Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations of the parties, on the exhibits received in evidence, on the deposition testimony received in evidence, and on the testimony of the witnesses at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact. Facts Stipulated To The Petitioner, Mike Smith Pontiac GMC, Inc., ("Dealer"), is a corporation organized and existing pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida. Dealer is engaged in the business of operating an automobile dealership with its place of business located in Daytona Beach, Florida. The Respondent, Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. ("MBNA"), is a corporation organized and existing pursuant to the laws of the State of Delaware. BNA has the exclusive license in the United States, its territories and possessions, to distribute, sell, and service Mercedes-Benz passenger cars, parts, and products. MBNA's principal place of business is located in Montvale, New Jersey. In addition, MBNA has seven zone offices within the United States, each of which oversees the operations of the Mercedes-Benz dealerships located within the zone. The zone office responsible for dealership operations in Daytona Beach, Florida, is located in Jacksonville, Florida. On or about January 1, 1984, MBNA and Dealer entered into a Mercedes- Benz Passenger Car Dealer Agreement which granted the Dealer the right to sell and service Mercedes-Benz passenger cars and parts through December 31, 1985. That agreement was extended by MBNA until January 31, 1986, by letter dated October 23, 1985. On or about June 21, 1985, Michael Smith left the dealership and no longer functions as dealer-operator of Dealer. Litigation between Michael Smith and Dealer and Jerome Ginsburg is presently pending in the Circuit Court in and for Volusia County, Florida, wherein Michael Smith presently claims to continue to own a 25 percent interest in Dealer. Pending disposition of this proceeding, MBNA has continued its business relationship with Dealer to date. Other Background Facts MBNA is a wholly owned subsidiary of Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft, a corporation of the Federal Republic of Germany, which manufacturers Mercedes- Benz passenger cars. Dealer was formed by Jerome Ginsburg ("Ginsburg") and Michael D. Smith ("Smith") for the purpose of operating an automobile dealership named "Mike Smith Pontiac," located in Daytona Beach, Florida. Jerome Z. Ginsburg is both a lawyer and a businessman of substantial means. In late 1982, Jerome Ginsburg negotiated the purchase of an automobile dealership in Daytona Beach, Florida, from the owner, Mr. Roger Holler. At the time of purchase of the dealership, Ginsburg had absolutely no experience in the automobile field and, to this day, has never managed the day-to-day operations of an automobile dealership. It was not Ginsburg's original intent to personally operate the dealership. Ginsburg did not consider it prudent for him to enter into the automobile business without the aid of a person experienced in that business. The buy-sell agreement between Ginsburg and Holler required, as a condition of sale, that Holler approve the qualifications of the dealer- operator, i.e., the person who would actually be in charge of managing the day- to-day operations of the dealership. The buy-sell agreement between Ginsburg and Holler also provided that Ginsburg would lease the real property on which the dealership was situated and contained a guaranteed option to purchase that property at a value set by an agreed :AI appraiser, which option could be exercised by Ginsburg beginning one year after the dealership purchase. Ginsburg set out to find an experienced dealer- operator to run the Daytona Beach dealership and he picked Michael D. Smith. Ginsburg was aware that the manufacturers were highly selective with respect to whom they would approve as dealer-operators. The investigative focus of MBNA differs with respect to evaluating a potential dealer-operator as opposed to a dealer-owner. MBNA looks to the financial status and ability to capitalize the dealership of the proposed owner. With respect to a proposed operator, however, MBNA seeks an individual who has proven automobile dealership management experience. Smith submitted a resume outlining his automotive experience and employment history to Ginsburg and Ginsburg hired a detective agency to check the validity of the information submitted. The agency confirmed Smith's automobile experience. Although Smith had extensive experience in the automobile business, he did not possess any unique qualities which made him substantially different from many other dealer-operators. There are a large number of other people with similar experience. Ginsburg, as majority shareholder and president of Dealer, assumed that Smith would operate the day-to-day business of Dealer subject to the usual controls of the board of directors and himself as chief executive officer of Dealer. There is nothing to the contrary in either of the franchise agreements between Dealer and MBNA giving the dealer-operator special independent status or legal rights vis-a-vis Dealer. Smith, like Ginsburg, was not a party to the franchise agreements. The two principals in Dealer were Ginsburg and Smith. Ginsburg provided all of the money for the business. Ginsburg was president of Dealer and has always held at least 75 percent of the stock of Dealer. Smith operated Dealer on a day-to-day basis. In both of the franchise agreements entered into by MBNA and Dealer, Ginsburg is shown as a "Dealer Owner" and Smith is shown as both a "Dealer Owner" and a "Dealer Operator." Ginsburg loaned Smith all of the money to buy stock in Dealer and was never repaid by Smith. A Mercedes-Benz automobile is one of the most expensive cars sold in the United States, the price to the consumer being as high as $70,000.00 for some models. Thus, MBNA's standards are higher than those of many other manufacturers, and MBNA expects its dealers to provide facilities and service commensurate with the quality and cost of the product they represent. MBNA's emphasis on service rather than sales distinguishes MBNA from most other automobile manufacturers. Because MBNA does not have a problem with sales, MBNA has a philosophy of going to the ultimate to try to satisfy its customers. It is important to MBNA that the ownership experience be as positive as is possible while the customer owns a Mercedes- Benz automobile. Thus, MBNA prefers, at a minimum, a Mercedes- Benz service reception area isolated from other car lines, with a covered area where the customer can bring his car in, be greeted, and have his order written. Moreover, MBNA expects all of its dealerships to provide a lounge wherein a customer can wait comfortably and be treated in a manner consistent with the cost of the car. If MBNA terminates Dealer, Dealer will not be paid for the value of good will or going concern value of its business but rather would receive a liquidation value of Dealer's MBNA franchise. MBNA franchises are very valuable. If Dealer is terminated and MBNA thereafter selects another dealer, less investment will have to be made by the successor dealer and MBNA could expect to more easily obtain concessions from the new dealer. Dealer continues to operate a dual franchise by also selling Alfa Romeo and Pontiac automobiles. Dealer does not insist on continuing to operate the MBNA franchise in Daytona even though MBNA wants to get rid of Dealer and, in fact, Dealer became contractually bound to sell to third parties unconnected to Dealer in October 1986. The third party, Mr. Cutler, agreed to pay $3.3 million for the dealership. A sale to a qualified candidate acceptable to MBNA would accomplish MBNA's sole objective in this termination proceeding by changing its representation in Daytona Beach. At all times material to this case, Dealer was treated fairly with respect to its allocation of vehicles by MBNA. Dealer's allocation was increased while Smith was operating Dealer. The Agreement Between Smith and Ginsburg In Mid-February of 1983, Jerome Ginsburg and Michael Smith entered into a written agreement titled "Operating Financial Agreement." The agreement contemplated the formation of a Florida corporation for the purpose of purchasing Lamb Pontiac, GMC, Mercedes-Benz, in Daytona Beach, Florida. The agreement also contemplated that Ginsburg would advance all of the funds necessary four the business venture and that Smith's primary role would be in the day to day on-site management of the business subject to the general supervisory control of Ginsburg. With respect to ownership of the corporation to be formed, the agreement provided in Paragraph 3: 3. That the stock of said corporation shall be owned 75 percent by JZG [Ginsburg] and 25 percent by MDS [Smith]. The 25 percent stock owned by NDS shall be placed in escrow until the provisions of this contract are met, together with properly executed stock transfer documents executed in blank so that said stock can be transferred to JZG or his appointee and undated but executed letters of resignation from any position as an officer or director, all in the event of a default as outlined in this Agreement. With respect to the distribution of the profits of the corporation to be formed, the agreement between Ginsburg and Smith provided in paragraph 6: Disregarding any modifications that may be made for tax purposes, to net income earned, said distributable income defined as prior to any salary or compensation to the parties, (less any cash requirements for the operations of the business) shall be distributed in accordance with stock ownership. To MDS -- 25 percent, however, 50 percent of any monetary compensation in excess of One Hundred Thousand and 00/00 ($100,000.00) shall be paid to JZG to the extent required to balance the capital and loan accounts in the corporation to the ratio of 75 percent JZG and 25 percent MDS. To JZG -- 75 percent. The parties can elect to take said compensation in any form desired provided that it includes compensatory charges for any tax effect on the corporation or the other party. With respect to Smith's basic obligations and salary under the agreement with Ginsburg, Paragraph 7 provided: 7. MDS [Smith] agrees to operate the dealership on a daily basis in accordance with the highest standards in the industry and to devote his full time to the operation of the dealership and shall not engage in any other work activity without JZG's [Ginsburg's] prior consent nor shall he invest or aid anyone else in investing or engaging in the automobile business or any related business without JZG's prior consent. MDS shall be employed by the Corporation at a salary of $60,000 per year. Paragraph 11 of the agreement provided: 11. In view of the large capital expenditure of JZG, MDS and his wife both agree to execute a promissory note in favor of JZG for 25 percent of the cash required not to exceed $225,000. Said promissory note shall be due in the event there is a default by MDS under this Agreement. The note shall be cancelled and returned upon the balancing of the capital and loan accounts as provided in Paragraph 6A. Said note shall bear interest at the rate of 10 percent per year compounded annually until paid. Said note shall be due at the end of the 54 months after purchase and unless fully paid, shall accrue interest at the highest rate allowed in the State of Florida and shall provide for waiver of presentment, dishonor and notice, the payment of full legal costs of collection, etc. The agreement between Smith and Ginsburg also contained the following provision in Paragraph 15: 15. In the event in the future, any franchisor requires that MDS have the right to purchase or obtain a greater interest than provided herein, then in that event, MDS agrees that he will not exercise any such right. In the event a franchisor actually requires the transfer of such greater interest to MDS then in that event, compensating adjustments will be made in the ownership of the other franchises and or other assets to maintain the agreed upon ratio of ownership of assets and distribution of profits. In addition to the foregoing, the agreement between Smith and Ginsburg contained numerous specific obligations and agreements as to the manner in which Smith would operate the business as well as a lengthy definition of what constituted a default by Smith under the agreement. Included in the definition of default by Smith was the failure of Smith to achieve specified amounts of distributable income during each of the first five years of operation of the business. The terms contained in the agreement were drafted by Ginsburg and Ginsburg made the stock escrow arrangement a condition of Smith's ability to participate in the dealership. Ginsburg had Smith sign blank stock transfer forms and blank resignation forms in February 1983, on which the date was left blank. After Smith signed these documents, they were kept by Ginsburg in his office. Twenty-five per cent of Dealer's stock was issued to Smith, but, immediately after Smith signed his stock certificates, Ginsburg took back Smith's stock and held it. Ginsburg and Smith never advised MBNA of the existence of this agreement. The Application Process After executing the foregoing agreement, Ginsburg and Smith contacted MBNA with a view toward obtaining approval of Dealer as a franchisee. MBNA requested that Ginsburg and Smith provide certain information, including business experience, financial data, and information related to stock ownership in Dealer. As part of the pre-application process, in response to MBNA's request for background information, on April 26, 1983, Ginsburg sent to MBNA copies of applications which had been submitted to the GM Pontiac Division. Ginsburg intended that MBNA utilize the information contained in the GM Pontiac Division materials in the evaluation of Dealer's application. Ginsburg's cover letter of that date stated that the dealership would be owned by a corporation, ". . . 75 percent of which will be owned by me and 25 percent by Michael Smith." The documents submitted to GM Pontiac Division and forwarded to MBNA with Ginsburg's letter of April 26, 1983, included a form titled "Applicant's Source Of Funds Statement." That form, filled out and signed by Smith, contains a detailed list of assets owned by Mr. Smith which he describes as being the assets which will constitute the source of his funds to acquire a 25 percent interest in the dealership. That detailed list does not include mention of any loan of money from Ginsburg. Another portion of the documents submitted to GM Pontiac Division and forwarded to MBNA requested the following information: "Would any funds you plan to invest be borrowed or be otherwise encumbered? If yes, state from whom, terms, restrictions and repayment program." Both Smith and Ginsburg answered the question, "no," and neither provided any information regarding from whom funds were to be borrowed, the conditions of the loan, or the repayment schedule. At MBNA's initial meeting with Ginsburg and Smith, on May 27, 1983, discussions were had regarding remodeling of the dealership service facility. At that time, the dealership's Mercedes-Benz reception area was the same one used for Pontiac and there were no adequate facilities for customer waiting. Under date of June 23, 1987, Smith and Ginsburg submitted an Application For Dealer Agreement to MBNA on behalf of Mike Smith Pontiac, GMC, Inc. The application form included a portion titled "Statement Of Finances And Ownership." That statement showed that Mike Smith Pontiac, GMC, Inc., had a maximum authorized capital stock of $1,000.00, that Ginsburg owned 75 shares for which he paid $750.00, and that Smith owned 25 shares for which he paid $250.00. In the column titled "Amount Borrowed for this Investment," both Ginsburg and Smith reported, "None." Subsection 6 of the Statement of Finances And Ownership states: "Information is given below when it is indicated that stockholders, partner, or owner have borrowed funds to make their individual investment in this business." No information was provided regarding funds borrowed for the investment in Mike Smith Pontiac, GMC, Inc., with regard to either Smith or Ginsburg. At the time of Dealer's original application and at all other times material to this case, MBNA had a written policy regarding absentee ownership. That policy read as follows in pertinent part: It is our intent to avoid "absentee management" and to ensure operating control of the dealership by the resident owner/operator and, therefore, it will be the policy of MBNA that the owner/operator of the dealership shall have: 51 percent stock interest in the dealership, or a minimum of 20 percent ownership coupled with the absolute right to purchase up to 51 percent of the dealership during the term of the Dealer Agreement, evidenced by a written Agreement between the shareholders to that effect. COMMENT Although MBNA may, in exceptional circumstances, approve the application of a newly formed enterprise where the owner/operator has less than 51 percent of the shares because of his financial inability at he outset to acquire 51 percent, it is the goal of MBNA to ensure that the owner/operator does acquire operating control during the term of the dealer agreement. Notwithstanding the foregoing written policy regarding absentee ownership, NBNA does not appear to have been very concerned about the application or enforcement of that policy. When representatives of MBNA met with Smith and Ginsburg during the application stage of the relationship, the NBNA representatives told Smith and Ginsburg about the 20 percent minimum ownership requirement with respect to dealer-operators, but did not discuss with Smith and Ginsburg the requirement of a right to purchase up to 51 percent of the stock. Further, the MBNA representative did not provide Smith and Ginsburg with a copy of the written absentee ownership policy and did not ask them to provide MBNA with a copy of a written agreement between the shareholders showing that the dealer-operator had the absolute right to purchase up to 51 percent of the dealership during the term of the dealer agreement. MBNA did not ask Ginsburg or Smith about any other agreements between those two individuals. The MBNA absentee ownership policy is not incorporated as one of the provisions of the agreement between MBNA and Dealer. During the application process neither Ginsburg nor Smith made any mention of their written "Operating - Financial Agreement," nor did either of them show that document to any representative of MBNA. Similarly, neither Ginsburg nor Smith told MBNA that Ginsburg was holding Smith's stock certificate and signed, undated, resignation and stock transfer documents. The "Operating - Financial Agreement" was not brought to MBNA's attention because Ginsburg did not feel it was necessary to tell them about it. MBNA assumed that the information submitted by Ginsburg and Smith was true. The First Agreement Between The Parties The first written agreement entered into between MBNA and Dealer was an agreement