The Issue Whether or not Respondent engaged in misconduct in the insurance business as is more particularly set forth in the Administrative Complaint filed herein signed December 7, 1992.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is currently licensed in this state as a life, health and a general lines agent. At all times relevant to the dates and occurrences referred to in the administrative Complaint in this matter, filed December 7, 1992, Respondent was licensed in this state as a life and health agent and a general lines agent. At all times relevant in this matter, Respondent was a corporate director of Gary Shepherd and Associates, Inc., a general lines insurance agency located in Panama City, Florida, (hereinafter "Associates"). Associates was, at all times relevant in this matter, incorporated under and existing by virtue of the laws of the State of Florida. Pursuant to Section 626.734, Florida Statues, as a general lines agent and corporate director of Associates, Respondent was and remains personally and fully liable and accountable for any wrongful acts, misconduct, or violation of any provision of the Florida Insurance Code which Respondent, or others acting under his supervision and control, committed while acting on behalf of Associates. At all times relevant in this matter, and pursuant to Section 626.561(1), Florida Statutes, all premiums, return premiums, or other funds belonging to others received by Respondent constituted trust funds, received in a fiduciary capacity, and Respondent was and remains obligated to account for and pay the same to the insurer, insured, or other persons lawfully entitled thereto in the applicable regular course of business. At all times relevant in this matter, Respondent did maintain signatory authority over account no. 0464000168823 at Sun Commercial Bank in Panama City, Florida, with said account being held in the name of Gary L. Shepherd d/b/a Gary Shepherd and Associates. On or about July 31, 1991, Respondent did solicit and procure from Craig Cook of Panama City, Florida, a renewal policy (no. 7000244) to be issued by American Surety and Casualty Company to provide coverages for marine properties owned by Craig Cook. In conjunction with the procurement of said renewal policy, Respondent received from Craig Cook his $186.00 premium down payment in the form of Craig Cook's personal check no. 672 drawn on account no. 0130000353528 at Peoples First Savings & Loan in Panama City Beach, Florida. On or about August 1, 1991, Respondent deposited the aforementioned $186.00 premium payment check into the agency bank account of Associates as more fully described in paragraph seven above. Respondent thereafter failed to forward to American Surety and Casualty Company the aforementioned policy renewal for Craig Cook and accompanying premium payments as required. Respondent thereafter altered and submitted to Sunshine State Bank in Fort Walton Beach, Florida, a certificate of insurance which falsely indicated that Craig Cook had coverage in place for the aforementioned marine properties.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner enter a Final Order revoking Respondent's licenses as a life and health and general lines agent. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 29th day of April, 1994. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1994.
The Issue Whether the Respondent's insurance licenses should be disciplined on the basis of the alleged multiple violations of Chapter 626, Florida Statutes, as set forth in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with licensing insurance agents of all types, regulating licensure status, and enforcing the practice standards of licensed agents within the powers granted by the Legislature in Chapter 626, Florida Statutes. At all times material to these proceedings, Respondent Wolfe was licensed as an insurance agent in the following areas: Ordinary Life, Ordinary Life including Disability Insurance, General Lines, and Disability. Respondent was also registered with the Department as an Automobile Inspection and Warranty Salesperson. Respondent Wolfe conducted his insurance business through Edison Insurance Agency, Inc. (hereinafter Edison), which is located in Fort Myers, Florida. The Respondent is the President, the Director, and sole shareholder of the insurance agency. All of Edison's personnel who collected funds in a fiduciary capacity, on behalf of the insured named in the Administrative Complaint, acted through the supervision and control of Respondent Wolfe, the licensed general lines agent of record at Edison. One of the services provided to customers who sought insurance through Edison was the agency's processing of premium financing applications. If an insurance customer decided to finance premium payments, the Respondent or agency personnel, would arrange premium financing for the customer through Regency Premium Finance Company (hereinafter Regency). Once the insurance customer's application to Regency was processed, Regency would issue a check for the financed portion of the premium. The check would name Edison as the payee, and would be sent to the agency's offices. The Respondent or agency personnel acting through his licenses, were then required to remit the money to the insurance company to obtain the insurance coverage selected by the proposed insured. Count I On October 7, 1986, Regency issued a check in the amount of eleven thousand eighty four dollars and twenty five cents to Edison. Upon receipt of the check, Edison paid the outstanding balance of the premiums owed to Canal Insurance Company by Shirley Turlington, who became insured with the company through Edison on July 16, 1986, under policies numbered P02 31 71, and 14 43 39. On November 7, 1986, a Notice of Cancellation was sent by Regency to the insurer as the insured did not pay an installment payment, as agreed, by October 16, 1986. The insurance policies were cancelled by the insurer, and an unearned premium of ten thousand one hundred and twenty four dollars was credited to Edison's account with Dana Roehrig & Associates, an authorized representative of Canal Insurance Company. Pursuant to the Premium Finance Agreement signed by the insured Shirley Turlington, Regency was assigned all unearned premiums returned by the insurance company on these specific policies. Shirley Turlington was not entitled to the unearned premiums credited to Edison's account by Canal Insurance Company through Dana Roehrig & Associates. A determination of Regency's entitlement to the unearned premium refund is currently pending in a civil action. Count II On March 16, 1987, Regency issued a check in the amount of nine thousand four hundred and forty one dollars to Edison. The purpose of the check was to have Edison pay the outstanding balance of the premium owed to Canal Insurance Company by Guillermo Rodriguez for a commercial automobile liability policy numbered 152 656. In reality, the amount of money necessary for payment to Canal Insurance Company had already been earmarked in the account maintained by Dana Roehrig & Associates which shows the credits and debits placed on Edison's business transactions with Dana Roehrig & Associates. The premium was paid, and the policy was issued by Canal Insurance Company with an effective date of February 2, 1987. In the premium finance agreement completed on behalf of Mr. Rodriguez in Edison's Offices, the inception date of the policy was projected for March 29, 1987. Respondent Wolfe and Edison personnel were unable to bind Canal Insurance Company so that an actual policy number and policy inception date were unknown by Edison at the time the finance agreement with Regency was completed at the agency. As the commercial automobile liability market was very active at Dana Roehrig & Associates during this time period, it is unknown what basis was used for the projected inception date of the policy. On May 27, 1987, a Notice of Cancellation was sent by Regency to the insurer as the insured did not pay an installment payment, as agreed, on April 29, 1987. The policy was cancelled September 25, 1987. No evidence was presented at hearing to demonstrate what happened to the unearned premium refund. Count III On March 24, 1987, Regency issued a check in the amount of twenty one thousand four hundred thirty five dollars to Edison. The purpose of the check was to pay the outstanding balance of the premium on a commercial automobile liability policy from Lumbermans Mutual Insurance Company which had been applied for by Thomas Gleason through Edison. Edison did not purchase an insurance policy for Mr. Gleason with the funds sent to Edison by Regency for that purpose. The check from Regency was cashed, and the funds were commingled with other funds in the agency's account number 632717. Count IV On April 21, 1987, Regency issued a check in the amount of twenty five thousand one hundred and fifty eight dollar and seventy five cents to Edison. The agency was to apply these funds against the outstanding balances on premiums for Clayton Olding, Inc., a trucking firm. The proposed insured had applied for insurance coverage from Canal Insurance Company and Cadillac Insurance Company. Edison paid for policy number 155941 with Canal Insurance Company with check number 7120. The premium amount and the inception date listed on the Regency premium finance agreement were correct. A notice of cancellation was sent to Canal Insurance Company on July 1, 1987, as Clayton Olding had failed to pay the installment due Regency on June 13, 1987. However, the policy had already been cancelled by the insured on June 1, 1987. A credit of nineteen thousand one hundred seventeen dollars and eighty cents was placed against Edison's account with Dana Roehrig & Associates, the authorized representative for Canal Insurance Company. Paperwork given to Clayton Olding, Inc. represented that the company was insured by Cadillac Insurance Company through Edison. Edison was the authorized agent of Cadillac Insurance Company and was able to temporarily bind the company. However, the money which was to be given to Cadillac Insurance Company as the down payment on the insurance premium was never sent to the insurer. Instead, Rose Delaney, an employee of Edison, created interagency documents which reflected that the money had been sent, and took the money for her own personal use. When Clayton Olding, Inc. notified Ms. Delaney to cancel the policy on June 1, 1987, this customer believed that Edison had acquired the insurance policy requested with Cadillac Insurance Company. Clayton Olding, Inc. received a refund from Edison after the cancellation of the two policies in the amount of approximately one thousand dollars. It was not revealed at hearing whether the refund related to the Canal Insurance Company policy or the Cadillac Insurance Company policy, or both transactions. Count V On April 28, 1987, Regency issued a check in the amount of four thousand five hundred and sixteen dollars to Edison for payment of the outstanding balance of the premium purportedly owed by Arthur Farquharson to Canal Insurance Company through Edison. Edison did not purchase an insurance policy for Mr. Farquharson with the funds sent to Edison by Regency for that purpose. The check from Regency was cashed, and the funds were commingled with the funds in the agency's checking account numbered 632717. The policy requested by Mr. Farquharson was never obtained by Edison on his behalf. Counts VI through VIII Count VI through Count VIII of the Administrative Complaint involve requests from proposed insured to purchase insurance through Edison. The proposed insured were Clinton Roole, Bertel Alexander Prince, and A & E Young Trucking, Inc, respectively. In each application for insurance, the proposed insured requested premium financing through Regency. Regency issued checks on behalf of these proposed insured to Edison. The agency was to pay the outstanding balances on insurance premiums in the policies purportedly obtained by Edison on behalf of these customers. Edison did not properly apply the funds sent to the agency by Regency because the requested policies were never purchased by Edison on behalf of these customers. The checks from Regency were cashed by the agency, and commingled with other funds in the agency's checking account numbered 632717. The customers did not receive the benefits requested from Edison, their insurance agency. Count IX On May 7, 1987, Regency issued a check in the amount of thirty two thousand one hundred and nine dollars to Edison. The agency was to apply the funds against the outstanding balances on three policies which were purportedly applied for from the following companies through Edison: Canal Insurance Company, Cadillac Insurance Company, and South Atlantic Council. The proposed insured was Charles Bernardo d/b/a ABX, Inc. A binder of insurance was issued by Canal Insurance Company to Mr. Bernardo for a fifteen day period which expired on April 28, 1987. A full policy was never purchased by Edison on behalf of Mr. Bernardo with the funds sent to Edison by Regency for that purpose. No information was provided at hearing regarding the purported application for insurance from South Atlantic Council on behalf of Mr. Bernardo through Edison. The check from Regency to Edison was cashed, and the funds were commingled with other funds in the agency's checking account numbered 632717. Mitigation All of the insurance transactions involved in the Administrative Complaint were conducted by Rose Delaney, an employee of Edison. During the months of March 1987 through May 1987, this employee was involved in a complex embezzlement and document falsification scheme in which she embezzled funds from the insurance agency and created phoney insurance policies and premium financing agreements, as well as false agency control documents, to cover her misdeeds. Respondent Wolfe was unable to discover this embezzlement scheme until May 23, 1987. His inability to detect the scheme was based upon a number of extraordinary factors, in spite of his reasonable attempts to supervise his insurance business and the employees with the high degree of care commensurate with his responsibilities as an insurance agent. These extraordinary factors were: the rapid and intense growth of Respondent's business during this time period; the redesign of the computerized accounting program by the agency's accountant, who failed to recognize that he had disabled an account reconciliation function within the program; the sophistication of Ms. Delaney's embezzlement scheme, and her ability to generate false documents within the agency setting which hid her crimes from the supervisory reviews conducted by Respondent Wolfe over a two and one half month period. Rose Delaney, the perpetrator of the embezzlement and documentation falsification scheme, is currently being treated in a mental health institution for mental illness. She has been diagnosed as having major depression with psychotic features as well as suffering from latent schizophrenia, paranoid type. Based upon the professional opinions of the two psychiatrists who examined Ms. Delaney, she was insane during the time she handled the insurance transactions set forth in the Administrative Complaint. The McNaughton standard was applied by both of the experts, and no evidence to the contrary was presented during the administrative hearing.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent, Gary Stephen Wolfe, be found not guilty of all nine counts set forth in the Administrative Complaint. DONE and ENTERED this 5th day of September, 1989, at Tallahassee, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of September, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 88-4927 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO# 2. Accepted. See HO# 2. Accepted. See HO# 3. Accepted. See HO# 3. Petitioner's findings do not contain a number 5. Accepted. See HO# 3. Accepted. Accepted. See HO# 4. Accepted. Accepted. See HO# 5. Rejected. See HO# 27. Accepted. See HO# 5. Accepted, but for further exposition of the facts, see HO# 7. Accepted. See HO# 5. Accepted. See HO# 6 and # 7. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. See HO# 27. Accepted. See HO# 8. Rejected. Irrelevant. See HO# 8. Rejected. See HO# 10. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. See HO# 27. Accepted. See HO# 11. Accepted. See HO# 12. Accepted. See HO# 12. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. See HOC 27. Accepted. See HO# 13. Rejected. Irrelevant. See HO# 13. Rejected. Irrelevant to pleadings. See HO# 13. Rejected. Irrelevant to pleadings. See HO# 13. Accepted. See HO# 14. Accepted. See HO# 14. Accepted. See HO# 14. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. See HO# 27. Accepted. See HO# 17. Accepted. See HO# 18. Accepted. See 1O# 18. 43.-48. Not provided to the Hearing Officer. Accepted. See HO# 18. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. See HO# 27. Accepted. See HO# 19. Accepted. See HO# 20. Accepted. See HO# 20. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO# 19. Accepted. See HO# 20. Accepted. See HO# 20. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. See HO# 27. Accepted. See HO# 19. Accepted. See HO# 20. Rejected. Cumulative. Rejected. Improper summary. Rejected. Cumulative. Rejected. See HO# 25 and #27. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant and immaterial. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO# 25. Rejected. See HO# 27. Rejected. Irrelevant. Improper shifting of burdens of proof. Not an ultimate issue in these proceedings. Rejected. Immaterial. Outside the scope of the pleadings. Rejected. Contrary to fact. A co-signer was required on any checks signed by Ms. Delaney. Rejected. Outside the scope of the pleadings. Accepted that Respondent Wolfe was not personally involved in the wrongdoings committed by Ms. Delaney. See HO# 25. The rest of paragraph 84 is rejected as argumentative. Rejected. Irrelevant - Argumentative. Rejected. Improper summary. Rejected. Argument as opposed to proposed finding of fact. Improper summary. Respondent's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO# 2. Accepted. See HO# 3. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted the first statement in paragraph 4. See HO# 9. The rest is rejected a- irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO# 26. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Not established by competent evidence. Accepted. Rejected. Improper summary with many factual conclusions that are immaterial to the allegationS in the Administrative Complaint. Rejected. Irrelevant to these proceedings. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Not established by competent evidence. Rejected. Irrelevant to these proceedings. Accepted. Accepted. See HO# 27. Accepted. Accepted. See HO# 25. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Improper summary. For rulings on each transaction, refer to Findings of Fact in the Recommended Order. Accepted. See HO# 25. COPIES FURNISHED: S. Marc Herskovitz, Esquire Office of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Joseph D. Stewart, Esquire Hardt & Stewart 801 Laurel Oak Drive Suite 705, Sun Bank Building Naples, Florida 33963 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Don Dowdell, Esquire General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 =================================================================
