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PASCO CWHIP PARTNERS, LLC vs FLORIDA HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION, 09-003330 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jun. 17, 2009 Number: 09-003330 Latest Update: Apr. 01, 2014

The Issue The threshold issue in this case is whether the decisions giving rise to the dispute, which concern the allocation and disbursement of funds appropriated to Respondent by the legislature and thus involve the preparation or modification of the agency's budget, are subject to quasi-judicial adjudication under the Administrative Procedure Act. If the Division of Administrative Hearings were possessed of subject matter jurisdiction, then the issues would be whether Respondent is estopped from implementing its intended decisions to "de- obligate" itself from preliminary commitments to provide low- interest loans to several projects approved for funding under the Community Workforce Housing Innovation Pilot Program; and whether such intended decisions would constitute breaches of contract or otherwise be erroneous, arbitrary, capricious, or abuses of the agency's discretion.

Findings Of Fact Petitioners Pasco CWHIP Partners, LLC ("Pasco Partners"); Legacy Pointe, Inc. ("Legacy"); Villa Capri, Inc. ("Villa Capri"); Prime Homebuilders ("Prime"); and MDG Capital Corporation ("MDG") (collectively, "Petitioners"), are Florida corporations authorized to do business in Florida. Each is a developer whose business activities include building affordable housing. The Florida Housing Finance Corporation ("FHFC") is a public corporation organized under Chapter 420, Florida Statutes, to implement and administer various affordable housing programs, including the Community Workforce Housing Innovation Pilot Program ("CWHIP"). The Florida Legislature created CWHIP in 2006 to subsidize the cost of housing for lower income workers performing "essential services." Under CWHIP, FHFC is authorized to lend up to $5 million to a developer for the construction or rehabilitation of housing in an eligible area for essential services personnel. Because construction costs for workforce housing developments typically exceed $5 million, developers usually must obtain additional funding from sources other than CWHIP to cover their remaining development costs. In 2007, the legislature appropriated $62.4 million for CWHIP and authorized FHFC to allocate these funds on a competitive basis to "public-private" partnerships seeking to build affordable housing for essential services personnel.1 On December 31, 2007, FHFC began soliciting applications for participation in CWHIP. Petitioners submitted their respective applications to FHFC on or around January 29, 2008. FHFC reviewed the applications and graded each of them on a point scale under which a maximum of 200 points per application were available; preliminary scores and comments were released on March 4, 2008. FHFC thereafter provided applicants the opportunity to cure any deficiencies in their applications and thereby improve their scores. Petitioners submitted revised applications on or around April 18, 2008. FHFC evaluated the revised applications and determined each applicant's final score. The applications were then ranked, from highest to lowest score. The top-ranked applicant was first in line to be offered the chance to take out a CWHIP loan, followed by the others in descending order to the extent of available funds. Applicants who ranked below the cut-off for potential funding were placed on a wait list. If, as sometimes happens, an applicant in line for funding were to withdraw from CWHIP or fail for some other reason to complete the process leading to the disbursement of loan proceeds, the highest-ranked applicant on the wait list would "move up" to the "funded list." FHFC issued the final scores and ranking of applicants in early May 2006. Petitioners each had a project that made the cut for potential CWHIP funding.2 Some developers challenged the scoring of applications, and the ensuing administrative proceedings slowed the award process. This administrative litigation ended on or around November 6, 2008, after the parties agreed upon a settlement of the dispute. On or about November 12, 2008, FHFC issued preliminary commitment letters offering low-interest CWHIP loans to Pasco Partners, Legacy, Villa Capri, Prime (for its Village at Portofino Meadows project), and MDG. Each preliminary commitment was contingent upon: Borrower and Development meeting all requirements of Rule Chapter 67-58, FAC, and all other applicable state and FHFC requirements; and A positive credit underwriting recommendation; and Final approval of the credit underwriting report by the Florida Housing Board of Directors. These commitment letters constituted the necessary approval for each of the Petitioners to move forward in credit underwriting, which is the process whereby underwriters whom FHFC retains under contract verify the accuracy of the information contained in an applicant's application and examine such materials as market studies, engineering reports, business records, and pro forma financial statements to determine the project's likelihood of success. Once a credit underwriter completes his analysis of an applicant's project, the underwriter submits a draft report and recommendation to FHFC, which, in turn, forwards a copy of the draft report and recommendation to the applicant. Both the applicant and FHFC then have an opportunity to submit comments regarding the draft report and recommendation to the credit underwriter. After that, the credit underwriter revises the draft if he is so inclined and issues a final report and recommendation to FHFC. Upon receipt of the credit underwriter's final report and recommendation, FHFC forwards the document to its Board of Directors for approval. Of the approximately 1,200 projects that have undergone credit underwriting for the purpose of receiving funding through FHFC, all but a few have received a favorable recommendation from the underwriter and ultimately been approved for funding. Occasionally a developer will withdraw its application if problems arise during underwriting, but even this is, historically speaking, a relatively uncommon outcome. Thus, upon receiving their respective preliminary commitment letters, Petitioners could reasonably anticipate, based on FHFC's past performance, that their projects, in the end, would receive CWHIP financing, notwithstanding the contingencies that remained to be satisfied. There is no persuasive evidence, however, that FHFC promised Petitioners, as they allege, either that the credit underwriting process would never be interrupted, or that CWHIP financing would necessarily be available for those developers whose projects successfully completed underwriting. While Petitioners, respectively, expended money and time as credit underwriting proceeded, the reasonable inference, which the undersigned draws, is that they incurred such costs, not in reliance upon any false promises or material misrepresentations allegedly made by FHFC, but rather because a favorable credit underwriting recommendation was a necessary (though not sufficient) condition of being awarded a firm loan commitment. On January 15, 2009, the Florida Legislature, meeting in Special Session, enacted legislation designed to close a revenue shortfall in the budget for the 2008-2009 fiscal year. Among the cuts that the legislature made to balance the budget was the following: The unexpended balance of funds appropriated by the Legislature to the Florida Housing Finance Corporation in the amount of $190,000,000 shall be returned to the State treasury for deposit into the General Revenue Fund before June 1, 2009. In order to implement this section, and to the maximum extent feasible, the Florida Housing Finance Corporation shall first reduce unexpended funds allocated by the corporation that increase new housing construction. 2009 Fla. Laws ch. 2009-1 § 47. Because the legislature chose not to make targeted cuts affecting specific programs, it fell to FHFC would to decide which individual projects would lose funding, and which would not. The legislative mandate created a constant-sum situation concerning FHFC's budget, meaning that, regardless of how FHFC decided to reallocate the funds which remained at its disposal, all of the cuts to individual programs needed to total $190 million in the aggregate. Thus, deeper cuts to Program A would leave more money for other programs, while sparing Program B would require greater losses for other programs. In light of this situation, FHFC could not make a decision regarding one program, such as CWHIP, without considering the effect of that decision on all the other programs in FHFC's portfolio: a cut (or not) here affected what could be done there. The legislative de-appropriation of funds then in FHFC's hands required, in short, that FHFC modify its entire budget to account for the loss. To enable FHFC to return $190 million to the state treasury, the legislature directed that FHFC adopt emergency rules pursuant to the following grant of authority: In order to ensure that the funds transferred by [special appropriations legislation] are available, the Florida Housing Finance Corporation shall adopt emergency rules pursuant to s. 120.54, Florida Statutes. The Legislature finds that emergency rules adopted pursuant to this section meet the health, safety, and welfare requirements of s. 120.54(4), Florida Statutes. The Legislature finds that such emergency rulemaking power is necessitated by the immediate danger to the preservation of the rights and welfare of the people and is immediately necessary in order to implement the action of the Legislature to address the revenue shortfall of the 2008-2009 fiscal year. Therefore, in adopting such emergency rules, the corporation need not publish the facts, reasons, and findings required by s. 120.54(4)(a)3., Florida Statutes. Emergency rules adopted under this section are exempt from s. 120.54(4)(c), Florida Statutes, and shall remain in effect for 180 days. 2009 Fla. Laws ch. 2009-2 § 12. The governor signed the special appropriations bills into law on January 27, 2009. At that time, FHFC began the process of promulgating emergency rules. FHFC also informed its underwriters that FHFC's board would not consider any credit underwriting reports at its March 2009 board meeting. Although FHFC did not instruct the underwriters to stop evaluating Petitioners' projects, the looming reductions in allocations, coupled with the board's decision to suspend the review of credit reports, effectively (and not surprisingly) brought credit underwriting to a standstill. Petitioners contend that FHFC deliberately intervened in the credit underwriting process for the purpose of preventing Petitioners from satisfying the conditions of their preliminary commitment letters, so that their projects, lacking firm loan commitments, would be low-hanging fruit when the time came for picking the deals that would not receive funding due to FHFC's obligation to return $190 million to the state treasury. The evidence, however, does not support a finding to this effect. The decision of FHFC's board to postpone the review of new credit underwriting reports while emergency rules for drastically reducing allocations were being drafted was not intended, the undersigned infers, to prejudice Petitioners, but to preserve the status quo ante pending the modification of FHFC's budget in accordance with the legislative mandate. Indeed, given that FHFC faced the imminent prospect of involuntarily relinquishing approximately 40 percent of the funds then available for allocation to the various programs under FHFC's jurisdiction, it would have been imprudent to proceed at full speed with credit underwriting for projects in the pipeline, as if nothing had changed. At its March 13, 2009, meeting, FHFC's board adopted Emergency Rules 67ER09-1 through 67ER09-5, Florida Administrative Code (the "Emergency Rules"), whose stated purpose was "to establish procedures by which [FHFC would] de- obligate the unexpended balance of funds [previously] appropriated by the Legislature " As used in the Emergency Rules, the term "unexpended" referred, among other things, to funds previously awarded that, "as of January 27, 2009, [had] not been previously withdrawn or de-obligated . . . and [for which] the Applicant [did] not have a Valid Firm Commitment and loan closing [had] not yet occurred." See Fla. Admin. Code R. 67ER09-2(29). The term "Valid Firm Commitment" was defined in the Emergency Rules to mean: a commitment issued by the [FHFC] to an Applicant following the Board's approval of the credit underwriting report for the Applicant's proposed Development which has been accepted by the Applicant and subsequent to such acceptance there have been no material, adverse changes in the financing, condition, structure or ownership of the Applicant or the proposed Development, or in any information provided to the [FHFC] or its Credit Underwriter with respect to the Applicant or the proposed Development. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 67ER09-2(33). There is no dispute concerning that fact that, as of January 27, 2009, none of the Petitioners had received a valid firm commitment or closed a loan transaction. There is, accordingly, no dispute regarding the fact that the funds which FHFC had committed preliminarily to lend Petitioners in connection with their respective developments constituted "unexpended" funds under the pertinent (and undisputed) provisions of the Emergency Rules, which were quoted above. In the Emergency Rules, FHFC set forth its decisions regarding the reallocation of funds at its disposal. Pertinent to this case are the following provisions: To facilitate the transfer and return of the appropriated funding, as required by [the special appropriations bills], the [FHFC] shall: * * * Return $190,000,000 to the Treasury of the State of Florida, as required by [law]. . . . The [FHFC] shall de-obligate Unexpended Funding from the following Corporation programs, in the following order, until such dollar amount is reached: All Developments awarded CWHIP Program funding, except for [a few projects not at issue here.] * * * See Fla. Admin. Code R. 67ER09-3. On April 24, 2009, FHFC gave written notice to each of the Petitioners that FHFC was "de-obligating" itself from the preliminary commitments that had been made concerning their respective CWHIP developments. On or about June 1, 2009, FHFC returned the de- appropriated funds, a sum of $190 million, to the state treasury. As a result of the required modification of FHFC's budget, 47 deals lost funding, including 16 CWHIP developments to which $83.6 million had been preliminarily committed for new housing construction.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that FHFC enter a Final Order dismissing these consolidated cases for lack of jurisdiction. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of February, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of February, 2010.

Florida Laws (9) 120.52120.54120.56120.565120.569120.57120.573120.574120.68
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PRIME HOMEBUILDERS vs FLORIDA HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION, 09-003334 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jun. 17, 2009 Number: 09-003334 Latest Update: Apr. 01, 2014

The Issue The threshold issue in this case is whether the decisions giving rise to the dispute, which concern the allocation and disbursement of funds appropriated to Respondent by the legislature and thus involve the preparation or modification of the agency's budget, are subject to quasi-judicial adjudication under the Administrative Procedure Act. If the Division of Administrative Hearings were possessed of subject matter jurisdiction, then the issues would be whether Respondent is estopped from implementing its intended decisions to "de- obligate" itself from preliminary commitments to provide low- interest loans to several projects approved for funding under the Community Workforce Housing Innovation Pilot Program; and whether such intended decisions would constitute breaches of contract or otherwise be erroneous, arbitrary, capricious, or abuses of the agency's discretion.

