The Issue Whether Isabelle Dianderas, a minor, qualifies for coverage under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan (Plan). If so, whether the hospital and the participating physician gave the patient notice, as contemplated by Section 766.316, Florida Statutes, or whether notice was not required because the patient had an "emergency medical condition," as defined by Section 395.002(9)(b), Florida Statutes, or the giving of notice was not practicable.
Findings Of Fact Findings related to compensability Maribenny Dianderas and Arturo Dianderas are the natural parents and guardians of Isabelle Dianderas, a minor. Isabelle was born a live infant on October 8, 2002, at Florida Hospital, a hospital located in Orlando, Florida, and her birth weight exceeded 2,500 grams. The physician providing obstetrical services at Isabelle's birth was Natasha M. Knight, M.D., who, at all times material hereto, was a "participating physician" in the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, as defined by Section 766.302(7), Florida Statutes. Pertinent to this case, coverage is afforded by the Plan for infants who suffer a "birth-related neurological injury," defined as an "injury to the brain . . . caused by oxygen deprivation . . . occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery period in a hospital, which renders the infant permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired." § 766.302(2), Fla. Stat. See also §§ 766.309(1) and 766.31(1), Fla. Stat. Here, the proof is compelling, and uncontroverted, that Isabelle suffered an injury to the brain caused by oxygen deprivation in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery period in the hospital that rendered her permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired. (Joint Exhibits 1-4; Transcript, pages 125-145). Consequently, the record demonstrated that Isabelle suffered a "birth-related neurological injury" and, since obstetrical services were provided by a "participating physician" at birth, the claim is compensable. §§ 766.309(1) and 766.31(1), Fla. Stat. The notice issue While the claim qualifies for coverage under the Plan, Petitioners would prefer to pursue their civil remedies, and avoid a claim of Plan immunity by the healthcare providers in a civil action. Therefore, Petitioners have averred, and requested a finding that, the hospital and the participating physician who delivered obstetrical services at Isabelle's birth, failed to comply with the notice provisions of the Plan. See Galen of Florida, Inc. v. Braniff, 696 So. 2d 308, 309 (Fla. 1997)("[A]s a condition precedent to invoking the Florida Birth- Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan as a patient's exclusive remedy, health care providers must, when practicable, give their obstetrical patients notice of their participation in the plan a reasonable time prior to delivery.") Consequently, it is necessary to resolve whether the notice provisions of the Plan were satisfied.1 The notice provisions of the Plan At all times material hereto, Section 766.316, Florida Statutes, prescribed the notice requirements of the Plan, as follows: Each hospital with a participating physician on its staff and each participating physician, other than residents, assistant residents, and interns deemed to be participating physicians under s. 766.314(4)(c), under the Florida Birth- Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan shall provide notice to the obstetrical patients as to the limited no-fault alternative for birth-related neurological injuries. Such notice shall be provided on forms furnished by the association and shall include a clear and concise explanation of a patient's rights and limitations under the plan. The hospital or the participating physician may elect to have the patient sign a form acknowledging receipt of the notice form. Signature of the patient acknowledging receipt of the notice form raises a rebuttable presumption that the notice requirements of this section have been met. Notice need not be given to a patient when the patient has an emergency medical condition as defined in s. 395.002(9)(b) or when notice is not practicable. Section 395.002(9)(b), Florida Statutes, defines "emergency medical condition" to mean: (b) With respect to a pregnant woman: That there is inadequate time to effect safe transfer to another hospital prior to delivery; That a transfer may pose a threat to the health and safety of the patient or fetus; or That there is evidence of the onset and persistence of uterine contractions[2] or rupture of the membranes. The Plan does not define "practicable." However, "practicable" is a commonly understood word that, as defined by Webster's dictionary, means "capable of being done, effected, or performed; feasible." Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary, Second Edition (1979). See Seagrave v. State, 802 So. 2d 281, 286 (Fla. 2001)("When necessary, the plain and ordinary meaning of words [in a statute] can be ascertained by reference to a dictionary."). The NICA brochure Responding to Section 766.316, Florida Statutes, NICA developed a brochure (as the "form" prescribed by the Plan), titled "Peace of Mind for an Unexpected Problem" (the NICA brochure), which contained an explanation of a patient's rights and limitations under the Plan, and distributed the brochure to participating physicians and hospitals so they could furnish a copy of it to their obstetrical patients. (Joint Exhibit 5). Pertinent to this case, the NICA brochure applicable to Mrs. Dianderas' prenatal care and Isabelle's birth provided: The birth of a baby is an exciting and happy time. You have every reason to expect that the birth will be normal and that both mother and child will go home healthy and happy. Unfortunately, despite the skill and dedication of doctors and hospitals, complications during birth sometimes occur. Perhaps the worst complication is one which results in damage to the newborn's nervous system - called a "neurological injury." Such an injury may be catastrophic, physically, financially and emotionally. In an effort to deal with this serious problem, the Florida Legislature, in 1988, passed a law which created a Plan that offers an alternative to lengthy malpractice litigation processes brought about when a child suffers a qualifying neurological injury at birth. The law created the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association (NICA). EXCLUSIVE REMEDY The law provides that awards under the Plan are exclusive. This means that if an injury is covered by the Plan, the child and its family are not entitled to compensation through malpractice lawsuits. CRITERIA AND COVERAGE Birth-related neurological injuries have been defined as an injury to the spinal cord or brain of a live-born infant weighing at least 2500 grams at birth. In the case of multiple gestation, the live birth weight is 2000 grams for each infant. The injury must have been caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury, which occurred in the course of labor, delivery or resuscitation in the immediate post delivery period in a hospital. Only hospital births are covered. The injury must have rendered the infant permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired. The legislation does not apply to genetic or congenital abnormalities. Only injuries to infants delivered by participating physicians, as defined in s. 766.302(7), Florida Statutes, are covered by the Plan. COMPENSATION Compensation may be provided for the following: Actual expenses for necessary and reasonable care, services, drugs, equipment, facilities and travel, excluding expenses that can be compensated by state or federal government or by private insurers. In addition, an award, not to exceed $100,000 to the infant's parents or guardians. Funeral expenses are authorized up to $1,500. Reasonable expenses for filing the claim, including attorney's fees. NICA is one of only two (2) such programs in the nation, and is devoted to managing a fund that provides compensation to parents whose child may suffer a qualifying birth-related neurological injury. The Plan takes the "No-Fault" approach for all parties involved. This means that no costly litigation is required and the parents of a child qualifying under the law who file a claim with the Division of Administrative Hearings may have all actual expenses for medical and hospital care paid by the Plan. You are eligible for this protection if your