The Issue The issues are (1) whether respondent's licenses as a life and health (debit) agent, life, health and variable annuity contracts agent, life agent, life and health agent, general lines agent and health agent should be disciplined for the reasons stated in the amended administrative complaint, and (2) whether respondent's applications for the issuance and renewal of a resident license should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Stephen Schnur, was licensed and eligible for licensure as a life and health (debit) agent, life, health and variable annuity contracts agent, life agent, life and health agent, general lines agent - property, casualty, surety and miscellaneous lines, and health agent by petitioner, Department of Insurance and Treasurer (Department). When the events herein occurred, respondent was licensed as a property and casualty insurance agent for Clarendon National Insurance Company (CNIC) and had placed his license as a general lines agent with Devor Insurance Agency (DIA), an incorporated general lines insurance agency located at 6611 West Hillsborough Avenue, Tampa, Florida. He has been licensed by petitioner for approximately nineteen years. In August 1987 respondent was associated with Bill Ely Insurance (Ely) in Tampa, Florida. Because that firm was unable to write automobile insurance on young drivers, Schnur referred some of Ely's business to DIA, a firm owned by one Marcia Cline, who held no insurance licenses. In September 1987 Schnur received an offer from Cline of a weekly salary of $150 if he would place his property and casualty general lines agency license with DIA. After obtaining independent verification from petitioner that DIA had no pending "problems", and accepting Cline's representation, albeit false, that the firm had an errors and omissions policy, respondent accepted Cline's offer and placed his license with DIA effective that month. He continued to utilize his other licenses to sell insurance for Ely, his principal employer. It should also be noted that another unnamed general lines agent had placed her license at DIA during this same period of time. At first Schnur attempted to review all automobile insurance applications received by DIA. However, because of his duties at Ely, he was unable to devote more than a few hours per week to DIA. In view of this, he agreed to sign in blank applications and binders for Cline to use in his absence. In doing so, he relied upon Cline's honesty and integrity and assumed she would forward all applications and premiums to the insurance company and secure coverage for DIA's customers. Under this arrangement, Cline was considered to be an employee of DIA and operating under Schnur's direct supervision and control. In October 1987 five customers purchased various types of automobile insurance from Cline. 1/ Each customer gave Cline either cash or checks as payment for their policies. Although none of the customers met with or spoke with respondent, and dealt exclusively with Cline, each received a binder from Cline signed by respondent evidencing insurance with CNIC. In addition, Cline gave each customer a receipt of payment also carrying respondent's signature. As it turned out, Cline did not process the applications or forward them to CNIC. She also failed to remit any monies to the insurance company. Consequently, none of the customers received a policy from CNIC or any other insurance company. However, respondent had no reason to suspect anything since he periodically examined the office files during this period of time and found all documents in order. On January 3, 1988, respondent learned from other office personnel that there was a problem with Cline's handling of insurance applications. He immediately telephoned petitioner's Tampa district office the same day and advised that DIA applications were found unprocessed and in the waste basket. When Schnur asked if he should pull his license from DIA, he was told by petitioner's representative not to do anything. In the meantime, the other general lines agent at DIA pulled her license and left the state. On January 28, 1988 DIA sent a form letter to various customers, including the five who had purchased policies in October 1987. The letter read as follows: Dear We are writing you this letter concerning the insurance policy which you sought through our agency. Please consider this letter as official notification from our agency that you need to purchase insurance coverage from another agency or agencies as soon as possible. You have no insurance coverage on your vehicle or vehicles. Again, you must secure insurance on your vehicle or vehicles immediately, as in today!! Sincerely, Devor Insurance Agency It should be noted that none of the five customers received any refund of monies. In early February 1988 respondent pulled his license with DIA. Since then, he has worked full-time with Ely. Respondent has fully cooperated with the Department during the course of this investigation. At hearing, Schnur was can did and forthright and admitted he used extremely poor judgment in signing in blank the binders and receipts and relying on Cline's honesty. However, there was no intent on his part to violate the insurance code or otherwise harm the customers. He strongly desires to continue in the insurance profession, a field in which he has worked without a blemish for the last nineteen years. His present employer, Ely, has expressed complete trust and confidence in Schnur, allows him to handle all of the firm's money, and intends to reward him with a part ownership of that business. Other than the charges set forth in the pending amended administrative complaint, there is no basis upon which to deny the applications for renewal and issuance of a resident license.
Conclusions Paragraph 2 of Petitioner's exceptions takes exception to the Hearing Officer's Statement of the Issues, Preliminary Statement, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation because none of these sections of the Recommended Order address the April 9, 1990 denial of the renewal of Respondent's resident license to represent C M Life Insurance Company as a life and health insurance agent. Petitioner filed a motion for consolidation regarding the April 9 denial on April 17, 1990. Although the record contains no Order ruling on-the last motion for consolidation, it appears that the parties agreed that the April 9 denial be considered together with the administrative complaint and the denial of Respondent's application to represent United States Life Insurance Company of NY as a life and health insurance agent (February 14, 1990) and the denial of Respondent's application to represent Acceleration Life Insurance Company as a life and health insurance agent (April 6, 1990). Because the three denials of Respondent's applications for licensure or renewal of licensure were based upon the allegations in the administrative complaint in this case, all three denials (February 14, April 6, and April 9, 1990) will be consolidated with the administrative complaint for disposition by this Final Order. Accordingly, Petitioner's exception numbered 2 is accepted. RULING ON PETITIONER'S EXCEPTION TO CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Paragraph 3 of Petitioner's Exceptions takes exception to the Hearing Officer's Conclusion of Law numbered 4 because that Conclusion of Law refers to Section 626.611(6), Florida Statutes, which was not alleged in the administrative complaint, and the Conclusion of Law does not refer to Section 626.611(7), Florida Statutes. Section 626.611(6), Florida Statutes addresses misrepresentations by insurance claims adjusters or agents in effecting claims settlements. Clearly, Section 626.611(6), Florida Statutes has no application to the instant case, and violation of that section was not charged in the administrative complaint. On the other hand, Section 626.611(7), Florida Statutes lists the demonstration of lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance as grounds for the-suspension or revocation of an insurance agent's license. This statute was included in the charges in each count of the administrative complaint. The hearing officer apparently considered Section 626.611(7), Florida Statutes, in his Conclusions of Law numbered 3 and 4. Accordingly, the citation to Section 626.611(6), Florida Statutes is deemed to be a typographical error and it is assumed that Section 626.611(7), Florida Statutes was the intended citation. In light of the foregoing, Petitioner's exception in Paragraph 3 is accepted. RULING ON PETITIONER'S EXCEPTION TO RECOMMENDATION Paragraph 4 of Petitioner's Exceptions takes exception to the Hearing Officer's Recommendation that Respondent's license be suspended for fifteen (15) days and that Respondent's applications for licensure be granted after the expiration of the fifteen-day suspension. After a complete evaluation of the record the hearing officer's recommended penalty of a 15-day suspension and acceptance of Respondent's applications after the 15-day suspension is hereby rejected for the following reasons: The Hearing Officer found, in Findings of Fact numbered 2, that Respondent accepted an offer to "place" his general lines insurance agent license with Marcia Cline, an unlicensed person. This finding is supported by the Respondent's testimony at hearing. (Tr. 71, 72) Respondent was compensated with a weekly salary of $150. (Tr. 72); The Hearing Officer found, in Findings of Fact numbered 3, that Respondent had signed, in blank, applications and binders for Cline to use in Respondent's absence. This finding is supported by Respondent's testimony at hearing. (Tr. 72, 79, 81); The Hearing Officer concluded, in Conclusions of Law numbered 4, that Cline wrongfully withheld premiums from the insurer, made willful misrepresentations to her customers, demonstrated a lack of trustworthiness, engaged in fraudulent and dishonest practices, and misappropriated monies belonging to others, as proscribed by sections 626.561(1), 626.611(5), 626.611(7), 626.611(9) and 626.611(10), Florida Statutes. The Hearing Officer further concluded that Respondent is responsible for Cline's wrongdoing pursuant to Section 626.734, Florida Statutes. (Concl. of Law #4); The Hearing Officer was of the opinion that Respondent was "the victim of circumstances which happened to place his license with the wrong person at the wrong time, and because of poor judgment, is now saddled with Cline's misconduct." (Concl. of Law #5). This circumstance, together with the facts that Respondent immediately notified the Department when he learned that Cline had misused his license (Finding of Fact #6) and that Respondent was candid and forthright under oath at the hearing of this matter and admitted that he used poor judgment (Finding of Fact *8), led the Hearing Officer to recommend the 15- day suspension. It should be noted that Respondent voluntarily "placed" his license with an unlicensed individual. (Tr. 71, 72). Not only was this "placing" of the license the result of poor judgment, but it is prohibited by Section 626.441, Florida Statutes. That section provides: 626.441 License or permit: transferability.--A license or permit issued under this part is valid only as to the person named and is not transferable to another person. S626.441, Fla. Stat. Accordingly, it is illegal to place an insurance agent's license on the wall of an agency in order to assist unlicensed persons in selling or servicing insurance policies in the absence of the licensed agent. However, because a violation of Section 626.441, Florida Statutes was not alleged in the Administrative Complaint, this final order does not rule on that issue. Additionally, agents are prohibited from supplying blank forms, applications and other supplies to unlicensed persons for use in soliciting, negotiating, or effecting contracts of insurance. S626.342, Fla. Stat. Respondent admitted that he signed blank applications and binders for Cline, an unlicensed individual, to use in his absence. (Fact Stipulation of March 5, 1990; Finding of Fact *3). Violation of Section 626.342, Florida Statutes was not alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and is not addressed by this Order. While Respondent was not charged with violation of Sections 626.342 and 626.441, Florida Statutes in the Administrative Complaint, his "poor judgment" in becoming involved in this illegal arrangement is an aggravating rather than a mitigating factor in this case. Accordingly, this aggravating factor should be considered together with the mitigating factors referred to by the Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer concluded that Respondent is liable for the acts of Cline while his license and signature were used by Cline, and that therefore, Respondent is guilty of violating five subsections of Section 626.611, Florida Statutes. Section 626.611, Florida Statutes compels the Department of Insurance to deny, suspend, revoke, or refuse to renew or continue the license of any agent who commits any of the acts listed in Section 626.611, Florida Statutes. However, the mitigating factors found by the Hearing Officer in Conclusion of Law numbered 5, namely Respondent's immediate notification of the Department when he learned of possible wrongdoing and Respondent's cooperation in the investigation, make the 15-day suspension an appropriate, if lenient, penalty in this case. However, the aggravating factor of the improper situation entered into by Respondent in "placing" his license and supplying forms to Cline renders acceptance of Respondent's applications at the end of the 15-day suspension period inappropriate in this case. Petitioner's exception to the Hearing Officer's Recommendation is therefore accepted. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: That the Findings of Fact of the Hearing Officer are hereby adopted in toto as the Department's Findings of Fact. That the Conclusions of Law of the Hearing Officer are hereby adopted in toto with the exceptions noted above; That the recommendation of the Hearing Officer is hereby rejected for the reasons set forth in paragraph 4 above, Ruling on Petitioner's Exception to Recommendation; That Respondent is guilty of violating subsections 626.561(1), 626.611(1), 626.611(5), 626.611(7), 626.611(9), and 626.611(10), Florida Statutes; That as a result of Respondent's violations of the above referenced statutes, the licenses and eligibility for licensure of Respondent, Steven Schnur, are hereby SUSPENDED for a period of fifteen (15) days, effective upon the date of this Order. The denial letters dated February 14, 1990, April 6, 1990, and April 9, 1990 are hereby AFFIRMED. Upon expiration of the suspension period, Respondent is free to reapply for any insurance licenses, and the Department of Insurance shall not deny Respondent's applications based upon any of the facts and circumstances at issue in this action. Any party to these proceedings adversely affected by this Order is entitled to seek review of this Order pursuant to Section 120,68, Florida Statutes and Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Review proceedings must be instituted by filing a petition or notice of appeal with the General Counsel, acting as the agency clerk, at 412 Larson Building, Tallahassee, Florida 32399- 0300, and a copy of the same with the appropriate district court of appeal within thirty (30) days of the rendition this Order. ORDERED this 21 day of June , 1990. TOM GALLAGHER Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Honorable Donald R. Alexander Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Alan J. Kerben, Esquire 8814 Rocky Creek Drive Tampa, FL 33615 C. Christopher Anderson, III, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is: RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of violating subsections 626.561(1) and 626.611(5),(6),(9) and (10) that his licenses be suspended for fifteen days. The other charge should be dismissed with prejudice. It is further recommended that his applications for renewal and issuance of resident licenses be approved after the suspension is lifted. DONE AND ORDERED this 19 day of April, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19 day of April, 1990.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, the following findings of fact are made: At all times material to the allegations of this case, Respondent is and has been licensed in the State of Florida as a life and health insurance agent and as a general lines insurance agent. On December 3, 1990, Respondent received an application for workers' compensation and employers' liability insurance from Emma Ware, corporate secretary for Abel Towing Service, Inc. Also at that time, Respondent received a check from the company in the amount of $817.00 which represented the premium due from the insured for the coverage sought. The check described above, which was made payable to A.B.C. Insurance Agency, was deposited by Respondent into an account for ABC Enterprises, Inc. on or about December 5, 1990. On December 3, 1990, Respondent issued to Lennon Ware, as the insured, a certificate of insurance indicating that the insured had obtained workers' compensation and employers' liability insurance effective 12/3/90 and that the company affording coverage was NCCI. NCCI does not afford workers' compensation insurance through authorized agents such as the Respondent. Consequently, the Respondent, or any other licensee, may not bind coverage on behalf of NCCI. NCCI receives applications for insurance, such as from Abel Towing and, when complete, assigns the insurance coverage to one of several companies in the assigned risk group. NCCI operates under plan guidelines to provide insurance for entities that cannot obtain coverage from the voluntary market. NCCI administers the assignment to insurance companies, and acts as the middle man to collect the premium. NCCI does not, itself, provide the insurance coverage. After December 3, 1990, based upon the certificate of insurance issued by Respondent, Emma Ware and Lennon Ware operated under the mistaken assumption that their company, Abel Towing Services, Inc. had obtained workers' compensation and employers' liability insurance. On January 29, 1991, an employee of Abel Towing was injured on the job and taken to a hospital for treatment. In connection with that injury, a claim was submitted to Respondent for payment under the insurance coverage presumed to be in effect. On or about February 5, 1991, Respondent forwarded an application for insurance coverage on behalf of Abel Towing to NCCI. That application was incomplete as it did not contain the company's form 941, federal quarterly tax reports, for the year 1990. NCCI returned the application as incomplete and advised Respondent as to the forms required for binding coverage. In response to requests from Respondent, Emma Ware delivered copies of Abel Towing's tax reports to Respondent in February, 1991. Respondent failed to timely forward the completed application to NCCI to secure an insurance binding date of February 7, 1991. Respondent then forwarded the application to NCCI in March, 1991. In order to secure a binding date of March 5, 1991, Respondent was required to have the application package completed by and postmarked to NCCI by March 20, 1991. Again, the information submitted by Respondent on behalf of Abel Towing was incomplete. Ultimately, the insurance was not bound and effective according to NCCI until March 27, 1991. Respondent failed to inform Abel Towing or the Wares that the insurance application had been returned by NCCI. Respondent failed to timely act to procure insurance for Abel Towing and the Wares in December, 1990. Respondent failed to timely procure insurance for Abel Towing and the Wares in January, 1991, when she became aware of the injury to one of Abel Towing's employees. NCCI allows fifteen days from the first receipt of an application for insurance within which to correct deficiencies or provide information needed to complete an application. If provided within the time line, NCCI will honor the original date and bind the insurance effective at that time. Respondent did not forward any insurance application to NCCI on behalf of the Wares or Abel Towing in December, 1990. ABC Enterprises, Inc. is not the corporate name under which Respondent does insurance business.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a final order finding that the Respondent has violated Section 626.611, Florida Statutes, and suspending her licenses for a period of six months. RECOMMENDED this 14th day of April, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 91-7566 RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER: 1. Paragraphs 1 through 19 are accepted with the deletion of the phrase "Pursuant to the reapplication of February 26, 1991," found in paragraph 13. That phrase is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence or irrelevant. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE RESPONDENT: None submitted. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph D. Mandt Division of Legal Services Department of Insurance and Treasurer 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Janet Joyce Buck 6102 Walbridge Street Orlando, Florida 32809 Hon. Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer Division of Legal Services The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issue is whether proposed rule 4-141.020 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background These cases arose after respondent, Department of Insurance (DOI), published in the Florida Administrative Weekly its notice of intent to adopt new rules 4-141.020 and 4-141-021, Florida Administrative Code. The first rule prescribes procedures for the withdrawal and surrender of a certificate of authority, or the discontinuance of writing insurance in the state. The second rule specifies procedures for implementing the moratorium phaseout process in Section 627.7013, Florida Statutes. By agreement by the parties, rule 4-141.021 is no longer in dispute. Contending that rule 4-141.020 is invalid for numerous reasons, petitioners, United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company (USF&G) and Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Company (FGIC), filed their petition to determine invalidity of proposed rules on February 25, 1994. Generally, the petition alleges that the rule as a whole conflicts with other statutory and constitutional provisions, as well as the authorizing statute. It further alleges that subsections (3), (5), (8), and (9)(b) of the rule conflict with the authorizing statutes, and that paragraph (9)(b) is also arbitrary, capricious and vague. Petitioner, Holyoke Mutual Insurance Company in Salem (Holyoke), filed its petition to determine invalidity of proposed rules on February 25, 1994. The petition generally alleges that the rule as a whole conflicts with the law being implemented and is arbitrary and capricious. More specifically, the petition alleges that subsections (2)(b), (5), (6)(e)4., (7)(a), (7)(b), (8), (9), (9)(a), and (9)(b) contravene statutory provisions, and that the rule as a whole violates the due process, equal protection, commerce, and impairment of contract clauses of the state and federal constitutions. The Parties Respondent is the state agency charged with the responsibility of administering and enforcing the laws of the state governing insurance companies. Petitioners USF&G and FGIC are foreign insurers authorized to transact insurance in the State of Florida, including personal lines and residential insurance. USF&G and FGIC filed a notice to withdraw from homeowners multi-peril lines of insurance on July 7, 1993, in accordance with Subsection 624.430(1), Florida Statutes. Under that law, petitioners were required to give ninety days notice to the DOI before discontinuing those lines of insurance. The ninety-day notice period would have expired on October 5, 1993. Due to various emergency rules adopted by DOI and newly enacted legislation, the notice to withdraw never became effective. Because the proposed rule would affect their right to discontinue writing certain lines of insurance, petitioners are substantially affected by rule 4-141.020. Petitioner Holyoke is a mutual insurance company that writes business in all the New England states, New York and Florida. As of December 31, 1994, Holyoke had 4,027 homeowner policies and 1,541 dwelling fire policies outstanding in the State of Florida. Some of these property and insurance contracts were entered into prior to the enactment of Section 627.7013, Florida Statutes, which provides for a phaseout of a moratorium imposed by the legislature on the cancellation or nonrenewal of certain policies. On March 11, 1993, Holyoke filed a notice of withdrawal from all lines and kinds of insurance in the State and of the surrender of its certificate of authority pursuant to Section 624.430, Florida Statutes. Its plan was to withdraw over six months, giving all policyholders six months notice before nonrenewing policies over a twelve month period. Due to various emergency rules and statutes, Holyoke has been unable to cease doing business in the state. Since rule 4-141.020 would regulate Holyoke with regard to withdrawing from the homeowners multi-peril insurance market, it is substantially affected by the proposed rule. Events Leading to the Adoption of the Rule Following Hurricane Andrew's landfall in South Florida on August 24, 1992, the insurance industry suffered catastrophic casualty losses which totaled around $15 billion. Many insurance companies announced they were either withdrawing from the state altogether, were withdrawing from the homeowners' line of business, or were cancelling or nonrenewing substantial blocks of policyholders. Beginning on August 31, 1992, the DOI began to issue a string of emergency rules designed to limit cancellations and nonrenewals of insurance policies. None of these rules, however, purported to regulate the withdrawal of insurers from the state or from particular lines of insurance. During this same time period, the DOI adopted two emergency rules establishing procedures for insurers wishing to withdraw from any property lines in Florida. These emergency rules pertaining to insurer withdrawals expired on May 12, 1993, and no authority to restrict withdrawals retroactively has been authorized by the legislature. On May 18, 1993, the DOI imposed emergency rule ER 93-18 which represented its response to market stabilization in homeowners insurance lines. The rule imposed a moratorium on the nonrenewal and cancellation of homeowners insurance policies. The rule did not purport to regulate insurer withdrawals under Section 624.430, Florida Statutes, which governs the surrender of certificates of authority or discontinuance of writing certain lines of insurance in the state. Effective June 8, 1993, the legislature enacted Chapter 93-401, Laws of Florida, which essentially codified a DOI emergency rule and imposed a moratorium on cancellation or nonrenewal of personal lines residential property insurance policies from May 19, 1993, until November 14, 1993. The law was specifically confined to imposing a time-limited moratorium on only the "cancellation and nonrenewal of residential property coverages." Just prior to the expiration of the moratorium, the legislature enacted Section 627.7013, Florida Statutes, which provided for a "phaseout" of the moratorium imposed in Chapter 93-401. The statute provides for the extension of the moratorium on nonrenewal or cancellation of personal lines property insurance imposed by Chapter 93-401, limits unrestricted nonrenewals to five percent per year, and is to remain in effect until November 14, 1996. The statute makes no reference to withdrawals by insurers. Indeed, its purposes, as stated in subsection (1) of the statute, "are to provide for a phaseout of the moratorium (on cancellation or nonrenewal of personal lines residential property insurance policies) and to require advance planning and approval for programs of exposure reduction." It is especially noteworthy that during the same legislative special session in which section 627.7013 was enacted, the legislature considered and rejected legislation that would have created a new section 624.431 granting DOI the authority to condition and prevent withdrawals by insurers. Thus, the legislature rejected a statute which would have provided the DOI with the same authority included in the proposed rule. There is no clear expression in section 627.7013 that the legislature intended the law to operate in a retroactive manner. Because the statute imposes new obligations on insurers, it must be presumed that the legislature intended it to operate prospectively. In contrast, and in response to Hurricane Andrew, when the legislature adopted Chapter 92-345, Laws of Florida, in its December 1992 special session, subsection (2) of section 1 of that law contained specific language that "this section shall take effect upon becoming a law and shall apply retroactively to August 24, 1992." On February 4, 1994, the DOI published notice of its intent to adopt new rules 4-141.020 and 4-141.021. However, the latter rule is no longer in issue. Rule 4-141.020, which is sometimes referred to as the "withdrawal rule," generally sets forth the procedures for withdrawal, surrender of certificate of authority, or discontinuance of writing insurance in the state under section 624.430. More specifically, it provides definitions of various terms [paragraph 2)], provides a DOI interpretation of section 624.430 (paragraphs (3) and (5)], prescribes procedures for withdrawals and reduction of insurance (paragraphs (6)-(8)], and sets out DOI policy regarding the relationship of reduction in business to the moratorium phaseout in section 627.7013 [paragraph (9)]. Sections 624.308(1) and 624.6012, Florida Statutes, are cited as the specific authority for adopting the rule while Sections 624.430, 624.6011, 624.6012 and 627.7013, Florida Statutes, are identified as the law implemented. Prior to Hurricane Andrew, if an insurer wished to (a) discontinue the writing of any one or more multiple kinds of insurance, (b) withdraw from the state, or (c) surrender its certificate of authority, it would simply provide to the DOI notice of its intent to do so as required by section 624.430. As long as the notice complied with the statutory requirements, the withdrawal was self- executing, and DOI did not require specific approval or impose further conditions on the insurer. Thus, before this controversy arose, DOI took the position that the only duty or power granted to it under the section was a ministerial one of altering the certificate of authority to reflect the insurer's withdrawal from certain lines of insurance or, in the case of complete withdrawal from the state, to cancel the insurer's certificate of authority. It has never adopted any permanent rule construing the statute in any other fashion. Although section 624.430 has not been amended by the legislature since it was enacted in 1963, under the proposed rule, section 627.7013 is interpreted as restricting the right of an insurer to withdraw from the state entirely or from a line of insurance. Indeed, the rule provides that section 627.7013 takes precedence over section 624.430, and unless an insurer had filed its notice of withdrawal prior to August 24, 1992, insurers are severely limited in their ability to discontinue lines of business or withdraw from the state through at least November 14, 1996. The Petitions, Stipulation and Proposed Final Orders Because the initial petitions, prehearing stipulation, and proposed final orders sometimes speak to different issues, and some of the allegations are either unclear or not precisely pled, it is necessary to comment on these matters before making findings as to the validity of the rule. Since the initial petitions frame the issues in these cases, and DOI counsel has objected to expanding the issues through stipulation or otherwise, the undersigned has limited the issues to those raised in the initial petitions and deemed all others to be untimely raised. Further, where a party has framed an allegation in its complaint, but failed to argue that issue in its proposed order, that allegation has been deemed to be abandoned. Finally, where allegations are nonspecific and speak to the rule as a whole, and the undersigned is unable to determine the language in the rule being challenged, those allegations have been disregarded. In their initial petition, USF&G and FGIC first contend that the rule as a whole is invalid because it conflicts with, extends or modifies sections 624.430, 627.7013 and "other existing (but unnamed) statutory authority," and it violates the Florida and U. S. Constitutions by interpreting section 627.7013 as taking precedence over section 624.430. In actuality, only subsection (9), and not the entire rule, speaks to this issue and thus the broad allegation has been narrowed in this respect. They have also alleged that the rule in its entirety is invalid because it conflicts with, extends or modifies the "authorizing statute" in that it purports to require filings and information not authorized by statute. Because these alleged illegal filing requirements are found in paragraph (6)(e), the undersigned has considered only that provision as subject to attack. USF&G and FGIC also allege that subsections (3), (5), (8) and (9)(b) are invalid because they conflict with, extend or modify the "authorizing statute." Finally, they allege that paragraph (9)(b) is invalid on the additional grounds that the language is arbitrary, capricious, and vague. Since the reference to paragraph (9)(b) appears to have been in error, and petitioners actually intended to challenge paragraph (9)(a), the undersigned will address the latter provision. In summary, then, and notwithstanding the broad allegations in the petition, only parts, and not the whole, of the rule have been placed in question by these petitioners. Because the proposed final order of USF&G and FGIC fails to address subsections (5) and (6)(e), the undersigned has deemed those allegations to be abandoned. Finally, the proposed order raises for the first time a contention that subsection (4) is invalid. This contention has been disregarded as being untimely raised. In its initial petition, Holyoke first contends that the rule in its entirety is invalid "because it would enlarge, contravene, and modify the specific provisions of law that it purportedly implements and because it would be arbitrary and capricious." It then goes on to plead that subsections (2)(b), (5), (6)(e)4., (7)(a), (7)(b), (8), (9), (9)(a), and (9)(b) are invalid on the ground they conflict with, extend, or modify other statutory provisions. Since no specific factual allegations have been made regarding the arbitrary and capricious nature of the rule, and there are no statutory allegations regarding the remaining parts of the rule, the undersigned will treat the petition as challenging only these paragraphs for the single ground stated. Finally, Holyoke alleges that the rule in its entirety violates the due process, equal protection, commerce, and impairment of contract clauses in the State and U. S. Constitutions. In its proposed order, Holyoke has further contended that the above paragraphs are also invalid on the grounds they are arbitrary and capricous, vague, fail to establish adequate standards and vest unbridled discretion in the agency. Because the latter three grounds were never raised in the initial petition and, as noted above, there are no specific allegations regarding the arbitrary and capricous nature of the cited paragraphs, these grounds have been disregarded as being untimely raised. Is the Rule Invalid? a. Rule 4-141.020(9) Petitioners' chief concern is the DOI's interpretation, as expressed in subsection (9) of the rule, that section 627.7013 takes precedence over section 624.430 "as to all attempted or desired reductions" affecting personal lines residential policies. Because "reductions" are broadly defined in paragraph (2)(b) of the rule as including the discontinuance of one or mulitiple lines of business, the withdrawal from the state, and the surrender of a certificate authority, subsection (9) effectively prevents an insurer from exercising its rights under section 624.430 until November 14, 1996, when the phaseout statute expires. Since the vitality of much of the rule turns on the validity of subsection (9), the multiple allegations concerning this provision will be addressed first. The exact language in subsection (9) is as follows: (9) Relationship of Reduction to Moratorium Phaseout. The department interprets Section 627.7013(2)(a)4., Florida Statutes, relating to certain applications for reduction filed prior to August 24, 1992, as indicating a legislative intent that as to all attempted or desired reductions affecting "Florida per- sonal lines residential policies" (hereinafter "residential policies"), other than those in which such reduction notice was filed prior to August 24, 1992, Section 627.7013 applies and takes precedence over Section 624.430, and prohibits or limits such reductions affecting residential policies, where there is any relation- ship between the reduction sought, and the risk of loss from hurricane exposure. Subparagraph (2)(a)4. of section 627.7013 provides the principal statutory support for the rule and reads as follows: 4. Notwithstanding any provisions of this section to the contrary, this section does not apply to any insurer that, prior to August 24, 1992, filed notice of its intent to dis- continue its writings in this state under s. 624.430, and for which a finding has been made by the department, the Division of Administrative Hearings of the Department of Management Services, or a court that such notice satisfied all re- quirements of s. 624.430. As explained at hearing by the author of the rule, "by implication" or "negative inference" the DOI construed the above statutory language as manifesting an intent on the part of the legislature to make all types of withdrawals, and not just the cancellation or nonrenewal of personal lines residential property policies, subject to the moratorium phaseout statute. In other words, DOI posits that the legislative exemption from the moratorium phaseout statute of an insurer who filed, prior to August 24, 1992, a notice of its intent to discontinue writings, supports the broad negative inference that section 627.7013 prohibits an insurer not only from "discontinuing its writing" of one or more lines of business after August 24, 1992, but also from withdrawing from the state and surrendering its certificate of authority. In making this interpretation of section 627.7013 in its rule, the DOI ignored the distinctions between "discontinuance of lines of insurance" versus "withdrawal from the state" versus "surrendering a certificate of authority." Section 627.7013 refers only to "discontinue," as opposed to a total withdrawal coupled with a surrender of a certificate. Whatever negative inference might be drawn from subparagraph (2)(a)4. regarding the discontinuance of a line of insurance before August 24, 1992, as opposed to after that date, it cannot be extended to prohibit an insurer's total withdrawal from Florida and the surrender of its certificate of authority. Such an interpretation is not only contrary to the plain language in sections 624.430 and 627.7013, but also subsection 624.416(1), which recognizes an insurer's right to surrender its certificate of authority. To this extent, then, the rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Assuming that the statute is a proper source of authority for imposing restrictions on discontinuing lines of insurance by virtue of the words "discontinue its writings" in subparagraph (2)(a)4., petitioners argue further that DOI has used the rule to interpret the statute so as to have it apply in a retroactive manner to insurance contracts in existence prior to the enactment of the statute. It is undisputed that all petitioners had insurance contracts in existence as of the date of the enactment of the law, and that the rule operates in a retroactive manner by applying to all notices of withdrawal filed prior to the enactment of section 627.7013 but after August 24, 1992. In resolving this issue, the undersigned cannot find, and respondent has not credibly reported, any clear expression in the statute that the legislature intended to apply the statute retroactively. At the same time, the statute affects petitioners' substantive rights by imposing new obligations or duties in connection with their right to withdraw under section 624.430, and thus it is deemed to be substantive in nature. Because the rule has the effect of imposing retroactive obligations and duties on petitioners in contravention of section 627.7013, subsection (9) is found to be an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. b. Rule 4-141.020(2)(b) Proposed rule 4-141.020(2)(b) defines the terms "reduce presence in Florida," "reduce," and "reduction" as follows: (b) "Reduce presence in Florida," "Reduce," and "Reduction," as used in this rule are inclusive terms meant to collectively refer to any and all of the following actions as may be desired or taken by an insurer: to surrender its Florida certificate of authority; to withdraw from Florida; or to discontinue the writing of any one or multiple lines or kinds of insurance in Florida. Holyoke contends that the foregoing language is invalid because the term "reduction" is defined as including a total withdrawal from all lines of insurance in Florida and the surrender of a certificate of authority, and thus it contravenes sections 624.430, 624.415, 624.416 and 627.7013. 