Findings Of Fact Petitioners Pasco CWHIP Partners, LLC ("Pasco Partners"); Legacy Pointe, Inc. ("Legacy"); Villa Capri, Inc. ("Villa Capri"); Prime Homebuilders ("Prime"); and MDG Capital Corporation ("MDG") (collectively, "Petitioners"), are Florida corporations authorized to do business in Florida. Each is a developer whose business activities include building affordable housing. The Florida Housing Finance Corporation ("FHFC") is a public corporation organized under Chapter 420, Florida Statutes, to implement and administer various affordable housing programs, including the Community Workforce Housing Innovation Pilot Program ("CWHIP"). The Florida Legislature created CWHIP in 2006 to subsidize the cost of housing for lower income workers performing "essential services." Under CWHIP, FHFC is authorized to lend up to $5 million to a developer for the construction or rehabilitation of housing in an eligible area for essential services personnel. Because construction costs for workforce housing developments typically exceed $5 million, developers usually must obtain additional funding from sources other than CWHIP to cover their remaining development costs. In 2007, the legislature appropriated $62.4 million for CWHIP and authorized FHFC to allocate these funds on a competitive basis to "public-private" partnerships seeking to build affordable housing for essential services personnel.1 On December 31, 2007, FHFC began soliciting applications for participation in CWHIP. Petitioners submitted their respective applications to FHFC on or around January 29, 2008. FHFC reviewed the applications and graded each of them on a point scale under which a maximum of 200 points per application were available; preliminary scores and comments were released on March 4, 2008. FHFC thereafter provided applicants the opportunity to cure any deficiencies in their applications and thereby improve their scores. Petitioners submitted revised applications on or around April 18, 2008. FHFC evaluated the revised applications and determined each applicant's final score. The applications were then ranked, from highest to lowest score. The top-ranked applicant was first in line to be offered the chance to take out a CWHIP loan, followed by the others in descending order to the extent of available funds. Applicants who ranked below the cut-off for potential funding were placed on a wait list. If, as sometimes happens, an applicant in line for funding were to withdraw from CWHIP or fail for some other reason to complete the process leading to the disbursement of loan proceeds, the highest-ranked applicant on the wait list would "move up" to the "funded list." FHFC issued the final scores and ranking of applicants in early May 2006. Petitioners each had a project that made the cut for potential CWHIP funding.2 Some developers challenged the scoring of applications, and the ensuing administrative proceedings slowed the award process. This administrative litigation ended on or around November 6, 2008, after the parties agreed upon a settlement of the dispute. On or about November 12, 2008, FHFC issued preliminary commitment letters offering low-interest CWHIP loans to Pasco Partners, Legacy, Villa Capri, Prime (for its Village at Portofino Meadows project), and MDG. Each preliminary commitment was contingent upon: Borrower and Development meeting all requirements of Rule Chapter 67-58, FAC, and all other applicable state and FHFC requirements; and A positive credit underwriting recommendation; and Final approval of the credit underwriting report by the Florida Housing Board of Directors. These commitment letters constituted the necessary approval for each of the Petitioners to move forward in credit underwriting, which is the process whereby underwriters whom FHFC retains under contract verify the accuracy of the information contained in an applicant's application and examine such materials as market studies, engineering reports, business records, and pro forma financial statements to determine the project's likelihood of success. Once a credit underwriter completes his analysis of an applicant's project, the underwriter submits a draft report and recommendation to FHFC, which, in turn, forwards a copy of the draft report and recommendation to the applicant. Both the applicant and FHFC then have an opportunity to submit comments regarding the draft report and recommendation to the credit underwriter. After that, the credit underwriter revises the draft if he is so inclined and issues a final report and recommendation to FHFC. Upon receipt of the credit underwriter's final report and recommendation, FHFC forwards the document to its Board of Directors for approval. Of the approximately 1,200 projects that have undergone credit underwriting for the purpose of receiving funding through FHFC, all but a few have received a favorable recommendation from the underwriter and ultimately been approved for funding. Occasionally a developer will withdraw its application if problems arise during underwriting, but even this is, historically speaking, a relatively uncommon outcome. Thus, upon receiving their respective preliminary commitment letters, Petitioners could reasonably anticipate, based on FHFC's past performance, that their projects, in the end, would receive CWHIP financing, notwithstanding the contingencies that remained to be satisfied. There is no persuasive evidence, however, that FHFC promised Petitioners, as they allege, either that the credit underwriting process would never be interrupted, or that CWHIP financing would necessarily be available for those developers whose projects successfully completed underwriting. While Petitioners, respectively, expended money and time as credit underwriting proceeded, the reasonable inference, which the undersigned draws, is that they incurred such costs, not in reliance upon any false promises or material misrepresentations allegedly made by FHFC, but rather because a favorable credit underwriting recommendation was a necessary (though not sufficient) condition of being awarded a firm loan commitment. On January 15, 2009, the Florida Legislature, meeting in Special Session, enacted legislation designed to close a revenue shortfall in the budget for the 2008-2009 fiscal year. Among the cuts that the legislature made to balance the budget was the following: The unexpended balance of funds appropriated by the Legislature to the Florida Housing Finance Corporation in the amount of $190,000,000 shall be returned to the State treasury for deposit into the General Revenue Fund before June 1, 2009. In order to implement this section, and to the maximum extent feasible, the Florida Housing Finance Corporation shall first reduce unexpended funds allocated by the corporation that increase new housing construction. 2009 Fla. Laws ch. 2009-1 § 47. Because the legislature chose not to make targeted cuts affecting specific programs, it fell to FHFC would to decide which individual projects would lose funding, and which would not. The legislative mandate created a constant-sum situation concerning FHFC's budget, meaning that, regardless of how FHFC decided to reallocate the funds which remained at its disposal, all of the cuts to individual programs needed to total $190 million in the aggregate. Thus, deeper cuts to Program A would leave more money for other programs, while sparing Program B would require greater losses for other programs. In light of this situation, FHFC could not make a decision regarding one program, such as CWHIP, without considering the effect of that decision on all the other programs in FHFC's portfolio: a cut (or not) here affected what could be done there. The legislative de-appropriation of funds then in FHFC's hands required, in short, that FHFC modify its entire budget to account for the loss. To enable FHFC to return $190 million to the state treasury, the legislature directed that FHFC adopt emergency rules pursuant to the following grant of authority: In order to ensure that the funds transferred by [special appropriations legislation] are available, the Florida Housing Finance Corporation shall adopt emergency rules pursuant to s. 120.54, Florida Statutes. The Legislature finds that emergency rules adopted pursuant to this section meet the health, safety, and welfare requirements of s. 120.54(4), Florida Statutes. The Legislature finds that such emergency rulemaking power is necessitated by the immediate danger to the preservation of the rights and welfare of the people and is immediately necessary in order to implement the action of the Legislature to address the revenue shortfall of the 2008-2009 fiscal year. Therefore, in adopting such emergency rules, the corporation need not publish the facts, reasons, and findings required by s. 120.54(4)(a)3., Florida Statutes. Emergency rules adopted under this section are exempt from s. 120.54(4)(c), Florida Statutes, and shall remain in effect for 180 days. 2009 Fla. Laws ch. 2009-2 § 12. The governor signed the special appropriations bills into law on January 27, 2009. At that time, FHFC began the process of promulgating emergency rules. FHFC also informed its underwriters that FHFC's board would not consider any credit underwriting reports at its March 2009 board meeting. Although FHFC did not instruct the underwriters to stop evaluating Petitioners' projects, the looming reductions in allocations, coupled with the board's decision to suspend the review of credit reports, effectively (and not surprisingly) brought credit underwriting to a standstill. Petitioners contend that FHFC deliberately intervened in the credit underwriting process for the purpose of preventing Petitioners from satisfying the conditions of their preliminary commitment letters, so that their projects, lacking firm loan commitments, would be low-hanging fruit when the time came for picking the deals that would not receive funding due to FHFC's obligation to return $190 million to the state treasury. The evidence, however, does not support a finding to this effect. The decision of FHFC's board to postpone the review of new credit underwriting reports while emergency rules for drastically reducing allocations were being drafted was not intended, the undersigned infers, to prejudice Petitioners, but to preserve the status quo ante pending the modification of FHFC's budget in accordance with the legislative mandate. Indeed, given that FHFC faced the imminent prospect of involuntarily relinquishing approximately 40 percent of the funds then available for allocation to the various programs under FHFC's jurisdiction, it would have been imprudent to proceed at full speed with credit underwriting for projects in the pipeline, as if nothing had changed. At its March 13, 2009, meeting, FHFC's board adopted Emergency Rules 67ER09-1 through 67ER09-5, Florida Administrative Code (the "Emergency Rules"), whose stated purpose was "to establish procedures by which [FHFC would] de- obligate the unexpended balance of funds [previously] appropriated by the Legislature " As used in the Emergency Rules, the term "unexpended" referred, among other things, to funds previously awarded that, "as of January 27, 2009, [had] not been previously withdrawn or de-obligated . . . and [for which] the Applicant [did] not have a Valid Firm Commitment and loan closing [had] not yet occurred." See Fla. Admin. Code R. 67ER09-2(29). The term "Valid Firm Commitment" was defined in the Emergency Rules to mean: a commitment issued by the [FHFC] to an Applicant following the Board's approval of the credit underwriting report for the Applicant's proposed Development which has been accepted by the Applicant and subsequent to such acceptance there have been no material, adverse changes in the financing, condition, structure or ownership of the Applicant or the proposed Development, or in any information provided to the [FHFC] or its Credit Underwriter with respect to the Applicant or the proposed Development. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 67ER09-2(33). There is no dispute concerning that fact that, as of January 27, 2009, none of the Petitioners had received a valid firm commitment or closed a loan transaction. There is, accordingly, no dispute regarding the fact that the funds which FHFC had committed preliminarily to lend Petitioners in connection with their respective developments constituted "unexpended" funds under the pertinent (and undisputed) provisions of the Emergency Rules, which were quoted above. In the Emergency Rules, FHFC set forth its decisions regarding the reallocation of funds at its disposal. Pertinent to this case are the following provisions: To facilitate the transfer and return of the appropriated funding, as required by [the special appropriations bills], the [FHFC] shall: * * * Return $190,000,000 to the Treasury of the State of Florida, as required by [law]. . . . The [FHFC] shall de-obligate Unexpended Funding from the following Corporation programs, in the following order, until such dollar amount is reached: All Developments awarded CWHIP Program funding, except for [a few projects not at issue here.] * * * See Fla. Admin. Code R. 67ER09-3. On April 24, 2009, FHFC gave written notice to each of the Petitioners that FHFC was "de-obligating" itself from the preliminary commitments that had been made concerning their respective CWHIP developments. On or about June 1, 2009, FHFC returned the de- appropriated funds, a sum of $190 million, to the state treasury. As a result of the required modification of FHFC's budget, 47 deals lost funding, including 16 CWHIP developments to which $83.6 million had been preliminarily committed for new housing construction.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that FHFC enter a Final Order dismissing these consolidated cases for lack of jurisdiction. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of February, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of February, 2010.

Florida Laws (9) 120.52120.54120.56120.565120.569120.57120.573120.574120.68
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MDG CAPITAL CORPORATION vs FLORIDA HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION, 09-004031 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jul. 28, 2009 Number: 09-004031 Latest Update: Apr. 01, 2014

The Issue The threshold issue in this case is whether the decisions giving rise to the dispute, which concern the allocation and disbursement of funds appropriated to Respondent by the legislature and thus involve the preparation or modification of the agency's budget, are subject to quasi-judicial adjudication under the Administrative Procedure Act. If the Division of Administrative Hearings were possessed of subject matter jurisdiction, then the issues would be whether Respondent is estopped from implementing its intended decisions to "de- obligate" itself from preliminary commitments to provide low- interest loans to several projects approved for funding under the Community Workforce Housing Innovation Pilot Program; and whether such intended decisions would constitute breaches of contract or otherwise be erroneous, arbitrary, capricious, or abuses of the agency's discretion.

