Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Petitioner, a black male, was hired by Respondent on February 11, 1985. Petitioner was employed as a wet mill laborer at Respondent's Florida Plant located in Bradford County, Florida. Petitioner's primary duties consisted of washing spirals and performing general housekeeping. Petitioner, like all newly hired employees, was hired subject to a ninety (90) day probationary period. Petitioner was provided an orientation period, given training, and was informed verbally during his employment about the importance of good job performance during his probation period. Petitioner was terminated by Respondent on April 1, 1985 during Petitioner's probationary period. Petitioner reported to four (4) first-line supervisors during his short period of employment which was the result of Petitioner being primarily on the day shift while the supervisors worked on a rotating shift basis. Petitioner's supervisors and the dates under each supervisor are as follows: C. A. Baldree during the weeks ending February 17, 1985 and March 17, 1985; J. W. Sherrill during the weeks ending February 24, 1985 and March 31, 1985; D. W. Baldree during the weeks ending March 3, 1985 and March 24, 1985 and; W. J. Frick during the week ending March 10, 1985. Although Petitioner's testimony conflicted with all three (3) first- line supervisors who testified concerning the fact surrounding the incidents which eventually gave rise to Petitioner's termination, the more credible evidence shows: During the week ending March 17, 1985, Supervisor C. A. Baldree instructed Petitioner and another employee to clean handrails in a specific area where a management visitation group would be observing. Petitioner proceeded to clean handrails in an area other than the one specified by the supervisor and when the supervisor attempted to advise Petitioner of his failure to follow instructions, Petitioner became abusive toward the supervisor and argued that he was following instructions. The Area Supervisor Gilberto Valazquez observed the incident and tried to resolve the matter with a meeting between Petitioner and Supervisor C. A. Baldree but Petitioner declined, commenting that he was afraid of losing his job. During the week ending March 24, 1985, Supervisor D. W. Baldree assigned Petitioner and another employee to wash some spirals in a specific area where visiting management would be observing. Again, Petitioner took it upon himself to clean spirals in a different area and when the supervisor attempted to advise Petitioner of his failure to follow instructions, Petitioner responded that he felt that where he had started was as good as any place to start, notwithstanding that Petitioner was aware of the reason for starting where the supervisor had instructed him to start cleaning. Also, during the week ending March 24, 1985, Supervisor D. W. Baldree repeatedly instructed Petitioner concerning the replacement of hoses and cutters that may be disconnected during the washing of the spirals. However, on several occasions Petitioner failed to replace the hoses and cutters that were disconnected during the washing process as instructed. During the week ending March 31, 1985, Supervisor J. W. Sherrill instructed Petitioner to clean out a tail box that was plugged with sand and adversely affecting production. When the supervisor returned in approximately 20-30 minutes he found the tail box still plugged. When the supervisor attempted to inform Petitioner of his failure to unplug the tail box, Petitioner became argumentative and pointed out that he had unplugged the tail box and that it was only water from a clear water hose that was dripping, notwithstanding the fact that a large amount of sand had accumulated and that muddy water rather than clean water was running from the tail box. At the end of the work week ending March 31, 1985, Supervisor Valazquez met with Petitioner and Supervisor Sherrill concerning an alleged promise made by Supervisor Sherrill to allow Petitioner to leave work early which Petitioner felt Supervisor Sherrill had reneged on, notwithstanding that supervisor had explained to Petitioner why he could not leave early. During the course of the discussion, Petitioner became very belligerent towards Supervisor Sherrill which prompted Supervisor Valazquez to review Petitioner's overall employment record to determine whether Petitioner should continue in the employment of Respondent. Supervisor Valazquez, in investigating Petitioner's overall performance, discussed Petitioner's employment record with all of Petitioner's first-line supervisors and also asked each of them for written comments. Based upon his own observations of Petitioner's job performance and his attitude toward supervision, the supervisors' comments, and the fact that as a short service probationary employee Petitioner was making no effort to improve his job performance or his attitude toward supervision, Supervisor Valazquez felt that Petitioner may not be salvageable as an employee and questioned Petitioner's continued employment with Respondent. Supervisor Valazquez reviewed Petitioner's performance record with his superiors and the site's Employee Relations Supervisor L. H. Wood, who was the site's Affirmative Action Officer. Wood found no evidence of discriminatory motivation. Valazquez's superiors concurred in the discharge recommendation. On April 1, 1985, Valazquez met with Petitioner to discuss the potential discharge action but approached the meeting with the view that should Petitioner show a change in his attitude in regard to his job performance and in accepting supervision, then Valazquez would change his mind and give the Petitioner another chance. When Valazquez attempted to review Petitioner's poor job performance and attitude problems with Petitioner, Petitioner again became very defensive and argumentative. As a result of Petitioner's attitude in this meeting, Valazquez proceeded with the discharge action that had been approved by management. Although the record reflects that Petitioner did not receive any written or verbal warnings from any of his shift- supervisors that his performance was so unsatisfactory that if improvement was not made he would be terminated, Petitioner was made aware, by his shift-supervisors and area supervisor that poor job performance was a basis for termination, particularly during his probationary period. There was at least one (1) occasion, the incident which occurred during the week ending February 17, 1985 with C. A. Baldree, where Petitioner commented about the possibility of losing his job and Valazquez advised him that he would not lose his job so long as he performed properly and showed respect for his supervisors. On three (3) other occasions, his supervisors made the Petitioner aware of his poor job performance and poor attitude. Petitioner was not advised of any written memorandums concerning his job performance or possible termination had been prepared until April 1, 1985, the date Petitioner had a conference with Valazquez and, due to his defensive and argumentative attitude, was not allowed further opportunity to improve his job performance or his attitude and was terminated. No formal employee/supervisor conferences were held with Petitioner until April 1, 985, the date Petitioner was terminated. On the same date that Petitioner was hired, Robert McGee, a white male, was hired by Respondent as a laborer. McGee was assigned to a field laborer position, reporting almost exclusively to one (1) supervisor, Doris Cole. Field laborers work in an area separate and apart from the wet mill and report to different first-line supervisors than the wet mill laborers. On April 25, 1985, within McGee's probationary period, McGee received a formal employee/supervisor conference concerning his unsatisfactory job performance and his damaging of company equipment, warned that definite improvement in his job performance was expected or probation or possibly termination could be expected. On July 3, 1985, McGee received another employee/supervisor conference which involved McGee, Doris Cole and Valazquez and McGee was informed that his performance had improved slightly but significant improvement was expected in the next two (2) weeks or he could expect termination. McGee was placed on probation at this time. On August 2, 1985, another formal employee/supervisor conference was held with McGee wherein it was noted that McGee had demonstrated that- he could perform at a satisfactory level but that continued improvement was expected and that McGee would remain on probation until October 3, 1985. The final employee/supervisor conference record dated October 4, 1985 concluded that McGee could not consistently perform satisfactorily, therefore termination was recommended. McGee did not attend this conference but resigned by telephone on that date in lieu of being terminated. McGee reviewed each of the employee/supervisor conference reports with the exception of the one on October 4, 1985 and each of the reports were included in his personnel file, including the one for October 4, 1985. McGee was a marginal employee who tried to perform his job properly and was receptive to constructive criticism; however, he was unable to improve his performance to a point that was acceptable to Respondent's management. McGee worked on the wet mill for brief periods without incident. McGee had no history of refusing to follow instructions of his supervisor or of being argumentative with the supervisors. The Respondent had no stated policy that required written warnings of poor job performance to employees by their respective supervisors. It was the general policy of the -shift supervisors that during the probationary period, especially during the early part of the probationary period, warnings of poor job performance were given verbally to the employee and that a formal employee/supervisor conference was reserved for more severe matters such as violation of safety rules. However, the manner in which a supervisor handled a particular warning of poor job performance during an employee's probationary period was left to the discretion of the individual supervisor. The record reflects only two (2) other incidents where an employee/supervisor conference was held with an employee during the employee's initial probationary period: Kathy D. Sanders, a black female, on June 5, 1985 and; Bernard Brown, a black male, on March 27, 1984. C. A. Baldree, D. W. Baldree and J. W. Sherrill, three (3) of Petitioner's shift supervisors, were all white as were the supervisors of McGee. Respondent has, and had during Petitioner's employment, an aggressive Affirmative Action program which applied to all aspects of the employment environment. Respondent has in the past received national and local recognition for its Affirmative Action efforts. Respondent's employment of minorities has exceeded the availability of minorities in the labor supply area. Although the local availability of minorities was fifteen percent (15 percent), twenty to twenty-one percent (20-21 percent) of employees at the site were minorities. Of the forty three (43) individuals hired, closely related in time to Petitioner's dates of employment, ten (10) or twenty-three percent (23 percent) were black. Although at the time of Petitioner's initial employment, Respondent had some misgivings about Petitioner's failure to disclose certain information on his employment application, Respondent decided to hire Petitioner anyway because of its Affirmative Action efforts and Petitioner's tests results. The clear weight of the evidence shows that Respondent's reasons for discharging Petitioner was his poor job performance and his argumentative and abusive behavior towards the supervisors when instructed to correct a situation where Petitioner had failed to follow instructions, either intentionally or because he had misunderstood the instructions. The clear weight of the evidence establishes that Petitioner was treated in a dissimilar manner from the white employee, but the disparity of treatment resulted from a dissimilar attitude toward job performance and supervision rather than racial motivation. Area Supervisor Valazquez, the supervisor primarily involved in the decision to discharge Petitioner, is Hispanic.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order finding that the Petitioner, Milton Baker, was not discharged due to his race in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (1985), and that the Petition for Relief be dismissed. Respectfully submitted and entered this 16th day of March, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of March, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-3623 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner 1-3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. The first sentence adopted in Finding of Fact 4. The second sentence rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 6.(a-c) Adopted in Finding of Fact 5 (a-d) but clarified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10 but clarified. Adopted in Findings of Fact 6 through 9 and 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Rejected as not supported by substantial competent in the record. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Adopted in Findings of Fact 2, 13, 14 and 17. Adopted in Findings of Fact 15 and 18. Adopted in Findings of Fact 16 and 18. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20 but clarified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20 but clarified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20 but clarified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 22. Rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. Rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. Rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. Respondent had no Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5(a) but modified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5(b) but modified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5(c) but modified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5(d) but modified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6 but modified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7 but modified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8 but modified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Adopted in Finding of Facts 17 and 19. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20 but clarified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20 but clarified. Adopted in Findings of Fact 10, 11 and 12. Adopted in Findings of Fact 14, 15 and 16. Adopted in Finding of Fact 21. Adopted in Finding of Fact 23. Adopted in Finding of Fact 24. Adopted in Finding of Fact 25 but clarified. COPIES FURNISHED: John F. MacLennan, Esquire Kattman, Eshelman & MacLennan 1920 San Marco Boulevard Jacksonville, Florida 32207 Jerry H. Brenner, Esquire Legal Department E. I. du Point de Nemours and Company 100 West 10th Street Wilmington, DE 19898 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Manatee County School Board (Petitioner) has just cause to terminate the employment of Teacher Karyn Cena (Respondent).
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, the Respondent was a first grade teacher employed by the Petitioner to work at Tillman Elementary School (Tillman) pursuant to a professional services contract. On May 11, 2010, the Tillman first grade students were gathered in an auditorium to rehearse for a musical program to be presented in celebration of Memorial Day. The students had been rehearsing for several days prior to May 11, 2010. As might be expected, some first grade students required occasional redirection. Such redirection was generally communicated by a teacher delivering a "stern look" to the non-complying student. If the correction was not successful, a non-complying student was directed to go to the back of the room and sit on a bench that essentially served as a "time out" area. At one point in the program, the students were standing, singing, and holding up their arms, pretending to waive American flags. The flags had not yet been distributed to the students. During this portion of the rehearsal on May 11, 2010, the Respondent apparently thought that one of the students ("S.M.") was playing and not pretending to wave the non-existent flag appropriately. The Respondent grabbed the student by the arm and quickly walked the student to the back of the room, where the Respondent placed the student forcefully on the time out bench. The student did not resist the Respondent in any manner. There was no credible evidence that the Respondent provided any redirection to the student prior to her physical interaction with the student. There was no evidence that the student was unable to comply with a verbal directive delivered by the Respondent or any other teacher. There was no evidence that the student was acting out or posed any threat whatsoever to himself or any other student, or to the Respondent or any other school employee. There was no evidence that any force or physical contact was necessary whatsoever to correct the student's behavior or to direct the student to the time out area. At the hearing, the Respondent was described by witnesses as appearing "angry" during the incident. Although the Respondent denied that she was angry with the child, the Respondent's interaction with the student was clearly inappropriate under the circumstances, and it is not unreasonable to attribute her behavior to anger. Observers of the incident testified that the student appeared to be embarrassed by the incident, sitting with his head bowed after being placed on the bench. Some teachers testified that they felt personal embarrassment for the student.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Manatee County School Board enter a final order, terminating the employment of Karyn Cena. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of March, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 2011.
The Issue The main issues in this case are whether, as the district school board alleges, a teacher has given the district just cause to terminate his employment contract for incompetency, and, alternatively, whether the teacher failed to correct performance deficiencies during a 90-day probationary period, which would constitute separate grounds for dismissal if proven true.
