The Issue Whether conviction of income tax evasion in a federal district court in Florida constitutes a violation of Chapter 470, Florida Statutes. If such a conviction is a violation of Chapter 470, Florida Statutes, whether a license nay be revoked or suspended under Chapter 470, Florida Statutes, pending an appeal of such conviction. 3, Whether a hearing on the merits can be heard pending a decision on an appeal of a conviction.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Clarence E. Prevatt holds funeral directors license No. 650 and embalmers license No. 760. Respondent was found guilty by a federal jury on November 14, 1974, of ten counts of willfully and knowingly attempting to evade and defeat a large part of the income tax due and owing by him to the United States of America and adjudged guilty of those crimes by court order dated December 20, 1974. Respondent has appealed his conviction to the United States Circuit Court for Fifth Circuit with oral arguments on said appeal having been heard December 1, 1975. The appeal is still pending. Respondent does not contest the fact of his conviction by a federal jury but contends that a hearing on the merits should not be heard prior to the determination of his appeal of his conviction. The Respondent was charged with the violation of the following subsections of Section 470.12, Florida Statutes: "470.12 Grounds for revocation of license.-- EMBALMER. (c) The licensee is either a habitual drunkard or narcotic addict or has been found guilty by a jury of, or has pleaded guilty to after being charged with, a crime in this state or any other state involving moral turpitude, without regard to whether a judgement of conviction has been entered by the court having jurisdiction of such cases. * * * (k) The licensee has violated any provision of this chapter. FUNERAL DIRECTOR. (c) The licensee is either a habitual drunkard or narcotic addict or has been found guilty of, or has pleaded guilty to, after being charged with, a crime in this state or any other state involving moral turpitude, without regard to whether a judgment of conviction has been entered by the court having jurisdiction of such cases. * * * (p) The licensee has violated any provisions of this chapter." Respondent Prevatt further contends: That a conviction of federal income tax evasion is not a crime in the State of Florida and is not a crime involving moral turpitude and that regardless of the outcome of the appeal his license should not be' suspended or revoked under Section 470.12, Florida Statutes, supra. The Board contends: That a hearing on the revocation should proceed inasmuch as the statute does not require that Respondent be convicted but merely that he be found guilty under Section 470.12(2)(c), Florida Statutes, or that he be found guilty by a jury under Section 470.12(1)(c), Florida Statutes, and that the statutes do not require the Respondent be found guilty of a crime in Florida but merely requires the finding of guilty of a crime "in this state"; that the conviction by a federal jury in the City of Tampa, Florida, is a finding of guilty of a crime in this state; that Florida has laws prohibiting acts of perjury and laws making it a crime to intentionally deprive the true owner of money by false representations; that the condition of filing false and fraudulent income tax returns is an offense involving "moral turpitude"; that the legislature has the right to regulate the moral and character qualifications of professionals and has met the goal by enacting Section 470.12(1)(c), Florida Statutes, and Section 470.12(2)(c), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation It is recommended that embalmer license No. 760 and funeral director license No. 650 of Respondent Clarence E. Prevatt be revoked. DONE AND ORDERED this 2nd day of March, 1976. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth F. Hoffman, Esquire Rogers, Towers, Bailey, Jones & Gay 1300 Florida Title Building Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Raymond E. LaPorte, Esquire 408 Madison Street Tampa, Florida 33602 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL AND OCCUPATIONAL REGULATION BOARD OF FUNERAL DIRECTORS AND EMBALMERS In the Matter of the Revocation or Suspension of the license of Clarence E. Prevatt, licensed, CASE NO. 75-425 Funeral Director and Embalmer 3402 26th Street, Tampa, Florida. /
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaints and Amended Administrative Complaints and, if so, what action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent was licensed by Petitioner as a certified residential contractor, having been issued license number CR C040917. He has been licensed since March 16, 1987. Respondent was the qualifying agent of KM Homes, Inc. (KMH) from June 10, 1995 through March 13, 1997, more than one year but less than two years. On or about February 3, 1997, KMH filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition under Chapter 7 in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of Florida, Case No. 97-30498, with an estimate of assets of less than $50,000.00 and an estimate of liabilities of between $1 million and $10 million. The petition was signed by Kenneth H. Maltz, as president of KMH. On or about February 4, 1997, the next day, Kenneth H. Maltz and his wife, Susan Maltz, filed a joint voluntary bankruptcy petition under Chapter 7. Case No. 01-3827PL On or about April 28, 1996, KMH contracted with Daniel L. Simons and Carol L. Stefanski for the sale of a lot to Simons and Stefanski and for construction of a house on the lot. The contract price for the lot was $45,000.00 and for the construction of the home was $141,000.00, totaling $186,000.00. Respondent's license number did not appear in the contract. In accordance with the contract, Simons and Stefanski made the following payments to KMH: on or about April 28, 1996, $5,000.00; on or about August 21, 1996, $40,000.00; and on or about August 30, 1996, $42,229.60 and $747.00, through their lender, First Federal Savings of the Palm Beaches, pursuant to an August 21, 1996, mortgage loan of $128,000.00. The payments totaled $100,976.60. KMH applied for a building permit from Martin County to build the home for Simons and Stefanski. Respondent's license number appeared on the application. The building permit was never obtained. Beginning on or about August 27, 1996, and at various times thereafter, until approximately January 9, 1997, the lot was cleared and fill was delivered to the lot by KMH's subcontractor, Tideway Construction Company, Inc. (Tideway). The work by Tideway was the only work performed by KMH pursuant to the contract with Simons and Stefanski. KHM did not pay Tideway and Tideway recorded a lien on the lot for $4,084.00. KMH failed to remove Tideway's lien. On or about November 23, 1997, Tideway filed suit to foreclose its lien. Sometime in May 1998, Tideway released the lien in exchange for payment from Simons and Stefanski in the amount of 65 percent of the lien amount. Simons and Stefanski's lender paid the 65 percent from additional funds the lender loaned to Simons and Stefanski to enable them to complete their home. Tideway wrote off the remaining 35 percent. KMH never explained to Simons and Stefanski why it did not complete their home. KMH's trustee in the bankruptcy never offered to complete the work. Simons and Stefanski never fired KMH, never denied KMH access to the property to perform work, and never refused to pay KMH monies due under the contract. Simons considered KMH to have abandoned the job. Simons and Stefanski filed a proof of claim in KMH's bankruptcy for an unsecured non-priority claim in the amount of $58,000.00. They received nothing from the bankruptcy action. In the latter part of 1998, Simons and Stefanski had their home completed by another contractor, Murex, for $143,270.00. The house that Murex completed for Simons and Stefanski was essentially the same house that KMH was to construct, except that the roof structure was different and the garage and back porch were a little larger. KMH never provided Simons and Stefanski with notification of the Construction Industries Recovery Fund. Simons and Stefanski never had any direct dealings with Respondent personally. They attempted to sue Respondent but were unsuccessful. As of November 15, 2001, Petitioner's costs of investigation and prosecution for Case No. 01-3827PL, excluding costs associated with an attorney's time, totaled $457.88. Case No. 01-3828PL On or about June 6, 1996, KMH contracted with Carol Morris for construction of a house on a lot owned by Morris. The contract price for the construction of the house was $287,940.00. Respondent's license number did not appear in the contract. In accordance with the contract, Morris made the following payments to KMH: on or about February 28, 1996, $1,000.00; on or about June 10, 1996, $27,000.00; and on or about August 2, 1996, $109,240.00. The payments totaled $137,240.00. Morris obtained a mortgage loan in the amount of $150,000.00 from First Bank of Florida to finance part of the contract price. On or about September 17, 1996, KMH applied for a building permit from Palm Beach Gardens to construct the home for Morris. Respondent's license number appeared on the application. On or about September 26, 1996, the building permit was approved and issued, bearing building permit number 28644. From approximately September to December 1996, KMH performed work pursuant to the contract and thereafter, did not perform any more work on the home. KMH failed to complete the construction of Morris' home. KMH never explained to Morris why it did not complete her home. KMH's trustee in the bankruptcy never offered to complete the work. Morris never fired KMH, never denied KMH access to the property to perform work, and never refused to pay KMH monies due under the contract. Morris considered