Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulation of the parties, the following facts are found: Ameni Selmi and Mondher Tahar Ghali are the parents and legal guardians of Oubey, and are the “Claimants” as defined by section 766.302(3). Oubey incurred a “birth-related neurological injury” as that term is defined in section 766.302(2), on or about January 25, 2018, which was the sole and proximate cause of Oubey’s medical condition. Oubey died during the pendency of this action on June 24, 2020. At birth, Oubey weighed 3,770 grams. Shereen Oloufa, M.D., rendered obstetrical services in the delivery of Oubey and, at all times material to this action, was a “participating physician” as defined in section 766.302(7). Orlando Health Central is a hospital located in Ocoee, Florida, and is the “hospital,” as that term is defined in section 766.302(6), where Oubey was born. Petitioners filed a Petition pursuant to section 766.305, seeking compensation from NICA, and that Petition is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety, including all attachments. Any reference made within this document to NICA encompasses, where appropriate, the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan (the Plan).
The Issue At issue is whether Christian M. Hernandez, a minor, qualifies for coverage under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan (Plan).
Findings Of Fact Preliminary findings related to compensability Miguel Hernandez and Lynn Hernandez, are the parents and natural guardians of Christian M. Hernandez, a minor. Christian was born a live infant on March 28, 2005, at Mount Sinai Medical Center, a hospital located in Miami Beach, Florida, and his birth weight exceeded 2,500 grams. Obstetrical services were delivered at Christian's birth by Melvin E. Castillo, M.D., who, at all times material hereto, was a "participating physician" in the Florida Birth- Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan as defined by Section 766.302(7), Florida Statutes. Coverage under the Plan Pertinent to this case, coverage is afforded by the Plan for infants who suffer a "birth-related neurological injury," defined as an "injury to the brain . . . caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery period in a hospital, which renders the infant permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired."1 § 766.302(2), Fla. Stat. See also §§ 766.309 and 766.31, Fla. Stat. Here, Petitioners and NICA are of the view that Christian did not suffer such an injury, whereas Intervenors hold a contrary view. Whether Christian suffered a "birth-related neurological injury" To address whether Christian suffered a "birth-related neurological injury," the parties offered the Mount Sinai Medical Center records associated with Christian's birth and immediate newborn course, March 28, 2005, to April 2, 2005 (Joint Exhibits 1 and 2), as well as the Miami Children's Hospital medical records associated with his subsequent care, April 2, 2005, to May 11, 2005 (Joint Exhibit 3). The parties also offered the deposition testimony of Donald Willis, M.D., a physician board-certified in obstetrics and gynecology, and maternal-fetal medicine, and Michael Duchowny, M.D., a physician board-certified in pediatrics, neurology with special competence in child neurology, electroencephalography, and neurophysiology. (Joint Exhibits 4 and 5). Dr. Willis reviewed the medical records related to Christian's birth and subsequent development, and accurately summarized his history, as follows: . . . The mother, Lynn Hernandez, was a 36 year old G3 P2 admitted at term in early labor. Her cervix was dilated 2 cms. She was taking Synthroid for hypothyroidism and had a previous Cesarean delivery. Meconium was identified with rupture of the membranes. Ampicillin was given during labor. The fetal heart rate pattern on admission had a normal baseline and was reactive. Variable decelerations, to about 90 bpm, developed during the second stage of labor and vacuum assisted delivery was done for this indication. Vacuum was applied and the baby was delivered on the first pull. Delivery was complicated by a tight nuchal cord and mild shoulder dystocia. McRoberts maneuver was required for delivery of the shoulders. Birth weight was 4,180 grams or 9 lbs 3 ozs. No meconium was identified below the vocal cords by neonatal evaluation. Apgar scores were 7/9/9. The baby was floppy at birth, but responded to resuscitation. From the delivery room, the baby was taken to the NICU for possible sepsis and respiratory distress. Retractions and a rapid respiratory rate were present. Neurologic exam was normal. Oxygen saturation was in the 90's on admission, but the baby was unable