34. Sections 624.430, 624.6011, 624.6012 and 627.7013 are cited by DOI as the source of authority for the definition. There is nothing in section 624.6011, which classifies insurance into seven "kinds of insurance," nor section 624.6012, which defines the term "lines of insurance," authorizing the broad and sweeping definition of the word "reduction." Similarly, section 627.7013(2)(b) authorizes the DOI to "adopt rules to implement this subsection," but subsection (2) deals only with "the cancellation or nonrenewal of personal lines residential property insurance policies that were in force on November 14, 1993, and were subject to the moratorium." Section 624.430 does speak in general terms to "(a)ny insurer desiring to surrender its certificate of authority, withdraw from this state, or discontinue the writing of any one or multiple kinds of insurance in this state," but in the context of this rule, which seeks to prevent all types of withdrawals under the authority of section 627.7013, the rule clearly contravenes the law being implemented. Therefore, paragraph (2)(b) constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. c. Rule 4-141.020(3) Proposed rule 4-141.020(3) reads as follows: (3) Actions Having the Substantial Effect of a Withdrawal or Discontinuance of Writing Insurance in this State. Reductions subject to Section 624.430, Florida Statutes, include any action or actions the reasonably forseeable substantial effect of which is, or will be when the action is completed, to have discon- tinued the writing of a kind or line of insurance or to have withdrawn from Florida. "Substantial effect" means that, for example, the continuance of a token amount of writing in Florida will not prevent a conclusion that a reduction subject to Section 624.430 has or will occur. Furthermore, it is not determinative of the existence of a reduction requiring notice under Section 624.430, that the action is taken in a single step, or by a series of steps over time, if the reasonably forseeable effect of the action or actions is or will to be to (sic) have substantially effected a reduction. The application of Section 624.430 does not depend upon the insurer's subjective statement of desire or intent as to the effect of its actions. In their petition, USF&G and FGIC contended this part of the rule impermissibly "conflicts with, modifies or extends the authorizing statutes in that the rule adopts a 'reasonably forseeable substantial effect' test for determining whether a proposed action is subject to Section 624.430, Florida Statutes." While petitioners have addressed other somewhat similar provisions in paragraph (9)(a), no argument has been made in their proposed order as to subsection (3), and the undersigned has accordingly assumed the issue to be abandoned. d. Rule 4-141.020(5) Proposed rule 4-141.020(5) prescribes the following time limitations in which an insurer can take no action after filing a notice of reduction with DOI: (5) Notice to Precede Action to Reduce Presence in Florida. An insurer shall take no action in furtherance of a reduction, prior to the expir- ation of 90 days after the receipt by the depart- ment of the notice required by Section 624.430. Prohibited actions include sending any notice of cancellation or termination, or notice of intent to cancel or terminate, to any policyholder, agent, managing general agent, reinsurer, or other person or entity. In their petition, USF&G and FGIC have alleged that the proposed rule conflicts with, modifies or extends "the authorizing statute in that it prohibits an insurer from taking action in furtherance of the proposed reduction prior to the expiration of the 90-day period under section 624.430, Florida Statutes." Holyoke makes the same allegation and contends the rule contravenes sections 624.430, 624.415 and 624.416. The record is not clear on the exact manner in which section 624.430 operates. It may be reasonably inferred, however, that once a notice of withdrawal is filed, the insurer may then begin notifying customers and other interested persons that it will withdraw at the end of the ninety-day statutory time period. By restricting insurers from taking this action in contravention of the terms of section 624.430, and there being no other valid source of authority, subsection (5) is found to be an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. e. Rule 4-141.020(6)(e)4. Paragraph (6)(e) describes the content of the notice to be given to DOI when providing a notice of reduction. Subparagraph 4. therein requires the following information to be provided in the notice of reduction: 4. Insurers shall also provide the department with the following information in the notice: A listing of all lines of insurance the insurer than has in force in Florida which will be affected by the reduction, and for each line, a statement of the approximate number of policies and dollars of premium then in force in Florida and which will be affected by the desired reduction. A description of what notice and treatment will be given by the insurer to its affected Florida policyholders concerning the reduction; and what steps will be taken by the insurer regarding processing of any outstanding covered claims of such policyholders while and after the insurer accomplishes its reduction. A description of projected impact of the reduction upon the insurer's Florida agent and agency force, if any. In addition to any other information related to the impact on agents, the insurer shall state the number of affected agents and give a brief description of what they are being told. Holyoke claims that this portion of the rule is invalid because it requires an insurer "to provide excessive information" in contravention of sections 624.430, 624.415 and 624.416. Since the proposed rule is based upon the premise that the DOI has the authority under section 627.7013 to restrict the ability of insurers to withdraw in any fashion, and such statutory authority has been found to be lacking in the laws being implemented, the rule is deemed to be an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority on the ground it modifies or extends sections 624.430 and 627.7013. f. Rule 4-141.020(7)(a) and (b) These paragraphs describe the DOI's responsibilities once an insurer files a notice of reduction. They read as follows: (7) Department Action Upon Receipt of Notice. Subsequent to receiving the initial filing the department will request the insurer to provide further information, or will conduct such other investigation as is necessary to determine whether the initial information provided is accurate and whether the proposed action will have the effects projected by the insurer. Reduction Tolled During Certain Investi- gations. The department shall inform the insurer by (sic) that the proposed reduction would be in violation of, or cause a violation of, any provision of the Insurance Code or rule of the department, and thereafter the insurer shall not effect the reduction and shall terminate any action then under way towards accomplishment of the reduction, until such time as the department's allegation is determined under Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, and such appeals as may be taken by either party are concluded. Like so many other parts of the rule, Holyoke contends here that the foregoing language is invalid because it contravenes sections 624.430, 624.415, and 624.416. Since the proposed rule purports to place new restrictions on insurers seeking to withdraw, and it has no source of statutory authority, the above language is found to be an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority on the ground it extends or modifies sections 624.430 and 624.7013. g. Rule 4-141.020(8) This provision provides that no surrender of a certificate is effective until approved by DOI. The specific language in the subsection reads as follows: (8) Certificate of Authority Surrender Effected by Department Order. No surrender or attempted surrender of a certificate of authority is effective until accepted by order of the department. USF&G and FGIC contend the rule conflicts with, modifies or extends section 624.430 since that statute requires an insurer to provide notice that it intends to surrend a certificate of authority, but does not require it to obtain DOI approval to do so. In its petition, Holyoke has alleged that the foregoing language contravenes not only section 624.430, but also sections 624.415 and 624.416. As noted in finding of fact 17, until the enactment of section 627.7013, DOI has always taken the position that a notice of withdrawal did not require specific agency approval. Rather, DOI has said that the only power or duty granted it under section 624.430 was a ministerial one of altering the certificate of authority to reflect the insurer's withdrawal from certain lines of insurance or, in the case of complete withdrawal from the state, to cancel the insurer's certificate of authority. Since section 624.430 has not been amended, and section 627.7013 does not enlarge DOI's rights with regard to a notice of withdrawal filed by an insurer, the paragraph is found to in conflict with both sections 624.430 and 627.7013. Therefore, it is deemed to be an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. h. Rule 4-141.020(9)(a) This paragraph generally provides that any reductions in residential policies proposed by an insurer must be unrelated, directly or indirectly, to a reduction of risk of loss from hurricane exposure. The rather lengthy rule reads as follows: Reduction Must be Unrelated to Risk of Loss From Hurricane Exposure. Pursuant to Section 627.7013, where the reduction affects residential policies, the proposed reduction must be unrelated to the risk of loss from hurricane exposure. The department notes that Section 627.7013 does not in any way qualify or limit the requirement that the reduction be unrelated to the risk of loss from hurricane exposure. The department interprets the word "unrelated," as used in Section 627.7013, in the context of the exigent circumstances motivating the enactment of the statute, and the remedial nature of the statute, as requiring a liberal, wide-reaching definition, so that the reduction must be completely unrelated, directly and indirectly, to reduction of risk of loss from hurricane exposure. As stated in subsection (3), above, the department is not bound by the reason facially asserted for the reduction. If the reduction is related in part to reduction of risk of loss from hurricane exposure, the reduction is prohibited unless authorized as type one, two, or three relief, under Rule 4-141.021, notwith- standing that some other reason is in good faith also part of the reason for seeking the reduction. The objective effect of the propose (sic) reduction in reducing hurricane exposure is given more weight than the insurer's subjective motivations, in determining whether the reduction is unrelated to risk of hurricane exposure. Subjective motivation is relevant primarily only where the objective effect is equivocal. Factors which will be given great weight in evaluating whether a desired reduction is related to risk of hurricane loss are: Would the reduction in Florida be accompanied by reduction action by the insurer in other states? If so, would a disproportionate amount of the impact be in areas of the country especially subject to risk of loss from hurricane? How much of the reduction in Florida would be in residential policy exposures as compared to exposures in other lines of insurance in Florida? If the insurer is discontinuing writing only some lines of insurance are the lines being discontinued especially subject to risk of loss from hurricane, as compared to the lines not being discontinued? Does the insurer have a significant con- centration of residential policies and exposure to risk of loss from hurricane exposure under residential policies in Florida? Would the desired reduction significantly reduce the insurer's exposure to risk of loss from hurricane exposure under residential policies in Florida? Holyoke argues that the paragraph contravenes sections 624.430, 624.416 and 627.7013 by stating that any "reduction" must be "unrelated to risk of loss from hurricane exposure" and that "unrelated" means "completely unrelated, directly and indirectly, to reduction of risk of loss from hurricane exposure." At the same time, USF&G and FGIC contend the rule is invalid since it "improperly" defines the term "unrelated" to permit the DOI to apply a subjective "effects" test "using illegal, arbitrary, capricious, and vague factors which fail to establish adequate standards for agency action and which exceed the agency's delegated authority." Although several statutes are cited as being the law implemented, section 627.7013 is the principal source of authority for the rule. Subparagraph (2)(a)1. of the statute provides in relevant part that (t)his subparagraph does not prohibit any cancellations or nonrenewals of such policies for any other lawful reason unrelated to the risk of loss from hurricane exposure. The statutory language unequivocally reserves to insurers the right to cancel or nonrenew policies "for any other lawful reason unrelated to the risk of loss from hurricane exposure." To the extent the rule authorizes DOI to prohibit nonrenewals or cancellations if they are related in part to reduction of hurricane exposure, even if other reasons are in good faith and are part of the reason for seeking the cancellations or nonrenewals, the language contravenes the statute. The rule further provides that if the effect of a reduction in exposure is to avoid hurricane exposure, the nonrenewal or cancellation can be denied even if the insurer has given a lawful reason unrelated to the risk of loss from hurricane exposure. Since it can be reasonably inferred that the ultimate effect of every withdrawal is to reduce to zero the insurer's risk of loss from hurricane exposure, the "effects" test strips the statute of its clear mandate that insurers maintain the right to cancel or nonrenew policies "for any other lawful reason unrelated to the risk of loss from hurricane exposure." For this additional reason, the rule contravenes the statute. Next, while there is some evidential support as to DOI's theory in adopting the rule as a whole, there is no factual basis in the record to support the rationale for the language in paragraph (9)(a). As such, it is deemed to be arbitrary and capricious. Finally, in applying the six factors that would be given "great weight" in evaluating whether a desired reduction is related to risk of hurricane loss, the DOI acknowledges that there are no criteria or guidelines to follow in weighing these objective effects. Indeed, the DOI author admitted he had insufficient experience to fashion more specific guidelines. Even so, the language is not so vague as to confuse a person of reasonable knowledge, nor can it be said that the rule fails to establish adequate standards for agency action which exceed the agency's delegated authority. i. Rule 4-141.020(9)(b) The final provision under challenge is found in paragraph (9)(b) which reads as follows: (b) If the department determines that any proposed reduction violates Section 627.7013, the insurer shall not proceed with the reduction as it affects residential policies, and shall file an application under Rule 4-141.021 which implements Section 627.7013. The reduction in residential policies shall be limited to the extent of relief granted the insurer by the department under Section 627.7013 and Rule 4-141.021. Holyoke contends that this language is invalid because it contravenes sections 624.430, 624.415 and 624.416. Although the allegation is imprecise, it is assumed that petitioner contends the rule impermissibly broadens the definition of the word "reduction" to include an insurer's withdrawal from the state or the surrender of a certificate of authority. Because the undersigned has previously found that the DOI clearly lacks statutory authority under section 627.7013 to limit withdrawals from the state or the surrender of a certificate of authority, and the broad definition of "reduction" in paragraph (2)(b) has been deemed to be invalid, it is found that the language in the rule conflicts with sections 624.430 and 627.7013 and is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. D. Constitutional Claims Even if the rule is a valid exercise of delegated legislative authority, Holyoke nonetheless contends the rule is invalid because it violates the Florida and United States Constitutions in several respects. USF&G and FGIC join in this claim. Due process and takings clause Article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution provides that "(n)o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law . . ." USF&G, FGIC and Holyoke contend the proposed rule violates this provision and its federal counterpart, the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. Holyoke's presence in the state may be characterized as small. Therefore, the absence of economies of scale assures continuing operating losses for the company. Indeed, in 1993 and 1994, Holyoke suffered operational losses in the state of $822,071 and $736,000, respectively, without the landfall of a hurricane. The rule bars Holyoke from withdrawing totally from Florida and surrendering its certificate of authority as it wishes to do. In Holyoke's case, every dollar of risk required to be underwritten in Florida requires that it forego writing business in another state, or increase its surplus-to-writings ratio, thereby increasing the financial risk assumed. The prospect of continuing losses in Florida impacts Holyoke in two ways. First, it suffers a drain on its surplus to the extent of the forced losses. Second, given the relationship between surplus and writing capacity, the loss of surplus caused by the operating losses results in its inability to write business in another state upon the lost surplus. USF&G is now in the process of downsizing its firm. In 1991, it was on the verge of insolvency having suffered losses of $600 million in that year alone. Based on marketing studies performed after 1991, the company has reshaped its corporate strategy and has subsequently withdrawn entirely from two states (Texas and Louisiana), and has withdrawn all personal lines from nine states. In addition, USF&G has made selected withdrawals for particular lines in many other states, and has pared its total employees from 12,500 to 6,000. The proposed rule prevents it from meeting its corporate objective of filing with DOI a notice of withdrawal for personal homeowners multiperil insurance. Equal protection clause Section 2 of Article I of the Florida Constitution provides in part that "(a)ll natural persons are equal before the law." Under the proposed rule, Holyoke must continue to do business in the personal lines market of the state indefinitely, or at least until November 1996. Holyoke contends this is to the detriment of residents of other states in which it writes business, and that the rule favors Florida residents over residents of other states for an illegitimate purpose. Commerce clause The federal commerce clause limits the power of the states to interfere with interstate commerce. Holyoke contends that the interstate allocation of capital and surplus constitutes interstate commerce, and because the proposed rule seeks to regulate its decision as to how to allocate capital and surplus, it violates the commerce clause. Impairment of contracts Article I, section 10 of the Florida Constitution provides that "(n)o . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." All three petitioners contend that section 627.7013, as interpreted by the proposed rule, violates the impairment of contract clauses of both the Florida and United States Constitutions. All petitioners had insurance contracts in existence at the time section 627.7013 was enacted and the rule proposed. Prior to that time, petitioners' rights with respect to those contracts were set forth in section 624.430. The DOI's interpretation of section 627.7013, as expressed in its rule, prohibits the insurers from exercising these pre-existing contractual rights, including the right to withdraw. To this extent, an impairment has occurred. By prohibiting an insurer from withdrawing from the state, DOI's impairment of those rights can be deemed to be substantial. Petitioners operate in a heavily regulated industry. At the same time, according to the findings and purposes of section 627.7013, that legislation was prompted by Hurricane Andrew's "enormous monetary impact to insurers," proposals by insurers to make "substantial cancellation or nonrenewal of their homeowner's insurance policyholders," and the legislature's "compelling state interest in maintaining an orderly market for personal lines residential property insurance."