KMH to have abandoned the job. KMH's subcontractors/material suppliers recorded liens on Morris' property. The subcontractors/material suppliers recorded liens were as follows: on December 12, 1996, Tideway for $8,438.00; on January 16, 1997, Buckeye Plumbing, Inc. (Buckeye Plumbing) for $3,676.00; on January 22, 1997, Tarmac Florida, Inc. (Tarmac) for $6,296.40; on January 23, 1997, Electrical Express, Inc. (Electrical Express) for $450.00; on February 13, 1997, E. M. Brandon, Inc. (Brandon) for $2,164.00; on February 18, 1997, Tom Rawn Masonry, Inc. (TR Masonry) for $16,454.00; and on April 3, 1997, Spacerace Enterprises, Inc. (Spacerace) for $7,850.00. Morris paid KMH for all the work or materials pertaining to the liens. KMH failed to remove any of the liens. Morris never paid any monies directly to the lien holders to remove any of the liens. However, Morris' lender, First Bank of Florida, assisted her with the resolution of the liens, including allowing its attorney to act as Morris' representative in resolving the liens. In May 1998, Tideway released its lien in exchange for payment by Morris' lender in the amount of 65 percent of the lien amount. Tideway wrote off the remaining 35 percent. The evidence is unclear as to whether Morris was obligated to repay the lender. Buckeye Plumbing, Electrical Express, TR Masonry, Inc., and Spacerace never received any money on their liens and the entire amount of their liens was a complete loss. Tarmac sued to foreclose on its lien, but ultimately dismissed its lawsuit and wrote off the amount of its lien as a bad debt. No testimony was presented regarding the final result of the lien held by Brandon. Morris obtained the services of another contractor, Home Work Group, Inc. (Home Work), to complete the construction of her home. Morris used the original mortgage loan of $150,000.00, a shortfall loan from the same lender in the amount of $45,000.00, and her savings of approximately $43,000.00, to pay Home Work. On or about September 1998, Home Work completed the construction of Morris' house, which was essentially the same as the house which was to be constructed by KMH. Morris received notification of KMH's bankruptcy by mail. She filed a complaint with the bankruptcy court objecting to KMH's discharge. The bankruptcy court eventually dismissed Morris' complaint. Sometime during the year 2000, Morris received $900.00 from KMH's bankruptcy. KMH never provided Morris with notification of the Construction Industries Recovery Fund. During the transaction between KMH and Morris, she knew Respondent as the construction manager for KMH. As of November 15, 2001, Petitioner's costs of investigation and prosecution for Case No. 01-3828PL, excluding costs associated with an attorney's time, totaled $478.70. Case No. 01-3829PL On or about February 23, 1996, KMH contracted with Fred W. Connell, Jr., and his wife, Celia M. Connell, for construction of a house on a lot that the Connells would purchase separately, not as a part of the contract. The contract price for the construction of the house was $258,870.00, which included $18,000.00 for a swimming pool. Respondent's license number did not appear in the contract. In accordance with the contract, the Connells made the following payments to KMH: on or about February 23, 1996, $5,000.00; on or about February 29, 1996, $30,000.00; on or about November 7, 1996, $8,687.00; on or about November 25, 1996, through their lender, First Bank of Florida, pursuant to a mortgage loan, $33,541.00; and on or about December 16, 1996, $24,393.00. The payments totaled $101,621.00. KMH applied for a building permit from the City of North Palm Beach to construct the home for the Connells. Respondent's name and license number appeared on the application. On or about November 5, 1996, the building permit was approved and issued, bearing building permit number 96-01386. From approximately November to December 1996, KMH performed work pursuant to the contract and thereafter, did not perform any more work on the home. KMH failed to complete the construction of the Connells' home. In December 1996, the City of North Palm Beach issued a stop work order due to voids in the concrete walls that made, according to the City of North Palm Beach, the structure of the house unsafe. After the issuance of the stop work order, KMH failed to resume work on the house. KMH never explained to the Connells why it did not complete their home. The Connells fired KMH only after they received notification of KMH's filing for bankruptcy. KMH's trustee in the bankruptcy never offered to complete the work. The Connells considered KMH to have abandoned the job. KMH's subcontractors/material suppliers recorded liens on the Connells' property. The subcontractors/material suppliers and recorded liens were as follows: on January 16, 1997, Palm Beach Masonry (PB Masonry) for $12,125.00; on January 17, 1997, Sasso Air Conditioning, Inc. (Sasso Air) for $550.00; on January 22, 1997, Tarmac for $4,239.21; on January 28, 1997, CPS Construction, Inc. (CPS Construction) for $2,580.00; on January 31, 1997, Gulf Stream Lumber Company (Gulf Stream Lumber) for $19,461.00; and on March 24, 1997, Waste Management of Florida, Inc. (Waste Management) for $276.50. The Connells paid KMH for all the work or materials pertaining to the liens. KMH failed to remove any of the liens. The Connells paid its lender, First Bank of Florida, $25,000.00 in exchange for the lender's assistance in resolving the liens. PB Masonry and Waste Management never received any money on their liens and the entire amount of their liens was a complete loss. On or about August 4, 1997, Sasso Air gave a partial release of its lien in return for payment in the amount of $275.00. Tarmac's notice to owner was untimely, so it chose to not pursue foreclosure proceedings and instead wrote the amount of its lien off as a bad debt. On or about November 11, 1997, Gulf Stream Lumber released its lien in return for payment of $5,000.00 from First Bank of Florida. On May 13, 1997, CPS Construction released its lien in exchange for payment from the Connells in the amount of $2,500.00. On or about April 22, 1997, the Connells obtained the services of another contractor, Villafranca Design and Development, L.C. (Villafranca Design), to complete the construction of their home for $221,000.00. The Connells, through their lender, paid Villafranca Design. Their home was completed shortly before Christmas 1997. The house completed by Villafranca Design was essentially the same as the house which was to be constructed by KMH. Because KMH failed to complete the Connells' home, the Connells, their two children and their two dogs were forced to live on the Connells' boat and to store their furniture for almost a year. During that year, the Connells had to pay dockage fees to live on their boat and storage fees for their furniture. The Connells estimate that the difference in the contract price of their home with KMH and what they eventually paid for their home was conservatively $100,000.00. The Connells did not receive any money from KMH's bankruptcy. KMH never provided the Connells with notification of the Construction Industries Recovery Fund. During the transaction between KMH and the Connells, the Connells knew Respondent as someone who worked in the KMH office. As of November 15, 2001, Petitioner's costs of investigation and prosecution for Case No. 01-3829PL, excluding costs associated with an attorney's time, totaled $519.43. Case No. 01-3830PL On or about September 19, 1996, KMH contracted with William and Iceline Chang for the construction of a house on the lot owned by the Changs. The contract price for the construction of the home was $205,620.00. Respondent's license number did not appear in the contract. In accordance with the contract, the Changs made the following payments to KMH: on or about September 16, 1996, $10,000.00; and on or about October 10, 1996, $10,620.00. Pursuant to a change order for additional site preparation and fill, on or about October 7, 1996, the Changs paid KMH $9,400.00. On or about December 16, 1996, KMH applied for a building permit from Palm Beach County to build the Changs' home. Respondent's license number and Respondent's name as the qualifying agent for KMH appeared on the application. The building permit was never obtained due to KMH's failing to submit the construction plans to Palm Beach County's building department. On December 13, 16, and 19, 1996, the Changs' lot was cleared and fill was delivered to the lot by KMH's subcontractor, Tideway. The work by Tideway was the only work performed by KMH pursuant to the contract with the Changs. KHM did not pay Tideway and Tideway recorded a lien on the lot for $10,900.00. KMH failed to remove Tideway's lien. On or about June 6, 1997, Tideway agreed with the Changs to release the lien in exchange for payment from them in the amount of $9,810.00. The Changs paid Tideway in six monthly installments, June through November 1997, of $1,635.00. On or about November 26, 1997, Tideway gave the Changs a release of its lien. KMH never explained to the Changs why it did not complete their home. KMH's trustee in the bankruptcy never offered to complete the work. The Changs never fired KMH, never denied KMH access to the property to perform work, and never refused to pay KMH monies due under the contract. The Changs considered KMH to have abandoned the job. The Changs had their home completed by another contractor, Villafranca Design, for $203,500.00. Villafranca Design submitted the same construction plans to Palm Beach County's building department that KMH was to use to construct the Changs' home. On or about May 7, 1997, a building permit was issued, bearing permit number B97012080. The house that Villafranca Design completed for the Changs was essentially the same house that KMH was to construct. On or about