The Issue The issue in these cases is whether Respondent failed to provide appropriate emergency care for a nursing home resident in respiratory distress in violation of 42 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) Section 483.25 and Florida Administrative Code Rule 59A-4.1288. (All references to rules are to rules promulgated in the Florida Administrative Code in effect as of the date of this Recommended Order.)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating nursing homes inside the State of Florida. Respondent operates a licensed nursing home at 830 West 29th Street, Orlando, Florida (the facility). Petitioner conducted a complaint survey of the facility on September 14, 2001. The survey cited the facility for a deficiency described in F309, and rated the deficiency with a scope and severity of "G" and Class II, respectively. The deficiency classifications authorized in Subsection 400.23(8) range from Class I through Class IV. Class I deficiencies are not relevant to this case. The statute defines the remaining classifications as follows: A Class II deficiency is a deficiency that the agency determines has compromised the resident's ability to maintain or reach his or her highest practicable physical, mental, and psychosocial well-being, as defined by an accurate and comprehensive resident assessment, plan of care, and provision of services. . . . A Class III deficiency is a deficiency that the agency determines will result in no more than minimal physical, mental or psychosocial discomfort to the resident or has the potential to compromise the resident's ability to maintain or reach his or her highest practicable physical, mental, or psychosocial well-being as defined. . . . A Class IV deficiency is a deficiency that the agency determines has the potential for causing no more than a minor negative impact on the resident. . . . Rule 59A-4.1288 requires nursing home facilities licensed by the state of Florida to adhere to federal regulations found in Section 483 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). In relevant part, Rule 59A-4.1288 provides: Nursing homes that participate in Title XVIII or XIX must follow certification rules and regulations found in 42 CFR 483, Requirements for Long Term Care Facilities, September 26, 1991, which is incorporated by reference. The "G" rating adopted by Petitioner for the scope and severity rating of the deficiency alleged in F309 is a rating authorized in relevant federal regulations. A "G" rating means that the alleged deficiency was isolated. Applicable state law authorizes Petitioner to change a facility's licensure rating from standard to conditional whenever Petitioner alleges that a Class II deficiency exists. Petitioner alleged in the survey report that a Class II deficiency existed at the facility and assigned a conditional rating to the facility's license. The conditional rating was effective September 14, 2001, and continued until substantial compliance was achieved. When Petitioner proves that a Class II deficiency exists, applicable law authorizes Petitioner to impose a civil money penalty. Petitioner filed an Administrative Complaint against Respondent seeking to impose a fine of $2,500.00 and subsequently filed an Amended Administrative Complaint. The allegations on which both the change in license status to a conditional license and the proposed fine are based are set forth in F309. The deficiency alleged in F309 is set forth on CMS Form 2567, entitled "Statement of Deficiencies and Plan of Correction" (the 2567). The 2567 that Petitioner used to charge Respondent with the deficiency described in F309 involved only one resident. In order to protect this resident's privacy, the 2567, F309, the Transcript, and all pleadings refer to the resident as Resident 1. F309 alleges that the facility failed to satisfy the requirement of 42 C.F.R. Section 483.25. In relevant part, the federal regulation provides: Each resident must receive and the facility must provide the necessary care and services to attain or maintain the highest practicable physical, mental, or psychosocial well-being, in accordance with the comprehensive assessment and plan of care. Use F309 for quality of care deficiencies not covered by 483.25(a)-(m). F309 alleges that the facility failed to satisfy the requirement of 42 CFR Section 483.25 because: Based on interview and record review the facility neglected to provide appropriate emergency care for [Resident 1] in respiratory distress and failure. Petitioner promulgates an officially stated policy in written guidelines entitled the State Operations Manual (the Manual). The Manual states agency policy regarding the interpretation and application of the regulatory standards surveyors must enforce. The facility admitted Resident 1 to the pediatric long-term care unit on November 20, 2000. The admitting diagnosis was cerebral palsy, pneumonia and convulsions, a tracheostomy, and a gastrostomy. Resident 1 could breathe on her own and was being weaned from the trach. She could breathe through her nose at times. She was not on a ventilator but could breathe room air. At all times, Resident 1 was making respiratory effort. Resident 1 was on an apnea monitor. Resident 1 had three stomas. Stomas are the openings for the tracheostomy tube. Her throat structures were very frail. She had received numerous throat reconstructions. She had significant scar tissue and a granuloma at her stoma sites. A granuloma is a tumor-like growth. The granuloma was vascular, and the blood vessels were easily broken. Resident 1 was spastic as a result of her cerebral palsy. On September 7, 2001, at 2:50 a.m., Resident 1's apnea monitor alarm sounded. Staff immediately responded to find that Resident 1 had pulled out her tracheostomy tube and was bleeding profusely. Facility staff called 911 and notified the treating physician and the parents. An ambulance was dispatched to the facility at 2:51 a.m. on September 7, 2001. While awaiting the ambulance, the Registered Nurse on duty (RN) could not detect an apical or radial pulse. The RN did not administer CPR. Rather, the RN established an airway by successfully replacing the tracheostomy tube. Securing a patent airway was the first thing that the RN should have done for Resident 1 under the circumstances. No oxygen can be given without a patent airway. It was difficult for the RN to visualize the trach opening because of the profuse bleeding. The RN was able to tactilely reinsert the tube. Vital signs taken by the RN showed that Resident 1 was alive when EMT personnel arrived on the scene. CPR is not appropriate when vital signs are present. The ambulance and EMT personnel arrived shortly after the RN reinserted the trach tube. At 2:56 a.m., EMT personnel took over the care of Resident 1. EMT personnel worked on Resident 1 for 23 minutes before transporting her to the hospital. Resident 1 died at the hospital at 3:35 a.m., 38 minutes after the EMTs took responsibility for her care. EMT personnel generated EKG strips indicating that Resident 1's heart was beating at some point after they took over. Two sets of x-rays subsequently taken at the hospital substantiate that Resident 1 was alive when EMT personnel took over her care. EMT personnel removed the trach the nurse had inserted and replaced it with an endotracheal tube. Removing the trach eliminated the airway that the RN had established for Resident 1 before EMT personnel arrived. The endotracheal tube was 22 centimeters long and significantly longer and larger than the regular trach tube used for Resident 1. The physician's order for Resident 1 stated that nothing should go past 6 centimeters into Resident 1's trach. It took the EMTs three attempts to get the endotracheal tube placed. The EMTs should have hyperventilated Resident 1 before placing the endotracheal tube. They did not do so. The x-ray taken at 3:42 a.m. in the hospital, shows that the endotracheal tube was improperly positioned in Resident 1's lung. All steps taken by the RN were appropriate for Resident 1 under the circumstances. Petitioner failed to show a nexus between any act or omission by the facility and the harm to Resident 1. The care plan for Resident 1 called for suctioning of her tracheal tube. Care plans are to be followed under normal circumstances. Emergency procedures take precedence in critical situations. Suctioning for Resident 1 was appropriate under normal circumstances when she had a patent airway. If Resident 1 did not have an airway, the first priority is to establish an airway. The RN first established a patent airway for Resident 1. It would have been inappropriate for the RN to suction Resident 1 before establishing an airway because it would have sucked out the air remaining in Resident 1's lungs. Suctioning also could have caused a vasovagal response that could stop the heart and could have caused tissue damage. After the RN opened an airway for Resident 1, the next priority would have been for the RN to check for vital signs. The RN checked Resident 1's vital signs after opening an airway, and the vital signs showed that Resident 1 was alive when EMT personnel arrived on the scene. The presence of vital signs made it inappropriate for either the RN or EMT personnel to administer CPR. CPR is appropriate only in the absence of vital signs. When EMT personnel arrived, they continued the same procedure that the RN had followed. EMT first established an airway by removing the trach tube used by the RN and replaced it with an endotracheal tube. The resident had vital signs after placement of the trach and CPR was inappropriate. F282 relates to failure to implement a care plan. Respondent was not cited under F282. Petitioner stipulated in the Prehearing Stipulation that both the conditional license and fine were based on F309 alone.
Recommendation Based on the forgoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent not guilty of the allegations in F309 and the Administrative Complaint, dismissing the Administrative Complaint, and changing Respondent's conditional license to a standard license effective September 4, 2001. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of September, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of September, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael P. Sasso, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 525 Mirror Lake Drive, Room 3106 St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Karen L. Goldsmith, Esquire Goldsmith, Grout & Lewis, P.A. Post Office Box 2011 2180 Park Avenue, North Suite 100 Winter Park, Florida 32790-2011 Lealand McCharen, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 William Roberts, Acting General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building Three, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Rhonda M. Medows, M.D., Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building Three, Suite 3116 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue As stated in the Prehearing Stipulation filed by the parties, the "issue to be litigated is whether Petitioner is entitled to a Superior or Standard rating on its license for the period September 1, 1986 through August 31, 1987"?
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, The Magnolias Nursing and Convalescent Center, is a 210-bed nursing home located in a four-story building in Pensacola, Florida. It is licensed as a nursing home by the State of Florida pursuant to Chapter 400, Florida Statutes. Howard Bennett and his wife have been the owners of the Petitioner since it was built in 1978. On April 28-30, 1986, and May 1-2, 1986, the Department conducted an annual Licensure and Certification survey (hereinafter referred to as the "Annual Survey") of the Petitioner's nursing home as required by Section 400.23, Florida Statutes. Based upon the Annual Survey conducted by the Department, the Department determined that the Petitioner's facility failed to meet nursing home licensure requirement numbers (NH) 100 and 102, as identified on the Department's Nursing Home Licensure Survey Report, DHRS exhibit 2. The deficiencies found by the Department and which in fact existed during the Annual Survey relating to NH 100 and 102 were as follows: The charge nurse for each shift on each of the four floors of the facility is responsible, under direction from Director of Nursing, for the total nursing activities in the facility during each tour of duty. The charge nurses are thus responsible for ensuring that nursing personnel carry out the direct nursing care needs of specific patients and assist in carrying out these nursing care needs. This responsibility is not always met in that: On the day of the survey, there were urine odors noted on the halls, rooms of fourth and third floors, indicating lack of attention by nursing. Other instances of lack of personal attention by nursing on the above mentioned floor in that: One patient required oral hygiene. Fourteen residents required fingernail care, one resident's fingernails were long, thick, and black indicating a need for attention. Two residents had redden buttocks, three residents were wet, three residents needed shaving, three residents needed hair cuts. One resident needed colostomy bag changed. One resident had a small amount of feces on backside, and was not properly cleaned around the rectum and scrotum. Several residents had on clothing that was too tight, zippers open, buttons not fasten, soil wrinkled and threads hanging around the bottom. It is also noted, that there are 116 total care, and 17 self care residents in the facility indicating a need for constant intensive nursing care to the residents. Ref. 10D-29.108(3)(d)(1) Based upon the totality of these deficiencies, it was concluded that the Petitioner failed to comply with the standard of care to be provided by the charge nurse. The deficiencies cited by the Department during the Annual Survey were classified as Class III deficiencies. The Annual Survey was conducted by Christine Denson. Ms. Denson had conducted nine to ten annual surveys of the Petitioner prior to the survey which is the subject of this proceeding. During Ms. Denson's inspection of the Petitioner's nursing home, Ms. Denson pointed out the deficiencies which are noted above to the director of nursing who accompanied Ms. Denson during her inspection. Ms. Denson normally records in some manner the identity of a resident to whom a deficiency relates; by noting the room number or bed number. Ms. Denson did not follow this procedure during the Annual Survey. Ms. Denson met with Howard Bennett, the owner of the Petitioner, at the conclusion of the Annual Survey. After Ms. Denson had explained the deficiencies she had found during her inspection, Judge Bennett stated to Ms. Denson: "I know the place is going down hill. We are letting it slide. Judge Bennett did not ask Ms. Denson for any information concerning the identity of the residents to which deficiencies related. The Petitioner had policies in effect at the time of the Annual Survey which addressed each of the deficiencies cited by the Department. Those policies were not, however, followed. Ms. Denson did not know when the residents to which the deficiencies she found related had been admitted to the Petitioner, their medical condition, how long the fingernail problems had existed or how long the residents had resided at the Petitioner. Ms. Denson did not speak to the residents about the problems she noted, review their medical or dental records or talk to any residents' physician. Finally, Ms. Denson did not remember whether any of the residents were continent or incontinent. On August 13, 1986, a letter was issued by the Department informing the Petitioner that its license rating was being converted from a superior rating to a standard rating. The August 13, 1986, letter from the Department also indicated that the deficiencies noted in the Annual Survey had been corrected based upon a July 31, 1986, follow-up inspection conducted by the Department. The Petitioner requested an administrative hearing challenging the proposed rating of its license by letter dated September 24, 1986.