Findings Of Fact The Broward County School Board ("School Board"), Petitioner in this case, is the constitutional entity authorized to operate, control, and supervise the Broward County Public School System. At all relevant times, Respondent Christopher Marshall ("Marshall") was employed as a math teacher in the Broward County school district, a position which he had held for some 15 years before this proceeding began. During that period, Marshall taught at a few different schools, the latest being McArthur High, where he worked for several years up to and including the 2013-14 school year. Marshall's teaching career, sad to say, has been mediocre. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that, at least as early as 2002, Marshall was identified by administrators and colleagues as a teacher of marginal ability. More than once over the years Marshall was placed on performance probation due to concerns about his unsatisfactory performance. Rather than terminate Marshall's employment, however, the district transferred Marshall from school to school, and somehow he managed to muddle through, doing enough to be rated "satisfactory" and avoid getting the sack. One of Marshall's defining characteristics has been the remarkably high percentages of Fs and Ds that his students consistently have earned, year in and year out. Frequently more than half of his students took home final grades lower than a C——and sometimes quite a bit more than 50 percent fell into this category. This was true across grade levels (Marshall taught grades nine through 12) and without regard to degrees of subject-matter difficulty (Marshall taught advanced as well as basic classes; he was not assigned only struggling students). It was not uncommon for Marshall to fail between one-quarter and one-third of his students. In the 2013-14 school year, for example, 31 percent of Marshall's Liberal Arts Math 2 students received a failing grade; 25 percent of his Math College Readiness students failed; and ten percent of his Algebra 2 students got Fs. This was consistent with a decade-long pattern. Needless to say, a teacher whose students in large numbers routinely get Ds or worse in his classes attracts attention from students, colleagues, parents, and administrators. In Marshall's case, students complained to other teachers——and to their parents. Parents, of course, complained to administrators and demanded that their children be placed in other classes. Often, to placate angry parents, Marshall's students were transferred, with the result that Marshall's classes were small, and other math teachers had to squeeze in additional students. Teachers complained about this. It must be acknowledged that poor grades are not necessarily a reflection of the teacher's ability or lack thereof. Certainly, as a general rule, each student bears substantial responsibility for his or her own grade, and no one should expect a teacher simply to hand out high marks that are unmerited and unearned. Sometimes, to be sure, an F or a D is as richly deserved as an A or a B. That said, the sheer persistence of Marshall's grade distribution under different conditions and through changing student populations implies that something other than resistance or indifference to learning, poor study habits, or lack of intellectual ability must be at work. The undersigned has combed the record for an explanation of his students' poor grades that might exonerate Marshall but can find none. There is no persuasive evidence, for example, that Marshall is a demanding teacher who sets the bar high for his students, administering tough but fair tests that are difficult for the unmotivated or unprepared to pass. To the contrary, Marshall had his students spend time on rote exercises, such as copying definitions and formulas from the textbook, which have little educational value. Nor did Marshall's students tend to excel in their next math classes. Rather, after being taught by Marshall, his students often had difficulty in their subsequent courses because they had not learned the prerequisite material. For years, administrators have tried to cajole or compel Marshall to reduce the number of students receiving Fs and Ds in his classes, not by the expedient of grade inflation, but by implementing different pedagogical techniques and strategies. Marshall, however, has ignored these importunings and directives, and nothing has changed. Marshall's apparent imperviousness to criticism has been an ongoing source of frustration to his colleagues and administrators. Marshall considers himself to be an "awesome" teacher, and therefore he concludes that anyone who has a different opinion——which unfortunately seems to be nearly everyone with whom he has worked——is either mistaken, lying, or treating him unfairly. This has led Marshall to file numerous grievances and complaints against his supervisors, none of which has been successful. He is not, however, confrontational, discourteous, or abusive in his workplace relationships. Rather, Marshall engages in passive-aggressive behavior. Faced with a demand or a directive, Marshall does not argue (although he might politely disagree); he simply does not comply. The greater weight of the evidence persuades the undersigned to find that the bad grades Marshall's students consistently have received are a symptom of Marshall's inability to teach. Although he knows his subject, Marshall lacks the skills necessary to impart his knowledge to his students, who consequently do not learn math in his classes. It is not that Marshall is deliberately trying not to succeed. He is not being insubordinate in this regard. He is simply not suited to the job of teaching high school math. In 2011, following a legislative directive then recently enacted, the school district adopted a teacher evaluation system known as the Broward Instructional Development and Growth Evaluation System ("BrIDGES"), which is based on Dr. Robert J. Marzano's strategies for educational effectiveness. When rating a teacher's classroom performance using BrIDGES, an evaluator inputs his or her observations into a database by filling out an electronic "iObservation" form. The iObservation tool contains 60 "elements," each of which represents a discrete strategy, action, or skill that a teacher might employ as appropriate: e.g., "Using Academic Games," "Identifying Critical Information," and "Displaying Objectivity and Control." The elements are organized under four separate "domains" as follows: Domain 1: Classroom Strategies and Behaviors (Elements 1-41) Domain 2: Planning and Preparing (Elements 42-49) Domain 3: Reflecting on Teaching (Elements 50-54) Domain 4: Collegiality and Professionalism (Elements 55-60). The 41 elements of Domain 1 are further subdivided into nine Design Questions, DQ1 through DQ9. On October 8, 2013, the school district and the Broward Teachers Union entered into a Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") setting forth their agreements regarding the use of BrIDGES to evaluate teachers for 2013-14. Pursuant to the MOU, each classroom teacher was to receive at least three observations, including one formal (30 or more minutes), one informal (15-25 minutes), and one snapshot or walkthrough (3-10 minutes) observation. During an observation, the subject teacher receives a "datamark" (prescribed number of points) for each element that the evaluator chooses to rate. For 2013-14, the datamarks were as follows: Innovating (Highly Effective), 4 points; Applying (Effective), 3 points; Developing (Effective), 2.5 points; Beginning (Needs Improvement), 2 points; and Not Using (Unsatisfactory), 1 point. Each teacher was to receive at least 45 datamarks, comprising at least 25 datamarks in Domain 1 and 10 within Domains 2, 3, and/or 4. A weighted average of the datamarks assigned to a teacher's performance as recorded on the iObservation forms became the teacher's Instructional Practice Score ("IPS"). The IPS was equal to 0.68X plus 0.32Y, where X was the average of the teacher's Domain 1 datamarks and Y was the average of the teacher's datamarks for Domains 2, 3, and 4 combined. The IPS was reported as a number having three decimal digits, to the thousandths place. This created a false precision, for the calculated result could not possibly have been more precise than the number having the least number of significant figures in the equation, which would always be a one-digit integer (unless the teacher happened to receive strait 2.5s——possible, but unlikely, and not the case here). In other words, the numbers to the right of the decimal point in the teacher's IPS were mathematically insignificant, spurious digits, because the original data could not support a measurement beyond the precision of one significant figure. The IPS should have been (but was not) rounded to a single-digit integer to avoid reporting insignificant digits. For 2013-14, the BrIDGES Overall Evaluation Score equaled the sum of the teacher's IPS (weighted as 49%), Deliberate Practice score (weighted as 1.0%), and Student Growth score (weighted as 50%). Teachers at McArthur High (including Marshall) for whom no individual student data were available automatically received a Student Growth score of 3.0 for that school year, and all teachers (including Marshall) who completed a self-assessment received a Deliberate Practice score of 3.0. The Overall Evaluation Scale for 2013-14 was Highly Effective (3.450-4.000), Effective (2.500-3.449), Needs Improvement (2.000-2.499), and Unsatisfactory (1.000-1.999). As of February 4, 2014, Marshall had received eight observations: three formals, three informals, and two walkthroughs. He had received 56 datamarks in Domain 1 and five datamarks in Domains 2, 3, and 4. His weighted IPS, to that date, was 2.145 (but this computed score was precise to no more than one significant figure and therefore should be understood as a 2 after rounding off the spurious digits), or Needs Improvement. Pursuant to the MOU, once a teacher receives an average IPS of Needs Improvement or Unsatisfactory among other conditions that Marshall had met as of February 4, 2014, a Performance Development Plan ("PDP") may be written for that teacher. Accordingly, in early February 2014, a PDP was written for Marshall. As well, on February 12, 2014, the principal of McArthur High placed Marshall on performance probation for 90 calendar days, delivering to Marshall a notice of "less than effective performance" ostensibly pursuant to section 1012.34(4), Florida Statutes. The statute, however, authorizes 90-day performance probation only for a teacher whose performance is unsatisfactory, and Marshall's performance was not unsatisfactory; it was Needs Improvement. Needs Improvement is, to be sure, less than Effective performance, but it is better than Unsatisfactory. Indeed, none of the levels of performance besides Unsatisfactory denotes unsatisfactory performance and thus, logically, all teachers rated Highly Effective, Effective, or Needs Improvement fall within the range of satisfactory performance. In any event, between February 28 and May 7, 2014, Marshall received 12 more observations, which added 75 datamarks to his total in Domain 1 (making 131 in all) and six additional datamarks in Domains 2, 3, and 4 (for a grand total of 11). The iObservation forms for Marshall's last six observations, incidentally, are not in evidence. As of May 7, 2014, Marshall's IPS was 1.963. This number, by itself, would be Unsatisfactory on the Overall Evaluation Scale. Given, however, that the initial numerical data was captured (mostly) in single-digit integers, together with a handful of 2.5s, the decimal places are spurious in this result; there is no meaningful distinction between "1.963" (which is a textbook example of false precision) and "2" (which is what 1.963 should be rounded up to, to avoid the fallacy of overprecision). Thus, if the insignificant figures are ignored, Marshall's IPS, by itself, is actually Needs Improvement. But more important, Marshall's IPS was not his Overall Evaluation Score, and therefore it is improper and unfair to deem his performance Unsatisfactory on the Overall Performance Scale based on an IPS of 1.963 as the School Board wants to do. Marshall's Overall Evaluation Score, as calculated by the School Board, was 2.492 — Needs Improvement.1/ Again, Needs Improvement is less than Effective and clearly not ideal, but it is not Unsatisfactory. To the contrary, Needs Improvement is one of the levels of satisfactory performance. Going a step farther, if Marshall's IPS were rounded to 2, as it should be to eliminate the false precision, and his Overall Evaluation Score recalculated absent the spurious decimals, then his final score would be 2.51, which in turn should be rounded to 3 to avoid overprecision, but which equals Effective performance regardless. The point is, based on a final score of 2.492, Marshall's overall performance can as correctly be deemed Effective as Needs Improvement, for there is no real difference between 2.492 and 3 based on the original data used to make these calculations.2/ (To repeat for emphasis, computations cannot make the original data more precise.3/) Determinations of Ultimate Fact The greater weight of the evidence fails to establish that Marshall is guilty of the offense of misconduct in office, which is defined in Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-5.056(2).4/ The greater weight of the evidence establishes that Marshall is guilty of incompetency,5/ which is just cause for dismissal from employment. A preponderance of the evidence establishes that Marshall's performance as measured in accordance with the BrIDGES evaluation system was not Unsatisfactory during the 2013-14 school year. Therefore, the evidence does not support the termination of Marshall's employment contract pursuant to section 1012.34(4). The evidence does not support a determination that Marshall independently violated section 1012.53, apart from his incompetency, which affords a sufficient basis (as "just cause") for dismissal. The evidence does not support a determination that Marshall independently violated School Board Rule 4008(B), apart from his incompetency, which affords a sufficient basis (as "just cause") for dismissal.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board enter a final order dismissing Marshall from his employment as a teacher in the Broward County Public Schools for the just cause of incompetency as a result of inefficiency. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of March, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of March, 2016.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent satisfactorily corrected specified performance deficiencies within the 90-day probation period prescribed by Section 1012.34(3) (d), Florida Statutes, and, if not, whether Respondent's employment should be terminated.