titled "Mercedes-Benz Passenger Car Dealer Agreement." This agreement was filled out by representatives of MBNA and was then reviewed by Ginsburg and Smith. Ginsburg and Smith confirmed that the statements inserted in the agreement were true. The agreement had an effective date of July 5, 1983, and remained in effect through December 31, 1984. This agreement was entered into by MBNA and Dealer as corporations. The first agreement included a section titled "Dealer Operating Requirements Agreement, also referred to as "DORA." The DORA portion of the first agreement included the following language: Additionally Dealer agrees that the following changes and/or improvements recommended by Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., in the course of an analysis of Dealer's service department are necessary to the proper functioning of Dealer's service department. Dealer agrees that it will complete the following within the period indicated: The foregoing was followed by a typed itemization which included the following: "Provide plans for an acceptable M-B service reception area and customer lounge," which had an agreed completion date of 10-1-83, and "Complete renovation of service facility in accordance with approved plans, as mentioned above," which had an agreed completion date of 12-31-83. These same DORA commitments were also contained in the application materials reviewed and signed by Ginsburg and Smith. In early October of 1983, Ginsburg wrote to MBNA and, among other things, sought to defer compliance with the DORA items quoted above until after the purchase of the real property on which the dealership was located, which purchase could not take place until one year after acquisition of the dealership. The condition that the property be purchased prior to completing renovations had not been mentioned by Ginsburg or Smith at the time the parties initially discussed and agreed to the DORA commitments and deadlines for completion. MBNA acquiesced in Dealer's request and agreed to extend the completion dates for the above-quoted DORA items in the DORA provisions of the next agreement. The Second Agreement Between The Parties Under date of January 1, 1984, MBNA and Dealer entered into a second written agreement titled Mercedes-Benz Passenger Car Dealer Agreement. Like the first agreement, this agreement was entered into by MBNA and Dealer as corporations. This is the existing and presently effective agreement. This agreement replaced the initial franchise agreement. Like the first franchise agreement between the parties, this agreement was drafted entirely by MBNA personnel without negotiation. Among the specific provisions of this existing agreement pertinent to this case are the following: FIRST: MBNA appoints Dealer as a dealer of Mercedes-Benz Passenger Cars and as a dealer of Mercedes-Benz Parts in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. Dealer accepts this appointment and assumes the obligation of an authorized Mercedes-Benz dealer, as specified in this Agreement. SECOND: Subject to the terms and conditions hereof, MBNA will sell to Dealer and Dealer will buy from MBNA Mercedes-Benz Passenger Cars and Parts and assumes the obligation of selling and promoting the sale of Mercedes-Benz Passenger Cars and Parts and performing service, including Warranty Service, for Mercedes-Benz Passenger Cars in the following non-exclusive area: Counties of Volusia and Flagler in the State of Florida. MBNA may alter the area described above at any time by written notice to Dealer. THIRD: The accompanying Dealer Operating Requirements Agreement (Form No. MB-903-O) and the Dealer Agreement Standard Provisions (Form No. MB-902-F) are hereby made a part of this Dealer Agreement. Dealer acknowledges receipt of the Dealer Agreement Standard Provisions and declares that it has examined the provisions and that it is fully familiar with them. FOURTH: This is a personal service agreement and has been entered into by MBNA in reliance upon, and in consideration of, the personal qualification and representations with respect thereto of the following named persons, hereinafter called Dealer Operators, who participate full time in the management of the Dealer and have full managerial authority and responsibility for the operations of Dealer: Name Address Title Michael Smith D. 1 River Ridge Trail, Ormond Secretary/ Treasurer/ Beach, FL 32074 General Manager and the following named persons, hereinafter called Dealer Owners who participate in the ownership of Dealer: Percentage Name Address of Ownership Jerome Z. Ginsburg 8 Boulder Trail, Armonk, 75 percent NY 10504 Michael D. Smith 1 River Ridge Trail, Ormond Beach, FL 32074 25 percent Except as may be otherwise provided in this Agreement, neither Dealer nor the persons named above shall permit any change in the ownership or management of Dealer without the prior written approval of MBNA, which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. No representative of MBNA has authority to give verbal approval to a change in ownership or management. FIFTH: MBNA hereby approves the following locations for the Dealer's business pursuant to this Agreement: a salesroom at 833 Volusia Avenue, Daytona Beach, Florida; facilities for the sale of used cars with space provided for used Mercedes-Benz Passenger Cars at same and service and parts department at same Facilities at these locations shall correspond as to style, size, layout, color, equipment, and identification by MB Signs as required by MBNA in accordance with the applicable provisions of this Agreement and with such reasonable directives and suggestions as MBNA may issue from time to time. Without the prior written consent of MBNA, Dealer shall neither change the location of its salesroom, storage facilities, service department, or used car facilities, nor establish for use in its Mercedes-Benz business, pursuant to this Agreement, any additional salesroom, storage facilities, service department, or used car facilities. . . . . SEVENTH: This Agreement is to be governed by, and construed according to, the laws of the State of New Jersey. It is understood, however, that it is a general form of agreement designed for use in any state; and it is therefore agreed that any provision herein contained which in any way contravenes the laws of any state or constituted authority which may apply to this Dealer Agreement shall be deemed to be deleted here from in accordance with the applicable provision of the accompanying Dealer Agreement Standard Provisions. . . . . EIGHTH: This Agreement terminates and supersedes all prior written or oral agreements, if any, between MBNA and Dealer, relating to the subject matter hereof, except with respect to any trade indebtedness which may be owing by either MBNA or Dealer to the other, and except that this Agreement shall not operate to cancel any of Dealer's unfilled orders with MBNA for any Mercedes- Benz Passenger Cars, Parts, and Products placed with MBNA pursuant to the provisions of any agreement terminated or superseded by this Agreement. Except as herein otherwise provided, the Dealer, upon execution of this Agreement and in consideration of the execution thereof by MBNA, releases MBNA from any and all claims, demands, contracts, and liabilities (including statutory liabilities) of any kind and nature whatsoever, if any, arising from or out of or in connection with any such prior agreements. . . . . TENTH: This Agreement shall become effective as of the day and year first above written and shall continue in effect until December 31, 1985, when it shall terminate, unless otherwise previously terminated in accordance with the applicable provisions of this Agreement. The agreement described immediately above incorporated a document titled Dealer Operating Requirements Agreement (hereinafter "DORA"). Paragraph II,E. of the DORA provisions stated: "The minimum inventory of Mercedes-Benz vehicles in Dealer's stock will be 18 units." And as the last item under Section IV of the DORA, it is provided "In 1984/85, after purchase of real property, provide M-B identified reception area and customer lounge." The agreement entered into between the parties also incorporated a separate document known as the "Standard Provisions," which document is a part of every Mercedes-Benz Passenger Car Dealer Agreement. Among the provisions of the Standard Provisions are the following: Paragraph 15.D. Dealer and MBNA agree that the following acts or events, all within the control of Dealer or originating from actions taken by Dealer or its management or owners, are so contrary to the spirit and purposes of this Dealer Agreement as to warrant its termination . . . . Removal, resignation, withdrawal or elimination from Dealer for any reason of any person listed in Article Fourth; provided, however, that if the person leaving is a non- owner Operator who left without notice, Dealer will be given such reasonable time as circumstances may require to replace the Operator with an Operator satisfactory to MBNA; Any change, whether voluntary or involuntary, in the management or ownership of Dealer as set forth in Article Fourth without the prior written approval of MBNA; . . . . Any disagreement between or among the Dealer Operators or Owners of Dealer which in MBNA's opinion may adversely affect the conduct of Dealer's business or the interests of MBNA, providing the disagreement continues three (3) months after notice to Dealer by MBNA that the disagreement must be resolved; Any misrepresentation by Dealer or by any Dealer Operator or Owner in applying for this Dealer Agreement, or regarding the source of funds or capitalization of Dealer; Submission by Dealer of false applications or claims for reimbursement, refund or credit, or of false reports of the delivery or transfer of MB Passenger Cars if such applications, claims or reports are fraudulent or part of a pattern of false applications, claims or reports; When MBNA learns that any of the above events or acts have occurred MBNA will endeavor to discuss it with Dealer. Thereafter, MBNA may terminate this Agreement by giving Dealer written notice of such termination, to be effective upon receipt of such notice. . . . . Paragraph 15.E. If MBNA determines that Dealer has failed to provide adequate facilities or to fulfill the sale and service obligations Dealer assumed under this Agreement, MBNA will advise Dealer of such failure and attempt to discuss it with Dealer. Thereafter, MBNA shall notify Dealer in writing by Certified Mail of the nature of the failure, of the acceptable remedy and of the period of time (not less than six months) during which Dealer will be expected to remedy the failure. If the failure has not been substantially remedied at the end of the period, MBNA may terminate this Agreement by giving Dealer three months written notice. Paragraph 16. This Agreement can be extended or renewed only through an express written instrument to that effect and only if such instrument is duly executed on behalf of MBNA by one of the persons referred to in Article Ninth of the Mercedes-Benz Dealer Agreement. Any business relations of any nature whatsoever between MBNA and Dealer after the expiration of this Agreement or after its proper termination pursuant to Paragraph 15 of this Agreement, without such written extension or renewal shall not operate as an extension or renewal of this Agreement. Nevertheless, all such business relations, so long as they are continued, shall be governed by terms identical with the provisions of this Agreement. Concerns About Smith's Performance During the spring of 1985; Ginsburg began to have some serious concerns about the manner in which Smith was managing the dealership. An area of primary concern was that expenses had increased significantly and the financial statements were not showing profits that should have been there. Because of these concerns, Ginsburg and Paul Richards flew to Florida for two days at the end of April of 1985. Paul Richards was an accountant who had been providing accounting services for Ginsburg and who shortly thereafter was hired full-time by Ginsburg. During the two-day visit in April of 1985, Ginsburg and Richards met with Smith, and Richards also met with the office manager. Expenses were extremely high at that time. There appeared to be no control over expenses or cash flow. There were indications that Smith had obligated the dealership for contingent liability under recourse repurchase type obligations. The dealership had not been making money for a couple of months at that time. They discussed these problems with Smith. They tried to establish control over the dollars being spent and tried to set up a purchase order system. They established a budget for the month of May of 1985. On May 13, 1985, Ginsburg and Richards returned to Florida to do a closer review of Dealer's books and records. During the- week of May 13, 1985, they discovered further serious problems with the operations of the dealership. During this week Ginsburg and Richards first discussed the possible removal of Smith as dealer-operator. Later in that same week Ginsburg and Richards met with Smith and discussed with him all of the problems they had discovered. Smith did not deny the problems, but asked for a chance to correct them and to continue as the dealer-operator. Ginsburg wrote a document which had the effect of modifying the "Operating - Financial Agreement," and at the end of the week of May 13, 1985, Ginsburg presented the modifying document to Smith, discussed it with Smith, and told Smith that the only way Smith could remain as the dealer-operator was to sign the modification to their previous agreement. Ginsburg also required that Smith sign a new undated resignation and a new undated stock transfer authorization. The modification document listed all of the problems that were known to Ginsburg and Richards at the time the document was prepared. Neither Ginsburg nor Richards threatened Smith in any way in conjunction with obtaining Smith's signature on the modification document. Specifically, they did not threaten Smith with criminal prosecution. Ginsburg let Smith take the modification document home so that Smith could consider it further or consult with an attorney. At the time Ginsburg presented Smith with the modification document, Ginsburg felt that the financial viability of Dealer was threatened and was concerned that Dealer might go bankrupt. On May 31, 1985, Smith met with Richards and signed the modification of his agreement with Ginsburg in the presence of Richards. At the same time Ginsburg signed an undated resignation document and an undated stock transfer authorization. Smith was not asked to sign any document whereby he specifically agreed to resign as the individual named as the dealer-operator at Paragraph Fourth of the franchise agreement between MBNA and Dealer. He has never signed such a document. Modifications to the Ginsburg/Smith Agreement The modification to the agreement recited, among other things, that Smith had failed to meet the minimum distributable income goals in the original agreement and set new monthly distributable income goals for the period July 1, 1985, through June 30, 1986. Specific provisions of the modified agreement in this regard read as follows: Whereas the parties acknowledge that the goal set forth in Par. 4C(i) of minimum distributable income for the first 12 month period has not been met also the second 12 month period will not be met and Whereas MS wants to remedy the default and JG has agreed based on the following terms and conditions (a) The deficiency for the first 12 month period is $83,338. The deficiency for the second 12 month period shall be determined at the end of the period by Paul Richards. Copies of his computation shall be sent to the parties. MS agrees to prepay JG 75 percent of the total deficiency for these 2 periods. Until such repayment is completed Par 6a shall continue in effect. Par 3 is amended to extend the escrow until such payment is made. The parties hereby agree that in all other respects the agreement shall continue in effect except as set forth above & following. MS has prepared a monthly profit projection for the third 12 month period a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A. Said profit projection shall total $900,000 & shall be agreed to by JG. MS agrees that failure to meet the profit projection for any one month which is not corrected by achieving the next month's profit projection plus the deficiency for the prior month shall constitute a default under this amendment and the original agreement. . . . Paragraph 2(d) of the modification to the prior agreement contained the following additional provisions with respect to the possibility of default: 2.(d) In the event of a default under the original agreement or this amendment by MS, he shall immediately turn over day to day operation of the dealership to JG or his designee cooperate in the orderly transition of all businesses to the new management execute any additional documents required for such transition by any franchisor i.e. GM, GMC, Pontiac, M.B., Alfa Romeo etc. or by any lendor i.e. GMAC, Barnett Bank. In the event of a default provided MS complies with the terms set forth herein, he shall be paid his salary for 90 days after default. The amendment to the agreement further provided in Paragraph 2(g) that Smith would submit a schedule for repayment of monies owned by Smith to the business and in Paragraph 2(h) stated: "MS acknowledges that he has willingly executed assignment and resignation papers which are to be effective upon default." The amendment to the agreement also included an observation that in view of current problems listed further down in the amendment to the agreement, Smith's performance would be evaluated on a continuous basis for the next 120 days. That observation was followed by an itemization of fifteen problems that were described as requiring immediate and continued corrective action. Those fifteen items read as follows: Excess new vehicle inventory Aged new vehicle inventory New vehicle inventory purchased in excess of cost New vehicle inventory purchased without RDR cards Excess inventory of used cars Aged inventory of used cars Used vehicles purchased or traded in at excess of value Purchases made in excess of the cash flow ability to pay Used vehicle purchases made in spite of already existing excess inventory Nonmonitoring of payables, receivables & credit extensions Excess advertising costs and non- monitoring of results Employment of excess personnel Payment of personnel in excess of that required and without consideration of economic return Failure to monitor the fleet rental car lease program & dispose of vehicles on return Failure to achieve income levels as projected The amendment to the agreement concluded with the following language: "Repetition or continuation of these problems, failure to take corrective actions or doing any act that creates further losses shall be considered an immediate default." The Termination of Smith's Involvement With Dealer During the latter part of May and the first three weeks of June of 1985, the dealership continued to experience problems and Ginsburg and Richards discovered new problems. Among the new problems was discovery of the fact that Smith had entered into recourse obligations to facilitate the sale of cars. Those recourse obligations exposed Dealer to contingent liability for which there was no reserve in the dealership books and records. The recourse obligations were not reflected anywhere in the dealership's books and records. It was also discovered that Smith had failed to inform Ginsburg of another serious problem, namely, the fact that GMAC had threatened to terminate the dealership's floorplan. Termination of the floorplan would have put the dealership out of business. By June 21, 1985, Ginsburg determined that it was no longer feasible for Smith to remain in control of Dealer's operations because of the numerous problems summarized above. On that day, Ginsburg met with Smith and told Smith that things were not working out and that Ginsburg was asking Smith to leave. Ginsburg told Smith that Smith was in default under the terms of the modifications to their "Operating - Financial Agreement" and that Ginsburg was exercising his rights under the modified agreement to date Smith's resignation and to transfer Smith's stock. Ginsburg thereafter dated Smith's resignation June 21, 1985. Ginsburg also dated Smith's stock transfer authorization June 21, 1985, and transferred all of Smith's stock to Ginsburg. When Smith left the dealership on June 21, 1985, Ginsburg knew that Smith was disappointed, but thought that they had parted on friendly terms. When Smith left, Ginsburg expected that Smith would cooperate in an orderly transition as provided in paragraph 2.