to maintain adequate oxygenation with hood oxygen. Oxygen saturation dropped to the 50's and intubation and mechanical ventilation was required shortly after being admitted to the NICU (about one hour). Respiratory distress continued with progressively increasing ventilator settings required to maintain adequate oxygenation. The baby was transferred to Miami Children's Hospital for possible ECMO. Diagnoses included meconium aspiration syndrome, suspected viral pneumonia and significant pulmonary hypertension. Chest tubes were placed for pneumothorax. Respiratory distress worsened and ECMO was started. Head ultrasound was done before ECMO and was normal. The baby suffered an intracranial hemorrhage while on ECMO, which required discontinuation of ECMO. The baby was on ECMO for 32 hours. Serial CT scans showed an evolving intracranial hemorrhage with eventual development of a porencephalic cyst. The baby was discharged home on day 43 of life. (Joint Exhibit 4; See also Joint Exhibit 1; Joint Exhibit 2, Discharge Summary; Joint Exhibit 3, Discharge Summary). Based on his evaluation of the medical records, it was Dr. Willis' opinion that Christian did not suffer a brain injury caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury during labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery period, and that the intracranial hemorrhage he suffered while on ECMO, was a complication of the blood thinner (anti-coagulant) required for ECMO therapy.2 (Joint Exhibit 4, pp. 13, 14, and 22). Compare, Orlando Regional Health Care System, Inc. v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, 33 Fla. L. Weekly D2563 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)(Where infant found to have suffered a "birth-related neurological injury" when it was shown that the infant required active resuscitation from birth until he was placed on ECMO bypass hours after his birth, and that the infant suffered a brain injury caused by oxygen deprivation, which rendered him permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired, between the time of birth and the time of being placed on ECMO.). Notably, it was not shown through Dr. Willis' testimony or otherwise that Christian's intracranial hemorrhage was caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury, and Dr. Willis offered no opinion regarding the significance of, or any sequelae caused by, the brain injury Christian suffered while on ECMO. (Joint Exhibit 4, p. 14). Dr. Duchowny evaluated Christian on September 28, 2007. Based on his evaluation, as well as his review of the medical records, Dr. Duchowny was of the opinion that Christian's impairments were, more likely than not, the result of a developmentally based brain disorder, as opposed to a brain injury. Dr. Duchowny was also of the opinion that Christian does not have a substantial physical impairment. Rather his motor function is essentially appropriate for age and he does not currently demonstrate, and is unlikely to demonstrate in the future, a substantial mental impairment. (Joint Exhibit 5). When, as here, the medical condition is not readily observable, issues of causation are essentially medical questions, requiring expert medical evidence. See, e.g., Vero Beach Care Center v. Ricks, 476 So. 2d 262, 264 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)("[L]ay testimony is legally insufficient to support a finding of causation where the medical condition involved is not readily observable."); Ackley v. General Parcel Service, 646 So. 2d 242, 245 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)("The determination of the cause of a non-observable medical condition, such as a psychiatric illness, is essentially a medical question."); Wausau Insurance Company v. Tillman, 765 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)("Because the medical conditions which the claimant alleged had resulted from the workplace incident were not readily observable, he was obligated to present expert medical evidence establishing that causal connection."). Here, the opinions of Doctors Willis and Duchowny were not controverted or shown to lack credibility. Consequently, it must be resolved that the cause of Christian's impairments was most likely a developmentally based brain abnormality, as opposed to a "birth- related neurological injury," and, regardless of the etiology of his impairments, he is not permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired. See Thomas v. Salvation Army, 562 So. 2d 746, 749 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)("In evaluating medical evidence, a judge of compensation claims may not reject uncontroverted medical testimony without a reasonable explanation.").