doctor is a participating physician in the NICA Plan. If your doctor is a participating physician, that means that your doctor has purchased this benefit for you in the event that your child should suffer a birth-related neurological injury, which qualifies under the law. If your health care provider has provided you with a copy of this informational form, your health care provider is placing you on notice that one or more physician(s) at your health care provider participates in the NICA Plan. (Joint Exhibit 5). Here, Petitioners contend the brochure prepared by NICA was insufficient to satisfy the notice provision of the Plan (which requires that the form "include a clear and concise explanation of a patient's rights and limitations under the plan"), because it failed to include an explanation of the civil remedies a patient would forego if she chose a participating provider. (Transcript, pages 11-13). However, neither Galen of Florida, Inc. v. Braniff, 696 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1997), the authority relied upon by Petitioners, nor the notice provision of the Plan, place such an obligation on NICA in the formulation of the brochure. In Galen, supra, the Court had for consideration the following question certified to be of great public importance: WHETHER SECTION 766.316, FLORIDA STATUTES (1993), REQUIRES THAT HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS GIVE THEIR OBSTETRICAL PATIENTS PRE-DELIVERY NOTICE OF THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE FLORIDA BIRTH RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY COMPENSATION PLAN AS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO THE PROVIDERS' INVOKING NICA AS THE PATIENTS' EXCLUSIVE REMEDY? Id. at 308. In answer to the certified question, the Court held: . . . as a condition precedent to invoking the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan as a patient's exclusive remedy, health care providers must, when practicable, give their obstetrical patients notice of their participation in the plan a reasonable time prior to delivery. Id. at 309. The Court reasoned, as follows: Section 766.316 provides in pertinent part: Each hospital with a participating physician on its staff and each participating physician . . . under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan shall provide notice to the obstetrical patients thereof as to the limited no-fault alternative for birth- related neurological injuries. Such notice shall be provided on forms furnished by the association and shall include a clear and concise explanation of a patient's rights and limitations under the plan. Without exception the district courts of appeal that have addressed the issue have read section 766.316 to require pre-delivery notice . . . . We agree with the district courts that the only logical reading of the statute is that before an obstetrical patient's remedy is limited by the NICA plan, the patient must be given pre-delivery notice of the health care provider's participation in the plan. Section 766.316 requires that obstetrical patients be given notice "as to the limited no-fault alternative for birth-related neurological injuries." That notice must "include a clear and concise explanation of a patient's rights and limitations under the plan." § 766.316. This language makes clear that the purpose of the notice is to give an obstetrical patient an opportunity to make an informed choice between using a health care provider participating in the NICA plan or using a provider who is not a participant and thereby preserving her civil remedies. Turner v. Hubrich, 656 So. 2d 970, 971 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). In order to effectuate this purpose a NICA participant must give a patient notice of the "no-fault alternative for birth-related neurological injuries" a reasonable time prior to delivery, when practicable. Our construction of the statute is supported by its legislative history. Florida's Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan was proposed by the 1987 Academic Task Force for Review of the Insurance and Tort Systems. In its November 6, 1987 report, the Task Force recommended adoption of a no-fault compensation plan for birth-related neurological injuries similar to the then newly enacted Virginia plan (1987 Va. Acts Ch. 540). Academic Task Force for Review of the Insurance and Tort Systems, Medical Malpractice Recommendations 31 (Nov. 6, 1987)(hereinafter Task Force Report). However, the Task Force was concerned that the Virginia legislation did not contain a notice requirement and recommended that the Florida plan contain such a requirement. The Task Force believed that notice was necessary to ensure that the plan was fair to obstetrical patients1 and to shield the plan from constitutional challenge.2 The Task Force explained in its report: The Virginia statute does not require participating physicians and hospitals to give notice to obstetrical patients that they are participating in the limited no- fault alternative for birth-related neurological injuries. The Task Force recommends that health care providers who participate under this plan should be required to provide reasonable notice to patients of their participation. This notice requirement is justified on fairness grounds and arguably may be required in order to assure that the limited no fault alternative is constitutional. Task Force Report at 34 (emphasis added). Since Florida's NICA plan was the result of the Task Force's report, it is only logical to conclude that the plan's notice requirement was included in the Florida legislation as a result of this recommendation and therefore was intended to be a condition precedent to immunity under the plan. * * * Under our reading of the statute, in order to preserve their immune status, NICA participants who are in a position to notify their patients of their participation a reasonable time before delivery simply need to give the notice in a timely manner. In those cases where it is not practicable to notify the patient prior to delivery, pre- delivery notice will not be required. Whether a health care provider was in a position to give a patient pre-delivery notice of participation and whether notice was given a reasonable time before delivery will depend on the circumstances of each case and therefore must be determined on a case-by-case basis . . . . Accordingly, we answer the certified question as explained herein and approve the decision under review. Id. at 309-311. 1 The Task Force obviously believed that because not all health care providers are required to participate in the NICA plan, fairness requires that the patient be made aware that she has limited her common law remedies by choosing a participating provider. 2 The Task Force also must have recognized that failure to require notice would open the plan up to constitutional attack. For example, the Braniffs argue that if pre- delivery notice is not a condition precedent to immunity under the plan, patients will be deprived of their common law remedies without due process. However, because of our resolution of the notice issue, we need not reach the merit of this procedural due process challenge. Notably, the Court was not asked to resolve, and did not resolve, whether the obligation to provide a form that "include[d] a clear and concise explanation of a patient's rights and limitations under the plan," required an explanation of the civil remedies a patient would forego if she chose a participating provider. Moreover, the unambiguous language the Legislature chose evidences no such intention. Rather, the Plan requires that the form "include a clear ['[f]ree from doubt or confusion']3 and concise ['[e]xpressing much in few words; succinct']4 explanation ['the process of making plain or comprehensible']5 of the patients' rights and limitations under the plan," and does not include an obligation to explain a patient's potential civil remedies at common law or otherwise. Rinella v. Abifaraj, 908 So. 2d 1126, 1127 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)("Where the plain and ordinary meaning of statutory language is unambiguous, we cannot construe the statute in a manner that would extend, modify, or limit its express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications."); Seagrave v. State, 802 So. 2d 281, 287 (Fla. 2001)(quoting Hayes v. State, 750 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1999))("[I]t is a basic principle of statutory construction that Courts 'are not at liberty to add words to statutes that are not placed there by the Legislature.'"); Crutcher v. School Board of Broward County, 834 So. 2d 228, 232 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)("When a court construes a statute, its goal is to ascertain legislative intent, and if the language of the statute under scrutiny is clear and unambiguous, there is no reason for construction beyond giving effect to the plain meaning of the statutory words."); American Bankers Life Assurance Company of Florida v. Williams, 212 So. 2d 777, 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968)("Words of common usage should be construed in their plain and ordinary sense."). The brochure prepared by NICA satisfies the legislative mandate. Jackson v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, 31 Fla. L. Weekly D8676 (Fla. 5th DCA March 24, 2006)("The ALJ properly recognized that NICA developed a pamphlet titled 'Peace of Mind for an Unexpected Problem.' The pamphlet contains a clear and concise explanation of a patient's rights and limitations under the NICA plan, as is required by the terms of the statute.")