The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the Respondent committed violations as alleged in the amended administrative complaint and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the allegations of this case the Respondent has been licensed as a limited surety agent. On April 10, 1995, Elsa De La Cruz went to the criminal courthouse in Miami, Dade County, Florida, and waited on the fifth floor. A male who represented himself to be Respondent approached Ms. De La Cruz and asked her if he could help her. He specifically wanted to know if she was there to bail someone out and identified himself as a bail bondsman. The male also gave Ms. De La Cruz a business card bearing Respondent's name and business location. Ms. De La Cruz left the fifth floor of the courthouse and walked to the east wing which is commonly referred to as "the jail wing." The same male was also there and again approached Ms. De La Cruz. At this time he advised her that if the bond was set at $10,000, he would need $1,000 and collateral to help her. Ms. De La Cruz left the property and returned to her office to complete the affidavit which is Petitioner's exhibit 2. Ms. De La Cruz did not initiate any of the contact between herself and the male who represented himself as Respondent. On April 11, 1995, Maggie Porto went to the criminal courthouse in Miami, Dade County, Florida, and waited on the fifth floor. A male who later identified himself as Respondent initiated contact with Ms. Porto and advised her that he was in business if she needed him. After a short while, Ms. Porto left the fifth floor and walked over to the east wing of the criminal center. Upon her arrival there, the same male handed Ms. Porto a business card. When Ms. Porto asked the male if he was the man identified on the card, the subject answered "yes." The business card represented Respondent's name. Later, Ms. Porto left the criminal center and returned to her office to complete the affidavit which is Petitioner's exhibit number 3. All contact between Ms. Porto and Respondent was initiated by the Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a final order revoking Respondent's license. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of February, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of February, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-3032 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner: Paragraphs 1, 4, 5 and 6 are accepted. With regard to paragraph 2, the allegation as to the time of the incident is rejected as not supported by the record or hearsay. With regard to paragraph 3, the allegation as to when the business card was delivered to Ms. De La Cruz is rejected as contrary to the weight of the record. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent: 1. None submitted. COPIES FURNISHED: Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dan Sumner Acting General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dickson E. Kesler, Esquire Division of Agent and Agency Services 8070 Northwest 53rd Street, Suite 103 Miami, Florida 33166 Noel A. Rivera 2200 Northwest 11th Street Miami, Florida 33172 Anthony Alvarez 350 Sevilla Avenue, Suite 201 Coral Gables, Florida 33134
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Respondent's bail bond agent's License issued by the State of Florida should be subjected to sanctions for alleged violation of certain provisions of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes, and related rules, as described in the First Amended Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged by statute and rule with regulating the entry to licensure, and regulating the practice, of bail bond agents such as the Respondent. The Respondent Donald Frank Shirey was, at times pertinent hereto, a licensed bail bond agent regulated by the Department. The Respondent was a corporate officer and director of Donald Shirey and Associates, Inc., located, at times pertinent hereto, at 112 East Adams Street, Jacksonville, Florida ("Associates"). It was an entity engaged in the bail bond business. The Respondent employed Robert Meyers, James Kinard and Michael Suttles as licensed bail bond agents. Count I On September 25, 1998, Darryl Gerald Irving was incarcerated in the Duval County Jail. The amount of his bond was set at $5003.00, with a premium of $500.00. On that date, the Respondent posted a bail bond for Darryl Gerald Irving. After bonding Mr. Irving out of jail, the Respondent took him to Mr. Irving's former employer, Target, to obtain a check (number 8215734), in the amount of $172.23. The check was signed over to the Respondent as partial payment for the bail bond premium. The Respondent and Mr. Irving then went to the Respondent's office were they called Mr. Irving's girlfriend, Sandra Jennings, who paid the remainder of the bond premium. Mr. Irving then completed Petitioner's Exhibit 3, at the Respondent's office. On this document he listed his address as 3273 University Boulevard, Apartment 244. The address listed on his driver's license is 3273 University Boulevard, Apartment 255. The address listed on his Target check stub is 1706 Art Museum Drive, Apartment G-11. Mr. Irving explained that he would be living at 3273 University Boulevard, Apartment 244, and that the addresses on his driver's license and check stub were prior addresses. The Respondent, however, alleged that Mr. Irving put an incorrect or non-existent address on the document (Petitioner's Exhibit 3), but he never verified that. The Respondent surrendered Mr. Irving back to the Duval County Jail, terminating his liability on the bond, on the theory that Mr. Irving had entered an incorrect address on the document, Petitioner's Exhibit 3; the address he where he would be living, instead of his driver's license address or the address appearing on the check stub from his employer. On this basis, the Respondent returned him to the Duval County Jail for incarceration and retained the $500.00 bond premium paid by Mr. Irving. From the time the Respondent bonded Mr. Irving out of jail until the time he surrendered him back to jail, Mr. Irving remained in the Respondent's custody. Mr. Irving was in handcuffs except for the time when he was completing the written bond documents. At no time was Mr. Irving free to leave the Respondent's custody. Count II On January 8, 1998, the Respondent posted a bail bond for Patrick Andrade in the amount of $3,656.00. The bond premium thereon was $365.60, which was paid by Mr. Andrade. The documents marked as Petitioner's Exhibit 6, were completed and signed by Mr. Andrade. After being bonded out of jail, the Respondent took Mr. Andrade to the Respondent's