February 26, 2000, the Changs received $643.29 from KMH's bankruptcy. KMH never provided the Changs with notification of the Construction Industries Recovery Fund. The Changs never had any direct dealings with Respondent personally. As of November 15, 2001, Petitioner's costs of investigation and prosecution for Case No. 01-3830PL, excluding costs associated with an attorney's time, totaled $714.11. Case No. 01-3831PL On or about July 30, 1996, KMH contracted with Harold and Jean Bell to sell them a lot and construct a house on the lot. The contract price for the lot was $53,000.00 and the construction of the home was $186,000.00, totaling $239,000.00. Respondent's license number did not appear in the contract. In accordance with the contract, on or about August 1, 1996, the Bells paid a deposit of $5,000.00 to KMH. On September 19, 1996, the Bells paid, as closing costs, $67,147.63 to Universal Land Title, Inc., which included the cost for the lot and an additional deposit toward construction in the amount of $13,600.00. Subsequently, the Bells received a deed to the lot. KMH never obtained a building permit to construct the house. On or about December 11, 1996, the Bells' lot was cleared and fill was delivered to the lot by KMH's subcontractor, Tideway. The work by Tideway was the only work performed by KMH pursuant to the contract with the Bells. KHM did not pay Tideway, and Tideway recorded a lien on the lot for $3,688.00. KMH failed to remove Tideway's lien. Tideway never received any money on its lien and the entire amount of its lien was a complete loss. KMH never explained to the Bells why it did not complete their home. KMH's trustee in the bankruptcy never offered to complete the work. The Bells never fired KMH, never denied KMH access to the property to perform work, and never refused to pay KMH monies due under the contract. The Bells considered KMH to have abandoned the job. The Bells had their home, with extras, completed by another contractor, Villafranca Design, for approximately $208,000.00. On or about August 2, 2000, the Bells received $996.95 from KMH's bankruptcy. KMH never provided the Bells with notification of the Construction Industries Recovery Fund. On October 1, 2002, Mr. Bell obtained a civil judgment against KMH in the amount of $24,199.64, plus costs of $264.75; prejudgment interest of $21,664.88; and attorney's fees of $2,395.00, totaling $48,524.27. The Bells never had any direct dealings with Respondent personally. As of November 15, 2001, Petitioner's costs of investigation and prosecution for Case No. 01-3831PL, excluding costs associated with an attorney's time, totaled $305.84. Case No. 01-3832PL On or about May 26, 1996, KMH contracted, in a revised contract, with Erol and Yildiz Aksoy for the sale of a lot and construction of a house on a lot. The contract price for the lot was $58,000.00 and construction of the house was $242,000.00, totaling $300,000.00. The revised contract entered into evidence at hearing was incomplete. No determination could be made as to whether Respondent's license appeared in the revised contract. In accordance with the contract, the Aksoys made the following payments to KMH: on or about October 28, 1994, $1,000.003; on or about June 5, 1996, $23,000.00; on or about August 14, 1996, $12,545.00; on or about October 4, 1996, $21,800.00; on or about October 17, 1996, $1,323.00; on or about November 2, 1996, $21,800.00; on or about November 20, 1996, $7,123.00 and $21,800.00; on or about November 22, 1996, $21,800.00; on or about December 13, 1996, $21,800.00; and on or about January 2, 1997, $21,800.00 and $5,000.00. The payments totaled $180,791.00. On or about July 26, 1996, KMH executed and delivered a deed to the Aksoys for the lot. KMH performed work pursuant to the contract, but only performed 55 percent to 60 percent of the construction contracted for. After January 1997, KMH failed to perform any further work on the Aksoys' home. KMH failed to complete the construction of Aksoys' home. KMH never explained to the Aksoys why it did not complete their home. KMH's trustee in the bankruptcy never offered to complete the work. The Aksoys never fired KMH, never denied KMH access to the property to perform work, and never refused to pay KMH monies due under the contract. The Aksoys considered KMH to have abandoned the job. The Aksoys filed a proof of claim in KMH's bankruptcy for an unsecured non-priority claim in the amount of $85,000.00. Sometime in the years 2000 or 2001, they received $918.00 from the bankruptcy action. KMH's subcontractors/material suppliers recorded liens on the Aksoys' property. The subcontractors/material suppliers and recorded liens were as follows: on January 8, 1997, Buckeye Plumbing for $2,570.00; on January 14, 1997, J. W. Hodges Drywall Textures, Inc. (Hodges Drywall) for $3,500.00; on January 15, 1997, Griffin & Wilson Stucco, Inc. (GW Stucco) for $6,040.00; on January 16, 1997, Gallina Electric, Inc. (Gallina Electric) for $3,732.00; on January 17, 1997, Sasso Air for $2,925.00; on January 21, 1997, K. D. Installation, Inc. (KD Installation) for $2,789.00; and on February 5, 1997, Macshmeyer Concrete Company of Florida, Inc. (Macshmeyer Concrete) for $5,814.00. The Aksoys paid KMH for all the work or materials pertaining to the liens. KMH failed to remove any of the liens. The Aksoys paid the lien holders to remove the liens, as follows: on or about February 18, 1997, $2,570.00 to Buckeye Plumbing; on or about April 7, 1997, $1,400.00 to Hodges Drywall, with the remaining unpaid amount ($2,100.00) being a loss for the company; on or about August 6, 1997, $7,760.10 to GW Stucco, which included additional monies for attorney's fees; on or about March 12, 1997, $1,866.00 to Gallina Electric; on or about April 7, 1997, $2,975.00 to Sasso Air; $1,500.00 to KD Installation (date of payment unknown); on or about March 12, 1997, $2,616.00 to Macshmeyer Concrete. The Aksoys also paid for work for which another KMH subcontractor, Spacerace Enterprises, Inc., claimed that KMH had failed to pay. On or about February 18, 1997, the Aksoys obtained the services of another contractor, Villafranca Design, to complete the construction of their home. The Aksoys paid Villafranca Design $145,250.00. In or around May 1997, Villafranca Design completed the construction of the Aksoys' house, which was essentially the same as the house which was to be constructed by KMH. KMH never provided the Aksoys with notification of the Construction Industries Recovery Fund. The Aksoys never had any direct dealings with Respondent personally. As of November 15, 2001, Petitioner's costs of investigation and prosecution for Case No. 01-3828PL, excluding costs associated with an attorney's time, totaled $606.48. Case No. 01-3833PL On or about December 11, 1995, KMH contracted with Milo and Jerolene Glass for construction of a house on a lot owned by the Glasses. The contract price for the construction of the house was $395,795.00. Respondent's license number did not appear in the contract. In accordance with the contract, the Glasses made the following payments to KMH: on or about November 13, 1995, $1,000.00; and on or about December 11, 1995, $39,079.00. The payments totaled $40,079.00. On or about May 21, 1996, KMH applied for a building permit from Palm Beach County to construct the home for the Glasses. Respondent's name as the qualifying agent for KMH and license number appeared on the application. Sometime thereafter in 1996, the building permit was approved and issued, bearing building permit number B96019588. From approximately November 1996 to January 1997, KMH performed work pursuant to the contract, but thereafter, did not perform any further work on the home. KMH failed to complete the construction of the Glasses' home. At the time KMH stopped working on the Glasses' home, a substantial amount of work remained to be completed. Furthermore, much of KMH's work had to be repaired or corrected. KMH never explained to the Glasses why it did not complete her home. KMH's trustee in the bankruptcy never offered to complete the work. The Glasses never fired KMH, never denied KMH access to the property to perform work, and never refused to pay KMH monies due under the contract. The Glasses considered KMH to have abandoned the job. KMH's subcontractors/material suppliers recorded liens on the Glasses' property. The subcontractors/material suppliers and recorded liens were as follows: on January 17, 1997, Sasso Air for $925.00; on January 23, 1997, Electrical Express for $750.00; and on January 28, 1997, R J G Masonry, Inc. (RJG Masonry) for $8,353.99. KMH failed to remove any of the liens. The evidence is unclear as to whether the Glasses paid KMH for all the work or materials pertaining to the liens. The Glasses paid to remove the liens. The Glasses paid the following: $925.00 to Sasso Air for which they received a final waiver of lien dated July 8, 1999; on or about February 14, 1997, $750.00 to Electrical Express for which they received a release of lien dated June 2, 1997; and on or about January 24, 1997, $8,353.99 to RJG Masonary. The Glasses did not obtain the services of another contractor to complete the construction of their home. Contractors whom they approached were very reluctant or unwilling to take over the project. Finally, the Glasses, who had prior experience as owners of other construction projects, became their own contractors and completed their home. They also received the assistance of a contracting firm, but the Glasses handled all the disbursements of funds to the suppliers for labor and materials. By September 2000, the Glasses had substantially completed their home and were living in it. At the time of the hearing, they had sold the house and moved to another location in Florida. The Glasses estimate that they expended $1,239,487.78 in the construction of their home. They