The Issue Whether birth-related neurological injuries which result in death during the neonatal period2 are covered by the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan (Plan) and, if so, whether Nicholas Erwin Schur, a deceased minor, otherwise qualifies for coverage under the Plan. Whether the notice requirements of the Plan were satisfied. Whether the Division of Administrative Hearings has the exclusive jurisdiction to resolve or, alternatively, must preliminarily resolve, whether there is "clear and convincing evidence of bad faith or malicious purpose or willful and wanton disregard of human rights, safety, or property" before a claimant may elect (under the provisions of Section 766.303(2), Florida Statutes) to reject Plan coverage and pursue such a civil suit. What effect, if any, the claimants' settlement with the birthing hospital has on the availability of benefits under the Plan. Whether the participating physician's corporate employers have standing to participate in this proceeding.
Findings Of Fact Fundamental findings Petitioners, Nicholas J. Schur and Lisa Schur, are the parents and natural guardians of Nicholas Erwin Schur (Nicholas), a deceased minor, and co-personal representatives of their deceased son's estate. Nicholas was born September 20, 1998, at Baptist Medical Center of the Beaches, Inc. (Baptist Medical Center), a hospital located in Jacksonville Beach, Duval County, Florida, and his birth weight exceeded 2,500 grams. Nicholas died on September 24, 1998, during the neonatal period at Baptist Medical Center.4 The physician providing obstetrical services during Nicholas' birth was Marijane Q. Boyd, M.D., who was at all times material hereto a "participating physician" in the Florida Birth- Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, as defined by Section 766.302(2), Florida Statutes. Coverage under the Plan Pertinent to this case, coverage is afforded by the Plan for infants who suffer a "birth-related neurological injury," defined as an "injury to the brain . . . caused by oxygen deprivation . . . occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate post-delivery period in a hospital, which renders the infant permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired." Sections 766.302(2) and 766.309(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Here, NICA has concluded, and the parties have stipulated, that Nicholas suffered a "birth-related neurological injury," as defined by the Plan. Consequently, since obstetrical services were provided by a "participating physician" at birth, NICA is of the view that, under the provisions of the Plan, the claim is compensable. NICA's conclusion is grossly consistent with the proof and is, therefore, approved.5 Notice of Plan participation While the claim qualifies for coverage under the Plan, Petitioners have responded to the health care providers' claim of Plan immunity by contending that the participating physician who delivered obstetrical services at birth (Dr. Marijane Boyd) failed to comply with the notice provisions of the Plan. As for Baptist Medical Center, the parties have stipulated that it provided timely pre-delivery notice as envisioned by the Plan. Consequently, it is only necessary to resolve whether, as alleged by the health care providers, the notice provisions of the Plan were satisfied by or on behalf of Dr. Boyd. O'Leary v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, 757 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), and University of Miami v. M.A., 26 Fla. L. Weekly D1473a (Fla. 3d DCA June 13, 2001). Pertinent to the notice issue, the proof demonstrates that on or about January 27, 1998, Mrs. Schur sought prenatal care from her existing provider, Cleveland W. Randolph, Jr., M.D., a physician who, together with Samuel A. Christian, M.D., maintained an office for the practice of obstetrics and gynecology (OB/GYN) known as North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A., Beaches-Division I, at 1375 Roberts Drive, Suite 205, Jacksonville Beach, Florida. At the time, Drs. Randolph and Christian, like approximately 40 other obstetricians practicing in the Jacksonville area, were employees/shareholders of North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A. Notably, all obstetricians employed by North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A., were "participating physicians" in the Plan. Consistent with that relationship, Mrs. Schur was offered and accepted a "Contract for Obstetrical Services" (on January 27, 1998) which identified North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A., as the entity through which Dr. Randolph would be providing obstetrical and post partum care. That agreement provided, inter alia, as follows: North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A., provides total obstetrical and post partum care. This includes a physical examination and prenatal care, delivery of the