(petition for rehearing pending). Findings related to the participating physician and notice Mrs. Dianderas received her prenatal care at Loch Haven OB/GYN Group, Orlando, Florida, a group practice comprised of a number of physicians, including Natasha M. Knight, M.D., and dedicated to the practice of obstetrics and gynecology. At the time, Loch Haven, like Florida Hospital, was owned by Adventist Health System/Sunbelt, Inc.; however, patients, including Mrs. Dianderas, were not noticed, by signage or otherwise, of the relationship the business entities shared. On February 14, 2002, Mrs. Dianderas presented to Loch Haven for her initial visit. At the time, consistent with established practice for new obstetric patients, Mrs. Dianderas was given a copy of the NICA brochure, together with a Notice to Obstetric Patient (to acknowledge receipt of the NICA brochure). The Notice to Obstetric Patient provided, as follows: Notice to Obstetric Patient I have been furnished with information by the Loch Haven OB/GYN as prepared by the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association and have been advised that the physicians of the Loch Haven OB/GYN Group are participating members in the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association. This Plan provides that certain limited compensation is available in event certain birth-related neurological injuries may occur during labor, delivery or post-delivery resuscitation, irrespective of fault. For specifics on the Plan, I understand I can contact the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation association (NICA), Post office Box 14567, Tallahassee, Florida 32317-04567, (904) 488-8191 or 1- 800-3982129: I further acknowledge that I have received a copy of the form brochure prepared and furnished by the Florida Birth- Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association. Patient Signature Date Print Name Social Security Number D.O.B. Witness Date Mrs. Dianderas completed the form, by providing the requested information (name, social security number, and date of birth), and then signed and dated the form. Beverly Bailey, the medical assistant who saw Mrs. Dianderas on her initial visit, witnessed her signature. Here, Mrs. Dianderas acknowledges she signed the Notice to Obstetric Patient, but has no current recollection of having done so, and has no current recollection of whether she was or was not given a copy of the NICA brochure. (Transcript, pages 39-41 and 54-58). Moreover, Petitioners candidly concede, they can offer no proof to rebut the presumption that the notice provisions were met by the participating physician. (Transcript, pages 9, 55, 56, and 278). Consequently, since the NICA brochure complied with the requirements of Section 766.316, Florida Statutes, the participating physician satisfied the notice provisions of the Plan. However, notwithstanding the common ownership of Loch Haven and Florida Hospital by Adventist, they were separate business entities, and the notice by Loch Haven (on behalf of its physicians) did not satisfy Florida Hospital's obligation to give notice. § 766.316, Fla. Stat. ("Each hospital with a participating physician on its staff and each participating physician . . . shall provide notice to the obstetrical patients as to the limited no-fault alternative for birth-related neurological injuries."); Board of Regents v. Athey, 694 So. 2d 46, 49 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)("Under section 766.316 . . . notice on behalf of the hospital will not by itself satisfy the notice requirement imposed on the participating physician(s) involved in the delivery " Conversely, it reasonably follows, notice on behalf of the participating physician will not by itself satisfy the notice requirement imposed on the hospital.) Findings related to the hospital and notice To support an inference that it complied with the notice provisions of the Plan, the hospital offered proof of the practice it followed to provide a copy of the NICA brochure and Notice to Obstetric Patient form (acknowledgment form)6 to each patient who presented to labor and delivery.7 See Tabb v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, 880 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Here, Mrs. Dianderas presented to the labor and delivery on two occasions (September 29, 2002, and October 7, 2002), during which the hospital had an opportunity to provide notice, and during which the hospital claims it provided notice.8 With regard to Mrs. Dianderas' first admission, the proof demonstrates that at or about 7:25 p.m., Sunday, September 29, 2002, Mrs. Dianderas, with an estimated delivery date of October 14, 2002, and the fetus at 37+ weeks' gestation, presented to labor and delivery, at Florida Hospital, with complaints of contractions. At the time, the finance window was closed, as it had been since 11:00 p.m., Friday, and would be until 6:00 a.m., Monday, and Mrs. Dianderas was admitted to the triage unit by Cynthia Hall, R.N., the on-duty triage nurse. Notably, Nurse Hall, who was responsible for completing all paperwork associated with Mrs. Dianderas' admission, attended Mrs. Dianderas from 7:25 p.m., until her discharge (after it was resolved Mrs. Dianderas was not in labor) at 12:19 a.m., September 30, 2002, except for a brief period (between 9:17 p.m., and 10:20 p.m.) when Mrs. Dianderas was taken for an ultrasound. With regard to notice, Nurse Hall, who routinely works weekends, testified that it was her practice, during her initial evaluation in triage, to provide the patient a copy of the NICA brochure, as well as an acknowledgment form and Consent to Treatment form to complete and sign. According to Nurse Hall, the forms were routinely signed in her presence, were routinely witnessed by her, and she routinely made a photocopy of the acknowledgment form and placed it on the finance clerk's desk (that was adjacent to her desk), so finance could update their computer records on Monday to reflect that the NICA brochure had been given. The original documents, including the original acknowledgment form, were placed in the patient's chart. Here, Nurse Hall is confident she followed her routine, and Mrs. Dianderas' chart does include a Consent to Treatment form signed by Mrs. Dianderas and witnessed by Nurse Hall. However, the chart does not include a signed acknowledgment form, as it should if Nurse Hall followed her routine practice, and she could offer no explanation for its absence. Also inexplicably, the finance records related to this visit (Intervenors' Exhibit 1A, pages 1 and 2), reveal that at 8:48 p.m. (20:48), September 29, 2002, a finance clerk identified as "RLCEE8" updated Mrs. Dianderas' record to reflect that a copy of the NICA brochure had been provided. Notably, according to Nurse Hall, who was in a position to know, the finance office (in which she would have placed a copy of the acknowledgment form) was not staffed at the time, and she could not explain those entries (which she did not and was not authorized to make). Moreover, at hearing, the hospital made no effort to identify "RLCEE8" or to otherwise explain how these entries occurred. Consequently, given such irregularities it cannot be inferred, with any sense of confidence, that the hospital or Nurse Hall's routine was