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what penalties should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent's Licensure and Work History Respondent is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, licensed by Petitioner as a general lines (property and casualty) insurance agent. At no time material to the instant case has he been licensed as a surplus lines agent. In the 30 plus years that he has been in the insurance business, no licensing agency has taken any disciplinary action against him. From January of 1997 until July of 1997 (which includes the entire period during which the events described in the Administrative Complaint took place), Respondent worked as an insurance agent for Braishfield of Florida, Inc. (Braishfield), an insurance agency/brokerage firm. (In July of 1997, he started his own insurance agency/brokerage firm, Bandel and Associates, which he still operates.) The Saxony Condominium Association The Saxony Condominium Association (Association) consists of the owners of the 672 units (located in 14 buildings) in the "Saxony" section of the Kings Point condominium development in Delray Beach. The development is approximately seven to ten miles from the Atlantic Ocean. For the past six years, Elinor Lichten has been the president of the Association. The Association's Insurance Committee In August of 1992, before Ms. Lichten became president of the Association, Hurricane Andrew made landfall in the South Florida area and caused extensive property damage. In the years that followed, the premiums that the Association paid for insurance increased dramatically. In February of 1996, in an effort to contain these escalating insurance costs, the Association formed an insurance committee. Ms. Lichten named Dan Miller to serve as the chairman of the committee. Mr. Miller appointed the remaining members on the committee. Ed Greenbaum was among those Mr. Miller appointed to the committee. Ms. Lichten was not a voting member of the committee, although she did attend some (but not all) of the committee's meetings. The Association's Fireman's Fund Policies At the time the insurance committee was formed, the Association was insured by Fireman's Fund. It obtained this insurance coverage through Sedgwick James of Florida, Inc. (Sedgwick). The insurance agent who represented Sedgwick in its dealings with the Association was J. Simione. In October of 1996, the Association received a notice that the Fireman's Fund policies would not be renewed. Upon receiving the notice, Ms. Lichten telephoned Mr. Simione, who advised her that he was "negotiating to reinstate that policy and that in all probability it would be reinstated." Mr. Simione subsequently contacted Ms. Lichten and advised her that the negotiations had been successful. The Fireman's Fund policies were thereafter renewed. The renewed policies had an effective date of December 1, 1996, and an expiration date of December 1, 1997. The Association agreed to the renewal notwithstanding the renewed policies' high premiums and deductibles. Members of the insurance committee, who had met with Mr. Simione "between three to five times" prior to the renewal of the policies, had advised the committee members that there were no better options available and that they should "be absolutely delighted [to] have the coverage [they] had since insurance companies were not renewing policies." When they asked Mr. Simione to "find [a] layered program [for the Association, like those other condominium associations in the area had] where the [risk] is divided so that the premiums are reduced," Mr. Simione told them that it "wasn't possible," explaining that "all of the layering programs [they] had referred to had since fallen apart." The Insurance Committee's Discussions with Respondent Following the renewal of the Fireman's Fund policies, members of insurance committee, at the direction Mr. Miller, "start[ed] to interview" other insurance agents "to see whether or not Mr. Simione's comment to [them concerning the unavailability of a layered program for the Association] had any validity." Respondent was the second agent to be "interview[ed]." He was initially contacted by Ed Greenbaum, who told him that the insurance committee "was very upset by the current coverage package they had" and wanted to see if "there was something better." Respondent spoke subsequently with both Mr. Greenbaum and Mr. Miller. Following this conversation, he sent Mr. Greenbaum the following letter, dated February 23, 1997: It was pleasure talking to you and Dan Miller and I appreciate your candor. Based on the information you provided on the phone, it appears the premiums and deductibles that are currently in force are excessive. My comment is based on what is available in the marketplace today. It appears that the earliest I can sit down and discuss this with the board is in May. My recommendation is that we move our meeting up to March or April. This will enable us to obtain the best possible terms and conditions as we will have ample time prior to the beginning of the hurricane season. The association has nothing to lose and potentially a lot to gain. My evaluation requires a minimum amount of time. After our meeting and a review of the current program and losses, I will be in a position to confirm in writing what improvements can be made. I look forward to hearing from you. Respondent provided the "marketing person" at Braishfield with the information he had been provided by Mr. Greenbaum and Mr. Miller concerning the Association's insurance needs and loss history. The "marketing person" thereupon canvassed the market to determine if there were any alternatives to the Fireman's Fund policies. Such canvassing revealed that there did exist an alternative to the Fireman's Fund policies, in the form of a layered program in which three of the participating insurers were not "authorized insurers," as that term is used in Florida's "Surplus Lines Law." The "marketing person" prepared the following "Statement of Diligent Effort" for Respondent's signature as the "producing agent": Pursuant to [sic] Section 626.914(4), Florida Statutes, requires producing agents to document that a diligent effort has been made to place a risk with at least three (3) authorized insurers prior to contacting a surplus lines agent to export the risk in the surplus lines market. The following form, prescribed by the Department, must be completed IN FULL for each risk. Name of person contacted and telephone number are MANDATORY. COUNTY OF RISK: Palm Beach County NAME OF INSURED: Saxony A-N Condominium Association TYPE OF COVERAGE: Property AUTHORIZED INSURER #1 NAME- Hartford Insurance TELEPHONE NUMBER- 800-824-1732 PERSON CONTACTED- Ben Wilson DATE OF CONTACT- March 21, 1997 REASON FOR DECLINATION- Type of Risk/Property Location AUTHORIZED INSURER #2 NAME- General Accident Ins. TELEPHONE NUMBER- 407-660-1985 PERSON CONTACTED- Bob Rayser DATE OF CONTACT- March 21, 1997 REASON FOR DECLINATION- Type of Risk/Property Location AUTHORIZED INSURER #2 NAME- RISCORP TELEPHONE NUMBER- 800-226-7472 PERSON CONTACTED- Bryan Flowers DATE OF CONTACT- March 21, 1997 REASON FOR DECLINATION- Risk does not qualify for program Respondent signed this "Statement of Diligent Effort" on the line provided for the "[s]ignature of [p]roducing [a]gent." He did so in good faith based upon the representations made to him by the "marketing person." In April of 1997, Respondent met with members of the insurance committee and Ms. Lichten at Mr. Miller's residence to discuss the possibility of the Association obtaining, through Braishfield, the layered program of insurance described above to replace the Fireman's Fund policies that were then in effect. Respondent, on behalf of Braishfield, made a "conceptual" proposal at the meeting. After the meeting, Respondent sent the following letter, dated April 16, 1997, to Dan Miller: It was a pleasure meeting with you and the committee and again I want to apologize for arriving late. Per our discussions, we will provide our final proposal after receiving written confirmation regarding the three year loss history for property and liability. Our proposal will be effective June 1, however we will use whatever date is acceptable to the committee. We anticipate, it will take us approximately two weeks from the time we go into the marketplace until everything is finalized. It appears, there is minimal exposure for equipment, such as heating, cooling and electrical systems. Consequently, we will not include machinery and equipment breakdown in our final proposal. I strongly recommend that you obtain an updated appraisal on your buildings as it is extremely important that your replacement cost reflect today's cost. This will eliminate any potential coinsurance or under insurance problem in the event of a loss. I look forward to working with you and the committee and being appointed as your broker to assist you in all your insurance needs. In May of 1997, Respondent, on behalf of Braishfield, presented a detailed formal written proposal (Braishfield's Written Proposal) to the Association. Braishfield's Written Proposal contained an "Executive Summary" which read as follows: Executive Summary Per our conceptual proposal and correspondence of April 16, we are pleased to present our final program including terms and conditions. Our proposal is based on information provided by the Insurance Committee on policies that are currently in force. Our comparison of coverages incorporates this information. The differences are what we believe to be the key or salient features of each program. The bottom line is, we are offering a substantial premium savings, significantly lower deductibles with comparable coverage. Our recommendation is to appoint Braishfield of Florida as your broker to place all coverage in effect as soon as possible. The "final program" referenced in the "Executive Summary" was a layered program. The "[p]articipating [c]arriers" in the program and their "Best's Ratings" were listed as follows in Braishfield's Written Proposal: PARTICIPATING CARRIERS Property Insurance Carriers Best's Rating Lexington Insurance A++15 General Star Insurance A++7 Royal Surplus Lines A-7 General Liability/Crime New Hampshire Insurance A++15 Directors & Officers Liability Chubb Insurance Group A++15 Umbrella Liability Great American Insurance A+11 The three "carriers" providing "property insurance" coverage were not "authorized insurers," within the meaning of the "Surplus Lines Law." The "[b]enefits of the Braishfield [p]roposed [p]rogram [o]ver [c]urrent [p]rogram" were described in Braishfield's Written Proposal as follows: A Premium Savings of $42,529 Annually.* No Coinsurance Penalty. A 2% Deductible per building as respect to the perils of wind and hail. A $5,000,000 limit for Excess Liability A $5,000 AOP Deductible * Our premium savings is based on the following: Company Coverage Premiums Fireman's Fund Package $144,071 Fireman's Fund Umbrella $2,168 TOTAL $146,239 $ 12,966 (Agent's Fee) TOTAL $159,205 Proposal Cancellation Date June 1, 1997 Pro Rata Return Premium- $79,761 Short Rate Return Premium- $71,801 NOTE: A $1,000,000 Umbrella would produce a further savings of $3,395 Braishfield's Written Proposal also contained a "Program Comparison," which provided as follows: Coverage Current Proposed Program Program $20,454,000 Blanket As Per Limit on Schedule Real and Personal Property Coinsurance Yes No Demolition $250,000 Cost Law & $5,000,000 $500,000 Ordinance Deductible -Wind 3% of $20,454,00 2% Per Building -AOP $10,000 $5,000 Valuation Replacement Cost Re- Placement Cost Unnamed Yes See Note Storm Deductible Umbrella $1,000,00 $5,000,000 Limit NOTE: Our comparison does not include unnamed storm wind coverage. This will be discussed during the presentation. Respondent met with the committee members and Ms. Lichten for about eight hours on or about May 6, 1997. At the meeting, he explained Braishfield's Written Proposal in detail and answered questions. On or about May 9, 1997, Respondent sent the following letter to Mr. Miller for the insurance committee's consideration: The benefits to the association under Braishfield's proposal are: A $5,000 AOP deductible Significantly lower premium No co-insurance penalty A superior wind deductible in the event of a catastrophe such a hurricane. The elimination of any rate increase in 1997 even if this is a bad year for the insurance industry. Outstanding insurance service will include a renewal strategy meeting 120 days prior to expiration. This meeting will disclose options, market conditions and pricing projections. This will allow the committee to act proactively instead of reactively in the best interest of the association. -$5,000,000 Umbrella. One other point to consider involves the payment of premium. If you cancel the Fireman's Fund Package policy on June 1, the earned premium is estimated to be $72,035. If you include a short rate penalty this increases to $79,239. Including the May installment the association has paid $96,165. The difference or the return premium due the association is $24,130 which should be refunded within 60 days. Since you have paid more premium than is earned no payment should be made for June. This enables the association to apply June's payment of $12,015 toward the down payment under Braishfield's program of $26,557.16. The net amount the association has to come up with is $14,542.16. I trust this will be helpful to the committee. It has not been shown that that Respondent at any time knowingly provided the Association (through its officers and representatives) with any false or misleading information or that he knowingly, with the intent to deceive, hid any information from the Association. He disclosed, among other things, that Braishfield's proposed layered program, unlike the Fireman's Fund policies, included "unauthorized insurers" and explained the differences between "unauthorized" and "authorized" insurers. In explaining these differences, he talked about the Florida Insurance Guaranty Act, which protects those insured by "authorized insurers" in the event of insurer insolvency, but does not offer similar protection to those insured by "unauthorized insurers." Respondent also advised that the mid- term cancellation of the Fireman's Fund policies would result in a "short rate" penalty and, in addition, he discussed how Braishfield's proposed layered program would be financed and the interest rates that would be charged. The Association's Acceptance of Braishfield's Written Proposal The insurance committee brought Braishfield's Written Proposal before the Association's board of directors, which voted 15 to 14 in favor of accepting the proposal and replacing the Fireman's Fund policies with the layered program proposed by Braishfield. Post-Acceptance Activities After learning of the results of the vote, Respondent sent the following letter, dated May 27, 1997, to Mr. Miller: I was delighted to hear that the board has made their decision in favor of Braishfield. If we are looking at a May 31, 1997, effective date it is essential that the following matters be addressed immediately: The original finance agreement signed in the appropriate places indicated by "x." A check in the amount of $26,557.67 should be made payable to Braishfield of Florida for the down payment. Both the finance agreement and the check must be available to be picked up by me prior to May 31, 1997. A broker of record letter naming Braishfield on the Director's and Officer's liability policy must be executed and signed. The specific policy number should be included in the caption. A sample letter was included in our final proposal. We will be sending you a completed statement of values form which will require signature of a board or insurance committee member. I have taken the liberty of drafting a letter advising the agent to cancel all coverages effective May 31, 1997. Included is a request to confirm the return premium due the association as well as any unearned fee that will be returned. This letter should be written on Saxony letterhead and signed by you or the President of the association. In accordance with Respondent's suggestion, Ms. Lichten sent the following letter, dated May 28, 1997, to Mr. Simione: Re: Fireman's Commercial Insurance Pkg. Policy #S15MZX80662013 Fireman's Umbrella Insurance Policy #XSC 00074217738 Dear Mr. Simione: Effective May 31, 1997, please cancel above captioned policies. The Saxony Board of Directors at a Special Meeting held on May 27, 1997 voted to appoint a new agent. Please acknowledge the above cancellation in writing and also confirm the return premium due under each policy, including any penalty. Confirmation of any unearned brokerage fee should also be included. All calculations should be based on a May 31, 1997 cancellation date. Thank you for your cooperation and consideration you have given Saxony over the past few years. The following day, May 29, 1997, Ms. Lichten sent the following letter, with the described enclosures, to Respondent: Enclosed herewith please find the following: Duly signed Finance Agreement for our Insurance as agreed upon. Check #001 payable to Braishfield of Florida date May 28, 1997 drawn on Sun Trust in the amount of $26,557.67, which represents our down payment. Please send us [a] letter acknowledging receipt of the above together with [a] letter indicating that we will indeed have insurance as we agreed to commencing May 31, 1997. Looking forward to working with you. That same day, May 29, 1997, Respondent sent Ms. Lichten "copies of binders confirming coverage effective May 31, 1997 as per [Braishfield's] May 6th proposal." On June 5, 1997, Ms. Lichten sent Mr. Simione a signed (by Ms. Lichten) and dated (May 29, 1997) "Cancellation Request/Policy Release" form formally requesting cancellation of the Fireman's Fund policies, effective May 31, 1997. On or about June 20, 1997, Ms. Lichten was sent a Certificate of Insurance "certify[ing] that the policies listed [which had been described in Braishfield's Written Proposal] ha[d] been issued to the [Association] for the policy period indicated [May 31, 1997, to May 31, 1998]." On or about June 30, 1997, the appraiser that the Association had hired (Allied Appraisal Service) completed the "updated appraisal on [the Association's] buildings" that Respondent had recommended. Respondent reviewed the appraisal report and prepared a written analysis of the report, which he subsequently discussed with the members of the insurance committee and Ms. Lichten. In his written analysis, Respondent stated, among other things, the following: This proposal analyzes the appraisal made by Allied Appraisal Service on June 30, covering the building and surrounding improvements at Saxony "E," Delray Beach, Florida 33446. The purpose is two fold. To ascertain if the values being reported to the insurance companies reflect as closely as possible the exposure at risk. This includes the impact on coverages such as limits and deductibles. The other area is the premium which includes various options. The property coverage is underwritten in a layered program using three companies. The total limit of coverage is $20,454,000, which is subject to a sublimit per building of $1,461,000. Based on the updated appraisal, the 100% replacement cost on buildings and improvements is $24,561,978 which breaks down to $1,754,427 per building. These amounts were arrived at by eliminating and or reducing those items that were not the responsibility of the association. Other adjustments were made regarding contingencies and contractor's profit which should be discussed. The breakdown is provided on Exhibit I attached. The difference or the amount of increase required to comply with the appraisal is $4,107,978. The change in values increases the wind deductible from $29,220 to $35,088 per building. On or about July 18, 1997, Respondent (who, by this time, had left the employ of Braishfield and had started his own insurance agency/brokerage firm) sent Ms. Lichten a letter, which read as follows: Per our meeting with the insurance committee on Wednesday, July 16, it was recommended the building values be amended based on the property appraisal made by Allied Appraisal Service[] on June 30, 1997. The 100% replacement value including improvements is $24,561,978. The total amount of insurance in force is $20,454,000. The net result is a[n] increase of $4,107,978. Also included in the appraisal is the cost to change certain items revised by current building codes. This is known as law or ordinance coverage. We recommend an increase in the limit by $850,000 to $1,350,000 to cover the additional exposure. Both of the above increases place the property insurance in compliance with the appraisal. The underwriter has agreed to provide blanket coverage using 90% coinsurance. The blanket amount excluding law or ordinance coverage is $22,105,760. This is an improvement over the existing program as the blanket amount would apply to any one loss and the basis for determining the premium would be significantly less. Using an effective date of July 31, the additional premium including taxes and fees is $8,446.20. In addition to the improvement in coverage and key deductibles, our program provides a net savings in excess of $34,000 a year over the Fireman's Fund policy. The changes that Respondent had recommended based upon the "updated Appraisal" were "bound," as Respondent advised Ms. Lichten by the following letter dated August 12, 1997: This will confirm that effective July 31, the following changes have been bound: The total insurable value increased to $22,105,780. The Law or Ordinance coverage increased to $1,350,000. Coverage is on a blanket basis. The coinsurance clause has been amended to 90%. The 2% wind deductible per building is increased to $31,580. All of these changes were based on the property appraisal made by Allied Appraisal Service on June 30, with some exceptions, such as Misc. & Contingencies and Overhead/Profits. It was agreed by the insurance committee not to include these items. Attached is our invoice amount of $8,446.20 representing the additional premium due hereunder. Please make your check payable to Braishfield of Florida and send it to me. In October of 1997, Respondent submitted a renewal proposal to the Association. The proposal was accepted and renewed coverage was bound, effective December 1, 1997, for a period of three years.