infant and post partum care. Prenatal care includes all office visits and routine lab evaluation related to the pregnancy. Post partum care includes care for problems relating to the pregnancy or delivery and routine examinations, following the delivery up to 12 weeks. North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A., agrees to provide availability of a licensed obstetrician on call 24 hours a day in case of emergency. The agreement further established a fee schedule for basic comprehensive obstetrical care, cesarean section, and other obstetrical services. On March 15, 1998, Dr. Randolph notified Mrs. Schur, as well as his other obstetrical patients, that he would no longer deliver babies, and that his "partner, Dr. Sam Christian," would provide that service. Thereafter, on March 23, 1998, Mrs. Schur had a prenatal visit with Dr. Christian (to decide whether she would accept him as her obstetrician) and decided not to continue her care with Dr. Christian (due to his increased patient load). Effective May 19, 1998, Mrs. Schur elected to transfer her obstetrical and post partum care to the offices of Drs. Rebecca Moorhead, Patricia Schroeder, and Marijane Q. Boyd, another small group practice affiliated with North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A. That office, known as North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A., Beaches-Division II, was located in a professional office building adjacent to the building occupied by Doctors Randolph and Christian. While the group practice of Drs. Moorhead, Schroeder, and Boyd was affiliated with North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A. (North Florida), and they held themselves out to the public as North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A., Beaches-Division II, as discussed more fully infra, the principles structured their business relationship through two separate professional associations. Regarding those associations, the proof demonstrated that Doctors Moorhead and Schroeder were employees of North Florida and Dr. Boyd was an employee (the sole employee) of Beaches Obstetrical and Gynecological Practice, Inc. (Beaches OB/GYN).6 Under the terms of a Management Services Agreement, effective August 1, 1997, North Florida (Drs. Moorhead and Schroeder/Beaches-Division II) and Beaches OB/GYN (Dr. Boyd) outlined the manner in which the group practice of Drs. Moorhead, Schroeder, and Boyd would be conducted, as well as how expenses and revenues would be shared. As structured, North Florida agreed to provide billing, administrative and other support services for Beaches OB/GYN (Dr. Boyd) and Beaches OB/GYN agreed that Dr. Boyd would provide her professional services. As compensation for North Florida's services, Beaches OB/GYN agreed to pay what was essentially one-third of the direct operating expenses incurred by North Florida in the operation of the group practice. As for revenue sharing, the agreement contemplated that North Florida and Beaches OB/GYN would receive a share of professional fees received based on the actual professional services provided by North Florida physicians (Drs. Moorhead and Schroeder) and Beaches OB/GYN's provider (Dr. Boyd). While Drs. Moorhead, Schroeder, and Boyd elected to structure their group practice through two professional associations, they otherwise did business as, and held themselves out to the public as, North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A., Beaches-Division II. Notably, the signage on the front door so identified their practice, followed by the names of Drs. Moorhead, Schroeder, and Boyd; and, all paperwork of note likewise identified their practice as North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A., Beaches-Division II. Indeed, Mrs. Schur was, at the time, unaware of any entity known as Beaches Obstetrical and Gynecological Practice, Inc.7 Finally, with regard to the manner in which the group practiced, the proof demonstrated that Drs. Moorhead, Schroeder, and Boyd, like many group practices, shared patients, with each patient (including Mrs. Schur) rotating her prenatal care through all three physicians, and shared calls, with each physician on call every third day and every third weekend. With such an arrangement, it was strictly a matter of chance which of the physicians (Drs. Moorhead, Schroeder, or Boyd), all of whom were participating physicians in the Plan, would deliver a patient's child. Regarding the notice issue, it is resolved that Mrs. Schur was provided timely notice that the physicians associated with North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A., were participating physicians in the Plan, together with notice as to the limited no-fault alternative for birth-related neurological injuries provided by the Plan. Such conclusion is based on the more credible proof which demonstrates that on June 15, 1998, when Mrs. Schur presented to the offices of Drs. Moorhead, Schoder, and