followed during Mrs. Dianderas' September 29, 2002, admission, or that she was provided a copy of the NICA brochure. With regard to Mrs. Dianderas' second admission, which ultimately led to Isabelle's birth, the proof demonstrates that at 2:00 p.m., October 7, 2002, Mrs. Dianderas, with the fetus at 39 weeks' gestation, presented to labor and delivery, at Florida Hospital, on referral from her obstetrician for a nonstress test (NST), secondary to decreased fetal movement. At the time, the finance window was open, and Iris Miranda, a financial services representative was on duty. With regard to notice, Ms. Miranda testified (by publication of her deposition) regarding the routine she would have followed when Mrs. Dianderas presented to the finance window that afternoon. According to Ms. Miranda, that routine would have included giving Mrs. Dianderas a Consent for Treatment form to sign, as well as a copy of the NICA brochure and an acknowledgment form to sign and give to the nurse in labor and delivery. Here, Ms. Miranda is confident she followed her routine, and Mrs. Dianderas' chart does include a Consent to Treatment form signed by Mrs. Dianderas and witnessed by Ms. Miranda. Moreover, the finance department's records (Intervenors' Exhibit 1B, pages 1 and 2) include a computer entry at 2:03 p.m. (14:03), October 7, 2002, by Ms. Miranda (identified as "IVM76B") noting that a NICA brochure was provided. However, again the chart does not include a signed acknowledgment form, as it should if the hospital's routine was followed, and no compelling explanation for its absences was presented.9 Consequently, given the lack of a reasonable explanation for the irregularities that have been shown regarding the finance department's computer entries, as well as the absence of the acknowledgment form, it cannot be inferred with any sense of confidence that the hospital's routine was followed during Mrs. Dianderas' admission of October 7, 2002, or that Mrs. Dianderas was given a NICA brochure Finally, with regard to the hospital and the notice issue, it is noted that on presentation to Florida Hospital at 2:00 p.m., October 7, 2002, Mrs. Dianderas was not in labor, and insofar as the record reveals she was not thereafter in labor until sometime after her membranes were ruptured, at 4:55 p.m. More particularly, there was no "evidence of the onset and persistence of uterine contractions or rupture of the membranes" from 2:00 p.m., until 4:55 p.m., October 7, 2002. Moreover, there was no proof that, upon admission or until her membranes ruptured, "there [was] inadequate time to effect safe transfer to another hospital prior to delivery" or "[t]hat a transfer may pose a threat to the health and safety of the patient or fetus." Consequently, until 4:55 p.m., when her membranes were ruptured, Mrs. Dianderas did not have an "emergency medical condition," as defined by Section 395.002(9)(b), Florida Statutes, that would have excused the giving of notice. Moreover, there was no proof to support a conclusion that the giving of notice was not practicable. Jurisdiction
The Issue Whether notice was accorded the patient, as contemplated by section 766.316, Florida Statutes, or whether the failure to give notice was excused because the patient had an emergency medical condition, as defined in section 395.002(8), or the giving of notice was not practicable.
Findings Of Fact On April 8, 2014, at approximately 7:33 a.m., Petitioner, Priscilla Franco, presented to Fisherman’s Community Hospital (Fisherman’s) in Marathon, Florida. At the time, she was 33 weeks and 6 days pregnant. Her primary complaint at Fisherman’s was abdominal pain. It was noted that her lower abdominal pain was sharp and had begun at 4:00 a.m. At 7:40 a.m., her pain was noted to be a 5 out of 10 on a 10-point pain scale. At 7:51 a.m., Ms. Franco was diagnosed at Fisherman’s with “active labor, premature.”1/ As Fisherman’s does not have obstetrical services available, a transfer was initiated. At approximately 8:45 a.m., Sabrya Ishoof, M.D., accepted the transfer of Ms. Franco to South Miami. Dr. Ishoof is a self-employed obstetrician/gynecologist. At all times relevant to this proceeding, she held staff privileges at South Miami. On April 8, 2014, she was called in to treat Ms. Franco as the on-call emergency obstetrician. Prior to this date, Dr. Ishoof and Petitioner did not have a physician- patient relationship for obstetrical services. Similarly, Ms. Franco did not have such a relationship with South Miami. At approximately 9:54 a.m., Ms. Franco was transported via helicopter provided by Lifenet from Fisherman’s to South Miami, where she arrived at approximately 11:15 a.m. Upon arrival, Ms. Franco was taken to the antepartum unit, where she was initially assessed and examined by Carmen Davis, R.N., and Melissa Luna, R.N. The initial assessments included, inter alia, placing an external fetal monitor on Ms. Franco and performing a vaginal examination. The vaginal examination revealed that Ms. Franco’s cervix was 3 cm dialated and had thinned to 60 percent effacement. At approximately 11:37, Nurse Luna documented that Ms. Franco was having uterine contractions, lasting 30 to 60 seconds. The contractions resulted in cramping abdominal pain. The pain was described as a 5-6 on the 10-point pain scale. At 11:38 a.m., this assessment was communicated to Dr. Ishoof. Two minutes later, Dr. Ishoof issued her Admission Order, wherein she admitted Ms. Franco to the antepartum unit and ordered magnesium, antibiotics, insulin, as well as an ultrasound. The decision to admit Ms. Franco was based upon the following: Ms. Franco’s prior history of a preterm Cesarean delivery, cervical dilation, and uterine contractions--being in active labor. At 12:06 p.m., Nurse Luna documented that Ms. Franco was having uterine contractions lasting 50 to 60 seconds. At 12:13 p.m., Nurse Davis contacted Dr. Ishoof regarding the external fetal monitoring interpretation, the contraction pattern, pain assessment, and interventions performed. Nurse Davis, at approximately 12:14 p.m., proceeded with admission paperwork with Ms. Franco. A packet of information was provided to Ms. Franco, which, inter alia, included a NICA brochure, entitled “A Peace of Mind for an Unexpected Problem,” and a form acknowledging receipt of the brochure, entitled “Notice to Obstetric Patient.” The notice language, which is contained on a document bearing the label for South Miami, provides as follows: NOTICE TO OBSTETRIC PATIENT I have been furnished information by the hospital prepared by the Florida Birth Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, and have been advised that my doctor may be a participating physician in that program, wherein certain limited compensation is available in the event certain neurological injury may occur during labor, delivery, or resuscitation. For specifics on the program, I understand I can contact the Florida Birth Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association (NICA), P.O. Box 14567, Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4567, (800) 398-2129. I further acknowledge that I have received a copy of the brochure prepared by NICA. Nurse Davis credibly testified that, while she does not have a specific recollection of Ms. Franco, her routine practice was to provide the NICA brochure and notice acknowledging receipt to her patients upon admission. Specifically, Nurse Davis testified that she would provide the documents and request the patient to sign the same. Nurse Davis would then sign the document acknowledging the patient’s signature and receipt. In this matter, Ms. Franco’s signature appears under the above- referenced notice. The document further bears the signature of Nurse Davis as a witness to Ms. Franco’s signature. While Ms. Franco testified that she did not receive the NICA brochure, Ms. Franco’s testimony on this fact is not credited. The better evidence establishes that Ms. Franco was provided the NICA brochure as described by Nurse Davis and acknowledged by Ms. Franco’s signature. At 12:34 p.m., Dr. Ishoof ordered Ms. Franco to be prepared for a Cesarean section delivery. Dallas was delivered at 1:51 p.m. It is undisputed that Dr. Ishoof was the physician providing obstetric services at Dallas’s birth. The evidence established that Dr. Ishoof was a Plan-participating physician at that time. The evidence further established that South Miami was a Plan-participating hospital at the time of Dallas’s birth.