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued assigning a standard rating on the Petitioner's license for the period September 1, 1986, through August 31, 1987. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of October, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of October, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-4182 The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Accentance or Reason for Rejection 1-3, 6-7, 81 These are matters included in the Prehearing Stipulation. They are hereby accepted. 4-5 Statement of the issue in this case 8 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Ms. Denson testified at pages 48-49 of the transcript that whether a nursing home was considered to be out of compliance depended on the totality of the deficiencies and that she considered all of the deficiencies she found at the Petitioner's facility. 9 12. 10-11 10. 12-13 7. 14 Irrelevant. 15-16, 19-20, 22-23, 25, 29-31 10. 17 Hearsay. 18, 28, 33-34, 36-37, 39, 41-43, 45 Hereby accepted. 21, 24, 26-27, 32, 48, 54-66, 71, 73-77 These proposed findings of fact are generally true. They all involve, however, possible explanations for the deficiencies found at the Petitioner's facility. In order for these proposed findings of fact to be relevant it would have to be concluded that the Department had the burden of dispelling any and all possible explanations for the deficiencies. Such a conclusion would not be reasonable in this case. The Department presented testimony that the deficiencies cited existed and that, taken as a whole, they supported a conclusion that the Petitioner was not providing minimum nursing care. This evidence was credible and sufficient to meet the Department's burden of proof and to shift the burden to the Petitioner to provide proof of any explanations for the deficiencies. 35 9. 38, 40, 49-51, 53, 82-83, 86-87 Irrelevant and/or argument. 43-44 1. 46-47, 51, 56, 66-67, 71-71 These proposed findings of fact are true. They are not relevant to this proceeding, however, because they involve situations at the Petitioner's facility which may explain the deficiencies. The Petitioner failed to prove that they actually were the cause of any of the deficiencies. 70, 78-80, 84-85 Conclusions of law. The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 2-3. 2 11-12. 3 4 and 6. 4 4. 5-7 Irrelevant, summary of testimony, conclusion of law. 8 9. 9 8. 10 Irrelevant. 11 8. 12 Summary of testimony and facts relating to the weight of Ms. Mayo's testimony. 13-14 Hereby accepted. 15 Argument. 16-17 Conclusions of law. 18 4. 19-20 Conclusions of law, argument and irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Jonathan S. Grout, Esquire Dempsey & Goldsmith, P.A. Post Office Box 10651 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael O. Mathis Staff Attorney Office of Licensure and Certification Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent committed the allegations in the notice of intent to assign a conditional license and, if so, whether Petitioner should have changed the rating of Respondent's license from standard to conditional for the period March 8 through May 30, 2001.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating nursing homes inside the state. Respondent operates a licensed nursing home at 5405 Babcock Street, Northeast, in Palm Bay, Florida (the "facility"). Petitioner conducted an annual survey of the facility that Petitioner completed on March 8, 2001 (the "March survey"). Petitioner noted the results of the survey on a Health Care Federal Administration form entitled "Statement of Deficiencies and Plan of Correction." The parties refer to the form as the HCFA 2567-L or the "2567". Petitioner conducted a follow-up survey of the facility that Petitioner completed on April 17, 2001 (the "April survey"). The 2567 is the document used to charge nursing homes with deficiencies that violate applicable law. The 2567 identifies each alleged deficiency by reference to a tag number (the "tags"). Each tag on the 2567 includes a narrative description of the allegations against Respondent and cites a provision of the relevant rule or rules in the Florida Administrative Code violated by the alleged deficiency. In order to protect the privacy of nursing home residents, the 2567 and this Recommended Order refer to each resident by a number rather than by the name of the resident. There are five tags at issue in this proceeding. The March survey cites two Class II deficiencies and three Class III deficiencies. The April survey cites repeat violations of three Class III violations. In this case, Section 400.23(8)(b) and (c), Florida Statutes (2000) establishes the deficiency classifications referred to as Classes II and III. All statutory references in this Recommended Order are to Florida Statutes (2000) unless otherwise stated. Section 400.23(8)(b) defines Class II deficiencies as those: . . . which the agency determines have a direct or immediate relationship to the health, safety, or security of the nursing home facility resident. . . . Section 400.23(8)(c) defines Class III deficiencies as those: . . . which the agency determines to have an indirect or potential relationship to the health, safety, or security of the nursing home facility residents, other than class I or class II deficiencies. The March survey sets forth allegations against Respondent in Tags F224, F282, F314, F325, and F363. Petitioner classifies Tags F224 and F314 as class II deficiencies and Tags F282, F325, and F363 as class III deficiencies. Tag F224 in the March survey generally alleges that Respondent failed to implement policies and procedures to prevent abuse to a resident by another resident. Tag F314 generally alleges that Respondent failed to provide necessary assessment, treatment, and documentation for pressure sores for one resident. Tag F282 generally alleges that the facility failed to provide care and services in accordance with the plan of care for two residents. Tag F325 generally alleges that the facility failed to ensure that one resident maintained acceptable parameters of nutritional status, including body weight. Tag F363 generally alleges that the facility failed to provide menus that meet the nutritional needs of the residents by not following menus for pureed and dysphagia diets. The April survey sets forth allegations against Respondent in Tags F282, F325, and F363. Petitioner classifies each alleged violation as a Class III deficiency. Tag F282 in the April survey generally alleges that Respondent failed to follow a resident’s plan of care by failing to provide a weighted spoon and plate guard. Tag F325 generally alleges that the facility failed to ensure that a resident maintained acceptable parameters of nutritional status, including body weight. Tag F363 generally alleges that the facility failed to ensure that menus designed to meet the nutritional needs of the residents were prepared in advance and followed. Florida Administrative Code Rule 59A-4.1288 establishes the requirement for nursing home facilities licensed by the State of Florida to adhere to federal rules and regulations as found in Section 483 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). In relevant part, the state rule provides: Nursing homes that participate in Title XVIII or XIX must follow certification rules and regulations found in 42 CFR 483, Requirements for Long Term Care Facilities, September 26, 1991, which is incorporated by reference. (All references to rules are to rules promulgated in the Florida Administrative Code in effect on the date of this Recommended Order). Applicable federal and state laws require Petitioner to assign to the deficiencies alleged in the 2567 a scope and severity rating required by federal regulations. In the March survey, Petitioner assigned a "G" rating to Tags F224 and F314, both of which are Class II deficiencies. A "G" rating means that the alleged deficiency was isolated, caused actual harm to one or more residents, but did not involve substandard quality of care. Petitioner assigned a "D" rating to the three Class III deficiencies alleged in Tags F282, F325, and F363 in the March survey. A "D" rating means that there is no actual harm but there is potential for more than minimal harm without actual jeopardy. Petitioner relies on two grounds for changing Respondent's license rating from standard to conditional. When Petitioner alleges two Class II deficiencies in the 2567, as Petitioner did in the March survey, applicable rules require Petitioner to change the rating of a facility's license. Applicable rules also authorize Petitioner to change a facility's license rating when the facility does not correct Class III deficiencies within the time prescribed by Petitioner. Petitioner alleges that Respondent failed to correct three Class III deficiencies alleged in Tags F282, F325, and F363 in the March survey by the time Petitioner conducted the April survey. Effective March 8, 2001, Petitioner changed the rating of the facility's license from standard to conditional. Effective May 31, 2001, Petitioner changed the rating of the facility's license from conditional to standard. The allegations in Tag F224 in the March survey pertain to two residents in the dementia unit of the facility who are identified individually as Resident 1 and Resident 13. Tag F224 in the March survey alleges that the facility failed to meet the requirements of 42 CFR Section 483.13(c). The federal regulation provides in relevant part: The facility must develop and implement written policies and procedures that prohibit mistreatment, neglect and abuse of residents and misappropriation of resident property. The facility must not use verbal, mental, sexual, or physical abuse, corporal punishment, or involuntary seclusion. The federal regulation is applicable to nursing homes in Florida pursuant to Rule 59A-4.1288. Tag F224 does not allege that the facility failed to develop the written policies required by 42 CFR Section 483.13(c) and Rule 59A-4.1288. Rather, Tag F224 alleges that Respondent failed to implement its policy. Tag F224 alleges that the facility failed to provide care and services to Resident 13 to prevent the resident from sexually intimidating a female resident identified as Resident 1. Tag F224 further alleges that Resident 13 had a past history of abusive and aggressive behavior to other residents but was not reassessed, "care planned," and monitored. The allegations in Tag F224 are based on observations of one of Petitioner's surveyors who participated in the March survey. On March 5, 2001, the surveyor observed Resident 13 in the dementia unit standing over Resident 1. The surveyor did not observe any overt sexual misconduct by Resident 13. Rather, the surveyor concluded that sexual misconduct occurred because she determined that Resident 13 was "invading [the female resident's] space," Resident 1 appeared "very anxious," "nervous," and "uncomfortable", and screamed for 15 minutes for Resident 13 to leave. The surveyor also relied on the history of Resident 13 to conclude that Resident 13 engaged in sexual misconduct on March 5, 2001. Resident 13 had, on two occasions, previously expressed a desire to have sex with female residents in the dementia unit and on other occasions had wandered into the rooms of female residents. Based on the inappropriate sexual statements by Resident 13 prior to March 5, 2001, the surveyor alleged in Tag F224 that Resident 13 engaged in sexual misconduct with Resident 1 on March 5, 2001. The preponderance of evidence does not show that Resident 13 engaged in sexual misconduct on March 5, 2001, by standing in front of Resident 1. Resident 13 did not engage in any overt sexual act or gesture. Resident 13 did not utter any inappropriate sexual comments. Resident 13 suffered from dementia and was elderly. He was mentally incapable of forming the requisite intent to sexually intimidate Resident 1 and was physically incapable of carrying out any such intent. In the absence of any overt sexual misconduct on March 5, 2001, the only evidence to support the allegation of sexual misconduct in F224 is the inference of the surveyor based on the gender difference between Residents 13 and 1 and the past history of inappropriate sexual statements by Resident 13. The inference of the observer does not satisfy the requirement for a preponderance of the evidence. The resident’s physician was qualified as an expert witness without objection. The physician testified that he was aware of Resident 13’s aggressive behavior, including the two occasions on which the resident expressed a desire to have sex with female residents. However, such incidents are typical of demented residents, do not reflect that Resident 13 was going to attack other residents in the dementia unit, and do not require any alteration to the care plan that was already in place. The only evidence that Petitioner provided to the contrary was the non-expert opinion of its surveyor. The non- expert opinion of the surveyor was insufficient to refute the physician’s expert opinion. Resident 13 suffered from severe cognitive impairment and was not physically or mentally capable of premeditating a plan to sexually intimidate Resident 1 and then carry out that plan. Resident 1 was paranoid of men. Her response to the encounter with Resident 13 was precipitated by her paranoia rather than by Resident 13's intent to sexually intimidate Resident 1. Although Resident 13 voiced a desire to have sex with other residents on two occasions during his stay at the facility, he never acted on those statements and was physically and mentally incapable of acting on them. On those two occasions, Respondent monitored Resident 13 closely but the resident did nothing to indicate that he would act on his stated desires or that he even remembered voicing them. Petitioner did not allege that Resident 13 engaged in any behavior on March 5, 2001, other than sexual misconduct. Even if Tag F224 were to have alleged that Resident 13 engaged in abuse other than sexual abuse, the preponderance of the evidence failed to show that Resident 13 engaged in non-sexual abuse. As a threshold matter, the evidence that the incident lasted for 15 minutes is not credible. It is implausible that a surveyor would allow apparent sexual intimidation to continue after she perceived the incident to be sexual intimidation, much less allow Resident 1 to endure such intimidation for 15 minutes. The surveyor testified that she could not locate a certified nursing assistant ("CNA") on the dementia unit when the incident occurred on March 5, 2001. The dementia unit is a locked unit comprised of resident rooms that open at regular intervals along a 60-foot hallway, and an activities room. There were two CNAs on duty at the time. One of those CNAs was in the hallway at the time of the alleged incident. The surveyor did not inform any member of the staff or administration at the facility that the incident had occurred before Petitioner provided Respondent with the allegations in the 2567 at the conclusion of the March survey. Resident 13’s primary behavior problem did not involve physical aggression toward other residents. Rather, the primary behavior problem was Resident 13's tendency to become aggressive with staff when they attempted to provide personal care, especially that care required for the resident's incontinence. Petitioner