Boyd, that they had an established routine whereby on a patient's first office visit she would be provided the notice contemplated by Section 766.316, Florida Statutes. Here, consistent with that routine, the proof demonstrates that on such date, when she presented for her first office visit, Mrs. Schur was given a form titled NOTICE TO OBSTETRIC PATIENT, which provided: I have been furnished information by North Florida Obstetrics & Gynecology Associates, P.A. prepared by the Florida Birth Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, and have been advised that North Florida Obstetrics & Gynecology Associates, P.A. is a participating practice in that program, wherein certain limited compensation is available in the event certain neurological injury may occur during labor, delivery or resuscitation. For specifics on the program, I understand I can contact the Florida Birth Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association (NICA), Barnett Bank Building, 315 South Calhoun Street, Suite 312, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, (904) 488-8191. I further acknowledge that I have received a copy of the brochure prepared by NICA. Dated this day of , 19 . Signature (NAME OF PATIENT) Social Security No.: Attest: (Nurse or Physician) Date: Rather than sign the form, Mrs. Schur wrote across it the words "received at Dr. Randolph's." At hearing, Mrs. Schur testified that, although she does not recall the incident, the best explanation she could offer for writing "received at Dr. Randolph's" instead of signing the form was that "someone would have had to tell me to do that . . . [since] I would not have known to write that on there." Such explanation is logical and credible; however, having accepted the explanation for why the entry was made, instead of signing the form, does not detract from the strong inference to be drawn from the entry. Indeed, having written the words "received at Dr. Randolph's" across the form is compelling evidence that, at the time, Mrs. Schur had a clear recollection that, during the period she was under the care of Dr. Randolph, she received notice that the physicians associated with North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A., were participating physicians in the Plan, as well as a copy of the NICA brochure that described the NICA program.8 As further evidence that notice was given, it is observed that established routine at the offices of Drs. Moorhead, Schoder, and Boyd also mandated that when notice was given an item titled "NICA ", and contained within a checklist (titled Plans/Education) on a patient's prenatal record, receive a "?" in the space following the acronym NICA. Notably, at or about the same time Mrs. Schur wrote across the notice "received at Dr. Randolph's" the space following the acronym NICA was annotated to read "? c Dr. Randolph." Given Mrs. Schur's entry on the notice form ("received at Dr. Randolph's"), as well as the established routine, it is reasonable to conclude that such annotation was intended to reflect that Mrs. Schur had received NICA notice when she was a patient of Dr. Randolph.9 While the proof demonstrated that Mrs. Schur received notice, as contemplated by Section 766.316, Florida Statutes, that the physicians associated with North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, Inc., were participants in the Plan, it likewise demonstrated that no separate notice was provided that Dr. Boyd, either individually or as an employee of Beaches Obstetrical & Gynecological Practice, Inc., was a participant in the Plan. However, for reasons discussed in the Conclusions of Law which follow, such failure was harmless. The settlement agreement with Baptist Medical Center On June 20, 2001, Nicholas J. Schur and Lisa S. Schur, individually and as Personal Representatives of the Estate of Nicholas Erwin Schur (Claimants) and Baptist Medical Center of the Beaches, Inc., formally resolved all claims or potential claims of the Claimants against Baptist Medical Center and North Florida Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates, P.A., including those matters relating to the pending civil action in the Circuit Court, Duval County, Florida, Case No. 00-01458-CA, Division CV- C; however, the Claimants reserved all claims they had against Marijane Q. Boyd and Beaches Obstetrical and Gynecological Practice, Inc. As consideration for that settlement, the Claimants received the sum of $87,500 and the release and discharge of all claims Baptist Medical Center had against the Claimants arising from the care provided to Nicholas or Mrs. Schur.
The Issue Whether Loren Romine, a minor, qualifies for coverage under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan (Plan). If so, whether Petitioners' recovery, through settlement of a civil action for medical malpractice against the treating obstetrician and hospital, bars them from recovering benefits under the Plan.