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Jeffrey Puretz, M.D., was a participating physician at the time of the birth of Sophia Talley for purposes of the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan (Plan).
Findings Of Fact Stipulated Facts Petitioners Jaime Barnes and Jonathan Talley are the parents/natural guardians of Sophia Talley. The delivery of Sophia was performed by Intervenor, Jeffrey Puretz, M.D. Sophia was born at Lakeland Regional Medical Center (LRMC), a licensed hospital in Lakeland, Florida, on June 14, 2011. Sophia’s birth weight was 2,970 grams. Sophia was a single gestation. Sophia did not suffer from a genetic or congenital abnormality at birth. Sophia’s APGAR scores at birth were 4/8/9. Sophia was delivered by Cesarean section. Sophia is substantially and permanently mentally and physically impaired as a result of an hypoxic injury to her brain which occurred during labor, delivery and in the immediate post- delivery period. Sophia’s medical condition and treatment are documented in the birth records of Lakeland Regional Medical Center. The Petition in this cause was filed within five years from the date of birth of Sophia. Jeffrey Puretz, M.D., provided NICA notice to Jaime Barnes. Jeffrey Puretz, M.D., paid the NICA fee covering the period during which the birth of Sophia took place. NICA issued a certificate of participation regarding Jeffrey Puretz, M.D., for the period of time which included the date of birth of Sophia. At the time of Sophia’s birth, Jeffrey Puretz, M.D., was providing services pursuant to a contract with Central Florida Healthcare, Inc. (CFH). Facts based upon evidence of record At the time he delivered Sophia Talley, Dr. Puretz was employed by Women’s Care of Florida Lakeland OB/GYN. However, Dr. Puretz also provided obstetrical services pursuant to an independent contractor agreement with CFH. Ms. Barnes received her prenatal care from CFH. Dr. Puretz provided services to Ms. Barnes as a result of Ms. Barnes’ status as a patient of CFH, a federally-funded community healthcare provider. The independent contractor agreement between Dr. Puretz and CFH states that Dr. Puretz has been "deemed" an employee of the federal government pursuant to the Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act and reads in pertinent part as follows: The practice represents and warrants to the Contractor that it has been “deemed” and that during the term of this Agreement it shall remain “deemed” as an employee of the Federal Government pursuant to the Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-73). As such, all of the Practice’s employees and certain independent contractors, as well as the Practice itself, are afforded protection under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for claims relating to personal injury, including death, resulting from the performance of medical procedures required under this Agreement. The Contractor, by virtue of his/her independent contractor status in the field of obstetrics and gynecology, will be afforded protection under the FTCA for duties performed under this Agreement. The NICA Notice provided to Ms. Barnes by CFH includes the name of Dr. Puretz as one of the physicians who could be providing obstetrical care to Ms. Barnes. In addition to having a “Certificate of Participation” from NICA, Dr. Puretz appears on NICA’s list of participating physicians, which listed Dr. Puretz as a participating physician for the time period in which Sophia was born. Carol Fox is Associate Vice President of Medical and Academic affairs at LRMC. Her responsibilities include oversight of the medical staff office, which does the credentialing, privileging, and enrollment of medical staff members of the hospital. According to Ms. Fox, a physician must provide evidence of licensure and malpractice insurance to apply for medical staff privileges. The office is also responsible for confirming that physicians with privileges are participants in NICA. Dr. Puretz is an active staff member providing obstetrical services at LRMC. A copy of Dr. Puretz’s memorandum of insurance for medical professional liability insurance is kept on file at LRMC, listing his private practice, Women’s Care Florida, LLC, as the named insured. According to Ms. Fox, LRMC does not consider or rely upon a physician’s employment status when considering the granting of privileges. The Agreement between Dr. Puretz and CFH specifically contemplates that the services provided by Dr. Puretz include both hospital and outpatient services. It is Dr. Puretz’s understanding that he was acting as a federal employee under the contract with CFH when he was providing obstetrical services for the birth of Sophia.