maintain that this cost does not include approximately $80,000.00 that the Glasses claim that their original lender paid to KMH without their authorization. The amount paid by the Glasses exceeds the contract price because (1) KMH underbid the job; (2) the Glasses spent substantial sums to repair or correct KMH's work, which the Glasses estimate conservatively to be more than $200,000.00; and (3) the Glasses spent substantial sums on upgrades of contract allowance items. The Glasses received approximately $1,000.00 from KMH's bankruptcy. KMH never provided the Glasses with notification of the Construction Industries Recovery Fund. After the bankruptcy, Mrs. Glass contacted Respondent and requested the construction plans for the home. Respondent indicated that he did not have the plans. Mrs. Glass contacted Respondent again and he indicated that he may be able to locate the plans. Subsequently, Respondent contacted the Glasses and indicated that he had located the plans. The Glasses went to Respondent's place of business to retrieve the plans. After providing the plans, Respondent requested the Glasses to hire him to complete their home. The Glasses declined Respondent's offer because they considered Respondent's cost estimate to be too high and because of Respondent's association with KMH. As of November 15, 2001, Petitioner's costs of investigation and prosecution for Case No. 01-3833PL, excluding costs associated with an attorney's time, totaled $628.33. Case No. 01-3834PL On or about December 8, 1995, KMH contracted with Suzanne Beck for construction of a house on a lot that Beck would acquire at a later date (in 1996), not as a part of the contract. The contract price for the construction of the house was $133,500.00. Respondent's license number did not appear in the contract. In accordance with the contract, Beck made the following payments to KMH: on or about December 8, 1995, $5,000.00; on or about July 31, 1996, $8,350.00 and 5,643.09; on or about August 7, 1996, $5,030.88; on or about September 4, 1996, $12,051.05; on or about September 18, 1996, $12,051.05; on or about October 1, 1996, $12,051.05; on or about October 11, 1996, $12,051.05; on or about November 7, 1996, $12,051.05; and on or about November 26, 1996, $12,051.05 and $12,051.05. The payments totaled $108,381.32. KMH applied for a building permit from the Town of Jupiter to construct the home for Beck. Respondent's name and license number appeared on the application as the contractor. On February 12, 1996, the building permit was approved and issued, bearing building permit number 96-29588. From approximately August to December 1996, KMH performed work pursuant to the contract and thereafter, did not perform any more work on the home. KMH failed to complete the construction of the Beck's home. KMH never explained to Beck why it did not complete her home. Around the end of December 1996 or in January 1997, Beck notified KMH that she was taking over the project. Progress by KMH had been slow and Beck discovered that KMH had closed the doors of its business for a second time and was not paying its subcontractors. Beck considered KMH to have abandoned the job. She obtained an owner's building permit and completed the project, making payments directly to the suppliers of labor and materials. On February 7, 1997, Beck obtained a certificate of occupancy from the Town of Jupiter. KMH's subcontractors/material suppliers recorded liens on the Beck's property. The subcontractors/material suppliers and recorded liens were as follows: on January 6, 1997, American Aluminum and Insulation FireProofing Company, Inc. (American Alum.) for $385.00; on January 6, 1997, Buckeye Plumbing for $2,625.00; on January 14, 1997, Hodges Drywall for $8,280.00; on January 14, 1997, Rizzo Tile & Marble, Inc. (R Tile & Marble) for $1,870.70; on January 15, 1997, James M. Webster d/b/a Rain Flow of South Florida (Rain Flow) for $75.00; on January 17, 1997, K. D. Installation, Inc. (KD Installation) for $520.40; on January 17, 1997, Q. C. Cabinet Systems, Inc. (QC Cabinets) for $3,207.00; on January 17, 1997, Paul Temple Painting (PT Painting) for $2,534.75; on January 17, 1997, Sasso Air for $3,360.00; on January 28, 1997, James Velix Bobcat Service (Bobcat Service) for $1,450.00; on February 4, 1997, Tideway for $279.00; on February 7, 1997, Florida Builder Appliances, Inc. (Builder Appliances) for $2,936.20; on February 7, 1997, Mc D Sprinklers, Inc. (McD Sprinklers)for $1,275.00; on February 11, 1997, Builder Direct Carpet Sales (Direct Carpet) for $1,959.26; and on February 12, 1997, Pollard Electric, Inc. (Pollard Electric) for $3,640.00. Beck paid KMH for all the work or materials pertaining to the liens. KMH failed to remove any of the liens. Beck paid to remove the liens as follows: on or about June 18, 1997, $2,625.00 to Buckeye Plumbing; on or about March 9, 1999, $10,125.00 to PT Painting, Hodges Drywall, R Tile & Marble, and Direct Carpet; and on or about October 19, 1999, $3,360.00 to Sasso Air. Hodges Drywall released its lien for $4,000.00 and the remaining amount of its lien was not paid, which represents a loss to the company. Builder Appliances, Rain Flow, McD Sprinklers, QC Cabinets, and Tideway did not receive payment from any source and the entire amounts of their liens were complete losses. After Beck took over construction of her home from KMH, she spent $19,203.00 to complete the home. Beck did not receive any money from KMH's bankruptcy. KMH never provided Beck with notification of the Construction Industries Recovery Fund. During the transaction between KMH and Beck, she met with Respondent at the job-site on one occasion to discuss some aspects of the project with which she was dissatisfied. Beck had expressed her dissatisfaction in a letter to KMH's owner. As of November 15, 2001, Petitioner's costs of investigation and prosecution for Case No. 01-3834PL, excluding costs associated with an attorney's time, totaled $534.57.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Construction Industry Licensing Board enter a final order: Dismissing the following counts: Count I of Case Nos. 01-3828PL, 01-3831PL, and 01-3833PL. Count IV of Case No. 01-3832PL. Finding that Glenn L. Mustapick committed all other violations in the counts of Case Nos. 01-3827PL, 01-3828PL, 01-3829PL, 01-3830PL, 01-3831PL, 01-3832PL, 01-3233PL, and 01-3834PL. Imposing a $25,000.00 administrative fine. Requiring Respondent to pay restitution not exceeding $25,000.00. Assessing $4,245.34 in costs for investigation and prosecution, excluding costs associated with an attorney's time, by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Construction Industry Licensing Board. Revoking the certified residential license, CR C040917, of Glenn L. Mustapick. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of May, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of May, 2002.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a manager of real estate specializing in condominiums. It was incorporated in Florida on August 30, 1978, as Property Management, Inc. at the address of its attorney and registered agent, Mr. Michael L. Hyman, Suite 400, 28 W. Flagler Street, Miami, Florida 33130. The corporation was involuntarily dissolved by the Secretary of State on December 5, 1979, for failure to file its annual report and pay its annual report filing fee. Petitioner admits that it was delinquent in submitting its annual report and filing fee, but contends that it was entitled to notice of delinquency prior to involuntary dissolution and reissuance of its corporate name. Through testimony of Petitioner's president and corporate counsel's secretary, who opens and distributes incoming mail, Petitioner established that it had not received any of the three notices discussed below. Rather, Petitioner learned of the dissolution in February, 1980, when it sought telephone service. It then submitted the annual report and filing fee which were received by the Secretary of State on March 17, 1980. By that time the name Property Management, Inc. had been issued to another corporation and was not available. Petitioner was therefore reinstated as Property Management of South Florida, Inc. The following notices relevant to this proceeding were prepared by the Secretary of State: January, 1979: Notices to all Florida corporations that annual reports and filing fees were due by July 1, 1979. September 1, 1979: Reminder notices to delinquent corporations that dissolution would follow if annual reports and filing fees were not submitted within 90 days. December 5, 1979: Certificates of dissolution issued to corporations which failed to submit the reports and filing fees. The above notices were prepared from computer data and were transmitted by ordinary mail. Respondent produced a computer printout with Petitioner's correct name and address showing dissolution on December 5, 1979. However, no evidence was adduced to establish that this notice or either of the preceding notices were actually mailed to Petitioner.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner's request for return of the name Property Management, Inc. be DENIED. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of July, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Michael L. Hyman, Esquire Suite 400 Roberts Building 28 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33130 William J. Gladwin, Jr., Esquire Office of the Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact On December 6, 1979, Respondent was employed by The Keyes Company as a sales associate in its Cutler Ridge branch office and was so employed until March 12, 1981. Pursuant to a power of attorney, Andrew Kasprik manages property owned by his father and located at 9604 Sterling Drive, Miami, Florida. Kasprik and Respondent met in October, 1980, and entered into an oral agreement whereby Respondent would obtain a tenant for the house on Sterling Drive and Kasprik would pay him one-half a month's rent for his services. On October 6, 1980, Respondent leased Kasprik's property to John and Debbie Protko on a month-to-month basis at a rent of $650 per month, and Kasprik paid Respondent the agreed-upon commission of $325. The Keyes Company has no record of a listing for rental of property at 9604 Sterling Drive during October, 1980, and Respondent did not turn in to Keyes any funds received by him as a commission or fee for the rental of that property. Prior to March, 1981, Kasprik never dealt directly with Keyes and never signed a listing agreement with Keyes for the rental of the Sterling Drive property. By Notice of Hearing dated November 17, 1981, Respondent was given notice of the hearing in this cause as required by the applicable statutes and rules. Respondent's copy of that notice was not returned, and the undersigned has received no communication from Respondent regarding his attendance or nonattendance.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED THAT: A final order be entered finding Earnest Kelley guilty of the allegations in the Administrative Complaint filed against him and suspending Earnest Kelley's real estate salesman's license for a period of six months. RECOMMENDED this 19th day of February, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of February,1982 COPIES FURNISHED: Theodore J. Silver Esquire 9445 Bird Road Miami, Florida 33165 Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Earnest Kelley 8640 S.W. 112th Street Miami, Florida 33156 Mr. Samuel R. Shorstein Secretary, Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Carlos B. Stafford Executive Director Board of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found Upon the suggestion of a special investigator with the Department of Insurance, a letter dated April 23, 1984, and signed by Northeast Regional Director Thomas P. Poston was written to the respondent at the address listed for him in the Tallahassee licensing office. This letter advised the respondent that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer had received complaints from Orange and Seminole Counties that he was recruiting clients during initial court appearances and that this appeared to be a violation of Section 648.44(b) of the Florida Statutes. The letter admonished respondent to immediately terminate such solicitation and advised him that any additional complaints would bring further action. The evidence does not establish whether respondent received this letter of April 23, 1984. The respondent was involved in another administrative proceeding with the petitioner, the facts of which were not brought into evidence in the instant proceeding. In the former proceeding, Case No. 84-L-3155, a Consent Order was entered which required respondent to pay an administrative fine of $1,000.00 and placed him on probation for a period of one year with the condition that he strictly adhere to the Florida Insurance Code. On or about December 4, 1984, Kenneth Martin was working on the property of Ray Dittmore. Respondent had previously, in July of 1984, written three bailbonds for Mr. Martin, all of which had been forfeited due to Mr. Martin's failure to appear in court. Upon learning of the whereabouts of Mr. Martin, respondent sent his employee, George Burfield, to Mr. Dittmore's property to apprehend Martin and return him to custody. Mr. Dittmore was present when Mr. Burfield arrived to take Martin into custody and felt that Mr. Burfield had misconducted himself during the apprehension process. After the incident, Dittmore telephoned respondent to complain about the conduct of his employee Burfield. Later that same day, Mr. Dittmore went to the Orange County Jail with his attorney, Warren Linsey, for the purpose of posting a cash bond for Kenneth Martin. There were prisoners confined in the Orange County Jail on December 4, 1984. While Mr. Dittmore was at the booking window counting his money, approximately $3,000.00, respondent approached him. Mr. Linsey recalls that respondent immediately introduced himself as a bondsman and offered his services. George Cox, also a bondsman, was present and recalls that when respondent saw Mr. Dittmore counting money at the window, respondent approached him, stated that he was a bail bondsman and informed him that Dittmore did not have to post the cash and could use him (respondent) instead. Mr. Dittmore recalls that after he told the deputy that he wished to bond out Kenneth Martin, respondent approached him at the window and asked him if he was the Dittmore he had spoken to earlier that day. Dittmore then recalls that respondent told him he didn't have to put up $3,000.00 because respondent could sell him a bond. According to Mr. Dittmore, respondent also told him that he wouldn't bond Martin out, that Dittmore was "dumb" for doing so and would end up losing his money. Respondent, who had previously written about $1,800.00 worth of bonds on Kenneth Martin and only received $216.00 as a remission for returning him to custody on December 4, 1984, recalls the incident at the Orange County Jail with Mr. Dittmore as follows. From his nearby position at the booking window, he could overhear and see that a "Dittmore" was there to post a bond for Kenneth Martin. After inquiring of Mr. Dittmore if he was the same Dittmore he had spoken with earlier, respondent introduced himself, apologized for what had happened earlier that day, begged him not to bail Martin out and told him he was foolish for doing so. He does recall later saying to George Cox that there were better ways to invest cash. Because respondent had previously lost money on Kenneth Martin, he had no intention of writing another bond on him on the same date he had been responsible for Martin's return to custody. Joseph Barrow was arrested on May 29, 1985, and was taken to the Seminole County Jail. At the time of his arrest, he had been drinking alcoholic beverages. Although subpoenaed to appear as a witness in this administrative hearing, Joseph Barrow was released and was not called upon to testify by the petitioner. According to sworn testimony taken on January 28, 1986, Joseph Barrow recalls that after he was fingerprinted at the Seminole County Jail on the evening of May 29, 1985, he called home to have his wife contact a bail bondsman to get him out of jail. He does not know if his family did contact a bondsman that night. However, he did speak with a bail bondsman that night at the jail, but could not remember his name. The description of the bondsman given in Joseph Barrow's statement of January 28, 1986, matched the respondent's physical appearance at the hearing. Joseph's wife, Michele Barrow, testified that her husband telephoned her the night he was arrested and asked her to find a bondsman. Neither the time of that telephone conversation nor the family's immediate response to that request were established at the hearing. On May 30, 1985, James Barrow, Joseph's brother; Donna Brino, Joseph's sister; and Michele Barrow, Joseph's wife, were at the Seminole County Jail for the purpose of getting Joseph out of jail. There were prisoners confined at the jail on that date. James recalls that, as he was standing in line to obtain information regarding his brother, respondent was also waiting in line and asked him why he was there. James replied that he was there to get his brother out of jail and asked respondent if he was a bondsman. Respondent stated that he was and asked James who his brother was. After James told respondent that his brother was Joe Barrow, respondent referred to a white piece of paper and replied that he had talked to Joe the previous night and had advised him to wait until the hearing that morning to see if his bond would be reduced. When James learned that he would need $250.00 to get his brother out of jail, he left the jail and went to the bank. When he returned to the jail, respondent approached him and asked him if he had gotten the $250.00. James recalls that when he replied that he had, respondent said "Well, give me the money, and I'll get your brother out of jail." James did not give respondent the money because his sister and sister-in-law who were standing behind respondent, were shaking their head "no." Joseph told James that he had spoken to a bondsman the night before, but could not remember the bondman's name. Michele Barrow recalls that as James was waiting in line at an information window, respondent approached him, asked if he needed a bondsman, and told James that he had spoken to Joseph the night before. At that point in time, Donna Brino, Joseph's sister, was on the telephone trying to contact a bondsman. Donna Brino did not hear the conversation which occurred between James Barrow and the respondent prior to James leaving the jail for the bank. She was aware that Joseph had spoken to a bondsman the night before and that he did not remember who that was. Because of her use of pronouns in lieu of names, Ms. Brino's description of the events which transpired on May 30th at the Seminole County Jail is unclear. She apparently telephoned Action Bail Bonds and left a message. While waiting for the message to be returned, she saw Bruce Moncrief, another bondsman, and spoke with him about writing her brother's bond. She stated that after she had already made arrangements with bondsman Bruce Moncrief, respondent told her she was stupid for using Moncrief and attempted to obtain the money from her brother James. Respondent testified that he was called to the Seminole County Jail by someone in the Barrow family on the evening of May 29, 1985. He went to the jail and spoke with Joseph Barrow. Upon learning that Joseph could not then afford to arrange for the $5,000.00 bail which had been set, respondent advised Joseph to wait until the next day when the amount of bail would be reduced. Respondent states that Joseph told him that his brother would get some money and would be contacting him. Respondent told Joseph that he would be at the jail the next day for the first appearances. Respondent also states that Joseph's brother, James, called him the next morning and he told James that it was better to wait until the first appearance and the reduction of the bond, that he would be at the jail for first appearances and that he would meet him there at that time. Respondent admits that he did approach James at the Seminole County Jail because he looked like his brother, Joseph, and said "I'm the one you're looking for. I talked to you this morning." After Joseph's bond was reduced to $2,500.00, respondent communicated this to James, and James left to go to the bank to get the money. At this point, respondent believed that he was going to write the bond, so he began preparing the papers and waited 30 to 45 minutes for James to return with the money. It was not until James returned from the bank that respondent learned he was not going to write Joseph's bond and that the family had obtained Mr. Moncrief instead.