The Issue At issue is whether Samer Abifaraj, a deceased minor, qualifies for coverage under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan (Plan). If so, whether the notice requirements of the Plan were satisfied. If so, whether the Division of Administrative Hearings has the exclusive jurisdiction to resolve or, alternatively, must preliminarily resolve, whether there is "clear and convincing evidence of bad faith or malicious purpose or willful and wanton disregard of human rights, safety, or property" before a claimant may elect (under the provisions of Section 766.303(2), Florida Statutes) to reject Plan benefits and pursue a civil suit.
Findings Of Fact Fundamental findings Petitioners, Bassam Abifaraj and Rayya Abifaraj, are the parents and natural guardians of Samer Abifaraj (Samer), a deceased minor, and co-personal representatives of their deceased son's estate. Samer was born October 30, 1997, at Plantation General Hospital, a hospital located in Broward County, Florida, and died December 4, 1997. At birth, Samer's weight exceeded 2,500 grams. The physician providing obstetrical services at Samer's birth was John L. Rinella, M.D., who was at all times material hereto a "participating physician" in the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, as defined by Section 766.302(2), Florida Statutes. Coverage under the Plan Pertinent to this case, coverage is afforded by the Plan for infants who suffer a "birth-related neurological injury," defined as an "injury to the brain . . . caused by oxygen deprivation . . . occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate post-delivery period in a hospital, which renders the infant permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired." Sections 766.302(2) and 766.309(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Here, NICA has concluded, and the parties agree, that Samer suffered a "birth-related neurological injury." Consequently, since obstetrical services were provided by a "participating physician" at birth, NICA proposes to accept the claim as compensable under the Plan. NICA's conclusion is consistent with the proof, and its proposal to accept the claim as compensable is approved. Notice of Plan participation While the claim qualifies for coverage under the Plan, Petitioners have responded to the health care providers' claim of Plan immunity by contending that the hospital and participating physician failed to comply with the notice provisions of the Plan. Consequently, it is necessary to resolve whether, as alleged by the health care providers, appropriate notice was given. O'Leary v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, 757 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). Regarding the notice issue, it is resolved that on June 3, 1997, Mrs. Abifaraj was provided timely notice that Dr. Rinella was a participating physician in the Plan, together with notice as to the limited no-fault alternative for birth- related neurological injuries provided by the Plan. Such conclusion is based on the more credible proof which demonstrates that on such date, when Mrs. Abifaraj presented to Dr. Rinella's office, Belinda Jill Pettitt, a medical assistant at the time, gave Mrs. Abifaraj a brief explanation of the Plan, as well as a form titled INFORMED CONSENT OF MY PHYSICIAN'S PARTICIPATION IN THE FLORIDA BIRTH-RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY COMPENSATION PLAN (NICA). The form further provided: I hereby acknowledge that: I have been advised that Dr. John Rinella (OB), MD is a participant in the NICA Plan; I have been furnished with a copy of the NICA brochure which describes the NICA Plan and my rights and limitations under the NICA Plan; I understand that the no-fault aspects of the NICA Plan will serve as an exclusive remedy for injury which qualifies under the NICA Plan and that as a result I am forfeiting any and all rights to bring legal action in a Court of Law for damages in connection with such injuries; Any questions I may have had regarding my physician's participation in the NICA Plan and my rights and limitations under the NICA Plan have been answered to my satisfaction; I hereby consent to obstetrical services having been given notice pursuant to Florida Statutes 766.316 by my physician of the applicability of NICA upon such obstetrical services. Contemporaneously, Ms. Pettitt gave Mrs. Abifaraj a copy of the brochure (prepared by NICA) titled "Peace of Mind for an Unexpected Problem," which contained a concise explanation of the patient's rights and limitations under the Plan. Ms. Abifaraj acknowledged her understanding of the form, as well as receipt of the NICA brochure, by dating and signing the form.3 While Mrs. Abifaraj received notice on behalf of the participating physician, the proof failed to demonstrate that Plantation General Hospital provided any pre-delivery notice, as envisioned by Section 766.316, Florida Statutes. Moreover, there was no proof offered to support a conclusion that the hospital's failure to accord Mrs. Abifaraj pre-delivery notice was occasioned by a medical emergency or that the giving of notice was otherwise not practicable. Rather, the health care providers contend that the hospital's failure to give notice is inconsequential when, as here, the patient's obstetrician has accorded notice of his participation in the Plan. Whether, as contended by the health care providers, the hospital's failure to accord Mrs. Abifaraj notice should be overlooked, as harmless, is addressed in the Conclusions of Law.
The Issue Whether Respondent's proposal to accept the claim as compensable should be approved. If so, the amount and manner of payment of the parental award, the amount owing for attorney's fees and costs incurred in pursuing the claim, and the amount owing for past expenses. Whether notice was accorded the patient, as contemplated by Section 766.16, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1998), or whether the failure to give notice was excused because the patient had an "emergency medical condition," as defined by Section 395.002(9)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1998), or the giving of notice was otherwise not practicable.