The Issue At issue is whether Christopher Kocher, a deceased minor, qualifies for coverage under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan. If so, whether the notice requirements of the Plan were satisfied.
Findings Of Fact Findings related to the parental award and past expenses At hearing, the parties stipulated that there were no monies owing for past expenses, as they had been paid by collateral sources (private insurance). Section 766.31(1)(a). The parties further agreed that Petitioners, as the parents of Christopher Kocher, a deceased minor, be accorded a lump sum award of $100,000.00, as well as an award of $1,500.00 for funeral expenses. Section 766.31(1)(b). Findings related to attorney's fees and costs incurred in connection with the filing of the claim To support their claim for attorney's fees, Petitioners offered what was titled "Ferraro & Associates, P.A.'s Time Sheet." (Petitioners' Composite Exhibit 1, "Ferraro & Associates, P.A.'s Time Sheet"). As explained by Plaintiffs' counsel, at hearing MR. JOHNSTON: And these were -- these are the hours that were reconstructed. Our firm doesn't normally keep time records. We're a plaintiffs firm. But Mr. Falzone did go through and estimated the time that was spent on the NICA related matters and put them in this time sheet . . . . The time sheet reflected 17 hours dedicated to the case by Mr. Falzone, for which Petitioners requested an hourly rate of $500 (a total of $8,500.00), and 109.25 hours dedicated to the case by "different associates," for which Petitioners requested an hourly rate of $250.00 (a total of $27,312.50), for a total award of $35,812.50. Notably, such time sheet is hearsay, and was received into evidence subject to the limitations of Section 120.57(1)(c). ("Hearsay evidence may be used for the purpose of supplementing or explaining other evidence, but it shall not be sufficient in itself to support a finding unless it would be admissible over objection in civil actions.") Consequently, since no witnesses were called or competent evidence offered detailing the services rendered or the prevailing hourly rate charged in the community by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation, for similar services, there is no competent proof to support an award of attorney's fees. Mercy Hospital, Inc. v. Johnson, 431 So. 2d 687, 688 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)("[Attorney's] failure to present detailed evidence of his services is fatal to his claim."); Yakubik v. Board of County Commissioner's of Lee County, 656 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)("The testimony of an expert witness concerning reasonable attorney's fees is necessary to support the establishment of the fees.") Nevertheless, at hearing, Respondent agreed that it would accept 37.25 hours (the hours ostensibly expended from November 7, 2000, through April 28, 2001), as reasonably expended in pursuing the claim, and $175.00 as a reasonable hourly rate, for a total fee award of $6,518.75. Here, given that the claim was routine, and lacked any novel aspect that would warrant the time claimed by Petitioners' counsel, Respondent's concession is reasonable. Consequently, given that Petitioners' counsel obviously expended some time pursuing the claim, and there is no competent proof to otherwise support an award of attorney's fees, an award of $6,518.75 is appropriate. Finally, Petitioners seek to recover certain expenses they claim were reasonably incurred in connection with pursuing the claim for compensation. Such costs total $4,139.30. (Petitioners' Composite Exhibit 1, "Case Expense Report," page 3). Respondent does not object to the costs reflected on counsel's "Case Expense Report," page 3, commencing with the entry of November 7, 2000 ($15.00), and extending through the entry of March 20, 2001 ($15.50), totaling $1,036.02. Accordingly, those costs are awarded, without further discussion. As for the balance of expenses claimed, and opposed by Respondent, the record is devoid of proof to support their recovery. Notably, as with their claim for attorney's fees, Petitioners offered neither testimony nor competent evidence detailing the nature of the expenses claimed. Consequently, it would be pure speculation to conclude such expenditures constitute costs that are traditionally taxable, that they were reasonable in amount, or that they were necessarily incurred in pursuing the claim for compensation. Consequently, such expenses are not recoverable.
The Issue At issue is whether Christopher White-Maldonado, a minor, qualifies for coverage under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan.