Findings Of Fact Petitioners Pasco CWHIP Partners, LLC ("Pasco Partners"); Legacy Pointe, Inc. ("Legacy"); Villa Capri, Inc. ("Villa Capri"); Prime Homebuilders ("Prime"); and MDG Capital Corporation ("MDG") (collectively, "Petitioners"), are Florida corporations authorized to do business in Florida. Each is a developer whose business activities include building affordable housing. The Florida Housing Finance Corporation ("FHFC") is a public corporation organized under Chapter 420, Florida Statutes, to implement and administer various affordable housing programs, including the Community Workforce Housing Innovation Pilot Program ("CWHIP"). The Florida Legislature created CWHIP in 2006 to subsidize the cost of housing for lower income workers performing "essential services." Under CWHIP, FHFC is authorized to lend up to $5 million to a developer for the construction or rehabilitation of housing in an eligible area for essential services personnel. Because construction costs for workforce housing developments typically exceed $5 million, developers usually must obtain additional funding from sources other than CWHIP to cover their remaining development costs. In 2007, the legislature appropriated $62.4 million for CWHIP and authorized FHFC to allocate these funds on a competitive basis to "public-private" partnerships seeking to build affordable housing for essential services personnel.1 On December 31, 2007, FHFC began soliciting applications for participation in CWHIP. Petitioners submitted their respective applications to FHFC on or around January 29, 2008. FHFC reviewed the applications and graded each of them on a point scale under which a maximum of 200 points per application were available; preliminary scores and comments were released on March 4, 2008. FHFC thereafter provided applicants the opportunity to cure any deficiencies in their applications and thereby improve their scores. Petitioners submitted revised applications on or around April 18, 2008. FHFC evaluated the revised applications and determined each applicant's final score. The applications were then ranked, from highest to lowest score. The top-ranked applicant was first in line to be offered the chance to take out a CWHIP loan, followed by the others in descending order to the extent of available funds. Applicants who ranked below the cut-off for potential funding were placed on a wait list. If, as sometimes happens, an applicant in line for funding were to withdraw from CWHIP or fail for some other reason to complete the process leading to the disbursement of loan proceeds, the highest-ranked applicant on the wait list would "move up" to the "funded list." FHFC issued the final scores and ranking of applicants in early May 2006. Petitioners each had a project that made the cut for potential CWHIP funding.2 Some developers challenged the scoring of applications, and the ensuing administrative proceedings slowed the award process. This administrative litigation ended on or around November 6, 2008, after the parties agreed upon a settlement of the dispute. On or about November 12, 2008, FHFC issued preliminary commitment letters offering low-interest CWHIP loans to Pasco Partners, Legacy, Villa Capri, Prime (for its Village at Portofino Meadows project), and MDG. Each preliminary commitment was contingent upon: Borrower and Development meeting all requirements of Rule Chapter 67-58, FAC, and all other applicable state and FHFC requirements; and A positive credit underwriting recommendation; and Final approval of the credit underwriting report by the Florida Housing Board of Directors. These commitment letters constituted the necessary approval for each of the Petitioners to move forward in credit underwriting, which is the process whereby underwriters whom FHFC retains under contract verify the accuracy of the information contained in an applicant's application and examine such materials as market studies, engineering reports, business records, and pro forma financial statements to determine the project's likelihood of success. Once a credit underwriter completes his analysis of an applicant's project, the underwriter submits a draft report and recommendation to FHFC, which, in turn, forwards a copy of the draft report and recommendation to the applicant. Both the applicant and FHFC then have an opportunity to submit comments regarding the draft report and recommendation to the credit underwriter. After that, the credit underwriter revises the draft if he is so inclined and issues a final report and recommendation to FHFC. Upon receipt of the credit underwriter's final report and recommendation, FHFC forwards the document to its Board of Directors for approval. Of the approximately 1,200 projects that have undergone credit underwriting for the purpose of receiving funding through FHFC, all but a few have received a favorable recommendation from the underwriter and ultimately been approved for funding. Occasionally a developer will withdraw its application if problems arise during underwriting, but even this is, historically speaking, a relatively uncommon outcome. Thus, upon receiving their respective preliminary commitment letters, Petitioners could reasonably anticipate, based on FHFC's past performance, that their projects, in the end, would receive CWHIP financing, notwithstanding the contingencies that remained to be satisfied. There is no persuasive evidence, however, that FHFC promised Petitioners, as they allege, either that the credit underwriting process would never be interrupted, or that CWHIP financing would necessarily be available for those developers whose projects successfully completed underwriting. While Petitioners, respectively, expended money and time as credit underwriting proceeded, the reasonable inference, which the undersigned draws, is that they incurred such costs, not in reliance upon any false promises or material misrepresentations allegedly made by FHFC, but rather because a favorable credit underwriting recommendation was a necessary (though not sufficient) condition of being awarded a firm loan commitment. On January 15, 2009, the Florida Legislature, meeting in Special Session, enacted legislation designed to close a revenue shortfall in the budget for the 2008-2009 fiscal year. Among the cuts that the legislature made to balance the budget was the following: The unexpended balance of funds appropriated by the Legislature to the Florida Housing Finance Corporation in the amount of $190,000,000 shall be returned to the State treasury for deposit into the General Revenue Fund before June 1, 2009. In order to implement this section, and to the maximum extent feasible, the Florida Housing Finance Corporation shall first reduce unexpended funds allocated by the corporation that increase new housing construction. 2009 Fla. Laws ch. 2009-1 § 47. Because the legislature chose not to make targeted cuts affecting specific programs, it fell to FHFC would to decide which individual projects would lose funding, and which would not. The legislative mandate created a constant-sum situation concerning FHFC's budget, meaning that, regardless of how FHFC decided to reallocate the funds which remained at its disposal, all of the cuts to individual programs needed to total $190 million in the aggregate. Thus, deeper cuts to Program A would leave more money for other programs, while sparing Program B would require greater losses for other programs. In light of this situation, FHFC could not make a decision regarding one program, such as CWHIP, without considering the effect of that decision on all the other programs in FHFC's portfolio: a cut (or not) here affected what could be done there. The legislative de-appropriation of funds then in FHFC's hands required, in short, that FHFC modify its entire budget to account for the loss. To enable FHFC to return $190 million to the state treasury, the legislature directed that FHFC adopt emergency rules pursuant to the following grant of authority: In order to ensure that the funds transferred by [special appropriations legislation] are available, the Florida Housing Finance Corporation shall adopt emergency rules pursuant to s. 120.54, Florida Statutes. The Legislature finds that emergency rules adopted pursuant to this section meet the health, safety, and welfare requirements of s. 120.54(4), Florida Statutes. The Legislature finds that such emergency rulemaking power is necessitated by the immediate danger to the preservation of the rights and welfare of the people and is immediately necessary in order to implement the action of the Legislature to address the revenue shortfall of the 2008-2009 fiscal year. Therefore, in adopting such emergency rules, the corporation need not publish the facts, reasons, and findings required by s. 120.54(4)(a)3., Florida Statutes. Emergency rules adopted under this section are exempt from s. 120.54(4)(c), Florida Statutes, and shall remain in effect for 180 days. 2009 Fla. Laws ch. 2009-2 § 12. The governor signed the special appropriations bills into law on January 27, 2009. At that time, FHFC began the process of promulgating emergency rules. FHFC also informed its underwriters that FHFC's board would not consider any credit underwriting reports at its March 2009 board meeting. Although FHFC did not instruct the underwriters to stop evaluating Petitioners' projects, the looming reductions in allocations, coupled with the board's decision to suspend the review of credit reports, effectively (and not surprisingly) brought credit underwriting to a standstill. Petitioners contend that FHFC deliberately intervened in the credit underwriting process for the purpose of preventing Petitioners from satisfying the conditions of their preliminary commitment letters, so that their projects, lacking firm loan commitments, would be low-hanging fruit when the time came for picking the deals that would not receive funding due to FHFC's obligation to return $190 million to the state treasury. The evidence, however, does not support a finding to this effect. The decision of FHFC's board to postpone the review of new credit underwriting reports while emergency rules for drastically reducing allocations were being drafted was not intended, the undersigned infers, to prejudice Petitioners, but to preserve the status quo ante pending the modification of FHFC's budget in accordance with the legislative mandate. Indeed, given that FHFC faced the imminent prospect of involuntarily relinquishing approximately 40 percent of the funds then available for allocation to the various programs under FHFC's jurisdiction, it would have been imprudent to proceed at full speed with credit underwriting for projects in the pipeline, as if nothing had changed. At its March 13, 2009, meeting, FHFC's board adopted Emergency Rules 67ER09-1 through 67ER09-5, Florida Administrative Code (the "Emergency Rules"), whose stated purpose was "to establish procedures by which [FHFC would] de- obligate the unexpended balance of funds [previously] appropriated by the Legislature " As used in the Emergency Rules, the term "unexpended" referred, among other things, to funds previously awarded that, "as of January 27, 2009, [had] not been previously withdrawn or de-obligated . . . and [for which] the Applicant [did] not have a Valid Firm Commitment and loan closing [had] not yet occurred." See Fla. Admin. Code R. 67ER09-2(29). The term "Valid Firm Commitment" was defined in the Emergency Rules to mean: a commitment issued by the [FHFC] to an Applicant following the Board's approval of the credit underwriting report for the Applicant's proposed Development which has been accepted by the Applicant and subsequent to such acceptance there have been no material, adverse changes in the financing, condition, structure or ownership of the Applicant or the proposed Development, or in any information provided to the [FHFC] or its Credit Underwriter with respect to the Applicant or the proposed Development. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 67ER09-2(33). There is no dispute concerning that fact that, as of January 27, 2009, none of the Petitioners had received a valid firm commitment or closed a loan transaction. There is, accordingly, no dispute regarding the fact that the funds which FHFC had committed preliminarily to lend Petitioners in connection with their respective developments constituted "unexpended" funds under the pertinent (and undisputed) provisions of the Emergency Rules, which were quoted above. In the Emergency Rules, FHFC set forth its decisions regarding the reallocation of funds at its disposal. Pertinent to this case are the following provisions: To facilitate the transfer and return of the appropriated funding, as required by [the special appropriations bills], the [FHFC] shall: * * * Return $190,000,000 to the Treasury of the State of Florida, as required by [law]. . . . The [FHFC] shall de-obligate Unexpended Funding from the following Corporation programs, in the following order, until such dollar amount is reached: All Developments awarded CWHIP Program funding, except for [a few projects not at issue here.] * * * See Fla. Admin. Code R. 67ER09-3. On April 24, 2009, FHFC gave written notice to each of the Petitioners that FHFC was "de-obligating" itself from the preliminary commitments that had been made concerning their respective CWHIP developments. On or about June 1, 2009, FHFC returned the de- appropriated funds, a sum of $190 million, to the state treasury. As a result of the required modification of FHFC's budget, 47 deals lost funding, including 16 CWHIP developments to which $83.6 million had been preliminarily committed for new housing construction.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that FHFC enter a Final Order dismissing these consolidated cases for lack of jurisdiction. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of February, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of February, 2010.

Florida Laws (9) 120.52120.54120.56120.565120.569120.57120.573120.574120.68
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GLOBE INTERNATIONAL REALTY AND MORTGAGE CORPORATION, MATTHEW RENDA AND KENNETH V. HEMMERLE vs FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT CORPORATION, 95-002514 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida May 16, 1995 Number: 95-002514 Latest Update: Feb. 28, 1996

The Issue Whether Florida Power & Light Company (hereinafter referred to as "FPL") properly refused the request of Globe International Realty & Mortgage, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Globe") to supply electric service to the premises located at 808 Northeast Third Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Florida?

Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Kenneth V. Hemmerle, Sr., is a real estate developer. Matthew Renda is a real estate and mortgage broker. Hemmerle and Renda have known each other since about 1986. At the suggestion of Hemmerle, in February of 1993, Renda, along with Hemmerle, formed Globe. At the time, Hemmerle was involved in a development project on the west coast of Florida and he wanted Renda, through Globe, to handle "the selling and so forth for the project." Globe was incorporated under the laws of Florida. The articles of incorporation filed with the Department of State, Division of Corporations (hereinafter referred to as the "Division of Corporations") reflected that: Renda was the president of the corporation; Hemmerle was its secretary; Renda and Hemmerle were the incorporators of the corporation, owning 250 shares of stock each; they also comprised the corporation's board of directors; and the corporation's place of business, as well as its principal office, were located at 808 Northeast Third Avenue in Fort Lauderdale, Florida (hereinafter referred to as the "808 Building"). Globe is now, and has been since its incorporation, an active Florida corporation. Annual reports were filed on behalf of Globe with the Division of Corporations in both 1994 (on April 19th of that year) and 1995 (on March 23rd of that year). The 1994 annual report reflected that Renda and Hemmerle remained the officers and directors of the corporation. The 1995 annual report reflected that Renda was still an officer and director of the corporation, but that Hemmerle had "resigned 9-2-93." Both the 1994 and 1995 annual reports reflected that the 808 Building remained the corporation's place of business and its corporate address. The 808 Building is a concrete block building with a stucco finish housing eight separate offices. The entire building is served by one electric meter. At all times material to the instant case, Southern Atlantic Construction Corporation of Florida (hereinafter referred to as "Southern") owned the 808 Building. Southern was incorporated under the laws of Florida in June of 1973, and administratively dissolved on October 9, 1992. Hemmerle owns a majority of the shares of the corporation's stock. The last annual report that Southern filed with the Division of Corporations (which was filed on June 10, 1991) reflected that: Hemmerle was the corporation's president and registered agent; he also served on the corporation's board of directors; Lynn Nadeau was the corporation's other officer and director; and the corporation's principal office was located in the 808 Building. From 1975 until September 6, 1994, FPL provided electric service to the 808 Building. Charges for such service were billed to an account (hereinafter referred to as the "808 account") that had been established by, and was in the name of, Hemmerle Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "HDC"). HDC was incorporated under the laws of Florida in 1975, and administratively dissolved on October 9, 1992. At the time of HDC's incorporation, Hemmerle owned 250 of the 500 shares of stock issued by the corporation. The last annual report that HDC filed with the Division of Corporations (which was filed on June 10, 1991) reflected that: Hemmerle was the corporation's president and registered agent; he also served on the corporation's board of directors; Lynn Nadeau was the corporation's other officer and director; and the corporation's principal office was located in the 808 Building. Following the administrative dissolution of the corporation, Hemmerle continued to transact business with FPL in the corporation's name, notwithstanding that he was aware that the corporation had been administratively dissolved. At no time has Renda owned any shares of HDC's stock or served on its board of directors. He and Hemmerle have served together as officers and directors of only two corporations: Globe and Hemmerle's Helpers, Inc. The latter was incorporated under the laws of Florida as a nonprofit corporation in March of 1992, and was administratively dissolved on August 13, 1993. Its articles of incorporation reflected that its place of operation, as well as its principal office, were located in the 808 Building. Pursuant to arrangements Renda and Hemmerle had made (which were not reduced to writing), Globe occupied office space in the 808 Building from March of 1993, through September 6, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as the "rental period"). Renda and Hemmerle had initially agreed that the rent Globe would pay for leasing the space would come from any profits Globe made as a result of its participation in Hemmerle's Florida west coast development project. Renda and Hemmerle subsequently decided, however, that Globe would instead pay a monthly rental fee of $300 for each office it occupied in the building. 1/ Globe (which occupied only one office in the building during the rental period) did not pay in full the monies it owed under this rental agreement. The office Globe occupied in the 808 Building was the first office to the right upon entering the building. It was across the lobby from the office from which Hemmerle conducted business on behalf of his various enterprises. Globe voluntarily and knowingly accepted, used and benefited from the electric service FPL provided to its office and the common areas in the building during the rental period. Under the agreement Renda and Hemmerle had reached, Globe was not responsible for making any payments (in addition to the $300 monthly rental fee) for such service. On July 26, 1994, the 808 account was in a collectible status and an FPL field collector was dispatched to the service address. There, he encountered Hemmerle, who gave him a check made out to FPL in the amount of $2,216.37. Hemmerle had noted the following on the back of the check: "Payment made under protest due to now [sic] owning [sic] of such billing amount to prevent discontinuance of power." The check was drawn on a Sunniland Bank checking account that was in the name of Florida Kenmar, Inc., (hereinafter referred to as "Kenmar"), a Florida corporation that had been incorporated in May of 1984, 2/ and administratively dissolved on November 9, 1990. (The last annual report that Kenmar filed with the Division of Corporations, which was filed on June 10, 1991, reflected that: Hemmerle was the corporation's president and registered agent; he also served on the corporation's board of directors; and the corporation's principal office was located in the 808 Building.) Hemmerle told the field collector, upon handing him the check, that there were no funds in the Kenmar checking account. Nonetheless, the field collector accepted the check. FPL deposited the check in its account at Barnett Bank of South Florida. The check was subsequently returned due to "insufficient funds." On the same day that he was visited by the FPL field collector, Hemmerle telephoned Sandra Lowery, an FPL customer service lead representative for recovery, complaining about, among other things, a debit that he claimed had been improperly charged to the 808 account. As a result of her conversation with Hemmerle, Lowery authorized the removal of the debit and all late payment charges associated with the debit from the 808 account. Following the July 26, 1994, removal of the debit and associated late payment charges, the balance due on the account was $1,953.91, an amount that Hemmerle still disputed. In an effort to demonstrate that a lesser amount was owed, Hemmerle sent Lowery copies of cancelled checks that, he claimed, had been remitted to FPL as payment for electric service billed to the 808 account. Some of these checks, however, had been used to pay for charges billed to other accounts that Hemmerle (or corporations with which he was associated) had with FPL. As of August 29, 1994, the 808 account had a balance due of $2,387.47. These unpaid charges were for service provided between March of 1993 and August 10, 1994. On August 29, 1994, Hemmerle showed Renda a notice that he had received from FPL advising that electric service to the 808 Building would be terminated if the balance owing on the 808 account was not paid within the time frame specified in the notice. Hemmerle suggested to Renda that, in light of FPL's announced intention to close the 808 account and terminate service, Renda should either apply for electric service to the 808 Building in Globe's name or relocate to another office building. Renda decided to initially pursue the former option. Later that same day, Renda telephoned FPL to request that an account for electric service to the 808 Building be opened in Globe's name. Gigi Marshall was the FPL representative to whom he spoke. She obtained from Renda the information FPL requires from an applicant for electric service. During his telephone conversation with Marshall, Renda mentioned, among other things, that Globe had been a tenant at the 808 Building since the previous year and that it was his understanding that FPL was going to discontinue electric service to the building because of the current customer's failure to timely pay its bills. Renda claimed that Globe was not in any way responsible for payment of these past-due bills. From an examination of FPL's computerized records (to which she had access from her work station), Marshall confirmed, while still on the telephone with Renda, that the 808 account was in arrears and that FPL had sent a disconnect notice to the current customer at the service address. Marshall believed that, under such circumstances, it would be imprudent to approve Globe's application for electric service without further investigation. She therefore ended her conversation with Renda by telling him that she would conduct such an investigation and then get back with him. After speaking with Renda, Marshall went to her supervisor, Carol Sue Ryan, for guidance and direction. Like Marshall, Ryan questioned whether Globe's application for service should be approved. She suggested that Marshall telephone Renda and advise him that FPL needed additional time to complete the investigation related to Globe's application. Some time after 12:30 p.m. on that same day (August 29, 1994), Marshall followed Ryan's suggestion and telephoned Renda. Ryan was on the line when Marshall spoke with Renda and she participated in the conversation. Among the things Ryan told Renda was that a meter reader would be dispatched to the 808 Building the following day to read the meter so that the information gleaned from such a reading would be available in the event that Globe's application for service was approved. At no time did either Marshall or Ryan indicate to Renda that Globe's application was, or would be, approved. Ryan referred Globe's application to Larry Johnson of FPL's Collection Department, who, in turn, brought the matter to the attention of Thomas Eichas, an FPL fraud investigator. After completing his investigation of the matter, which included an examination of the Broward County property tax rolls (which revealed that Southern owned the 808 Building), as well a search of the records relating to Globe, HDC and Southern maintained by the Division of Corporations, Eichas determined that Globe's application for service should be denied on the basis of the "prior indebtedness rule." Eichas informed Johnson of his decision and instructed him to act accordingly. Electric service to the 808 Building was terminated on September 6, 1994. As of that date, the 808 account had a past-due balance that was still in excess of $2,000.00. Although he conducted his business activities primarily from his home following the termination of electric service to the 808 Building, Hemmerle continued to have access to the building until March of 1995 (as did Renda). 3/ During this period, Hemmerle still had office equipment in the building and he went there on almost a daily basis to see if any mail had been delivered for him. It was his intention to again actively conduct business from his office in the building if electric service to the building was restored. Hemmerle (and the corporations on whose behalf he acted) therefore would have benefited had there been such a restoration of service. After discovering that electric service to the 808 Building had been terminated, Renda telephoned FPL to inquire about the application for service he had made on behalf of Globe. He was advised that, unless FPL was paid the more than $2,000.00 it was owed for electric service previously supplied to the building, service to the building would not be restored in Globe's name. Thereafter, Renda, on behalf of Globe, telephoned the PSC and complained about FPL's refusal to approve Globe's application for service. FPL responded to the complaint in writing. In its response, it explained why it had refused to approve the application. On or about November 15, 1994, the Chief of PSC's Bureau of Complaint Resolution sent Renda a letter which read as follows: The staff has completed its review of your complaint concerning Florida Power & Light's (FPL) refusal to establish service in the name of Globe Realty, Inc. at the above- referenced location. Our review indicates that FPL appears to have complied with all applicable Commission Rules in refusing to establish service. Our review of the customer billing history indicates that the past-due balance is for service at this location and not attributable to the judgment against Mr. Hemmerle for service at another location. The interlocking directorships of Globe International Realty & Mortgage, Inc. and Hemmerle Development, Inc. suggest that the request to establish service in the name of Globe Realty is an artifice to avoid payment of the outstanding balance and not a result of any change in the use or occupancy of the building. Thus, FPL's refusal to establish service is in compliance with Rule 25-6.105(8)(a), Florida Administrative Code. Please note that this determination is subject to further review by the Florida Public Service Commission. You have the right to request an informal conference pursuant to Rule 25-22.032(4), Florida Administrative Code. Should that conference fail to resolve the matter, the staff will make a recommenda- tion to the Commissioners for decision. If you are dissatisfied with the Commission decision, you may request a formal Administrative hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. After receiving this letter, Renda, on behalf of Globe, requested an informal conference. The informal conference was held on November 30, 1994. At the informal conference, the parties explained their respective positions on the matter in dispute. No resolution, however, was reached. Adopting the recommendation of its staff, the PSC, in an order issued January 31, 1995, preliminarily held that there was no merit to Globe's complaint that FPL acted improperly in refusing to provide electric service to the 808 Building pursuant to Globe's request. Thereafter, Renda, on behalf of Globe, requested a formal Section 120.57 hearing on the matter.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the PSC enter a final order dismissing Globe's complaint that FPL acted improperly in refusing to provide electric service to the 808 Building pursuant to Globe's request. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 4th day of December, 1995. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of December, 1995.

Florida Laws (3) 120.56120.57607.1421 Florida Administrative Code (2) 25-22.03225-6.105
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DUVAL COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs THOMAS CAGGIANO, 20-005259TTS (2020)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Atlantic Beach, Florida Dec. 04, 2020 Number: 20-005259TTS Latest Update: Oct. 05, 2024

The Issue Whether just cause exists to reprimand and suspend Respondent, Thomas Caggiano, for five days without pay from his position as a teacher with Petitioner, the School Board of Duval County (School Board),1 for the reasons set forth in the March 26, 2021, correspondence from the School Board, which contained an April 6, 2021, Amended Step III Progressive Discipline Petition.