incorrectly concluded that the inappropriate behavior by Resident 13 indicated that he was a risk to assault or intimidate other residents. Resident 13’s historical experience at the facility did not involve aggression toward other residents. Instead, Resident 13 directed his aggressive behavior to situations with staff who were attempting to provide personal care for him. Irrespective of the proper characterization of Resident 13's behavior on March 5, 2001, the behavior did not occur because of any failure by the facility to assess Resident 13 or to develop and implement appropriate care plans to address the Resident 13's inappropriate behavior. Respondent acknowledged that Resident 13 wandered the hall, wandered into residents’ rooms, occasionally urinated in inappropriate places, and occasionally made inappropriate sexual remarks. However, those behaviors are typical of residents who suffer from dementia, and the inappropriate behavior cannot be eliminated through a care plan. Facility staff knew to monitor Resident 13 and to re- direct him if he engaged in inappropriate behavior that affected other residents. The chart for Resident 13 is replete with instances of staff consistently implementing those interventions. The care plan for Resident 13 directed staff to approach him calmly, let the resident choose the timing of his care, assess him for pain as a potential cause of agitation, and leave the resident alone and approach him later if the resident became upset during care. All of these interventions were appropriate for the identified behavior problem, and the record is replete with instances of the successful implementation of appropriate interventions. A physician saw Resident 13 and evaluated the resident almost weekly. The physician was aware of and assisted in the evaluation of the resident’s behavior. The physician considered several alternative interventions including the use of anti- anxiety medications to address the resident’s aggressiveness. The physician called in a psychiatric nurse practitioner to evaluate the resident and to recommend medications that might be effective in controlling aggressive episodes. At various times during the course of Resident 13’s stay at the facility, the physician prescribed Seraquil, Risperdal, BuSpar and Ativan for the resident. When aggressive incidents occurred, staff administered these medications with positive effects. Petitioner offered no specific evidence that any intervention used by the facility was not appropriate or that there was another intervention that the facility failed to identify and implement that would have changed any of the inappropriate behavior. Rather, the surveyor concluded that whatever the facility did was inappropriate because Resident 13’s behavioral problems did not subside or disappear while he was at the facility. The surveyor's conclusion fails to adequately understand dementia. The inappropriate behavior displayed by Resident 13 is typical of residents in a dementia unit and cannot be eliminated. Petitioner did not prove that Respondent failed to adequately reassess Resident 13. The resident’s medical record is replete with examples of efforts by the staff to continually re-evaluate the resident and to modify care plan approaches. The facility conducted quarterly re-assessments of the resident. The facility required staff to chart all incidents of inappropriate behavior in the resident’s medical record in an effort to identify any triggering events. The facility provided staff with in-service training for Resident 13 by the resident’s physician. The scope of the training encompassed the care of residents with dementia but focused in particular on the care that was required for Resident 13. The physician wanted to assure that Resident 13 would not become over-medicated and implemented frequent assessments and readjustments of the dosages of the resident's medications. Petitioner offered no evidence that Respondent failed to assess the resident in a timely manner or that any assessment performed by the facility was inappropriate. Petitioner did not allege in the March survey that the incident between Residents 13 and 1 was a result of Respondent's failure to consistently implement Respondent's policy regarding investigations of abuse. Therefore, any evidence relevant to such an allegation at the hearing is irrelevant to the allegations for which Petitioner provided adequate notice in the March survey. A contrary ruling would violate fundamental due process requirements for notice of the charges that substantially affect Respondent's license to operate the facility. Assuming arguendo that Petitioner can prove charges at the hearing that were not included in the allegations in the March survey, Petitioner's surveyor testified at the hearing that the incident she observed on March 5, 2001, occurred because the facility did not implement its policy and procedure regarding investigations of abuse of residents. As evidence of Respondent's failure to implement its policy, the surveyor contended that the facility did not properly investigate another incident described in nursing notes on January 31, 2001, before the March survey. In the January incident, the nursing notes indicated that Resident 13 made sexual advances to other residents. The implication is that the facility would have done something different with the resident had it properly investigated the January incident and would have, in turn, been able to prevent the occurrence of the incident the surveyor observed on March 5, 2001. Respondent maintains an adequate anti-abuse policy. Respondent’s anti-abuse policy requires its designated staff members to investigate and report to abuse agencies, if necessary, any suspected incidence of abuse of its residents. However, the facility did not fail to implement this policy with regard to Resident 13. Abuse is defined in Respondent's policy as the "willful infraction [sic] of injury . . . resulting in physical harm, pain or mental anguish." Due to Resident 13's dementia, he was not capable of willfully inflicting harm on anyone. No facility investigator could reasonably conclude that an incident involving Resident 13 constituted abuse within the meaning of the written policy of the facility. Even if the incident described in the January 31, 2001, nursing notes were relevant to the allegations in the March survey, Petitioner failed to show that the incident which the surveyor observed on March 5, 2001, was the product of any failure by Respondent to implement its policy on January 31, 2001. The facility’s director of nursing adequately investigated the incident described in the nursing notes on January 31, 2001, and determined that Resident 13 made no sexual advances to anyone and did not direct any inappropriate sexual comments to other residents. Rather, the investigation found that Resident 13 made inappropriate sexual comments to a CNA. Staff appropriately monitored Resident 13 after he made that statement to the CNA, and Resident 13 did nothing to act on the statement. The director of nursing notified Resident 13’s physician, and the physician determined there was no need to alter the resident’s care plan. Petitioner failed to show that the deficiency alleged in F224 was a Class II deficiency. Petitioner presented no evidence that the incident the surveyor observed on March 5, 2001, was anything other than an isolated incident or presented a threat of harm to other residents. Tag F314 alleges that Respondent violated 42 CFR Section 483.25(c). The federal regulation requires, in relevant part: Pressure Sores. Based on the comprehensive assessment of a resident, the facility must ensure that— A resident who enters the facility without pressure sores does not develop pressure sores unless the individual’s clinical condition demonstrates that they were unavoidable; and A resident having pressure sores receives necessary treatment and services to promote healing, prevent infection and prevent new sores from developing. The federal regulation is applicable to nursing homes in Florida pursuant to Rule 59A-4.1288. The March survey alleges in Tag F314 that the facility failed to provide required treatment and services to Resident 2. The surveyor determined the facility was out of compliance after she determined that Resident 2 had pressure sores. The surveyor based her findings on her observation of Resident 2 and a review of the records. In the nursing notes of February 22, 2001, the facility noted small open areas to the left thigh, back of scrotum, and buttocks. On March 5, 2001, the resident’s medical record indicated that the resident had two reddened areas on his buttocks. On March 6, 2001, the surveyor observed that the resident had two open areas on his right buttock and two on his scrotum. Petitioner charged in F314 in the March survey that these areas were pressure sores, and that the areas identified on March 6th were those which had been initially identified on February 22, 2001. Petitioner further charged that the facility failed to provide necessary treatment and services because staff failed to notify the resident’s physician and obtain a treatment order to the areas in accordance with the facility's policy relating to pressure sore care. A threshold issue is whether the reddened areas on Resident 2 were pressure sores or were reddened areas that did not satisfy Petitioner's definition of a pressure sore. If the areas were not pressure sores, Petitioner acknowledges that there would be no deficiency and no violation of the facility's pressure sore policy. The guidelines promulgated by Petitioner to guide its surveyors in the interpretation of the standard applicable under Tag F314 define a pressure sore as: . . . ischemic ulceration and/or necrosis of tissues overlying a bony prominence that has been subjected to pressure, friction or sheer. The areas identified on February 22, 2001, were located on Resident 2’s buttocks, scrotum, and thigh. None of those areas were located over any bony prominence within the meaning of Petitioner's promulgated definition of a pressure sore. Additionally, the areas identified on February 22nd were healed the next day. Pressure sores do not typically heal overnight. A nurse practitioner examined the areas identified on March 5th and 6th during the survey. The nurse practitioner diagnosed those reddened areas as a rash. Petitioner relies on records that identify the reddened areas on forms that the facility uses for both pressure sores and reddened areas that are not located over a bony prominence. For convenience, the facility uses a single form to identify both reddened areas and pressure sores. Petitioner seeks to rely on the facility forms, including elements of the plan of care on such forms, as though they were admissions by the facility that define pressure sores and then attempt to require the facility to prove the areas are not pressure sores. Petitioner is bound by its own definition of a pressure sore, cannot deviate from that definition, and cannot rely on a different definition as a basis for disciplinary action against the licensee. Petitioner limits the definition of a pressure sore to those ischemic ulcerations and/or necrosis of tissues that overlie a bony prominence. Those ischemic ulcerations and/or necrosis of tissues that do not overlie a bony prominence are not pressure sores within the meaning of the definition adopted by the state agency. The use by the facility of pressure sore treatment forms and the use of the term pressure sore in the medical records does not create a bony prominence where none exists. The preponderance of evidence shows that the reddened areas at issue were not located over a bony prominence. Clearly, there is no bony prominence in the scrotum, thigh, or buttocks where the reddened areas were located on Resident 2. Assuming arguendo that the areas were pressure sores, Respondent provided all treatment and services to the areas necessary to promote their healing. The facility treated the areas identified on February 22, 2001, by cleansing and application of Lantiseptic, a skin protector. The effectiveness of the treatment is reflected by the complete healing of the areas on the next day. Facility staff properly notified the treating physician and treated the areas identified on March 5th with Lantiseptic. A physician’s assistant examined the areas identified in the March survey and confirmed the use of Lantiseptic on the areas. The surveyor found no record of any plan of care for the pressure sores alleged in the March survey. The facility subsequently produced a note by a nurse practitioner dated March 6, 2001, stating that Lantiseptic was applied to a rash on the buttocks and scrotum, a doctor’s order for treatment, and a care plan for pressure sores after the physician’s note of February 23, 2001. The surveyor testified that the additional documents did not alter her testimony that the areas were pressure sores and that the facility failed to provide an adequate plan of care. The testimony of the surveyor does not refute the preponderance of evidence at the hearing. The areas at issue did not overlay a bony prominence. In any event, Petitioner failed to show that the deficiency alleged in F314 in the March survey was a Class II deficiency. Even if the areas were pressure sores and it were determined that the facility failed to provide necessary treatment and services, the evidence does not demonstrate that the problem suffered by Resident 2 was systemic or likely to occur with other residents in the facility. At most, the evidence demonstrates a limited failure to provide care to one resident. Accordingly, Petitioner failed to prove that the identified deficiency presented an immediate threat to other residents in the facility. At the conclusion of Petitioner's case in chief, Respondent moved to dismiss the allegations in Tag F282 on the grounds that Tag F282 in the March and April surveys alleged different deficiencies and therefore were not relevant or material to a change in license that is based on uncorrected deficiencies. After hearing arguments from both parties, the ALJ granted the motion to dismiss with leave for Petitioner to revisit the issue in its PRO if Petitioner could provide legal authority to support its position. Petitioner argues in its PRO that the ALJ erred in granting the motion to dismiss. However, Petitioner does not cite any legal authority to support its argument. Tag F282 in the March and April surveys alleges that the facility failed to provide care and services in accordance with the plan of care for two residents in violation of 42 CFR Section 483.20(k)(ii). The federal regulation provides in relevant part: Comprehensive Care Plans. (3). The services provided or arranged by the facility must— (ii) Be provided by qualified persons in accordance with each resident’s written plan of care. The federal standard is applicable to nursing homes in Florida pursuant to Rule 59A-4.1288. In the March survey, Tag F282 did not allege that Respondent provided services to residents by unqualified staff. Instead, Tag F282 charged that Respondent's staff incorrectly fastened a clip belt in the back of Resident 21 while she was in her wheel chair and failed to toilet her once in accordance with a physician’s order. In addition, Tag F282 alleged that staff did not weigh Resident 3 weekly as required by his care plan. However, a preponderance of the evidence showed that the facility did not miss any required weights after January 13, 2001. In the April survey, Tag F282 did not allege that Respondent failed to correct the deficiencies alleged in the March survey regarding Residents 21 and 3. Nor did Tag F282 allege that Respondent failed to comply with the plan of corrections submitted by