Findings Of Fact Preliminary findings Petitioner, Susanna Maldonado, is the natural mother and guardian of Christopher White-Maldonado, a minor. Christopher was born a live infant on January 1, 2000, at Orlando Regional Healthcare System, Inc., d/b/a Arnold Palmer Hospital, a hospital located in Orlando, Florida, and his birth weight exceeded 2,500 grams. The physician providing obstetrical services at Christopher's birth was Virgil Davila, M.D., who, at all times material hereto, was a "participating physician" in the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, as defined by Section 766.302(7), Florida Statutes. Coverage under the Plan Pertinent to this case, coverage is afforded by the Plan for infants who suffer a "birth-related neurological injury," defined as an injury to the brain . . . caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery period in a hospital, which renders the infant permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired." § 766.302(2), Fla. Stat. See also §§ 766.309 and 766.31, Fla. Stat. Here, the medical records and the results of a neurological examination by Michael Duchowny, M.D., a physician board-certified in pediatrics, neurology with special competence in child neurology, and clinical neurophysiology, demonstrate, and Petitioner agrees, that Christopher does not suffer from a substantial mental or physical impairment, much less a permanent and substantial mental and physical impairment, as required for coverage under the Plan.1 (Respondent's Exhibits 1-7, Transcript page 10 and 11). Consequently, the claim is not compensable, and it is unnecessary to resolve whether Christopher's impairments resulted from brain injury caused by birth trauma (oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury), as advocated by Petitioner, or whether they are developmentally based, as advocated by Respondent.
The Issue The petition (claim) filed on behalf of Petitioners presented the following issues for resolution:1 Whether the claim is compensable under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensable Plan (Plan). Whether the notice provisions of the Plan were satisfied. Whether the exclusiveness of remedy provision of the Plan is an available defense to a nurse midwife or hospital when no civil claim has been made against the participating physician. Whether the amendments to Sections 766.301(1)(d) and 766.304, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1998), which accorded the administrative forum exclusive jurisdiction to resolve whether claims are covered by the Plan, may be applied retroactively.
Findings Of Fact Fundamental findings Petitioners, Maria Ferguson (formerly known as Maria Mish) and Garry Ferguson, are the parents and natural guardians of Casey Ferguson, a minor. Casey was born a live infant on January 28, 1997, at Morton Plant Mease Health Care, Inc., d/b/a Mease Hospital Dunedin (Mease Hospital), a hospital located in Dunedin, Florida, and her birth weight exceeded 2,500 grams. The physician who provided obstetrical services during Casey's birth was Harvey A. Levin, M.D., and he was, at the time, a "participating physician" in the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, as defined by Section 766.302(7), Florida Statutes. Services were also provided during the course of birth by Lenore V. McCall, a certified nurse midwife (C.N.M.). At the time, Ms. McCall had not paid the assessment requirement by Section 766.314(4)(c) and (5)(a), Florida Statutes, and was not a "participating physician" in the Plan. Coverage under the Plan Pertinent to this case, coverage is afforded by the Plan for infants who suffer a "birth-related neurological injury," defined as an "injury to the brain . . . caused by oxygen deprivation . . . occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate post-delivery period in a hospital, which renders the infant permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired." Sections 766.302(2) and 766.309(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Here, NICA has concluded, and the parties have stipulated, that Casey suffered a "birth-related neurological injury," as defined by the Plan. NICA's conclusion, as well as the parties' stipulation, is grossly consistent with the record. Consequently, since obstetrical services were provided by a participating physician at birth, the claim is compensable, and NICA's proposal to accept the claim is approved.3 Sections 766.309(1) and 766.31(1), Florida Statutes. Notice of Plan participation While the claim qualifies for coverage under the Plan, Petitioners have responded to the health care providers' claim of Plan immunity by contending that the participating physician who delivered obstetrical services at birth (Dr. Levin), as well as the hospital (Mease Hospital), failed to comply with the notice provisions of the Plan.4 Consequently, it is necessary to resolve whether, as alleged by the health care providers, the notice provisions of the Plan were satisfied. O'Leary v. Florida Birth- Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, 757 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), and University of Miami v. M.A., 793 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). Pertinent to this issue, it is worthy of note that, at the time of Casey's birth, Section 766.316, Florida Statutes, prescribed the notice requirements, as follows: Notice to obstetrical patients of participation in the plan.