Findings Of Fact The School Board is charged with the duty to operate, control, and supervise free public schools within Duval County Public Schools. See Art. IX, § 4(b), Fla. Const.; § 1012.33(1)(a), Fla. Stat. The School Board and Mr. Caggiano executed a professional service contract, as defined in section 1012.33, Florida Statutes, and he has been employed by the School Board since 1994. The School Board has renewed this professional services contract on an annual basis. The parties’ employment relationship is governed by School Board policies, Florida laws, Department of Education rules, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between Duval Teachers United and the School Board. The CBA relevant to this matter was effective from 2017 through 2020.2 Mr. Caggiano’s Employment at SHS Mr. Caggiano had been a math teacher at SHS for numerous years, including the time period relevant to the allegations of the Amended Step III Progressive Discipline correspondence. He currently remains employed by the School Board, but is currently not a math teacher at SHS. During his career with the School Board, Mr. Caggiano received positive employment evaluations. Prior to the allegations at issue, the School Board had never disciplined Mr. Caggiano. During the 2019/2020 school year, Mr. Caggiano taught Algebra II. During his career at SHS, he also taught geometry, trigonometry, analytic geometry, calculus, and statistics. He also taught college-level classes for Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University during this time. As a teacher at SHS and an employee of the School Board, Mr. Caggiano received numerous and various training materials and updates concerning governing policies and procedures, electronically (via email). 2 The CBA entered into evidence, without objection, and which was unexecuted, states on its cover page that it is effective from 2017 through 2020. However, the same document, in Article XV, section C, states that it is effective from July 1, 2014, through June 30, 2017. As the Amended Step III Progressive Discipline letter references the 2017-2020 CBA, and as no party objected to the CBA that the undersigned accepted into evidence, the undersigned has treated the CBA entered into evidence as the CBA that was in effect during the allegations concerning Mr. Caggiano. Many of these materials were provided to Mr. Caggiano prior to faculty and staff training, which occurred in the weeks leading up to the start of the school year. Among the various materials provided to Mr. Caggiano (and other faculty) was a handout entitled “Ethics and Professionalism,” provided by Duval County Public Schools’ Office of Equity and Inclusion/Professional Standards. SHS also provided Mr. Caggiano (and other faculty) a link to its handbook, which contained policies, laws, and rules that govern Mr. Caggiano. The “Ethics and Professionalism” training materials contained a section on social media, and stated: Please ensure that personal social media accounts are set to private. Do not accept friend requests from students or their parents, and use discretion when inviting colleagues to your pages. Please ensure that your social media posts are respectful and do not possess profane, insensitive, or offensive language or images. As a reminder, you may not post photographs or identifying language about your students. It is a violation of FERPA. In the Acceptable Use Policy (2.1.11), it states “Employees must maintain professional boundaries between themselves and students. Employees will not solicit or engage in inappropriate communications with students verbally, in writing, or electronically regardless of the age of the student. Employees will not engage in any direct electronic communications with students, parents, supervisors, or co-workers whether by e-mail, instant messaging, or other digital media that will adversely affect the employee’s ability to perform his or her job.” Here are some best practices to follow: You are the adult, the teacher, the professional. You are not their friend. You are in violation of the Code of Ethics if you post disparaging comments about your colleagues, administration, and/or the Superintendent. Do not post material that is illegal, sexually explicit, obscene, derogatory, related to alcohol or drug use, or in violation of copyright laws. Do not access social networking sites from your school computer or during work time. Be cautious about photos posted online. Students and parents could view them! Any information posted to, or communicated through, a social networking site shall not bring disfavor, embarrassment or condemnation to the student, employee or school district. Mr. Caggiano (and other faculty) further received materials and training related to the School Board’s Non-Discrimination Policy (Board Policy 10.10), which states: Duval County Public Schools (DCPS) believes that education should be provided in an atmosphere where differences are understood and appreciated, and where all persons are treated fairly and with respect, and where all persons are free from discrimination, harassment and threats of violence or abuse. School board policy explicitly states, “No person shall, on the basis of a person’s actual or perceived identity with regard to race, color, religion, gender or gender identity, age, marital status, disability, sexual orientation, political or religious beliefs, national or ethnic origin, veteran status, or any other distinguishing physical or personality characteristics, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity on in any employment conditions or practices conducted by this School District, except as provided by law.” Previous Incident Involving Transgender Student J.N.S. J.N.S., a student at SHS, is a female transgender student and has identified as female at least since the 2018-2019 school year, her freshman year. In the summer before her sophomore year, after receiving her class assignments for the new academic year, J.N.S. sent an email to all of her new teachers, including Mr. Caggiano. The August 5, 2019, email, sent at 9:21 p.m., stated: I will be in your class during the 2019-2020 school year, and I would like to let you know that I am a Male-to-Female Transgender student who would like to go by the name [J.N.S.] as well as female pronouns in your class. I am sending this email before the actual school year starts so that there is plenty of time to change it on the roll before then if possible. Thank you very much for carrying out my request, I can’t wait to attend your class this year. That same evening, Mr. Caggiano responded to J.N.S.’s email: I will call you by any reasonable name you like, but the pronouns are not a negotiable thing for me. I will NOT refer to you with female pronouns. If this is not acceptable for you change classes. J.N.S. testified that most of her remaining teachers responded to this email in a positive fashion, agreeing to her request. J.N.S. also testified that she posted her email interaction with Mr. Caggiano on one of her social media platforms. On August 6, 2019, during the faculty pre-planning period before classes started, SHS held a mandatory training session presented by Dr. Wells as part of the Duval County Public Schools’ “All In: Ally for All” program. As part of this training, Dr. Wells presented various Duval County Public Schools policies that included the treatment of transgender students, including that transgender students had a right to be called by names that they chose. Principal Hatcher also attended this training, and stated that all students had a right to be called by their requested names, including pronouns. A sign-in sheet reflected that Mr. Caggiano attended this training session, although Mr. Caggiano testified that he did not recall attending. On August 7, 2019, J.N.S. contacted the SHS school counselor, Ms. Solliday, to request a transfer out of Mr. Caggiano’s class. After conferring with SHS Assistant Principal Motley, Ms. Solliday transferred J.N.S. to a different class with a different teacher. J.N.S. never attended Mr. Caggiano’s class, was never his student during the 2019-2020 school year, and has never been a student in Mr. Caggiano’s class. On August 12, 2019, Principal Hatcher met with Mr. Caggiano regarding his email response to J.N.S. and to counsel him regarding Duval County Public Schools’ policies for addressing students. Principal Hatcher informed Mr. Caggiano that he should use whatever name or pronoun a student asks to be called. Mr. Caggiano testified that he told Principal Hatcher he would stop using all pronouns, and refer to a student by the name requested. Although the School Board devoted a significant amount of time and effort at the final hearing to this incident involving Mr. Caggiano’s response to J.N.S.’s email request, this incident is not part of the Amended Step III Progressive Discipline correspondence that is the subject of the instant action. Dr. Hatcher counselled Mr. Caggiano on this issue. The undersigned heard testimony of various students, faculty, administrators, and even a school psychologist concerning this incident, which the undersigned finds provides background to the issues included in the Amended Step III Progressive Discipline correspondence; however, this particular incident does not form the basis for the proposed discipline in the instant proceeding. Mr. Caggiano’s Use of Facebook Mr. Caggiano testified that he decided to set up a Facebook account sometime in 2008, to catch up with old friends. He testified that his daughter, Arielle, actually set up the account, and told him that his account’s settings were “private.” Thereafter, Mr. Caggiano stated that he posted and commented on posts of his Facebook “friends,” and because he believed his settings were “private,” he believed that only those “friends” could see those posts and comments. He testified that “[a]ll my posts were either political commentary, social commentary, or adult humor.” Mr. Caggiano did not accept any of his students as Facebook “friends,” but did have a few fellow SHS teachers as Facebook “friends.” He testified that he did not think anybody from SHS would be able to see his Facebook posts, aside from the fellow SHS teacher “friends.” Additionally, at some point in the past, Mr. Caggiano set up a separate Facebook account, called “AP Caggiano,” for students in an advanced placement class to post questions or comments concerning a class. Mr. Caggiano testified that he had not used that particular Facebook account in some time. Mr. Caggiano also testified that he never accessed his Facebook account at SHS or during his normal work hours. Mr. Stika, who was a forensic examiner in the Information Technologies department of Duval County Public Schools, testified that Mr. Caggiano did not use his school- issued laptop to access Facebook during the time period relevant to the instant matter. Amended Step III Progressive Discipline On May 19, 2020, the Duval County Public Schools Office of Equity and Inclusion/Professional Standards received an email concerning Mr. Caggiano’s Facebook postings. On May 21, 2020, the Florida Times Union published a story concerning Mr. Caggiano’s Facebook postings and comments. The May 19, 2021, email, and the May 21, 2020, newspaper article, caused an investigation into Mr. Caggiano’s Facebook posts and comments, conducted primarily by Mr. Johnson. Mr. Johnson interviewed parents, students, former students, Principal Hatcher, Mr. Stika, and Mr. Caggiano, as part of this investigation. His findings form the basis for the Amended Step III Progressive Discipline correspondence. As alleged in the Amended Step III Progressive Discipline correspondence, the complainant provided screenshots of Mr. Caggiano’s Facebook postings. Mr. Johnson’s investigation discovered a Facebook account in the name of “Thomas Caggiano,” who was listed as a Duval County Public School teacher. Mr. Caggiano admitted that the Facebook account referenced in the Amended Step III Progressive Discipline correspondence was his personal Facebook account, which his daughter initially set up. As reflected in the Amended Step III Progressive Discipline correspondence, the investigation revealed Mr. Caggiano, commencing on or about January 2020, admitted to 27 various Facebook posts, reposts, or comments. The Amended Step III Progressive Discipline correspondence specifically alleges that “some of your posts and/or comments were as follows[,]” and then lists seven specific posts, reposts, or comments from Mr. Caggiano’s personal Facebook account.3 At the final hearing, the undersigned heard testimony and considered evidence of Mr. Caggiano’s Facebook posts, reposts, or comments, including Mr. Caggiano’s testimony, and finds that Mr. Caggiano’s Facebook account reflects the following posts and reposts—which could be considered “memes,” which can be defined as amusing or interesting pictures, videos, etc., that are 3 The School Board introduced into evidence other Facebook posts, reposts, or comments attributed to Mr. Caggiano, and questioned numerous witnesses about this “other” Facebook activity. The undersigned has only considered the allegations contained in the Amended Step III Progressive Discipline correspondence in determining whether the School Board has just cause to discipline Mr. Caggiano. spread widely through the internet or social media—or comments to memes or articles, that were made, or reposted, by Mr. Caggiano. These seven posts, reposts, or comments, which are the only posts, reports, or comments alleged in the Amended Step III Progressive Discipline, are: A repost from a Facebook entity called “Messenger of Liberty,” which states: “My son is taking part in a social experiment. He has to wear a Bernie 2020 t-shirt for 2 weeks and see how people react. So far he’s been spit on, punched and had a bottle thrown at him! I’m curious to see what happens when he goes outside.”; A repost from an individual and an entity called “LIFT – LONG ISLANDERS FOR TRUMP,” which states: “Crazy but TRUE, If this girl sees a penis at a party it’s a crime … [with an accompanying photograph of a young woman], but if this girl sees a penis in the woman’s bathroom … it’s tolerance [with an accompanying photograph of a girl in a bathroom]. Vote Republican and put an end to the madness.”’ A post authored by Mr. Caggiano which states: “Dumb ass liberals are now organizing protest against the killing of the Iranian general (terrorist) who was responsible for many attacks against the USA. Amazing how TRUMP derangement syndrome can cause democraps, and the main stream media, to support our enemies.”; A repost from another individual, which appears to be a “screen grab” from a Fox News segment, which states, at the top, “MAN AND WOMAN,” and which then states: “A man goes home and masturbates his typical fantasy. A woman on her knees, a woman tied up, a woman abused. A woman enjoys intercourse with her man—she fantasizes being raped by 3 men simultaneously…” The “screen grab” attributes this quote to Bernie Sanders, currently a United States Senator from Vermont, sometime in the 1970’s (the exhibit copy is unclear), and Mr. Caggiano’s handwritten notes next to this exhibit states” “Bernie said this!”; A repost from a Facebook entity called “Maine Bikers,” which states: “Meanwhile at the ‘Bikers for Bernie’ rally…[,]” and which contains a picture of two nude men on a motorcycle; What appears to be an attempted repost by Mr. Caggiano, which Facebook apparently removed with the message “False information, Checked by independent fact-checkers,” but which also contains the following comments from Mr. Caggiano: “Teach this childish nasty bitch a lesson. Have her treasonous ass removed from office and put in jail.”; and A repost, dated August 19, 2020, from Mr. Caggiano, of an article from an entity called “Lifesitenews.com,” with a headline that states, “Teen girls stage school walkout to protest boys in their bathroom who claim to be ‘girls’”; and to which Mr. Caggiano commented, “Love it! About time people stood up to this insanity.” The Amended Step III Progressive Discipline correspondence further alleges: Resulting from our Facebook postings, your school and district leadership were both impacted as they received several complaints and/or concerns from students, parents and constituents expressing their displeasure with your conduct as a Duval county teacher and the comments displayed within your Facebook account. Many parents also contacted the school and informed the principal that they would not want their children in your class for the 2021- 2021 school year. If this administrative action had not occurred, the public consequences would cause an equity issue for other teachers by redistributing your assigned students or assignment of replacement teachers. While you are certainly entitled to your First Amendment right to free speech, your actions are in direct contradiction to the District’s mission to “Provide educational excellence in every school, in every classroom, for every student, every day.” This is without regard to a student’s ethnicity, race, religious beliefs, gender orientation, political persuasion, or any other qualifier. In addition, the Principals of Professional Conduct of the Education Profession in Florida (Florida Administrative Code 6A-10.081), requires that an individual, “Take reasonable precautions to distinguish between personal views and those of any educational institution or organization with which the individual is affiliated.” As an educator you have a duty and/or a responsibility to maintain the respect of the community and your colleagues. You posted and/or shared inappropriate, derogatory, demeaning and inflammatory material and comments referencing sexual orientation, national origin, and domestic abuse on your public social media (Facebook) account. Your conduct was unethical, lacked integrity and violated Duval County School Board policy, as such, warrants corrective discipline. The Amended Step III Progressive Discipline correspondence alleges that Mr. Caggiano’s Facebook posts, reposts, and comments violated section 1006.147, Florida Statutes; Florida Administrative Code Rules; rules 6A-5.053 and 6A-10.081, and Duval County School Board Policies 6.80 and 10.10. It further alleges that, pursuant to article V, section 9, of the CBA, which concerns “potential harm to the physical or mental wellbeing of a student, or students, constitutes more severe acts of misconduct which warrant circumventing progressive disciplinary steps,” and imposed discipline of a written reprimand, five consecutive working days of suspension without pay, and a requirement that Mr. Caggiano complete a course in “Culture Diversity” by a certain date.4 Additional Facts Concerning Mr. Caggiano’s Facebook Account J.N.S. testified that at some point after her email interaction with Mr. Caggiano, she was “curious” and decided to access his Facebook account, 4 A review of the CBA in evidence shows that the provision of the CBA that addresses progressive discipline may be found in article V, section C, subsections 9 and 10. and saw numerous posts, including some of the posts that form the basis of the School Board’s proposed discipline. She stated that she was “appalled, but not surprised.” She also testified that the Florida Times Union reporter who authored the May 21, 2020, article about Mr. Caggiano reached out to her through social media concerning Mr. Caggiano. Ms. Schultz previously served as SHS Principal during the time period that Mr. Caggiano taught at SHS. She recalled seeing Mr. Caggiano’s posts that were “forwarded” to