Findings Of Fact The Home is licensed as an assisted living facility. It is also licensed to provide extended congregate care, limited nursing services, and limited mental health services. The Home accepted Respondent as a resident. In July 1998, Petitioner had to transport Respondent to the hospital due to an overdose of medication. Upon his return from the hospital, Respondent told Petitioner's staff that he had taken the overdose intentionally. Thereafter, the Home required Respondent to sign a mental health contract dated September 9, 1998. This contract states as follows in relevant part: Qualifications for the Home requires [sic] that a member or applicant must not be mentally ill, habitually inebriated, or addicted to the use of a controlled substance. With these requirements, I understand that to be eligible and maintain my membership in the Home, I must agree to the terms of this contract. * * * If I use alcohol or any non-prescribed drugs I understand I may be dismissed from the Home. I understand that I will allow the Veterans' Domiciliary Home of Florida to supervise the self-administering of my medications. I will take my medication as it is prescribed by the primary physician. I will only be given my full prescription at the time of my discharge. I understand upon reasonable suspicion of being under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs, I consent to testing. The Domiciliary Home staff may take a blood, saliva, or supervised urine sample to test for illegal drugs or alcohol. I authorize members of the Domiciliary staff to perform random searches of my person, vehicle, living quarters, or belongings to determine if I am using drugs or alcohol. If I refuse to allow a blood, saliva, or urine test, or search, or if I interfere in any way with the staff's performance of these duties, I may be dismissed. The Home also required Respondent to sign a Dual Diagnosis/Substance Abuse/Psychiatric (dual diagnosis) contract dated September 14, 1998. In addition to terms and conditions similar to the ones set forth above, the dual diagnosis contract provides as follows in relevant part: 10. In order to assist me in gaining freedom from alcohol and drugs, I will not use alcohol, tranquilizers, sleeping medication, over the counter medications, or any other chemical escapes which have not been prescribed by a physician. If I use alcohol or non-prescribed drugs, I understand I will be dismissed from the Home. In November 1998, one of Respondent's doctors wrote him a prescription for Ritalin. Respondent became very upset when a nurse would not administer the Ritalin to him without first checking with Petitioner's staff physician. Eventually, Respondent's primary care physician approved the administration of Ritalin together with Respondent's other medications. In January 1999, Respondent worked for Petitioner as a receptionist. After working overtime on one occasion, Respondent's speech was slurred, his eyes were dull, and his voice was horse. Petitioner's staff became suspicious that Respondent was taking medication in violation of his contracts. Respondent subsequently tested negatively for all substances except his prescribed medicines. In March 1999, Respondent violated his contracts by having a prescription for methadone filled at a drugstore and removing twenty-four of the pills from the bottle before turning the medicine over to Petitioner's staff as required by his contract. Petitioner's staff advised Respondent that he would be dismissed from the Home by letter dated March 23, 1999. Respondent subsequently requested Petitioner's Executive Director to review the decision to discharge him from the Home. By letter dated August 16, 1999, Petitioner rescinded its decision to dismiss Respondent from the Home but warned him that any further infraction would result in his immediate expulsion. On April 14, 2000, Petitioner conducted a routine facility-wide room inspection at the Home. During the course of the inspection, Petitioner found a bottle of Ephedra 250 in Respondent's room. According to the label on the bottle, Ephedra 250 is a dietary supplement that General Nutrition Corporation (GNC) markets. During the hearing, Respondent admitted that he heard about Ephedra 250 on a television show that discussed its benefits as a diet aid as well as its dangerous side effects. The label states as follows in pertinent part: WARNING: Seek advice from a health care practitioner prior to use if you are pregnant or nursing, or if you have high blood pressure, heart or thyroid disease, diabetes, difficulty in urination due to prostate enlargement, or if taking MAO inhibitor or any other prescription drug. Reduce or discontinue use if nervousness, tremor, sleeplessness, loss of appetite or nausea occur. Not intended for use by person under the age of 18. The maximum recommended dosage of Ephedrine for a healthy adult is no more than 100 mg in a 24 hour period for not more than 12 weeks. Improper use of this product may be hazardous to a person's health. Each capsule of Ephedra 250 contains 250 mg of MA Huang Extract (Ephedra sinica) or ( 15 mg of 6 percent Ephedrine). The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Ephedra 250 is an over-the-counter medication despite being labeled as a diet supplement. Ephedrine is a prescription drug in Florida unless an individual dose is less than a specified quantity. Petitioner's staff properly became concerned about Respondent's possession of Ephedra 250 because he takes numerous prescribed medications, which can have serious side effects, if taken with certain other medications. Ephedrine is one of those drugs. For instance, Respondent takes Cozaar for high blood pressure, Methadose to reduce his dependency on Percoset, and Ritalin. Persuasive evidence indicates that large doses of Ephedra can be used as a recreational drug. Respondent knew or should have known that Ephedra 250 was prohibited by his contracts with the Home.