(d) of the modification to their agreement. Ginsburg even allowed Smith to retain possession of two demonstrators (one for Smith and one for Smith's wife) for several months after June 21, 1985. It was not long before Ginsburg was disabused of any notion that he still had a friendly relationship with Smith. Prior to the termination of Smith, Ginsburg had not advised MBNA of any of the problems at the dealership. Following Smith's termination, Ginsburg did not immediately notify MBNA of the termination. By letter dated June 26, 1985, Ginsburg advised MBNA that Smith was on vacation, that Smith had submitted his resignation, and that Dealer intended to accept. Ginsburg did not forward copies of the resignation and stock transfer authorization with the letter. Instead, Ginsburg was trying "to buy time" by not fully informing MBNA of the circumstances. Ginsburg was concerned that had he told MBNA the entire truth, they would have become concerned that there was no dealer- operator on the premises. Ginsburg's letter of June 26, 1985, was received by MBNA on June 27, 1985. By that time MBNA had already heard through the "grapevine" that Smith had been terminated from his position as dealer-operator. On June 27, 1985, the MBNA zone manager also received a phone call from Smith and a telegram from Smith which made him aware that Ginsburg and Smith had a dispute and that Smith was still claiming to be the "dealer of record." The telegram read: THIS IS TO PUT YOU ON NOTICE AND INFORM YOU THAT I AM STILL DEALER OF RECORD IN DAYTONA BEACH FLORIDA AND ANY AND ALL CORRESPONDENCE RECEIVED FROM JEROME Z GINSBURG OR ASSOCIATES IN REGARD TO MIKE SMITH PONTIAC INC WERE NOT EXECUTED LEGALLY AND WERE NOT AGREED UPON BY MYSELF THEREFORE THEY ARE TO BE TOTALLY DISREGARDED By letter dated June 28, 1985, Smith confirmed his earlier notification to MBNA. The letter included the following: This will further confirm my mailogram to you on June 27 regarding the papers filed. I hereby put you on notice of the documents being invalid and any signatures were obtained through duress some time ago and no action should be taken on any request of Mr. Ginsburg in relation to this dealership. He does not have the authority to act in this capacity in regard to the franchise. When the MBNA zone manager received the conflicting communications from Ginsburg and Smith, he felt that MBNA's only option was to invoke the provisions of the franchise agreement which required the principals to resolve their differences within 90 days. By memo to the home office, he recommended invocation of that option because of the dispute as well as because of other matters mentioned in the memo. The Warning Letter To Dealer By letter dated July 1, 1985, MBNA followed the zone manager's recommendation and invoked paragraph l5D(g) of the franchise agreement by advising Dealer that the dispute between Ginsburg and Smith must be resolved within 90 days under pain of possible termination of the franchise agreement. The letter included the following: It has come to our attention that a dispute is underway at your dealership among the owners of the corporation. We have received conflicting correspondence concerning the employment status of Mr. Smith and we are very concerned as to the effects this disagreement will have on the Mercedes-Benz customers in the Daytona Beach market. This internal dispute conceriing ownership interest in your corporation is compounded by the recent events which have transpired concerning your lack of or unwillingness to conform to your Dealer Operating Requirement Agreement as well as misleading DDR reporting practices in conjunction with your leasing operation in St. Petersburg, Florida. These various incidents along with the current serious disagreement among corporate officers is unacceptable. At the time of sending the July 1, 1985, letter, MBNA did not know, as between Ginsburg and Smith, which was telling the truth. MBNA also felt that it had no way of determining which of the two was telling the truth. Further, MBNA felt that it had no obligation, contractual or otherwise, to referee a dispute between Ginsburg and Smith. Further Events Following Smith's Termination Shortly after Smith's termination, Ginsburg sought to remedy the management vacuum resulting from Smith's departure by locating a replacement dealer-operator. To that end, in Ginsburg's letter of June 26, 1985, he asked MBNA to assist him in trying to find a new dealer-operator. MBNA did not provide any assistance in this regard. With the many financial problems facing the dealership and with MBNA threatening termination, it is difficult to find a competent dealer-operator who wants to leave a reasonable job and move into that uncertain situation. As an interim measure, in July of 1985 Ginsburg arranged for a Mr. Lawrence Rigby, the dealer-operator of another dealership owned by Ginsburg, to temporarily fill the role of dealer-operator or general manager. Rigby is an experienced automobile dealer-operator. Since approximately July of 1985, Rigby has been spending roughly 70 to 75 per cent of his time managing Dealer. Rigby's name has never been submitted to MBNA for approval as a dealer-operator to replace Smith. Since his telegram of June 27, 1985, and his letter of June 28, 1985, Smith has continued to contend that he still has an ownership interest in Dealer and that he still has the right to manage the day-to-day operations of Dealer. In this regard, Smith claims that he continues to be the dealer-operator of Dealer because he is so designated in the franchise agreement. Smith, through his attorneys, has put MBNA on notice of his contentions in this regard and has threatened to join MBNA in a lawsuit if MBNA takes any action inconsistent with Smith's contentions without first obtaining Smith's consent. Smith continues to contend that he has not agreed to sell or transfer his stock in Dealer to Ginsburg or anyone else. Smith continues to contend that he has not agreed to, and that he in fact objects to, the assignment or transfer of Dealer's Mercedes-Benz franchise to anybody. Specifically, Smith contends that he has not authorized the sale of Dealer or the transfer of Dealer's franchise to Mr. Cutler. All of Smith's contentions in this regard were communicated to MBNA. In September of 1985, Smith filed suit in circuit court against Ginsburg, Dealer, and Advantage Leasing to enforce the claims described in the preceding paragraph. After the suit was filed, an injunction was entered which allowed Smith to return to the dealership for a few days. Smith's return was disruptive to Dealer's activities, but the injunction was soon stayed by an appellate court. The appellate court ultimately determined that whatever rights Smith might have against the defendants in his lawsuit, those rights did not include the right to manage Dealer or be employed by Dealer. As of the date of the formal hearing in this case, no final decision had been rendered in the circuit court litigation between Ginsburg and Smith, and the disputes between Smith and Ginsburg had not been resolved. MBNA did not undertake any investigation or inquiry into the facts and circumstances surrounding Smith's departure from the dealership. MBNA did not try to find out if Smith had actually resigned (as Ginsburg claimed) or if he had been involuntarily ejected (as Smith claimed). MBNA did not try to find out if there was any good reason for removing Smith, if in fact he had been removed involuntarily. Instead, without any investigation into what the actual facts might be, and with full awareness that under any version of the facts Ginsburg owned at least 75 percent of Dealer's stock, MBNA took the position that Smith continued to be an owner of 25 percent of the stock of Dealer and continued to be the general manager until such time as MBNA approved a change in the ownership and/or management of Dealer. MBNA persisted in this position even after it was clear to MBNA that Smith was no longer performing any management functions at Dealer after June 21, 1985. MBNA's position was based on language in the franchise agreement to the effect that there will be no changes in the ownership or management of Dealer without prior approval of MBNA. Because of the foregoing position, MBNA has also taken the position that it will not approve any changes in the management or ownership of Dealer, absent the consent of Smith. By letter dated August 28, 1985, Ginsburg asked MBNA to accept him as Dealer's dealer-operator. With that letter he provided copies to MBNA of Smith's resignation and cancelled stock certificate, together with corporate minutes. The letter of August 28, 1985, stated, inter alia, that Ginsburg had become a Florida resident and intended to become the dealer-operator of Dealer. This statement was not true because Ginsburg was not and never became a Florida resident. Moreover, Ginsburg is the chief executive officer and a substantial investor in several other businesses which have offices in New York, Ohio, South Carolina, and Texas. It is most unlikely that Ginsburg would ever devote full- time attention to the management of Dealer to the exclusion of his several other business ventures. Ginsburg's letter of August 28, 1985, did not provide MBNA with any information regarding his experience in the automotive field. Ginsburg has never been the day-to-day operator of an automobile dealership. Upon consideration of Ginsburg's letter of August 28, 1985, MBNA was of the opinion that Ginsburg had neither the experience nor the time to manage the day-to-day operations of Dealer. Accordingly, MBNA responded to Ginsburg's letter of application with a summary denial in a letter dated September 10, 1985. This summary rejection was repeated in the termination letter of October 23, 1985. MBNA has no written criteria to determine whether a candidate for dealer-operator is satisfactory. Individual discretion is exercised with judgmental factors in lieu of written criteria. Ginsburg has continued to look for a permanent replacement for Smith, but has been unable to find anyone acceptable to himself. Other than Ginsburg's proposal of himself as dealer-operator, no dealer-operator candidate has been submitted to MBNA for approval since the departure of Smith. Since June of 1985, MBNA has continued to provide cars to Dealer and to treat Dealer in an ordinary fashion despite the departure of Smith. The Termination Letter By letter dated October 23, 1985, MBNA advised Dealer that it intended to terminate Dealer's Mercedes-Benz Passenger Car Dealer Agreement on January 31, 1986, a date more than 90 days from the date of the letter. The letter of October 23, 1985, also stated: The Mercedes-Benz Dealer Agreement expires on December 31, 1985. In order to provide sufficient notice to effect the termination of the Agreement, we will extend the Dealer Agreement until January 31, 1986. This notice and extension is pursuant to the provisions of Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the Mercedes-Benz Passenger Car Dealer Agreement. The termination letter of October 23, 1985, stated that there had been "numerous deficiencies" and "material breaches" of the Mercedes-Benz Passenger Car Dealer Agreement dated January 1, 1984. The specified deficiencies and breaches were described as follows in the termination letter: Your corporation has reported on past occasions what appears to be inaccurate sales reports, referred to as DDR cards. This was done apparently for the purpose of gaining an unfair advantage by abusing the allocation system by which Mercedes-Benz vehicles are distributed in the United States. Improper reporting on sales documents impairs our ability to have the proper customer information available for the administration of the warranty and, in the event of a recall, does not enable us to forward proper documentation to the ultimate user of the vehicle. Under section IV, titled Service Department, of the Dealer Operating Requirement Agreement, (DORA), executed as part of the Dealer Agreement, your corporation agreed and committed: "in 1984/85, after purchase of real property, (to) provide Mercedes-Benz identified reception area and customer lounge". This commitment has not been met. In addition, your corporation has attempted to make a change in management by the attempted dismissal of the Dealer Operator, Mr. Michael D. Smith as General Manager. This is in direct viola- tion of Paragraph FOURTH of the Mercedes-Benz Dealer Agreement which states "...neither dealer nor the persons named above shall permit any change in the ownership or management of dealer without the prior written approval of Mercedes- Benz of North America..." This has resulted in a situation where the dealership has been functioning without any approved management. As we stated previously in our letter of September 10, 1985, we are not willing to approve Mr. Jerome Z. Ginsburg as a dealer operator as he appears to be a New York based attorney and is not experienced in the management of a dealership. Mr. Ginsburg was never approved as a Dealer Operator and his name is listed under Paragraph FOURTH of the Mercedes-Benz Dealer Agreement solely as a dealer owner who participates in the ownership of the dealer. This non-approved change in management has resulted in a management dispute. We advised you in our corporate communication of July 1, 1985 that we were invoking the provisions of Paragraph 15D(g) of the Mercedes-Benz Passenger Car Dealer Agreement thereby giving you 90 days to resolve this internal management dispute. This dispute is anything but resolved as demonstrated by the Transcript of Proceedings of Mike D. Smith, Plaintiff vs. Mike Smith Pontiac, GMC, Inc., a Florida Corporation; Advantage Leasing and Rental Corporation, a Florida Corporation; and Jerome Z. Ginsburg, Defendants in the Circuit Court Seventh Judicial Circuit of Florida in and for Volusia County, Case : 85-3034- CA-01, Division F, as well by Mr. Smith's recent appearance at the dealership and the attempted arrest of him by other parties at the dealership. It has also come to our attention that in review of the aforementioned Transcript that Mr. Ginsburg and Mr. Smith misrepre- sented the ownership interest each was required to have as a condition precedent to the execution of the Dealer Agreement. In addition to the foregoing material breach alluded to in Paragraph 3 of this letter, this misrepresentation as to the owner- ship of the corporation also constitutes a material breach of the Dealer Agreement, thus justi- fying the termination of that Agreement and relationship between us. We believe that we have given your corporation sufficient time to remedy the many problems which have occurred at your dealership. As Mr. Korman, our Dealer Organization Manager, indicated to one of your attorneys, Mr. Crocker, our previous corporate communications were designed to indicate to you the seriousness of the situation at your dealership and the need to take the appropriate timely actions to remedy them. You have not done so. Inaccurate Sales Reports (DDR cards) All of MBNA's dealers are required to fill out a DDR card, or sales report, for each Mercedes-Benz car sold. It is not infrequent that DDR cards have mistakes on them. Accurate reporting of sales by way of DDR cards is very important to MBNA. The purpose of having cards completed accurately is threefold: (1) to determine the starting date of the retail customer's vehicle warranty, (2) to advise MBNA of the address and name of the purchaser or lessee in the event of a vehicle recall, and (3) to determine the dealer's future allocation of vehicles. With regard to the last of these three purposes, Mercedes-Benz vehicles are in great demand and they are usually easily sold by Mercedes-Benz dealers. Generally, demand exceeds supply and dealers want more cars than are allocated to them. Each dealer's allocation is derived by way of a mathematical formula based on his actual sales as a percentage of the zone's sales. No inaccurate sales reports by Dealer (referred to as "DDR cards") have been discovered by MBNA to have existed prior to January of 1985. Because of the importance of the DDR policy, Dealer was provided with a copy of that policy at the inception of the relationship, and was provided additional copies thereafter. Representatives of MBNA also explained the DDR policy to Dealer on several occasions. The explanations were not always the same. The totality of the DDR card problem at Dealer up to the time of the termination letter consists of one incident in February of 1985 involving six cars that were sold to Advantage Leasing, a leasing company owned by Smith and Ginsburg. The Dealer reported (via DDR cards) a sale of six Mercedes-Benz cars to the leasing company before the cars were removed from Dealer's premises. Those DDR cards did not contain the names of the ultimate lessees. When representatives of MBNA communicated with Dealer about the February 1985 incident and provided Dealer with a copy of the DDR policy, Dealer indicated that it would comply with the policy. Dealer's explanation for part of the February 1985 DDR problem was that the removal of the cars was unexpectedly delayed by a truck breakdown. Ultimately MBNA's representative McDonough was satisfied with Dealer's response to MBNA's communications regarding the February 1985 DDR card incident. MBNA suffered no prejudice as a result of the DDR card problem