Findings Of Fact A. 1. One of the statutory duties of Petitioner Miami-Dade County School Board ("Board") is to evaluate the performance of every teacher employed in the Miami-Dade County School District ("District"), at least once per year. To accomplish this, the Board uses a personnel assessment system known as "PACES," which is an acronym for Professional Assessment and Comprehensive Evaluation System. PACES is the product of collective bargaining between the Board and the teachers' union, and it has been duly approved by the Florida Department of Education. 2. The Board's evaluation procedure begins with an observation of the subject teacher, conducted by an administrator trained in the use of PACES. On a score sheet called the Observation Form for Annual Evaluation ("OFAE"), the evaluator rates the teacher's performance on 44 independently dispositive "indicators." The only grades assignable to the respective indicators are "acceptable" and “unacceptable”; thus, the evaluator's decision, for each indicator, is binary: yes or no, thumbs up or thumbs down.! A negative mark on any one of the 44 indicators results in an overall performance evaluation of "unsatisfactory." For the teacher under observation, therefore, each indicator constitutes, in effect, a pass/fail test, with his or her job hanging in the balance. 3. If the teacher passes all 44 of the independently dispositive indicators, then the teacher's performance is rated "setisfactory” and the evaluative process is complete. If, on the other hand, the teacher is given a failing grade on one or more of the 44 indicators and hence adjudged an unsatisfactory performer, then the initial observation is deemed to be "not of record" (i.e. inoperative) anda follow-up, “for the record" evaluation is scheduled to occur, upon notice to the affected teacher, about one month later. 4, In the meantime, the teacher is offered the assistance of a Professional Growth Team ("PGT"), a group of peers who, having received special training in PACES, are in a position to help the affected teacher correct performance deficiencies in advance of the follow-up evaluation. 5. The follow-up evaluation is conducted in the same manner as the initial "not of record" evaluation. If the teacher passes all 44 indicators, then his performance is deemed satisfactory and the evaluative process is complete. If he fails one or more of the indicators, however, then the teacher is placed on probation for a period of 90 calendar days (excluding vacations and holidays). The probation period is preceded by a formal Conference-for-the-Record ("CFR"), at which notice of the specific performance deficiencies is provided to the teacher. As well, the teacher is provided a PGT and given a Professional Improvement Plan ("PIP"), wherein particular remedial tasks, intended to help the teacher correct the noted performance deficiencies, are assigned. 6. During the performance probation, the teacher must be formally observed at least twice, by an evaluator using the OFBE. If, on any of these probationary observations, the teecher fails at least one indicator, then another PIP is prepared and offered. 7, The performance probation could end early, before 90 days have passed. This occurs when, during probation, the teacher is deemed to have mastered all the required indicators. At that point, should it come, the teacher receives a satisfactory performance rating, and the evaluative process is terminated. 8. ‘Within 14 days after the end of probation, assuming the process has not ended sooner as just described, a "confirmatory evaluation" is conducted, using the OFAE. The purpose of the confirmatory evaluation is to determine whether the noted performance deficiencies were corrected. If they were, then the teacher's performance is rated "satisfactory." If not, the principal then makes a recommendation to the superintendent whether to continue or terminate the teacher's employment. 9. As mentioned above, a PACES evaluation takes account of 44 crucial indicators. The indicators are organized under "components." The 44 outcome determinative indicators fall within 21 components, which are identified on the OFAE. These components are organized, in turn, under "domains," of which six are identified on the OFAE. 10. Each domain has been assigned a Roman numeral identifier: I through VI. The components are distinguished alphabetically: A, B, C, etc. The indicators are numbered using Arabic numerals. Each specific indicator is named according to the Roman numeral of its domain, the letter of its component, and its own Arabic number. Thus, for example, the first indicator under Component A of Domain I is referred to as "TL,A.1." 11. Notwithstanding the PACES taxonomy, the classifications of "domain" and "component" are useful only as a means of organizing the indicators. This is because a teacher does not pass or fail a performance evaluation at the domain level or at the component level; rather, he passes or fails at the indicator level, for, again, each of the 44 indicators is independently dispositive under PACES.” Thus, each of the determinative 44 indicators is of precisely equal weight. None is more important or less important than another.? B. 12. At all times material to this case, Respondent Leopoldo Mutis ("Mutis") was a teacher in the District. From 1999 until April 2004, when the Board suspended him pending termination of employment, Mutis taught middle school Spanish and ESOL at Key Biscayne K-8 Center ("Key Biscayne"). 13. During the 2003-04 school year, an evaluator observed Mutis in his classroom on five separate occasions, each time using the OFAE. The dates of these evaluations were, and the names of the respective evaluators are, as follows: Evaluation Date Evaluator October 23, 2003 Ana Maria Rasco, Principal, Key Biscayne November 17, 2003 Ms. Rasco January 13, 2004 Blanca Herrera-Torres, Assistant Principal, Key Biscayne February 18, 2004 Cathy Williams, Assistant Principal, Key Biscayne March 15, 2004 Ms. Rasco 14. The Board contends that Mutis failed ali five evaluations; the first, however, was deemed "not of record" and thus is relevant only insofar as it opened the door to the process that followed. The following table shows, for each evaluation for the record, the indicators that the respective evaluators thought Mutis had failed: Ti-lt-05 Gl-1s-08 02-18-06 G3-15-04 ; | | x | O1-13-04 [ TvEt_[ vat ver Ti-17-03 CU td 04 x | x [x 2-28-08 03-15-04 x 15. Because Ms. Rasco identified five performance deficiencies on November 17, 2003, Mutis was placed on 90-day performance probation, effective November 26, 2003, pursuant to the procedure described in detail above. Ms. Rasco held a CFR on November 25, 2003, to review with Mutis the identified deficiencies and explain the procedures relating to the 90-day probation. Following the CFR, Mutis was given written notice of unsatisfactory performance, in the form of a "Summary of Conference-For-The-Record And Professional Improvement Plan (PIP)," dated November 26, 2003 ("Summary"). In the Summary, Ms. Rasco charged Mutis with failure to satisfactorily perform the following PACES indicators: IV.A.3, IV.A.5, IV.B.2, VI.C.2, and VI.C.4. (These five indicators are highlighted vertically in the table above.) At the same time, Mutis was given a PIP, anc a PGT was assembled to provide assistance. 16. Following the confirmatory evaluation on March 15, 20C4, based on which Ms. Rasco identified 13 deficiencies as shown in the table above, Ms. Rasco notified the superintendent thet Mutis had failed to correct noted performance deficiencies during a 90-day probation and recommended that Mutis's employment be terminated. The superintendent accepted Ms. Rasco's recommendation and notified Mutis, by letter dated March 31, 2004, of his decision to recommend that the Board terminate Mutis's employment contract. On April 14, 2004, the Board voted to do just that. Cc. 17. In general terms, the ultimate issue in this case, according to Section 1012.33(3) (d)2.b., Florida Statutes, is whether Mutis corrected noted performance deficiencies as of the two-week period after the close of the 90 calendar days' probation. In view of the issue, the initial "of record" evaluation of November 17, 2003, is primarily relevant because it established the five "noted performance deficiencies" that Mutis needed to correct.’ Indeed, the Board cannot terminate Mutis's employment based on other deficiencies allegedly found during probation or at the confirmatory evaluation, but rather must focus exclusively on those five particular deficiencies which Mutis was given 90 calendar days to correct, for reasons that will be discussed below in the Conclusions of Law. Stated more precisely, then, the ultimate question in this case is whether any of the five specific deficiencies identified in the Summary provided to Mutis on November 26, 2003, persisted after the 90-day probation. 18. The two evaluations that were conducted during Mutis's probation (on January 13, 2004, and February 18, 2004) are of present interest mainly because they show Mutis making steady progress toward eliminating the noted deficiencies. By January 13, 2004, according to Ms. Herrera-Torres, Mutis had corrected three of the five noted deficiencies (Indicators IV.A.3, VI.C.2, and VI.C.4), leaving just two (Indicators IV.A.5 and V.B.2). When Ms. Williams evaluated Mutis on February 18, 2004, she found that the teacher had corrected four of the five noted performance deficiencies, failing him only on Indicator IV.A.5. 19. The evidence presented at hearing is insufficient, however, to support findings that Mutis was, in fact, deficient 10 with respect to (a) Indicators IV.A.5 and V.B.2 as determined by Ms. Herrera-Torres or (b) Indicator IV.A.5 as determined by Ms. Williams. As for the evaluation of January 13, 2004, it is found that the purpose of the learning task observed by Ms. Herrera-Torres that day was obviously to teach students rules relating to gender identification in the Spanish language. Thus, Indicator IV.A.5, which requires that the purpose or importance of learning tasks be clear to learners, was met. Regarding Indicator V.B.2, which requires that wait time be used as appropriate to enhance the development of thinking skills, Ms. Herrera-Torres gave no testimony at hearing; and, her cor.temporaneous written summary of Mutis's alleged deficiency in this area merely states, in conclusory fashion, that Mutis afforded students insufficient “wait time to think and develop answers to questions." A subjective opinion, devoid of facts, is not enough to justify an ultimate determination of insufficient performance in this regard. 20. As for the evaluation of February 18, 2004, it is found that Mutis informed the class observed by Ms. Williams that he intended to review a previous lesson or lessons. Having told his students that the purpose of the learning task was review, Mutis satisfied Indicator IV.A.5. 21. Thus, based on the evidence presented, it is found that Mutis's performance probation in connection with the five 11 noted deficiencies should have been terminated on January 14, 2004, or February 18, 2004, at the latest.° 22. As it happened, however, Mutis’s probation was not prematurely terminated, and Ms. Rasco performed a confirmatory evaluation on March 15, 2004. She found that Mutis had corrected two of the five noted performance deficiencies, giving Mutis a passing grade on Indicators IV.A.3 and VI.C.2. The remaining three deficiencies upon which termination could legally be based are identified in the table above with the "@" symbcl. It is to these three allegedly uncorrected deficiencies thet our attention now must turn. 23. The Board contends, based on Ms. Rasco's confirmatory evaluation of March 15, 2004, that Mutis was still, as of that date, failing satisfactorily to perform the following PACES indicators: IV.A.5: The purpose or importance of learning tasks is clear to learners. V.B.2: Wait time is used as appropriate to enhance the development of thinking skills. vI.C.4: Learners receive specific feedback when learning tasks and/or learning outcomes are completed. 24. The only descriptive evidence in the record regarding Muzis's performance on March 15, 2004——and hence the only evidence of historical fact upon which the undersigned can decide whether Mutis failed adequately to perform the three 12 indicators just mentioned—consists of Ms. Rasco's testimony, together with a memorandum dated March 15, 2004, that Ms. Rasco prepared for Assistant Superintendent Essie Pace. 25. At the final hearing, Ms. Rasco recounted what she had seen on March 14, 2004, when she observed Mutis in the classroom for 50 minutes: [1] This lesson—this lesson was atrocious. [2] First of all, Mr. Mutis walked into class three minutes late, the children were already seated in class. [3] When he walked in late, and I found this particularly offensive to the students because Mr. Mutis had been free for the two periods prior, this was fourth period, he had been free during second and third period so for him to have come in late was very difficult for me to understand. [4] Secondly, he was unprepared. He did not have his lesson plans readily available. He had to rummage through the stacks of papers on his desk to find his lesson plans. [5] This was a Monday morning, he had been out Friday, and he had proceeded to teach the lesson that the children had already done on Friday with the substitute. [6] Several students started to complain they could not understand why they had to repeat the lesson that they had already done on Friday, he was asking them to read some pages from a story, and they kept on explaining to him that they had already done it. He didn't explain to the children his rationale for doing—-for having them do it again, he just went through the lesson. 13 [7] There was an inordinate amount of off- task behavior. There was one student——and in this class there were maybe seven or eight students, this was a small class, there was one student who spent a long time catapulting a pen. There was another student who had birthday balloons attached to the back of her chair, and she was playing with the birthday balloons, fidgeting with the balloons for an extended period of time. [8] There was another student who was doing his writing assignment on a little, must have been a little five, maybe, a five by eight sheet of paper even though he told the students at the beginning of the lesson to take out their folders, this child was writing on a small piece of paper, and he didn’t address it. [9] Q. Did he address any of that off-task behavior? [10] A. He did not address any of these behaviors, he did not redirect the students at any point and time. [11] Again, the questioning techniques, he was asking questions without, again, any regard to the student responses, without probing. 12] Some students, I think, were speaking in Spanish, and, again, this was an English lesson, and yet they were never redirected to the English language. This one was just— 13] Q. They were in his class to learn English? [14] A. This was an English class. Students were not given any feedback. Sometimes he asked questions, if he didn't get a response he would answer, he would 14 answer the question himself and go to the next question. is Q. Could you tell whether he appeared to care about the class? 16 A. No, it's like he had given up. 17 Q. Do children react to that? 18 A. Children were definitely reacting [19] Q. His children were? 20} A. Yes, I mean, he was not getting any cooperation or engagement from the children. Final Hearing Transcript at 74-76 (numbering added) . 26. In her contemporaneous memorandum of March 15, 2004, which supplements and explains the foregoing testimony, Ms. Rasco stated in relevant part as follows: A chronology of observations and results for the above employee is provided for your review. Data indicate that this employee has not demonstrated corrective action. Of particular concern during the confirmatory observation in Seventh/Eighth Grades Language Arts Through ESOL was: II.A.1 The teacher entered the classroom three minutes after the bell signaling the beginning of fourth period had rung. The learners had already entered the classroom. The teacher did not have his lesson plans readily available and had to take time to locate them. There was no rationale for not being prepared since the teacher did not have students in his class during second or third period. 15 TII.B.4 At the beginning of the lesson when the teacher instructed the learners to turn to pages 162-163, three different learners told the teacher they had already read those pages with the substitute teacher on Friday. The learners did not understand why they had to repeat the assignment and the teacher did not give them any reason for repeating the lesson. V.A.1 When learners attempted to develop associations using their own experiences, the teacher curtailed this experience by allowing interruptions from other learners and letting several learners speak at the same time. V.C.1 No concepts that required critical analysis or problem-solving were developed. For example, the teacher asked, "Why is it important to learn about people who have difficulties in life?" He did not get a response and proceeded to ask, "Should everyone learn sign language?" V1.A.2 Learner engagement was not monitored. There were numerous instances of off-task behavior throughout the lesson which the teacher did not address. One learner was catapulting a pen, second learner was daydreaming and not following along as others read orally, a third learner was fidgeting with her birthday balloons, and a fourth learner was writing on a 3"x8" sheet of paper instead of her notebook as the teacher had initially instructed. The teacher never re-directed the off-task behaviors during the lesson. v1l.C.4 At various points throughout the lesson, several learners made comments and responded to questions in Spanish. At no time did the teacher redirect the responses to English, assist the learners in making their comments in English, or provide feedback. 16 27. To repeat for emphasis, any findings of historical fact concerning Mutis's performance during the confirmatory evaluation must be based on the foregoing evidence, for that is all the proof there is on the subject.® 28. Ms. Rasco did not explain how she had applied the PACES indicators to her classroom observations of Mutis to determine that the teacher's performance was not up to standards. D. 29. The three indicators at issue in this case, it will be seen upon close examination, are not so much standards upon which to base a judgment as factual conditions ("indicator- conditions") for which the evaluator is supposed to look. Ifa particular indicator-condition (e.g- the purpose of learning tasks is clear to learners) is found to exist, then the evaluator should award the teacher a passing grade of "acceptable" for that indicator (in this example, Indicator IV.A.5); if not, the grade should be "unacceptable." 30. But the indicator-conditions are not objective facts, equally perceivable by all observers; they are, rather, subjective facts, which come into being only when the evaluator puts historical (or observed) facts against external standards, using reason and logic to make qualitative judgments about what occurred. Subjective facts of this nature are sometimes called 17 "ultimate" facts, the answers to "mixed questions” of law and fact. 31. To illustrate this point, imagine that the class Ms. Rasco observed on March 15, 2004, had been videotaped from several different camera angles. The resulting tapes would constitute an accurate audio-visual record of what transpired in Mutis's class that day. Anyone later viewing the tapes would be able to make detailed and accurate findings of objective historical fact, including words spoken, actions taken, time spent on particular tasks, etc. But, without more than the videotapes themselves could provide, a viewer would be unable fairly to determine whether, for example, the purpose of learning tasks was "clear" to the students (Indicator IV.A.5),/ or whether “wait time" was used appropriately to enhance "thinking skills" (Indicator V.B.2).° This is because to make such determinations fairly, consistently, and in accordance with the rule of law requires the use of standards of decision, yardsticks against which to measure the perceptible reality captured on film. 32. Another term for standards of decision is "neutral principles." A neutral principle prescribes normative conduct in a way that permits fair judgments to be made consistently— that is, in this context, enables the reaching of similar results with respect to similarly performing teachers most of 18 the time. A neutral principle must not be either political or results oriented. It must be capable of being applied across-~- the-board, to all teachers in all evaluations. 33. In the unique milieu of PACES, neutral principles could take a variety of forms. One obvious form would be stendards of teacher conduct. Such standards might be defined, for example, with reference to the average competent teacher in the District (or school, or state, etc.). In an adjudicative proceeding such as this one, expert testimony might then be necessary to establish what the average competent teacher does, for example, to provide specific feedback upon the conclusion of learning tasks (Indicator VI.C.4) or to enhance the development of thinking skills through appropriate use of wait time (Indicator V.B.2).° 34. Other standards might be definitional. For example, definitions of terms such as "wait time” and "thinking skills" would facilitate the application of Indicator V.B.2. Still other standards might be framed as tests, e.g. a test for determining whether wait time enhances the development of thinking skills. 35. However the neutral principles are framed, at bottom there must be standards that describe what "satisfactory" performance of the indicators looks like, so that different people can agree, most of the time, that the indicator- 19 conditions are present or absent in a given situation-—and in other, similar situations. Without neutral principles to discipline the decision-maker, the indicators can be used as cover for almost any conclusion an evaluator (or Administrative Law Judge) might want to make. 36. In this case, the record is devoid of any persuasive evidence of neutral principles for use in determining, as a matter of ultimate fact, whether the conditions described in the three relevant indicators were extant in Mutis's classroom on March 15, 2004, or not. E. 37. In this de novo proceeding, the undersigned fact- finder is charged with the responsibility of determining independently, as a matter of ultimate fact, whether, as of the two-week period following probation, Mutis had corrected all of the performance deficiencies of which he was notified at the outset of probation. As mentioned, the only evidence of Mutis's post-probation teaching performance consists of Ms. Rasco's testimony about her observation of Mutis for 50 minutes on March 15, 2004, which was quoted above, along with her contemporaneous memorandum to Ms. Pace. 38. Ms. Rasco's contemporaneous memorandum sheds light on her testimony by clarifying which of the indicators was implicated by particular observations. Not much of this 20 evidence, as will be shown below, is relevant to Mutis's performance in relation to the three indicators on which termination could be based. (The discussion that follows refers to che numbered answers as quoted in paragraph 25 supra.) 39. Answers 2, 3, and 4 pertain to purported deficiencies with regard to Indicator II.A.1.*° Having been rated unsatisfactory in this area for the first time on March 15, 2004, Mutis cannot be fired for these alleged deficiencies. This testimony, therefore, is irrelevant. 40. Answers 5 and 6 relate to alleged deficiencies with respect to Indicator III.B.4.*' Having been rated unsatisfactory in this area for the first time on March 15, 2004, Mutis cannot be fired for these alleged deficiencies. This testimony, therefore, is irrelevant. 41. Answers 7, 8, and 10 relate to alleged deficiencies pertaining to Indicator VI.A.2.° Having been rated unsatisfactory in this area for the first time on March 15, 2004, Mutis cannot be fired for these alleged deficiencies. This testimony, therefore, is irrelevant. 42. Answers 16, 18, and 20 were not clearly associated with any particular deficiency. The undersigned finds this testimony unhelpful in determining whether Mutis was unsatisfactorily performing in the areas of Indicators IV.A.5, V.B.2, or VI.C.4. 21 43. Answer 1 is simply a conclusion, which the undersigned finds unhelpful as a basis for independent fact-finding. 44. This leaves Answers 12 and 14, which relate to alleged deficiencies in Indicator VI.C.4, which is a noted performance deficiency upon which termination could be based. The thrust of this testimony is that Mutis addressed some students in Spanish, rather than English. Even if Mutis did this, however, such does not implicate the Indicator in question, which is concerned with the provision of specific feedback upon the completion of learning tasks or outcomes, because Indicator VI.C.4 is silent as to the means of communication. Beyond that, Ms. Rasco offered the naked conclusion that Mutis failed to provide feedback, which merely tells the undersigned how to rule and her.ce is unhelpful. 45. In sum, the evidence is insufficient for the undersigned to find, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Mutis's performance on March 15, 2004, was deficient with regard to Indicators IV.A.5, V.B.2, and VI.C.4. 46. As important as the paucity of evidence establishing the objective historical facts concerning Mutis's performance on March 15, 2004, is the failure of proof regarding neutral principles for use in determining the existence or nonexistence of the relevant indicator-conditions. Even if the undersigned had a clear picture of what actually occurred in Mutis's 22 classroom that day, he has been provided no standards against which to measure Mutis's performance, to determine whether the indicator-conditions were met or not. 47. The absence of evidence of such standards is fatal to the Board's case. To make ultimate factual determinations without proof of neutral principles, the undersigned would need to apply standards of his own devising. Whatever merit such standards might have, they would not be the standards used to judge other teachers, and thus it would be unfair to apply them to Mutis.