Findings Of Fact Findings related to compensability Juanita Ruiz and Miguel Angel Ruiz, are the natural parents and guardians of Michael A. Ruiz, a minor. Michael was born a live infant on August 14, 1998, at Jackson North Maternity Center, a hospital located in Dade County, Florida, and his birth weight exceeded 2,500 grams. Among the physicians providing obstetrical services at Michael's birth were Paul Norris, M.D., and Bel Barker, M.D., who, at all times material hereto, were "participating physician[s]" in the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, as defined by Section 766.302(7), Florida Statutes (1997).2 When it has been established that obstetrical services were provided by a participating physician at the infant's birth, coverage is afforded by the Plan if it is also shown the infant suffered a "birth-related neurological injury," defined as an "injury to the brain . . . of a live infant weighing at least 2,500 grams at birth caused by oxygen deprivation . . . occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery period in a hospital, which renders the infant permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired." § 766.302(2), Fla. Stat. See also §§ 766.309 and 766.31(1), Fla. Stat. In this case, it is undisputed, and the proof is otherwise compelling, that Michael suffered severe brain injury caused by oxygen deprivation occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery period in the hospital which rendered him permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired. Therefore, the claim is compensable, and NICA's proposal to accept the claim is approved. §§ 766.309 and 766.31(1), Fla. Stat. Findings related to the award When it has been resolved that a claim qualifies for coverage under the Plan, the administrative law judge is required to make a determination of how much compensation should be awarded. § 766.31(1), Fla. Stat. Pertinent to this case, Section 766.31(1), Florida Statutes, provided for an award of compensation for the following items: Actual expenses for medically necessary and reasonable medical and hospital, habilitative and training, residential, and custodial care and service, for medically necessary drugs, special equipment, and facilities, and for related travel . . . . Periodic payments of an award to the parents or legal guardians of the infant found to have sustained a birth-related neurological injury, which award shall not exceed $100,000. However, at the discretion of the administrative law judge, such award may be made in a lump sum. Reasonable expenses incurred in connection with the filing of a claim under ss. 766.301-766.316, including reasonable attorney's fees, which shall be subject to the approval and award of the administrative law judge . . . . In this case, Petitioners and NICA have agreed that, should Petitioners elect to accept benefits under the Plan, Petitioners recover the following award: Reimbursement of actual expenses already incurred in the sum of $190.65 together with the right to receive reimbursement of actual expenses for future medical bills pursuant to § 766.31(1)(a), Fla. Stat. A lump sum payment of $100,000.00 to the Petitioners in accordance with § 766.31(1)(b), Fla. Stat. Reimbursement of reasonable expenses, inclusive of attorney's fees and costs to the Petitioners, in the total sum of $10,580.33, pursuant to § 766.31(1)(c), Fla. Stat. The notice provisions of the Plan While the claim qualifies for coverage under the Plan, Petitioners have responded to the health care providers' claim of Plan immunity in a pending civil action, by averring that the health care providers failed to give notice, as required by the Plan. Consequently, it is necessary to resolve whether the notice provisions of the Plan were satisfied. O'Leary v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, 757 So. 2d 624, 627 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)("All questions of compensability, including those which arise regarding the adequacy of notice, are properly decided in the administrative forum.") Accord University of Miami v. M.A., 793 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Tabb v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, 29 Fla. L. Weekly D1982b (Fla. 1st DCA August 30, 2004). See also Behan v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, 664 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). But see All Children's Hospital, Inc. v. Department of Administrative Hearings, 863 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (certifying conflict); Florida Health Sciences Center, Inc. v. Division of Administrative Hearings, 871 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)(same); and Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association v. Ferguson, 869 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)(same). At all times material hereto, Section 766.316, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1998), prescribed the notice provisions of the Plan, as follows: Each hospital with a participating physician on its staff and each participating physician, other than residents, assistant residents, and interns deemed to be participating physicians under s. 766.314(4)(c), under the Florida Birth- Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan shall provide notice to the obstetrical patients as to the limited no-fault alternative for birth-related neurological injuries. Such notice shall be provided on forms furnished by the association and shall include a clear and concise explanation of a patient's rights and limitations under the plan. The hospital or the participating physician may elect to have the patient sign a form acknowledging receipt of the notice form. Signature of the patient acknowledging receipt of the notice form raises a rebuttable presumption that the notice requirements of this section have been met. Notice need not be given to a patient when the patient has an emergency medical condition as defined in s. [395.002(9)(b)][3] or when notice is not practicable. Pertinent to this case, Section 395.002(9)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1998), defined "emergency medical condition" to mean: (b) With respect to a pregnant woman: That there is inadequate time to effect safe transfer to another hospital prior to delivery; That a transfer may pose a threat to the health and safety of the patient or fetus; or That there is evidence of the onset and persistence of uterine contractions or rupture of the membranes. Responding to Section 766.316, Florida Statutes, NICA developed a brochure, titled "Peace of Mind for an Unexpected Problem" (the NICA brochure), which contained a clear and concise explanation of a patient's rights and limitations under the Plan, and distributed the brochure to participating physicians and hospitals so they could furnish a copy of it to their obstetrical patients. (Petitioners' Exhibit 15, the NICA brochure, "This brochure is prepared in accordance with the mandate of § 766.316, Florida Statutes.") Findings related to the hospital and notice Pertinent to the hospital and the notice issue, the proof demonstrates that on Wednesday, July 22, 1998, Mrs. Ruiz, accompanied by her husband, presented for pre-registration at Jackson North Maternity Center, a hospital owned and operated by the Public Health Trust of Dade County at 14701 Northwest 27th Avenue, Opa Locka, Florida. At the time, consistent with established practice, Mrs. Ruiz was interviewed by a health service representative, and asked to provide pertinent personal and financial information for herself and her husband, including address, telephone number, place of employment, monthly wages and expenses, and the identity of any commercial insurer, so the service representative could complete a number of forms. At this time, the service representative also entered pertinent data regarding the Ruizes in the hospital computer data base. During the interview process, four or six forms were routinely completed, depending on whether the patient had commercial coverage, in which case four forms were completed, or whether the patient desired to apply for Medicaid, in which case six forms were completed. (Petitioners' Exhibit 6, pages 24-29 and Petitioners' Exhibit 5, pages 18 and 20). According to the proof, the first form was referred to as "Chronological notes," on which the service representative noted the need for any additional information or follow-up, and is not pertinent to this case. The second, third, and fourth forms that were completed in all cases, were the Application for Credit (on which the service representative noted the personal and financial information provided for the patient and her guarantor, here, Mr. Ruiz, including address, telephone number, place of employment, monthly wages and expenses, and the identity of any commercial insurer, and to which the patient and her guarantor attested by signing), the