in February 1985 and Dealer did not receive any advantage in the MBNA allocation system as a result of that problem. Specifically, Dealer did not receive any accelerated DDR credit due to reporting the cars sold at an early date. The DDR policy appears to be ambiguous in some respects and is certainly complex. MBNA has not previously terminated a dealer for making mistakes on DDR cards. The first stated ground for termination in MBNA's October 23, 1985, termination letter in essence accuses Dealer of intentionally submitting inaccurate DDR cards for an improper purpose. However, MBNA did not conduct any investigation into Dealer's motives in this regard and there is no evidence in this case that Dealer had any improper motive or purpose when it submitted inaccurate DDR cards in February of 1985. The Reception Area And Customer Lounge The Dealer Operating Requirements Agreement, or DORA, is a part of the franchise agreement. The purpose of the DORA is to apply MBNA expertise to individual local circumstances. The DORA is drafted by MBNA according to what MBNA thinks is necessary in order for the dealership to operate efficiently and effectively. When Dealer applied for the franchise in 1983, MBNA filled in the application form for Dealer and included non- negotiated provisions related to a customer lounge and a reception area. The provisions in the MBNA application then were put into the initial franchise agreement of MBNA and Dealer. On November 1, 1983, Mr. McDonough became Jacksonville zone manager for MBNA with authority over Dealer, and he determined at that time there were unfulfilled "service requirements" for Dealer. In 1983, Dealer provided a separate customer reception area for Mercedes customers and renovated an existing customer lounge. Dealer's DORA commitment in the existing franchise agreement regarding the reception area and lounge has as a condition precedent ". . . after purchase of real property. . . ." The real property referred to is the property on which the dealership is located. At the time of purchasing the dealership, Mr. Ginsburg also received an option to purchase the dealership premises. The earliest date on which the option could be exercised was one year after the purchase of the dealership. Mr. Ginsburg exercised the option to purchase the property, but the sale has never taken place because Ginsburg and the property owner became embroiled in a dispute about the appraised value of the property, which value determines the purchase price. That dispute resulted in litigation which is still pending. Accordingly, there having been no purchase of the real property, the condition precedent has not occurred. Further, as of the date of the termination letter, the time limit for these commitments ("1984/85") had not expired. Paragraph l5E of the Standard Provisions in the franchise agreement requires that MBNA give a dealer certain notice prior to initiating a termination based on inadequate facilities. No such notice was given by MBNA to Dealer regarding the reception area and customer lounge. MBNA does not terminate a dealer every time a DORA commitment is not met but rather exercises judgment. Where termination involves a DORA provision, then the dealership agreement procedure is followed. The zone manager, Mr. McDonough, was not aware of any complaints regarding Dealer's customer lounge. MBNA did not perform its own study as to whether or how long customers waited at Dealer. However, a scientific study was commissioned by MBNA. That study contains no indication of dissatisfaction with Dealer's service facilities. Instead, it shows that persons purchasing cars from Dealer returned for service or went elsewhere because of the distance to Dealer. Ginsburg was not made aware that the customer lounge represented any major problem with respect to MBNA. Nothwithstanding the assertions in the second stated ground for termination, Dealer's failure to comply with the DORA provisions regarding the reception area and customer lounge was not one of the reasons for the proposed termination. MBNA's real concern in this regard was much broader; it was MBNA's perception that throughout the entire period of the relationship between the parties, Dealer had failed to act in a manner consistent with the "M-B Service Concept." This broader concern was not stated in the termination letter. Throughout the greater part of the relationship between the parties from its inception until the termination letter of October 23, 1985, there seems to have been a continuing concern on the part of MBNA with respect to Dealer's failure to perform in a manner consistent with the "M-B Service Concept. Although the record in this case suggests that the "M-B Service Concept" may be set forth in some document, that document does not appear among the many exhibits offered in this case and the most that can be said about what constitutes the "M-B Service Concept" is that there appears to be some sort of article of faith amongst the functionaries of MBNA to the effect that because Mercedes-Benz cars are such expensive and high quality cars, the entire ownership experience should be a high quality experience, i.e., that Mercedes- Benz car owners are entitled to more than the owners of lesser cars. Aspects of this article of faith include concerns about such matters as the size and quality of the facilities, the staffing of the facilities, and the attitude of those operating the facilities. MBNA seems to have been disappointed with anything less than what might be described as a "gung-ho" commitment to the "M-B Service Concept" and appears to have expected Dealer to take an enthusiastic attitude toward making all sorts of changes in its facilities and operations even at times when MBNA seemed to be having difficulty providing Dealer with enough Mercedes-Benz automobiles to sell. Numerous Dealer Contact Reports show that the Dealer had an inadequate inventory of Mercedes-Benz cars even though Dealer seems to have rather constantly sought to receive more cars than MBNA was able or willing to provide. The location from which Dealer was doing business seems to have been ill suited to the operation of a Mercedes-Benz dealership in conjunction with other lines of cars, because not only was MBNA dissatisfied with Dealer's efforts at implementing the "M-B Service Concept" at that location, but MBNA had been similarly dissatisfied with several previous Mercedes-Benz dealers who had attempted to do business at that same location. MBNA's frustration with Dealer's failure to live up to their ill- defined "M-B Service Concept" should not have come as any real surprise, because MBNA seems to have been similarly frustrated in its efforts to have two or three previous dealers implement the "M-B Service Concept" at that same location.
Recommendation On the Basis of all of the foregoing, it is hereby recommended that the Department of Highway Safety And Motor Vehicles enter a final order to the following effect: Concluding that termination of the Dealer's agreement for the grounds alleged in Subparagraph 1 of the termination letter would be unfair; Concluding that termination of the Dealer's agreement for the grounds alleged in Subparagraph 2 of the termination letter would be both unfair and prohibited; Concluding that termination of the Dealer's agreement for the grounds alleged in Subparagraph 3 of the termination letter would be prohibited; Concluding that termination of the Dealer's agreement for the grounds alleged in Subparagraph 4 of the termination letter would be fair; Concluding that termination of the Dealer's agreement for the grounds alleged in Subparagraph 5 of the termination letter would be both unfair and prohibited; and Concluding that the relief request in the Dealer's verified complaint should be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of May, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of May, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-0271 The following are my specific rulings on each of the proposed findings of fact submitted by each parties. Findings proposed by Petitioner/Dealer (The numbers which follow correspond to the paragraph numbers of the proposed findings of fact contained in the proposed recommended order filed by the Petitioner/Dealer.) Accepted in substance. Accepted in substance. First, second, and third sentences are rejected as irrelevant. Fourth sentence is accepted. Fifth sentence is rejected as irrelevant. Sixth and seventh sentences are rejected as argument. Accepted in substance. Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Also portions rejected as not fully supported by the evidence and as constituting editorial excesses. Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details and as a summary of testimony rather than proposed findings. Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Also, some details not fully supported by the evidence. Rejected as subordinate, unnecessary details. Rejected as irrelevant, subordinate, or unnecessary details. (Findings have been made as to the provisions of the termination letter.) Accepted. Rejected because this entire paragraph consists of a summary of or quotation of testimony and does not propose a fact based on any testimony. Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial. First sentence is accepted. Second and third sentences are rejected as constituting argument rather than a proposed finding. (The merits of the argument are addressed in the conclusions of law portion of this recommended order.) Accepted in substance. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted in substance. Rejected as irrelevant or subordinate details. Accepted in substance. Rejected because this entire paragraph consists of a summary of testimony and does not propose a fact based on any testimony. Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Substance of last sentence accepted. The remainder of this paragraph is rejected as constituting unnecessary details. Last sentence rejected as unnecessary. The remainder of this paragraph is accepted. Substance of the fourth sentence is accepted. The remainder of this paragraph is rejected as constituting unnecessary details. Accepted. Accepted in substance. Rejected as argument. The merits of the argument are addressed elsewhere. Rejected as argument and as unnecessary details. Rejected, primarily because much of it is irrelevant. Also rejected because much of it constitutes argument about credibility rather than proposed findings. Rejected because it is all legal argument. Such arguments belong in a separate brief or in the conclusions of law portion of a proposed recommended order--not in the middle of the proposed findings of fact. Accepted. First two sentences are accepted. The last sentence is rejected: the first clause because it consists of unnecessary detail and the second clause because it is a legal conclusion. First two sentences are accepted. Last sentence is rejected as irrelevant. The essence of this paragraph is accepted with the deletion of the quotations of testimony and other unnecessary details. Rejected as a totally unnecessary quotation of testimony which contains not a single proposed finding of fact and ends in an unnecessary snippy remark. Rejected as irrelevant or subordinate details. Rejected as irrelevant or subordinate details. Rejected as irrelevant or subordinate details. Rejected as irrelevant or subordinate details. Rejected as irrelevant or subordinate details. The first sentence is rejected as argument. The quotation from the contract is accepted. The first sentence following the quotation is rejected as irrelevant. The last sentence is rejected as constituting a legal conclusion. Rejected as irrelevant or subordinate details. Rejected as irrelevant or subordinate details. Accepted in substance. Rejected as irrelevant, subordinate, and unnecessary. Rejected as irrelevant, subordinate, and unnecessary. Rejected as irrelevant, subordinate, and unnecessary. Accepted. Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Accepted in substance. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted in substance. Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Rejected as irrelevant and subordinate details. Also rejected because portions are not consistent with the greater weight of the evidence. Finally, portions rejected as constituting argument. Rejected as constituting legal argument. The merits of the argument are addressed elsewhere in this recommended order. Rejected as constituting legal argument. Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted in substance with unnecessary details and quotations omitted. Second sentence accepted in substance. The remainder of this paragraph is rejected as irrelevant. All of this paragraph is rejected as irrelevant details with the exception of the portion to the effect that MBNA was not told about the problem. Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Accepted in substance. Accepted in substance. Accepted in substance with many irrelevant details omitted and some further findings for clarification. Rejected as constituting irrelevant details. Accepted in substance with many irrelevant details omitted. Also omitted are certain editorial excesses. Accepted in substance with certain editorial excesses omitted. Accepted in substance with a lower percentage figure more consistent with the evidence. First three sentences accepted in substance. Fourth and fifth sentences rejected as subordinate, unnecessary and cumulative details. Sixth and seventh sentences rejected as constituting argument or legal conclusions. Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details, not all of which are warranted by the evidence. The substance of the first sentence and the substance of the quoted language in the last three lines are accepted. The remainder is rejected as irrelevant or subordinate details. Rejected as subordinate, unnecessary details, not all of which are warranted by the evidence. Accepted in substance. Accepted in substance. First sentence is accepted. Second sentence is rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant or subordinate details, not all of which are supported by the evidence. Rejected as irrelevant or subordinate details, not all of which are supported by the evidence. Accepted. All but last sentence accepted. Last sentence rejected as argument. Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details, as well as argument. First sentence accepted. Last two sentences rejected as cumulative or as irrelevant and subordinate details. Rejected for the most part because it consists of subordinate and unnecessary details. Also rejected because portions are not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence or are contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Rejected as constituting primarily argument rather than proposed findings of fact. Accepted. Rejected because it is primarily argument rather than proposed findings. Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Rejected as argument. Rejected as argument. Rejected as argument. Rejected as argument. Rejected as argument. Rejected as argument. Accepted. Rejected as argument rather than proposed findings. Rejected as subordinate details, some of which are not supported by the persuasive evidence. Rejected as constituting a mixture of subordinate details and argument. Accepted in substance. Rejected as constituting a mixture of subordinate details and argument. First three sentences accepted in substance. Penultimate sentence rejected as argument. Last sentence rejected as argument and as containing inferences not warranted by the evidence. Rejected as constituting primarily argument. Rejected as argument rather than proposed findings. Rejected as argument rather than proposed findings. Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary detail. Accepted. First and third sentences rejected as unnecessary commentary about the record. Second sentence rejected as erroneous argument. Fourth sentence rejected as cumulative. Quoted material rejected as cumulative. Last two sentences rejected as cumulative. Rejected as argument. Rejected as argument. The relevant terms of the agreement between Smith and Ginsburg are included in the findings. The remainder of this paragraph is rejected as subordinate details and argument. First sentence accepted. Second and third sentences rejected as cumulative. Fourth sentence rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Fifth sentence rejected as cumulative. Sixth sentence rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Seventh sentence accepted. First sentence is rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Second and third sentences are accepted in substance. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as irrelevant and subordinate details. First sentence rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Second sentence rejected as conclusion of law. First part of third sentence accepted; last part rejected as argument. Findings proposed by Respondent/MBNA (The numbers which follow correspond to the paragraph numbers of the proposed findings of fact contained in the proposed recommended order filed by the Respondent/MBNA.) Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected in part as misleading, because the franchise agreement was entered into by two corporations. Rejected in part for reasons stated immediately above. Accepted. Covered in introductory material. Accepted. Rejected as imprecise statement of reasons. Exact stated reasons are included in findings of fact. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted in substance. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted in substance. Accepted in substance. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Accepted in substance with some subordinate and unnecessary details omitted. First two lines and quoted contract language accepted. The remainder of this paragraph is rejected as irrelevant or subordinate and unnecessary details. Accepted in substance. Accepted in part to the extent of including the text of the written policy. Remainder rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Rejected as irrelevant. Accepted in substance. Accepted. Rejected as subordinate or unnecessary details. Rejected as constituting irrelevant or subordinate details, some of which are not fully consistent with the greater weight of the evidence. First sentence rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Remainder of the paragraph rejected as irrelevant. Accepted in substance. Accepted in substance. Rejected as irrelevant. Accepted in substance with numerous irrelevant details omitted. Accepted in substance. Rejected as a mixture of irrelevant or subordinate details and argument. Accepted in substance. Accepted. First sentence accepted in substance. The remainder of this paragraph is rejected as constituting irrelevant or subordinate and unnecessary details. First sentence accepted in substance. The remainder of this paragraph is rejected as constituting irrelevant or subordinate and unnecessary details. Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Rejected as irrelevant or as subordinate and unnecessary details. Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Accepted in substance. Accepted. Rejected primarily because of consisting of irrelevant or subordinate details. Also rejected because several details, including final sentence, are not supported by persuasive evidence. Rejected as irrelevant to this proceeding. Rejected as a summary of testimony and not a proposed finding and, in any event, as subordinate and unnecessary details. First two sentences accepted in substance. Last sentence rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Accepted in substance. Rejected as irrelevant or subordinate and unnecessary details. First two sentences are rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Last two sentences are accepted in substance. First sentence rejected as not fully supported by competent substantial evidence. Second sentence rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Third sentence rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Fourth and fifth sentences rejected as irrelevant. Sixth sentence rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Accepted in substance. All but last sentence accepted in substance. Last sentence rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. First sentence rejected as constituting an over- simplification. Other findings have been made regarding this matter. Second sentence is rejected as unnecessary details. The last sentence is accepted in substance. Accepted in substance. Accepted in substance. Rejected as irrelevant or subordinate and unnecessary details. Rejected as irrelevant or subordinate and unnecessary details. Rejected as irrelevant or subordinate and unnecessary details. Accepted in substance. First three sentences accepted in substance. Last two sentences rejected as irrelevant. Accepted in substance with some adverbs and adjectives omitted in the interest of accuracy. All but last sentence accepted in substance with some unnecessary details omitted. Last sentence rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Rejected as irrelevant in view of other evidence regarding MBNA's position with regard to a successor dealer/operator. Accepted in substance. Rejected as irrelevant or subordinate and unnecessary details. Accepted. First two sentences accepted in substance. Remainder of this paragraph rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Accepted in substance. Rejected as constituting argument rather than proposed findings of fact. Rejected as constituting argument rather than proposed findings of fact. Rejected because of having argument inextricably intertwined with any proposed findings in this paragraph. Rejected as argument about other party's position and not proposed finding of fact. First sentence is rejected as ambiguous and as subordinate and unnecessary. Second sentence is rejected as ambiguous and as constituting argument. Third sentence rejected as irrelevant. Fourth sentence rejected as ambiguous and as not fully consistent with the evidence. Fifth sentence rejected in part as irrelevant and in part as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Rejected as argument rather than proposed findings. First sentence accepted in substance. Second sentence rejected as not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. Rejected as argument rather than proposed findings. First three sentences rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Fourth sentence rejected as ambiguous rhetorical excess; too broad to be meaningful and not fully supported by the evidence. Fifth sentence rejected as irrelevant or subordinate details. Sixth and seventh sentences rejected as not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. Rejected as primarily constituting argument or legal conclusions; what few facts are included are repetitious and cumulative. Rejected as primarily constituting argument or legal conclusions; what few facts are included are repetitious and cumulative. Accepted in substance. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence; there were inaccurate cards, but not "false" cards. The first three sentences are rejected in part as an argumentative over-simplification that omits the crux of the matter, and as also constituting subordinate details which are irrelevant in light of other evidence. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as constituting subordinate and unnecessary details, some of which are not fully supported by the evidence. The first sentence is rejected as exaggeration not supported by the evidence. Also largely irrelevant in light of other evidence. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as constituting argument or legal conclusions. Rejected as not supported by persuasive evidence and as, in any event, being such a broad, vague, statement as to be virtually meaningless. First three sentences rejected as irrelevant argument; the statements of counsel are not evidence. The remainder of this paragraph is rejected as irrelevant. Rejected because it consists mostly of argument. To the extent it incorporated proposed facts, most of them are irrelevant, subordinate, or unnecessary. What few relevant facts are proposed have been included elsewhere. Rejected as argument instead of proposed findings. All but last sentence rejected as primarily constituting argument. Last sentence accepted in substance. Rejected. This is primarily a description of the issues the Dealer seeks to litigate and argument about legal issues. What few facts are proposed here have been found elsewhere to the extent relevant. Accepted in substance. Rejected as argument or conclusions of law rather than proposed findings of fact. Rejected as an argumentative 0ver-simplification which is in part irrelevant and in part not supported by persuasive evidence. Rejected as argument or conclusions of law rather than proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Henry L. Kaye, Esquire STIERER, AMENDOLA, KAPLAN, HYMAN & KAYE 1401 Harvey Building 224 Datura Street West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 John Radey, Esquire AURELL, FONS, RADEY & HINKLE Post Office Drawer 11307 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William J. Dunaj, Esquire Teresa Ragatz, Esquire MERSHON, SAWYER, JOHNSTON, DUNWODY & COLE Southeast Financial Center Suite 4500 200 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131 Leonard R. Mellon, Executive Director Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioners' notice of intent to establish a supplemental motor vehicle dealership was effective to commence the statutory protest period, which must be completed as a necessary condition of licensure.
Findings Of Fact By letter dated September 13, 2002, Petitioner BMW of North America, LLC ("BMW NA") notified Respondent Department Of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (the "Department") that Petitioner Pompano Imports, Inc., d/b/a Vista Motors ("Vista"), intended to relocate its dealership, where BMW cars and light trucks were being sold and serviced, from 700 North Federal Highway in Pompano Beach ("Source Site") to 4401 West Sample Road in Coconut Creek ("Target Site").1 BMW NA and Vista took the position that, pursuant to Section 320.642(5), Florida Statutes,2 the proposed reopening of the "relocatee-dealership"3 at the Target Site should not be considered subject to competing dealers' administrative protests. Pursuant to Section 320.642(1)(d), Florida Statutes, the Department caused BMW NA's September 13, 2002, notice of relocation to be published in the September 27, 2002, edition of the Florida Administrative Weekly. On September 27, 2002, also in accordance with Section 320.642(1)(d), the Department mailed copies of BMW NA's September 13, 2002, notice of relocation to all existing BMW passenger car dealers and BMW light truck dealers in Collier, Palm Beach, Miami-Dade, and Broward Counties. Within two weeks, however, the Department mailed letters to these same dealers explaining that the proposed reopening of Vista's relocatee- dealership at the Target Site would not be a "protestable" event after all. A little more than seven months later, by letter dated May 5, 2003, BMW NA notified the Department that Vista planned to establish an additional or "supplemental" dealership for selling and servicing BMW cars and light trucks at 744 North Federal Highway in Pompano Beach (the "Supplemental Site"), a parcel which is contiguous to the Source Site where the relocatee-dealership then remained open for business, the previously announced relocation having not yet taken place. As required by statute, the Department not only caused a notice to be published in the May 16, 2003, edition of the Florida Administrative Weekly regarding this putative supplemental dealership, but also it mailed copies of BMW NA's May 5, 2003, notice to all existing BMW passenger car dealers and BMW light truck dealers in Collier, Palm Beach, Miami-Dade, and Broward Counties. No dealer timely protested Vista's intended opening of a supplemental dealership at the Supplemental Site. Generally speaking, after the Department has received notice from a licensee or applicant regarding the latter's intent either to establish an additional dealership or to relocate an existing dealership, and after such notice has been duly published in accordance with Section 320.642, Florida Statutes, the Department routinely enters a final order authorizing the issuance of a license for the proposed additional or relocated dealership upon the applicant's satisfaction of all other requirements for licensure, unless a timely protest is filed, in which case final agency action must be taken pursuant to Chapter 120.4 In this case, however, by letter dated July 10, 2003, the Department informed BMW NA and Vista of its decision that because the putative relocatee- dealership was still doing business at the Source Site, and because the Supplemental Site was immediately adjacent to the Source Site, the proposed supplemental dealership would be deemed an "expansion" of the putative relocatee-dealership, as opposed to an "additional" dealership. Based on this determination, the Department concluded in its July 10, 2003, correspondence that: (1) a license would not be issued for the expansion of Vista's dealership into the Supplemental Site; (2) the opening of the dealership that Vista proposed to establish at the Target Site, which would come into being as the putative relocatee-dealership expanded, could not be considered exempt from protest, for no "relocation" would be occurring; and (3) notice and an opportunity to protest would need to be provided with respect to the Target Site before a license for an additional dealership at that location could be issued. BMW NA and Vista each requested a hearing to challenge the Department's findings and conclusions, initiating, respectively, DOAH Case Nos. 03-2969 and 03-2970. These cases were subsequently consolidated. On September 30, 2003, before the final hearing in the consolidated proceeding, the Department, BMW NA, and Vista entered into a settlement agreement. Upon being advised of the settlement, the presiding administrative law judge (not the undersigned) closed DOAH's files in Case Nos. 03-2969 and 03-2970 and relinquished jurisdiction to the Department. Pursuant to the referenced settlement agreement, the Department, on October 7, 2003, approved Vista's application to relocate its BMW passenger car and BMW light truck dealership from the Source Site to the Target Site, as had been proposed in the September 13, 2002, notice of relocation. Vista's motor vehicle dealer license was, accordingly, modified to permit Vista to conduct dealership activities with regard to BMW passenger cars and BMW light trucks at the Target Site. This modification effectively "de-licensed" Vista as a BMW dealer at the Source Site. On October 7, 2003, Vista stopped selling and servicing BMW passenger cars and BMW light trucks at the Source Site. (Vista continued to operate a preexisting, separately licensed Volkswagen dealership at the Source Site.) On October 8, 2003, Vista started selling and servicing BMW passenger cars and BMW light trucks at the Target Site. (Vista continued to operate a preexisting, separately licensed MINI dealership at the Target Site.) Also pursuant to the settlement agreement referenced above, the Department notified BMW NA and Vista, by letter dated October 15, 2003, of the following relevant findings:5 Pursuant to Rule 15C-7.004(3)(d)2, Florida Administrative Code, the Department views [Vista's] proposed additional motor vehicle BMW dealership . . . at [the Supplemental Site] as an expansion of Vista Motors' existing licensed BMW dealership at [the Source Site.] Therefore, the [proposed project at the Supplemental Site] . . . , [being] in fact merely an expansion of Vista Motors' existing location [i.e. the Source Site], [is] not [an additional BMW dealership] subject to Section 320.642, Florida Statutes. [T]hus BMW is essentially intending to remain open at its existing . . . location [meaning, apparently, the Source Site] at the same time it is relocating to [the Target Site]. Based on the foregoing findings, the Department concluded as follows:6 [The exemption from protest afforded under Section 320.642(5), Florida Statutes, cannot apply where the putative relocatee- dealership of] Vista Motors . . . remain[s] open at the [Source Site] as a franchise BMW dealer . . . [while] at the same time [Vista] move[s] [the putative relocatee- dealership] to the [Target Site]. Therefore, Vista may not be issued a license as a franchise BMW dealer at the [Supplemental Site], until it relocates to [the Target Site] and thereafter publishes a new notification of an additional dealership for the [Supplemental Site], and those proceedings, if any, are concluded in favor of the additional dealership. (Emphasis added.) At first blush, the October 15, 2003, notice seems curiously oblivious to the fact that the Department had already approved Vista's relocation to the Target Site and modified Vista's license accordingly. Indeed, there appears to be some tension between the "facts" found in the notice and the actual facts on the ground. For example, while the notice refers to Vista's existing licensed BMW dealership at the Source Site, the undisputed fact is that Vista was not licensed to operate a BMW dealership at the Source Site as of October 7, 2003. Thus, if the Department believed, as a literal reading of the notice suggests, that Vista's intent on October 15, 2003, was to expand an existing BMW dealership at the Source Site, then it would be reasonable to wonder why the Department did not conclude that Vista was operating at the Source Site without a license. Conclusion 1 seems likewise to be at odds with what had transpired in fact. On the one hand, the Department concludes that Vista has remained open at the Source Site, which it cannot do and also claim, as it had done, the Section 320.642(5) exemption. Yet, on the other hand, the Department had, in fact, previously authorized Vista to operate a BMW dealership at the Target Site under the auspices of the very exemption that the October 15, 2003, notice concludes cannot apply because Vista is still open (according to the "findings") at the Source Site. To properly understand the October 15, 2003, notice, it is necessary to focus on the word "thereafter" in Conclusion 2(b). Clearly, the timing of the "new notification" is critical. The Department is saying that, where a dealer has previously given notice of its intent to relocate an existing dealership, taking advantage of Section 320.642(5) to exempt the reopening of such relocatee-dealership at the target site, if the dealer now wants to establish a "supplemental" dealership at the source site7 (hereafter, such a dealership will be called a "backfill dealership"8) then the relocatee-dealership must truly be relocated before effective notice of the proposed backfill dealership may be published. Under this policy,9 hereafter called the "Exempt Relocation/Backfill Policy," it is appropriate for the Department, in determining retrospectively10 whether the notice of the proposed "supplemental" dealership was effective, to look at the facts as of the date of the notice. In this case, the subject notice was given to the Department on May 5, 2003, and published in the Florida Administrative Weekly on May 16, 2003. With these points in mind, it becomes apparent that the "findings" in the October 15, 2003, notice, which seem inconsistent with the facts on the ground, actually refer to the state of affairs in May 2003. Once the findings in the October 15, 2003, notice are understood as being retrospective in nature, the notice begins to make sense. What the Department found was that Vista had not relocated its BMW dealership from the Source Site to the Target Site as of May 5, 2003, when notice of the proposed backfill dealership was furnished to the Department. As a result, because Vista had previously sought the protection of Section 320.642(5) for the reopening of its relocatee-dealership, the May 5, 2003, notice respecting the backfill dealership was premature and ineffective. To remedy the problem of premature notice, the Department would afford Vista a second chance to give effective notice in the proper sequence, after the relocation of its BMW dealership from the Source Site to the Target Site had taken place.11 It is important to note that, in the October 15, 2003, notice, the Department neither needed to make nor made a finding, one way or the other, as to whether Vista's putative relocatee-dealership has, in fact, moved from the Source Site to the Target Site.12 Thus, such a determination should not be made in and through this proceeding, but, rather, by the Department (preliminarily) either (a) at the time BMW NA gives notice to the Department, again, of the proposed backfill dealership at Supplemental Site or (b) after publication of such notice in the Florida Administrative Weekly but before a license for the proposed backfill dealership is issued or denied.13 It is also not necessary, and indeed would be inappropriate, to determine in this case what action, if any, the Department should take if it subsequently determines that Vista's putative relocatee- dealership has not in fact relocated from the Source Site to the Target Site.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order providing that Vista shall be issued a license to operate a BMW dealership at 744 North Federal Highway only if: (a) prior to the time notice is given to the Department pursuant to Section 320.642, Florida Statutes, regarding the proposed dealership, Vista has actually relocated the dealership that existed at 700 North Federal Highway to 4401 West Sample Road in Coconut Creek; any protest filed against the proposed dealership is resolved in Petitioners' favor; and (c) all other legal requirements for licensure are met. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of April, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of April, 2004.