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a final order dismissing Respondent as a resident of the Robert H. Jenkins Veterans' Domiciliary Home of Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of October, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: James W. Sloan, Esquire Department of Veterans' Affairs Post Office Box 21003 St. Petersburg, Florida 33731-8903 William T. Fisher 1300 Sycamore Lane, Suite 148 Lake City, Florida 32025 Lt. Col. Robin L. Higgins, Executive Director Department of Veterans' Affairs Post Office Box 31003 St. Petersburg, Florida 33731-8903
The Issue Whether the Petitioner should reimburse the Respondent for alleged Medicaid overpayments in the amount of $44,581.50.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Petitioner, Roosevelt T. Jackson, Jr., M.D., has been a Medicaid provider authorized to receive reimbursement for Medicaid services provided to Medicaid recipients. Dr. Jackson is an ophthalmologist. All services in this cause related to Medicaid claims for procedures performed between January 1, 1998, and December 31, 1999. The Respondent is the state agency responsible for the administration of the Medicaid program within the State of Florida. Medicaid Program Integrity is the arm of the Agency that oversees the activity of the Florida Medicaid providers and recipients to ensure that they are in compliance with the Medicaid program. As part of its duties, the Agency audits the records of providers to verify compliance with all Medicaid rules. In this case the audit of Petitioner's records was triggered by a computer program that reviews data from similar Medicaid providers. The Surveillance Utilization Review Section (SURS) of the Medicaid Program Integrity office found that the Petitioner had exceeded the norm in Medicaid billings when compared to his peers. When the SURS kicked back the Petitioner's name, it represented that the Petitioner had exceeded his peers in the total number of Medicaid recipients serviced, total number of evaluation and management procedures, average number of evaluation and management procedures per recipient, number of office visits, average number of office visits per recipient, and average number of services per recipient. Based upon the SURS responses, the Agency elected to conduct a sample audit of the Petitioner's records. Records for 30 Medicaid recipients were requested and obtained from the Petitioner. The results of that sample audit were then extended to calculate the overpayment for which the Respondent currently seeks reimbursement. The Respondent's audit established that the Petitioner had failed to comply with Medicaid provisions in three specific areas. First, based upon the records submitted to the Agency, the Petitioner billed for services at a higher level than actually performed. Second, the audit established that the Petitioner billed for services that were "medically unnecessary" as that term is utilized by Medicaid. And third, the audit found that the Petitioner billed for services that were not properly documented by the records maintained. Such records were created, maintained and produced to the Agency by the Petitioner. The results of the audit were set forth in the Final Agency Audit Report and were provided to the Petitioner. The report requested reimbursement from the Petitioner in the amount of $44,581.50. The report was completed on or about June 27, 2001. Thereafter, the Petitioner timely challenged the results of the audit, and requested a formal administrative hearing to dispute the amounts set forth in the report. As to all amounts claimed in the report, the evidence presented in this cause supports the Agency's conclusions as to the overpayment. Prior to January of 1999, the Petitioner was not authorized to bill for a level 4 visit. Thus all services billed at that rate prior to January 1999 should be reduced. Secondly, none of the records supplied by the Petitioner supported the complexity required for a level 4 billing. Therefore, services billed at the level 4 rate should be reduced to the appropriate level. The Petitioner also billed for services that were not medically necessary. A normal examination (with no retinal problem identified in the record) would not warrant additional retinal examinations. Therefore, billings for additional procedures would not be warranted in such cases. Finally, Medicaid rules require that a physician maintain records in compliance with documentation guidelines. The Petitioner's records did not comply with such guidelines. Accordingly, Medicaid payments for services that lack the required documentation may be recouped. After a full review of the records submitted, the Agency used a standard formula to extend the sample data throughout the population from which the sample was taken. That is, from the 30 patient records reviewed, the results were applied by statistical formula to the entire Medicaid patient population served by the Petitioner. This computation resulted in the amount of the overpayment currently sought. The statistical formula used by the Agency to compute the overpayment was reasonable and within the guidelines of the law.