Respondent after the March survey. Rather, Tag F282 in the April survey alleged that Respondent failed to provide a plate guard and weighted spoon for Resident 7 in violation of a physician's order. Petitioner argues that the alleged deficiencies in Tag F282 in the March and April surveys, pertaining to Residents 21 and 7, respectively, involved the failure to comply with a physician's order and, therefore, represent uncorrected deficiencies. Even if Petitioner's definition of an "uncorrected deficiency" were accepted, it would not be dispositive of the issue. The evidence showed that the physician who ordered the weighted spoon and plate guard for Resident 7 terminated the order at the conclusion of the April survey. Even if Respondent failed to follow a physician's order for Residents 21 and 3 in the March survey, Respondent did not fail to follow a physician's order for Resident 7 during the April survey. Moreover, the termination of the physician's order evidences a medical determination that the failure to comply with the order did not cause any harm to Resident 7. In any event, the definition of an "uncorrected deficiency" asserted by Petitioner is not persuasive. Notwithstanding the request of the ALJ, Petitioner did not submit any legal authority to support its asserted definition of the phrase "uncorrected deficiency." In the absence of a technical definition established by statute, rule, or judicial precedent, the phrase "uncorrected deficiency" is properly construed in accordance with the plain and ordinary meaning of its terms. The allegations in Tag F282 in the March survey are rooted in a physician’s order that called for a clip belt to be placed around Resident 21 while she was in her wheelchair. The purpose of the order was to guard the safety of Resident 21. The order further directed staff to check the belt every thirty minutes and release it every two hours to toilet the resident. During the March survey, a surveyor observed that staff had placed the clip belt on Resident 21 improperly on one day, and further determined that the resident had not been taken to the toilet. Based upon that information, the surveyor charged that the facility failed to follow the doctor’s order for checking and releasing the belt. The surveyor’s observations established, at most, a single isolated instance of failure to follow the care plan for Resident 21. The surveyor's observations failed to establish a consistent failure to implement the care plan. The alleged deficiency presented no potential for harm to Resident 21. Resident 21 was cognitively alert and could notify staff if she needed to be toileted or needed her belt removed. At the time that the surveyor observed Resident 21, the resident was in a supervised setting with staff readily available to her in the event she needed attention. She was not shown to have experienced any incontinent episode or to have even requested that she be toileted or otherwise released from the belt. Petitioner acknowledges that any failure by staff to remove the resident’s belt during this time presented nothing more than a minimal risk of harm to the resident. Resident 3 was admitted to the facility on January 13, 2001, and had a care plan that called for the resident to be weighed weekly. Between the resident’s admission to the facility and the March survey, the facility weighed the resident in accordance with the care plan except for one omission in late February. This one instance of failing to do a weekly weight did not demonstrate a consistent failure to implement the care plan. Petitioner provided no evidence that this single instance of failing to weigh the resident caused the resident harm or presented even the potential for harm to the resident. After the March survey, Respondent submitted a plan of correction to address the alleged deficiencies relating to Tag F282. Applicable law precludes Respondent from arguing the validity of the alleged deficiencies in its plan of correction. In the plan of correction, Respondent indicated that it would focus on restraints and weekly weights to insure that the alleged deficiencies would not re-occur. Petitioner accepted the plan of correction and, in April, did not find that staff at the facility failed to properly apply restraints to residents, failed to do weekly weights for residents, or otherwise failed to implement the plan of correction. Petitioner charged that Respondent violated Tag F282 in April because the facility failed to provide a weighted spoon and plate guard to Resident 7 as required by a physician’s order. It is uncontroverted that the plan of correction adopted to address the March F282 deficiency pertaining to Residents 21 and 3 did not address the deficiency alleged in Tag F282 in the April survey with respect to Resident 7; and would not have prevented the deficiency alleged in the April survey pertaining to Resident 7. Accordingly, the deficiency alleged in Tag F282 in the April survey pertaining to Resident 7, even if true, did not represent an "uncorrected" deficiency. Instead, the deficiency alleged in Tag F282 in the April survey represented a new deficiency. In any event, Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the alleged failure of the facility to comply with any of the orders at issue denied residents any necessary care and treatment, or presented even the possibility that the residents would be harmed. The physician ordered the weighted spoon and plate guard for Resident 7 due to the loss of dexterity in the resident's hand needed to assist him in the consumption of his meals. Even though the plate guard and spoon were not provided to the resident after they were ordered for him, the resident had no trouble with meal consumption. His medical records reflected that he consistently consumed his meals and that he gained almost 20 pounds during the time period that the spoon and plate guard were ordered. The weight gain and food consumption are significant because the facility initially admitted the resident as a hospice resident. The absence of any medical necessity for the physician's order requiring the spoon and plate was confirmed when the facility contacted the doctor during the survey, and the doctor issued an order discontinuing the use of the plate guard and spoon. Tag F325 in the March and April surveys alleges that the facility failed to comply with the requirements of 42 CFR Section 483.25(i)(1). The federal regulation provides, in pertinent part: Nutrition. Based on a resident’s comprehensive assessment, the facility must ensure that a resident-- Maintains acceptable parameters of nutritional status, such as body weight and protein levels, unless the resident’s clinical condition demonstrates that this is not possible. . . . The federal regulation applies to nursing homes in Florida pursuant to Rule 59A-4.1288. Tag F325 alleges in the March survey that Respondent did not maintain acceptable parameters of body weight for Resident 4. Respondent does not dispute this charge. Tag F325 alleges in the April survey that Respondent did not maintain acceptable parameters of body weight for Resident 9. Resident 9 lost approximately 20 pounds between August of 2000 and April 8, 2001. However, Petitioner provided no evidence that the weight the resident lost was "unacceptable" or caused by inadequate nutritional care. Petitioner neither contended nor demonstrated that a 20-pound weight loss over seven or eight months violates any accepted dietary or health standard. Even if such a rate of weight loss were an "unacceptable nutritional parameter," Petitioner provided no evidence that Respondent failed to properly monitor Resident 9's weight, assess his dietary needs, provide the resident with an appropriate diet, or otherwise caused the weight loss. Rather, the resident’s medical records demonstrate on-going assessments of the resident by the dietary staff and numerous interventions to address the resident's weight. Petitioner alleges that Respondent failed to comply with several directives for supporting care for Resident 9. Facility staff had been directed to cue Resident 9 to use a "chin tuck" to address his risk of aspiration due to swallowing difficulties. Staff were directed to cue the resident to cough and tuck his chin anytime the staff determined that the resident's voice sounded wet. During the survey, the surveyor observed three meals in which the staff provided no cues to Resident 9. However, no cues were required of staff if the resident did not have a wet sounding voice, and the surveyor acknowledged that she did not hear the resident cough during any of her meal observations. Even if cues were required to be given to Resident 9 during the meals observed by the surveyor, the surveyor did not demonstrate that the failure to cue the resident had any negative impact either on the resident's ability to eat or on the resident's weight. Rather, the evidence shows that Resident 9 weighed 151.6 pounds on April 8, 2001, and weighed 160.2 pounds on April 20, 2001, the day after Petitioner completed the April survey. Thus, the failure of the staff to cue the resident during the observed meals did not violate a nutritional parameter. The surveyor testified that the facility failed to provide fortified foods to Resident 9 during the April survey in violation of the resident's dietary care plan. The allegations in Tag F325 in the April survey do not include the allegation of inadequate care to which the surveyor testified during the hearing. In the absence of adequate notice in the written allegations, the testimony of the surveyor cannot be used as a basis for any finding of deficiency. Even if the testimony were considered as a basis for a finding of fact, the failure to provide fortified foods did not violate any nutritional requirements. Resident 9's wife provided the resident with "home-cooked" meals to satisfy his food preferences. Petitioner acknowledges that the meals the wife supplied effectively precluded the resident from eating fortified foods provided by the facility. Moreover, Resident 9 gained weight between April 8 and 17, 2001. Tag F363 alleges in the March and April surveys that the facility failed to meet the requirements of 42 CFR Section 483.35(c)(1)-(3). The federal regulation provides in relevant part: (C) menus and nutritional adequacy. Menus must-- Meet the nutritional needs of residents in accordance with the recommended dietary allowances of the Food and Nutrition Board of the national Research Council, National Academy of Sciences; Be prepared in advance; and Be followed. The federal regulation applies to nursing homes in Florida pursuant to Rule 59A-4.1288. Tag F363 alleges that the facility’s menu for March 8, 2001, included cranberry sauce and that the facility did not serve cranberry sauce to 11 residents in the rehabilitation dining room. The surveyor who made this charge did not evaluate the meal actually provided to the residents for its nutritional adequacy. Rather, the surveyor cited the facility because the facility failed to comply with the literal terms of the printed menu. Respondent does not dispute that the facility did not serve cranberry sauce to 11 residents in its rehabilitation dining room on the day in question. The facility’s menu for March 8, 2001, consisted of roast turkey, poultry gravy, cornbread dressing, peas and carrots, mandarin oranges, bread, and cranberry sauce. The menu called for one-half tablespoon of cranberry sauce. The omission was not significant. The dietician did not include the cranberry sauce in calculating the nutritional content of the meal. The cranberry sauce was only a garnish to the plate. The remainder of the food items offered in the meal met all of the requirements for residents’ nutritional needs. Any failure by Respondent to provide the cranberry garnish presented no risk of harm to any resident. Tag F363 alleges in the April survey that Respondent provided a saltine cracker during one meal to a resident who required a pureed diet. Tag F363 also alleges that Respondent gave a bologna sandwich to a resident whose food preferences did not include bologna sandwiches. Petitioner provided no evidence that either of these residents received nutritionally inadequate meals. Petitioner’s apparent concern with the resident who was served the cracker was that she might attempt to eat it and choke on it because she required pureed foods and the cracker was not pureed. The surveyor who observed the resident acknowledged that the resident did not eat the cracker. She also acknowledged that there is a regulatory standard which requires a facility to provide a therapeutic diet to residents who require such a diet, and that a pureed diet is a therapeutic diet. Accordingly, this observation is, at most, a violation of that standard, not Tag F363, and presented nothing more than a minimal chance of harm to the resident. Petitioner failed to show that the resident who did not get the bologna sandwich was deprived of any required nutrition, or that placing a bologna sandwich in front of the resident created any risk of harm to the resident. The surveyor acknowledged that the sandwich did not remain in front of the resident for long and that the facility immediately corrected the situation by providing the resident with an acceptable substitute. Tag F363 also alleges that the facility posted for resident observation the same menu on Monday, April 17, 2001, that the facility posted on Sunday, April 16, 2001. The regulation at issue does not address how or even if menus must be posted in a nursing home. Petitioner failed to explain why posting the same menu on consecutive days would violate any regulation, rule, or statute. Respondent acknowledged that the Sunday menu was not removed on Monday, but demonstrated that different, nutritionally adequate meals were planned and served to residents on each of those days.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order finding that Petitioner failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that a factual basis existed upon which Petitioner should have issued a Conditional rating to Respondent on March 8, 2001, and revising the March 8 and April 16, 2001, 2567 reports by deleting the deficiencies described under Tags F224, F314, F282, F363 and F325 (April only); and issuing a Standard rating to Respondent to replace the previously issued Conditional rating that was in effect from March 8, 2001, until May 31, 2001. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of March, 2002, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Dennis L. Godfrey, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 525 Mirror Lake Drive, North, Room 310L St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 R. Davis Thomas, Qualified Representative Broad & Cassel 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 400 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Diane Grubbs, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 William Roberts, Acting General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue The ultimate issue is whether proposed Rules 10-5.002, 10-5.0025, 10-5.003, 10-5.004, 10-5.005, 10-5.008, 10-5.0085, 10-5.010, 10-5.0105, 10-5.020, and 10- 5.024, published in Volume 16, Number 13, Florida Administrative Weekly, are invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact 10-5.002(1) Proposed Rule 10-5.002(1) defines the term "acquisition" to mean "the act of possessing or controlling, in any manner or by any means, a health care facility, major medical equipment, an institutional health service or medical office building as one's own." The proposed rule is HRS's attempt to clarify the term's meaning as used in Section 381.706, Florida Statutes. It is based on dictionary definitions, primarily, Webster's Dictionary, Ninth Edition, but also Black's Law Dictionary. Armond Balsano, an expert in health planning, did not believe the definition to be reasonable and thought it was unclear, ambiguous, and open ended. However his opinion in this regard was not persuasive. Proposed Rule 10-5.002(1) is reasonable and sufficiently clear to withstand this challenge. 