home. While there he engaged in sexual relations with Mr. Andrade. When Mr. Andrade was no longer willing to engage in sexual relations with the Respondent, the Respondent surrendered him back to jail for re-incarceration and retained the bond premium. Count III On February 14, 1998, the Respondent posted a bail bond for Patrick Andrade in the amount of $50,003.00. The bond premium was $5,003.00. Mr. Andrade paid $2,500.00, as a down payment and paid an additional $1,200.00, of the bond premium for a total of $3,700.00, before being surrendered back to jail by the Respondent. The documents marked as Petitioner's Exhibit 7 in evidence, were completed and signed by Mr. Andrade. After being bonded out of jail, Mr. Andrade was taken by the Respondent to the Respondent's home where he spent several days and engaged in sexual relations with the Respondent. On February 25, 1998, when Mr. Andrade was no longer willing to engage in sexual relations with the Respondent and wished to go home to his wife, the Respondent surrendered Mr. Andrade to the Clay County Jail for re-incarceration and again retained the bond premium. Count IV On September 24, 1998, the Respondent again posted a bond for Mr. Andrade in the amount of $1,502.00. The bond premium of $150.20 was paid by Mr. Andrade and he signed the documents in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 8. After being bonded out of jail, Mr. Andrade was again taken to the Respondent's home where he stayed for several days and engaged in sexual relations with the Respondent. Thereafter, when Mr. Andrade wished to go home to his wife the Respondent instead surrendered him to the Clay County Jail and retained the bond premium already paid. Count V Ms. Jeanette Alzola met with the Respondent at his office on April 7, 1999, and entered into an agreement with the Respondent to provide for the bond of Pabel Romero Martinez from incarceration in the Lee County Jail in Fort Myers, Florida. Mr. Martinez's bond was $150,000.00. Ms. Alzola paid a premium of $15,000.00, and a transfer fee of $100.00. She posted the Deed for her house and the title to her car as collateral for the bond. When Ms. Alzola met with the Respondent she explained that Mr. Martinez would be living with her at her residence. She also told the Respondent that Mr. Martinez had difficulties comprehending English and would need assistance completing the required documents. She requested that Mr. Shirey contact her when Mr. Martinez was brought to the Respondent's office so that she could function as a translator and assist him in completing the documents. On April 9, 1999, the Respondent went to the Lee County Jail and posted a bond for Mr. Martinez to remove him from the jail. He brought him back to Jacksonville, Florida. He was in handcuffs the entire time except for a short period of time when he was completing the relevant bond documents. Mr. Martinez explained to the Respondent that he would be living with Ms. Alzola. The Respondent held up Mr. Martinez's driver's license and told him to "copy this address onto there." Mr. Martinez listed an address on the application that was not Ms. Alzola' s address or the address that appears on his driver's license, but it was the address of his previous residence. The Respondent then said that he was going to surrender Mr. Martinez back to the jail "now that we have good cause that I can go by and check this address because the address is a lie." The Respondent then surrendered Mr. Martinez back to the Lee County Jail without ever releasing him from his custody and retained the $15,100.00, that had been paid by Ms. Alzola. Ms. Alzola filed a civil lawsuit against the Respondent in which she obtained a Judgment in the amount of $15,100.00. The Court therein concluded that the: Decision to return him (Martinez) to the Lee County Jail within a few hours of bringing him here without ever releasing him or turning him over to the custody of the plaintiff (Alzola) constituted a breach of their contract with the plaintiff. The acts of the defendants herein did not constitute a "release" of Mr. Martinez anymore than if they had merely transferred him from the Lee County Jail to the Duval County Jail and back. Mr. Martinez remained in the custody of at least two of the defendants' agents at all times. Nothing in the acts or statements of these agents would have indicated to a reasonable person that he was free to leave their custody. In fact, their conduct was a clear indication that Mr. Martinez was still in a custodial status. Count VI Janice Smith met with the Respondent on May 27, 1999, to arrange for a bail bond for her seventeen-year-old son Kevin Smith. Kevin Smith was incarcerated in the Duval County Jail in Jacksonville, Florida. His bond amount was $100,000.00, and the premium on that bond was $10,000.00. Ms. Smith paid $7,000.00 of the premium and entered into a premium agreement for the remaining balance of $3,000.30. Under the terms of the agreement she was to make monthly payments of no less than $300.00 until the balance was paid. The balance was due before discharge of the bond. The Respondent held the title to Ms. Smith's 1999 Chevrolet Lumina as collateral security on the loan. The Respondent told Ms. Smith that he would help her out with any problem that she might have with Kevin. On or about May 31, 1999, she called the Respondent and told him that she was concerned because Kevin was coming home after a curfew that she had set for him. On June 1, 1999, the Respondent called Ms. Smith and recommended that Kevin be surrendered back to the jail for a few days in effect, to teach him a lesson. The Respondent assured Ms. Smith that he would get Kevin out of jail at any time without incurring additional costs. She agreed to allow the Respondent to surrender Kevin back to the jail with the understanding that she could get Kevin out of jail at any time without any additional costs. On June 1, 1999, the Respondent and several of his agents arrived at Ms. Smith's home. At the time of their arrival, Kevin Smith was not at home. The Respondent went into the house with Ms. Smith and two or more of his employees positioned themselves outside the house and waited for Kevin to return home. Kevin Smith approached the house in his vehicle and noticed several cars near his house. He purportedly believed that they belonged to a neighborhood gang which he had had problems with in the past. Allegedly fearing for his safety, he turned in his vehicle and proceeded to drive away. The Respondent's agents tried unsuccessfully to block his retreat with their vehicles and then pursued him but were unable to catch him. Janice Smith then called Kevin on his cell