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Amended Administrative Complaint against the respondent be DISMISSED. Respectfully submitted and entered this day of September, 1986. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of September, 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 86-0462 The proposed findings of fact submitted by the petitioner and the respondent have been carefully considered and are accepted and/or incorporated in this Recommended Order, except as noted below: Petitioner 6 and 7. Rejected, not supported by competent, substantial evidence. 8 and 9. Rejected. These ultimate conclusions are not supported by competent, substantial evidence. 11. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Rejected, not supported by competent, substantial evidence. 19 and 20. Rejected as Unsupported by the evidence. Respondent - Respondent's proposals contain unnumbered and mixed factual findings and legal conclusions. Each of the topics included has been addressed in either the Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law section of this Recommended Order, except: Page 2, first paragraph Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial. Page 4, last full paragraph Rejected, Unsupported and irrelevant in light of factual findings and legal conclusions. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard W. Thornburg, Esquire Bill Gunter Department of Insurance Insurance Commissioner Legal Division and Treasurer 413-B Larson Building Department of Insurance Tallahassee, Florida 32301 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Joseph R. Fritz, Esquire 4204 North Nebraska Avenue Tampa, Florida 33603
The Issue Whether Respondent's license as a Limited Surety Agent should be suspended or revoked for alleged violations of Section 648.45, Florida Statutes, as set forth in the Administrative Complaint, dated August 14, 1978. Notice of Hearing was mailed to the Respondent at his last address of record with Petitioner on October 26, 1978, by the Division of Administrative Hearings. The record reflects that the Administrative Complaint issued by Petitioner had been received by the Respondent at that address by virtue of the fact that he had filed an answer to the complaint on September 8, 1978. Neither Respondent nor any representative appeared at the place of hearing at the designated time. Accordingly, the matter was tried as an uncontested proceeding.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Ronald John Anderson, North Miami Florida, is currently licensed as a limited surety agent with Petitioner and was so licensed to represent the Stuyvesant Insurance Company during the period October 1 to September 30, 1977. A limited surety agent licensed under Chapter 648, Florida Statutes, is a bail bondsman whose authority extends only to a power of attorney to execute or countersign bail bonds in connection with judicial proceedings. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1, Testimony of Stewart) On December 15, 1976, Respondent purportedly acting on behalf of the Stuyvesant Insurance Company, New York City, New York, posted a $1,000 immigration bond on behalf of Brutus Cadet, an alien of Haitian nationality, with the Immigration and Naturalization Service, United States Department of Justice, at Miami, Florida. The bond was conditioned for the delivery of an alien; however, the power of attorney executed by Respondent, power no. 582936, recited on its face that the said power of attorney authorized Respondent to execute a criminal bail bond on behalf of the said company. In like manner, on March 24, 1977, Respondent attached his power of attorney no. 603734, for Perelus Charles, a Haitian national, on a $2,500 immigration bond, which was posted with the United States Department of Justice Immigration and Naturalization Service in Miami, Florida. Both bonds were approved and accepted by the district director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. (Petitioner's Exhibit 4, Supplemented by Petitioner's Exhibit 5) Respondent's contract with the Stuyvesant Insurance Company appointed Respondent as executing agent for the company in Florida for the soliciting and writing of bail bonds, and provided in paragraph 13 thereof that such excuting agent could excute and renew only this type of bond. In fact, separate power of attorney forms were issued by the Stuyvesant Insurance Company for criminal bail bonds and immigration bonds. (Petitioner's Exhibits 2, 6) The only persons authorized to write immigration bonds in Florida are general lines insurance agents licensed under Chapter 626, F.S. (Testimony of Stewart) Although Respondent did not appear at the hearing, he filed an answer in this cause wherein he admitted executing the bonds in question but stated that he was not aware that a bail bondsman could not execute immigration bonds and that it was a common practice by all Dade and Broward County bondsmen. The answer further recited that in order to preclude the surrender of the principals to the custody of the Immigration Service, Respondent obtained new bonds from another Dade County bondsman and paid the premiums himself. The facts alleged in Respondent's answer are considered admissions against interest properly cognizable in this proceeding. (Case Pleadings )
Recommendation That an administrative penalty of $100 be imposed against Respondent and that he be administered a public reprimand, pursuant to Section 648.52(1), Florida Statutes, for the aforesaid actions falling within the purview of Section 648.45 (1)(j), Florida Statutes. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of December, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas A. T. Taylor, Esquire Department of Insurance Room 428A - Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Ronald John Anderson 2170 NE 122nd Road North Miami, Florida 33181
The Issue The issues are whether, in violation of section 648.45(3)(c), Florida Statutes, Respondent executed a bond after a judgment had been entered on a bail bond that she had executed and the judgment had remained unpaid or unsecured for at least 35 days; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent has been licensed as a limited surety (bail bond) agent, holding license number A097887. She has not been previously disciplined. From March 2004 through August 2010, Respondent was appointed as a bail bond agent to represent Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Company (Lumbermens). On August 3, 2007, Respondent, as a bail bond agent, issued a bond on behalf of her principal, Lumbermens, in the amount of $75,000 for defendant Richard Benton. Almost two years later, Mr. Benton failed to appear at a mandatory court appearance on May 15, 2009, in Broward Circuit Court Case 07-13631CF10A. On May 15, 2009, a circuit judge entered an Order Estreating Bond, which ordered Lumbermens to pay $75,000 to the Broward County Clerk of Courts. On July 17, 2009, the Broward County Clerk of Courts entered a judgment in the amount of $75,000 against Lumbermens based on the Order Estreating Bond (Judgment). After "Ordered and Adjudged," the Judgment reads: "Judgment in the amount of $75,000 be and the same is hereby entered against Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Ins as surety" plus interest. On July 17, 2009, the Clerk's office served a copy of the Judgment to the bail bond agency at which Respondent worked. By Clerk's Certificate of Unsatisfied Judgment dated August 21, 2009, the Broward County Clerk of Courts certified that the $75,000 Judgment had not been satisfied as of the date of the certificate. The certificate, which, on its face, was not served on Respondent or her bail bond agency, states erroneously that the Judgment was against Lumbermens and Respondent. This flawed certificate does not establish by clear and convincing evidence that the Judgment was unpaid, nor do the confusing docket remarks that the civil action against Lumbermens was "Disposed by Other," as indicated under the column marked "Statistical Closure(s)." However, Petitioner introduced into evidence Petitioner Exhibit 7, which is another Clerk's certificate certifying that the Judgment remained unpaid as of September 28, 2017. This establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the Judgment remains outstanding. After the expiration of 35 days following the entry of the Judgment, Respondent continued to execute surety bonds as a bail bond agent for one or more surety companies. In 2015, an investigator employed by Petitioner called Respondent and informed her about the Judgment against Lumbermens. The investigator told Respondent that the Judgment was outstanding and "could affect her license."