--Each hospital with a participating physician on its staff and each participating physician . . . under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan shall provide notice to the obstetrical patients thereof as to the limited no-fault alternative for birth- related neurological injuries. Such notice shall be provided on forms furnished by the association and shall include a clear and concise explanation of a patient's rights and limitations under the plan. It is further worthy of note that NICA developed a brochure titled "Peace of Mind for An Unexpected Problem" to comply with the statutory mandate, and distributed the brochure to participating physicians and hospitals so they could furnish the brochure (form) to their patients. Turning now to the case at hand, it is observed that Mrs. Ferguson received her prenatal care at A Woman's Place, an office maintained for the practice of obstetrics and gynecology by Harvey A. Levin, M.D., and A. Trent Williams, M.D., at 5347 Main Street, Suite 302, New Port Richey, Florida. Also active in the practice were a number of midwives, including Lenore McCall. Of note, Doctors Levin and Williams delivered exclusively at Mease Hospital Dunedin. Regarding her care, the proof demonstrates that Mrs. Ferguson's initial visit to A Woman's Place occurred on May 30, 1996. As would be expected, Mrs. Ferguson initially presented to the front window (front desk), registered her presence (by writing her name on the pad at the front window), and then took a seat in the waiting room. Shortly thereafter, Mrs. Ferguson was recalled to the front window and given a number of forms (referred to as a packet in this proceeding) to fill out, date, sign, and return before she could be seen by a healthcare provider. Among the documents she completed and returned to the front desk was a form titled Notice to Obstetric Patient,5 which provided: NOTICE TO OBSTETRIC PATIENT (See Section 766.316, Florida Statutes) I have been furnished information by A WOMAN'S PLACE AND/OR MEASE HOSPITAL prepared by the Florida Birth Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, and have been advised that Drs. Levin and Williams are participating physicians in that program, wherein certain limited compensation is available in the event certain neurological injury may occur during labor, delivery or resuscitation. For specifics on the program, I understand I can contact the Florida Birth Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association (NICA), Barnett Bank Building, 315 South Calhoun Street, Suite 312, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, (904) 488-8191. I further acknowledge that I have received a copy of the brochure prepared by NICA. DATED this day of , 199 . Signature (NAME OF PATIENT) Social Security Number Attest: (Nurse or Physician) Date: Here, Mrs. Ferguson acknowledges receipt of the Notice to Obstetric Patient, and therefore notice that Doctors Levin and Williams were participants in the Plan, but denies receipt of the brochure prepared by NICA. Notably, it is that brochure, titled Peace of Mind for An Unexpected Problem, which contains the "clear and concise explanation of a patient's rights and limitations under the [P]lan" required by the notice provisions of Section 766.316, Florida Statutes.6 In response to Mrs. Ferguson's denial, and to buttress its argument that Mrs. Ferguson received the brochure, Mease Hospital offered proof regarding the customary practice employed by A Woman's Place for all new patients. According to Joanie Perkins, the OB coordinator, all new patients were routinely handed a number of forms (the packet) to fill out on their first visit, including the Notice to Obstetric Patient, with a copy of the NICA brochure attached. The packets were prepared by Ms. Perkins once or twice a month in quantities of 20 or 30, and stored at her desk until needed. Then, the day preceding a new patient's first visit, she would place a packet inside the new patient's file (also referred to as a chart) and give the file to the front desk clerk. On