Conclusions For Petitioner: Madelyn P. Schere, Esquire Miami-Dade County School Board 1450 Northeast Second Avenue, Suite 400 Miami, Florida 33132 For Respondent: Leopoldo Mutis, pro se 4001 North 67th Terrace Hollywood, Florida 33024
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board enter a final order: (a) exonerating Mutis of all charges brought against him in this preceeding; (b) providing that Mutis be immediately reinstated to the position from which he was suspended; and (c) awarding Mutis back salary, plus benefits, to the extent these accrued during the suspension period, together with interest thereon at the statutory rate. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of December, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 2004. 37
The Issue The issue in this case is whether a veteran teacher should be dismissed for having drawn and displayed a kitchen knife while quieting a noisy class.
Findings Of Fact The Broward County School Board ("School Board"), Petitioner in this case, is the constitutional entity authorized to operate, control, and supervise the Broward County Public School System. As of the final hearing, Respondent Lynn Deering ("Deering") had been a teacher for about 34 years. She holds a certificate to teach in Florida. During the 2004-05 school year, Deering was employed as a science teacher at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School, which is a public school in Broward County. For reasons that will soon be apparent, it is pertinent to note that Deering contracted polio at a young age and as an adult has suffered from post-polio syndrome. As a result of these illnesses, Deering's upper-body is weak, the range of motion of her upper extremities is limited, and she has little grip strength in her right hand, which is dominant. Since 1985, Deering has been confined to a wheelchair.1 The incident giving rise to this case occurred on March 2, 2005. When the bell rang that day to start Deering's sixth period anatomy and physiology class, the students were excited and talkative. As was her practice, Deering raised her hand to signal that she was ready to begin teaching; this gesture usually quieted the class. This time, however, the students continued to talk, and the classroom was noisy——too noisy for Deering to be heard. So Deering, who was sitting (in her wheelchair) in front of a demonstration table located at the head of the classroom, hitched up her right shoulder, reached back behind her body, and grabbed a utensil from the top of the table. She then used the utensil to tap on a glass beaker——which was filled with water and flowers——to get the students' attention. The "utensil" in question happened to be a knife. It was a chef's knife,2 bearing the Chefmate™ brand on its blade. Measured from butt to point, the knife was approximately 10 and one-half inches long. From heel to point, the blade was roughly five and three-quarters inches in length; it was no wider than about three-quarters of an inch from edge to spine. The knife was in Deering's classroom at the time because she had been using it to slice flowers and potatoes for demonstrations in her biology class.3 Upon hearing the distinctive "tap, tap, tap" of blade on beaker, most of the students stopped talking. Some in the back of the room, however, perhaps being out of earshot, continued to converse. Two were especially oblivious. Presently, Deering wheeled over to their lab table, still holding the knife in her right hand, between her thumb and fingers. When she reached the students' table, Deering turned the knife over in her hand, so that the point was down and the edge faced away from the students (toward Deering herself). Deering leaned over the table, in front of the where the two students were sitting, raised the knife an inch or two above a couple of sheets of paper that were lying on the tabletop, and, loosening her grip, let gravity pull the knife down between her fingers.4 Driven by the knife's own weight, the point punched through the papers, leaving small slits in them, and scratched the surface of the tabletop. Now gripping the knife's handle more tightly (for had she let go the knife would have fallen), Deering said, "Hello!"——which she pronounced "Heh-LOW!"——"Do I have your attention?" She did. The students stopped talking. Some were startled or frightened; others were amused or nonplussed. None, however, reacted as one might when facing a genuine threat of harm, e.g. by screaming or fleeing. As she returned to the front of the classroom, Deering joked, "Don't mess with a postmenopausal woman . . . with a knife!" This was meant to be humorous and was not uttered in a threatening tone of voice. Following this incident, Deering taught her lesson as usual, and the class unfolded in routine fashion. Her use of the knife, in other words, produced no discernible immediate fallout. At least a few students, however, were sufficiently upset by Deering's conduct to report the matter to the administration, and they did.5 The students' report not only set in motion an internal investigation, but also prompted the administration to call the police. Somehow, as well, the incident rapidly made its way into the local news. At least one local TV station aired a brief, 35-second story on the incident, which was short on facts, long on sensationalism, and notably unbalanced, in that Deering's side was not shown. The undersigned cannot comment on the contents or accuracy of other media reports, for they are not in evidence. In due course, the Broward County Sheriff's Office commenced an investigation that brought forth a criminal charge against Deering, who found herself accused of having improperly exhibited a dangerous weapon. The crime of improper exhibition, which is a misdemeanor, is defined in Section 790.10, Florida Statutes, as follows: If any person having or carrying any dirk, sword, sword cane, firearm, electric weapon or device, or other weapon shall, in the presence of one or more persons, exhibit the same in a rude, careless, angry, or threatening manner, not in necessary self- defense, the person so offending shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree[.] Deering ultimately pleaded no contest to the criminal charge and was sentenced by the county court to three months' probation and a $30 fine. Meantime, the School Board decided that Deering should be fired, voting at its regular meeting on August 2, 2005, to accept the superintendent's recommendation that she be suspended without pay pending termination of employment. Following her suspension, Deering accepted a teaching position at the Upper Room Christian Academy, where she was working as a science and math teacher at the time of the final hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board enter a final order (a) rescinding its previous decision to suspend Deering without pay pending dismissal and (b) awarding Deering the back salary, plus benefits, that accrued during the administrative proceedings, together with interest thereon at the statutory rate. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of July, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 2006.
The Issue The issues to be determined are whether Respondent, Ms. Claudine Etienne, violated section 1012.795(1)(j), Florida Statutes (2011),1/ and implementing administrative rules, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint; and, if so, what is the appropriate sanction.
Findings Of Fact The Commissioner is responsible for investigating and prosecuting allegations of misconduct against individuals holding educator's certificates. Ms. Etienne holds Florida Educator's Certificate 845026, covering the areas of English and mathematics, which is valid through June 30, 2018. At all times relevant to the complaint, Ms. Etienne was employed as an English teacher at Miami Springs High School in the Miami-Dade County School District. On or about January 20, 2012, an unknown student ignited a smoke bomb or large firecracker in a locker in Ms. Etienne's classroom. Ms. Etienne was unsure what the device was or how it was ignited. Smoke was generated from the device, and it filtered into the classroom. One or more students requested to leave the room because of the smoke. In her deposition, Ms. Etienne indicated that at the time of the incident, she was aware that one of the students assigned to her class, C.E., had asthma because she had a conversation with C.E.'s mother in December about it. Ms. Etienne testified that she did not recall C.E. asking her to leave the room on the day of the incident, however, and in fact did not remember if C.E. was even in class that day. Ms. Etienne did not believe the smoke was sufficiently serious to require her to allow the students to leave the room. She was uncertain how to proceed until administrators who had been called arrived in the classroom. Ms. Etienne instructed the students to stay in the room until an administrator arrived. One student subsequently required medical attention as a result of the smoke inhalation. In her written statement, C.E. stated that paramedics came to the school to assist her because she could not breathe after her exposure to the smoke in the classroom.2/ Ms. Etienne later received a verbal reprimand from the school district.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Education Practices Commission enter a final order finding Ms. Claudine Etienne in violation of section 1012.795(1)(j), Florida Statutes, through her violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 6B-1.006(3)(a), issuing her a letter of reprimand, and assessing a fine against her in the amount of $500. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of February, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S F. SCOTT BOYD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of February, 2017.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent, Debra E. West, a middle school teacher, made inappropriate or disparaging remarks to her students or exposed them to unnecessary embarrassment or disparagement; whether she failed to correct performance deficiencies; and, if so, whether the proposed penalty of dismissal is reasonable.