Findings Of Fact Findings related to compensability John Romine and Rebecca Romine are husband and wife, as well as the natural parents and court-appointed guardians of the property of Loren Romine (Loren), a minor. Loren was born January 26, 1998, at Columbia Regional Medical Center - Oak Hill, a hospital located in Brooksville, Hernando County, Florida, and her birth weight exceeded 2,500 grams. The physician providing obstetrical services at Loren's birth was Samir Shakfeh, M.D., who, at all times material hereto, was a "participating physician" in the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, as defined by Section 766.302(7), Florida Statutes. Pertinent to this case, coverage is afforded by the Plan for infants who have suffered a "birth-related neurological injury," defined as an injury to the brain . . . caused by oxygen deprivation . . . occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate post-delivery period in a hospital, which renders the infant permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired." Section 766.302(2), Florida Statutes. See also Section 766.309(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Here, the parties have stipulated, and the proof is otherwise compelling, that Loren sustained a "birth-related neurological injury," as that term is defined by the Plan. Findings related to the settlement of the civil action On December 29, 1998, the Romine family served a Notice of Intent to Initiate Litigation, pursuant to Section 766.106, Florida Statutes, on Dr. Shakfeh and Columbia Regional Medical Center - Oak Hill. At the conclusion of the 90-day pre-suit screening period, both the doctor and the hospital denied the claim and on April 12, 1999, the Romine family filed suit against the doctor and the hospital in the Circuit Court of Hernando County. That case was styled John Romine and Rebecca Romine, as parents and next friends of Loren Romine, a minor, and John Romine and Rebecca Romine, individually, Plaintiffs, v. HCA Health Services of Florida, Inc., d/b/a Columbia Regional Medical Center - Oak Hill, and Samir Shakfeh, M.D., Defendants, Case No. 99-857-CA01-Law. Both the doctor and the hospital denied liability and raised, as an affirmative defense, Plan immunity. Petitioners replied to that defense, and alleged that the doctor and the hospital failed to provide notice as required by the Plan. Section 766.316, Florida Statutes. On November 29, 2000, the hospital filed a Motion to Abate the civil action until the Romines filed a petition for Plan benefits with the Division of Administrative Hearings and an administrative law judge had resolved whether Loren had suffered a compensable injury and whether the doctor and the hospital had complied with the notice provisions of the Plan. O'Leary v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, 757 So. 2d 624, 627 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)("All questions of compensability, including those which arise regarding the adequacy of notice, are properly decided in the administrative forum.") The Motion to Abate was never set for hearing, and the case proceeded to mediation on December 7, 2000. Following mediation, the Romine family, the doctor, and the hospital, as well as the doctor's and the hospital's malpractice insurance carriers, reached an agreement to settle the civil suit. The settlement provided for an immediate cash payment to John Romine, Rebecca Romine, and Loren Romine, and the purchase of annuities for each of them. The total present value of the settlement was $5,250,000. The written agreement between the Romines and the hospital included the following stipulation: The parties agree that no part of the Settlement is intended to impair in any manner plaintiff's rights to pursue NICA benefits nor is it intended to be a release of any NICA benefits that may be due plaintiffs. It has always been and remains the position of the Defendant that this claim is covered by NICA. The Defendant agrees that it will take no action and refrain from doing anything to defeat or disparage plaintiff's NICA claim in any way . . . . The written settlement agreement between the Romines and the doctor contained a similar stipulation. On or about January 18, 2001, the Romines filed a Petition for Approval and Apportionment of Settlement Involving Minor in the civil suit. And, on or about January 23, 2001, the Guardian Ad Litem filed a written report with the court, and recommended approval of the settlement and apportionment of the settlement as proposed by the Romines. A hearing was held before the trial court on January 26, 2001, and on the same date the trial court entered an order granting the Petition for Approval and Apportionment of Settlement. The order further provided, as follows: 3. Nothing about this settlement is intended by the parties or this Court to limit or reduce the amount of compensation which may be recoverable by the Petitioners or LOREN ROMINE in a subsequent NICA proceeding, or from any other governmental program or private health insuror. NICA was not a party to the settlement agreements entered into between the Romine family and the healthcare providers, nor was it advised of and nor did it participate in the hearing on the Petition for Approval and Apportionment of Settlement. After the settlement was approved by the trial court, the settlement funds were disbursed to the Romines and releases were exchanged. Petitioners filed their claim for benefits under the Plan on June 14, 2001, seeking actual expenses for, inter alia, Loren's medical and hospital care, and a lump sum award to Mr. and Mrs. Romine of $100,000.