Indigent Income Attestation form (on which the service representative noted the gross family income for the past 12 months, as disclosed by the patient, and to which the patient and her guarantor attested by signing), and the Patient Funding Source form (on which the patient and her spouse attested that they had no other source of funding, other than that disclosed on the insurance benefits worksheet). (Petitioners' Exhibit 6, pages 24-29 and PHT's Exhibit 1, Exhibits 5-7). If the patient wished to apply for Medicaid, the service representative completed a Referral to Medicaid for the patient's signature (form five) and gave the patient an Application for Medicaid (form six) to complete and sign.4 Here, there is no compelling proof that Mrs. Ruiz chose to apply for Medicaid at pre-registration. Indeed, the only forms she signed at pre-registration, that are of record, are the Application for Credit, Indigent Attestation form, and Patient Funding Source form, and the only Medicaid Assistance Referral form of record was dated August 14, 1998, following Michael's birth. (PHT's Exhibit 1, Exhibits 5-7 and 9, and Petitioners' Exhibit 5, pages 18-22). Following completion of the interview process, Mrs. Ruiz was given three pamphlets, an Advance Directives brochure (a pamphlet that explained the living will), a NICA brochure, in Spanish, titled "Peace of Mind for an Unexpected Problem,"5 and a Patient's Bill of Rights brochure. According to the proof, the pamphlets were stapled together, with the Advance Directives brochure, being the longest, on the bottom, followed by the NICA brochure, which was a little smaller, and then the Patient's Bill of Rights brochure, which was the smallest, on top. As configured, all three brochures were visible when presented or held. Contemporaneously, Mrs. Ruiz was asked to sign a form acknowledging receipt of the NICA brochure. (PHT's Exhibit 1, pages 26 and 27). That form provided, as follows: He recibido el folleto intitulado "Tranquilidad Mental" preparado por la Asociacion de Compensaciones por Lestones Neurologicas Relacionadas con el Nacimiento, del Estado de la Florida (Florida Birth- Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association). Firma del Paciente Fecha: Testigo: Mrs. Ruiz signed the form, acknowledging receipt of the NICA brochure, and the service representative witnessed and dated the form.6 Thereafter, the service representative provided Mrs. Ruiz with a gift package for expectant mothers, and the pre- registration process was completed. In all, pre-registration typically took 10 to 15 minutes to complete. Findings related to the participating physicians and notice Pertinent to the participating physicians and the notice issue, the proof demonstrates that the participating physicians in this case (Doctors Paul Norris and Bel Barker) held appointments as full-time members of the faculty at the University of Miami, with the rank of assistant professors of clinical obstetrics and gynecology, and also held contracts with the Public Health Trust to provide, inter alia, supervision for physicians in the Trust's resident physician training program. (Petitioners' Exhibits 13 and 14, and PHT's Exhibits 4 and 5). Among the terms of their agreement with the Public Health Trust, Doctors Norris and Barker, as attending physicians in the resident physician training program, agreed To supervise medical care to patients provided by resident physicians to regularly review the medical charges of these patients. To supervise the completion of medical records by residents physicians. Of note, at all times material hereto, Doctor Norris was the medical director of Jackson North Maternity Center and, together with Dr. Barker and others, an attending physician in the Public Health Trust's resident training program at the facility. Regarding Michael's birth, the proof demonstrates that at or about 4:00 p.m., August 13, 1998, with the fetus at term, Mrs. Ruiz presented to Jackson North Maternity Center, in labor. Following an initial assessment, Mrs. Ruiz was examined by Wayne McCreath, a physician in the resident training program, who noted the cervix at 2 centimeters dilation, effacement at 90 percent, and the fetus at -1 station, and regular uterine contractions every 3 minutes. Membranes were noted to have ruptured spontaneously at 3:00 a.m. Dr. McCreath's impression was intrauterine pregnancy, at 39+ weeks gestation, in labor, and he proposed to admit Mrs. Ruiz to labor and delivery. Dr. McCreath's assessment and proposal to admit Mrs. Ruiz was reviewed by Dr. Norris, the attending physician at the time, and approved. Dr. McCreath continued to provide medical care for Mrs. Ruiz, under the supervision of Dr. Norris, until the 7:00 p.m., shift change, when Dr. Barker assumed the duties of attending (supervising) physician, and some time thereafter George Butler, another physician in the resident training program, was noted to be providing medical care. Ultimately, at 6:01 a.m., August 14, 1998, Michael was delivered by cesarean section, due to arrest in descent and a nonreassuring fetal heart rate pattern. The operating report names Dr. Barker as the attending surgeon and Dr. Butler as a resident surgeon. Notably, with regard to the notice issue, neither Doctor Norris nor Doctor Barker provided NICA notice to Mrs. Ruiz at or following her admission of August 13, 1998, and the only notice she received was that provided by the hospital at pre- registration. Resolution of the notice issue, with regard to the hospital Petitioners do not dispute that the hospital provided Mrs. Ruiz with a copy of the NICA brochure at pre-registration or that she signed the form acknowledging receipt of the brochure. Rather, they contend, first, that Mrs. Ruiz did not receive notice because she never read the documents she signed or the NICA brochure, and that her failure to read the documents or NICA brochure was reasonable or excusable given that, in their opinion, the procedure the hospital employed to secure her signature and deliver the brochure was not adequate to alert her to their significance. Second, Petitioners contend that neither the acknowledgment form nor the brochure was sufficient, for reasons hereafter addressed, to satisfy the hospital's notice obligation under the Plan. To support their first contention, Petitioners offered the testimony of Mrs. Ruiz who, to support Petitioners' contention that her failure to read the documents she signed and the NICA brochure she received was reasonable, observed that the service representative (Machele Lockhart Wadley) simply flipped the bottom up of each page she wanted Mrs. Ruiz to sign, never gave Mrs. Ruiz time to read before signing, never gave Mrs. Ruiz the documents to read before signing or told her to read before signing, and never told Mrs. Ruiz the documents were of any legal significance. Moreover, as for the NICA brochure, Mrs. Ruiz observed that, at the time, she was of the opinion it was simply another baby advertisement, and of no significance. Considering the proof, Petitioners' first contention, and the testimony of Mrs. Ruiz that was offered to support it, must be rejected for a number of reasons. First, given the routine nature of pre-registration and the passage of time since it occurred, it is unlikely that Mrs. Ruiz would have any specific recollection of the events that transpired at the time. Moreover, given the limited number of forms Mrs. Ruiz signed during the interview process, discussed supra, and the fact that her husband also signed as guarantor or spouse, it is also unlikely that the process was hurried or that Mrs. Ruiz was seriously deprived of an opportunity to read the forms or the NICA brochure had she chosen to do so. Finally, and most pertinent to the notice issue, Mrs. Ruiz acknowledged in her testimony that, while she did not read the acknowledgment form, she was specifically advised that by signing the form she was agreeing that she received the NICA brochure. (PHT's Exhibit 1, pages 26 and 27). Under such circumstances, and considering that the brochure was also delivered with two other pamphlets of legal significance (the Advance Directives brochure and the Patient's Bill of Rights brochure), if Mrs. Ruiz failed to accord the NICA brochure significance, her act of doing so was not reasonable. Petitioners' second contention, regarding the adequacy of notice with regard to the hospital, was premised on their view that, as worded, neither the acknowledgment form nor the NICA brochure was adequate to satisfy the notice provisions of the Plan. As for this contention, Petitioners first posit that, since the NICA brochure stated only injuries that "have occurred in the course of labor, delivery or resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery period in a hospital" (emphasis added) were covered, Mrs. Ruiz was not on notice that delivery at Jackson North Maternity Center was covered by the Plan