10-5.002(13) and 10-5.008(2)(d)--Skilled Nursing Issues Proposed Rule 10-5.002(13) defines "community nursing home beds" as relevant to this proceeding to include "acute care beds licensed pursuant to Chapter 395, Part I, F.S., but designated as skilled nursing beds, which are reviewable pursuant to Rule 10-5.011(1)(k) [the nursing home bed need methodology]." Proposed Rule 10-5.008(2)(d) relates to fixed need pools and states: (d) Skilled Nursing Units in Hospitals. Beds in skilled nursing units which are a distinct part of a hospital will be counted in the nursing home bed inventory, even though they retain their licensure as acute care beds. Essentially, proposed Rule 10-5.008(2)(d) requires that skilled nursing beds in a distinct unit in a hospital be categorized as hospital "general" beds on the hospital license, but that they be carried at the same time on the inventory of community nursing home beds for purposes of projecting need under "pool" projections utilized by HRS for evaluating need for new beds. Proposed Rule 10-5.008(2)(d) attempts to codify what has been HRS's policy. This rule proposes that licensed acute care beds, which form a distinct part of a hospital-based skilled nursing unit, be counted in the nursing home bed inventory to project future need with respect to the nursing home bed need formula. Thus, these beds will no longer be counted or used in the acute care bed need formula to project the acute care bed need. From a health planning standpoint, several reasons exist for and against the inclusion of these hospital-based skilled nursing units within the nursing home bed inventory. A hospital cannot use its acute care beds as skilled nursing beds without a certificate of need. However, pursuant to this rule, to obtain these distinct unit beds a hospital is forced to compete with nursing home applicants for those beds. Skilled nursing beds in hospitals are "general" beds set up in a special category for which there is no specialty hospital bed methodology. Applications are reviewed under the nursing home bed methodology. A skilled nursing unit in a hospital is a unit, certified under the Health Care Finance Administration program, to identify a distinct part of the hospital as being a service in which there is 24-hour nursing with an RN nurse on the day shift. There also must be skilled nursing multi-disciplinary treatments and therapy services provided. The Health Care Finance Administration categorizes such beds as hospital beds, a distinct part of a hospital. Skilled nursing facility (SNF) beds in a hospital are used to treat acutely ill patients with an average length of stay of 20 days, who are different from the extended care patients found in community nursing homes, who have lengths of stay of one year or longer. Hospital skilled nursing patients are overwhelmingly Medicare patients, whereas community nursing home patients are overwhelmingly Medicaid patients. In Florida, Medicaid does not reimburse for care provided in the hospital-based skilled nursing unit. Hospital-based skilled nursing units are reimbursed by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) on a cost-based method. This system of reimbursement is also used with respect to non-hospital-based skilled nursing facilities. Furthermore, this means that hospital-based units are no longer reimbursed under the DRG (Diagnosis Related Groups) system. Medicare limits the patient benefit period to 100 days, regardless of the patient setting. Except for hospitals having higher allowable costs, federal guidelines do not differentiate between hospital and non-hospital-based skilled nursing units. The level of staffing is higher in a hospital nursing unit than in any community nursing home. Specialized equipment and services are offered in the hospital skilled nursing unit which are not offered in the community nursing homes. There are different conceptual approaches to care in the skilled nursing unit in a hospital as compared to those provided in community nursing facilities. Acutely ill patients on intravenous feeding or hyperalimentation, and those with multiple diagnoses require the hospital level nursing care. These units are not intended to provide residential care. Hospital beds are licensed under Rule 10D-28, whereas nursing home beds are licensed under Rule 10D-29, Florida Administrative Code. Although the proposed rule requires skilled nursing beds in distinct units of hospitals to be comparatively and competitively reviewed with community nursing home applications, the two types of beds are not comparable. This creates an unfair comparison. As a matter of good health planning, these skilled units in hospitals should be reviewed differently and separately from regular community nursing home beds. By their nature, SNF beds in distinct units in hospitals are in fact "hospital" beds under Chapter 395 and not nursing home beds under Chapter 400, Florida Statutes. Hospital-based skilled nursing units are not considered special care units as defined in Rule 10D-28, Florida Administrative Code. Specifically, special care units deal with very specialized intensive care settings. However, pursuant to some federal guidelines and state licensing requirements, a skilled nursing unit is considered a custodial type setting. For example, special care units are surveyed about once every two years and skilled nursing facilities once every year. However, failure to conduct a survey is not a determinative factor for special care units continuing under the Medicaid/Medicare programs. Skilled nursing units are not as fortunate. In fact, failure to survey a skilled nursing unit leads to the expiration of its enrollment in the Medicaid/Medicare programs. Section 395.003(4), Florida Statutes, defines the various types of hospital beds and states that beds not covered under any specialty bed need methodology, which a skilled nursing unit is not, shall be considered general beds. This is why these hospital-based skilled nursing units are licensed as general acute care beds. The proposed rule amendments also present logistical problems. Hospitals and nursing homes are licensed under different chapters of the Florida Statues and the Florida Administrative Code, and those standards do not match. Their projects are in different planning cycles. HRS intends that hospitals apply for skilled nursing units on the nursing home application currently in use, but admits that the application does not really fit this type of project. The proposed rule amendments regarding skilled nursing units will be costly and burdensome. Although skilled nursing units offer valuable services and few currently exist, under the nursing home need rule it will be difficult to prove need for these projects. A hospital desiring to establish one will likely find itself having either to challenge the fixed need pool for nursing home beds or litigate the almost inevitable denial of its application for lack of need. Either course of action would involve time and expense over and above those usually encountered in the CON process, particularly because such an application would likely draw the opposition of existing nursing homes, even though their services are not really comparable. The proposed rule amendments do not comport with the basic health planning policy of reducing over-bedding by encouraging conversion to other services. It is unlikely a hospital could get a skilled nursing unit by showing a numeric need under the nursing home need methodology, and any attempt to show exceptional circumstances would be hampered by the lack of utilization data. Such beneficial conversions will probably also be chilled by the difficulty in converting a skilled nursing unit back to general acute care use, should it not be successful. Given the extreme acute care over-bedding which exists throughout the state, it is not anticipated that there will be any need for additional acute care beds for the foreseeable future. Since a skilled nursing unit would not be counted in the acute care bed inventory, the reconversion to acute care use would have to undergo CON review and would almost certainly be denied. 10-5.002(52) Proposed Rule 10-5.002(52) defines refinancing costs, which Rule 10- 5.004(2)(c) states are subject to expedited review under Section 381.706(2). The purpose of this definition is to provide guidance to applicants by identifying examples that are often encountered in either bond refunding or refinancing. The definition is straightforward in nature and encompasses the elements common in refinancing. Mr. Balsano, testifying for Adventist, readily acknowledged the preciseness of this definition, but faulted the definition for its absence of any discussion as to the potential benefit of refinancing. However, Mr. Balsano's concerns were misplaced. Distinctions exist between the benefits of refinancing and the meaning of refinancing. Indeed, the benefits of refinancing go to the merit of whether or not the certificate of need should be granted. Since every applicant is required to address the review criteria found in Section 381.705, Florida Statutes, the proper forum for addressing the benefits of refinancing is in the CON application itself. Proposed Rule 10- 5.002(52) is simply a definition. 10-5.004(2)(g)--Projects Subject to Expedited Review: Capital Expenditure Projects This proposed rule allows applicants who propose a capital expenditure project to improve, repair, or correct their existing facility to apply for a certificate of need on an expedited basis. This proposed rule is conducive to encouraging existing facilities to make needed improvements by seeking approval of the expenditure expeditiously and without the delays associated with batching cycles. It is important for a provider to make and complete corrections or improvements quickly in order to minimize the disruption of patient care. Some of the more common capital expenditures include expansion of emergency departments or emergency rooms and the renovation or expansion of other patient care areas. An application to relocate a hospital is also considered a capital expenditure. Under extreme circumstances of pervasive physical plant deficiencies, coupled with a lack of practical renovation options to overcome plant deficiencies, an existing health care facility might apply for a replacement facility. Only when such replacement facility would (1) involve no new beds or changed bed use (e.g., from general acute care to comprehensive medical rehabilitation beds), (2) involve no substantial change in services, and (3) involve no substantial change in service area would HRS consider such an application to be solely reviewable as a capital expenditure and thus entitled to expedited review under the proposed rule. HRS reviews replacement facility applications by carefully assessing the applicants' claims of pervasive physical plant problems. HRS sends a team of experts, including architects, to the existing facilities to independently judge whether the physical plant is in such a condition as would warrant replacement and whether renovations could serve as a practical alternative from a physical standpoint. HRS also performs an economic assessment to compare the alternatives of replacement versus renovation in order to determine the most cost-effective alternative. Replacement facility applications typically involve a determination not of whether dollars will be spent, but rather, how they are best spent--by replacement or by renovation. As such, HRS helps to contain health care costs without participation by competitors in these institution- specific decisions. Pursuant to Section 381.709(5)(b), Florida Statutes, competitors do not have standing to challenge a proposed capital expenditure and, therefore, there is no adequate reason to defer review of these projects until a future application cycle. Further, when a capital expenditure approval is sought to replace or relocate an existing facility, no one other than the applicant/existing facility can apply to spend or make those expenditures. An unrelated entity cannot compete to replace another entity's existing facility. Conducting a comparative review with respect to a capital expenditure project for the replacement of a hospital is illogical, unworkable, and futile. 10.5.008(1)(c)3 and 10-5.008(3)(b)--Capitalized Costs Proposed Rule 10-5.008(1)(c) requires that a letter of intent describe the proposal with specificity. Subsection (1)(c)3 sets forth the following requirement: 3. A proposed capital expenditure must be rounded to the nearest dollar . . . . If no capital expenditure is proposed, the applicant must so indicate. If the actual capital expenditure has already been incurred, either wholly or in part, and the project will account for such expenditures as capitalized costs, regardless of the purpose, then the total capital expenditure of the project shall be indicated. As related to this same subject, proposed Rule 10-5.008(3)(b) states: (b) Capital expenditures incurred for projects not originally subject to Certificate of Need review must be identified as a proposed expenditure when such expenditure will be capitalized in a project for which a Certificate of Need is required. HRS asserts that this proposed rule codifies HRS's existing policy and that the purpose of this provision is to develop consistency in how applicants treat an already incurred capital expenditure. It is also allegedly intended that this proposed rule give uniformity concerning how project costs are calculated and allocated. For example, if an applicant is going to convert space from one use to another, the value of the space must be included in the applicant's capital expenditure estimate. While Ms. Gordon-Girvin, HRS's health planning expert, opined that this proposed rule is consistent with current practices in the health care market place concerning how capital expenditures are treated and that it forms a common basis of comparison for comparing the applicants' treatment of capitalized costs, the greater weight of the credible evidence does not support these opinions. Actually, the effect of these proposed rules is that a certificate of need applicant, who has previously made capital expenditures and later pursues a certificate of need project utilizing such prior capitalized costs, must identify and include those prior capital expenditures as a portion of the certificate of need project, even though no actual incremental funds will be necessary or spent in connection with the project. One of the problems with proposed Rules 10-5.008(1)(c)3 and (3)(b) is that they both ignore a distinction between fixed costs and variable costs which is fundamental to a financial evaluation of any project. Specifically, it is inappropriate to require an applicant who will have no incremental costs in implementing a project to allocate a portion of prior capital expenditures, where such an application is measured against a competing application in which the entire outlay for capital costs will be necessary. This distorts the evaluation due to inappropriately comparing prior fixed costs to future variable costs. An example of the illogical result of the proposed rules provides guidance. If a hospital has already spent one million dollars to add a CON- exempt outpatient cardiac cath lab, and later seeks to establish an inpatient cardiac cath program, under these proposed provisions, that hospital would have to represent