arrival, the front desk clerk would hand the packet (on a clipboard) to the new patient. When returned to the clerk, the forms were then given back to Ms. Perkins, who would put them in the patient's chart. Following completion of the forms, a new patient was routinely seen by Ms. Perkins, who entered certain basic information on the patient's antepartum record (such as, the date of the first visit; the patient's name, address, date of birth, and insurance carrier; the hospital where delivery was to occur; and height and weight). It was also during this period that Ms. Perkins routinely distributed to the new patient what was referred to as the OB packet. That packet included a folder from Mease Hospital (also referred to by the hospital as their baby book), which contained information about the hospital and other materials, including pre-registration papers. The OB packet also included a prenatal care booklet, as well as education materials pertaining to Lamaze and exercise classes, and information pertaining to anesthesia. Samples of pre-natal vitamins, coupons for diaper bags, and other miscellaneous materials were also included in the OB packet. Following her meeting with Ms. Perkins, the new patient was then referred to a physician or nurse midwife to complete her initial visit. Contrasted with the conclusion one would draw from her acknowledgment execution of the Notice to Obstetric Patient and the customary practice of A Woman's Place, Mrs. Ferguson testified that not only was the NICA brochure not attached to the notice she signed, but the only items she received that day were a book titled Child Birth Planner and some prenatal vitamins. The reasons for Mrs. Ferguson's statements are two-fold. First, according to Mrs. Ferguson, she recalls that one of the forms referred to an attachment or additional document that was not included, and that when she brought this oversight to the attention of the front desk clerk she was unable to locate one. Of note, the only form Mrs. Ferguson signed that day that referred to another document she should have received was the Notice to Obstetric Patient. Second, Mrs. Ferguson observed that she is compulsive regarding the retention of documents, and that with regard to her pregnancy with Casey she retained every document she received from, inter alia, A Woman's Place and Mease Hospital. Those documents, which Mrs. Ferguson identified as Petitioners' Exhibit 5A-5Y at hearing, did not include a NICA brochure or a Mease Hospital baby book, but did include two pages of education materials pertaining to Lamaze and exercise classes, and information pertaining to anesthesia, all of which were customarily included in the new patient OB packet. Also included was a booklet Mrs. Ferguson received when she participated in a tour of the Mease Hospital Maternity Center. Of note, the availability of Maternity Center tours was a topic addressed in the hospital's baby book. Here, giving due consideration to the proof, it must be resolved that, more likely than not, Mrs. Ferguson received the NICA brochure on her initial visit, as evidenced by her signature on the Notice to Obstetric Patient and as one would anticipate from the customary practice of A Woman's Place. It is further resolved that, more likely than not, Mrs. Ferguson received the OB packet on her initial visit, which included a Mease Hospital baby book. In concluding that Mrs. Ferguson did receive a copy of the NICA brochure on her initial visit, the testimony of Mrs. Ferguson to the contrary, has clearly not been overlooked. However, Mrs. Ferguson's testimony, both in deposition and at hearing, demonstrates that she had very little recall of the events which took place during her initial visit. Moreover, while Mrs. Ferguson suggests that the front desk clerk could not locate a NICA brochure, the compelling proof reflects that the brochures were readily available and that staff was aware they could be obtained at Ms. Perkins' desk. In concluding that Mrs. Ferguson also received the OB packet on her initial visit, the testimony of Mrs. Ferguson to the contrary has also not been overlooked. However, for reasons similar to those noted with regard to the NICA brochure, Mrs. Ferguson's testimony has been found unpersuasive. While Mrs. Ferguson received notice on behalf of the participating physician, the proof failed to demonstrate that Mease Hospital provided any pre-delivery notice, as envisioned by Section 766.316, Florida Statutes. Moreover, there was no proof offered to support a conclusion that the hospital's failure to accord Mrs. Ferguson pre-delivery notice was occasioned by a medical emergency or that the giving of notice was otherwise not practicable. In reaching such conclusion, the inclusion of the