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint issued against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of July, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of July, 2000.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto Respondent was licensed as an Ordinary Life and General Lines Agent (Exhibit 1) and was the agent for Dixie Insurance Company at the Bartow office. As such, he had the authority to write policies binding the insurer. At all times relevant hereto, Respondent was president and principal stockholder of Friendly Insurance Companies of Bartow, Winter Haven, Lake Wales and Haines City. The corporate records (Exhibit 3 for Polk County) show this to be the same as Friendly Auto Insurance of Lake Wales, Inc. Respondent was the agent for Dixie Insurance Company only at the Bartow office. Dixie Insurance Company qualifies agents, not offices, to sell their policies. Respondent had no authority to act as agent for Dixie Insurance at any of these offices other than the Bartow office as the insurance company has but one agent per office. To support the allegations in count 34 of the Administrative Complaint, Edward Bland testified, and Exhibits 21 through 23 were admitted. Bland applied for automobile insurance at Friendly Auto Insurance at the Winter Haven office, which he paid for by check in the amount of $728 (Exhibit 23) as full payment for the one year premium. Subsequent thereto, a Premium Finance Agreement was prepared on which Bland's signature was forged showing $546 of the premium to be financed. This finance agreement was signed by T. R. Shaw as agent. Upon learning that the finance agreement had been issued on his coverage, Bland contacted the Winter Haven office manager, and after a few weeks of "run around" contacted the Department of Insurance and "got his money back." Bland never saw Shaw or Respondent. Rafael Gomez, M.D. purchased automobile insurance on his three cars from Friendly Auto Insurance of Winter Haven in December 1985 for which he paid $3452.71 for the annual premium. Subsequently thereto, he received a call from the Barnett Bank, which had financed one of the cars, to tell him that the bank needed evidence of insurance on the financed auto. Dr. Gomez contacted Ruth Kent, the office manager at the Winter Haven office, who assured him she would supply the bank with the necessary documentation. When the bank contacted Dr. Gomez later to again demand proof of insurance, Gomez went to the Winter Haven office and demanded to see his file. He made copies of certain documents which he took to the bank. Dr. Gomez subsequently learned that a finance agreement had been entered into on his behalf, but without his knowledge or consent, and that the address shown on the agreement under his name was that of Ruth Kent. Although when accosted by Dr. Gomez with this information, Ms. Kent denied such an intentional act, this would have allowed her to hold the finance coupons and get all information supplied by the finance company to the borrower without Dr. Gomez learning that the policy for which he had paid in full was subsequently financed. After learning of the subterfuge, Dr. Gomez contacted the Department of Insurance. Ruth Judd was office manager at the Friendly Insurance Agency of Haines City for a period of time ending in 1987 when she was terminated by Respondent. Ms. Judd contends she was only the office manager, and Respondent was the boss of the office and hired all employees. During the time she worked in the office, Ms. Judd testified several different people served as the licensed agent for the office, but they spent little time in the office with Donald Leroy Flentke, towards the end of his tenure, coming in only for his weekly paychecks. No evidence was presented from which a determination could be made that for a specific period of time any of the four offices were not being supervised by a licensed agent. Ms. Judd testified she was aware of one policy for which the insured had paid the premium in full being submitted for a premium finance agreement with forged documents. She also was aware that monthly financing payments were made by the Haines City office on some three or four other premium finance agreements. Ms. Judd testified on March 2, 1988, that she was presently unemployed. Respondent called one witness that testified and produced documentary evidence (Exhibits 24 through 26) that on March 2, 1988, this witness purchased insurance from Ms. Judd at New Horizons and was required to buy an accidental death policy in order to obtain PIP coverage. Exhibit 7 shows that an automobile insurance policy was issued to Jackie Bryan, the policy was sold through Friendly Insurance of Winter Haven, Inc., that the premium was financed, the borrower owed an additional $142.66 on the finance agreement, and the policy expired 2-26-86. Respondent acknowledged that his signature appears on the premium finance application. Some 5000 policies are sold by Respondent's agencies per year, and Respondent has no independent recollection of that finance agreement. Dixie Insurance Company issued a policy to Johnny Davis which was also financed through Envoy, but this application was signed by Shaw. Although Dixie Insurance Company had their own premium finance organization and, if the premium is financed, preferred to do the financing, Respondent testified that occasionally, if a client did not want to finance their premium through Dixie, the agency would go through another premium finance company such as Envoy. Exhibits 9, 10, 11 and 12 show premium finance agreements were contracted for on behalf of Raymond Scott, Mark Turner, Kathy Smith and Cathy Phillips, but no auto insurance policies were issued by Dixie Insurance Company to these individuals. Only one of these finance agreements (Exhibit 12) purports to be prepared at the Bartow office, and two of the drafts (Exhibits 9 and 12) purport to be signed by Respondent. Respondent testified he neither signed those drafts nor authorized someone else to sign for him. The forgery on both Exhibits 9 and 12 appear to have been perpetrated by the same person. Cathy Phillips, a friend of Ruth Kent, testified without contradiction that the signature purporting to be hers on Exhibit 12 was forged, that she never entered into a premium finance agreement with Envoy Finance Corporation, and that she had never seen Exhibit 14 until presented to her by the Petitioner's attorney. Ms. Phillips did receive a past-due notice on one occasion and called Ruth Kent who told her not to worry about it, that everything was taken care of. Subsequently, Ms. Phillips' husband wrote a letter to Envoy Finance Corporation denying any knowledge of any insurance policy written by Friendly Insurance of Bartow. Considerable testimony was submitted regarding the activities of Chuck Evans who was, at one time, employed by Respondent at the Winter Haven agency as a non-licensed employee with authority to write checks on the Trust Account. While the statements made by Evans to Department of Insurance officials contributed to the initiation of the investigation of Respondent's agencies, none of this testimony was relevant to the charges here at issue.
The Issue Whether proposed rules promulgated by the Florida Department of Insurance related to sale of insurance products by agents affiliated with financial institutions are an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact The Florida Department of Insurance is responsible for regulation of insurance transactions in the State of Florida. On January 29, 1997, the Department of Insurance issued a notice to interested parties of a rules workshop to address "parity" of insurance regulation. The workshop was conducted on February 21, 1997. The Department of Insurance published the final rule proposal on May 23, 1997. A public hearing was conducted on June 19, 1997. The record of the public hearing remained open until June 25, 1997, for submission of written comments. A Notice of Change was published on July 18, 1997. A Second Notice of Change was published on August 8, 1997. The Petitioners timely filed petitions challenging the proposed rules. All parties have standing to participate in this proceeding. As set forth in the rule proposal, the purpose and effect of the proposed rules is as follows: Section 626.5715, Florida Statutes, requires the Department to adopt rules to assure parity of regulation in this state of insurance transactions as between an insurance agency owned by or an agent associated with a federally chartered financial institution, an insurance agency owned by or an agent associated with a state- chartered financial institution, and an insurance agency owned by or an agent associated with an entity that is not a financial institution. (Emphasis supplied.) The summary portion of the published rule proposal states that the "proposed rules implement standards to provide parity pursuant to Section 626.5715, Florida Statutes." Section 626.5715, Florida Statutes, the "parity statute," provides as follows: The department shall adopt rules to assure the parity of regulation in this state of insurance transactions as between an insurance agency owned by or an agent associated with a federally chartered financial institution, an insurance agency owned by or an agent associated with a state-chartered financial institution, and an insurance agency owned by or an agent associated with an entity that is not a financial institution. Such rules shall be limited to assuring that no insurance agency or agent is subject to more stringent or less stringent regulation than another insurance agency or agent on the basis of the regulatory status of the entity that owns the agency or is associated with the agent. For the purposes of this section, a person is "associated with" another entity if the person is employed by, retained by, under contract to, or owned or controlled by the entity directly or indirectly. This section does not apply with respect to a financial institution that is prohibited from owning an insurance agency or that is prohibited from being associated with an insurance agent under state or federal law. (Emphasis supplied.) The word "parity" is not defined in the statute. Webster's Dictionary defines "parity" as "[t]he quality or state of being equal or equivalent." Pursuant to the specific statute requiring the Department to adopt rules, the Department's authority to adopt rules related to this issue is limited to those rules which provide for equivalent regulation of insurance transactions without regard to ownership or affiliation of the insurance agent or agency. Rule 4-224.002 (Settings and Circumstances) Proposed Rule 4-224.002 provides as follows: 4-224.002 Setting and Circumstances of Insurance Transactions. The setting and circumstances in which insurance transactions occur shall be structured so as to avoid deception as to, and to assist the consumer in understanding, the nature of the product sold, the identity of the insurer, and the identity and representative capacity of the insurance agent. When an agent is transacting insurance, any business cards and stationery used shall reflect his status as an insurance agent. Other materials used in insurance transactions which address the representative capacity of the agent shall identify the individual as an insurance agent. The published rule proposal indicates that Proposed Rule 4-224.002, Florida Administrative Code, is specifically authorized by Section 624.308, Florida Statutes, and implements Sections 624.307, 626.5715, 626.951, 626.9521, 626.9541, 626.9561 and 626.9611, Florida Statutes. Section 624.308, Florida Statutes, provides the Department with the general authority to adopt "reasonable rules necessary to effect any of the statutory duties of the department...." and states that willful violation of Department rules may result in a range of penalties including revocation of licensure. Section 624.307, Florida Statutes, generally sets forth the powers and duties of the Department. Section 626.5715, Florida Statutes, the "parity" statute, provides as set forth herein. Section 626.951, Florida Statutes, is the "declaration of purpose" for the Unfair Insurance Trade Practices Act, and in part states as follows: The purpose of this part is to regulate trade practices relating to the business of insurance in accordance with the intent of Congress as expressed in the Act of Congress of March 9, 1945 (Pub. L. No. 15, 79th Congress), by defining, or providing for the determination of, all such practices in this state which constitute unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices and by prohibiting the trade practices so defined or determined. Section 626.9521, Florida Statutes, prohibits and penalizes unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices and provides penalties. Section 626.9541, Florida Statutes, addresses "unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts" and provides as follows: UNFAIR METHODS OF COMPETITION AND UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE ACTS.--The following are defined as unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices: Misrepresentations and false advertising of insurance policies.--Knowingly making, issuing, circulating, or causing to be made, issued, or circulated, any estimate, illustration, circular, statement, sales presentation, omission, or comparison which: Misrepresents the benefits, advantages, conditions, or terms of any insurance policy. Misrepresents the dividends or share of the surplus to be received on any insurance policy. Makes any false or misleading statements as to the dividends or share of surplus previously paid on any insurance policy. Is misleading, or is a misrepresentation, as to the financial condition of any person or as to the legal reserve system upon which any life insurer operates. Uses any name or title of any insurance policy or class of insurance policies misrepresenting the true nature thereof. Is a misrepresentation for the purpose of inducing, or tending to induce, the lapse, forfeiture, exchange, conversion, or surrender of any insurance policy. Is a misrepresentation for the purpose of effecting a pledge or assignment of, or effecting a loan against, any insurance policy. Misrepresents any insurance policy as being shares of stock or misrepresents ownership interest in the company. False information and advertising generally.--Knowingly making, publishing, disseminating, circulating, or placing before the public, or causing, directly or indirectly, to be made, published, disseminated, circulated, or placed before the public: In a newspaper, magazine, or other publication, In the form of a notice, circular, pamphlet, letter, or poster, Over any radio or television station, or In any other way, an advertisement, announcement, or statement containing any assertion, representation, or statement with respect to the business of insurance, which is untrue, deceptive, or misleading. Defamation.--Knowingly making, publishing, disseminating, or circulating, directly or indirectly, or aiding, abetting, or encouraging the making, publishing, disseminating, or circulating of, any oral or written statement, or any pamphlet, circular, article, or literature, which is false or maliciously critical of, or derogatory to, any person and which is calculated to injure such person. Boycott, coercion, and intimidation.-- Entering into any agreement to commit, or by any concerted action committing, any act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation resulting in, or tending to result in, unreasonable restraint of, or monopoly in, the business of insurance. False statements and entries.-- Knowingly: Filing with any supervisory or other public official, Making, publishing, disseminating, circulating, Delivering to any person, Placing before the public, Causing, directly or indirectly, to be made, published, disseminated, circulated, delivered to any person, or placed before the public, any false material statement. Knowingly making any false entry of a material fact in any book, report, or statement of any person, or knowingly omitting to make a true entry of any material fact pertaining to the business of such person in any book, report, or statement of such person. Stock operations and advisory board contracts.--Issuing or delivering, promising to issue or deliver, or permitting agents, officers, or employees to issue or deliver, agency company stock or other capital stock, benefit certificates or shares in any common- law corporation, or securities or any special or advisory board contracts or other contracts of any kind promising returns or profits as an inducement to insurance. Section 626.9561, Florida Statutes, authorizes the Department to "investigate the affairs of every person involved in the business of insurance in this state in order to determine whether such person has been or is engaged in any unfair method of competition or in any unfair or deceptive act or practice. " Section 626.9611, Florida Statutes, provides for the adoption of Department rules as follows: 626.9611 Rules.