The Issue Whether Brianna Renee Joyner, a minor, qualifies for coverage under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan (Plan). Whether the hospital and participating physician provided the patient notice, as contemplated by Section 766.316, Florida Statutes (2005), or whether notice was not required because the patient had an "emergency medical condition," as defined by Section 395.002(9)(b), Florida Statutes (2005),1 or the giving of notice was not practicable.
Findings Of Fact Stipulated facts Chontee Joyner and David Joyner are the natural parents of Brianna Renee Joyner, a minor. Brianna was born a live infant on February 16, 2006, at Lawnwood Regional Medical Center, a licensed hospital located in Fort Pierce, Florida, and her birth weight exceeded 2,500 grams. Obstetrical services were delivered at Brianna's birth by William B. King, M.D., who, at all times material hereto, was a "participating physician" in the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, as defined by Section 766.302(7), Florida Statutes. Coverage under the Plan Pertinent to this case, coverage is afforded by the Plan for infants who suffer a "birth-related neurological injury," defined as an "injury to the brain . . . caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery period in a hospital, which renders the infant permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired."2 Here, Petitioners and Intervenor took no position on whether Brianna suffered a "birth-related neurological injury." In contrast, NICA was of the view that the record failed to support the conclusion that Brianna's impairments, admittedly substantial, were birth-related. Whether Brianna suffered a "birth-related neurological injury" To address whether Brianna suffered a "birth-related neurological injury," the parties offered a Stipulated Record (Exhibits 1-22), that included the medical records associated with Mrs. Joyner's antepartal course, as well as those associated with Brianna's birth and subsequent development. The parties also offered the deposition testimony of Donald Willis, M.D., a physician board-certified in obstetrics and gynecology, and maternal-fetal medicine, and Raymond Fernandez, M.D., a physician board-certified in pediatrics and neurology with special competence in child neurology, who offered opinions as to the likely etiology of Brianna's impairments. Dr. Fernandez examined Brianna on July 31, 2008, and obtained the following history from Mrs. Joyner: Labor was induced at 39 weeks gestation. Her cervix was 1 cm dilated. She was given Cytotec and Pitocin, and overall duration of labor was 31 hours. Epidural anesthesia was given at 24 hours of labor. Towards the end of the labor, contractions occurred one after the other and she pushed for 2 hours. Vacuum extraction was used, but she was stuck, and she was then extracted manually. Brianna was pale and she did not cry after birth. She was given to Mrs. Joyner for "1 second" and then taken to the nursery because of breathing problems. She was transferred to the NICU because of an apneic spell. Subsequent to discharge she was referred to several specialist[s]. She was found to have a small patent ductus arteriosus that was not felt to be significant. The neurosurgeons found no clinically significant spinal abnormalities. She required PE tubes and tonsillectomy and adenoidectomy because of recurrent ear infections and apneic spells. Hearing is normal. Genetics and neurology have not arrived at a specific diagnosis. She has been enrolled in a developmental therapy program through the Early Steps Program, and has improved slowly, but she remains delayed. Brianna sat straight without support at about 13 months of age. She ambulates by scooting in the sitting position, by pulling with her legs and balancing with her arms. She tries to pull up, but only if offered assistance and encouragement by holding her hands. She reaches for objects, manipulates toys but does not play with them meaningfully, although she likes noisy toys. She rarely puts food in her mouth (Cheerios sometimes). She babbles, but no words are spoken. She does not seem to understand spoken language, but does respond to visual cues. She lifts her arms when a shirt is about to be put on. She plays pat-a-cake, but not consistently. Eye contact is improving. She smiles and is loving with family members, and tends to be anxious in the presence of strangers. She bangs blocks together, but does not stack them. She does not engage in imaginative play. She likes to be read to, and helps turn pages. She watches her younger brother and follows him around the house, and laughs when he does funny things. Physical examination revealed the following: Recent weight was 27 pounds. Head circumference 47.25 cm (approximately 