Findings Of Fact Respondent has been employed as a teacher in the Pinellas County School District since August 20, 1991. The allegations which are the subject of this case arose while Respondent was teaching sixth-grade physical education and health at Azalea Middle School (Azalea). Most of Respondent's students at Azalea are 12 years old. Before becoming a teacher at Azalea, Respondent was a physical education teacher at Gibbs High School. In 2001, the School Board administratively transferred Respondent to Azalea from Gibbs High School to provide Respondent a "fresh start," following numerous complaints from parents beginning in 1997 about Respondent's making inappropriate remarks to students and disclosing student grades at Gibbs High School. In 2003, the commissioner of education brought disciplinary action against Respondent for her alleged violations of state statutes and rules governing teachers during the time she was a teacher at Gibbs High School. On March 2, 2004, following an evidentiary hearing conducted by DOAH, the Education Practices Commission issued a Final Order suspending Respondent's educator's certificate for the 2004 summer session and placing Respondent on probation for two years. In his Recommended Order in the earlier case against Respondent, the Administrative Law Judge made the following findings: Respondent made derogatory comments to students during the [2000-2001] school year. The derogatory comments included terms such as: fat, little slacker, stupid, sorry bunch of kids, Gomer Pyle, and Dutch Boy. Respondent asked one of her students, "What's a black boy doing with a Dutch last name?" Respondent asked another student if the student was tired from walking the streets at night and called her "sleeping booty." * * * Respondent has made derogatory comments to students in previous school years. * * * Respondent read student grades aloud in class without the permission of the affected student in violation of District policy. Respondent also read the names of students receiving a grade of "A," "B," or "C" thereby disclosing the [identity] of students with lower grades. * * * Respondent has a history of disclosing student grades in class. * * * Respondent read to the class the grades of [five students]. Each had failing grades. Respondent passed a test completed by A.S. down a row of students so that each student could see the test score on the front of the test and stated audibly that the only thing A.S. "got right" on the test was the date. The comment embarrassed, upset, and humiliated A.S. At Azalea, parents continued to complain that Respondent was making disparaging remarks that upset and embarrassed their children. The complaints resulted in multiple conferences between Respondent and Azalea administrators and, ultimately, to her receipt of poor performance evaluations and official reprimands. Numerous students were transferred out of Respondent's classes at the request of parents whose children had complained to them about Respondent. On November 28, 2005, Superintendent Wilcox notified Respondent by letter of his intent to recommend to the School Board that Respondent be dismissed. At the School Board's meeting of December 13, 2005, the School Board accepted the superintendent's recommendation for dismissal. Respondent was suspended without pay beginning December 13, 2005, pending the outcome of this administrative proceeding to review the School Board's action. "Tiny Tot," "Shrimphead," and "Dumbo" T.J., who is small for his age, stated that Respondent called him "tiny tot" and "shrimphead," which embarrassed and upset him. T.J. also said Respondent called him "dumbo." Respondent denies calling T.J. by these names. No other student who testified at the final hearing said they heard Respondent call T.J. "tiny tot," "shrimphead," or "dumbo." No other student claimed that Respondent called him or her by one of these names. The evidence was insufficient to prove that Respondent called any student by another derogatory name. The only corroborating evidence presented by the School Board was the hearsay testimony of T.J.'s stepmother who said T.J. told her that Respondent called him by these names. Although T.J. might have been telling the truth,1 his testimony with regard to these insults, standing alone and taking into account his demeanor, was not persuasive. The School Board, therefore, failed to meet its burden to prove that Respondent called T.J. "tiny tot," "shrimphead," or "dumbo." "You must have studied in the dark." Respondent admits that she made the comment, "You must have studied in the dark," to T.J. and to other students on occasion, but denies that it was ever meant to disparage or to embarrass the students to whom the comment was directed. Of all the disparaging comments that Respondent is alleged to have made, this one is the most innocuous. It is difficult to imagine how teachers could be held to a standard of refraining from any comment of this kind or risk dismissal. However, many otherwise innocuous comments, if made in a disrespectful tone of voice, can be disparaging and can embarrass a student. The testimony from the parents of several students was hearsay with regard to what Respondent said to their children, but it was not hearsay with regard to the parents' observations of the emotional distress that Respondent caused to their children. The emotional distress reported by the parents and which resulted in numerous complaints made to Azalea administrators about Respondent's comments, therefore, is persuasive evidence that Respondent's comments were often made in a tone of voice and under circumstances that caused the students to feel disparaged and embarrassed. "Take your grow up pill." T.J. also stated that Respondent told him in front of his classmates to “Take your grow-up pill.” He took this comment to be a reference to his small size, and he said the comment upset and embarrassed him. Respondent concedes that she told T.J. that he "needed to grow up" because he was acting immaturely by frequently failing to bring his folder to class, but that she did not intend to belittle T.J. because of his size. Respondent, herself, is of small stature. Respondent told other students to "Grow up" from time to time when she thought they were acting immaturely. The preponderance of the evidence supports Respondent's contention that her comment to T.J. was not intended to belittle him for his small size. A teacher's comment to "Grow up," or even to "Take a grow up pill," is a relatively innocuous comment that under ordinary circumstances should not cause a student to feel disparaged unless they are particularly sensitive. However, like the comment "You must have studied in the dark," the tone of voice used and other circumstances could make any student perceive the comment as disparaging and cause them to be embarrassed. "Dumb boys make dumb babies." Several students testified that Respondent made the comment “Dumb boys make dumb babies” during her health class in the fall of 2005. Respondent admits making this comment and explained that it was intended to make her students think about the consequences of the choices they make in life. Respondent denies directing the comment to T.J. or to any other student in her class to indicate that she thought the student was dumb. This comment is another example of Respondent's habit of making a comment by which she intends to convey a legitimate message with humor, but using words that also convey disparagement. The School Board's evidence was not persuasive that Respondent directed this comment to T.J. or any other student in her class to indicate she thought that student was dumb. However, the comment, even as explained by Respondent, was inappropriate because it indicated that Respondent had a low opinion of certain boys that "hung out" in the lunch room. Although Respondent's intended message was a good one, it is never appropriate for a teacher to refer to any student as being dumb. Respondent presented the testimony of other teachers and school employees who said they sometimes observed Respondent's classes and never heard Respondent make inappropriate comments to her students. That evidence was not sufficient to rebut the School Board's evidence that Respondent made the inappropriate comments discussed above because the comments could have been made, and evidently were made, at times when Respondent was not observed by these other teachers and school employees. There was other evidence presented by Respondent to show that she has a number of good teaching skills and is appreciated and even loved by many of her students. That evidence is accepted as credible, but is not inconsistent with the charge that she made inappropriate and disparaging comments to some of her students. Telephone Calls to Parents During Class While teaching at Gibbs High School, Respondent would occasionally make a telephone call to parents during class, which Respondent considered to be an effective "classroom management technique," in the presence of students Connie Kolosey, an assistant principal at Azalea and Respondent's supervisor, said that when she discovered that Respondent had called a parent from the classroom, she directed Respondent not to do it anymore. Respondent admits that Ms. Kolosey told her that making calls to parents during class was "not done at Azalea," but Respondent claims she was not told to stop. The School Board presented evidence to prove that Respondent continued to call parents from her classroom to discuss their children's low grades or misbehavior in a manner that allowed students to hear the conversations or, at least, to know which students were the subject of the conversations. Respondent said she never called parents during class time. She said that she sometimes called parents from the telephone in her classroom, but not during class time. Respondent also denied ever divulging confidential information about a student in front of other students. However, there appeared to be agreement that, on one occasion, a student, J.T., called his mother during class and then handed the telephone to Respondent so she could talk to his mother. Even under Respondent's version of the event, having the telephone conversation with J.T.'s mother during class and within sight and hearing of the other students was inappropriate and reasonably calculated to embarrass J.T. In another incident in which the mother of a student complained that she was called by Respondent about her child during class, Respondent told Theresa Anderson, the principal of Azalea, that the call was not made during class. However, Ms. Anderson later discovered that Respondent had not made the call from a certain school phone as Respondent had claimed, but from Respondent's own cell phone. Respondent's version of the event, therefore, is discredited, and the more persuasive evidence establishes this as a second instance in which Respondent called a parent during class, which exposed the student to unnecessary embarrassment. Respondent admitted that she would occasionally pretend to call a parent from the classroom as a classroom management technique. According to Respondent, instead of actually calling a parent, she would dial her own mother's phone number or no number at all and then pretend to have a conversation about the low grade or misbehavior of a student. Although Respondent did this in a manner that purposely allowed her students to see her make the call and to hear enough to know that Respondent was having a serious discussion with a parent about a student, Respondent denies that any student in her class knew whose parent she was pretending to call. That claim is not credible because, unless Respondent made these pretend calls in conjunction with an event related to a student's low grade or misbehavior, it would not serve its purpose as a classroom management technique. In other words, it is more likely that when Respondent made a pretend call to a parent, the students in her class had some idea which student was in trouble and why.2 This practice of Respondent, therefore, was inappropriate and exposed students to unnecessary embarrassment. Discussing Low Grades in the Classroom Respondent denied ever divulging student grades in class but admitted that she rewarded students who received A's and B's by calling them to the front of the class and awarding them “Azalea bucks.” Students who received A’s were given two Azalea bucks, and students who received B’s were given one Azalea buck. Azalea bucks could be redeemed for ice cream. By calling up the A and B students, Respondent created a situation in which the students who made lower grades were also identified. No evidence was presented by the School Board about its policies regarding the recognition given to students who make good grades. The School Board did not dispute that Azalea identifies honor roll students. Any time that a school recognizes students for their academic achievement, that recognition will necessarily have the effect of identifying the students who have not done as well. That is a reasonable consequence and does not cause the recognition of the best students to be an act of disparagement against all the other students. Students N.R. and J.G. said Respondent read student grades out loud in class. J.G. said Respondent read the grades of students who received D’s and F’s. N.R. said Respondent would line students up according to the grades they got. Their testimony was persuasive to prove that Respondent conducted her classes in such a way that student grades, including low grades, were sometimes made known to other students. Failure to Correct Performance Deficiencies Administrative officials at Azalea spent a considerable amount of time responding to complaints from parents about Respondent, investigating allegations against her, as well as counseling and disciplining Respondent. Three consecutive "success plans" were developed for Respondent in an attempt to change her style of speaking to students to eliminate the disparaging remarks and to prevent any further disclosure of a student's low grade. When the findings of the prior administrative hearing involving Respondent's problems at Gibbs High School are compared to the findings set forth above regarding Respondent's problems at Azalea, it appears that Respondent's latest infractions are less egregious. However, Respondent's deficiencies have not been corrected. It is significant that Respondent's deficiencies have been moderated only a small degree from the past despite her being on probation and repeatedly disciplined. Although slightly moderated, Respondent's deficiencies continue to upset students, cause numerous complaints to be made by parents, and create considerable inconveniences for school administrators. Two assistant principals at Azalea and an administrator in the Pinellas County School District's Office of Professional Standards were all of the opinion that Respondent is ineffective as a teacher due to her performance deficiencies.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Pinellas County School Board issue a final order finding that Respondent violated School Board policies set forth in Sections 8.25(1)(n), (t), and (x) and dismissing her from her employment with the School Board. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of December, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of December, 2006.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner, Department of Children and Families (Department), should impose a $75 fine on Respondent, Jumpstart Enrichment Program, Inc. (Jumpstart), and place it on probation for up to six months for not complying with child care facility staff-to-children ratio requirements for the fourth time.
Findings Of Fact The Department has issued Respondent license C09OR0629 to operate a child care facility in Orlando under sections 402.301 through 402.319, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Chapter 65C-22. The statutes and rules have minimum staff-to-children ratio requirements that are clear, but not uncomplicated, and not always easy to implement. It is necessary to have one staff person for every four children from birth to age one, for every six aged one to two, for every ten aged two to three, for every 15 aged three to four, for every 20 aged four to five, and for every 25 aged five or older. Generally, the ratio requirement for a mixed group of children aged two or older is dictated by the age group with the largest number of children in the group. However, if children under the age of two are present, the ratio requirement for a group is dictated by the age of the youngest child. It was undisputed that staff-to-children ratio requirements are Class II standards under the Department's rules. Citation Issued January 6, 2012 The Administrative Complaint alleges that a citation for insufficient staff was issued to Respondent during a Department inspection on January 6, 2012. It alleges that this was the fourth violation of the standard, justifying a $75 fine and probation for up to six months conditioned on being subject to unannounced visits to ensure compliance with all statutes and codes and on ensuring the maintenance of appropriate staff-to- children ratio. On January 4, 2012, Sabrina Hayles and Conswela Green were the staff on duty at Jumpstart. Eight children were present that morning when Ms. Hayles left the facility to go to lunch. She took two of the children with her so that Ms. Green would meet ratio requirements for the remaining six. While Ms. Hayles was gone, a grandmother dropped off another child, which put the facility out-of-compliance with staffing ratio requirements. Ms. Green asked the grandmother to stay until Ms. Hayles returned, but she said she had an appointment and could not stay. Ms. Green accepted the child into the facility and telephoned Ms. Hayles to tell her to return to the facility because they were out-of-compliance. Ms. Hayles, who already was on her way back, arrived several minutes later. The facility's being out- of-compliance was observed by staff from the Early Learning Coalition of Orange County (ELCOC), who happened to drop some paperwork off at the facility at that time. ELCOC reported the ratio violation to the Department, which investigated the allegation on January 6 and issued a citation. The Administrative Complaint alleges that this was Respondent's fourth insufficient staff violation and that the previous violations were on September 9 and April 14, 2011, and on August 20, 2010. Alleged Violation on September 9, 2011 There was no evidence of a staffing ratio violation on September 9, 2011. Actually, there was a staffing violation on September 7, 2011. One staff was caring for an infant and five toddlers; two staff were required. ELCOC reported the violation to the Department. When apprised of the violation, Michael Collins, the owner and director of the facility, took immediate action to increase staffing and bring the violation to an end as soon as possible. The Department investigated on September 9, 2011, verified the violation through interviews with Shawnda Bernard, and cited Respondent for the violation on September 9, 2011. Alleged Violation on April 14, 2011 Another entity involved in child care and school readiness, referred to in the hearing as Devoreaux, reported to the Department on April 12, 2011, that there was one staff caring for 13 children, when two staff were required. The Department investigated on April 14, 2011, determined from interviews with staff that the violation had in fact occurred, and cited Respondent for the violation. There was hearsay evidence of another staffing violation after the Department's inspection on April 14, 2012. The second alleged violation was not proven by any direct evidence or by any hearsay evidence that would be admissible over objection in a civil action. See § 120.57(1)(c), Fla. Stat. Alleged Violation on August 20, 2010 On August 20, 2010, the Department conducted a routine inspection and cited Respondent for having six children at its facility and no staff, just the owner/director, Mr. Collins. Two qualified staff were required for the six children. There was an unscreened volunteer there, who would have counted and made the staffing ratio sufficient prior to August 1, 2010, when the law changed to require staff to be screened. First Affirmative Defense In May 2011, the Department filed an Administrative Complaint against Respondent charging staffing ratio violations on August 20, 2010, and on August 6 and December 28, 2009, plus numerous other kinds of violations, including some on August 20, 2010. In October 2011, the Department and Respondent settled the charges in that Administrative Complaint by payment of a $500 fine (reduced from $2,205) and a reduced period of probation, through August 15, 2011. The alleged facts and charges were not admitted as part of the settlement. The settlement included a provision that the Department would "make no further orders and will take no further action on the Administrative Complaint and underlying violations in connection with this proceeding that is being settled." It also including a provision in the next numbered paragraph saying: However, if in the future, the Petitioner should have to take administrative action against the Respondent, the Respondent agrees that the Petitioner shall not be estopped from using the facts set forth in the Administrative Complaint in this case as additional basis' [sic] for any future denials, revocations or other administrative actions, taken against the Respondent by the Petitioner resulting from any future non- compliances with applicable statute, code or agreements, by the Respondent. Since one of the "facts set forth" in the settled Administrative Complaint was that Respondent had insufficient staffing on August 20, 2010, the Department was not estopped from using those facts as it does in this case--i.e., as one of the three staffing violations that preceded the one in January of 2012. Second Affirmative Defense Because of the insufficient staffing on January 4, 2012, ELCOC withheld payment for that day under the federal school readiness program it administers, which requires qualified staff to be present.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Families enter a final order: finding Respondent guilty as charged; fining Respondent $75; and placing Respondent on probation for six months, with unannounced visits to ensure compliance with all statutes and codes, including the maintenance of appropriate staff-to-children ratio. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of September, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of September, 2012. COPIES FURNISHED: Stefanie C. Beach, Esquire Department of Children and Families Suite S-1129 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801-1782 Jack P. Caolo, Esquire 131 East Woodland Drive Sanford, Florida 32773 Gregory Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Marion Drew Parker, General Counsel Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 David Wilkins, Secretary Department of Children and Families Building 1, Room 202 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent satisfactorily corrected specified performance deficiencies within the 90-day probation period prescribed by Section 1012.34(3)(d), Florida Statutes, and, if not, whether Respondent's employment should be terminated.