The Issue Whether J.S. Imports, Inc. should be granted a new point Mazda dealership at 631 South Military Trail, West Palm Beach, Florida, pursuant to Section 320.642, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Mazda Motor of America, Inc., is a manufacturer of automobiles and trucks which are distributed and sold through a network of dealerships. Under Florida law Mazda is denoted a "licensee." On January 5, 1996, a notice of publication for a new point franchise motor vehicle dealer was published which announced Mazda intends to allow the establishment of J.S. Imports, Inc., as a dealership for the sale of Mazda vehicles at 631 South Military Trail, West Palm Beach (Palm Beach County), Florida 33415. The notice further provided, in pertinent part: Mazda Motor of America, Inc., intends to engage in business with J. S. Imports, Inc., as a dealership on or after February 1, 1996. The name and address of the dealer-operator and principal investor of J. S. Imports, Inc., is: John Staluppi, Jr., 42 Davidson Lane East, West Islip, New York 11795. * * * Dealerships of the same line-make which can establish standing to protest the establishment of the new point may do so by filing a written petition or complaint with the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles. Thereafter, on February 1, 1996, Respondents, Stewart Mazda, Delray Mazda, and Jupiter Dodge Mazda, filed a petition or complaint challenging the proposed new point dealer. Respondents are the existing Mazda dealerships located within Palm Beach County. There are no other same line-make motor vehicle dealerships which are physically located so as to meet or satisfy the requirements of Section 320.642(3), Florida Statutes. Thus, all dealers with the potential for standing have participated in this proceeding. Palm Beach County is a county with more than 300,000 population. Respondent, Stewart Mazda, is located at 2001 South Dixie Highway, West Palm Beach, Florida, and is within 12.5 miles of the proposed location for the new point site. In fact, the Stewart dealership is within five miles of the proposed new point. Respondent, Delray Mazda, is not located within 12.5 miles of the proposed location. Nevertheless, Delray Mazda established that during any 12 month period of the 36 month period preceding the filing of the licensee's application for the proposed dealer Delray Mazda made 25% of its retail sales of new motor vehicles to persons whose registered household addresses were within a radius of 12.5 miles of the proposed site. Respondent, Jupiter Dodge Mazda, is not within 12.5 miles of the location for the proposed new dealership yet it also met the sales standard described in paragraph 7. The proposed new motor vehicle dealer, J.S. Imports, Inc., is owned by John Staluppi, Jr., the son of John Staluppi. No other person or entity owns more than a 10% interest in JSI. It is proposed that J.S. Imports, Inc. will be located at 631 South Military Trail, West Palm Beach. Such real property is part of an automobile mall or auto mall (a cluster of automobile dealerships) which is owned or controlled by John Staluppi. The new Mazda vehicle sales facility would be located at 631 South Military Trail; however, the service facility for the dealership would be located elsewhere within a shared space at 561 South Military Trail, West Palm Beach. Both parcels are owned or controlled by John Staluppi. Both parcels are part of the same auto mall. As part of its documentation to establish the dealership, J.S. Imports, Inc. (JSI) submitted an unsigned lease for the subject property between John Staluppi and the proposed dealer. On or about October 25, 1996, just prior to this case going to hearing, John Staluppi entered into an agreement to sell the assets of the automobile dealerships located within the auto mall. He also agreed to lease the real estate upon which they are located. The lease included the sites for the new Mazda point as well as the service location. Without going into details of the agreement which are not material to the issues of this case, and without listing all of the corporate entities involved in the transaction, the principals in this new agreement were John Staluppi and Terry Taylor. Material to this case, however, is the covenant between Mr. Taylor and John Staluppi, Jr. Those parties reached an agreement to sublease the real estate at 631 South Military Trail and the service department at 561 South Military Trail, West Palm Beach. Such agreement to sublease was also executed October 25, 1996. Based upon the foregoing, as of October 25, 1996, the proposed site for the Mazda new point dealer continued to be 631 South Military Trail with service work to be at 561. These sites are identical to the information submitted by the applicant to the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles. This information was also disclosed to Respondents during discovery of the case, prior to the prehearing stipulation. Subsequently, the transaction between Mr. Taylor and John Staluppi was abandoned. Mr. Taylor’s deposit on the transaction was refunded. Apparently, these parties no longer intend to abide by the terms of the asset purchase agreement. JSI does not own the proposed site. If approved, JSI will lease the property from John Staluppi or entities he owns or controls. As of the time of hearing, JSI did not have a signed lease for the subject property. Typically, Mazda does not submit applications for new point dealerships without some documentation substantiating control of the proposed site. A proposed dealer would normally either own or control the proposed site. Control of the site may be shown by a lease, an option to purchase or an option to lease. In this instance, Mazda presumed the proposed site would be secured through the efforts of John Staluppi, Jr. on behalf of his company which would lease from his father. Moreover, Mazda believes its agreement with JSI (for the applicant dealer to reimburse it for costs or expenses incurred should the dealership effort fail due to an act or omission of JSI) adequately protected its interests in this regard. As of the dates of filing the application for a new point dealership, the notice of same, and the hearing in this cause, no person or entity, other than John Staluppi, Jr., had a beneficial ownership interest in the proposed dealership. To determine whether an additional same line-make dealer should be approved, the existing network of motor vehicle dealers must be evaluated to determine whether they are providing adequate representation to the community or territory. The applicable statutory criteria do not define "adequate representation" nor the "community or territory." Typically, sales data of past dealership performance is utilized by all parties to establish a community or territory (Comm/Terr) and to evaluate the dealers' effectiveness. In this case how the Comm/Terr should be defined is disputed by the parties. Although entitled to weight in the consideration of how the Comm/Terr should be defined, the dealer agreements with the three existing dealers (Respondents) do not assign an area by geographical boundaries. Respondents believe the Comm/Terr, based upon their interpretation of their agreements, should be defined as Palm Beach County as a whole. In contrast, Mazda studies have defined the market for these dealers in different ways; however, it believes the Comm/Terr should be Palm Beach County excluding the primary market area (PMA) ascribed to Jupiter Dodge Mazda. In making this determination, Mazda constructed the PMAs for the existing dealers as well as the new point (or open point) which has been designated as the Staluppi PMA. Within the Staluppi PMA it is presumed that dealer would have a competitive advantage in the market. Similarly, within the Stewart PMA that dealer would have the competitive edge due to customer preference and convenience. The actual shopping patterns of Mazda customers was also assessed. In this case, the three dealers are located in three distinct geographical areas: one toward the northern boundary of the county at Jupiter; one to the south at Delray; and one in the eastern central portion at downtown West Palm Beach. The proposed Staluppi/JSI site is west of the Stewart location. Based upon the actual shopping patterns the majority of the sales by these three existing dealers are made to customers in the same county. Because few of Mazda's customers come from adjacent counties, the largest area which should be used to define the Comm/Terr is the county itself. Within Palm Beach County there are also identifiable plots associated with the three dealers which show that while Stewart and Delray are connected to the JSI site (via established purchasing patterns), Jupiter is not. For this reason, Mazda's expert in rendering his initial opinions regarding this matter excluded Jupiter from the Comm/Terr. This approach has been deemed persuasive. Currently, there are three clusters of automobile and truck dealerships within the Palm Beach Comm/Terr: Delray, where Mazda is now located; Military Trail/Okeechobee Boulevard, where Mazda wants to be located; and North Lake Boulevard. Eighty percent of the customers who shop for new cars, regardless of brand, go to one of the three clusters. Mazda is not represented in two of these popular shopping venues. Mazda and Dodge are the only brands offered in Jupiter. Less than 5% of the customers from the remainder of Palm Beach County (away from the Jupiter PMA) went to Jupiter to purchase a new vehicle. To determine a reasonable expected market penetration standard, it is appropriate to exclude certain factors, such as the consumer preferences for certain types of vehicles (independent of brand) over which the dealers have no control. Market penetration is the traditional standard used to measure adequacy of representation because it reflects the competitive efforts of the competing dealers. Registration data of all brands is used to comprise a single indicator called market share, which is an objective and accurate measure of market activity. Registration data reflects actual consumer purchases. Actual registrations account for demographic characteristics, including age, income, education, size-class preferences, and product popularity. Market penetration for any area is computed utilizing all registrations to addresses in the area, regardless of the location of the selling dealer. After registration data is compiled, the performance of the Comm/Terr can be compared to another market area (allowing for differences in segment popularity). In this case, Mazda compared the Palm Beach Comm/Terr to the Miami/Ft. Lauderdale market. Typically, manufacturers and companies which compile data regarding vehicle sales classify new vehicle sales into segments. These segments list models which are comparable to one another and are, presumably, competing for the same customer. Mazda classifies its vehicles into nine segments. Although it could be argued Mazda is ineffective against Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler, part of that theoretical ineffectiveness is due to the lack or absence of entries from Mazda into markets or segments flooded by those make vehicles. For example, Mazda does not have a vehicle to compete with a Chevrolet Suburban. Nevertheless, on a segment-by-segment basis where Mazda competes with an entry comparable to the other line-makes (in size and class) Mazda's effectiveness can be computed and demonstrated. By measuring Mazda's penetration in each segment achieved in the Miami/Ft. Lauderdale area, applied to the industry data available in each segment in the Staluppi/JSI PMA, an appropriate standard is established for what could be expected if the latter were receiving adequate representation. Similarly, by applying the penetration rate to the Palm Beach Comm/Terr as a whole it is possible to establish what could be expected if the Comm/Terr were receiving adequate representation. By considering the segment analysis the process takes into account differences in consumer preferences between markets as to the popularity of segments, and thereby gives a more accurate measure of what Mazda's reasonably expected market penetration should be. Utilizing this segment analysis, the reasonably expected 1995 Mazda market share in the Staluppi/JSI PMA was 5.97%. The actual penetration for Mazda in this PMA was 3.81%. Similarly, in the Palm Beach Comm/Terr in 1995, Mazda's reasonably expected share in the segments was 6.21%. The actual penetration for Mazda in the Comm/Terr was 4.49%. Alternatively, adding Jupiter to the Palm Beach Comm/Terr, Mazda's reasonably expected market share in 1995 was 6.19%. The actual penetration in the Palm Beach Comm/Terr (adding Jupiter) was 4.65%. Thus, in each analysis Mazda performance fell short of its reasonably expected penetration. With a properly constructed dealer network, containing the appropriate number of dealerships in proper locations, it is reasonable to expect the dealer network in Palm Beach County to perform as well as the dealer network in Miami/Fort Lauderdale after adjusting for the local consumer patterns that make Palm Beach different from the other area. Net shortfall is the number of additional Mazdas that would have to be registered in order to equal the expected level based on average performance across an area. On the basis of the net shortfall in units, or units required to be registered in order to bring the Staluppi/JSI PMA up to the expected performance, the 1995 shortfall was 246 units. In reviewing the Palm Beach Comm/Terr as a whole over the three year period from 1993 to 1995, the efficiency has changed from 70.1% to 72.4%. For the Comm/Terr plus Jupiter, the efficiency has changed from 68.6% to 75.2% during the three years immediately following the insertion of Jupiter Dodge Mazda. Mazda was not receiving adequate representation from the standpoint of not achieving reasonably expected market share. That conclusion is the same whether the area under review is the Staluppi/JSI PMA, the larger Palm Beach Comm/Terr, or the Palm Beach Comm/Terr with Jupiter included. Increases in performance in 1996 (after the existing dealers knew an additional dealer was being sought for the Palm Beach Comm/Terr) while commendable do not negate the historical pattern of providing inadequate representation. The growth of population and households in Palm Beach County has been predominately to the west and central portions of the county and throughout the Delray Beach area. The proposed Staluppi/JSI PMA has also experienced rapid growth in households and population which is expected to continue. Among Mazda buyers, 28.5% thought that the location of the dealer was extremely important; 35.1% thought it was very important; 22.8% thought it was somewhat important; whereas only 8.7% thought it was not important, and 4.9% not important at all. The Military Trail auto mall into which JSI proposes to open the additional Mazda dealership, now contains Toyota, Jeep Eagle, Chrysler Plymouth, Nissan, Infiniti, Kia, GMC, Saturn, Ford and Isuzu. Other brands considered part of this cluster are on Okeechobee Boulevard. They are VW, Hyundai, Acura, Subaru, Volvo, Oldsmobile, Buick, Audi, BMW, Lexis, Lincoln Mercury, Chevrolet, Dodge, Mitsubishi and Mercedes Benz. Mazda would be required to have 3.2 dealerships in order to have the same share of the franchises in the Palm Beach Comm/Terr as it has in the Miami/Ft. Lauderdale area. Because Jupiter Dodge Mazda does not serve the Palm Beach Comm/Terr in a meaningful way, the Comm/Terr has two Mazda dealerships, and needs at least one more dealership to have a reasonable opportunity to receive adequate interbrand competition and gain expected market share. The likely cause of the current inadequacy of performance for the Palm Beach Comm/Terr is insufficient dealer count and poor dealer location. Without a dealer in the Staluppi/JSI PMA, consumers average 9.9 miles from the nearest Mazda dealer, which is higher than the major competitors located in the Staluppi/JSI PMA. With the addition of a Mazda dealer in the Staluppi/JSI PMA customers will be 7.2 miles, on average, to the nearest Mazda dealer a distance which should be more competitive with other brands such as Ford (3.9 miles), Chevrolet (4.7 miles), Nissan (7.2 miles), and Toyota (7.2 miles). Optimal location analysis also demonstrates that the proposed location would maximize customer convenience. If the J. S. Imports dealership is allowed to "float" in the Palm Beach Comm/Terr, while the other dealer locations are fixed, the location which would maximize customer convenience is near the proposed site. The proposed location is near the optimal location, and in the midst of a cluster of dealerships where approximately 30% of the sales of all Palm Beach County dealers are made. The proposed site is good in terms of solving the customer convenience problem in the area, and providing Mazda a presence in