her, and she thereafter communicated directly with Mr. Caggiano. She stated that she asked Mr. Caggiano to remove his Facebook posts. In an email exchange between them, after Ms. Schultz informed Mr. Caggiano that she was able to access his Facebook account numerous times after he stated that he had changed his account settings to private, Mr. Caggiano wrote: Thank you for your email. I have had my daughter assist me in making my Facebook account settings “private,” and I have changed my account password. I am going through and removing a number of posts that were made by people that I do not know. I do not want to shut the entire account down, because I have a number of personal photos of my grandkids and me. Please confirm whether you are still able to see the Facebook “wall” for my account. I want to make sure the settings are properly adjusted so that only people whom I accept as “friends” can see what I post at this time. As you are aware, I have also received inquiries from the Duval County Public Schools Equity & Inclusion/Professional Standards supervisor …. In the emails, [he] provided me with a link to a Times- Union article by reporter Emily Bloch. [He] inquired whether I posted the items in question, on my Facebook account, as attributed by the writer of the article. I have reviewed the article. The article indicates that I am not obligated to respond to [his] inquiry. The article states that a “note from the Office of Equity and Inclusion and Professional Standards added that an inquiry ‘could take some time, as the office cannot compel anyone to meet or speak with us’,” and that I “did not directly reference a student of direct [my] posts at a student in [my] posts,” nor identify myself as a Duval County Public Schools teacher in my posts. Please confirm whether the article’s statement is accurate, as I prefer to only respond on this issue as I am obligated and as is otherwise necessary. For the record, I view Emily Bloch’s article as a well- timed political hit piece, full of inaccuracies, targeting me for my political views on issues of sexuality, to promote the latest version of the “need” for the City of Jacksonville Human Rights Ordinance (“HRO”), which was illegally passed back in 2017, and recently struck down by a Florida court. It is a transparent attempt to torpedo a good teacher’s career, to score political points. I hope the Duval County Schools will not countenance this reporter’s efforts to manufacture an issue to promote her political causes, especially where the public cannot come out to oppose the latest ordinance, because of Coronavirus. I treat all of my students with dignity and respect, and my classroom record speaks for itself. I will not lie to my students. I treat all of them with honesty and fairness. On the other hand, I make no secrets that when I am not acting in my official capacity as a Duval County Schools teacher, I do engage in robust political debate on political issues. I deny making any kind of “phobic” remarks or posts. A “phobia” is an irrational fear. Holding traditional views about the biological nature of sex (and need for sex-based privacy in bathrooms and lockers) is not a “phobia.” Disagreement with the political orthodoxy of the Left on matters of sexuality is not a “phobia.” Sharing my belief on my personal Facebook that there are only two genders that correspond with biological sex is not a “phobia.” Ms. Bloch may not like the way I make those points, and that is fine. Since I have been active on Facebook, I know I have shared various political memes on my personal Facebook wall, or commented in response to others’ postings. I do not instantly recall them all. Memes are often a good way of making pithy political statements, with a touch of humor. Sometimes “humor” is in the eye of the beholder, or is funny at the time. I’m sure I found certain memes funny or punchy at the time, and I have friends who did as well. I’m sure others may not find them funny, or may disagree with me, as is their right. I have not gone back through the last year’s worth of Facebook postings, and I am unable to verify some of Ms. Bloch’s attributed quotes. I can confirm that the account settings are now “private.” I stand by a number of statements Ms. Bloch attributes to me (or at least, I agree with the sentiments expressed, where they may have been posted by me or others). Others I do not. I will also note that at least one of the specifically quoted references in Ms. Bloch’s article was taken out of context, and she uses that out-of-context quote to suggest my remarks are “racist” or “xenophobic.” I’m neither. In fact, some of my beautiful grandchildren are “biracial” (for lack of a better term – there is only one “race”– the human race). But even having to make that note is offensive, and suggests bigotry and prejudice on the part of Ms. Bloch in leveling that charge against me. For the record, the “corona” or “covid” food reference was a political jab at President Trump’s references to the “CHINA” virus. Nothing more, nothing less. I trust that the Duval County Schools will continue to respect the rights of teachers to engage in robust political debate on Facebook, on matters of public concern (such as the political “transgenderism” movement – “Exhibit A” of which is the novel “lexicon” Ms. Bloch placed in her article, purporting to tell the public which terms are acceptable in the debate, and which are not). The First Amendment surrounds political speech with the highest level of protection, whether some people find the speech of others “offensive,” or wish to silence speakers with whom they disagree. Mr. Caggiano and his daughter, Arielle, testified that it was, and has been, Mr. Caggiano’s intention that his Facebook account settings be “private” so that only his “friends” could see them, and that after the May 21, 2020, Florida Times Union article, they both checked and saw that it was not set to private. Arielle then set Mr. Caggiano’s settings back to private. The School Board called numerous witnesses, including students and parents, who testified about accessing Mr. Caggiano’s Facebook account. None of the student witnesses (including J.N.S.) were students of Mr. Caggiano. Ms. Porak, a parent of students at SHS, testified that neither of her children had Mr. Caggiano for a teacher. The various student and teacher witnesses discussed a number of Mr. Caggiano’s Faceook posts, reposts, and comments, only some of which were contained in the Amended Step III Progressive Discipline correspondence. Impact of Mr. Caggiano’s Facebook Posts After the publishing of the May 21, 2020, Florida Times Union article, school officials, including Ms. Schultz and Dr. Hatcher, testified to receiving numerous complaints. The undersigned received into evidence numerous complaints from parents concerning Mr. Caggiano’s Facebook posts, some of which were included with Mr. Johnson’s investigative report. Some of these parents also testified at the final hearing concerning their complaints and feelings concerning Mr. Caggiano’s Facebook activity. These parents testified that they felt Mr. Caggiano’s Facebook posts were inappropriate for a teacher. Assistant Principal Motley testified that a total of four students (not including J.N.S.) requested and were transferred out of Mr. Caggiano’s classes during the Spring 2020 semester. Dr. Hatcher testified that after the Duval County Public Schools removed Mr. Caggiano from SHS, it took part of the Fall 2020/2021 semester to hire a full-time replacement teacher. During that semester, several substitute teachers taught what would have been Mr. Caggiano’s math classes before SHS hired a full time teacher. Ms. Brennan testified that Mr. Caggiano’s Facebook posts impacted J.N.S. negatively. Ms. Brennan did not perform a psychological assessment of J.N.S.; the School Board requested that Ms. Brennan provide emotional support to J.N.S. during her preparation as a witness in this matter in March 2021—more than a year after J.N.S. testified that she read Mr. Caggiano’s Facebook posts. Ms. Brennan testified that J.N.S. has experienced symptoms of depression. She also testified that J.N.S.— previously an A-B student her freshman year, and who had few absences her sophomore year—had approximately 345 separate class absences from school her junior year and was retained. Mr. Caggiano’s Explanation Mr. Caggiano admitted to having authored the Facebook posts, reposts, and comments that are contained in the Amended Step III Progressive Discipline correspondence and detailed in paragraph 29 above. Mr. Caggiano testified that his daughter Arielle “did everything” in setting up his Facebook account, to ensure that his settings were private so that only people he accepted as “friends” could see his posts, reposts, and comments. He further stated that, for the approximately 10 years after establishing his Facebook account, he believed his settings were private. After learning in 2019/2020 that members of the public could view his Facebook account, he again asked Arielle to ensure that it was private. Mr. Caggiano believes his Facebook account was “hacked.” He testified that he believed it to be set to private, and after learning otherwise, “fixed” it. Then, he found it was “public” again. As there was no additional testimony or evidence concerning whether Mr. Caggiano’s Facebook account was hacked, the undersigned does not credit this explanation. Mr. Caggiano testified about the seven posts, reposts, or comments that are the subject of the Amended Step III Progressive Discipline correspondence and detailed in paragraph 29 above. Mr. Caggiano did not express any regret in making any of these Facebook posts, reposts, or comments. With respect to Mr. Caggiano’s repost from a Facebook entity called “Messenger of Liberty,” which states, in part, “My son is taking part in a social experiment[,]” Mr. Caggiano testified that “it’s funny. All my posts were either political commentary, social commentary, or adult humor. And that’s funny. Okay. So for somebody to look at that and not giggle at least, you know, I don’t think you know what funny is. That’s funny.” This particular repost states that, after his son wears a “Bernie” t-shirt, “[s]o far he’s been spit on, punched and had a bottle thrown at him.” Although Mr. Caggiano testified that he believed this to be “funny,” the undersigned finds that it also could be logically read to encourage violence against a child. With respect to Mr. Caggiano’s repost from another individual, which appears to be a “screen grab” from a Fox News segment, which states, at the top, “MAN AND WOMAN,” and which then states: “A man goes home and masturbates his typical fantasy. A woman on her knees, a woman tied up, a woman abused. A woman enjoys intercourse with her man—she fantasizes being raped by 3 men simultaneously…[,]” and which attributes this quote to Bernie Sanders, sometime in the 1970’s (the exhibit copy is unclear), Mr. Caggiano testified that it was not his opinion, but that he was quoting Bernie Sanders, and that “people should know somebody who’s a sitting senator, twice presidential candidate, former mayor of New York City, has this sort of mentality.” On cross-examination, when asked if “women, teenage girls, could be offended by this post[,]” Mr. Caggiano testified, “I think everybody should be offended by this.” The undersigned finds that despite Mr. Caggiano’s belief that his post makes an important point about Bernie Sanders, the undersigned finds that it can be logically read to be patently offensive, discriminatory, and degrading to women. Mr. Caggiano’s own testimony confirms this. The undersigned finds that the remaining posts, reposts, or comments, can be fairly characterized as political memes that, depending on the viewpoint of the reader, could be characterized as crude political commentary, passionate advocacy, or humor. While these postings, which are generally consistent with a conservative ideology, might not originate from more traditionally respected sources like the National Review or the opinion page of the Wall Street Journal, they are the type of abrasive political speech that one regularly finds in social media. In particular, with respect to Mr. Caggiano’s repost of the meme entitled “Crazy but TRUE,” and the article from an entity called “Lifesitenews.com,” with a headline that states, “Teen girls stage school walkout to protest boys in their bathroom who claim to be ‘girls’”; and to which Mr. Caggiano commented, “Love it! About time people stood up to this insanity[,]” the undersigned cannot find that these reposts, or Mr. Caggiano’s comments, are related to, or in retaliation to, his email interaction with J.N.S. concerning the use of pronouns, or his subsequent counselling on the subject. Mr. Caggiano testified of his concern about men using a women’s restroom which, while counter to the policy of the Duval County Public Schools, does not on its face appear to be the type of bullying, harassing, or retaliating prohibited in applicable laws, rules, and policies. Ultimate Findings of Fact Mr. Caggiano created seven posts, reposts, and comments to posts on his personal Facebook account, which are more fully described in paragraph 29 above. Mr. Caggiano contends that he never intended to share these posts, reposts, and comments publicly, and more specifically, to the SHS community. Mr. Caggiano contends that his Facebook account was hacked, which caused all of his Facebook activity to become public. The undersigned finds that Mr. Caggiano’s explanation is not credible, as he testified that he had several SHS teachers as “friends,” and as he did not check his Facebook settings for approximately 10 years, before the Duval County Public Schools, and the SHS community, became aware of the seven posts, reposts, and comments. The undersigned finds that Mr. Caggiano posted, reposted, and commented on Facebook on his personal account, and shared them in a manner that did not ensure that they remain private. Ultimately, Mr. Caggiano’s Facebook posts, reposts, and comments described in paragraph 29 made their way into the public sphere, and students, parents, Duval County Public Schools personnel, and the media viewed and became aware of them. The undersigned finds that two of the alleged posts, reposts, and comments—entitled “My son is taking part in an experiment,” and “MAN AND WOMAN”—warrant further findings that include violations of statutes, rules, and policies enunciated in the Amended Step III Progressive Discipline correspondence. The undersigned does not make such findings with respect to the remaining five posts, reposts, and comments contained in the Amended Step III Progressive discipline correspondence. Accordingly, the following ultimate findings of fact below apply only to the two posts previously mentioned. The two posts at issue concern violence and abuse of a child, as well as discriminatory and degrading views of women being abused and raped. Mr. Caggiano candidly admitted that the post concerning women was offensive. The undersigned finds that these particular posts violate some of the governing laws, rules, and policies alleged in the Amended Step III Progressive Discipline correspondence. Mr. Caggiano violated rule 6A-10.081(1)(b), because the School Board established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he failed to exercise best professional judgment and integrity. As a result, the School Board has also established, by a preponderance of the evidence, a violation of rule 6A-5.056(2)(b). Mr. Caggiano violated rule 6A-10.081(1)(c), because the School Board established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he failed to maintain the respect and confidence of his colleagues, students, and parents, and failed to sustain the highest degree of ethical conduct. As a result, the School Board has also established, by a preponderance of the evidence, a violation of rule 6A-5.056(2)(b), which concerns “misconduct in office.” Mr. Caggiano violated rule 6A-10.081(2)(a)1., because the School Board established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he failed to make reasonable effort to protect students from conditions harmful to learning and/or to the students’ mental and/or physical health and/or safety. As a result, the School Board has also established, by a preponderance of the evidence, a violation of rules 6A-5.056(2)(b), which concerns “misconduct in office.” Mr. Caggiano violated rule 6A-10.081(2)(a)5., because the School Board established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he intentionally exposed students to unnecessary embarrassment or disparagement. As a result, the School Board has also established, by a preponderance of the evidence, a violation of rule 6A-5.056(2)(b), which concerns “misconduct in office.” Mr. Caggiano violated rule 6A-10.081(2)(b)1., because the School Board established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he failed to take reasonable precautions to distinguish between personal views and those of any educational institution or organization with which he is affiliated. As a result, the School Board has also established, by a preponderance of the evidence, a violation of rule 6A-5.056(2)(b), which concerns “misconduct in office.” Mr. Caggiano violated rule 6A-5.056(1), which concerns “immorality,” because the School Board established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his actions constituted immorality, which is “conduct that brings the individual concerned or the education profession into public disgrace or disrespect and impairs the individual’s service in the community.” Mr. Caggiano violated Duval County School Board Policy 10.10(IV)(A), because the School Board established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he engaged in conduct that denigrates or shows hostility or aversion toward an individual because of his/her actual or perceived identity with regard to gender. The undersigned finds that the School Board did not establish, bya preponderance of the evidence, that Mr. Caggiano violated section 1006.147(2), which prohibits bullying and harassment. The undersigned finds that the School Board did not establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Mr. Caggiano violated rule 6A-10.081(2)(a)6. (“Shall not intentionally violate or deny a student’s legal rights.”), or rule 6A-10.081(2)(c)1. (“Shall maintain honestly in all professional dealings.”). The undersigned finds that the School Board did not establish other alleged violations of Duval County School Board Policy, including bullying or retaliation. The School Board established, with respect to the two aforementioned Facebook posts, that Mr. Caggiano’s conduct constituted “potential harm to the physical and mental wellbeing of a student, or students[,]” and “behavior that impairs the employee’s effectiveness in performing her/his duties, professionalism, and confidence in the eyes of the students and parents/guardians[,]” and thus, under article V, section C, subsections 9 and 10 of the CBA, it was not required to follow the steps of progressive discipline, and had just cause to reprimand (Step II) and suspend without pay (Step III) Mr. Caggiano, and require him to complete a course in Culture Diversity. However, because the undersigned finds that the School Board did not establish that the remaining Facebook posts violated governing laws, statutes, rules or polices, and because the undersigned further finds that the School Board did not establish that the posts constituted bullying or retaliation, the undersigned finds that a reduction in the proposed discipline is warranted.