Findings Of Fact One of the statutory duties of Petitioner Miami-Dade County School Board ("Board") is to evaluate the performance of every teacher employed in the Miami-Dade County School District ("District"), at least once per year. To accomplish this, the Board uses a personnel assessment system known as "PACES," which is an acronym for Professional Assessment and Comprehensive Evaluation System. PACES is the product of collective bargaining between the Board and the teachers' union, and it has been duly approved by the Florida Department of Education. The Board's evaluation procedure begins with an observation of the subject teacher, conducted by an administrator trained in the use of PACES. On a score sheet called the Observation Form for Annual Evaluation ("OFAE"), the evaluator rates the teacher's performance on 44 independently dispositive "indicators." The only grades assignable to the respective indicators are "acceptable" and "unacceptable"; thus, the evaluator's decision, for each indicator, is binary: yes or no, thumbs up or thumbs down.1 A negative mark on any one of the 44 indicators results in an overall performance evaluation of "unsatisfactory." For the teacher under observation, therefore, each indicator constitutes, in effect, a pass/fail test, with his or her job hanging in the balance. If the teacher passes all 44 of the independently dispositive indicators, then the teacher's performance is rated "satisfactory" and the evaluative process is complete. If, on the other hand, the teacher is given a failing grade on one or more of the 44 indicators and hence adjudged an unsatisfactory performer, then the initial observation is deemed to be "not of record" (i.e. inoperative) and a follow-up, "for the record" evaluation is scheduled to occur, upon notice to the affected teacher, about one month later. In the meantime, the teacher is offered the assistance of a Professional Growth Team ("PGT"), a group of peers who, having received special training in PACES, are in a position to help the affected teacher correct performance deficiencies in advance of the follow-up evaluation. The follow-up evaluation is conducted in the same manner as the initial "not of record" evaluation. If the teacher passes all 44 indicators, then his performance is deemed satisfactory and the evaluative process is complete. If he fails one or more of the indicators, however, then the teacher is placed on probation for a period of 90 calendar days (excluding vacations and holidays). The probation period is preceded by a formal Conference-for-the-Record ("CFR"), at which notice of the specific performance deficiencies is provided to the teacher. As well, the teacher is given a Professional Improvement Plan ("PIP"), wherein particular remedial tasks, intended to help the teacher correct the noted performance deficiencies, are assigned. During the performance probation, the teacher must be formally observed at least twice, by an evaluator using the OFAE. If, on any of these probationary observations, the teacher fails at least one indicator, then another PIP is prepared and offered. Within 14 days after the end of probation, a "confirmatory evaluation" is conducted, using the OFAE. The purpose of the confirmatory evaluation is to determine whether the noted performance deficiencies were corrected. If they were, then the teacher's performance is rated "satisfactory." If not, the principal then makes a recommendation to the superintendent whether to continue or terminate the teacher's employment. As mentioned above, a PACES evaluation takes account of 44 crucial indicators.2 The indicators are organized under "components." The 44 outcome determinative indicators fall within 21 components, which are identified on the OFAE. These components are organized, in turn, under "domains," of which six are identified on the OFAE. Each domain has been assigned a Roman numeral identifier: I through VI. The components are distinguished alphabetically: A, B, C, etc. The indicators are numbered using Arabic numerals. Each specific indicator is named according to the Roman numeral of its domain, the letter of its component, and its own Arabic number. Thus, for example, the first indicator under Component A of Domain I is referred to as "I.A.1." Notwithstanding the PACES taxonomy, the classifications of "domain" and "component" are useful only as a means of organizing the indicators. This is because a teacher does not pass or fail a performance evaluation at the domain level or at the component level; rather, he passes or fails at the indicator level, for, again, each of the 44 indicators is independently dispositive under PACES.3 Thus, each of the determinative 44 indicators is of precisely equal weight. None is more important or less important than another.4 B. At all times material to this case, Respondent Sergio H. Escalona ("Escalona") was a teacher in the District. From 2000 until May 19, 2004, when the Board suspended him pending termination of employment, Escalona was a science teacher at Miami Springs Senior High School ("Miami Springs"), a typical high school in the District. During the 2003-04 school year, an evaluator observed Escalona in his classroom on five separate occasions, each time using the OFAE. The dates of these evaluations were, and the names of the respective evaluators are, as follows: Evaluation Date Evaluator November 5, 2003 Carlos M. del Cuadro, Assistant Principal, Miami Springs December 2, 2003 Mr. del Cuadro January 16, 2004 Douglas P. Rodriguez, Principal, Miami Springs February 17, 2004 Deborah Carter, Assistant Principal, Miami Springs April 5, 2004 Mr. Rodriguez The Board contends that Escalona failed all five evaluations; the first, however, was deemed "not of record" and thus is relevant only insofar as it opened the door to the process that followed. The following table shows, for each evaluation (including the first), the indicators that the respective evaluators thought Escalona had failed: IA1 IA2 IB1 IB3 IE3 IF1 IF2 IIA1 IIA3 IIB2 IIB4 11-05-03 x x x x x x x 12-02-03 x 01-16-04 x x x 02-17-04 x x x x 04-05-04 x x x IID1 IID3 IID4 IIE1 IIE2 IIE5 IIIA1 IIIA3 IIIB1 IIIB3 IIIB4 11-05-03 x x x x x x 12-02-03 x x 01-16-04 x x 02-17-04 x 04-05-04 x x x x x IVA3 IVA 5 IVA6 IVB1 IVB2 IVB 3 IVC2 IVD1 IVD3 IVD6 IVE2 11-05-03 x x x x x x x x x 12-02-03 x x x 01-16-04 x x x x x x 02-17-04 x x x x x 04-05-04 x ? x ? x ? x x IVE4 VA1 VA4 VB1 VB2 VC1 VIA2 VIB1 VIB3 VIC2 VIC4 11-05-03 x x x x x x x x 12-02-03 x x x x 01-16-04 x x x x x x x 02-17-04 04-05-04 x ? ? ? x ? x x Because Mr. del Cuadro identified 10 performance deficiencies on December 2, 2003, Escalona was placed on performance probation, pursuant to the procedure described in detail above. Mr. Rodriguez held a CFR on December 9, 2004, to review with Escalona the identified deficiencies and explain the procedures relating to the 90-day probation. Following the CFR, Escalona was given written notice of unsatisfactory performance, in the form of a Summary of Conference-For-The-Record And Professional Improvement Plan (PIP), dated December 9, 2003 ("Summary"). In the Summary, Mr. Rodriguez charged Escalona with failure to satisfactorily perform the following PACES indicators: II.B.4, II.E.5, III.B.3, IV.A.5, IV.B.1, IV.D.1, V.A.1, V.A.4, V.B.1, and VI.A.2. (These 10 indicators are highlighted vertically in the table above.) At the same time, Escalona was given a PIP, and a PGT was assembled to provide assistance. Following the confirmatory evaluation on April 5, 2004, based on which Mr. Rodriguez identified 24 deficiencies as shown in the table above, Mr. Rodriguez notified the superintendent that Escalona had failed to correct noted performance deficiencies during a 90-day probation and recommended that Escalona's employment be terminated. The superintendent accepted Mr. Rodriguez's recommendation on April 12, 2004, and shortly thereafter notified Escalona of his decision to recommend that the Board terminate Escalona's employment contract. On May 19, 2004, the Board voted to do just that. C. Of the four evaluations "for the record," the two that were conducted during Escalona's probation (on January 16, 2004, and February 17, 2004) are presently relevant mainly to establish that the proper procedure was followed——a matter that is not genuinely disputed. The substance of these probationary evaluations cannot affect the outcome here because even if Escalona's performance had been perfect during probation, Mr. Rodriguez nevertheless found deficiencies during the post- probation, confirmatory evaluation, which is the only one probative of the dispositive question: Had Escalona corrected the noted performance deficiencies as of the two-week period after the close of the 90 calendar days' probation? In view of the ultimate issue, the evaluation of December 2, 2003, is primarily relevant because it established the 10 "noted performance deficiencies" that Escalona needed to correct. For reasons that will be discussed below in the Conclusions of Law, the Board cannot terminate Escalona's employment based on other deficiencies allegedly found during probation or at the confirmatory evaluation; rather, it must focus exclusively on those 10 particular deficiencies which Escalona was given 90 calendar days to correct. Thus, stated more precisely, the ultimate question in this case is whether any of the 10 specific deficiencies identified in the Summary provided to Escalona on December 9, 2003, persisted after the 90-day probation. As it happened, Mr. Rodriguez determined, as a result of the confirmatory evaluation on April 5, 2004, that Escalona had corrected three of the 10 noted performance deficiencies, for Mr. Rodriguez gave Escalona a passing grade on the indicators II.B.4, II.E.5, and III.B.3. The remaining seven deficiencies upon which termination could legally be based are identified in the table above with the "?" symbol. It is to these seven allegedly uncorrected deficiencies that our attention now must turn. The Board contends, based on Mr. Rodriguez's confirmatory evaluation of April 5, 2004, that Escalona was still, as of that date, failing satisfactorily to perform the following PACES indicators: 5: The purpose or importance of learning tasks is clear to learners. 1: Teaching and learning activities are appropriate for the complexity of the learning context. IV.D.1: Learners have opportunities to learn at more than one cognitive and/or performance level or to integrate knowledge and understandings. V.A.1: Learners are actively engaged and/or involved in developing associations. 4: Learners are actively engaged and/or involved and encouraged to generate and think about examples from their own experiences. 1: A variety of questions that enable thinking are asked and/or solicited. VI.A.2: Learner engagement and/or involvement during learning tasks is monitored. The only descriptive evidence in the record regarding Escalona's performance on April 5, 2004——and hence the only evidence of historical fact upon which the undersigned can decide whether Escalona failed adequately to perform the seven indicators just mentioned——consists of Mr. Rodriguez's testimony. Mr. Rodriguez, who had observed Escalona in the classroom for 50 minutes that day, recounted at final hearing what he had seen as follows: Again, there were students that were simply not engaged at all in learning. For example, there was a student that put his head down at a particular time. He slept for about fifteen minutes. Mr. Escalona never addressed the student, never redirected the learning, never tried to engage that student. Overall the students continued to pass notes in class. The students simply——there was really no plan at all. That was get up, give a lecture. Kids were not paying attention. No redirection for student learning. Questions again very basic. Most of the questions had no response from the students. And [they] just seemed very disinterested, the students did, and the lesson was just not acceptable. Final Hearing Transcript at 103-04. To repeat for emphasis, any findings of historical fact concerning Escalona's performance during the confirmatory evaluation must be based on the foregoing testimony, for that is all the evidence there is on the subject.5 Mr. Rodriguez did not explain how he had applied the seven indicators quoted above to his classroom observations of Escalona to determine that the teacher's performance was not up to standards. D. The seven indicators at issue in this case, it will be seen upon close examination, are not standards upon which to base a judgment, but rather factual conditions ("indicator- conditions") for which the evaluator is supposed to look. If a particular indicator-condition (e.g. the purpose of learning tasks is clear to learners) is found to exist, then the evaluator should award the teacher a passing grade of "acceptable" for that indicator (in this example, Indicator IV.A.5); if not, the grade should be "unacceptable." The indicator-conditions are plainly not objective historical facts; they are, rather, subjective facts, which come into being only when the evaluator puts historical facts against external standards, using reason and logic to make qualitative judgments about what occurred. Subjective facts of this nature are sometimes called "ultimate" facts, the answers to "mixed questions" of law and fact. To illustrate this point, imagine that the class Mr. Rodriguez observed on April 5, 2004, had been videotaped from several different camera angles. The resulting tapes would constitute an accurate audio-visual record of what transpired in Escalona's class that day. Anyone later viewing the tapes would be able to make detailed and accurate findings of objective historical fact, including words spoken, actions taken, time spent on particular tasks, etc. But, without more than the videotapes themselves could provide, a viewer would be unable fairly to determine whether, for example, the "[t]eaching and learning activities [had been] appropriate for the complexity of the learning context" (Indicator IV.B.1), or whether the questions asked adequately "enable[d] thinking" (Indicator V.B.1).6 This is because to make such determinations fairly, consistently, and in accordance with the rule of law requires the use of standards of decision, yardsticks against which to measure the perceptible reality captured on film. Another term for standards of decision is "neutral principles." A neutral principle prescribes normative conduct in a way that permits fair judgments to be made consistently—— that is, in this context, enables the reaching of similar results with respect to similarly performing teachers most of the time. A neutral principle must not be either political or results oriented. It must be capable of being applied across- the-board, to all teachers in all evaluations. In the unique milieu of PACES, neutral principles could take a variety of forms. One obvious form would be standards of teacher conduct. Such standards might be defined, for example, with reference to the average competent teacher in the District (or school, or state, etc.). In an adjudicative proceeding such as this one, expert testimony might then be necessary to establish what the average competent teacher does, for example, to monitor learner engagement and/or involvement during learning tasks (Indicator VI.A.2) or to create opportunities to learn at more than one cognitive level (Indicator IV.D.1).7 Other standards might be definitional. For example, to determine whether teaching and learning activities are appropriate (Indicator IV.B.1) practically demands a definition of the term "appropriate" for this context. Still other standards might be framed as tests, e.g. a test for determining whether a question enables thinking (Indicator V.B.1). However the neutral principles are framed, at bottom there must be standards that describe what "satisfactory" performance of the indicators looks like, so that different people can agree, most of the time, that the indicator- conditions are present or absent in a given situation——and in other, similar situations. Without neutral principles to discipline the decision-maker, the indicators can be used as cover for almost any conclusion an evaluator (or Administrative Law Judge) might want to make. In this case, the record is devoid of any persuasive evidence of neutral principles for use in determining, as a matter of ultimate fact, whether the conditions described in the seven relevant indicators were extant in Escalona's classroom on April 5, 2004, or not. E. In this de novo proceeding, the undersigned fact- finder is charged with the responsibility of determining independently, as a matter of ultimate fact, whether, as of the two-week period following probation, Escalona had corrected all of the performance deficiencies of which he was notified at the outset of probation. The only evidence of Escalona's post- probation teaching performance consists of Mr. Rogriguez's testimony about his observation of Escalona for 50 minutes on April 5, 2004, which was quoted above. Mr. Rodriguez's testimony gives the undersigned little to work with. His observations can be boiled down to four major points, none of which flatters Escalona: (a) Escalona lectured, and the students, who seemed disinterested, did not pay attention——some even passed notes; (b) Escalona asked "very basic" questions, most of which elicited "no response"; (c) one student slept for 15 minutes, and Escalona left him alone; (d) the lesson was "just not acceptable." On inspection, these points are much less helpful than they might at first blush appear. One of them——point (d)——is merely a conclusion which invades the undersigned's province as the fact-finder; accordingly, it has been given practically no weight. The only facts offered in support of the conclusions, in point (a), that the students "seemed" disinterested and were "not paying attention" to Escalona's lecture is the testimony that some students passed notes, and some (many?) did not answer the teacher's questions. But this is a rather thin foundation upon which to rest a conclusion that the students were bored because Escalona's teaching was poor. And even if they were (or looked) bored, is it not fairly common for teenaged high-school students to be (or appear) bored in school, for reasons unrelated to the teacher's performance? There is no evidence whatsoever that student boredom (or note passing or non- responsiveness) features only in the classrooms of poorly performing teachers. As for the supposedly "basic" nature of Escalona's questions, see point (b), the undersigned cannot give Mr. Rodriguez's testimony much weight, because there is no evidence as to what the questions actually were or why they were so very basic. Finally, regarding point (c), the fact that a student slept during class is, to be sure, somewhat damaging to Escalona, inasmuch as students should not generally be napping in class, but without additional information about the student (who might have been sick, for all the undersigned knows) and the surrounding circumstances the undersigned is not persuaded that the sleeping student is res ipsa loquitur on the quality of of Escalona's teaching performance. There is certainly no evidence that students doze only in the bad teachers' classes. More important, however, than the paucity of evidence establishing the objective historical facts concerning Escalona's performance on April 5, 2004, is the failure of proof regarding neutral principles for use in determining the existence or nonexistence of the relevant indicator-conditions. Even if the undersigned had a clear picture of what actually occurred in Escalona's classroom that day, which he lacks, he has been provided no standards against which to measure Escalona's performance, to determine whether the indicator- conditions were met or not. The absence of evidence of such standards is fatal to the Board's case. To make ultimate factual determinations without proof of neutral principles, the undersigned would need to apply standards of his own devising. Whatever merit such standards might have, they would not be the standards used to judge other teachers, and hence it would be unfair to apply them to Escalona.