--The department may, in accordance with chapter 120, promulgate reasonable rules as are necessary or proper to identify specific methods of competition or acts or practices which are prohibited by s. 626.9541 or s. 626.9551, but the rules shall not enlarge upon or extend the provisions of ss. 626.9541 and 626.9551. (Emphasis supplied.) Proposed Rule 4-224.002 is an invalid delegation of legislative authority. The proposed rule exceeds the Department specific grant of rulemaking authority which is limited in this case to those rules which provide for equivalent regulation of insurance transactions without regard to ownership or affiliation of the insurance agent or agency. The rule does not provide parity of regulation. Proposed Rule 4-224.002 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it is vague, fails to establish adequate standards for agency decisions and vests unbridled discretion in the agency. The proposed rule provides no information as to how an insurance transaction may be "structured" so as to "avoid deception" of the purchaser. The determination of whether an insurance transaction has been "structured" to "avoid deception" is at the discretion of the Department. The proposed rule provides no standards for Department decisions which will be made under the rule. The proposed rule provides no assistance or information to regulated parties as to what types of transaction structures are prohibited or acceptable, other than to require that the agent be identified as such during the insurance transaction. Proposed Rule 4-224.002 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it is not supported by competent substantial evidence. Neither the testimony of the Department's witnesses, nor the research information offered by the Department in support of the proposed rule, are sufficient to support validation of this rule. The evidence fails to establish the existence of substantial consumer confusion regarding marketing of insurance products by financial institutions. The Department cites a previous administrative action related to the sale of insurance products in a financial institution as evidence that consumer confusion exists. The Department also cites another administrative action where the agency prosecuted an insurer for the misleading sale of insurance products. The evidence establishes that the cited cases were prosecuted under currently existing rules and regulations and does not establish the validity of the proposed rules at issue in this proceeding. The existence of other rules relating to manner and means of insurance product sales is insufficient to establish the validity of the proposed rules at issue in this case. Rule 4-224.004 (Underwriting of Insurance- Authorization Required) Proposed Rule 4-224.004 provides: No entity which is not licensed as an insurer by the Department shall directly or indirectly assume the obligation to provide the benefits of an insurance contract, or otherwise transact insurance as an insurer in this state. As identified in the published rule proposal, Proposed Rule 4-224.004, Florida Administrative Code, is specifically authorized by Section 624.308, Florida Statutes, and implements Sections 624.11, 624.401, 626.5715, 626.051 and 628.151(1), Florida Statutes. Section 624.308, Florida Statutes, provides general rulemaking authority to the Department. Section 624.11, Florida Statutes, prohibits any person from transacting insurance in Florida without complying with the provisions of the Insurance Code, and provides for operation of "risk retention groups" pursuant to law. Section 624.401, Florida Statutes, requires each insurer to obtain a certificate of authority from the Department in order to conduct business either directly or indirectly, and provides that failure to obtain a certificate is a third degree felony. The section also provides for preemption by the state of the field of regulating insurers and their agents and representatives from local regulation. Section 626.5715, Florida Statutes, the "parity" statute, provides as set forth herein. Section 626.051, Florida Statutes, provides a definition of "life agent." Section 628.151(1), Florida Statutes, provides as follows: No domestic insurer shall engage directly or indirectly in any business other than the insurance business and business activities reasonably and necessarily incidental to such insurance business. At the hearing, the Department's witness testified that the proposed rule was in response to comments offered by participants in the rulemaking proceeding suggesting that recent court decisions would permit financial institutions to act as insurers and to assume the obligations of insurance contracts. Proposed Rule 4-224.004 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it exceeds the specific grant of rulemaking authority which is limited in this case to those rules which provide for equivalent regulation of insurance transactions without regard to ownership or affiliation of the insurance agent or agency. The proposed rule does not implement, interpret or make specific any provision of Florida law. Proposed Rule 4-224.004 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it is not supported by competent substantial evidence. Anecdotal recollections of comments made by unidentified persons during rulemaking workshops do not constitute competent substantial evidence. Rule 4-224.007 (Primary Agent) Proposed Rule 4-224.007 provides: Each agency location where a licensed and appointed insurance agent is engaged in transactions with respect to insurance products shall be considered an insurance agency for purposes of Section 626.592, Florida Statutes. In those instances where an agent legally conducts insurance transactions at two or more agency locations, a separate primary agent need not be designated at each location, provided that no insurance transactions shall occur at any location when the agent is not present, and no unlicensed employee at the location has engaged in insurance activities requiring licensure. In those instances the agent shall be responsible for insurance transactions occurring at each location and one location shall be designated as the primary location. As identified in the published rule proposal, Proposed Rule 4-224.007, Florida Administrative Code, is specifically authorized by Section 624.308, Florida Statutes, and implements Sections 626.5715, 626.031, 626.041, 626.0428, 626.051, 626.062, 626.094, 626.112, 626.592, Florida Statutes. Section 624.308, Florida Statutes, sets forth the general rulemaking authority of the Department. Section 626.5715, Florida Statutes, the "parity" statute, provides as set forth herein. Section 626.031, Florida Statutes, provides a definition of "agent." Section 626.041, Florida Statutes, provides a definition of "general lines agent." Section 626.0428, Florida Statutes, provides limitations on the activities of agency personnel as follows: 626.0428 Agency personnel powers, duties, and limitations.-- An individual employed by an agent or agency on salary who devotes full time to clerical work, with incidental taking of insurance applications or quoting or receiving premiums on incoming inquiries in the office of the agent or agency, is not deemed to be an agent, customer representative, or solicitor if his or her compensation does not include in whole or in part any commissions on such business and is not related to the production of applications, insurance, or premiums. No employee of an agent or agency may bind insurance coverage unless licensed and appointed as a general lines agent or customer representative. No employee of an agent or agency may initiate contact with any person for the purpose of soliciting insurance unless licensed and appointed as a general lines agent, customer representative, or solicitor. Section 626.051, Florida Statutes, provides a definition of "life agent." Section 626.062, Florida Statutes, provides a definition of "health agent." Section 626.094, Florida Statutes, provides a definition of "insurance agency" as follows: 626.094 "Insurance agency" defined.--An "insurance agency" is a business location at which an individual, firm, partnership, corporation, association, or other entity, except for an employee of the individual, firm, partnership, corporation, association, or other entity, and other than an insurer as defined by s. 624.03 or an adjuster as defined by s. 626.101, engages in any activity or employs individuals to engage in any activity which by law may be performed only by a licensed insurance agent or solicitor. (Emphasis supplied.) Section 626.112, Florida Statutes, requires licensure of agents, agencies and related personnel. Section 626.592, requires the designation of "primary agents" as follows: 626.592 Primary agents.-- On or before January 1, 1990, and annually thereafter, each person operating an insurance agency and each location of a multiple location agency shall designate a primary agent for each insurance agency location and shall file the name of the person so designated, and the address of the insurance agency location where he or she is primary agent, with the Department of Insurance, on a form approved by the department. The designation of the primary agent may be changed at the option of the agency and any change shall be effective upon notification to the department. For the purpose of this section, a "primary agent" is the licensed agent who is responsible for the hiring and supervision of all individuals within an insurance agency location who deal with the public in the solicitation or negotiation of insurance contracts or in the collection or accounting of moneys from the general public. An agent may be designated as primary agent for only one insurance agency location. For the purpose of this section, an "insurance agency" is a location where any agent is engaged in the business of insurance. The department may suspend or revoke the license of the primary agent if an insurance agency employs any person who has had a license denied or any person whose license is currently suspended or revoked. However, when a person has been denied a license for failure to pass a required examination, he or she may be employed to perform clerical or administrative functions for which licensure is not required. The primary agent in an unincorporated agency, or the primary agent in an incorporated agency in which no officer, director, or stockholder is an agent, shall be responsible and accountable for the acts of salaried employees under his or her direct supervision and control, while acting on behalf of the agency. Nothing in this section shall be construed to render any person criminally liable or subject to any disciplinary proceedings for any act unless such person personally committed or knew or should have known of such act and of the facts constituting a violation of this chapter. The department may suspend or revoke the license of any agent who is employed by a person whose license is currently suspended or revoked. No insurance agency location shall conduct the business of insurance unless a primary agent is designated at all times. Failure to designate a primary agent as required under this section shall constitute grounds for requiring that the agency obtain a license in accordance with ss. 626.112 and 626.172. Any insurance agency may request, on a form prescribed by the department, verification from the department of any person's current licensure status. If a request is mailed to the department within 5 working days after the date an agent is hired, and the department subsequently notifies the agency that an employee's license is currently suspended, revoked, or has been denied, the license of the primary agent shall not be revoked or suspended if the unlicensed person is immediately dismissed from employment as an insurance agent with the agency. (emphasis supplied) Proposed Rule 4-224.007 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it exceeds the grant of rulemaking authority provided in Section 626.5715, Florida Statutes. The proposed rule does not provide parity of regulation. The proposed rule is not limited to assuring that no insurance agency or agent is subject to more stringent or less stringent regulation than another insurance agency or agent on the basis of the regulatory status of the entity that owns the agency or is associated with the agent. Proposed Rule 4-224.007 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it enlarges, modifies and contravenes the specific provisions of law implemented. The proposed rule specifically states that "where an agent legally conducts insurance transactions at two or more agency locations, a separate primary agent need not be designated at each location. " Section 626.592, Florida Statutes, requires the designation of a primary agent for each insurance agency location. An insurance agency is defined as a location where any agent is engaged in the business of insurance. No insurance agency location can conduct the business of insurance unless a primary agent is designated at all times. A primary agent may be so designated for only one insurance agency location. The Department has no authority to waive the requirements of Section 626.592, Florida Statutes. Further, the proposed rule permits an agent to designate one location of several as a "primary location." There is no statutory authorization for designation of a "primary location." Proposed Rule 4-224.007 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it is not supported by competent substantial evidence. The only testimony regarding this proposed rule relates to the alleged expense involved in requiring separate primary agent designation for some banks which may choose to offer insurance products. The testimony is not persuasive and does not constitute competent substantial evidence supporting the rule. Rule 4-224-012 (Coercion) Proposed Rule 4-224.012 provides: 4-224.012 Coercion No person shall by words, actions, or distribution of written materials require or imply that the purchase of insurance by a borrower or prospective borrower from a particular agent, agency, insurer or other entity is required as a condition of, or will influence the terms or conditions of, the lending of money or the extension of credit. To the extent that insurance may permissibly be marketed in connection with or in conjunction with any activities described in this section; The agent shall disclose at or before the initial discussion or in response concerning insurance coverage required or offered in connection with a loan or credit application, that: the purchase of insurance from any particular source is not a condition to the provision of, and will not affect the terms of, any loan of money or extension of credit; Insurance is available through agent not associated with a lender or creditor; and The choice of another insurance provider will not affect decisions relating to or terms of any loan or credit extension. 1. A written disclosure which addresses the elements of paragraph (a) above shall be provided to the consumer in a separate documents on Form DI4- (rev /97) or Form DI4- (rev /97) [sic] which are adopted and incorporated herein by reference, or on another form approved in advance by the Department that provides equivalent disclosure, at or before the time the consumer completes an application or enrollment form or otherwise applies for coverage. 2. One copy of the form signed by the consumer shall be retained by the agent. The requirements of this rule 4-224.012 are inapplicable to credit insurance for which disclosures provided satisfy the disclosure requirements for excluding the premium of charge for insurance from the finance charge pursuant to Federal Truth in Lending Regulation Z, Section 12 CFR 226.4(d)(1) and (2), which is adopted incorporated herein by reference. As identified in the published rule proposal, Proposed Rule 4-224.012, Florida Administrative Code, is specifically authorized by Sections 624.308 and 626.9611, Florida Statutes, and implements Sections 626.5715, 626.051, 626.9541, 626.9551, and 626.9641, Florida Statutes. Section 624.308, Florida Statutes, provides the Department's general rulemaking authority. Section 626.9611, Florida Statutes, provides the Department's authority to adopt rules pursuant to Section 120, Florida Statutes, which specifically identify prohibited methods of competition, but limits such rules to those acts prohibited under Sections 626.9541 and 626.9551. Section 626.5715, Florida Statutes, the "parity" statute, provides as set forth herein. Section 626.051, Florida Statutes, defines "life agent." Section 626.9541, Florida Statutes, addresses "unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts" and is set forth herein. Section 626.9551, Florida Statutes, addresses the issue of coercion or "favoritism" and provides as follows: 626.9551 Favored agent or insurer; coercion of debtors.-- No person may: Require, as a condition precedent or condition subsequent to the lending of money or extension of credit or any renewal thereof, that the person to whom such money or credit is extended, or whose obligation the creditor is to acquire or finance, negotiate any policy or contract of insurance through a particular insurer or group of insurers or agent or broker or group of agents or brokers. Unreasonably disapprove the insurance policy provided by a borrower for the protection of the property securing the credit or lien. For purposes of this paragraph, such disapproval shall be deemed unreasonable if it is not based solely on reasonable standards, uniformly applied, relating to the extent of coverage required by such lender or person extending credit and the financial soundness and the services of an insurer. Such standards shall not discriminate against any particular type of insurer, nor shall such standards call for the disapproval of an insurance policy because such policy contains coverage in addition to that required. Require, directly or indirectly, that any borrower, mortgagor, purchaser, insurer, broker, or agent pay a separate charge in connection with the handling of any insurance policy required as security for a loan on real estate or pay a separate charge to substitute the insurance policy of one insurer for that of another. This paragraph does not include the interest which may be charged on premium loans or premium advances in accordance with the security instrument. Use or disclose information resulting from a requirement that a borrower, mortgagor, or purchaser furnish insurance of any kind on real property being conveyed or used as collateral security to a loan, when such information is to the advantage of the mortgagee, vendor, or lender, or is to the detriment of the borrower, mortgagor, purchaser, or insurer, or the agent or broker, complying with such a requirement. The department may investigate the affairs of any person to whom this section applies to determine whether such person has violated this section. If a violation of this section is found to have been committed knowingly, the person in violation shall be subject to the same procedures and penalties as provided in ss. 626.9571, 626.9581, 626.9591, and 626.9601. Section 626.9641, Florida Statutes, sets forth a series of standards known as Policyholder's Bill of Rights and provides as follows: 626.9641 Policyholders, bill of rights.