Petitioner maintains that the storm shutters she received were steel.) Flooring: Ameron installed floor coverings, including carpeted bedrooms, vinyl kitchen flooring, and tile, as standard features in Petitioner’s home. Petitioner, however, wanted to use laminated wood flooring in parts of her home. Therefore, in June 2015, on her own, Petitioner bought wood tile flooring from a third-party tile company. The additional tile cost Petitioner $2,331.29. Ameron agreed to pay a subcontractor to install the tile Petitioner purchased. Kitchen cabinets: Mr. Brognano refuted Petitioner’s assertion that her cabinets were made of cheap material. Mr. Brognano relayed that, not only did Petitioner select the cabinets that Ameron installed, but they were of nice quality. Sod and soil: Per the specific terms of Petitioner’s contract, Ameron provided 8,000 square feet of Bahia sod for Petitioner’s property. However, Petitioner’s lawn required a total of 10,625 square feet of sod. Mr. Brognano asserted that Petitioner was obligated to pay the additional cost. Mr. Brognano further testified that Ameron fixed the parts of Petitioner’s lawn affected by erosion at no additional cost. General construction complaints: Mr. Brognano commented that Petitioner’s complaints reveal that she does not understand how home construction works. The presence of sawdust, nails, and construction materials is common in most homes during, or immediately after, construction. Just before Petitioner moved in, Ameron paid to have her house professionally cleaned (as is its common practice). Mr. Brognano further testified that everything in Petitioner’s home meets building code standards. Mr. Brognano also claimed that Ameron addressed a number of Petitioner’s complaints. Finally, upon completion, Petitioner’s home was inspected, and no construction issues were found. Regarding Petitioner’s shower, Mr. Brognano explained that Petitioner first notified Ameron about the issues in her shower just after Ameron had completed her home, but before she took occupancy on September 25, 2015. Mr. Brognano relayed that Petitioner’s contract did not contain any provisions regarding grab bars. Instead, Petitioner personally bought grab bars and requested Ameron install them. (Petitioner produced a purchase receipt from Lowe’s showing that two grab bars were purchased on September 10, 2015.) Mr. Brognano testified that Ameron agreed to pay for the installation of both the grab bars and the soap dish at no extra charge to Petitioner. (At the final hearing, Petitioner asserted that she personally paid the individual Ameron hired to install the grab bars.) Ameron hired Chuck Velek, who has worked as a carpenter for over 30 years, to install the grab bars. At the final hearing, Mr. Velek testified that when he reported to Petitioner’s home, she provided him with a grab bar and instructed him to place it in her shower. Mr. Velek declared that he installed one grab bar in Petitioner’s shower. Mr. Velek stated that Petitioner’s friend directed him where to position the grab bar in the shower. Mr. Brognano testified that, when she moved into her home on September 25, 2015, Petitioner did not alert Ameron to any issues with her shower. On the contrary, Petitioner told Mr. Brognano that she loved her house. Based on the evidence and testimony presented at the final hearing, Petitioner did not demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Ameron discriminated against her based on her age, sex, (aloneness) or handicap in violation of the FHA.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner, Carolyn Henke, for lack of jurisdiction based on Petitioner’s failure to timely file her petition under the Florida Fair Housing Act. Alternatively, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a file order concluding that Respondent, Ameron, did not commit a discriminatory housing practice against Petitioner and dismiss her Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of December, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. BRUCE CULPEPPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of December, 2018.