20th percentile). . . . Brianna was alert. She was anxious when approached, and comforted by her mother. She did not babble. No words were spoken. Eye contact was limited. She did not point. Mainly, she sat on her mother's lap and stared about the room and sometimes looked at me. There was no indication that she understood basic verbal requests. She did not point to body parts. She was not interested in toys, and pushed them away when offered. There were no specific dysmorphic features. She has 2 hyperpigmented macular-papular skin markings on her back. One is over the thoracic spine, and the other is to the right of midline. Pupils were equal and briskly reactive to light. Eye movement was full. She tracked visually, but eye contact was limited. Face was symmetric. She swallowed well. Low axial and proximal tone, but normal tone distally in extremities. No obvious weakness noted. She sat independently. She stood and took steps, but only with both hands held by her mother. There was no involuntary movement. Deep tendon reflexes 1+ throughout. Liver and spleen were not enlarged. Funduscopic examination was limited, only able to note normal red reflexes and unable to visualize optic nerves. She inconsistently turned toward sounds and when her name was called. Based on his evaluation of July 31, 2008, as well as his review of the medical records, Dr. Fernandez was of the opinion that Brianna was permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired. However, with regard to etiology, Dr. Fernandez was of the opinion that Brianna's impairments were, more likely than not, caused by a genetic abnormality, as opposed to a brain injury caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury. In so concluding, Dr. Fernandez observed that the record did not provide evidence of an acute brain injury due to hypoxia or mechanical trauma during labor and delivery. Rather, he noted: There was mild shoulder dystocia but no evidence of upper extremity weakness. There was some medical instability after delivery but no evidence for an acute encephalopathy. Following a single fluid bolus she was then medically stable and began feeding well by the end of day 1. Hypotonia was noted initially and it has persisted without evolution or evidence of spasticity or involuntary movement. The initial brain CT scan [of February 20, 2006] showed no hemorrhage and later brain MRI [of May 18, 2006] was normal. Finally, Dr. Fernandez pointed to the report of Charles Williams, M.D., a geneticist associated with Shands Children's Hospital at the University of Florida, Division of Pediatric Genetics, where Brianna had been seen because of her developmental delay and austic-like features. That report, following chromosome analyses, identified a chromosome deletion, a genetic abnormality, that in Dr. Fernandez's opinion likely explains Brianna's global delay and physical findings. Dr. Willis reviewed the medical records associated with Mrs. Joyner's antepartal course; those associated with Mrs. Joyner's labor and delivery, including the fetal heart rate monitor strips; and those associated with Brianna's newborn course. Based on that evaluation, Dr. Willis was of the opinion that Brianna did not suffer a brain injury caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury during labor, delivery, or the immediate postdelivery period. In so concluding, Dr. Willis observed there was no significant fetal distress on the fetal heart monitor during labor; the baby's Apgar scores were normal (8 at one and five minutes); the baby did not require any significant resuscitation at birth (only suctioning and blow-by oxygen); and CT scan of the head on February 20, 2006, was negative, without evidence of hypoxic changes. When, as here, the medical condition is not readily observable, issues of causation are essentially medical questions, requiring expert medical evidence. See, e.g., Vero Beach Care Center v. Ricks, 476 So. 2d 262, 264 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)("[L]ay testimony is legally insufficient to support a finding of causation where the medical condition involved is not readily observable."); Ackley v. General Parcel Service, 646 So. 2d 242, 245 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)("The determination of the cause of a non-observable medical condition, such as a psychiatric illness, is essentially a medical question."); Wausau Insurance Company v. Tillman, 765 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)("Because the medical conditions which the claimant alleged had resulted from the workplace incident were not readily observable, he was obligated to present expert medical evidence establishing that causal connection."). Here, the opinions of Doctors Fernandez and Willis were not controverted