phone to ask him why he left. He replied that he thought the individuals at the house were gang members. Ms. Smith told him that it was just the Respondent and his agents who wanted Kevin to sign some papers. Kevin thereupon went home and attempted to shake the Respondent's hand whereupon the Respondent handcuffed and shackled him and took him back to his office. The Respondent later surrendered him to the Duval County Jail. A few days later, Janice Smith contacted the Respondent and requested that he bond Kevin back out of jail. The Respondent said he would not bond Kevin out of jail until Janice Smith provided proof that Kevin's car had been placed in storage. Ms. Smith put the car in storage and brought the receipt to the Respondent's office. The Respondent still would not bond Kevin out of jail. Ms. Smith went to the Respondent's office on numerous occasions and he refused to meet with her. Ms. Smith made several telephone calls to the Respondent but he would not take or return her calls. After several days had passed, one of the Respondent's employees told Ms. Smith that the Respondent would not bond Kevin out of jail and would not refund the premium payments. In June 1999, when Ms. Smith attempted to purchase a tag for her 1999 Chevrolet Lumina, she learned that the Respondent had transferred the vehicle to his name. The Respondent claimed that that action was taken pursuant to the terms of the premium agreement. However, the Respondent never notified Ms. Smith that the balance was due in full, or of his intent to transfer title of the vehicle to his name. Ms. Smith paid the Respondent the $3,000.00 balance so that the Respondent would release the title to her vehicle, which he did. Ms. Smith paid a total of $10,000.00, as a bail bond premium to the Respondent. The Respondent surrendered Kevin back to the jail but refused to bond him back out of jail as he had previously agreed and he also refused to refund the premium to Ms. Smith.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Insurance revoking the Respondent's license and eligibility for licensure as a bail bond agent, and that the Respondent be found ineligible to apply for licensure with the Department for a minimum period of two years and not until such time as restitution is made to Darryl Irving in the amount of $500.00, Patrick Andrade in the amount of $4,215.80, Jeannett Alzola in the amount of $15,100.00 and Janice Smith in the amount of $10,0003.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of October, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of October, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard J. Santurri, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Donald Frank Shirey, Jr. 5337 107th Street Jacksonville, Florida 32244 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer/Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 0307
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was first licensed as a ball bondsman in 1961 or 1962. In 1969 (Exhibit 2), Petitioner was charged with being incompetent and untrustworthy as a bail bondsman, found guilty and placed on one year's probation which was successfully completed. In 1973, Petitioner was again charged with conducting himself in a manner unbecoming a bail bondsman (Exhibit 3). These charges alleged failure to return the premium paid on a supersedes bond when the prisoner was not released from jail on the bond and failure to maintain his office open to the general public as required. In the Final Order issued in this case, Petitioner was fined $850 and placed on probation for two years. Upon failure of Petitioner to comply with the terms of the Final Order, his license was revoked for a period of ten months after which the revocation was set aside and his license restored. In 1979, a hearing was conducted by the undersigned Hearing Officer on charges alleging that Petitioner had failed to maintain the minimum requirement for permanent office records and failed to maintain a place of business accessible to the public and be actively engaged in the bail bond business in violation of Chapter 64B, Florida Statutes. Petitioner was found guilty as charged, and the recommendation that his license be revoked was adopted by the Commissioner of Insurance in the Final order. In 1986, Petitioner was arrested for operating a donut shop in Tampa utilizing topless waitresses in violation of Tampa Ordinance 24-11. These charges were dismissed on appeal to the circuit court (Exhibit 5). Witnesses called by Petitioner included the attorney who prosecuted the 1979 case (Exhibit 4) against Respondent; the investigator who investigated the 1979 charges for the Department, and a sitting circuit court judge who filed an appeal of the 1979 revocation order on behalf of the Petitioner At the time the charges which led to the revocation were preferred, Respondent was without power to write bonds, but still had an obligation to service bonds still outstanding. The two witnesses who testified in these proceedings on the status of a licensed bail bondsman without power to write new bonds both concurred that this places a bail bondsman in the anomalous position of one who has no need for an office to provide bail bonds for the public but who still needs to be accessible to those clients for whom he has outstanding bonds. This distinction was not clarified at the 1979 hearing. All three witnesses who testified on behalf of Petitioner were aware of nothing that would disqualify Petitioner as a bail bondsman at this time. No evidence was submitted that Petitioner was convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, except for the admission by Petitioner that on or about August 11, 1966, he pleaded guilty to uttering a check without sufficient funds on deposit with which the check could be honored. This offense occurred more than 20 years ago and prior to Petitioner twice being found qualified for licensure by Respondent as a bail bondsman.