Conclusions The Division of Administrative Hearings has personal and subject matter jurisdiction in this proceeding pursuant to Sections 120.569, 120.57(1), and 1012.34(3)(d)2.b.(II), Florida Statutes. When a teacher contests a superintendent's recommendation of dismissal, as here, the ensuing hearing must be conducted "in accordance with chapter 120." See § 1012.34(3)(d)2.b.(II), Fla. Stat. A "chapter 120 proceeding [entails] a hearing de novo intended to 'formulate final agency action, not to review action taken earlier and preliminarily.'" Young v. Department of Community Affairs, 625 So. 2d 831, 833 (Fla. 1993)(quoting McDonald v. Department of Banking & Fin., 346 So. 2d 569, 584 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)). Thus, the Board's burden in this case was not merely to persuade the undersigned that the evaluators sincerely believed, after conducting a legally sufficient assessment, that Young's performance was deficient, nor even to persuade the undersigned that the evaluators' judgment was factually and legally tenable. Rather, the Board's burden was to persuade the undersigned himself to find, independently, that Young's performance was deficient. Because this case is a proceeding to terminate a teacher's employment and does not involve the loss of a license or certification, the Board was required to prove the alleged grounds for Escalona's dismissal by a preponderance of the evidence. McNeill v. Pinellas County School Bd., 678 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Allen v. School Bd. of Dade County, 571 So. 2d 568, 569 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Dileo v. School Bd. of Lake County, 569 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). B. Section 1012.34, Florida Statutes, which governs the process for evaluating teachers, provides in full as follows: 1012.34 Assessment procedures and criteria.-- For the purpose of improving the quality of instructional, administrative, and supervisory services in the public schools of the state, the district school superintendent shall establish procedures for assessing the performance of duties and responsibilities of all instructional, administrative, and supervisory personnel employed by the school district. The Department of Education must approve each district's instructional personnel assessment system. The following conditions must be considered in the design of the district's instructional personnel assessment system: The system must be designed to support district and school level improvement plans. The system must provide appropriate instruments, procedures, and criteria for continuous quality improvement of the professional skills of instructional personnel. The system must include a mechanism to give parents an opportunity to provide input into employee performance assessments when appropriate. In addition to addressing generic teaching competencies, districts must determine those teaching fields for which special procedures and criteria will be developed. Each district school board may establish a peer assistance process. The plan may provide a mechanism for assistance of persons who are placed on performance probation as well as offer assistance to other employees who request it. The district school board shall provide training programs that are based upon guidelines provided by the Department of Education to ensure that all individuals with evaluation responsibilities understand the proper use of the assessment criteria and procedures. The assessment procedure for instructional personnel and school administrators must be primarily based on the performance of students assigned to their classrooms or schools, as appropriate. Pursuant to this section, a school district's performance assessment is not limited to basing unsatisfactory performance of instructional personnel and school administrators upon student performance, but may include other criteria approved to assess instructional personnel and school administrators' performance, or any combination of student performance and other approved criteria. The procedures must comply with, but are not limited to, the following requirements: An assessment must be conducted for each employee at least once a year. The assessment must be based upon sound educational principles and contemporary research in effective educational practices. The assessment must primarily use data and indicators of improvement in student performance assessed annually as specified in s. 1008.22 and may consider results of peer reviews in evaluating the employee's performance. Student performance must be measured by state assessments required under s. 1008.22 and by local assessments for subjects and grade levels not measured by the state assessment program. The assessment criteria must include, but are not limited to, indicators that relate to the following: Performance of students. Ability to maintain appropriate discipline. Knowledge of subject matter. The district school board shall make special provisions for evaluating teachers who are assigned to teach out-of-field. Ability to plan and deliver instruction, including implementation of the rigorous reading requirement pursuant to s. 1003.415, when applicable, and the use of technology in the classroom. Ability to evaluate instructional needs. Ability to establish and maintain a positive collaborative relationship with students' families to increase student achievement. Other professional competencies, responsibilities, and requirements as established by rules of the State Board of Education and policies of the district school board. All personnel must be fully informed of the criteria and procedures associated with the assessment process before the assessment takes place. The individual responsible for supervising the employee must assess the employee's performance. The evaluator must submit a written report of the assessment to the district school superintendent for the purpose of reviewing the employee's contract. The evaluator must submit the written report to the employee no later than 10 days after the assessment takes place. The evaluator must discuss the written report of assessment with the employee. The employee shall have the right to initiate a written response to the assessment, and the response shall become a permanent attachment to his or her personnel file. If an employee is not performing his or her duties in a satisfactory manner, the evaluator shall notify the employee in writing of such determination. The notice must describe such unsatisfactory performance and include notice of the following procedural requirements: 1. Upon delivery of a notice of unsatisfactory performance, the evaluator must confer with the employee, make recommendations with respect to specific areas of unsatisfactory performance, and provide assistance in helping to correct deficiencies within a prescribed period of time. 2.a. If the employee holds a professional service contract as provided in s. 1012.33, the employee shall be placed on performance probation and governed by the provisions of this section for 90 calendar days following the receipt of the notice of unsatisfactory performance to demonstrate corrective action. School holidays and school vacation periods are not counted when calculating the 90-calendar-day period. During the 90 calendar days, the employee who holds a professional service contract must be evaluated periodically and apprised of progress achieved and must be provided assistance and inservice training opportunities to help correct the noted performance deficiencies. At any time during the 90 calendar days, the employee who holds a professional service contract may request a transfer to another appropriate position with a different supervising administrator; however, a transfer does not extend the period for correcting performance deficiencies. b. Within 14 days after the close of the 90 calendar days, the evaluator must assess whether the performance deficiencies have been corrected and forward a recommendation to the district school superintendent. Within 14 days after receiving the evaluator's recommendation, the district school superintendent must notify the employee who holds a professional service contract in writing whether the performance deficiencies have been satisfactorily corrected and whether the district school superintendent will recommend that the district school board continue or terminate his or her employment contract. If the employee wishes to contest the district school superintendent's recommendation, the employee must, within 15 days after receipt of the district school superintendent's recommendation, submit a written request for a hearing. The hearing shall be conducted at the district school board's election in accordance with one of the following procedures: A direct hearing conducted by the district school board within 60 days after receipt of the written appeal. The hearing shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of ss. 120.569 and 120.57. A majority vote of the membership of the district school board shall be required to sustain the district school superintendent's recommendation. The determination of the district school board shall be final as to the sufficiency or insufficiency of the grounds for termination of employment; or A hearing conducted by an administrative law judge assigned by the Division of Administrative Hearings of the Department of Management Services. The hearing shall be conducted within 60 days after receipt of the written appeal in accordance with chapter 120. The recommendation of the administrative law judge shall be made to the district school board. A majority vote of the membership of the district school board shall be required to sustain or change the administrative law judge's recommendation. The determination of the district school board shall be final as to the sufficiency or insufficiency of the grounds for termination of employment. The district school superintendent shall notify the department of any instructional personnel who receive two consecutive unsatisfactory evaluations and who have been given written notice by the district that their employment is being terminated or is not being renewed or that the district school board intends to terminate, or not renew, their employment. The department shall conduct an investigation to determine whether action shall be taken against the certificateholder pursuant to s. 1012.795(1)(b). The district school superintendent shall develop a mechanism for evaluating the effective use of assessment criteria and evaluation procedures by administrators who are assigned responsibility for evaluating the performance of instructional personnel. The use of the assessment and evaluation procedures shall be considered as part of the annual assessment of the administrator's performance. The system must include a mechanism to give parents and teachers an opportunity to provide input into the administrator's performance assessment, when appropriate. Nothing in this section shall be construed to grant a probationary employee a right to continued employment beyond the term of his or her contract. The district school board shall establish a procedure annually reviewing instructional personnel assessment systems to determine compliance with this section. All substantial revisions to an approved system must be reviewed and approved by the district school board before being used to assess instructional personnel. Upon request by a school district, the department shall provide assistance in developing, improving, or reviewing an assessment system. The State Board of Education shall adopt rules pursuant to ss. 120.536(1) and 120.54, that establish uniform guidelines for the submission, review, and approval of district procedures for the annual assessment of instructional personnel and that include criteria for evaluating professional performance. (Underlining and italics added). Under Section 1012.34(3), school districts must establish a primarily student performance-based procedure (or system) for assessing the performance of teachers. In other words, the method of accomplishing the assessment must be tailored to meet the goal of forming evaluative judgments about teachers' performance based mainly on the performance of their students. In clear terms, then, the legislature has announced that the primary (though not exclusive)8 indicator of whether a teacher is doing a good job is the performance of his students. If a teacher's students are succeeding, then, whatever he is doing, the teacher is likely (though not necessarily) performing his duties satisfactorily. It is plainly the legislature's belief that if we do not know how the teacher's students are performing, then we cannot make a valid judgment as to whether the teacher is performing his duties satisfactorily.9 The statute further mandates that, in assessing teachers, indicators of student performance——which performance is assessed annually as specified in Section 1008.22——must be the primarily-used data. (In contrast, evaluators are permitted, but not required, to make use of peer reviews in assessing teacher performance.) Section 1008.22, which is referenced specifically in Section 1012.34(3)(a), requires that school districts participate in a statewide assessment program, the centerpiece of which is the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test ("FCAT"). See § 1008.22(3), Fla. Stat. The FCAT is a standardized test that is administered annually to students in grades three through 10. Id. Section 1008.22 is not concerned only with the FCAT, however. Subsection (7), for example, provides as follows: (7) LOCAL ASSESSMENTS.--Measurement of the learning gains of students in all subjects and grade levels other than subjects and grade levels required for the state student achievement testing program is the responsibility of the school districts. Thus, the school districts are charged with developing their own local assessment tools, to fill in the gaps left open by the statewide FCAT testing program. Section 1008.22(5) provides additionally that "[s]tudent performance data shall be used in . . . evaluation of instructional personnel[.]" Section 1012.34(3)(a) prescribes two and only two permissible measures of student performance for use in evaluating teachers: (a) the statewide FCAT assessments and (b) the gap-filling local assessments, both of which measures are required under Section 1008.22. It is clear that Sections 1012.34(3) and 1008.22 have at least one subject in common, namely, student performance-based assessment of teachers. Being in pari materia in this regard, Sections 1012.34 and 1008.22 must be construed so as to further the common goal. See, e.g., Mehl v. State, 632 So. 2d 593, 595 (Fla. 1993)(separate statutory provisions that are in pari materia should be construed to express a unified legislative purpose); Lincoln v. Florida Parole Com'n, 643 So. 2d 668, 671 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)(statutes on same subject and having same general purpose should be construed in pari materia). When the requirements of Section 1012.34(3) are read together with Section 1008.22, several conclusions are inescapable. First, FCAT scores must be the primary source of information used in evaluating any teacher who teaches an FCAT- covered subject to students in grades three through 10. Second, school districts must develop, and annually administer, local assessments for subjects and grade levels not measured by the FCAT. Third, student performance data derived from local assessments must be the primary source of information used in evaluating teachers whose subjects are not covered on the FCAT and/or whose students do not take the FCAT. The absence of evidence in the record concerning the performance of Escalona's students either on the FCAT or on local assessments, as appropriate, see endnote 5, supra, deprives the undersigned of information that the legislature has deemed essential to the evaluation of a teacher's performance. Having neither state nor local assessments to review, the undersigned cannot find that Escalona's performance was deficient in the first place, much less whether he corrected the alleged performance deficiencies in accordance with Section 1012.34(3)(d). Without such findings, the Board cannot dismiss Escalona for failure to correct noted performance deficiencies. C. It was stated in the Findings of Fact above that the Board can terminate Escalona's employment only if, based on an assessment of his performance as of the two-week period following the 90 calendar days of probation, the teacher had failed to correct the particular performance deficiencies of which he had been formally notified in writing prior to probation; other alleged deficiencies, whether observed during probation or thereafter, cannot be relied upon in support of a decision to dismiss