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating section 448.44(1)(m), Florida Statutes; suspending her limited surety license for three months; and reinstating the license at the end of three months without regard to whether the Judgment remains outstanding. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of November, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of November, 2017. COPIES FURNISHED: Matthew R. Daley, Esquire Department of Financial Services Office of the General Counsel 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Frank Eduardo Gil, Esquire The Law Office of Frank E. Gil, P.A. 10689 North Kendall Drive, Suite 208 Miami, Florida 33176 (eServed) Julie Jones, CP, FRP, Agency Clerk Division of Legal Services Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390 (eServed)
Conclusions This case came before me for the purpose of issuing a final agency order. The Administrative Law Judge, Stephen F. Dean, assigned by the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) to the above-styled case, entered his Recommended Order dated June 4, 2004. In the Recommended Order, the Administrative Law Judge explained that the Division of Retirement could not process the Petitioner’s Petition for Benefits absent a judicial order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction determining heirs and a judicial order of guardianship of minor heirs. At the time the Recommended Order was issued, the Petitioner had not submitted either order to the Division of Retirement. The Administrative Law Judge recommended that the Division of Retirement allow the Petitioner to submit the required judicial orders within 45 days of the date of the order. In addition, the Administrative Law Judge recommended the Division’s dismissal of the Petition for Benefits, upon Petitioner's failure to provide the judicial orders within the 45 day time period. Prior to the Administrative Law Judge’s Recommended Order, the Petitioner submitted an Order Determining Beneficiaries to the Division of Retirement. Rather than submit the judicial orders identified by the Administrative Law Judge in response to the Recommended Order, the Petitioner filed a Notice of Exception stating that documents submitted prior to the Recommended Order fulfilled the requirements of the Recommended Order. Those documents were part of the application for benefits that the Administrative Law Judge determined are inadequate to support the Petition for Benefits. Because the exception is not responsive to the Recommended Order, it is rejected. The Division hereby adopts and incorporates by reference the Recommended Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge on June 4, 2004. A copy of that Recommended Order is attached hereto and made a part hereof as “Exhibit A.” Based upon the foregoing, it is ORDERED and DIRECTED that the application filed by Lavondra Steadman o/b/o John Steadman is rejected and the request for retirement benefits is hereby Denied. DONE and ORDERED this A k day of l , 2004, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Soult. Serra SARABETH SNUGGS ~~ State Retirement Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 (850) 488-5541
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for licensure should be denied based upon his prior disciplinary history by the Florida Bar and failure to provide proof of satisfaction of resulting cost judgments against him, as indicated in the Notice of Denial issued by Respondent on February 12, 2016.
Findings Of Fact DFS is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulation of insurance in Florida pursuant to chapter 626, Florida Statutes. On September 4, 2015, Petitioner, Jeffrey A. Norkin, applied for licensure as a life, including health and variable annuity, insurance agent. On February 12, 2016, DFS issued a Notice of Denial with respect to Petitioner's application based upon Petitioner's disciplinary history with the Florida Bar ("Bar") and his failure to pay amounts assessed in his suspension and disbarment proceedings. Petitioner's Background Petitioner graduated from the University of Miami Law School in 1992 and was admitted to the Florida Bar in 1993. Prior to attending law school, Petitioner worked for several months as a life insurance agent and for a commodities broker. Until his suspension from the practice of law on October 31, 2013, Petitioner maintained a successful general litigation practice in Broward County, Florida, handling commercial disputes and civil rights matters, including the representation of victims in police brutality cases. Petitioner's Disciplinary History as an Attorney Petitioner's 2003 Reprimand On April 20, 1999, in the case of Greenberg v. Hunter, U.S. District Court, Northern District of Florida, Case No. 4:99cv45 WS, Judge William Stafford issued a Contempt Order against Petitioner for, among other things, falsely accusing opposing counsel of improperly interrupting a deposition to coach his client. Judge Stafford noted: I have observed . . . [Petitioner] is constantly accusatory in tone and by choice of words. He has been consistently disrespectful to the court, to the lawyers, to the parties, to the witnesses. He has accused counsel of spoliation of the evidence, of illegal conduct, of unprofessional behavior, of lying. He has demeaned the justice system, law enforcement, and his own profession, and my profession. He has refused to accept the court's rulings. He has constantly argued about rulings once I've made them. . . . He has called not just one attorney incompetent, but almost every attorney that has appeared here either as a witness or as counsel of record, and even his own client's prior counsel . . . . He has berated the court. . . . The Fla. Bar v. Norkin, 132 So. 3d 77, 88 (Fla. 2013). Judge Stafford banned Petitioner from practicing in the Northern District for a year. As a result, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida instituted a disciplinary action pursuant to the Rules Governing Attorney Discipline, Local Rules for the Southern District of Florida, Rule V(B). The matter was ultimately referred to the Bar for prosecution and on September 24, 2003, the Florida Supreme Court in SC02-854,2/ in its capacity as the Bar Disciplinary Board, disciplined Petitioner for "disrespectful, accusatory, argumentative, and rude behavior," by issuing a public reprimand, entering judgment for the recovery of costs against Petitioner in the amount of $930.00, and instructed him to attend 30 hours of continuing legal education. The Fla. Bar v. Norkin, 132 So. 3rd at 87 (citing The Fla. Bar v. Norkin, 858 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 2003)(unpublished table decision). Petitioner's 2013 Suspension Petitioner represented David Beem in a commercial litigation dispute, Gary Ferguson, individually, and derivatively on behalf of Floors to Doors, Inc. v. David Beem and Floors to Doors, Inc., Circuit Court Case Number: 07-34790 CA 20, in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami- Dade County ("Ferguson v. Beem"), which began in 2007. The litigation was very contentious and opposing counsel representing Ferguson, Gary Brooks, initiated a grievance against Petitioner, which resulted in the Bar complaint filed against Petitioner in July 2011. On October 31, 2013, in The Florida Bar v. Norkin, supra, the Florida Supreme Court, again in its capacity as the Bar Disciplinary Board, suspended Petitioner's license to practice law for 24 months, issued him a public reprimand, placed him on probation for 18 months upon reinstatement of his license, assessed costs against him in the amount of $7,970.53, and assessed administrative fees against him in the amount of $1,250.00 for engaging in unprofessional conduct in the Ferguson v. Beem litigation. Petitioner was cited for violating the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 4-3.5(c), 4-8.2(a), 4-8.4(a), and 4-8.4(d),3/ for disrupting several court hearings by yelling at judges and exhibiting disrespectful conduct, falsely accusing a senior judge of criminal conduct to berate him into withdrawing his request for a fee, and engaging in "relentless unethical and unprofessional" efforts to denigrate and humiliate opposing counsel. The court adopted the referee's findings of fact and recommendations as to guilt, because they were supported by competent, substantial evidence, including witness testimony, exhibits, and transcripts from the Ferguson v. Beem litigation. However, the court disapproved the referee's recommended sanction of a 90-day suspension and, instead, imposed a two-year suspension. The Court held: Competent, zealous representation is required when working on a case for a client. There are proper types of behavior and methods to utilize when aggressively representing a client. Screaming at judges and opposing counsel, and personally attacking opposing counsel by disparaging him and attempting to humiliate him, are not among the types of acceptable conduct but are entirely unacceptable. One can be professional and aggressive without being obnoxious. Attorneys should focus on the substance of their cases, treating judges and opposing counsel with civility, rather than trying to prevail by being insolent toward judges and purposefully offensive toward opposing counsel. This Court has been discussing professionalism and civility for years. We do not tolerate unprofessional and discourteous behavior. We do not take any pleasure in sanctioning Norkin, but if we are to have an honored and respected profession, we are required to hold ourselves to a higher standard. Norkin has conducted himself in a manner that is the antithesis of what this Court expects from attorneys. By his unprofessional behavior, he has denigrated lawyers in the eyes of the public. Norkin's violations of the Bar rules and unprofessional behavior