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a Final Order confirming the Medicaid overpayment in the amount of $44,581.50. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of May, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of May, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 William Roberts, Acting General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Roosevelt T. Jackson, Jr., M.D. 3740 West Broward Boulevard Plantation, Florida 33312 Kim A. Kellum, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403
Findings Of Fact Ellen K. Clark is a registered nurse holding license number 0927962 issued by the Florida State Board of Nursing. Mrs. Clark was employed at Florida Hospital North, Orlando, Florida, in August and in September of 1977, in the Intensive Care Unit (ICU). During her employment, she had access to Meperedine (Demerol) used to medicate patients in the ICU. On September 28, 1977, Joann Johnson, Head Nurse of the ICU, discovered a shortage in the quantity of Demerol during a routine drug audit. She asked Clark to assist her in a recount, and at that time, Clark admitted to her that she was powerless to drugs and had taken and used Demerol from the ICU. Clark also admitted having been recently hospitalized for the treatment of Demerol abuse at Palm Beach Institute. Clark made similar admissions to the Board's investigative nurse. The chief pharmacist for Florida Hospital North, Arthur Lu, identified narcotic control forms for the drug Demerol which were received into evidence as Exhibit 1. Lu also stated that Demerol is the trade name for the drug Meperedine. Kathy Wahl, Assistant Director of Medical Records, identified the medical records for Jerome Kalish, a patient at Florida Hospital North. These records were received into evidence as Exhibits 2, 3 and 4. These records show that Clark withdrew many more doses of 50mg. and 75mg. Demerol injectable than were administered to Kalish. No wastage of these drugs was recorded as required. Dr. Kenneth Crofoot, a clinical psychologist who had treated Clark from October until December, 1977, testified concerning his treatment of Clark. Dr. Crofoot obtained his doctorate in guidance counseling from George Washington University and did a two year residency in the specialty in the Federal Mental Hospital in Washington, D.C. He worked in this field in a hospital environment until his retirement to Florida. Since his retirement, he has done volunteer counseling with the Seminole County mental health authorities and has served as a consultant to the state courts in Seminole County. He has been qualified and has testified as an expert witness in both the federal and state courts. Mrs. Clark was referred to Dr. Crofoot by the pastor of a Seventh Day Adventist Church, of which denomination Dr. Crofoot is also an ordained minister. Dr. Crofoot has had experience with the treatment of drug addicts and alcoholics in his career as a clinical psychologist. Mrs. Clark admitted to Crofoot that she was taking Demerol, and Crofoot assumed that she was addicted to the drug. Mrs. Clark sought Dr. Crofoot's help and treatment for her drug problem. Mrs. Clark met one hour per week for three months in therapy sessions with Dr. Crofoot. Dr. Crofoot diagnosed Mrs. Clark's problem as a serious lack of self identity and a lack of value system sufficient to permit her to cope with the stress of personal crises. This condition was brought to a critical stage by Mrs. Clark's concern over her husband's health, a recent move to the Orlando area where she had no friends, and the financial problems which arose from the move and her husband's illness. Dr. Crofoot was of the opinion that Mrs. Clark had received a good start in the treatment of her problems which were the cause of her abuse of Demerol while at Palm Beach Institute. Building on her earlier treatment, Dr. Crofoot expressed his professional opinion that Mrs. Clark developed a new sense of self identity and a value system sufficient to now enable her to cope with her personal problems without relying on drugs. Mrs. Clark has been employed since October by a physician specializing in Neurology for four hours a day, five days a week. Mrs. Clark advised the doctor of her problem with drugs when she sought employment with him, and at that time, an agreement was reached that she would have no responsibility for the administration of the drug Demerol. Mrs. Clark admitted that during her employment she had abused Demerol twice, a fact which she reported immediately to the doctor. The first instance of abuse occurred in October, shortly after commencing work with the doctor, and again in December of 1977. She has continued her employment with the physician and has not had any further episode of drug abuse.