the cluster where many sales are made. The addition of a dealership will likely benefit consumers and the public interest. It will provide the growing population of the Staluppi/JSI PMA with a more convenient place to shop for Mazdas and more convenient Mazda service. It will take Mazda to a growing cluster of dealerships allowing customers a one stop opportunity to comparison shop Mazda and its competitors. Moreover, with increased interbrand and intrabrand competition Mazda and the existing dealers should be able to improve sales penetration and take advantage of the available market for Mazda products. Therefore, because of the large untapped opportunity for Mazda in the Palm Beach Comm/Terr as a whole, in the Comm/Terr plus Jupiter, and in the "identifiable plot" known as the Staluppi/JSI PMA, the addition of a new dealer should not cause a decrease in the existing Mazda dealers' sales over the long term. The addition should have a positive impact upon the overall sales opportunities for all the Mazda dealers. If you compute the total lost opportunity for sales in this market (941 units) and allocate a portion of sales to the Staluppi/JSI PMA (555), the remainder would be available to the existing dealers of the Comm/Terr. This remainder of the lost opportunity, (467 units utilizing the average penetration profile; 386 using the Jupiter profile), would be available for all Palm Beach Mazda dealers. Therefore, the proposed addition of a dealership can take place without taking any sales from existing Mazda dealers. The existing dealers should increase their sales because a large number of customers are now shopping in the Northlake and Okeechobee/Military Trail clusters, and could not previously consider Mazda conveniently because of the lack of a dealer. Having a dealer in the Okeechobee/Military Trail cluster should stimulate interest in Mazdas. All existing dealers have made substantial financial investments to perform their obligations under their dealers' agreements. In Stewart's case, the total investment is close to $5,000,000. Stewart's real estate and building are valued at approximately $3,000,000. Jupiter Dodge Mazda has about $1,000,000 invested in its dealership. Delray Mazda has approximately $3,500,000 invested in its dealership. All three existing dealerships should benefit from an increased Mazda presence in the market place. The reasonably expected market penetration for Mazda should improve with an additional dealership at the Staluppi auto mall. Mazda has not denied its existing dealers an opportunity for reasonable growth, expansion or relocation. In fact, Mazda urged Stewart to establish the dealership at the proposed location. Only when efforts with Stewart failed did Mazda go outside the existing dealers for an operator for the additional point. Mazda has not attempted to coerce the existing dealers into consenting to the additional dealership. In reaching this conclusion the single incident complained of by one existing dealer (that Mazda withdrew some advertising support) has been considered but is not persuasive that Mazda has acted improperly in its efforts to establish the new point. The distance travel time, considering traffic patterns and accessibility, between the proposed site and its nearest same line-make dealer (Stewart) is approximately ten minutes. While geographically closer than other dealers of same line-make vehicles, traffic and accessibility put the proposed site and Stewart at a reasonable distance. No evidence in this case supports a conclusion that consumers could have the same benefits offered by the proposed dealership from other changes. No evidence suggests the existing dealers are not in compliance with their dealer agreements. Intrabrand and interbrand competition should improve with the establishment of the new point. Service and sales facilities will be more convenient to customers. All existing dealers make sales into the area of the proposed site. With anticipated population growth and market availability, any sales lost to the new point should be offset by Mazda’s increased market presence, improved market penetration, and greater overall sales for all dealerships.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED That the Department of Motor Vehicles and Highway Safety enter a final order approving the new point dealership sought by Mazda Motor of America on behalf of J.S. Imports, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of May, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of May, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Dean Bunch, Esquire Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, L.L.P. 909 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James D. Adams, Esquire Adams & Quinton 7300 West Camino Real Camino Real Centre Boca Raton, Florida 33433 Douglas E. Thompson Post Office Box 16480 West Palm Beach, Florida 33416 Dean J. Rosenbach Lewis, Vegosen, Rosenbach & Silber, P.A. Post Office Box 4388 West Palm Beach, Florida 33402-4388 Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Division of Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A-432 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0504 Charles J. Brantley, Director Division of Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room B439 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Enoch Jon Whitney, General Counsel Division of Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500
Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of an Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction by Lynne A. Quimby-Pennock, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to Parties’ Settlement Agreement, a copy of which is attached, and incorporated by reference, in this order. The Department hereby adopts the Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction as its Final Order in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that Respondent, Elite Trikes, LLC, be granted a license to sell motorcycles manufactured by Hyosung Motors American, Inc. at 12395 Belcher Road, Largo, (Pinellas County), Florida 33773, upon compliance with all applicable requirements of Section 320.27, Florida Statutes, and all applicable Department rules. Filed June 28, 2013 7:57 AM Division of Administrative Hearings DONE AND ORDERED this al day of June, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Baker, Chief Bureau of Issuance Oversight Division of Motorist Services Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A338 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Motorist Services this AL day of November, 2012. os Nalini Vinayak, Dealer Eicense Adminictro*s- NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. JB/wev Copies furnished: Pat Clark Eco Green Machine, LLC 7000 Park Boulevard Pinellas Park, Florida 33781 Tony Kim Hyosung Motors America, Inc. 5815 Brook Hollow Parkway, Suite C Norcross, Georgia 30071 Jack Lavery Elite Trikes, LLC 12395 Belcher Road Largo, Florida 33773 Matthew Mosk Elite Trikes, LLC 12397 Belcher Road, Suite 270 Largo, Florida 33773 Lynne A. Quimby-Pennock Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Administrator
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's establishment of North Tampa Chrysler Jeep Dodge, Inc. (North Tampa), as a successor motor vehicle dealer for Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge line-makes (vehicles) in Tampa, Florida, is exempt from the notice and protest requirements in Subsection 320.642(3), Florida Statutes (2009),1 pursuant to Subsection 320.642(5)(a).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner manufactures and sells Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles to authorized Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge dealers. Ulm is a party to Dealer Sales and Service Agreements with Petitioner for Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles. Ulm sells Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles at 2966 North Dale Mabry Highway, Tampa, Florida 33607. Ferman is a party to Dealer Sales and Service Agreements with Petitioner for Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles. Ferman sells Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles at 24314 State Road 54, Lutz, Florida 33559. It is undisputed that Petitioner has had four dealers in the Tampa metro market for a significant number of years. Petitioner's primary competitors also have had four or more dealers in the Tampa metro market. By appointing North Tampa as a successor dealer to Bob Wilson Dodge Chrysler Jeep (Wilson), Petitioner seeks to maintain the status quo of four Chrysler dealers in the Tampa metro market. In April 2008, Petitioner had four dealers in the Tampa metro market that each sold and serviced Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles. The four dealers were: Ulm, Ferman, Courtesy Chrysler Jeep Dodge, and Wilson. On April 25, 2008, Wilson filed a Chapter 11 petition in United States Bankruptcy Court in the Middle District of Florida (the Bankruptcy Court). At or about the same time, Wilson closed its doors and ceased selling and servicing Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles. The filing of Wilson’s bankruptcy petition precipitated an automatic stay under Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code. The automatic stay prevented Petitioner from terminating Wilson’s franchise and dealer agreements (dealer agreements). But for Wilson’s bankruptcy filing, Petitioner would have sent Wilson a notice of termination when Wilson closed its doors and ceased dealership operations. Wilson’s cessation of business adversely impacted Petitioner. In relevant part, Petitioner lost sales and lacked a necessary fourth dealer to provide service to Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge customers in the Tampa metro market. Petitioner desired to reopen a dealership at or close to the former Wilson location as soon as possible to mitigate or eliminate the economic loss. During the automatic stay, Petitioner was legally precluded from unilaterally appointing a successor dealer to Wilson. Wilson still had valid dealer agreements for the Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles and, therefore, was still a dealer. During the automatic stay, Wilson attempted to sell its existing dealership assets, including the Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge dealer agreements. Any attempt by Petitioner to appoint a successor dealer or even negotiate with a successor dealer, would have undermined Wilson’s efforts to sell the dealerships and maximize the estate for the benefit of the creditors. A sale of the dealership required the consent of Wilson and Wilson’s largest creditor, Chrysler Financial. Petitioner did everything it could to accelerate a sale. However, Petitioner was not a party to the sale negotiations and had no ability to require or force Wilson to sell the dealership or its assets to any particular party or to do so within any particular time period. A preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner did anything to intentionally, or inadvertently, delay or manipulate the timing of a sale. On July 30, 2008, Petitioner filed a motion with the Bankruptcy Court to lift the automatic stay. The motion also sought the termination of Wilson’s dealer agreements. Petitioner filed the motion in the Bankruptcy Court in an attempt to hasten the sale negotiations. Petitioner also wanted to be able to terminate the dealer agreements as quickly as possible in the event that a sale was not consummated. The Bankruptcy Court did not initially grant Petitioner's motion. The court wanted to allow time for a sale of the dealership to proceed. During 2008 and early 2009, Wilson continued to negotiate with potential buyers for the dealership. On January 8, 2009, Wilson's motor vehicle dealer license expired. It became apparent to Petitioner that a sale of Wilson’s assets would be unlikely. Petitioner again asked the Bankruptcy Court to grant Petitioner's motion to lift the stay. On February 9, 2009, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order granting Petitioner's motion to lift the stay. However, the order did not terminate Wilson’s dealer agreements. On February 16, 2009, within a week of the entry of the order lifting the stay, Petitioner sent Wilson a notice of intent to terminate Wilson’s dealer agreements. Wilson received the notice of termination on February 23, 2009, and the termination became effective on March 10, 2009. A preponderance of evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner attempted to manipulate or delay the timing of the termination of Wilson’s dealer agreements. Petitioner began working on establishing a replacement dealership as soon as Wilson’s dealer agreements were terminated. Establishing a replacement dealership is a lengthy process that primarily involves finding a suitable dealer candidate, finding a suitable location and facility, and making sure that the candidate has the necessary capital to start and maintain the dealership. Petitioner talked to several potential candidates to replace the Wilson dealership, including Jerry Ulm, the principal of one of the complaining dealers in these cases. By letter dated June 24, 2009, Mr. Ulm advised Petitioner that he opposed the opening of a successor dealership for anyone else but wanted the successor dealership for himself should Petitioner decide to proceed. Petitioner determined that Petitioner would not be able to locate the successor dealership at the former Wilson facility. Petitioner considered several potential alternative locations for the successor dealership, including property offered by Ferman. Ferman had a vacant site on Fletcher Avenue in Tampa, Florida, which Ferman leased from a third party unrelated to this proceeding. Ferman offered to sublease the property to Petitioner. In a letter to Petitioner's real estate agent dated July 17, 2009, Ferman stated Ferman's understanding that Petitioner intended to use the property to establish a Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge dealership. Petitioner ultimately decided to locate the dealership at 10909 North Florida Avenue in Tampa, Florida. It is undisputed that this location is less than two miles from the former Wilson location. Before establishing the successor dealership, however, Petitioner wrote a letter to the Department on February 5, 2010 (the letter). The letter requested the Department to confirm that the establishment of the successor dealership would be exempt under Subsection 320.642(5)(a)1. from the notice and protest requirements in Subsection 320.642(3). The letter explained that Wilson had filed bankruptcy and ceased operations and that the bankruptcy had prevented Petitioner from terminating Wilson and appointing a successor dealership. The letter also provided the relevant dates of the bankruptcy, the lifting of the stay, and the termination of Wilson dealer agreements and advised the Department of Petitioner's intent to locate the successor dealership within two miles of Wilson’s former location. The letter asked the Department to confirm that the establishment of a successor dealership would be exempt if it was established within one year of March 10, 2009, when Petitioner terminated the Wilson dealer agreements. By separate e-mails dated February 9 and 12, 2010, the Department twice confirmed that it had consulted with counsel and determined that the establishment of a successor dealership to Wilson in the manner outlined by Petitioner would be exempt. Petitioner relied on this confirmation by the Department before proceeding with the appointment of a successor dealership. On February 24, 2010, Petitioner sent a second letter to the Department, stating Petitioner's intention to appoint North Tampa as the replacement and successor dealer for Wilson (the second letter). In the second letter, Petitioner again asserted its understanding that the establishment of North Tampa was exempt from the relevant statutory requirements for notice and protest. On February 24, 2010, Petitioner also submitted to the Department an application for a motor vehicle dealer license for North Tampa. On March 3, 2010, the Department issued a license to North Tampa for the Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles at 10909 North Florida Avenue in Tampa, Florida. On March 7, 2010, North Tampa opened for business. North Tampa has operated successfully and continuously and employs approximately 30 individuals at the site.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order finding that the establishment of North Tampa as a successor motor vehicle dealer is exempt from the notice and protest requirements in Subsection 320.642(3) pursuant to Subsection 320.642(5)(a). DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of October, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of October, 2010.
The Issue Whether the Petitioners' proposed dealership should be approved.