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for licensure as a temporary limited surety/bail bond agent pursuant to Sections and 648.355, Florida Statutes, should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying; documentary materials received into evidence; stipulations by the parties; evidentiary ruling made pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes; and the record evidence submitted, the following relevant and material facts are determined: Pursuant to Chapter 648, Florida Statutes, Respondent has jurisdiction over bail bond licensure, appointments, and related activities. Petitioner appeared before the undersigned in this proceeding, identified himself and admitted that he is the individual prosecuted in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for, Hillsborough County, Florida, Case No. 88-CF-15373, State of Florida v. Bennie Small, Jr., on a Direct Information of two counts of grand theft, and that Respondent has jurisdiction over him and the subject matter involved in its denial letter. The record evidence demonstrated that on or about January 21, 1987, Petitioner entered into a real estate contract with Deltricia Wiggins, a prospective homebuyer. Ms. Wiggins, believing Petitioner to be the realtor representing the seller, gave Petitioner $500.00 to assist her in the purchase of the home. Thereafter, she became aware that the subject home had been sold and demanded that Petitioner return her $500.00. Petitioner failed or refused to return her $500.00. Ms. Wiggins contacted the Hillsborough County State Attorney's Office and made a report. At no time during the above transaction was Petitioner a licensed real estate sales person or licensed real estate broker. The record evidence demonstrated that Petitioner entered into a real estate contract with Janet Richardson, a prospective homebuyer. Ms. Richardson, believing Petitioner to be the realtor representing the seller, gave Petitioner $500.00 to assist her in the purchase of a family home. Thereafter, she became aware that the subject home had been sold and demanded that Petitioner return her $500.00. Petitioner failed or refused to return her $500.00. At no time during the above transaction was Petitioner a licensed real estate sales person or licensed real estate broker. On October 26, 1988, the State Attorney's Office filed a Direct Information charging Petitioner with two counts of grand theft. The two counts of grand theft stemmed from Petitioner's above two unlicensed real estate transactions. At some unknown time on or before January 5, 1989, Petitioner returned the money to both Misses Wiggins and Richardson. The fact that he subsequently returned money to his two victims did not negate his taking their money under illegal and false pretense. Record evidence demonstrated that on January 17, 1989, Petitioner was represented by the Office of the Public Defender of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for, Hillsborough County, Florida, in Case No. 88-CF-15373, and a plea of no contest to the charge of grand theft was entered on his behalf. Circuit Judge Harry Lee Coe accepted the plea of no contest on behalf of Petitioner, withheld adjudication of guilt, imposed no probation, and ordered that Petitioner not practice law nor practice real estate without appropriate licensure. Petitioner produced no record evidence that the no contest plea entered on his behalf by the public defender and that the judgment and sentence of the Court imposed by Circuit Judge Harry Lee Coe, of the Hillsborough County Circuit Court on January 17, 1989, in Case No. 88-CF-15373, has been overturned, reversed or set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction. Petitioner, through his evidence and post-hearing submittals, presented the following arguments in support of his position that "he did not enter a plea of no contest to the grand theft charge." First, Petitioner argued that while in court, "he" personally did not enter a no contest plea. Second, he argued that "his" personal approval that a no contest plea be entered on his behalf was neither requested nor given to the public defender that represented him. Third, he argued that he was not made a party at the bench conference between the presiding Judge, the prosecutor, and his public defender, when discussions regarding the terms and condition of resolving his case were ongoing and concluded. Fourth, he argued that copies of the court docket sheet, recording entries written by the court's clerk, who sat in court and made each docket sheet entry as pronounced by the court, were insufficient to establish that those recorded actions were actually taken by the court. Because of the foregone alleged irregularities, argued Petitioner, there is no "official court record" of his having entered a no contest plea to the grand theft charge. Petitioner put forth no evidence in support of his several arguments challenging Respondent's denial of his license application. Petitioner proffered no evidence of the official judicial disposition of the two counts of grand theft filed against him. Petitioner failed to produce a scintilla of evidence in support of his assertions that Respondent did not fully comply with the Florida Statutes when Respondent, by letter dated June 2, 2003, informed Petitioner that his application for licensure as a surety/bail bond agent was denied, and the denial was based on a January 17, 1989, plea of no contest to the charge of grand theft, a felony, in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for, Hillsborough County, Florida.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner's, Bennie Small, Jr., application for licensure as a temporary limited surety/bail bond agent. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of June, 2004.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to a license as a limited surety/bail bond agent.
Findings Of Fact On July 22, 2002, Petitioner signed, under penalty of perjury, a statement declaring that his application for a license as a limited surety/bail bond agent was true. In the application, Petitioner answered "no" to the question: Have you ever been charged, convicted, found guilty, or pleaded guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) to a crime under the laws of any municipality, county, state, territory, or country, whether or not adjudication was withheld or a judgment of conviction was entered?" By Information dated February 28, 1971, the State of Florida charged Respondent with "unlawfully and feloniously break[ing] and enter[ing]" into a dwelling with the intent to commit a felony--namely, grand larceny. By Order entered October 15, 1971, the court acknowledged that Respondent had entered a plea of guilty to "breaking and entering with intent to commit a misd[demeanor]," withheld adjudication of guilt, and placed Petitioner on three years' probation. By Order entered August 15, 1974, the court terminated Petitioner's probation, noting that he had successfully completed it.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for a license as a limited surety/bail bond agent. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Santiago Lavan-dera Law Office of Pena and Lavan-dera 7950 Northwest 155th Street, Suite 201 Miami Lakes, Florida 33016 Eduardo Federico Godoy 969 East 29th Street Hialeah, Florida 33013 Ladasiah Jackson Division of Legal Services Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333