a cost of one million dollars in its application to convert the outpatient cardiac cath lab to an inpatient project. From a health planning and financial standpoint, this is inappropriate. Having to include capital costs which have already been incurred and viewing those costs in the context of the decision to approve or reject a CON project is misleading. Ultimately, the purpose and objective of the CON process is to minimize duplication of health care resources. The proposed rules work in conflict with that goal. Conversion of underutilized resources to resources that could be more beneficially utilized is a policy that is encouraged by HRS. This policy is encouraged in the various need methodologies. One of the reasons to encourage a conversion is that often zero dollars are involved to convert a project from one CON-approved use to another CON-approved use. Proposed Rules 10-5.008(1)(c)3 and (3)(b) would eliminate consideration of the minimal cost involved in a conversion project and are therefore unreasonable. Moreover, the proposed rules could end up creating excess resources in the system simply because they would eliminate the preference for conversion as opposed to new construction. With respect to allocating prior capital expenditures, the proposed rules, as alleged by HRS, are intended to codify existing HRS policy as well as provide uniformity to the process of ascertaining project costs. These proposed rules do neither. In point of fact, HRS has accepted, within the last three years, conversion projects indicating a zero project cost in the application. The proposed rules are thus inconsistent with current HRS policy of accepting and evaluating these applications and are contrary to HRS's stated intention in this proceeding. However, with respect to providing uniformity to the process of ascertaining project costs, the proposed rules provide no methodology by which prior capital cost allocations are to be determined. Indeed, there is no uniformity proposed regarding how a health care facility or applicant accounts for capital expenditures. Generally, a capital expenditure is one that is "material" and the useful life of the item capitalized exceeds one year. What is material to one applicant may be entirely different from that which would be material to another applicant. Thus, the uniformity of presentation of prior capitalized costs contained in CON applications submitted to HRS for review will not and cannot exist as envisioned by HRS in its proposed rules. 10-5.005(2)(e) Proposed Rule 10-5.005 relates to exemption from CON review and Subsection (2)(e) states as follows: (e) Failure to initiate the exemption within twelve months after it appears in the Florida Administrative Weekly will result in the notice of exemption being void. The alleged basis for this proposed rule is to protect those persons pursuing an exemption by ensuring that they are still eligible for it under the same facts and circumstances. Additionally, HRS has encountered problems in the past when entities have received a determination of exemption for a project but have failed to implement the project. In one case, HRS gave a nursing home an exemption to replace a facility on site. After discharging the patients, the nursing home took no further action. However, these beds are still licensed and are included in the bed inventory. Such a situation artificially suppresses the need for nursing home beds in that district for the planning horizon. The proposed rule is an attempted response to this problem. The laws implemented by the proposed rules are Section 381.706 and 381.713(1). Pursuant to these sections, HRS must grant an exemption if the applicant meets the statutory definitions. Further, if a project is exempt, it is not subject to review. Exemption requests may be made at any time and are not subject to batching requirements. Once a project is deemed to be exempt and not subject to review, HRS ceases to have jurisdiction over the project and HRS, accordingly, has no jurisdiction to void an exemption. 10-5.008(2)(f) Proposed Rule 10-5.008(2)(f) establishes a procedure for HRS and applicants to follow when a departmental need methodology does not exist for a proposed project. The proposed rule attempts to clarify for applicants how best to present themselves when applying for a project for which no methodology has been adopted in an existing rule. This is particularly useful to applicants in addressing the need component required by statute. Policy utilized but not yet adopted by HRS will be provided to applicants in addressing the need component required by statute; however, applicants are not bound by that policy and may tender their need calculations. This proposed rule gives credence to the fact that there may be different methodologies and allows applicants the opportunity to make all the necessary arguments to demonstrate the nature and extent of entitlement to a certificate of need. 10-5.0085(4) Proposed Rule 10-5.008(4) describes shared service arrangements and delineates the procedures applicants must follow to initiate or terminate a shared service. The part of the proposed rule challenged by FHA and the area on which it focused concerned the termination of a shared service arrangement. Proposed Rule 10-5.008(4) provides in pertinent part: (4)(a) The following factors are considered when reviewing applications for shared services where none of the applicants are currently authorized to provide the service: * * * Any of the parties providing a shared service may seek to dissolve the arrangement. This action is subject to review as a termination of service. If termination is approved by the department, all parties to the original shared service give up their rights to provide the service. Parties seeking to provide the service independently in the future must submit applications in the next applicable review cycle and compete for the service with all other applicants. * * * 6.b. The following factors are considered when reviewing applications for shared services when one of the applicants has the service: * * * e. Dissolution of a shared services contract is subject to review as a termination of service. * * * If termination is approved, the entity(ies) authorized to provide the service prior to the contract retains the right to continue the service. All other parties to the contract who seek to provide the service in their own right must request the service as a new health service and are subject to full Certificate of Need review as a new health service. (Emphasis added) The basis for requiring CON review for a termination of a shared service as delineated above is found in Section 381.706(2)(e), Florida Statutes (1989). If a shared service arrangement terminates, the party who originally had the service would retain the service. This is reasonable because the entity would have already been granted a certificate of need for the service, singularly offered. The party would be placed back in the same situation it was in prior to the shared service. Conversely, in situations where neither party originally had the service, the remaining parties would have to apply for the service in a batched review. This, too, is reasonable in that the service would no longer be shared and the ability to provide it singularly would be evaluated anew. Here, the party would also be placed back in the same situation it was in prior to the shared service. Additionally, a shared service arrangement (and approval of it) is based on certain benefits present within that arrangement. Upon termination the same benefits may not be present. The identity of the parties and their relationships to each other will have changed. Review at this point provides an applicant the opportunity to compete again to establish the service in its own right under a different set of circumstances, and it allows other providers to compete either for the service in their own right or through another shared arrangement. Such a policy is prudent because the very reason for the shared service was to produce benefits that were not otherwise obtainable singularly. Indeed, even FHA's own witness, Mr. Bebee, acknowledged that certain advantages to a shared services arrangement might not be present when such an arrangement terminates. 10-5.010(2) Proposed Rule 10-5.010(2) concerns what local health plan is to be used and addressed in a CON application, and it provides as follows: The applicable local health plan is the most current plan adopted by the appropriate local health council and which has been accepted and approved in writing by the Department at the time letters of intent are due or, if not accepted by the Department, as reviewed and commented on by the Department. The agency will provide to all prospective applicants those items of the local health plan which must be addressed in the application. HRS asserts that the purpose of this amendment to existing Rule 10- 5.010 is to assist applicants by identifying various components of the plan to which they should address their application and thereby maximize their time and effort and, ultimately, their chances for approval and that this proposed rule codifies current departmental practice of providing those items of the local health plan which must be addressed by the applicant. Contrary to HRS's assertion that this proposed rule is clarifying in nature, the rule in fact goes far beyond those parameters. "Reviewed and commented on by the Department" means that the local health council's adopted plan has been reviewed for consistency with existing need methodologies and has been commented on by HRS. HRS maintains that "commented on" does not mean verbal comments. The proposed rule does not, however, specify that only written comments were intended. Indeed, HRS admitted that the way the rule is drafted it takes into account oral as well as written comments. Statutorily, HRS is required to adopt as a rule the local health plans or portions thereof to be used in the CON review regulatory process. Local health plans generally contain allocation factors, preferences, and policies with respect to the particular district. Within the last several months, HRS has sought to adopt as a rule preferences and policies set forth in the various local health plans around the state of Florida. HRS withdrew those proposed rules. Proposed Rule 10-5.010(2) does not make reference to or account for the fact that the local health plans must be adopted as rules by HRS. HRS cannot circumvent statutory requirements by proposing that an applicant address "approved plans," nor can it require an applicant to address local health plans with which HRS is not in full agreement with the local health council as to whether the plan is consistent with statutory guidelines. Indeed, where HRS and the local health council are in disagreement, an applicant is pulled between HRS and the local council. This proposed rule allows HRS to simply reject the expressed wants of the local health council and to insert its own comments and views, thereby inserting itself into a province exclusively reserved to the local health councils. 10-5.020 Proposed Rule 10-5.020 involves addition of one sentence to the existing rule. The added language provides that HRS will issue a license to the CON holder in accordance with the CON and will not issue a license for fewer beds than the total on the CON. The proposed addition to this rule addresses a problem currently facing the Department, and it reflects a change in agency policy for HRS. Basically, the added language clarifies for an applicant or certificate of need holder that the Office of Licensure and Certification shall only issue a license consistent with the terms of the certificate of need. The proposed rule addition conforms to several health planning goals. First, it requires the implementation of a project in accordance with the certificate of need. Second, the language addresses HRS's current problem of need suppression by industry members. Third, it seeks to ensure uniform development of services. This proposed rule does not penalize hospitals who want to do phase-in type projects. On the contrary, the language seeks to ensure that needed beds and services will be implemented in the horizon year in accordance with the application and entitlement demonstrated by the applicant. Economic Impact Statement The Summary of the Estimate of the Economic Impact states in relevant part: The proposed amendments are expected to have no adverse impact either on existing and new applicants for certificate of need, or on small and minority businesses . . . . The Economic Impact Statement (EIS) addresses the cost to the agency of implementing the proposed rules, an estimate of the cost to persons directly affected by the proposed rules, an estimate of the impact of the proposed action on competition, a statement of the date and method used in making those estimates, and an analysis of the impact on small businesses as defined in the Florida Small and Minority Business Assistance Act of 1985. Specifically, the EIS states that the proposed rules "will have a minimal economic impact on current or future certificate of need applicants and the public at large." There is no competent, substantial evidence to establish with specificity the existence of any defects in the EIS which impaired the fairness of the rulemaking proceeding or the correctness of the agency actions related to the EIS.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is ORDERED: 1. Proposed Rules 10-5.002(1) and (52), 10-5.004(2)(g), 10-5.008(2)(f), 10-5.0085(4), and 10-5.020 are valid. 2. Proposed Rules 10-5.002(13); 10-5.008(1)(c)3, (2)(d), and (3)(b); 10- 5.005(2)(e); and 10-5.010(2) are invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority. DONE and ORDERED this 10th day of October, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of October, 1990. APPENDIX TO THE FINAL ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in these cases. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioners Venice Hospital and Adventist Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Final Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 4(3); 5(5); 6(6); 10(14); 12(15 and 16); 15-17(25-27); and 19(28). Proposed findings of fact 1, 3, 7-9, 11, 13, 18, 21, 22, 24, and 25 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Final Order. Proposed finding of fact 2 is unnecessary. Proposed findings of fact 14, 20, 23, and 26 are unsupported by the credible, competent, and substantial evidence. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner FHA Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Final Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 4(7); 5(10); 6(11); 8-12(12- 16); and 13-17(19-23). Proposed findings of fact 2, 3, 18, 19, and 21-24 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Final Order Proposed finding of fact 7 is unnecessary. Proposed finding of fact 20 is unsupported by the credible, competent, substantial evidence. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner Humana Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Final Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 6(34, 35, and 38). Proposed findings of fact 2, 5, and 7-13 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Final Order. Proposed findings of fact 1, 3, 4, and 14-19 are unnecessary. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioners NME and PIA Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Final Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 2(34, 35, and 38); 3-6(39- 42); 8(53); and 9(54 and 55). Proposed findings of fact 1 and 7 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Final Order. Proposed findings of fact 10 and 11 are irrelevant because these Petitioners dismissed their challenge to the EIS in the Stipulation of the parties admitted as Joint Exhibit 2. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner Sarasota Proposed findings of fact 1-4, 6, 7, and 13 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Final Order. Proposed finding of fact 5 is unnecessary. Proposed findings of fact 17, 18, and 20 are unsupported by the credible, competent, and substantial evidence. Proposed findings of fact 8-12, 14-16, and 19 are irrelevant. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent HRS Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Final Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1(1 and 2); 2(28); 3(46); 4(47-49); 5(51); 7(29); 8(32 and 33); 9(33); 11(8); 13(17); 14(18); 15(23); 16(23 and 24); 17(36); 19(37); 21(57); and 22(58). Proposed findings of fact unnumbered paragraph re: 10-5.005(2)(e); 10; 12; 18; 20; and unnumbered paragraph re: Economic Impact Statement are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Final Order. Proposed findings of fact 1A and 6 are unnecessary. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Intervenor HCA DOCTORS Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Final Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 6(30) and 7(31). Proposed findings of fact 2-5 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Final Order. Proposed findings of fact 1 and 9-11 are unnecessary. Proposed findings of fact 8 is irrelevant. *NOTE: THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER'S EXHIBIT "A" [RULE 10-5.002, 10-5.004(2), 10-5.005(2), 10-2.008(1)(n), 10-5.008(5)(h), 10-5.010(2), 10-5.020] IS AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW IN THE DIVISION'S CLERK'S OFFICE. COPIES FURNISHED: Jeffery A. Boone, Attorney at Law Robert P. Mudge, Attorney at Law 1001 Avenida del Circo Post Office Box 1596 Venice, FL 34284 Kenneth F. Hoffman, Attorney at Law 2700 Blair Stone Road Post Office Box 6507 Tallahassee, FL 32314-6507 James C. Hauser, Attorney at Law 204-B South Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 C. Gary Williams, Attorney at Law Stephen C. Emmanuel, Attorney at Law Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Theodore C. Eastmoore, Attorney at Law 1550 Ringling Boulevard Post Office Box 3258 Sarasota, FL 34230 Robert A. Weiss, Attorney at Law John M. Knight, Attorney at Law The Perkins House, Suite 101 118 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 Thomas R. Cooper, Attorney at Law Edward G. Labrador, Attorney at Law Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 103 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 John Radey, Attorney at Law Elizabeth W. McArthur, Attorney at Law Suite 1000, Monroe-Park Tower 101 North Monroe Street Post Office Drawer 11307 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Donna H. Stinson Moyle, Flanigan, Katz, FitzGerald & Sheehan, P.A. The Perkins House--Suite 100 118 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Linda K. Harris Acting General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Liz Cloud, Chief Bureau of Administrative Code Room 1802, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Carroll Webb, Executive Director Administrative Procedures Committee Room 120, Holland Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent properly changed Petitioner's licensure status to conditional on June 23, 1997.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner owns and operates a nursing home in Venice, Florida. Respondent conducted a relicensure survey of Petitioner's nursing home on June 12, 1997. On June 23, 1997, Respondent issued Petitioner a new license, effective June 12, 1997, through October 31, 1997, for a skilled nursing facility. However, as a result of the deficiencies found in this survey, Respondent rated the renewal license as conditional. A resurvey on August 6, 1997, revealed that Petitioner had corrected all of the cited deficiencies, so Respondent issued a standard license, effective August 6. There are three ratings for a license: superior, standard, and conditional. Prior to the June 12 renewal, Petitioner's license was rated superior. The issuance of a conditional license adversely affects a licensee in one and possibly two ways. First, the conditional license hinders marketing and employee recruiting and retention. Second, the conditional license may affect Medicaid reimbursement levels. Even though Respondent rerated the nursing home as standard, the earlier conditional rating remains meaningful because it means that Petitioner cannot gain a superior rating for the next licensing period. Another factor militating against a determination that the present proceeding is moot is Respondent's procedure by which it does not provide licensees with an opportunity for a hearing prior to changing the rating of their nursing home licenses. As an incidental complaint to the issuance of a conditional license, Petitioner also complains of the procedure by which this Respondent issues this conditional license. Without having given Petitioner an opportunity for a hearing based on a proposed or tentative decision to change Petitioner's rating, Respondent simply issued the conditional license and gave Petitioner an opportunity to challenge this action, after the fact, in a formal administrative hearing. A mootness determination on these facts would insulate Respondent's initial action from effective challenge, despite the obvious economic impacts of the initial action. The June 12 survey reports cites three sets of Class II deficiencies, which were identified as Tags F 225, F 309, and F 314. These three tags were the sole bases for the issuance of a Conditional license. Tag F 225 concerns the investigation and documentation of an alleged incident of abuse of a resident by one of Petitioner's employees. The survey report asserts that Petitioner did not satisfy applicable legal requirements by failing, in violation of its own policies, to document in the resident's file the results of an abuse investigation report. Tag F 225 and the testimony of Respondent's witnesses at the hearing are vague as to whether the issue under Tag F 225 is that Petitioner failed to conduct an appropriate investigation or failed to document adequately that it had conducted an investigation. When pressed, Respondent's witnesses chose failure to document, perhaps in deference to the fact that Petitioner's employees clearly conducted an investigation. The alleged incident underlying this issue did not constitute abuse. A staffperson grabbed a resident's arm for an appropriate purpose and did not injure or harm the resident. Petitioner's investigation properly concluded that there was no abuse. As discussed under the conclusions of law, the subsubsubparagraph of the federal regulation allegedly violated under this tag requires only that Petitioner report to appropriate authorities any knowledge of actions by a "court of law" against an employee suggestive of unfitness to serve as facility staff. There is no proof of action by a court of law; this missing fact alone ends the inquiry under this tag. Additionally, Petitioner nonetheless reported the unfounded allegations to the state agency charged with investigating allegations of abuse, and the state agency concluded that the charge was unfounded. Tag F 309 concerns the quality of care received by six residents. As to Resident Number 6, who was in the final stages of a terminal illness, the survey report asserts that Petitioner kept him in isolation and did not offer him opportunities for socialization. Testimony at the hearing revealed that the resident was dying and did not want to socialize, but Respondent's witness opined that this was not an appropriate option. No evidence suggested that the dying resident suffered any diminution of ability to eat or use language. Respondent's witness labored under the misconception that the cited federal regulation addresses socialization (as opposed perhaps to the role of socialization in facilitating the more specific activities actually mentioned by the regulation, which is discussed in the conclusions of law). Even if the federal regulation were so broad, which it is not, the evidence certainly suggests that any diminution in socialization was unavoidable due to the resident's terminal clinical condition. The evidence reveals that Resident Number 6, who had had a gangrenous foot, suffered a staph infection of his gangrenous right foot. He was depressed, fatigued, and in pain; however, he was freely visited by staff and family. As to Resident Number 8, who had had a stroke, the survey report asserts that Petitioner failed to provide him his restorative therapy of walking and failed to document this therapy. At the time of the survey, Petitioner was short of restorative staff due to a scheduled vacation and an unscheduled bereavement absence due to the suicide of an employee's brother. When a restorative aide, who was on vacation, appeared at the nursing home and attempted to provide Respondent's surveyor with documentation concerning the therapy administered to Resident Number 8, the surveyor rejected the documentation on the grounds that it did not sufficiently identify the resident or therapist. Resident Number 8 suffered some loss of functioning--i.e., the ability to walk 400 feet--but the record does not link this loss of functioning to any brief interruption in his restorative therapy. As to Resident Number 9, the survey report states that, during the two days that surveyors were at the facility, she did not ambulate, even though her restorative nursing plan called for daily ambulation. However, she suffered no harm during this insignificant interruption in her program, from which she was successfully discharged a couple of weeks after the survey. As to Resident Number 13, who was 102 years old, the survey report notes that he was supposed to ambulate in a wheelchair. One of Respondent's surveyors noticed that a staffperson was pushing this resident's wheelchair. However, staff had assumed the responsibility of pushing this resident's wheelchair for him after he had developed pressure sores on his heels. The evidence fails to show that Petitioner's care for the treatment of Resident Number 13 had anything to do with his loss of function. As to Resident Number 26, the survey report asserts that his physician had ordered an increase in dosage of Prilosec, which aids digestion by treating the acidity associated with peptic ulcers. Three weeks passed before Petitioner's staff noticed that the change, which was on the resident's chart, had not yet been implemented. They implemented the change prior to the survey, and notified the resident's physician of the error in medication administration a couple of days later. The survey report states that Petitioner's staff documented, on May 30, 1997, that Resident Number 26 had lost 4.8 pounds, or 5.7 percent of his body weight, in one week. This weight loss occurred during the latter part of the period during which Resident Number 26 was receiving less than his prescribed amount of medication. Two of Petitioner's witnesses testified, without elaboration, that the medication error did not cause the weight loss. The survey report implies otherwise, although Respondent's witnesses were not as pronounced as Petitioner's witnesses in dealing with any link between the medication error and the weight loss. Absent the weight loss, the medication error-- consisting of a failure to raise a digestive medication--would have been insignificant and insufficient grounds for a Class II deficiency on the cited basis. However, there was a serious weight loss while the resident was undermedicated. The lack of evidence in the record proving that there was or was not a causal link between the weight loss and undermedication means that the party bearing the risk of nonpersuasion loses on this issue. As discussed in the conclusions of law, Respondent has the burden of proof; thus, for this reason alone, Petitioner prevails on this issue. As to the last resident under Tag F 309, who was not identified, the survey asserts that a restorative aide commented that he used to walk 440 feet, but does not anymore because he thinks that he does not have to. This scanty allegation provides no basis for citing Petitioner with a deficiency, even if it applies to Resident Number 8, as appears probable. Tag F 314 also concerns a quality-of-care issue-- specifically, the development and treatment of pressure sores in three residents. As to Resident Number 1, who had been in the nursing home for three years, the survey report states that, on May 12, 1997, he had developed a Stage II pressure sore on his right outer ankle. The survey report asserts that Petitioner failed to provide sufficient care to prevent the development of this pressure sore, that Resident Number 1 had suffered pressure sores in 1995, and that Petitioner should have known and treated Resident Number 1 on the basis of his being at risk for developing pressure sores. Despite a failure to document, Petitioner's staff adequately treated Resident Number 1 once the pressure sore developed. Nursing assistants required that he wear silicone pressure booties and that lotion be rubbed on the irritated skin. In addition, Petitioner has shown that the clinical condition of Resident Number 1 made pressure sores unavoidable. One of Petitioner's Assistant Directors of Nursing testified that Resident Number 1 had poor pedal pulses, indicative of poor circulation, and a history of peripheral neuropathy. The resulting decreased sensation in his feet would prevent him from feeling increased pressure and thus the need to move his feet. Despite preventative measures, Resident Number 1 developed pressure sores due to these clinical conditions. As to Resident Number 7, who had been in the nursing home for six years, the survey report asserts that she had a Stage II pressure sore--meaning that the skin was broken--but was allowed to remained seated in the same position for two hours in a position in which the pressure on the sore on her buttock was not relieved. The survey report does not allege that this pressure sore developed while Resident Number 7 resided in the nursing home. Resident Number 7 had severe dementia and was a total-care patient. She could not move independently. In fact, she sat, unmoved, in a chair for at least 4 and 3/4 hours on one of the days of the survey. The failure to move Resident Number 7 raises serious questions about the adequacy of Petitioner's treatment. However, Petitioner's Assistant Director of Nursing answered these questions when she testified that the one- centimeter pressure sore healed five days after the survey. Thus, Petitioner provided Resident Number 7 with the necessary treatment and services to promote healing. As to Resident Number 13, who had been in the nursing home for less than three months, the survey report alleges that he had developed pressure sores while in the nursing home. Resident Number 13 was the 102-year-old resident who is also discussed in Tag F 309. The survey report alleges that, on April 24, 1997, Resident Number 13 had a red left heel, red right foot, and pink right heel; on May 1, 1997, he had soft and red heels; on May 7 and 14, 1997, his pressure sores could not be staged due to dead tissue surrounding the sores; on May 20, 1997, his left heel was documented as a Stage II pressure sore, but the right heel could not be staged due to dead tissue; and Petitioner's staff did not implement any treatment until May 12, 1997. Respondent proved the allegations cited in the preceding paragraph except for the last concerning a failure to implement any treatment until May 12. Petitioner's Assistant Director of Nursing testified that Patient Number 13 was frail and debilitated. If this is a clinical condition, it is the only statement of Patient Number 13's clinical condition contained in the record. The Assistant Director of Nursing testified that the pressure sore on the left heel healed by June 3 after the usual treatment measures of turning and repositioning and heel protectors. She testified that the pressure sore on the right heel improved somewhat, but had not healed by the time of his death in January 1998 of presumably unrelated causes. The testimony of the Assistant Director of Nursing rebuts any evidence concerning inadequate treatment of Resident Number 13, but does not establish that the development of his pressure sores was clinically unavoidable. Her testimony as to Resident Number 1 identified clinical conditions that, when coupled with the early implementation of preventative measures, established that Resident Number 1's pressure sore was unavoidable. As to Resident Number 13, the Assistant Director of Nursing also testified of early implementation of preventative measures, but, in contrast to her testimony concerning Resident Number 1, she described little, if anything, of any clinical condition making the pressure sores unavoidable. If the intent of the Assistant Director of Nursing was to imply that old age coupled with frailty and debilitation provide the necessary clinical justification, she failed to establish the necessary causal relationships among pressure sores, advanced age, and frailty and debilitation-- even if the frailty and debilitation were relative to other 102-year-olds, which the record does not reveal, as opposed to the frailty and debilitation, relative to the general population, that one might expect in a 102-year-old. Without more detailed evidence concerning Resident Number 13's clinical condition, Petitioner effectively invites the creation of a safe harbor from liability for the development of pressure sores in 102-year-olds or even 102-year-olds who are frail and debilitated for their age, and the administrative law judge declines either invitation.