because Jackson North Maternity Center was not described as a hospital in the acknowledgment form, the NICA brochure, the facility signage, or otherwise. Petitioners also posit that, because neither the acknowledgment form nor the NICA brochure states that Jackson North Maternity Center has participating physicians on its staff, Mrs. Ruiz was not on notice that delivery at Jackson North Maternity Center was covered by the Plan. Here, Petitioners' second contention must also be rejected. First, Petitioners have stipulated that Jackson North Maternity Center is a hospital, as that terms is used in the Plan, and there is no evidence of record that Mrs. Ruiz suffered any confusion over Jackson North Maternity Center's status as a hospital. Second, there is no requirement under the notice provisions of Section 766.316, Florida Statutes, for the hospital to advise patients that it has participating physicians on staff. Rather, such is presumed if notice is given, and the obligation to disclose their participating status rests with the physician. Resolution of the notice issue, with regard to the participating physicians With regard to the participating physicians, it is undisputed that Mrs. Ruiz was never given notice by Doctors Norris and Barker that they were participating physicians in the Plan, and that the only NICA notice she received was that provided by the hospital at pre-registration, which failed to identify any physician associated with the hospital, or reveal their status as participating physicians.7 Nevertheless, it was the position of Intervenors that the acknowledgment form signed by Mrs. Ruiz at pre-registration, and delivery of the NICA brochure, satisfied the notice provisions of the Plan for the hospital, as well as the participating physicians. Alternatively, the Intervenors were of the view that the participating physicians were not required to give notice, since Mrs. Ruiz presented to the hospital on August 13, 1998, with an "emergency medical condition," as defined by Section 395.002(a)(b), Florida Statutes, or the giving of notice was "not practicable." § 766.316, Fla. Stat. Given the proof, it must be resolved that Doctors Norris and Barker failed to comply with the notice provisions of the Plan. In so concluding, it is noticed that Intervenors' contention that the giving of notice by the hospital also satisfied the participating physicians' independent obligation to give notice must be rejected as lacking a rational basis in fact or, stated otherwise, any compelling proof that a patient, similarly situated as Mrs. Ruiz, would reasonably conclude, from the hospital's notice, that notice was also given on behalf of Doctors Norris and Barker. Notably, the acknowledgment form signed by Mrs. Ruiz at pre-registration did not reveal that it was also given on behalf of any physician associated with the hospital and did not reveal that any physician associated with the hospital was a participating physician in the Plan. Under such circumstances, the giving of notice by the hospital could not satisfy the participating physicians' independent obligation to provide notice.8 With regard to the Intervenors' contention that the giving of notice was not required or was not practicable, it is noted that, while the Legislature clearly expressed its intention in Section 766.316, Florida Statutes, that notice was not required when a patient presented with an "emergency medical condition," the Legislature did not absolve a health care provider from the obligation to give notice when the opportunity was previously available. Consequently, while Doctors Norris and Barker were not required to give notice when they assumed Mrs. Ruiz's care at the hospital, because there was "evidence of the onset and persistence of uterine contractions or rupture of the membranes," they nevertheless failed to comply with the notice provisions of the Plan because, although there was a reasonable opportunity for them to do so, they failed to give Mrs. Ruiz notice at pre-registration.9 See Galen of Florida, Inc. v. Braniff, 696 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1997); Board of Regents of the State of Florida v. Athey, 694 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Schur v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, 832 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Turner v. Hubrich, 656 So. 2d 970 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).
The Issue At issue is whether Christopher Kocher, a deceased minor, qualifies for coverage under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan. If so, whether the notice requirements of the Plan were satisfied.
Findings Of Fact Findings related to the parental award and past expenses At hearing, the parties stipulated that there were no monies owing for past expenses, as they had been paid by collateral sources (private insurance). Section 766.31(1)(a). The parties further agreed that Petitioners, as the parents of Christopher Kocher, a deceased minor, be accorded a lump sum award of $100,000.00, as well as an award of $1,500.00 for funeral expenses. Section 766.31(1)(b). Findings related to attorney's fees and costs incurred in connection with the filing of the claim To support their claim for attorney's fees, Petitioners offered what was titled "Ferraro & Associates, P.A.'s Time Sheet." (Petitioners' Composite Exhibit 1, "Ferraro & Associates, P.A.'s Time Sheet"). As explained by Plaintiffs' counsel, at hearing MR. JOHNSTON: And these were -- these are the hours that were reconstructed. Our firm doesn't normally keep time records. We're a plaintiffs firm. But Mr. Falzone did go through and estimated the time that was spent on the NICA related matters and put them in this time sheet . . . . The time sheet reflected 17 hours dedicated to the case by Mr. Falzone, for which Petitioners requested an hourly rate of $500 (a total of $8,500.00), and 109.25 hours dedicated to the case by "different associates," for which Petitioners requested an hourly rate of $250.00 (a total of $27,312.50), for a total award of $35,812.50. Notably, such time sheet is hearsay, and was received into evidence subject to the limitations of Section 120.57(1)(c). ("Hearsay evidence may be used for the purpose of supplementing or explaining other evidence, but it shall not be sufficient in itself to support a finding unless it would be admissible over objection in civil actions.") Consequently, since no witnesses were called or competent evidence offered detailing the services rendered or the prevailing hourly rate charged in the community by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation, for similar services, there is no competent proof to support an award of attorney's fees. Mercy Hospital, Inc. v. Johnson, 431 So. 2d 687, 688 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)("[Attorney's] failure to present detailed evidence of his services is fatal to his claim."); Yakubik v. Board of County Commissioner's of Lee County, 656 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)("The testimony of an expert witness concerning reasonable attorney's fees is necessary to support the establishment of the fees.") Nevertheless, at hearing, Respondent agreed that it would accept 37.25 hours (the hours ostensibly expended from November 7, 2000, through April 28, 2001), as reasonably expended in pursuing the claim, and $175.00 as a reasonable hourly rate, for a total fee award of $6,518.75. Here, given that the claim was routine, and lacked any novel aspect that would warrant the time claimed by Petitioners' counsel, Respondent's concession is reasonable. Consequently, given that Petitioners' counsel obviously expended some time pursuing the claim, and there is no competent proof to otherwise support an award of attorney's fees, an award of $6,518.75 is appropriate. Finally, Petitioners seek to recover certain expenses they claim were reasonably incurred in connection with pursuing the claim for compensation. Such costs total $4,139.30. (Petitioners' Composite Exhibit 1, "Case Expense Report," page 3). Respondent does not object to the costs reflected on counsel's "Case Expense Report," page 3, commencing with the entry of November 7, 2000 ($15.00), and extending through the entry of March 20, 2001 ($15.50), totaling $1,036.02. Accordingly, those costs are awarded, without further discussion. As for the balance of expenses claimed, and opposed by Respondent, the record is devoid of proof to support their recovery. Notably, as with their claim for attorney's fees, Petitioners offered neither testimony nor competent evidence detailing the nature of the expenses claimed. Consequently, it would be pure speculation to conclude such expenditures constitute costs that are traditionally taxable, that they were reasonable in amount, or that they were necessarily incurred in pursuing the claim for compensation. Consequently, such expenses are not recoverable.