-- The principles expressed in the following statements shall serve as standards to be followed by the department in exercising its powers and duties, in exercising administrative discretion, in dispensing administrative interpretations of the law, and in promulgating rules: Policyholders shall have the right to competitive pricing practices and marketing methods that enable them to determine the best value among comparable policies. Policyholders shall have the right to obtain comprehensive coverage. Policyholders shall have the right to insurance advertising and other selling approaches that provide accurate and balanced information on the benefits and limitations of a policy. Policyholders shall have a right to an insurance company that is financially stable. Policyholders shall have the right to be serviced by a competent, honest insurance agent or broker. Policyholders shall have the right to a readable policy. Policyholders shall have the right to an insurance company that provides an economic delivery of coverage and that tries to prevent losses. Policyholders shall have the right to a balanced and positive regulation by the department. This section shall not be construed as creating a civil cause of action by any individual policyholder against any individual insurer. Proposed Rule 4-224.012 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it exceeds the Department's grant of rulemaking authority. Such authority is limited to those rules which provide for equivalent regulation of insurance transactions without regard to ownership or affiliation of the insurance agent or agency. The evidence fails to establish that this rule provides for parity of insurance regulation. Proposed Rule 4-224.012 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it enlarges the specific provisions of law being implemented. The rule mandates a statement of disclosure for which there is no statutory requirement. The statutes cited as being implemented by this proposed rule clearly prohibit coercive activities, but do not impose any disclosure requirement as would be required by the rule. Proposed Rule 4-224.012 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because there is no competent substantial evidence supporting the rule. The Department asserts that research indicates consumers can be, and are, coerced into purchasing insurance products by lenders during credit transactions. The Department also cites a previous administrative action prosecuted under existing statutes as evidence that coercion occurs. The evidence offered by the Department, including the testimony of the Department's witnesses, fails to support the assertion that coercion by financial institutions in the sale of insurance products is a substantial problem. Neither the cited research nor the related testimony by the Department's witnesses was persuasive. The greater weight of the evidence, including the testimony of Dr. Michael White, establishes that there is little empirical evidence of coercion in the sale of insurance products by financial institutions. As additional support for the rule, the Department offered testimony related to the existence of other regulatory disclosure rules and of model language adopted by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. Neither the other rules or the model language establish that the proposed coercion rule meets the current requirements of law. Other disclosure regulations were adopted prior to recent amendments to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), which altered the "reasonableness" standard under which such rules could have been appropriate. The relevant model language of the NAIC has not been adopted by the Florida legislature. Rule 4-224.013 (Remedies) Proposed Rule 4-224.013 provides as follows: 4-224.013 Remedies Any person violating the provisions of the Insurance Code implemented by this rule chapter shall be subject to the issuance of a Cease and Desist Order in accordance with the provisions of Sections 624.310(3) and 626.9581, Florida Statutes, and to the imposition of an administrative penalty pursuant to Sections 624.310(5) and 626.9521, Florida Statutes, and to such other sanctions or proceedings as are authorized by the Florida Insurance Code. If the majority owner, partner, manager, director, officer or other person who manages or controls an insurance agency violates any provision of the Insurance Code or any department rule, or knowingly permits violation of any requirement of these rules by an agent or employee of the agency, the agency must obtain a license as an insurance agency in accordance with the provisions of Section 626.112(8), Florida Statutes. As identified in the published rule proposal, Proposed Rule 4-224.013, Florida Administrative Code, is specifically authorized by Section 624.308, Florida Statutes, and implements Sections 624.310, 624.4211, 646.418, 626.5715, 626.051, 626.112, 626.9521 and 626.9581. Section 624.308, Florida Statutes, provides the Department with general rulemaking authority. Section 624.310, Florida Statutes, provides the Department with enforcement and prosecutorial powers for violations of the Insurance Code, including cease and desist orders, administrative fines, and removal of "affiliated parties." Section 624.4211, Florida Statutes, provides for imposition of administrative fines in lieu of other disciplinary penalties. Section 624.418, Florida Statutes, provides suspension or revocation of certificates of authority for certain violations and other conditions. Section 626.5715, Florida Statutes, the "parity" statute, provides as set forth herein. Section 626.051, Florida Statutes, provides a definition of "life agent." Section 626.112, Florida Statutes, provides for licensure of agencies, agents and other representatives. Section 626.9521, Florida Statutes, prohibits and penalizes unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices which are statutorily defined or determined pursuant to Sections 626.951 and 626.9651, Florida Statutes. Section 626.9581, Florida Statutes, provides the Department with the ability to issue cease and desist orders related to the commission of unfair or deceptive acts or practices or the unlawful transaction of insurance, and states as follows: 626.9581 Cease and desist and penalty orders.--After the hearing provided in s. 626.9571, the department shall enter a final order in accordance with s. 120.569. If it is determined that the person charged has engaged in an unfair or deceptive act or practice or the unlawful transaction of insurance, the department shall also issue an order requiring the violator to cease and desist from engaging in such method of competition, act, or practice or the unlawful transaction of insurance. Further, if the act or practice is a violation of s. 626.9541 or s. 626.9551, the department may, at its discretion, order any one or more of the following: Suspension or revocation of the person's certificate of authority, license, or eligibility for any certificate of authority or license, if he or she knew, or reasonably should have known, he or she was in violation of this act. Such other relief as may be provided in the insurance code. The Department presented no evidence with respect to Proposed Rule 4-224.013. The Department asserts only that the proposed rule is intended to provide notice to non-traditional sellers of insurance that a violation of the Insurance Code will subject them to the penalties set forth in the Insurance Code. Proposed Rule 4-224.013 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it is redundant and unnecessary. The rule does not implement, interpret or make specific any provision of Florida law. There is no competent substantial evidence which establishes the validity of the proposed rule. Rule 4-224.014 (Confidential Information) Proposed Rule 4-224.014 provides: 4-224.014 Confidential Information Obtaining confidential information for a stated purpose unrelated to the transaction of insurance when it is known that the information will or may be used for purposes of marketing insurance, and when the insurance-related purpose is not disclosed, constitutes a deceptive statement or omission and is an unfair and deceptive act or practice under the provisions of the Unfair Insurance Trade practices Act, Part X, Chapter 626, Florida Statutes. (2)(a) Any entity which is a non-insurance transaction obtains confidential information concerning an individual or entity where it is known the information will be used by an affiliate insurance agent or agency for purposes of marketing insurance, or where it is known or reasonably should be known that there is a present intent or plan to use such information in such a manner, shall conspicuously and clearly disclose that fact to the person at the time the information is obtained and the consumer should be afforded an opportunity to object to the utilization of such information. (b) If the disclosure is not provided on a separate form, it must be made on a document signed by the person, in which case the disclosure shall be made in a larger type size than that used elsewhere in the document, or in a manner that is otherwise clearly distinguishable from the remaining text of the document, and must appear immediately adjacent to the person's signature. If the disclosure is made on a separate form and if information obtained as a result of future transaction may be used for marketing purpose; The disclosure shall clearly reflect such fact, and After a period of three years a new disclosure form must be provided if additional confidential information is secured and this paragraph is not complied with. (3)(a) Insurance agents and insurance companies are prohibited under the Insurance Code from engaging in practices which are injurious to policyholders or the public. (b) Use of confidential information concerning any person for purposes of marketing insurance when the person has directed that the information not be used for such purposes entails conduct which is injurious to policyholders or the public. (4) For purposes of this rule 4-224.014, confidential information is information pertaining to an individual or entity that is generally not available, provided that in no event shall the name, address, or telephone number or any person be considered confidential. As identified in the published rule proposal, Proposed Rule 4-224.013, Florida Administrative Code, is specifically authorized by Section 624.308, Florida Statutes, and implements Sections 624.418(1)(b), 626.5715, 626.621(6), 626.9541(1), 626.9611 and 626.964(1), Florida Statutes. Section 624.308, Florida Statutes, provides the Department's general rulemaking authority. Section 624.418, Florida Statutes, provides suspension or revocation of certificates of authority for certain violations and other conditions. Subsection (1)(b) specifically provides for such penalties where the insurer is using such methods and practices in the conduct of its business as to render its further transaction of insurance in this state hazardous or injurious to its policyholders or to the public. Section 626.5715, Florida Statutes, the "parity" statute, provides as set forth herein. Section 626.621(6), Florida Statutes, sets forth grounds for denial or suspension of licensure, and provides as follows: 626.621 Grounds for discretionary refusal, suspension, or revocation of agent's, solicitor's, adjuster's, customer representative's, service representative's, managing general agent's, or claims investigator's license or appointment.--The department may, in its discretion, deny an application for, suspend, revoke, or refuse to renew or continue the license or appointment of any applicant, agent, solicitor, adjuster, customer representative, service representative, managing general agent, or claims investigator, and it may suspend or revoke the eligibility to hold a license or appointment of any such person, if it finds that as to the applicant, licensee, or appointee any one or more of the following applicable grounds exist under circumstances for which such denial, suspension, revocation, or refusal is not mandatory under s. 626.611: * * * (6) In the conduct of business under the license or appointment, engaging in unfair methods of competition or in unfair or deceptive acts or practices, as prohibited under part X of this chapter, or having otherwise shown himself or herself to be a source of injury or loss to the public or detrimental to the public interest. Section 626.9541, Florida Statutes, addresses "unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts" and is set forth herein. Section 626.9611, Florida Statutes, provides the Department's authority to adopt rules pursuant to Section 120, Florida Statutes, which specifically identify prohibited methods of competition, but limits such rules to those acts prohibited under Sections 626.9541 and 626.9551. Section 626.9641(1), Florida Statutes, is the "Policyholder's Bill of Rights" and is set forth herein. Proposed Rule 4-224.014 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it exceeds the Department's grant of rulemaking authority. The evidence fails to establish that the cited statutes provide the Department with the authority to prohibit the collection or utilization of information. The proposed rule exceeds the Department's specific grant of rulemaking authority which is limited in this case to those rules which provide for equivalent regulation of insurance transactions without regard to ownership or affiliation of the insurance agent or agency. Proposed Rule 4-224.014 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it is vague, fails to establish adequate standards for agency decisions and vests unbridled discretion in the agency. The rule states that collection of information "when it is known that the information will or may be used for purposes of marketing insurance, and when the insurance-related purpose is not disclosed, constitutes a deceptive statement or omission. " The phrase "when it is known that the information...may be used" is vague and requires a post-collection determination of the intent of the data collector at the time the information was gathered. Further, proposed definition of "confidential information" as that which is "generally not available" is vague. The vagueness of the rule results in a lack of adequate standards for decision making and vests unbridled discretion in the Department. Proposed Rule 4-224.014 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it is not supported by competent substantial evidence. The testimony related to this proposed rule consisted primarily of an analysis of the statutory support for the rule. The evidence is insufficient to establish that the undisclosed collection of information which may be used at some time in a non-insurance setting constitutes an unfair or deceptive trade practice. There is no statutory provision which prohibits or restricts the sharing of information between a financial institution and an affiliated insurance agency. There is evidence that such prohibition as the Department intends to impose by this rule may violate the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, 12 U.S.C. 1681t(b)(2), and the state Banking Code, Section 655.059(2)(b), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Introduction At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Charles Lee Anderson, was licensed as a general lines insurance agent by petitioner, Department of Insurance and Treasurer. Respondent presently resides at 2291 Northwest 12th Court, Pompano Beach, Florida. He has been licensed by petitioner since 1968, and, prior to this proceeding, had no blemishes on his record. When the events herein occurred, Anderson was the president and director of Payless and Save Insurance Underwriters Corporation (Payless), an insurance agency located and doing business at 2401 Northwest 21st Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Anderson was also the general lines agent of record for the corporation. Count I In early January, 1984 Anderson was working from midnight until 8:00 a.m. as a security guard. Because of this, he hired one Mamie Baugh as an independent contractor to operate his insurance agency. Anderson authorized Baugh to sell policies and sign his name on insurance applications and other documents. Anderson would drop by his office two or three times a week to "check on (Baugh)" and "look at the paperwork." On or about January 3, 1984 Blanche Jones went to Payless to purchase an automobile insurance policy. She chose Payless because it was located just around the corner from her home in Fort Lauderdale, and was more convenient than her former insurance agent in Hallandale. Because Anderson was not present, Jones met with Baugh and discussed her insurance needs. Baugh filled out an application on behalf of Jones for automobile insurance with Industrial Fire and Casualty Insurance Company (Industrial) in Hollywood, Florida. Anderson was a licensed agent with Industrial, and authorized to act as a brokering agent for that company. Baugh signed Anderson's name on the application as brokering agent. Jones then gave Baugh a check for $456 as payment for the policy and was given a receipt. In February Jones had not received her policy or any evidence that she was insured. Her husband decided to visit the Payless office and obtain an insurance identification card in the event they had an accident. He met with Anderson who promised to give him a card. The following day, Anderson went to Jones' house and dropped off a business card. 1/ While there, Jones told Anderson she had paid for a policy but had never received anything. Anderson promised to "check into the particulars." After not hearing from Anderson for two months, Jones' husband went to Payless' office and found it closed. Jones thereafter went to her old insurance agent in Hallandale, and then to Public Insurance Agency (Public) in Hollywood. Public was the managing general agent for Industrial, the insurance company with whom Jones thought she had a policy. Public had no record of having received Jones' application or the $456 premium paid to Anderson. It also had no record of Anderson having telephoned Public on its "application telephone", a procedure that Anderson should have followed in order to have a binder issued on the policy. Consequently, Public never issued a policy insuring Jones. In late 1985 Jones was reading a copy of the Hollywood Sun Tattler, a local newspaper, and noticed an article about Anderson, who was then running for chief of police in Dania. She contacted the reporter who wrote the story who in turn contacted Anderson. Respondent telephoned Jones the next day and promised to return her money. A week later (January 10, 1986) Jones received a $456 money order from Anderson. A representative of Public established that Anderson was given a copy of an underwriting guide which contained explicit instructions on how to bind coverage and fill out applications. Among other things, the guide required that Anderson, and not his surrogate, sign all applications. Therefore, he was not authorized to allow Baugh to sign in his stead. Count II On or about December 20, 1983 Joseph V. Baxter visited Payless for the purpose of purchasing insurance coverage on various rental properties he owned. Baxter met with Anderson who prepared six "Homeowners Application for Quotation Only" with International Bankers Insurance Company (IBIC). Baxter gave Anderson a check for $818 as payment for the coverage. Anderson later endorsed the check. On January 11, 1984 Baxter returned to Payless and made application for a seventh insurance policy on another rental property. He gave Anderson a $318 check which Anderson subsequently endorsed. At that time Baxter was given a certificate of insurance indicating coverage with Great Southwest Fire Insurance Company (GSFIC). Several months later Baxter received a telephone call from a representative of the lending institution which held the mortgages on his property. Baxter then instructed Anderson to contact the institution and certify that Baxter had coverage on his properties. Anderson telephoned the institution in Baxter's presence and told the representative that Baxter was insured. Sometime later Baxter was again contacted by the mortgagee concerning his insurance coverage. Baxter attempted to visit Anderson but found Payless had closed its offices and gone out of business. Baxter then filed a complaint with petitioner. He never received insurance policies from IBIC or GSFIC. On January 10, 1986 Anderson repaid Baxter $1,136, the amount received by Anderson some two years earlier. A representative of IBIC established that Anderson never remitted the premiums or mailed the six quotation forms to the home office. It was further established that although GSFIC quoted a rate for Anderson on Baxter's seventh piece of property, it never received the follow-up application or premium. Respondent's Case Respondent blamed the Jones mishap on Baugh, who he claimed may have misplaced the application and taken the money. According to Anderson, she now lives in California and was unable to attend the hearing. However, he had no explanation for failing to follow up on Baxter's applications. Anderson said he closed his business in February, 1984 after a series of break- ins at his office, and left a note on the door giving a telephone number where he could be reached. However, he made no effort to personally contact those persons who held policies. Anderson further stated that he was unaware of the Jones and Baxter complaints until contacted by the newspaper reporter and petitioner, and then promptly repaid all monies due.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of the violations set forth in the Conclusions of Law portion of this order, and that his license and eligibility for licensure be REVOKED. DONE and ORDERED this 10th day of September, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of September, 1986.