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order dismissing the petition filed by Petitioner and rating Petitioner's license as conditional for the relevant period. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of July, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of July, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Donna H. Stinson Broad and Cassell Post Office Drawer 11300 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1300 Karel Baarslag Agency for Health Care Administration State Regional Service Center 2295 Victoria Avenue Fort Myers, Florida 33901 Paul J. Martin, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229 Douglas M. Cook, Director Agency for Health Care Administration Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229
The Issue Whether Respondent committed deficient practices as alleged in violation of 42 C.F.R. Section 483.13(b) and 42 C.F.R. Section 483.13(c)(1)(ii), adopted by reference in Florida Administrative Code Rule 59A-4.1288; and if so, whether Petitioner should impose a civil penalty in the amount of $5,000 and issue a conditional license to Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with licensing and regulating nursing homes in Florida under state and federal statutes. Petitioner is charged with evaluating nursing homes facilities to determine their degree of compliance with established rules as a basis for making the required licensure assignment. Additionally, Petitioner is responsible for concluding federally-mandated surveys of those long-term care facilities receiving Medicare and Medicaid funds for compliance with federal statutory and rule requirements. These federal requirements are made applicable to Florida nursing home facilities. Pursuant to the statute, Petitioner must classify deficiencies according to the nature and scope of the deficiency when the criteria established under the statute are not met. The classification of any deficiencies discovered is determinative of whether the licensure status of a nursing home is "standard" or "conditional." Respondent is a 98-bed nursing home located at 1024 Willow Springs Drive, Winter Springs, Florida, and is licensed as a skilled nursing facility. On May 30, 2003, Petitioner's staff conducted an inspection, also known as a survey, at Respondent's facility. Upon completion of the survey, Petitioner issued a document entitled, Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, CMS Form 2567L, also known as a "2567," which contains a statement of the alleged violations of regulatory requirements, also referred to as "deficiencies," titled "Statement of Deficiencies and Plan of Correction." The evaluation or survey of a facility includes a resident review and, depending upon the circumstances, may consist of a record, reviews, resident observations, and interviews with family and facility staff. Surveyors note their findings on the 2567 Form, and if violations of regulations are found, the violations are noted and referred to as "Tags." A tag identifies the applicable regulatory standard that the surveyors believe has been violated, provides a summary of the violation, sets forth specific factual allegations that they believe support the violation, and indicates the federal scope and severity of the noncompliance. Petitioner's surveyors use the "State Operations Manual," a document prepared by the United States Department of Health and Human Services, Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, as guidance in determining whether a facility has violated 42 C.F.R. Chapter 483. Count I In Count I of the Administrative Complaint, Petitioner alleges that Respondent's staff subjected three residents (Resident Nos. 6, 13, and 18) to verbal and mental abuse in violation of 42 C.F.R. Section 483.13(b), which provides that a nursing home resident has the right to be free from verbal and mental abuse. As to Resident No. 6, Petitioner contends that this resident stated to a surveyor that the resident had "overheard" a certified nursing assistant (CNA) loudly tell another staff member that the resident was "going to the bathroom 25 times a day." Petitioner believes the CNA's statement, which was allegedly "overheard," occurred sometime during the month of March 2003, based upon nurses' notes which indicate Resident No. 6 had an episode of diarrhea during this time. However, the nurses notes also reveal that during this time Resident No. 6 was subject to confusion and nonsensical outbursts. Petitioner's belief that Resident No. 6 was a reliable historian is based on Petitioner's mistaken belief that Resident No. 6 was admitted about March 30, 2003, and was alert and oriented and not confused upon admission. Petitioner's staff exhibited a lack of understanding of the timing and significance of the Multiple Data Set (MDS) forms describing Resident No. 6's mental condition upon which they relied. In fact, Resident No. 6 was admitted in mid-February 2003 and exhibited confused and eccentric behavior. The "overheard" comment was not reported to Respondent until the survey. Therefore, the evidence that this incident occurred as described by Petitioner is unreliable hearsay. Surveyors reviewed Respondent's records, which contained a complaint from a family member of Resident No. 6 that the same CNA had noticed that the resident had a physical anomaly. The CNA called other CNAs to view this anomaly, which was located in Resident No. 6's genital area. Respondent learned of the allegations relating to Resident No. 6's physical anomaly on April 21, 2003, from a family member of Resident No. 6. Respondent immediately began an investigation, including an interview with and physical examination of Resident No. 6 and an interview with the CNA. The resident only stated that she did not want this CNA taking care of her any longer. The CNA denied the allegations. The CNA was suspended pending investigation and later terminated based upon directions from Respondent's corporate office based on additional, unrelated information. The incident was reported to the Department of Children and Families (DCF) Abuse Hot Line on April 22, 2003. Although Resident No. 6 and her family member had frequent contact and conversation with Respondent's director of nursing (DON), neither had ever complained about the CNA's conduct. Respondent's DON observed no mental distress on the part of Resident No. 6 after Respondent's DON learned of the allegations. Petitioner alleges that this CNA had observed the physical anomaly for the first time. If that is true, it would be expected that the CNA would consult other nursing staff to address potential nursing issues. As to Resident No. 13, Petitioner alleges verbal abuse based upon the allegation that Resident No. 13 reported to a surveyor that she found a male resident sitting on her bed in her room. When this was reported by Resident No. 13 to one of the Respondent's nurses, the resident alleged that the nurse "laughed at" the resident. This incident was reported by Resident No. 13 to Respondent's DON shortly after it happened. Respondent's DON interviewed the resident and the two nurses who were on duty at the time. The nurses reported that they assured Resident No. 13 that everything was okay, escorted the male resident to his room, and Resident No. 13 went to bed with no complaint or distress. This incident was reported by Resident No. 13 to Respondent's DON in a joking manner, as an event and not as a complaint. Although Respondent's DON was concerned that the nurses should respond appropriately and was also concerned that the wandering resident be identified, Respondent's DON did not believe that the incident constituted any form of abuse. Respondent's DON did not observe this incident to have any adverse impact on Resident No. 13. During the survey, Petitioner's surveyor advised Respondent that the incident should have been investigated and reported to the DCF Abuse Hot Line. Respondent's DON completed a written report and called the DCF Abuse Hot Line and related the incident. The incident did not meet the DCF guidelines for the reporting of abuse. On or about March 30, 2003, two surveyors observed Resident No. 18 in her wheelchair as she approached the nurse's station. One of Respondent's nursing staff spoke in a "curt, loud voice" to Resident No. 18. The resident had approached the nurses' station to ask for her medication, to which the nurse replied: "I told you I will give you your medicine." Resident No. 18 was hearing-impaired and was documented in her medical record as one to whom staff "must speak loudly." This resident did not wear any hearing assistance devices. Respondent's staff credibly described this resident as one to whom staff had to speak loudly and in clipped words for the resident to understand. Petitioner's surveyors did not speak to this resident after the alleged incident. There is no evidence that this incident had any effect on the resident or even that the resident heard the staff member. The incident does not rise to the level of verbal abuse of the resident. Count II Count II of the Administrative Complaint alleges a violation of 42 C.F.R. Section 483.13(c)(1)(ii), which provides that a nursing home must develop and implement written policies and procedures that prohibit mistreatment, neglect, and abuse; and that the nursing home must not employ individuals who have been found guilty of abuse or neglect or are listed in the state nursing aide registry with a finding of abuse, neglect, or mistreatment. Count II is based on the allegation that Respondent failed to report to Petitioner (the appropriate "state agency") the incidents involving Resident No. 13 and 18 and other allegations of abuse or neglect, which the surveyor allegedly identified in Respondent's log of grievances. Respondent has in place written policies and procedures regarding abuse and neglect and its staff receive regular training regarding these policies and procedures. Petitioner has offered no evidence that these written policies and procedures or the staff's knowledge of these policies and procedures is inadequate. With regard to Resident No. 13, when Respondent's DON learned of the incident from the resident, Respondent's DON made inquiries of nursing staff who were on duty at the time, in addition to interviewing the resident. Respondent's DON did not consider any aspect of the incident to constitute abuse or neglect. Later, after Petitioner alleged, during the survey, that the incident should have been reported to DCF, Respondent's DON prepared a written report of the incident and called and related the incident to the DCF Abuse Hot Line. Respondent's DON was advised by DCF that the incident did not meet DCF's requirements for reporting. Respondent is required to report all allegations of abuse and neglect to the DCF's Abuse Hot Line. Petitioner does not dispute this fact. Instead, Petitioner contends that Respondent is also required to report allegations of abuse and neglect to the "state agency" and that Respondent failed to do so. The "state agency" for the purpose of federal regulations is Petitioner. Petitioner's allegations are based upon its review of Respondent's grievance log, which Petitioner's surveyors say allegedly records 18 incidents of alleged abuse, none of which was reported to the state agency. At the time of the survey, Respondent was a part of the Mariner Corporation. It has since disassociated from that corporation and changed its name to Tuskawilla Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, effective October 1, 2003. At the time of the survey, all reporting of abuse allegations were done by the corporate regional risk management department, and it is not known if they reported any of the incidents cited by the surveyors to Petitioner. However, the document received in evidence, which has many more than 18 entries in summary style, is almost completely illegible. Petitioner's witness was unable to identify any entries on this document which could be identified as alleged abuse and which had not been properly reported. Understanding this document requires substantial explanation, which was never provided. Standing alone, this document is not probative of any fact. Petitioner offered no evidence that Respondent employed any individuals who had been found guilty of or who had been listed on the nurse aide registry of abusing, neglecting, or mistreating residents. Even if it is assumed that Respondent should have reported but did not report to Petitioner the 18 alleged incidents or the incident regarding Resident No. 13, Petitioner offered no evidence that reporting this information to DCF, but not to Petitioner, had any impact on any resident or prevented a resident from maintaining or achieving the resident's highest practicable physical, mental, or psychosocial well-being. Count III Since there is no proof of Class II deficiencies, there is no basis for imposing a conditional license status on Respondent for the period May 30, 2003, until July 8, 2003.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a final order of dismissal of the Administrative Complaint be entered in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of March, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Alfred W. Clark, Esquire 117 South Gadsden Street, Suite 201 Post Office Box 623 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0623 Gerald L. Pickett, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Sebring Building, Suite 330K 525 Mirror Lake Drive, North St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Lealand McCharen, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Valda Clark Christian, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