Findings Of Fact On October 17, 2008, in the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 34, Number 42, a Notice of Publication for a New Point Franchise Motor Vehicle Dealer in a County of More than 300,000 Population was published. The notice provided that Snyder Computer Systems, Inc., d/b/a Wildfire Motors intended to allow the establishment of Beach Cycle of Fort Lauderdale, Inc., as a dealership for the sale of motorcycles manufactured by Zhejiang Summit Huawin Motorcycle Co. Ltd. (POPC) at Ravens Wood Road, Fort Lauderdale (Broward County), Florida 33312, on or after November 5, 2008. On November 12, 2008, the Respondent timely filed a protest of the establishment of the Petitioners' dealership. Respondent alleged that it currently services customers for the line-make proposed by the Petitioners and that its location is within 12.5 miles of the location proposed by the Petitioners. The evidence presented established that the Respondent's dealership is within 8.5 miles of the proposed site. Mr. McMahon verified the driving distance and presented the measured distance as computed by the website Mapquest. Further, the driving time between the two points is less than 30 minutes. The Respondent has served the area for not less than 2 years and has successfully promoted the vehicles proposed to be sold by the line-make proposed by the Petitioners. The Respondent established that its sales are within 12.5 miles of the proposed dealership. The Respondent established that it currently markets the motorcycle to be sold by the proposed dealership. More specifically, the Respondent offered testimony that it has an agreement for the same line-make vehicle to be sold by the proposed dealer. Notice of the formal hearing was provided to all parties of record at their addresses of record.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles enter a Final Order denying the approval of the Petitioners' proposed dealership. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of February 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Electra Theodorides-Bustle Executive Director Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Robin Lotane, General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Paul J. Lane, Esquire 2755 East Oakland Park Boulevard, Suite 300 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33306 Joel Ribler Beach Cycle of Fort Lauderdale, Inc. 2190 Southwest 31st Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33312 Michael James Alderman, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A-432 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32344 Ronald Gardner Snyder Computer Systems, Inc., d/b/a Wildfire Motors 11 Technology Way Steubenville, Ohio 43952
The Issue Whether Florida Administrative Code Rule 15C-7.005 is a invalid exercise of legislatively delegated authority in violation of Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Department is an agency of the State of Florida. The Department adopted Florida Administrative Code Rule 15C- 17.005, which became effective March 3, 1996. The Rule has not been amended since its initial adoption. JM Lexus and Lexus of Orlando are both licensed franchised motor vehicle dealers in the State of Florida. Lexus of Orlando has filed a complaint in the Ninth Circuit Court, Orange County, Florida, alleging, that JM Lexus violated Rule 15C-7.005 in connection with the alleged sale for resale of new Lexus vehicles to non-Lexus dealerships. FADA and SFADA are trade associations whose members are licensed motor vehicle dealers in the State of Florida and are substantially affected by the rule. Florida Administrative Code Rule 15C-7.005 provides the following: 15C-7.005 Unauthorized Additional Motor Vehicle Dealerships - Unauthorized Supplemental Dealership Locations. An additional motor vehicle dealership, as contemplated by Sections 320.27(5) and 320.642, Florida Statutes, shall be deemed to be established when motor vehicles are regularly and repeatedly sold at a specific location in the State of Florida for retail purposes if the motor vehicle dealer transacting such sales: Is not located in this state, or Is not a licensed motor vehicle franchised for the specific line-make, or Is a licensed motor vehicle dealer franchised for such line-make, but such sales are transacted at a location other than that permitted by the license issued to the dealer by the Department. Such sales are not subject to this rule, however, when a motor vehicle dealer occasionally and temporarily (not to exceed seven days) sells motor vehicles from a location other than the motor vehicle dealer's licensed location provided such sales occur within the motor vehicle dealer's area of sales responsibility (except a motor vehicle dealer who may be deemed a licensee under this rule). For the purpose of this rule, a sale for retail purposes is the first sale of the motor vehicle to a retail customer for private use, or the first sale of the motor vehicle for commercial use, such as leasing, if such commercial motor vehicle is not resold for a period of at least ninety days. Furthermore, this rule shall apply regardless of whether the titles issued, either in this or another state, pursuant to such sales are designated as "new" or "used." An additional motor vehicle dealership established in this fashion is unlawful and in violation of Section 230.642, Florida Statutes. A licensed motor vehicle dealer of the same line-make, as the vehicle being sold in violation of this rule, may notify the Department of such violation. The notice shall include motor vehicle identification numbers or other data sufficient to identify the identity of the selling dealer and initial retail purchaser of the motor vehicles involved. Within 30 days from receipt of a request from the Department containing motor vehicle identification numbers or other data sufficient to identify the motor vehicles involved, the licensee shall provide to the Department, to the extent such information is maintained by the licensee, copies of documents showing the dealer to whom each vehicle was originally delivered, any inter- dealer transfer and the initial retail purchaser as reported to the licensee. Upon a showing of good cause, the Department may grant the licensee additional time to provide the information requested under this paragraph. Examples of good cause include, but are not limited to, request for information on more than 100 vehicles, information on vehicle sales which accrued more than 2 years prior to the date of the request, and information which is no longer maintained in the licensee's current electronic data base. Within forty days of receipt of notice from the motor vehicle dealer, the Department shall make a determination of probable cause and if it determines that there is probable cause that a violation of this rule has occurred, the Department shall mail, by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the line-maker motor vehicle dealership or dealerships involved a letter containing substantially the following statement: Pursuant to Rule 15C-7.005, F.A.C., the undersigned has received a notice that you have allegedly supplied a substantial number of vehicles on a regular and repeated basis, which were sold at a location in the State of Florida, at which you are not franchised or licensed to sell motor vehicles. If these allegations are true, your conduct may violate Florida law including, but not limited to, the above-mentioned rule, Sections 320.61 and 320.642, Florida Statutes. It may also cause you to be deemed a licensee, importer and/or distributor pursuant to Florida law and subject you to disciplinary action by the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, including fines and/or suspension of your Florida Dealer license, if applicable. The Division of Motor Vehicles is putting you on notice, if you are conducting such activity, that you cease and desist such activity immediately. If you fail to do so, this agency will take appropriate action. If the dealer supplying vehicles in violation of subsections (1) and (4) is not located in the State of Florida, the Department shall notify such dealer in writing that they may be operating as a distributor of motor vehicles without proper authorization in violation of Section 320.61, Florida Statutes, and may be violating Section 320.642, Florida Statutes. A motor vehicle dealer, whether located in Florida or not, which supplies a substantial number of vehicles on a regular and repeated basis which are sold in the manner set forth in subsection (1), shall be deemed to have established a supplemental location in violation of Section 320.27(5), Florida Statutes, and Rule 15C-7.005, F.A.C. Furthermore, a motor vehicle dealer which supplies vehicles in this manner shall be deemed to have conducted business within the State of Florida and acted as a "licensee," "importer" and "distributor" as contemplated by Section 320.60, Florida Statutes, and thus such activity shall constitute a violation of Sections 320.61 and 320.642, Florida Statutes. Furthermore, this paragraph neither imposes any liability on a licensee nor creates a cause of action by any person against the licensee, except a motor vehicle dealer who may be deemed to have acted as a licensee under this paragraph. Furthermore, no provision of this entire rule creates a private cause of action by any person against a licensee, other than a dealer who is deemed a licensee pursuant to the provisions of subsection (4) of this rule, for civil damages; provided, however, if a licensee fails to comply with the requirements of paragraph (3)(a) of this rule, the Department may bring an action for injunctive relief to require a licensee to provide the information required. No other action can be brought against the licensee pursuant to this entire rule other than a dealer who is deemed to be a licensee pursuant to the provisions of subsection (4) of this rule. Any franchised motor vehicle dealer who can demonstrate that a violation of, or failure to comply with, the provisions of subsection (4) of this rule by a motor vehicle dealer, or a motor vehicle dealer which pursuant to subsection (4) shall be deemed to have conducted business and acted as a licensee, importer, and distributor, has adversely affected or caused pecuniary loss to that franchised motor vehicle dealer, shall be entitled to pursue all remedies against such dealers, including, but not limited to the remedies, procedures, and rights of recovery available under Sections 320.695 and 320.697, Florida Statutes. Rule 15C-7.005 identifies as specific authority Section 320.011, Florida Statutes. Section 320.011 states: The department shall administer and enforce the provisions of this chapter and has authority to adopt rules pursuant to ss. 120.536(1) and 120.54 to implement them. The Rule lists as "Law Implemented" Sections 320.27 and Sections 320.60-.70, Florida Statutes. Sections 320.60 through 320.70, Florida Statutes, are commonly referred to as the Motor Dealers Act. Section 320.27(1)(c), Florida Statutes, provides the following definitions for a motor vehicle dealer and a franchised motor vehicle dealer: (c) "Motor vehicle dealer" means any person engaged in the business of buying, selling, or dealing in motor vehicles or offering or displaying motor vehicles for sale at wholesale or retail, or who may service and repair motor vehicles pursuant to an agreement as defined in s. 320.60(1). Any person who buys, sells, or deals in three or more motor vehicles in any 12-month period or who offers or displays for sale three or more motor vehicles in any 12-month period shall be prima facie presumed to be engaged in such business. The terms "selling" and "sale" include lease-purchase transactions. . . The transfer of a motor vehicle by a dealer not meeting these qualifications shall be titled as a used vehicle. The classifications of motor vehicle dealers are defined as follows: 1. "Franchised motor vehicle dealer" means any person who engages in the business of repairing, servicing, buying, selling, or dealing in motor vehicles pursuant to an agreement as defined in s. 320.60(1). Subsection 320.27(2), Florida Statutes, requires motor vehicle dealers to be licensed. Subsection (5) of this same provision requires that "any person licensed hereunder shall obtain a supplemental license for each permanent additional place or places of business not contiguous to the premises for which the original license is issued." Section 320.27(9) authorizes the Department to discipline motor vehicle dealers for a variety of enumerated offenses. Among those enumerated offenses is the willful failure to comply with any administrative rule adopted by the department or the provisions of Section 320.131(8), Florida Statutes. § 320.27(9)(a)16., Fla. Stat. Section 320.60, Florida Statutes, provides definitions for terms used in Sections 320.61 through 320.70, Florida Statutes. Pertinent to this case are the following: "Agreement" or "franchise agreement" means a contract, franchise, new motor vehicle franchise, sales and service agreement, or dealer agreement or any other terminology used to describe the contractual relationship between a manufacturer, factory branch, distributor, or importer, and a motor vehicle dealer, pursuant to which the motor vehicle dealer is authorized to transact business pertaining to motor vehicles of a particular line-make. * * * (5) "Distributor" means a person, resident or nonresident, who, in whole or in part, sells or distributes motor vehicles to motor vehicle dealers or who maintains distributor representatives. * * * "Importer" means any person who imports vehicles from a foreign country into the United States or into this state for the purpose of sale or lease. "Licensee" means any person licensed or required to be licensed under s. 320.61. * * * (10) "Motor vehicle" means any new automobile, motorcycle, or truck, including all trucks, regardless of weight . . . the equitable or legal title to which has never been transferred by a manufacturer, distributor, importer, or dealer to an ultimate purchaser; (11)(a) "Motor vehicle dealer" means any person, firm, company, corporation, or other entity, who, Is licensed pursuant to s. 320.27 as a "franchised motor vehicle dealer" and, for commission, money, or other things of value, repairs or services motor vehicles or used motor vehicles pursuant to an agreement as defined in subsection (1), or Who sells, exchanges, buys, leases or rents, or offers, or attempts to negotiate a sale or exchange of any interest in, motor vehicles, or Who is engaged wholly or in part in the business of selling motor vehicles, whether or not such motor vehicles are owned by such person, firm, company, or corporation. * * * (14) "Line-make vehicles" are those motor vehicles which are offered for sale, lease, or distribution under a common name, trademark, service mark, or brand name of the manufacturer of same. Section 320.61, Florida Statutes, requires all manufacturers, factory branches, distributors or importers to be licensed. Section 320.63, Florida Statutes, describes the application process for obtaining licensure for manufacturers, factory branches, distributors or importers. The section authorizes the Department to require certain enumerated information as well as "any other pertinent matter commensurate with the safeguarding of the public interest which the department, by rule, prescribes." § 320.63(7), Fla. Stat. Section 320.64, Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part: 320.64 Denial, suspension, or revocation of license; grounds.--A license of a licensee under s. 320.61 may be denied, suspended, or revoked within the entire state or at any specific location or locations within the state at which the applicant or licensee engages or proposes to engage in business, upon proof that the section was violated with sufficient frequency to establish a pattern of wrongdoing, and a licensee or applicant shall be liable for claims and remedies provided in ss. 320.695 and 320.697 for any violation of any of the following provisions. A licensee is prohibited from committing the following acts: * * * (3) The applicant or licensee willfully has failed to comply with significant provisions of ss. 320.60-320.70 or with any lawful rule or regulation adopted or promulgated by the department. * * * A motor vehicle dealer who can demonstrate that a violation of, or failure to comply with, any of the preceding provisions by an applicant or licensee will or can adversely and pecuniarily affect the complaining dealer, shall be entitled to pursue all of the remedies, procedures, and rights of recovery available under ss. 320.695 and 320.697. Section 320.642, Florida Statutes, provides the process for a licensee to establish additional motor vehicle dealerships or to relocate existing dealerships to a location where the same line-make vehicle is presently represented by a franchised motor vehicle dealer or dealers. Section 320.642, does not, by its terms, authorize rulemaking. Section 320.69, Florida Statutes, states in its entirety that "the department has the authority to adopt rules pursuant to ss. 120.536(1) and 120.54 to implement the provisions of this law." Section 320.695, Florida Statutes, which contains no additional grant of rulemaking authority, provides: In addition to the remedies provided in this chapter, and notwithstanding the existence of any adequate remedy at law, the department, or any motor vehicle dealer in the name of the department and state and for the use and benefit of the motor vehicle dealer, is authorized to make application to any circuit court of the state for the grant, upon a hearing and for cause shown, of a temporary or permanent injunction, or both, restraining any person from acting as a licensee under the terms of ss. 320.60-320.70 without being properly licensed hereunder, or from violating or continuing to violate any of the provisions of ss. 320.60-320.70, or from failing or refusing to comply with the requirements of this law or any rule or regulation adopted hereunder. Such injunction shall be issued without bond. A single act in violation of the provisions of ss. 320.60-320.70 shall be sufficient to authorize the issuance of an injunction. However, this statutory remedy shall not be applicable to any motor vehicle dealer after final determination by the department under s. 320.641(3). Section 320.697, Florida Statutes, which also contains no additional grant of rulemaking authority, provides: Civil damages.--Any person who has suffered pecuniary loss or who has been otherwise adversely affected because of a violation by a licensee of ss. 320.60-320.70, notwithstanding the existence of any other remedies under ss. 320.60-320.70, has a cause of action against the licensee for damages and may recover damages therefor in any court of competent jurisdiction in an amount equal to 3 times the pecuniary loss, together with costs and a reasonable attorney's fee to be assessed by the court. Upon a prima facie showing by the person bringing the action that such a violation by the licensee has occurred, the burden of proof shall then be upon the licensee to prove that such violation or unfair practice did not occur.
The Issue The issue in these cases is whether two applications for new point franchise motor vehicle dealerships filed by Puma Cycles Corporation and Wild Hogs Scooters and Motorsports, LLC (Respondents), should be approved.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Finding of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles enter a final order denying the two applications filed by the Respondents to establish new point franchise motor vehicle dealerships at Wild Hogs Scooters and Motorsports, LLC, for the sale of line-make FSTI motorcycles. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of February, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of February, 2012.
The Issue The issue in the case is whether an application for a new point franchise motor vehicle dealership filed by Zongshen, Inc., and Tropical Scooters, LLC, should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Tropical is seeking to establish a new point franchise motor vehicle dealership at 11610 Seminole Boulevard, Largo, in Pinellas County, Florida, for line-make ZONG. The Respondent is an existing franchise dealer for ZONG-manufactured vehicles located at 1450 First Avenue, North, St. Petersburg, in Pinellas County, Florida. The Respondent is located within 12.5 miles of the proposed new point motor vehicle dealership location. The Respondent timely filed a protest of the proposed dealership. The Petitioner presented no evidence that the Respondent is not providing adequate representation within the territory of the motor vehicles at issue in this proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order, denying the Petitioners' application for establishment of the new point franchise motor vehicle dealer franchise. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Patricia Fornes Zongshen, Inc. 3511 Northwest 113th Court Miami, Florida 33178 Jennifer Clark Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A-308 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0635 Chris Densmore Scooter Escapes, LLC, d/b/a Scooter Escapes 1450 First Avenue, North St. Petersburg, Florida 33705 Michele R. Stanley Tropical Scooters, LLC 11610 Seminole Boulevard Largo, Florida 33778 Carl A. Ford, Director Division of Motor Vehicles Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room B-439 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Robin Lotane, General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500