The Issue The issue in this case is whether disciplinary action should be taken against Respondent's insurance licenses based upon the alleged violations of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes, as set forth in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was licensed in Florida as a limited surety agent (bail bondsman). On September 15, 1989, the Department filed an Administrative Complaint against Respondent seeking disciplinary action against Respondent's license as a result of his alleged employment of a convicted felon identified as Ira Stern. That case, Department of Insurance Case No. 89-L-650RVE, was settled pursuant to a Consent Order entered on January 2, 1990, pursuant to which Respondent was fined $500 and placed on probation for one year. Respondent also agreed not to employ any individual disqualified by Section 648.44(7)(a) to work at his bail bond agency and agreed that no unlicensed person employed by his bail bond agency would be permitted to engage in any activity for which a license was required. The Consent Order incorporated a Settlement Stipulation which specifically provided that the settlement was entered to avoid the costs and uncertainty of litigation and did not constitute an admission by Respondent of any violation of the insurance code. At the time of the hearing in this case, Respondent's license was apparently under suspension pursuant to an Emergency Order of Suspension issued by the Department in Department Case No. 93-ESO-005JDM. The Emergency Order of Suspension is not referenced in the Administrative Complaint and no copy of that Emergency Order has been provided. The basis for entry of that Emergency Order was not established in this case and the parties stipulated that the Emergency Order was not a part of this proceeding. For at least two years prior to the hearing in this case, Respondent was appointed to write bail bonds by American Bankers Insurance Group ("American Bankers"). Respondent previously operated a company known as Barry's Bail Bonds. Apparently as a result of some unsatisfied judgements, Respondent did not issue any bail bonds in his name or in the name of Barry's Bail Bonds during the first 6 months of 1992. At the time of the transactions alleged in the Administrative Complaint, Respondent was married to Linda Ratner. Linda Ratner was a qualified and appointed agent of American Bankers. She was also the principle of Linda's Bail Bonds, Inc. The evidence established that Respondent was a primary contact for American Bankers on behalf of Linda's Bail Bonds. It appears that Linda's Bail Bonds and Barry's Bail Bonds were operating out of the same office in Fort Lauderdale for some periods during 1991 and 1992. Other businesses were also apparently operated out of this office. The evidence established that an individual by the name of Ira Stern was involved in the operations of that office during late 1991 and the first nine months of 1992. The evidence was inconclusive as to who actually employed Ira Stern. The evidence did establish that Respondent and Ira Stern primarily handled the day to day operations of the office, including the bail bond business transacted out of the office. No evidence was presented that Ira Stern was a convicted felon and/or that he was the same individual identified in the prior Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent. Respondent solicited and issued bail bonds through Linda's Bail Bonds on several occasions from January 1992 through July 1992. The evidence established that Linda Ratner signed several American Banker's power of attorney forms in blank. As discussed in more detail below, Respondent utilized several of these forms on behalf of clients during the time period in question. Respondent's authority to write bonds for American Bankers was terminated by American Bankers on or about July 24, 1992. At that same time, the authority of Linda Ratner and Linda's Bail Bonds, Inc. was also terminated. At some point after this termination, Respondent turned over to American Bankers certain tangible collateral that had been held in a safe deposit box. This collateral was turned over sometime between July and September of 1992. The exact date was not established. On September 11, 1992, employees of American Bankers accompanied by a Department investigator, went to Respondent's office and collected all of the files and tangible collateral in the office relating to the outstanding bonds written by Respondent and/or Linda's Bail Bonds for American Bankers. No cash collateral was recovered in connection with those files. Upon arriving at the office, representatives of American Bankers and the Department investigator dealt exclusively with a man who identified himself as Ira Stern and who claimed to be the office manager. As noted above, Respondent was previously disciplined by Petitioner for employing an Ira Stern, who was allegedly a convicted felon. No direct evidence was presented to establish the identity of the person in the office on September 11, 1992 nor was there any evidence that the person who identified himself as Ira Stern was a convicted felon and/or the same individual whom Respondent was accused of improperly employing in the previous disciplinary case. Moreover, no conclusive evidence was presented to establish who actually employed the individual in question. On or about July 9, 1992, Anna Agnew and her husband called Linda's Bail Bonds to obtain a bond to get their nephew out of jail. Respondent responded to the call and told the Agnews that he would issue a bond in return for $100 cash and the delivery of a $1,000 check which was to serve as collateral for the bond. Respondent told the Agnews that he would hold the check as collateral without cashing it until their nephew's case was resolved. To obtain the release of the Agnews' nephew, Respondent submitted American Bankers power of attorney number 0334165 which had been signed in blank by Linda Ratner and filled out by Respondent. The amount of the bond was $1,000. Shortly after the Agnews' nephew was bonded out of jail, Mrs. Agnew discovered that the check they gave to Respondent had been cashed. After the Agnews' many attempts to contact Respondent regarding the check were unsuccessful, Mrs. Agnew wrote to the Department complaining of the situation. On August 17, 1992, the Agnews' nephew's case was resolved. Respondent failed to return the Agnews' collateral within the time provided by law. In an attempt to retrieve their collateral after their nephew's case was completed, Mrs. Agnew testified that her husband unsuccessfully attempted to contact