Escalona. Standing behind this observation is Section 1012.34(3)(d), Florida Statutes. The pertinent statutory language instructs that a teacher whose performance has been deemed unsatisfactory must be provided a written "notice of unsatisfactory performance," which notice shall include a description of "such unsatisfactory performance" plus recommendations for improvement in the "specific areas of unsatisfactory performance." The statute then specifies that the teacher must be allowed 90 calendar days "following the receipt of the notice of unsatisfactory performance" to correct "the noted performance deficiencies." Clearly, the "noted performance deficiencies" are the specific areas of unsatisfactory performance described in the notice of unsatisfactory performance. Finally, the statute mandates that the teacher shall be assessed within two weeks after the end of probation to determine whether "the performance deficiencies" have been corrected. It is clear, again, that "the performance deficiencies" are "the noted performance deficiencies" described in the written notice of unsatisfactory performance. See § 1012.34(3)(d)1. & 2.a., Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). The reason why a decision to terminate a poorly performing teacher must be based solely on the specific performance deficiencies described in the pre-probation notice of unsatisfactory performance is plain: allowing the school district to rely on subsequently observed deficiencies would defeat the teacher's unambiguous statutory right to have 90 post-notice calendar days in which to correct the noted performance deficiencies that triggered probation in the first place. This case exemplifies the problem posed by post-notice deficiencies. The notice of unsatisfactory performance (the Summary) that gave rise to Escalona's probation, which was based on Mr. del Cuadro's evaluation of December 2, 2003, charged the teacher with 10 specific performance deficiencies. By February 17, 2004, when Ms. Carter formally observed Escalona for the last time before the end of probation, Escalona had corrected all but one (Indicator IV.A.5) of the noted performance deficiencies——suggesting that he had made significant improvement. Unfortunately for Escalona, however, Ms. Carter believed that the teacher had exhibited nine deficiencies besides the noted performance deficiencies, with the net result that, near the end of probation, Escalona still had 10 deficiencies. Of these nine post-notice deficiencies, four (Indicators I.F.1, I.F.2, II.A.1, and IV.B.3) were recorded for the first time ever on February 17, 2004. Obviously, Escalona was not given 90 days to correct these four alleged deficiencies. Yet another three of the post-notice deficiencies reported by Ms. Carter (Indicators I.A.1, IV.A.6, and IV.B.2) had not been seen since Mr. Cuadro's initial evaluation of November 5, 2003. This initial evaluation, being "not of record," cannot count as a notice of unsatisfactory performance to Escalona. Hence he was not given 90 days to correct these three alleged deficiencies. For that matter, the remaining two post-notice deficiencies alleged to exist on February 17, 2004—— Indicators II.D.4 and IV.A.3——had not been observed, post- notice, until January 16, 2004, which means that Escalona did not have 90 days to correct them, either. For the above reasons, when assessing whether, in fact, Escalona had corrected the noted performance deficiencies as of the two-week period following probation, the undersigned focused, as he was required to do, exclusively on the 10 deficiencies described in the Summary, seven of which were alleged not to have been timely corrected. Having determined as a matter of fact that the evidence was insufficient to prove these seven alleged deficiencies existed or persisted, it must be concluded that the Board has failed to carry its burden of establishing the alleged factual grounds for dismissal.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board enter a final order: (a) exonerating Escalona of all charges brought against him in this proceeding; (b) providing that Escalona be immediately reinstated to the position from which he was suspended; and (c) awarding Escalona back salary, plus benefits, to the extent these accrued during the suspension period, together with interest thereon at the statutory rate. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of November, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of November, 2004.
The Issue The issues in this case are: Whether Respondent, County of Osceola School Board (the "Board"), discriminated against Petitioner, Valmyr Vilbrun ("Vilbrun"), on the basis of his race (African-American) in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act; and Whether the Board retaliated against Vilbrun when he filed a discrimination claim.
Findings Of Fact Vilbrun is an African-American male who, at all times relevant hereto, was teaching an exceptional student education (ESE) class at the School. Vilbrun is currently employed at Alternatives Unlimited, a school in Polk County, Florida. He also works as a dispatcher for the St. Cloud Police Department, a position he has held for several years. The Board is the agency responsible for hiring and supervising all teachers in Osceola County, including those employed at the School. The Board is further responsible for determining whether teachers working under annual contracts are to be renewed at the end of their contract term. Vilbrun was a teacher at the School during the 2008-2009 school year. He was working under an annual contract for that school year only. Vilbrun had been hired by Tapley to teach an ESE class at the School. At the end of the school year, Tapley recommended non-renewal of Vilbrun's contract based, in large part, upon her evaluation of Vilbrun's teaching skills, her concerns about his tardiness, and his negative interaction with a fellow teacher. Vilbrun maintains that the reason for the recommendation of non-renewal was racial discrimination. While citing no direct evidence of discrimination by anyone at the School or the Board, Vilbrun provided circumstantial evidence as to three incidents that had occurred in furtherance of his claim: Vilbrun had a confrontation with a Caucasian, female teacher (Reyes) at the School; Vilbrun had a negative relationship with the dean of students (Andrea Beckel); and There was an issuance of disciplinary letters to four African-American teachers on the same day. Each of those incidents will be discussed more fully below. Incident Involving Fellow Teacher When Vilbrun began teaching at the School, he approached Reyes, a fellow ESE teacher, to help him prepare Individual Education Plans ("IEPs") for his students. IEPs are an integral part of the ESE program, and each teacher is expected to develop IEPs for their students. After a period of assistance from Reyes, Vilbrun began preparing the IEPs for his students by himself. Reyes remembers telling Vilbrun that it was time for him to do the IEPs on his own. Vilbrun remembers deciding to do the IEPs independently after seeing that the extra time spent with Reyes might be misconstrued by others as improper. Reyes is a young, Caucasian woman. In December 2008, about halfway through the school year, one of Reyes' students approached her and asked if she wanted to buy some items that he was selling "for Mr. V's class." Reyes was taken aback because her class was in the midst of a fundraiser at that time, and the School only allows limited fundraisers to be going on at any one time. Reyes telephoned Vilbrun to inquire about his fundraiser, but he did not answer the call. Reyes then emailed the person responsible for coordinating fundraisers at the School to make sure that she (Reyes) was not violating the policy by carrying out her class's fundraiser at that time. She was advised that her fundraiser was authorized. The fundraising coordinator apparently then went to Vilbrun to inquire about his fundraising project. A day or two later, Vilbrun approached Reyes in another teacher's classroom and said, "I can't believe it's in your character to do that." Vilbrun was upset that Reyes had contacted the School office about his alleged fundraiser. He told Reyes that it was not a fundraiser per se and that "the money was going to someone else." The conversation escalated into an argument, and Reyes, a small woman, became uncomfortable and intimidated by Vilbrun's behavior. Reyes was also concerned that because her child and Vilbrun's child both attended the same day care, she would potentially have to confront Vilbrun away from the School grounds. Reyes was upset enough by the incident to contact the principal to discuss her version of what had transpired. The principal spoke with Reyes and asked for a written statement, which Reyes submitted. Coincidentally, Reyes had submitted a typed letter to the office that very morning complaining about another issue she had with Vilbrun, namely, that he was often late to class and that she would have to monitor his students until he arrived. Her hand-written statement about the fundraiser incident was submitted in the afternoon of the day she sent in the tardiness letter. Tapley then issued a letter to Vilbrun advising him that a complaint had been filed against him by another teacher. The letter did not make a determination of whether the complaint was founded, and Vilbrun was given the opportunity to submit a written response prior to meeting with the principal. There is no evidence that a written response was prepared by Vilbrun. Tapley then conducted an investigation to determine whether there were grounds for discipline against either of the teachers involved. As a result of Tapley's investigation into the matter, Tapley verbally advised Vilbrun to keep his distance from Reyes. Tapley then issued a letter of guidance to Vilbrun directing him to follow procedures for all fundraising activities. The letter also addressed Vilbrun's failure to report to work on time. The letter did not provide any sanction or direction concerning interaction with Reyes or other colleagues. As far as Vilbrun knew, no action was taken against Reyes. Relationship With Dean of Students For unknown or unstated reasons, Vilbrun did not have a good working relationship with Beckel, the dean of students at the School. Vilbrun believed Beckel was not adequately performing her role, that she was not able to handle unruly or disruptive students, and that she failed to provide Vilbrun with sufficient support. In April 2009, Vilbrun submitted a memorandum to Tapley addressing his concerns about the relationship between him and Beckel. The memorandum discussed Vilbrun's perception of his interactions with Beckel, but without benefit of Beckel's version of the facts, it is impossible to make a finding as to the exact nature of the relationship between the two individuals. However, the gist of Vilbrun's complaint against Beckel is professional in nature and relates to differences between the two concerning the handling of student discipline. There is one peripheral comment about an "outright discriminative" email received from Beckel in the memorandum. However, the emails presented into evidence by Vilbrun do not substantiate that claim. As a matter of fact, Vilbrun, when asked whether race was a motivating factor for the way Beckel interacted with him, stated, "I can't speculate on that" and "As far as what was causing that, I can't really say." [Transcript, pp. 296-297.] Vilbrun had a general perception that Caucasian teachers did not seem to have the same difficulties with Beckel that he was experiencing. Adverse Action Towards Four African-American Teachers On the day before he received the letter from Tapley concerning the Reyes matter, Vilbrun was the recipient of a letter from Tapley concerning his attendance and punctuality. In fact, all four ESE teachers, all of whom are African-American, received letters on that same day, March 10, 2009. Vilbrun views that fact as evidence of discrimination against him and the other African-American teachers. Tapley generated each of the letters, but states they were based on alleged violations by each teacher and were not based on reference to the recipient's race. Tapley's testimony in this regard is credible. The letters are known as "9.02 letters," based on the section of the Union Agreement in which such letters are described. The 9.02 letters advise teachers of perceived or alleged violations that have been reported and give the teacher an opportunity to respond before further action is taken by administration. The letters are not final and do not establish fault. Rather, they are merely a preliminary step that may either result in a sanction or may be dismissed entirely. One of the recipients of one of the four 9.02 letters, Sweeney, adamantly defended Tapley as non-racist. In fact, Tapley assisted Sweeney and helped her find a new position when Sweeney's class at the School had to be eliminated due to loss of students. Other than the fact that each of the four recipients of a 9.02 letter from Tapley on that date was African-American, there is no evidence that race had anything to do with the letters. A former ESE teacher at the School testified that ESE teachers were sometimes discriminated against as a group, i.e., as ESE teachers, but there was no racial discrimination at the School to her knowledge. Other Factors for Consideration At the end of the 2008-2009 school year, Tapley made a recommendation to the Board for non-renewal of the annual contracts for 17 teachers from the School. Of that group, 11 were Caucasian, three were African-American, and three were Hispanic. Tapley was described by almost every teacher, except Vilbrun, as acting responsibly and without regard to race when dealing with issues at the School. There is no evidence that Tapley engaged in any racist behavior. To the contrary, her demeanor and fairly universal support from staff indicates just the opposite. Andrea Beckel, with whom Vilbrun alleges a strained relationship and who Vilbrun suggests made statements with racist undertones, did not testify. It is impossible to make a finding of fact concerning her behavior or demeanor. The union representative at the School, Patty Minor, described Tapley as decidedly non-racist. Vilbrun never went to Minor with a complaint about Tapley acting in a discriminatory fashion based on race or anything else. One of Tapley's "hot buttons" for her teachers was timely arrival at school. Vilbrun had some issues with timeliness during his tenure at the School. Reyes testified that she had to cover Vilbrun's students on many occasions. Minor, as the union representative, counseled Vilbrun about the necessity for timely arrival. No documentary evidence was presented, however, to substantiate that Vilbrun was habitually tardy. During the 2008-2009 school year, Vilbrun received two "annual" reviews, performed by assistant principal Neves. The reviews indicate satisfactory performance of most of his required tasks and that improvements were being made. However, Vilbrun was viewed by his principal and other administrators as deficient in the classroom. His students were observed to be unfocused and lacking in clear direction as to their studies. Vilbrun rejects those allegations on the basis that Tapley was not his direct supervisor and did not perform regular reviews of his classroom. Tapley, however, viewed Vilbrun on numerous occasions and relied upon reports from other teachers and administrators as the basis for her actions. Of the six teachers hired for the ESE department at the School for the 2009-2010 school year, five had less experience than Vilbrun. However, Tapley testified that she considers qualifications, rather than experience, as the deciding factor for hiring teachers. Vilbrun claims retaliation by the School and/or the Board because of his complaint to the Commission. One of the purported retaliatory actions was a phone reference check form evidencing that Tapley told Ana Smith, a Board employee, she would not rehire Vilbrun or recommend him for employment. Vilbrun also applied for numerous jobs, and he believes that someone at the School or Board was sabotaging his applications or blackballing him in some fashion because he could not get any interviews. However, the phone call and Vilbrun's applications occurred in May 2009; his complaint to the Commission was filed in December of that year.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner, Valmyr Vilbrun, in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of July, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of July, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gary M. Glassman, Esquire Brown, Garganese, Weiss & D'Agresta, P.A. 111 North Orange Avenue, Suite 2000 Orlando, Florida 32801 Candance N. Vilbrun Post Office Box 701975 St. Cloud, Florida 34770