Recommendation Because of the admissions of the Respondent, the only real issue presented in this case is the penalty to be assessed. This is made very difficult by the extreme candor of Mrs. Clark. At the proceeding, Mrs. Clark admitted all of the allegations against her except admitting she was using 125mg. of Demerol I.V. every four hours. She was very assertive and refused to admit this allegation of the complaint, which was subsequently determined to be an error. Mrs. Clark admitted to Mrs. Johnson her abuse of the drug Demerol prior to even a repeat audit of the drugs on hand in the ICU or the records were reviewed to determine who was responsible for the shortages. Mrs. Clark advised her current employer that she had a drug problem when she was initially interviewed. She also admitted with absolute candor at the hearing that she had abused Demerol at his office but had reported this to the doctor immediately. Such honesty substantiates Dr. Crofoot's observation that Mrs. Clark has developed a new and stronger value system. Mrs. Clark offered no excuse for her conduct and admitted her problem. She also admitted when she "fell off the wagon." Her only defense in mitigation of the charges against her was that she was seeking help for her problem and was making progress. From her testimony concerning her abuse of drugs in October and December, a question clearly exists of whether Mrs. Clark has conquered her problem. However, she has made progress and appears to be a good candidate for rehabilitation. As an ICU nurse, Clark must be a competent, experienced nurse and it would be worth the attempt to salvage her nursing career. Her abuse of drugs after her release from treatment at Palm Beach Institute and again after the termination of therapy with Dr. Crofoot indicates that she receives support from her therapy, and should not be abruptly released from therapy while practicing. Mrs. Clark has the apparent support of her husband, her employer, and others in the community in assisting her with her problem. This is a strong base upon which to build a program of probation which would provide reasonable safe guards to the public while permitting Mrs. Clark to overcome her problem without lose of her nursing credentials which would undoubtedly be a personal set back. Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Board revoke Mrs. Clark's license but that the enforcement of the revocation be suspended on the condition that Mrs. Clark reenter therapy and that the therapist make regular reports to the Board on Mrs. Clark's progress, that Clark be required to appear personally before the Board on a regular basis to report on her progress, that her employer be advised by Mrs. Clark of her drug problem and the conditions of the Board's probation, that the employer be required to advise the Board that Mrs. Clark has disclosed her problem and be required to report any abuse of drugs by Mrs. Clark or any narcotic discrepancies in which she may be involved, that Mrs. Clark be required on her own to cease employment when it appears to her that she is faced with a personal crisis with which she feels unable to cope until the crisis or stress is resolved, that it be clearly understood that a reoccurrence of the abuse of any drug or unprofessional conduct by Mrs. Clark will result in her immediate revocation through imposition of the suspended revocation, and that this probation shall remain in effect until the Board is satisfied that Mrs. Clark is fully rehabilitated DONE and ORDERED this 24th day of February, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Julius Finegold, Esquire 1007 Blackstone Building 233 East Bay Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Mrs. Ellen K. Clark 5338 Dawn Mar Street Orlando, Florida 32810 John H. Mogan, Esquire 2900 N. E. 33rd Avenue Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33308