Respondent at his office on a least one occasion. At the time of Mr. Agnew's visit, Respondent's office was allegedly not open. No conclusive evidence was presented as to who cashed the Agnews' check or what happened to the proceeds. On or about January 8, 1993, the managing general agent for American Bankers returned $1,000 to the Agnews in repayment of the collateral. On or about June 21, 1992, American Bankers' power of attorney form number 0333494 was submitted to the Broward County Circuit Court to obtain the release from jail of Wentworth McNorton. The amount of the bond was $1,000. The power of attorney form had been signed in blank by Linda Ratner and was filled in by Respondent. Mr. McNorton's mother, Linnette, arranged for the issuance of the bond by paying Respondent $100 in cash. In addition, she gave Respondent a diamond ring appraised in excess of $10,000 as collateral for the bond. Linnette McNorton asked Respondent to hold the ring as collateral until she could arrange to substitute some other collateral. Liability on Mr. McNorton's bond was discharged by the court on July 14, 1992. Respondent did not return Mrs. McNorton's ring within twenty-one days of discharge of liability on the bond as required by law. Linnette McNorton continued to call Respondent for several months after her collateral was due to be returned. At no time during this period did Respondent return Mrs. McNorton's calls or inform her of the whereabouts of her ring. Approximately five months after Wentworth McNorton was released, Linnette McNorton and her husband went to Respondent's home and confronted him. Respondent advised the McNortons that he did not have the ring and that it had been turned over to the insurance company. Sometime prior to September of 1992, employees of American Bankers took possession of Mrs. McNorton's ring along with other tangible collateral held by Respondent in a safe deposit box. As noted in paragraph 9 above, the evidence did not establish the exact date American Bankers took control of the collateral in the safe deposit box. At the time, Mrs. McNorton's ring was marked improperly and the staff of American Bankers was unable to identify which file it belonged with. Mrs. McNorton's ring was finally returned to her on April 15, 1993 by American Bankers after they had determined that the mislabelled and unidentified ring in their possession was Mrs. McNorton's. On or about March 13, 1992, American Bankers power of attorney numbers 0295546, 0295547, and 0295548 were executed for the issuance of three bail bonds on behalf of Kevin Krohn, the principle. The total face value of these three bonds was $3,000. The powers of attorney had been signed in blank by Linda Ratner. The other handwriting on the powers of attorney appears to be Respondent's, however, the circumstances surrounding the execution and delivery of these powers was not established. The records obtained from Respondent's office on September 11, 1992 indicate that Jeanette Krohn, the indemnitor, paid $300 in premiums for the three bail bonds described in paragraph 24 and also put up $3,000 in cash collateral. The handwriting on the collateral receipts appears to be Ira Stern's however, the circumstances surrounding the execution of these documents was not established. The last of the bonds described in paragraph 24 was discharged by the court on April 22, 1992. In July of 1992, the Department received a complaint that Jeanette Krohn was unable to obtain the return of her $3,000 cash collateral. The Department notified American Bankers of the complaint and a representative of the insurance company contacted Respondent who advised that the collateral had been repaid on June 22, 1992 by check no. 1021 drawn on the trust account of Linda's Bail Bonds. June 22, 1992 was well beyond the twenty-one days provided by law for return of the collateral. The check which Respondent told the insurance company was issued to return Ms. Krohn's collateral was purportedly signed by Linda Ratner. The check was dishonored by the bank. The signature of Linda Ratner on the check given to Ms. Krohn was forged. The evidence was insufficient to establish who forged the signature. American Bankers paid Jeanette Krohn $3,000 on or about January 8, 1993 as repayment for the cash collateral placed for the bonds. In March of 1992, M. T. Heller contacted Respondent to procure a bail bond. Respondent arranged for the issuance of the bond. When the bond was discharged, Mr. Heller returned to Respondent's office, where he dealt with Ira Stern in attempting to obtain return of the collateral.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of the violations alleged in Counts I, II, and III of the Administrative Complaint and dismissing Counts IV and V. As a penalty for the violations, an administrative fine of $1,500 should be imposed and the license issued to the Respondent, Barry Seth Ratner, under the purview of the Florida Department of Insurance should be suspended for a period of two years, followed by a two year probationary period. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of October, 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of October, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Both parties have submitted Proposed Recommended Orders. The following constitutes my rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Subordinate to Findings of Fact 3. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 4 and 9. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 5. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 24. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 25. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 26. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 28. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 29. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 30. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27 and 28. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 17. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 18. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 19. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 20. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 22. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 21. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 23. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 20 and 22. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 11. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 11. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 13. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 13. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 16. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 14. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 31. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 32. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 10. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 33. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 2. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 34. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1 and 3. The first sentence is adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. The second sentence is adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 4. The third sentence is adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 9. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 6. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 11 and 15. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 17-23. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 24-30. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 14. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 2 and 31-34. Addressed in the Preliminary Statement. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph D. Mandt, Esquire Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Joseph R. Fritz, Esquire 4204 North Nebraska Avenue Tampa, Florida 33603 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil, Esquire General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue At issue is whether respondent committed the offense alleged in the administrative complaint and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact The Department excepts to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact number 15, asserting that the hearing officer mischaracterized the persuasive weight of the evidence regarding Mr. Rubino's ownership of the bail funds. At hearing, Mr. Rubino testified that the money he supplied was half of the bond amount necessary to obtain the release of his client's codefendant, Mr. Sergio Gonzalez (Transcript pages 36, 42- 44). He further testified that the source of the bond funds originated from his office account (Transcript page 47) and were not drawn from a check (Transcript page 49). Mr. Rubino's only proof that he owned the bail funds was the following statement: possessed it as "I possessed the money in my pocket" (Transcript page 45). The hearing officer's findings that it was incredulous for Mr. Rubino to advance his own money for a codefendant's bail; that the money advanced by Rubino was street money; and that Mr. Rubino was equivocal in his responses were supported by competent substantial evidence. It is for the hearing officer to consider all the evidence presented, resolve conflicts, judge credibility of witnesses, draw permissible inferences from the evidence, and reach ultimate findings of fact based upon competent substantial evidence. Heifetz v. Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 475 So.2d 1277 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). Therefore, the Department's Exception to Finding of Fact number 15 is REJECTED. The Department excepts to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact number 16, asserting that the hearing officer ignored the Respondent's implicit admission that he mistakenly released the bail money to Ms. Maria Diaz. At hearing, Respondent presented a letter (Respondent's Exhibit 6) in which he advised Mr. Fernandez of his intent to file a complaint with the Miami Police Department against Ms. Maria Diaz for theft of the bail funds. The Respondent also presented a police report receipt from the Miami Police Department (Respondent's Exhibit 4) demonstrating that he filed a police report against Ms. Diaz (Case Incident Number 346-1561T) in connection with the alleged theft of the above-referenced money. Both exhibits were received into evidence and demonstrated that the Respondent concluded that Ms. Diaz was not entitled to the bail money after the fact. Notwithstanding this evidence, the hearing officer's Finding of Fact number 16 addressed Mr. Rubino's ownership interest in the bail funds, not whether Respondent wrongfully returned the bail funds. The Department's arguments regarding this exception are misplaced because the Department fails to demonstrate how the hearing officer's finding of fact that Mr. Rubino did not have any lawful entitlement to the bail funds was not supported by competent substantial evidence. See Heifetz, supra. Therefore, the Department's Exception to Finding of Fact number 16 is REJECTED. The Department excepts to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact number 17, alleging that Mr. Joaquin Fernandez's testimony regarding his disavowment of the bail money was taken out of context. However, Mr. Fernandez's testimony on transcript page 177 is consistent with his testimony contained on transcript pages 163 and 165. Thus, the Department has failed to prove that the hearing officer's finding of fact was not supported by competent substantial evidence. As a result, the Department's Exception to Finding of Fact number 17 is REJECTED. The Department excepts to Finding of Fact number 20, alleging that said finding is inconsistent with the hearing officer's Finding of Fact number 16. The Department confuses the hearing officer's observations regarding Mr. Fernandez's credibility concerning the Respondent's good character with the elements necessary to prove the violations cited in the administrative complaint. Mr. Fernandez testified at hearing that he continued to do business with the Respondent following his written request for the return of the bail money; that he was a very good friend of the Respondent; and that the Respondent was deceived by Ms. Diaz to release the bail money to her (Transcript pages 173- 174,182). The Department has failed to prove that the hearing officer's finding of fact regarding Mr. Fernandez's credibility was not supported by competent substantial evidence. Consequently, the Department's Exception to Finding of Fact number 20 is REJECTED. The Department excepts to Finding of Fact number 21, asserting that the hearing officer drew improper inferences from the evidence presented regarding Respondent's deposit of $10,000 into his attorney's trust account. It appears that the Department has interpreted the hearing officer's finding of fact as dispositive of Respondent's guilt. However, the hearing officer's findings are supported by competent substantial evidence through the testimony of Mr. Rubino, Petitioner's Exhibits 5D, 5E, and 5F and Respondent's Exhibit 10. Moreover, the hearing officer is permitted to draw permissible inferences based upon the evidence presented. Heifetz, supra. Therefore, the Department's Exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact number 21 is REJECTED. RULINGS ON THE DEPARTMENT'S EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARING OFFICER'S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The hearing officer was entirely correct in finding that Respondent was justified in his belief that Mr. Rubino was not entitled to the return of the bond premium payment. However, the hearing officer erred as a matter of law by concluding that Ms. Diaz was entitled to the return of the bail money. Respondent did not receive the funds from Ms. Diaz, as evidenced by the pre- numbered receipt given to Mr. Fernandez. Respondent had not received any purported written or oral permission from Mr. Fernandez authorizing the release of the funds to Ms. Diaz. There is no evidence noted in the recommended order or the exceptions, that Mr. Fernandez ever indicated to the Respondent that Ms. Diaz was the source of the funds, or had any right to the funds. Respondent had no basis, other than Ms. Diaz's bald oral assertions, that she had any right to receive the refund of the premium deposits. It is uncontested that Respondent received the bail bond premium deposit from Mr. Fernandez's office, and gave Mr. Fernandez a written receipt. In the usual course of business, bail bondsmen return bail moneys to the receipted person or persons upon termination of the bond liability. This receipting system is fundamental to bail bondsmen accounting procedures. See Rule 4-221.115, Florida Administrative Code. Certainly, under normal circumstances, Respondent could have and should have returned the funds to Mr. Fernandez, which would have shielded him from any liability, if he had done so. And in normal circumstances, Respondent would be guilty of violating 648.295(1), Florida Statutes and would be subject to discipline by the Department. However, these are not normal circumstance, due to Mr. Fernandez's testimony that he did not know where the bond premium deposit money came from, where it went, and "could care less." In these highly unusual circumstances, in which the apparently wronged and victimized person, Mr. Fernandez, is indifferent to the events that transpired, it would be incongruous and inequitable to find that the Respondent violated section 648.295(1), Florida Statutes, for failing to return the bond funds to a person, who by his own testimony, "could care less" what happened to the funds. Therefore, while rejecting the hearing officer's conclusion that the Respondent was justified in returning the funds to Ms. Diaz, the hearing officer's ultimate recommendation that the case be dismissed is accepted. Based upon the evidence presented at hearing, as discussed in paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 above, the Department has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent is subject to discipline by the Department pursuant to section 648.45(2), Florida Statutes. Therefore, the Department's Exception to Conclusion of Law number 27 is REJECTED. Based upon the evidence presented at hearing, as discussed in paragraphs 6, 7, and 8 above, the Department has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent is subject to discipline by the Department pursuant to section 648.43(3), Florida Statutes. Therefore, the Department's Exception to Conclusion of Law number 28 is REJECTED. Based upon the evidence presented at hearing, as discussed in paragraphs 6, 7, and 8 above, the Department failed to prove that Respondent utilized the bail money to his own use or benefit. As a result, the Department failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent violated section 648.295(3), Florida Statutes. Therefore, the Department's Exception to Conclusion of Law number 30 is REJECTED. Based upon the evidence presented at hearing, as discussed in paragraphs 6, 7, and 8 above, the Department failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent violated section 648.295(1), Florida Statutes. Therefore, the Department's Exception to Conclusion of Law number 32 is REJECTED RULINGS ON THE DEPARTMENT'S EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARING OFFICER'S ENDNOTES The Department was correct in bring the instant action based upon the allegations, as alleged in the administrative complaint. However, the Department's Exception to Endnote number 1 is REJECTED, to the extent that the allegations were proved by clear and convincing evidence. The Department's Exception to Endnote number 2 is ACCEPTED. The Department's Exception to End note number 3 is REJECTED because the hearing officer clearly stated in this endnote that Finding of Fact number 15 was based upon the record evidence. The Department's Exception to Endnote number 4 is REJECTED. Rule 4- 231.160(e), Florida Administrative Code, permits the Department to consider the timeliness of restitution as a mitigating or aggravating factor. The Department does not have any legal authority, aside from situations involving Consent Orders, thorough its penalty rule or statutory provisions of the Florida Insurance Code, to order restitution or to condition its penalty on the making of restitution. Upon careful consideration of the Record, the submissions of the parties and being otherwise advised in the premises, it is ORDERED: The Findings of Fact of the hearing officer, as modified in this Order, are adopted as the Department's Finding of Fact. The Conclusions of Law of the hearing officer, as modified in this Order, are adopted as the Department's Conclusion of Law. The End notes of the hearing officer, as modified in this Order, are adopted as the Department's End notes. The hearing officer's Recommendation that the Administrative Complaint be dismissed is ACCEPTED as being the appropriate disposition for this particular case. Any party to these proceedings adversely affected by this Order is entitled to seek review of this Order pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes, and Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Review proceedings must be instituted by filing a Notice of Appeal with the General Counsel, acting as the agency clerk, at 412 Larson Building, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300, an a copy of the same and the filing fee with the appropriate District Court of Appeal within thirty (30) days of rendition of this Order. DONE and ORDERED this 11th day of July, 1996. BILL NELSON Insurance Commissioner and Treasurer
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered dismissing the administrative complaint. 4/ DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of April 1996 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of April 1996.