hospital's name in the Notice to Obstetric Patient provided by A Woman's Place to Mrs. Ferguson has not been overlooked. However, the reason the hospital's name was included on the form stands unexplained, and there is no proof that A Woman's Place was requested or authorized to provide notice on behalf of the hospital. Indeed, for all that appears of record, the inclusion of the hospital's name was gratuitous, and can hardly be deemed to satisfy the hospital's independent obligation under Section 766.316, to provide notice to Mrs. Ferguson.7 Finally, in concluding that the hospital did not provide pre-delivery notice as envisioned by the Plan, the testimony offered by the hospital (through the deposition of Rosemary Atkinson, Intervenor's Exhibit 1), wherein she testified that the hospital routinely included a copy of the NICA brochure in its baby book, has likewise not been overlooked. However, given the absence of proof regarding the manner in which the hospital's baby books were assembled, the method employed to distribute them to physicians, and the manner in which the books were safeguarded at the physician's office prior to distribution, such proof is inadequate to allow a conclusion to be drawn with any sense of confidence that a baby book given to a patient, such as Mrs. Ferguson, contained a NICA brochure. Moreover, even if it could be demonstrated that the baby book contained a copy of the NICA brochure (commingled with other papers) when it was given to Mrs. Ferguson, the absence of any statement or explanation to draw her attention to the brochure, or its significance, could hardly be considered notice as that word is commonly understood and as that word is used in the Plan.
The Issue The issue to determine in this matter is whether the minor child should be awarded compensation under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association Plan.
Findings Of Fact On October 16, 2018, Petitioner Brandi L. Jennings was admitted to St. Joseph's to deliver her child (Killian). As part of her admission that day, Ms. Jennings signed a Receipt of NICA Information ("Receipt") presented to her by St. Joseph's pursuant to section 766.316. The Receipt notified Ms. Jennings that St. Joseph's was furnishing her information prepared by NICA, and stated that "certain limited compensation is available in the event certain types of qualifying neurological injuries may occur during labor, delivery or resuscitation." By providing Ms. Jennings this Receipt, St. Joseph's complied with the terms of the NICA notice requirement set forth in section 766.316. On October 18, 2018, Ms. Jennings gave birth to Killian at St. Joseph's. Killian was born a live infant weighing at least 2,500 grams. However, during the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery period, Killian sustained an injury to the brain or spinal cord caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury, which rendered him permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired. (Killian was ultimately diagnosed with hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy.) As such, Killian's injury qualifies as a "birth-related neurological injury" as defined in section 766.302(2). Killian was delivered by obstetrician, Kathryn Leenhouts, M.D. Dr. Leenhouts was the only physician who directly provided obstetrical services to Ms. Jennings in the course of her labor and delivery or in the immediate postdelivery period at St. Joseph's. At the time of Killian's birth, Dr. Leenhouts was not employed by St. Joseph's. Instead, Dr. Leenhouts worked for Exodus Women's Center, where she, along with other members of that group, had previously applied for and were granted staff privileges at St. Joseph's. During the year of Killian's birth (2018), Dr. Leenhouts did not pay the assessment set forth in section 766.314, which is required for participation in the NICA Plan. Neither was any evidence offered to establish that Dr. Leenhouts was exempt from payment of the assessment for 2018. Consequently, Dr. Leenhouts was not a "participating physician" in the Plan as that term is defined by section 766.302(7). St. Joseph's, on the other hand, was current with its assessment payments under section 766.314 for 2018. Based on "all available evidence" in the record, Petitioners' claim does not meet the statutory requirements for compensability under the Plan. The evidence produced at the final hearing establishes that the obstetrical services provided at Killian's birth were not delivered by a "participating physician" as defined in section 766.302(7). Therefore, Petitioners' claim does not meet the requirements for compensation under section 766.309(1), and Killian is not eligible for an award of NICA benefits under section 766.31.