Conclusions For Petitioner: Derrel Q. Chatmon, Esquire Office of General Counsel City of Jacksonville Suite 480 117 West Duval Street, Jacksonville, Florida 32202 For Respondent: Kelly B. Mathis, Esquire Mathis Law Firm 3577 Cardinal Point Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32257

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the undersigned hereby RECOMMENDS that the School Board of Duval County enter a final order that: (1) finds that Mr. Caggiano violated rule 6A- 5.056(1) and (2)(b); rule 6A-10.081(1)(b), (c), (2)(a)1., (2)(a)5., and (2)(b)1.; and Duval County School Board Policy 10.10(IV)(A) for two public Facebook posts or reposts associated with his Facebook account; (2) finds that Mr. Caggiano did not violate section 1006.147(2), rules 6A-10.081(2)(a)6. or 6A- 10.081(2)(c)1., or any remaining portions of Duval County School Board Policy 10.10(IV); (3) issues a written reprimand; (4) suspends Mr. Caggiano, without pay, for three days; and (5) requires Mr. Caggiano to complete a course in Culture Diversity. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of November, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: S ROBERT J. TELFER III Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 2021. Derrel Q. Chatmon, Esquire Office of General Counsel City of Jacksonville Suite 480 117 West Duval Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Anastasios Kamoutsas, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Dr. Diana Greene, Superintendent Duval County School Board 1701 Prudential Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32207-8152 Kelly B. Mathis, Esquire Mathis Law Firm 3577 Cardinal Point Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32257 Richard Corcoran Commissioner of Education Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400

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PRIME HOMEBUILDERS vs FLORIDA HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION, 09-003336 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jun. 17, 2009 Number: 09-003336 Latest Update: Apr. 01, 2014

The Issue The threshold issue in this case is whether the decisions giving rise to the dispute, which concern the allocation and disbursement of funds appropriated to Respondent by the legislature and thus involve the preparation or modification of the agency's budget, are subject to quasi-judicial adjudication under the Administrative Procedure Act. If the Division of Administrative Hearings were possessed of subject matter jurisdiction, then the issues would be whether Respondent is estopped from implementing its intended decisions to "de- obligate" itself from preliminary commitments to provide low- interest loans to several projects approved for funding under the Community Workforce Housing Innovation Pilot Program; and whether such intended decisions would constitute breaches of contract or otherwise be erroneous, arbitrary, capricious, or abuses of the agency's discretion.

Findings Of Fact Petitioners Pasco CWHIP Partners, LLC ("Pasco Partners"); Legacy Pointe, Inc. ("Legacy"); Villa Capri, Inc. ("Villa Capri"); Prime Homebuilders ("Prime"); and MDG Capital Corporation ("MDG") (collectively, "Petitioners"), are Florida corporations authorized to do business in Florida. Each is a developer whose business activities include building affordable housing. The Florida Housing Finance Corporation ("FHFC") is a public corporation organized under Chapter 420, Florida Statutes, to implement and administer various affordable housing programs, including the Community Workforce Housing Innovation Pilot Program ("CWHIP"). The Florida Legislature created CWHIP in 2006 to subsidize the cost of housing for lower income workers performing "essential services." Under CWHIP, FHFC is authorized to lend up to $5 million to a developer for the construction or rehabilitation of housing in an eligible area for essential services personnel. Because construction costs for workforce housing developments typically exceed $5 million, developers usually must obtain additional funding from sources other than CWHIP to cover their remaining development costs. In 2007, the legislature appropriated $62.4 million for CWHIP and authorized FHFC to allocate these funds on a competitive basis to "public-private" partnerships seeking to build affordable housing for essential services personnel.1 On December 31, 2007, FHFC began soliciting applications for participation in CWHIP. Petitioners submitted their respective applications to FHFC on or around January 29, 2008. FHFC reviewed the applications and graded each of them on a point scale under which a maximum of 200 points per application were available; preliminary scores and comments were released on March 4, 2008. FHFC thereafter provided applicants the opportunity to cure any deficiencies in their applications and thereby improve their scores. Petitioners submitted revised applications on or around April 18, 2008. FHFC evaluated the revised applications and determined each applicant's final score. The applications were then ranked, from highest to lowest score. The top-ranked applicant was first in line to be offered the chance to take out a CWHIP loan, followed by the others in descending order to the extent of available funds. Applicants who ranked below the cut-off for potential funding were placed on a wait list. If, as sometimes happens, an applicant in line for funding were to withdraw from CWHIP or fail for some other reason to complete the process leading to the disbursement of loan proceeds, the highest-ranked applicant on the wait list would "move up" to the "funded list." FHFC issued the final scores and ranking of applicants in early May 2006. Petitioners each had a project that made the cut for potential CWHIP funding.2 Some developers challenged the scoring of applications, and the ensuing administrative proceedings slowed the award process. This administrative litigation ended on or around November 6, 2008, after the parties agreed upon a settlement of the dispute. On or about November 12, 2008, FHFC issued preliminary commitment letters offering low-interest CWHIP loans to Pasco Partners, Legacy, Villa Capri, Prime (for its Village at Portofino Meadows project), and MDG. Each preliminary commitment was contingent upon: Borrower and Development meeting all requirements of Rule Chapter 67-58, FAC, and all other applicable state and FHFC requirements; and A positive credit underwriting recommendation; and Final approval of the credit underwriting report by the Florida Housing Board of Directors. These commitment letters constituted the necessary approval for each of the Petitioners to move forward in credit underwriting, which is the process whereby underwriters whom FHFC retains under contract verify the accuracy of the information contained in an applicant's application and examine such materials as market studies, engineering reports, business records, and pro forma financial statements to determine the project's likelihood of success. Once a credit underwriter completes his analysis of an applicant's project, the underwriter submits a draft report and recommendation to FHFC, which, in turn, forwards a copy of the draft report and recommendation to the applicant. Both the applicant and FHFC then have an opportunity to submit comments regarding the draft report and recommendation to the credit underwriter. After that, the credit underwriter revises the draft if he is so inclined and issues a final report and recommendation to FHFC. Upon receipt of the credit underwriter's final report and recommendation, FHFC forwards the document to its Board of Directors for approval. Of the approximately 1,200 projects that have undergone credit underwriting for the purpose of receiving funding through FHFC, all but a few have received a favorable recommendation from the underwriter and ultimately been approved for funding. Occasionally a developer will withdraw its application if problems arise during underwriting, but even this is, historically speaking, a relatively uncommon outcome. Thus, upon receiving their respective preliminary commitment letters, Petitioners could reasonably anticipate, based on FHFC's past performance, that their projects, in the end, would receive CWHIP financing, notwithstanding the contingencies that remained to be satisfied. There is no persuasive evidence, however, that FHFC promised Petitioners, as they allege, either that the credit underwriting process would never be interrupted, or that CWHIP financing would necessarily be available for those developers whose projects successfully completed underwriting. While Petitioners, respectively, expended money and time as credit underwriting proceeded, the reasonable inference, which the undersigned draws, is that they incurred such costs, not in reliance upon any false promises or material misrepresentations allegedly made by FHFC, but rather because a favorable credit underwriting recommendation was a necessary (though not sufficient) condition of being awarded a firm loan commitment. On January 15, 2009, the Florida Legislature, meeting in Special Session, enacted legislation designed to close a revenue shortfall in the budget for the 2008-2009 fiscal year. Among the cuts that the legislature made to balance the budget was the following: The unexpended balance of funds appropriated by the Legislature to the Florida Housing Finance Corporation in the amount of $190,000,000 shall be returned to the State treasury for deposit into the General Revenue Fund before June 1, 2009. In order to implement this section, and to the maximum extent feasible, the Florida Housing Finance Corporation shall first reduce unexpended funds allocated by the corporation that increase new housing construction. 2009 Fla. Laws ch. 2009-1 § 47. Because the legislature chose not to make targeted cuts affecting specific programs, it fell to FHFC would to decide which individual projects would lose funding, and which would not. The legislative mandate created a constant-sum situation concerning FHFC's budget, meaning that, regardless of how FHFC decided to reallocate the funds which remained at its disposal, all of the cuts to individual programs needed to total $190 million in the aggregate. Thus, deeper cuts to Program A would leave more money for other programs, while sparing Program B would require greater losses for other programs. In light of this situation, FHFC could not make a decision regarding one program, such as CWHIP, without considering the effect of that decision on all the other programs in FHFC's portfolio: a cut (or not) here affected what could be done there. The legislative de-appropriation of funds then in FHFC's hands required, in short, that FHFC modify its entire budget to account for the loss. To enable FHFC to return $190 million to the state treasury, the legislature directed that FHFC adopt emergency rules pursuant to the following grant of authority: In order to ensure that the funds transferred by [special appropriations legislation] are available, the Florida Housing Finance Corporation shall adopt emergency rules pursuant to s. 120.54, Florida Statutes. The Legislature finds that emergency rules adopted pursuant to this section meet the health, safety, and welfare requirements of s. 120.54(4), Florida Statutes. The Legislature finds that such emergency rulemaking power is necessitated by the immediate danger to the preservation of the rights and welfare of the people and is immediately necessary in order to implement the action of the Legislature to address the revenue shortfall of the 2008-2009 fiscal year. Therefore, in adopting such emergency rules, the corporation need not publish the facts, reasons, and findings required by s. 120.54(4)(a)3., Florida Statutes. Emergency rules adopted under this section are exempt from s. 120.54(4)(c), Florida Statutes, and shall remain in effect for 180 days. 2009 Fla. Laws ch. 2009-2 § 12. The governor signed the special appropriations bills into law on January 27, 2009. At that time, FHFC began the process of promulgating emergency rules. FHFC also informed its underwriters that FHFC's board would not consider any credit underwriting reports at its March 2009 board meeting. Although FHFC did not instruct the underwriters to stop evaluating Petitioners' projects, the looming reductions in allocations, coupled with the board's decision to suspend the review of credit reports, effectively (and not surprisingly) brought credit underwriting to a standstill. Petitioners contend that FHFC deliberately intervened in the credit underwriting process for the purpose of preventing Petitioners from satisfying the conditions of their preliminary commitment letters, so that their projects, lacking firm loan commitments, would be low-hanging fruit when the time came for picking the deals that would not receive funding due to FHFC's obligation to return $190 million to the state treasury. The evidence, however, does not support a finding to this effect. The decision of FHFC's board to postpone the review of new credit underwriting reports while emergency rules for drastically reducing allocations were being drafted was not intended, the undersigned infers, to prejudice Petitioners, but to preserve the status quo ante pending the modification of FHFC's budget in accordance with the legislative mandate. Indeed, given that FHFC faced the imminent prospect of involuntarily relinquishing approximately 40 percent of the funds then available for allocation to the various programs under FHFC's jurisdiction, it would have been imprudent to proceed at full speed with credit underwriting for projects in the pipeline, as if nothing had changed. At its March 13, 2009, meeting, FHFC's board adopted Emergency Rules 67ER09-1 through 67ER09-5, Florida Administrative Code (the "Emergency Rules"), whose stated purpose was "to establish procedures by which [FHFC would] de- obligate the unexpended balance of funds [previously] appropriated by the Legislature " As used in the Emergency Rules, the term "unexpended" referred, among other things, to funds previously awarded that, "as of January 27, 2009, [had] not been previously withdrawn or de-obligated . . . and [for which] the Applicant [did] not have a Valid Firm Commitment and loan closing [had] not yet occurred." See Fla. Admin. Code R. 67ER09-2(29). The term "Valid Firm Commitment" was defined in the Emergency Rules to mean: a commitment issued by the [FHFC] to an Applicant following the Board's approval of the credit underwriting report for the Applicant's proposed Development which has been accepted by the Applicant and subsequent to such acceptance there have been no material, adverse changes in the financing, condition, structure or ownership of the Applicant or the proposed Development, or in any information provided to the [FHFC] or its Credit Underwriter with respect to the Applicant or the proposed Development. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 67ER09-2(33). There is no dispute concerning that fact that, as of January 27, 2009, none of the Petitioners had received a valid firm commitment or closed a loan transaction. There is, accordingly, no dispute regarding the fact that the funds which FHFC had committed preliminarily to lend Petitioners in connection with their respective developments constituted "unexpended" funds under the pertinent (and undisputed) provisions of the Emergency Rules, which were quoted above. In the Emergency Rules, FHFC set forth its decisions regarding the reallocation of funds at its disposal. Pertinent to this case are the following provisions: To facilitate the transfer and return of the appropriated funding, as required by [the special appropriations bills], the [FHFC] shall: * * * Return $190,000,000 to the Treasury of the State of Florida, as required by [law]. . . . The [FHFC] shall de-obligate Unexpended Funding from the following Corporation programs, in the following order, until such dollar amount is reached: All Developments awarded CWHIP Program funding, except for [a few projects not at issue here.] * * * See Fla. Admin. Code R. 67ER09-3. On April 24, 2009, FHFC gave written notice to each of the Petitioners that FHFC was "de-obligating" itself from the preliminary commitments that had been made concerning their respective CWHIP developments. On or about June 1, 2009, FHFC returned the de- appropriated funds, a sum of $190 million, to the state treasury. As a result of the required modification of FHFC's budget, 47 deals lost funding, including 16 CWHIP developments to which $83.6 million had been preliminarily committed for new housing construction.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that FHFC enter a Final Order dismissing these consolidated cases for lack of jurisdiction. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of February, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of February, 2010.