or shown to lack credibility. Consequently, it must be resolved that the cause of Brianna's impairments was most likely a developmentally based genetic abnormality, as opposed to a "birth-related neurological injury." See Thomas v. Salvation Army, 562 So. 2d 746, 749 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)("In evaluating medical evidence, a judge of compensation claims may not reject uncontroverted medical testimony without a reasonable explanation."). The notice issue Apart from issues related to compensability, Petitioners have sought an opportunity to avoid a claim of Plan immunity in a civil action, by requesting a finding that the notice provisions of the Plan were not satisfied by the participating physician and the hospital. § 766.309(1)(d), Fla. Stat. See Galen of Florida, Inc. v. Braniff, 696 So. 2d 308, 309 (Fla. 1997)["A]s a condition precedent to invoking the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan as a patient's exclusive remedy, health care providers must, when practicable, give their obstetrical patients notice of their participation in the plan a reasonable time prior to delivery."). Consequently, it is necessary to resolve whether the health care providers complied with the notice provisions of the Plan. § 766.309(1)(d), Fla. Stat.; Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association v. Florida Division of Administrative Hearing, 948 So. 2d 705, 717 (Fla. 2007)("[W]hen the issue of whether notice was adequately provided pursuant to section 766.316 is raised in a NICA claim, we conclude that the ALJ has jurisdiction to determine whether the health care provider complied with the requirements of section 766.316."). The notice provisions of the Plan At all times material hereto, Section 766.316, Florida Statutes (2005), prescribed the notice requirements of the Plan, as follows: Each hospital with a participating physician on its staff and each participating physician, other than residents, assistant residents, and interns deemed to be participating physicians under s. 766.314(4)(c), under the Florida Birth- Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan shall provide notice to the obstetrical patients as to the limited no-fault alternative for birth-related neurological injuries. Such notice shall be provided on forms furnished by the association and shall include a clear and concise explanation of a patient's rights and limitations under the plan. The hospital or the participating physician may elect to have the patient sign a form acknowledging receipt of the notice form. Signature of the patient acknowledging receipt of the notice form raises a rebuttable presumption that the notice requirements of this section have been met. Notice need not be given to a patient when the patient has an emergency medical condition as defined in s. 395.002(9)(b) or when notice is not practicable. Section 395.002(9)(b), Florida Statutes (2005), defined "emergency medical condition" to mean: (b) With respect to a pregnant woman: That there is inadequate time to effect safe transfer to another hospital prior to delivery; That a transfer may pose a threat to the health and safety of the patient or fetus; or That there is evidence of the onset and persistence of uterine contractions or rupture of the membranes. The Plan does not define "practicable." However, "practicable" is a commonly understood word that, as defined by Webster's dictionary, means "capable of being done, effected, or performed; feasible." Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary, Second Edition (1979). See Seagrave v. State, 802 So. 2d 281, 286 (Fla. 2001)("When necessary, the plain and ordinary meaning of words [in a statute] can be ascertained by reference to a dictionary."). Resolution of the notice issue When, as here, the Petitioners dispute that the healthcare providers complied with the notice provisions of the Plan, "the burden rest[s] on the health care providers to demonstrate, more likely than not, that the notice provisions of the Plan were satisfied." Tabb v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, 880 So. 2d 1253, 1260 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Here, the parties' Pre-Hearing Stipulation and Stipulated Record (Exhibits 1-22) provide no such evidence. Consequently, it must be resolved that Lawnwood Regional Medical Center and William B. King, M.D., failed to establish they complied with the notice provisions of the Plan, or that any such failure was excused because the patient presented in an "emergency medical condition" or the giving of notice was otherwise "not practicable."3