merit a two-year suspension and a public reprimand. We direct Norkin to appear personally before this Court to receive the public reprimand. His unprofessional conduct is an embarrassment to all members of The Florida Bar. Id. at 93. Petitioner's conduct was considered so outrageous that the court, in footnote 5 stated, "Members of The Florida Bar, law professors, and law students should study the instant case as a glaring example of unprofessional behavior." Id. Petitioner's 2015 Disbarment The Court's opinion required Petitioner to fully comply with Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 3-5.1(h), which requires a suspended attorney to give notice of the suspension to all clients, opposing counsel or co-counsel, and all courts, tribunals, or adjudicative agencies before which the attorney is counsel of record by furnishing them with a copy of the suspension order. The rule also requires the suspended attorney, within 30 days of service of the order, to furnish Bar counsel with a sworn affidavit listing the names and addresses of all persons and entities to which notice was given. On December 31, 2013, the Bar filed a petition for contempt and order to show cause against Petitioner in case number SC13-2480 alleging that despite several notifications of his noncompliance, he had failed to submit the required affidavit to Bar counsel. On January 13, 2014, the Bar filed an amended petition also alleging that Petitioner had engaged in the practice of law after the effective date of the suspension. Petitioner admits ghostwriting numerous pleadings for Mr. Beem after his suspension, both in the Ferguson v. Beem litigation and in In Re: Gary Ferguson, Debtor, United States Bankruptcy Court Case Number 12-22368, in and for the Southern District of Florida ("Ferguson bankruptcy"). In the meantime, the Bar filed, in case number SC11- 1356, a motion for sanctions against Petitioner. The motion alleged that after having been suspended and publicly reprimanded by the Court, Petitioner sent Bar counsel three offensive and threatening e-mails evidencing "complete disregard for the contents of the Court's opinion, as well as the reprimand administered by Justice Polston." The motion also pointed out that Petitioner, through his countenance and physical conduct while the public reprimand was being administered in case number SC11-1356, showed his contempt for the court. The motion urged the court to disbar Petitioner. This motion was referred to the referee in case number SC13-2480 for a hearing and recommendation. On September 3, 2014, the referee filed a report and recommendation on the Bar's petition for contempt and the motion for sanctions. The referee found that based upon Petitioner's own response to the motion for summary judgment and testimony at the hearing, there were no genuine issues of material fact with respect to the allegations concerning Petitioner's failure to comply with Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 3-5.1(h). Similarly, based on Petitioner's response and his own testimony at the hearing, the referee found that there was no genuine issue of fact concerning whether he engaged in the practice of law after the effective date of his suspension. The referee also found that with regard to the Bar's motion for sanctions, Petitioner knowingly or through callous indifference disparaged, threatened, and humiliated Bar counsel, in violation of Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4-8.4(d). Based on these findings, the referee recommended that Petitioner be found in contempt of the court's suspension order in SC11-1356, and that he be disbarred. The Florida Supreme Court unanimously approved the recommendation, permanently disbarred Petitioner from the practice of law, and entered a judgment against Petitioner for costs in the amount of $3,034.19. See The Fla. Bar v. Norkin, 183 So. 3rd 1018 (Fla. 2015). In support of its decision, the court reasoned: Moreover, given Norkin's continuation of his egregious behavior following his suspension and during the administration of the public reprimand, we conclude that he will not change his pattern of misconduct. Indeed, his filings in the instant case continue to demonstrate his disregard for this Court, his unrepentant attitude, and his intent to continue his defiant and contemptuous conduct that is demeaning to this Court, the Court's processes, and the profession of attorneys as a whole. Such misconduct cannot and will not be tolerated as it sullies the dignity of judicial proceedings and debases the constitutional republic we serve. We conclude that Norkin is not amenable to rehabilitation, and as argued by the Bar, is deserving of permanent disbarment. Id. at 1023. The Application On September 4, 2015, Petitioner began his application for licensure as a resident life, including variable annuity and health, insurance agent. On November 5, 2015, DFS sent Petitioner a deficiency letter asking for, among other things, proof that he "paid all outstanding monies due the Florida Bar for recovery of costs ($7,970.53) and administrative fees ($1,250.00), with reference to . . . Florida Supreme Court Case 11-1356." On November 17, 2015, DFS received a letter from Petitioner indicating that he had not paid the costs or fees assessed against him in the 2013 Action. Petitioner stated "[m]ost of them are nothing more than fabricated costs, invented, and unsupported in any way by the Florida Bar as a revenue producer and as an additional means of harassing me." This submission completed his application. Petitioner admits that to date, the assessments from the suspension and disbarment have not been paid, and he has no intention of paying them. On February 12, 2016, DFS informed Petitioner of its intent to deny his application based on the Bar proceedings against him. DFS did not interview anyone, including Petitioner, prior to denying the application. Matt Tamplin, DFS Bureau Chief of Licensing, made the decision to deny Petitioner's application for lack of fitness based on Petitioner's suspension, disbarment, and failure to pay the costs or fees the Bar assessed against him. The position for which Petitioner seeks licensure is one of public trust. Tamplin's rational for the application denial was that "Florida is a very diverse and vulnerable population" and that Petitioner's disciplinary history resulted in "very serious concerns about Mr. Norkin's failure to follow rules under a regulatory authority." Petitioner's Position Petitioner does not dispute his disciplinary record or the fact that the fees assessed are not paid. However, he takes no responsibility for his actions, which resulted in his suspension and disbarment. He claims that every negative allegation against him "has been a total lie." For example, although Petitioner admits that he yelled about Judge Stafford and his rulings in a crowded public restaurant on a lunch break during trial, he speculates that he was disciplined by the federal court for the Northern District of Florida and the Bar in 2003, because he and his client were Jewish, he was "too handsome," "too young," "too loud," or "from New York." Regarding the 2013 suspension, Petitioner contends that he did nothing wrong, he apologized to the judges when he raised his voice, and that his actions towards his opposing counsel were justified because the litigation was "destroying" his client's life. Petitioner asserts he was not fully advised of the charges against him and that he was not under an obligation to disseminate the Florida Supreme Court's order of suspension to all of his opposing counsel and judges before whom he had cases pending because "the decision did not require me to send them the outrageous, false, and defamatory decision." Petitioner fully admits ghostwriting pleadings for Mr. Beem in both the Ferguson v. Beem civil litigation and Ferguson bankruptcy proceedings after his suspension. Petitioner, who was not a party to either litigation, contends this was not the unlicensed practice of law, because he was working to protect his "vested interest" in attorney's fees earned and "to protect my client from having the court be used as a weapon to steal money from him." Petitioner argues he was "the only lawyer in the world" who would help Mr. Beem and that he was not practicing law because he was not collecting fees from Mr. Beem. Petitioner also admits "staring down" each Florida Supreme Court Justice during his public reprimand, but justifies it as his attempt to humanize himself in their eyes. He also believes it was constitutionally protected non-verbal speech and that he did not receive due process because the justices did not ask him to stop staring or recuse themselves. Petitioner explains his threatening communication to Bar counsel: And I wrote an email to my bar counsel who destroyed my life telling her that she did something, I can't remember what it was, and telling her that she was the most despicable lawyer and that's the–-and that I'm going to file a lawsuit against her and to keep an eye out for it. To date, Petitioner has not paid the assessments of the Bar and has no intention of doing so. He claims an inability to pay because of his disbarment and alleges that the imposition of the costs "along with all the other punishment was unconstitutional, and completely unjustified." Petitioner argues there is no correlation between his disciplinary history as a lawyer and his ability to sell life insurance.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that DFS enter a final order denying Petitioner’s application for licensure as a life, including variable annuity and health, insurance agent in Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of August, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MARY LI CREASY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of August, 2016.