Florida Laws (9) 120.52120.54120.56120.565120.569120.57120.573120.574120.68
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BANYAN AREA AGENCY ON AGING, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 88-002305BID (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-002305BID Latest Update: Jun. 20, 1988

Findings Of Fact Introduction On February 26, 1988 respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), through its District IX office, advertised a Request for Proposal (RFP) in the Florida Administrative Weekly inviting qualified and interested organizations and vendors to submit proposals for the designation of an Area Agency on Aging in District IX. The designation would run from May 2, 1988 through the end of the calendar year but the successful vendor could be expected to be redesignated in subsequent years. According to the advertisement: Proposals will be received by District IX until 12:00 p.m., EST, March 24, 1988, for the designation of an Area Agency on Aging authorized under Title III of the Older Americans Act as amended, within the jurisdictional areas of Martin, St. Lucie, Indian River, Okeechobee and Palm Beach Counties. * * * Contract awards will be based on approximately 75 percent federal funds, 11 percent general revenue and 14 percent local matching funds. * * * Written inquiries concerning the Request for Proposals will be received until 4:00 p.m., EST, March 11, 1988. A Bidders Conference, to review the proposed format and contract award process, will be held on March 4, 1988. * * * Under this proposal, HRS intended to award the contract to the best qualified firm since price proposals were not being submitted. To this extent, the proceeding differs from the typical state project where the contract is ordinarily awarded to the lowest and most responsive bidder. In response to the above RFP, petitioner, Banyan Area Agency on Aging, Inc. (Banyan), timely submitted its proposal. As it turned out, Banyan was the only organization that filed a bid. After being reviewed by a seven person evaluation committee, the proposal was given a score of 480 out of a possible 1525 and a recommendation that it be rejected. This recommendation was later adopted by the District Administrator. This decision was conveyed to petitioner by letter dated April 4, 1988. That prompted a request for hearing by petitioner to challenge the preliminary agency action. As grounds for contesting the action, petitioner contended the agency was arbitrary and capricious in rejecting its proposal. If its preliminary action is sustained, HRS intends to seek authority from the Department of General Services to negotiate a noncompetitive bid. Under this process, HRS desires to designate, after a screening process, one person from each of the five counties to serve on the board of a corporation to be established to run the program. Thus, HRS does not intend to readvertise the RFP and seek competitive proposals a second time. The Contract The contract in question is funded principally through federal grant dollars under the federal Older Americans Act of 1965, as amended. The monies, commonly known as Title III funds, are used to provide programs for senior citizens. Respondent is the State agency charged with the responsibility of administering the program funds. To receive federal funds, HRS was required to prepare a state plan and submit it to the U.S. Commissioner on Aging for his approval. A part of that plan calls for HRS, or District IX in this case, to designate an area agency on aging (AAA) to plan and administer a comprehensive and coordinated system of services for the aging in the five county area of Palm Beach, Okeechobee, Indian River, Martin and S. Lucie Counties. Among other things, the local AAA must develop an area plan for supportive services, senior centers and nutrition services in the five county area. The AAA will receive $300,000 to cover administrative costs in administering the program and will be in charge of dispensing several million dollars annually in grant dollars for aging programs. District IX had previously designated Gulfstream Area Agency on Aging (Gulfstream) as its AAA. However, due to a combination of faulty management, lack of supervision and other factors, Gulfstream was designated as AAA in May, 1987. Since then, HRS has received several waivers from the Commissioner on Aging but now faces a mandate to designate a District IX AAA by October 1, 1988 or lose its federal funding. To avoid a recurrence of the Gulfstream problem, the HRS District IX contract manager, and several other district personnel, prepared a comprehensive RFP to be issued in conjunction with the selection of a new AAA designee. After a draft was assembled at the local level, the RFP was forwarded to HRS' Tallahassee office where further refinements were made. The final product has been received in evidence as petitioner's exhibit 9 and respondent's exhibit 11. According to the District IX contract manager, the RFP is the "state of the art" in terms of what an AAA ought to be. The RFP is a voluminous document, weighing some 6 1/2 pounds according to Banyan, and requires a great deal of information and detail regarding the AAA organization, procedures, and program plans and goals to satisfy the federal act. The RFP was given to interested organizations, including Banyan, around March 1, 1988. This gave vendors approximately three and one-half weeks to prepare and submit a proposal. Only Banyan was interested in being the designee and thus was the only bidder on the job. Its proposal contained 135 pages. Evaluation Process HRS created a seven person evaluation committee to review the proposals. The committee included five HRS employees and two non-HRS members. All members were given Banyan's proposal prior to the selection date. On March 28, 1988 the committee met and each member independently evaluated Banyan's proposal. Although a top score of 1525 was theoretically possible, Banyan received an average overall score from each There of 480, or a rating of approximately thirty-one and one half percent. After the scores were tallied, Banyan was given one hour to orally explain its proposal before the full committee. At the conclusion of the presentation, the committee voted unanimously to reject the proposal. The reasons for rejecting Banyan's proposal are set forth in respondent's exhibit 2. The three primary deficiencies, as broadly stated, were the "proposal did not develop ideas fully enough to demonstrate a clear understanding of the needs and conditions of the District IX 60+ population," the proposal "did not demonstrate a clear understanding of the role and responsibility of area agency on aging nor was there evidence of administrative capability,' and (c) the proposal "did not offer assurance that current board members fully understood their position as the governing board." At hearing, several members of the committee amplified on the above three shortcomings and pointed out specific deficiencies in Banyan's proposal which led them to reject the proposal. For example, the proposal failed to focus on areas outside of Palm Beach County, did not contain a proposed budget, lacked minority representation, failed to fully identify goals and objectives, did not include a detailed description of the fair hearing process and the make- up and procedure of the advisory council and omitted the corporation's bylaws. Given these deficiencies, and others, HRS was justified in rejecting the bid. Petitioner's Case Petitioner contends that three and one-half weeks was too short a time to prepare a responsible proposal to the RFP. In this regard, HRS acknowledged it was a lengthy RFP, but it considered the time adequate for a qualified and experienced organization, particularly since much of the RFP was reference material. Banyan also pointed out that its board of directors was made up of highly qualified people with impressive work experience. While this is true, as evidenced by testimony at hearing, none were experienced in managing a federally funded program of this magnitude. Banyan further stated that, after the proposal was filed, it could have corrected or expanded on many of its abbreviated responses. However, once the proposal was filed, such changes were impermissible. Finally, Banyan conceded that while many of its responses were brief and nonspecific, this was because Banyan intended to rely upon HRS for technical assistance to implement the programs. However, the RFP called for specific, detailed responses so that HRS could properly evaluate the proposal. Allegations of Bias or Impropriety There is no evidence that the committee acted unfairly or improperly during the evaluation process or that any eber was personally biased towards Banyan. There is also no evidence that HRS rejected the bid so that it could "control" the management of the program.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the protest filed by petitioner be DENIED and that a Final Order be entered confirming the rejection of petitioner's proposal. DONE AND ORDERED this 20th day of June, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Colman B. Stein 100 Worth Avenue Apartment 416 Palm Beach, Florida 33480 Laurel D. Hopper, Esquire 111 Georgia Avenue Third Floor West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 R. S. Power, Esquire Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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