Findings Of Fact By stipulation filed December 2, 1993, petitioners and respondent stipulated as follows: That pursuant to Chapter 766.301- 766.316, Florida Statutes, a claim was filed on behalf of the above-styled infant against the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association (the "Association") on behalf of Jasmin Soto, Violeta Rodriguez and Luis Soto (the "Petitioners") for benefits under Chapter 766.301-766.316 (F.S.) 1988. That a timely filed claim for benefits complying with the requirements of F.S. 766.305 was filed by the Petitioners and a timely denial was filed on behalf of the Association. That the infant, Jasmin Soto, was born at Baptist Hospital on September 29, 1990, and that the said hospital was a licensed Florida Hospital and the attending physician was a participating physician within the meaning of Chapter 766, Florida Statutes. That the Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter of this claim. That Section 766.302(2), Florida Statutes, states that "birth-related neurological injury" means injury to the brain or spinal cord of a live infant weighing at least 2500 grams at birth caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate post- delivery in a hospital, which renders the infant permanently and substantially, mentally and physically impaired. The parties agree that Jasmin Soto suffers from a right brachial plexus injury. That the parties stipulate to the authenticity of the medical records and/or medical reports of Michael Duchowny, M.D., who appears on behalf of the Respondents and Leon I. Charash, M.D., who appears on behalf of the Petitioner. While Dr. Charash has not been deposed, Dr. Duchowny has been deposed and his deposition is submitted as part of this Stipulation. The parties stipulate that there are no other pertinent medical facts to be considered by the Division of Administrative Hearings. The parties further Stipulate that if the parties were to proceed to a hearing on the merits no further proof would be offered and traditional burdens of proof would apply. Based upon this stipulation, the parties request the hearing officer to rule on Petitioner's claim based upon this Stipulation, the attached medical records and the deposition of Dr. Duchowny. The neurological examinations of Jasmin reveal that she suffered from a "mild" to "moderate" right Erb's palsy related directly to the right brachial plexus injury she received at birth. A brachial plexus injury, the cause of Erb's palsy, is not, however, a brain or spinal cord injury. Moreover, Jasmin's mental functioning is normal and not impaired due to any birth- related complications.
Findings Of Fact By stipulation filed November 12, 1993, petitioners and respondent stipulated as follows: COMES NOW, CHARLES PATRICK, ESQUIRE, Attorney for CLYDE RAY, JR., a minor, and LISA TAYLOR and CLYDE RAY SR., individually and as parents and natural guardians of CLYDE RAY, JR., and COMES NOW, MARK J. ZIENTZ, ESQUIRE, Attorney for FLORIDA BIRTH RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY COMPENSATION ASSOCIATION, who hereby stipulate and agree as follows: That pursuant to Chapter 766, Florida Statutes, a claim was filed on behalf of the above-styled infant against the Florida Birth Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association (the Association) on behalf of Clyde Ray, Jr., and Clyde Ray, Sr., and Lisa Taylor (the Petitioners) for benefits under Chapter 766, F.S. That a timely filed claim for benefits complying with the requirements of F.S. 766.305 was filed by Petitioners and a timely denial was filed on behalf of the Association. That the Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter of this claim. That Section 766.302(2), Florida Statutes, requires an infant to suffer both a permanent and substantial mental and physical impairment to fall within the definition of a "Birth-related neurological injury" making said infant eligible for coverage by the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan. The parties agree that the infant, Clyde Ray, Jr., does not exhibit substantial physical impairment so as to fit within the strict definition of claims covered by the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association under Section 766.302(2), Florida Statutes. That the infant, Clyde Ray, Jr., was born at Jackson Memorial Hospital on June 17, 1990, and that said hospital was a licensed Florida Hospital and the attending physicians were participating physicians within the meaning of Chapter 766, Florida Statutes. WHEREFORE, based upon the above stipulated set of facts, it is respectfully requested that the Division of Administrative Hearings approve the stipulations as being consistent with the evidence in this cause and enter an order denying the claim against the Association on the basis that Clyde Ray, Jr., did not suffer a birth-related neurological injury as defined by Section 766.302(2), Florida Statutes.
