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LINDA L. YOUNG vs NEAL COLLEY AND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 90-007348 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Gulf Breeze, Florida Nov. 21, 1990 Number: 90-007348 Latest Update: May 10, 1991

The Issue Whether Respondent Neal Colley should be issued a permit to fill certain wetlands located within the regulatory jurisdiction of the Department of Environmental Regulation.

Findings Of Fact The Department of Environmental Regulation is the agency with regulatory jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case, pursuant to Chapter 403, Part VIII, Florida Statutes, and related administrative rules. On or about October 19, 1989, Neal Colley (hereinafter "Colley") filed his Permit Application No. 571717171 with the Department of Environmental Regulation (hereinafter "DER") seeking a permit to fill wetlands located within the regulatory jurisdiction of the Department. Colley's application was related to a residential development identified as the Deer Point subdivision located in Gulf Breeze, Florida. As proposed in the application, the subdivision would contain 0.91 acres of fill in jurisdictional wetlands, 31 buildable lots and a 31 slip marina. The site of the development is adjacent to Pensacola Bay and Santa Rosa Sound, Class III waters. In February, 1990, Colley modified the application by deleting the proposed marina. Colley also proposed to fill on an additional 14 lots, bringing the total of jurisdictional wetlands fill to 2.8 acres. On July 6, 1990, subsequent to review of the application, the DER published notice of it's intent to deny Colley's application. The DER based the action on Colley's failure to provide reasonable assurances that the project would not result in significant wetlands habitat loss and water quality degradation. Colley filed a request for administrative hearing challenging the intent to deny the application. 1/ Thereafter, Colley and the DER discussed several amendments to the application directed at meeting the DER's objections to the original application. On or about August 20, 1990, Colley modified the proposed development by reducing the total number of lots to 31 and reducing the fill required. Colley further agreed to other conditions designed to otherwise mitigate the apparent adverse impacts of the project. In determining the acceptability of a mitigation proposal, the DER weighs the proposal and assigns "credit" for the mitigation proposal which provides a quantifiable method of evaluating a mitigation proposal. For example assignment of a 1 to 1 ratio indicates that there must be one acre of "mitigation" for every one acre of fill. In this case, the combined mitigation credit would allow the filling of 2.16 acres of fill. In his mitigation proposal, Colley reduced the amount of fill for which permission is sought to 2.14 acres in jurisdictional wetlands. This is the minimum which will provide Colley with an economically acceptable number of buildable lots. As onsite mitigation, Colley agreed to convey 29.2 acres of high quality wetlands adjacent to the existing public "Shoreline Park" to the City of Gulf Breeze for preservation as an additional public park. Of the 29 acres, 9 are jurisdictional wetlands which the DER assigned a mitigation ratio of 70 to The remaining 20 wetlands acres were assigned a mitigation ratio of 50 to 1. The application of the mitigation ratios to the 29 acres results in credit of .50 acres of fill. Colley also agreed to offsite mitigation in the form of preservation of 46 acres of high quality jurisdictional wetlands at Innerarity Island, to be conveyed by Colley to the University of West Florida. The DER assigned a mitigation ratio of 100 to 1, resulting in a credit of .46 acres of fill. Colley further agreed to onsite creation of 1.47 acres of marsh. The marsh creation plan provides for scraping down the land surface between two existing wetlands areas and planting the scraped surface with wetlands vegetation consistent with the vegetation found in the existing wetlands. Based upon the location of the wetlands creation and the availability of suitable vegetation for transplantation, there is a substantial likelihood that the created wetlands will function successfully. The DER assigned a mitigation ratio of 1.25 to 1, resulting in a credit of 1.2 acres of fill. The DER staff, both locally and in Tallahassee, reviewed the amended project and determined that the proposal, as amended, was acceptable under the DER's standards. The DER gave notice of it's intent to issue the permit for the amended project proposal. The greater weight of evidence establishes that the amended project will not violate water quality standards. In the short term construction phase, the permit requires sequencing of construction and use of hay bales and other turbidity screens to prevent discharge of runoff into the adjacent wetlands. In the longer term, post-construction phase, the project utilizes a system of retaining walls and buffer swales which are designed to prevent direct discharge of stormwater into the wetlands areas. The project permit requires utilization of best management practices and design standards which should operate to prevent violation of water quality standards. The greater weight of evidence establishes that the amended Colley project is not contrary to public interest. The preservation of a total of 75 acres of high quality wetlands by conveyances to the City of Gulf Breeze and the University of West Florida eliminates further development pressure in the parcels, and is clearly in the public interest. The evidence fails to establish that the project will adversely affect the public health, safety, or welfare or the property of others. There is no evidence that the project will adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife, including endangered or threatened species, or their habitat or that the project will adversely affect the fishing or recreational values or marine productivity in the vicinity of the project. The biological impacts of the amended project are minimal. There is no evidence that endangered or threatened species habitat in the area. There was anecdotal testimony related to adverse impacts on fishing allegedly resulting from other development. However, the evidence is insufficient to establish that this project will adversely affect fishing. There is sporadic water exchange between the surrounding bays and the interior wetlands, likely caused by periods of high rainfall which result in outflows of water from the wetlands into the bays. Water flowing from the bays to the wetlands may occur on occasion, however, water salinity samples taken immediately prior to the hearing showed, at most, minimal salinity in the wetlands. The types of vegetation and marine organisms within the wetlands are more common to fresh water areas than to salt water marsh. There is no evidence that the project will adversely affect navigation or the flow of water or cause harmful erosion or shoaling. The permanent nature of the project and the wetlands preservation conveyances provide a public benefit and are in accordance with the mitigation criteria. The existing wetlands to be preserved are acknowledged to be of high quality. Considering the site and existing vegetation adjacent to the location of the proposed 1.47 acres of created wetlands, the probability for success of the created wetlands area is substantial. It is highly likely that the created wetlands will provide the same conditions and functional values as the impacted wetlands. There is no evidence that the project will adversely affect or will enhance significant historical and archaeological resources. The evidence establishes that the adverse impacts which led to the DER's original determination not to permit the project, are either eliminated by the modification of the project or are offset by the mitigation plan which is part of the modified project. As to the cumulative impacts of the project, the onsite preservation proposal results in providing permanent protection for a 29 acre wetlands parcel which could otherwise be permitted for development. Outside this project, including the 29 acre wetlands mitigation area, there are few undeveloped lots remaining in the Deer Point area which contain jurisdictional wetlands. Prior to development on these lots, permits would be required. The lots would be required, on a case-by-case basis, to meet dredge and fill standards, and could be required to mitigate adverse impacts if such exist. The evidence establishes that the Colley project adequately mitigates any cumulative impact directly or indirectly related to this project. At hearing, the Petitioner failed to testify or otherwise offer evidence that would support a finding that Petitioner is substantially affected by the DER's proposed issuance of the permit for Colley's Deer Point Subdivision.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby recommended that the Department of Environmental Regulation enter a Final Order dismissing the petition of Linda L. Young and granting permit number 571717171 to Neal Colley. RECOMMENDED this 10th day of May, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of May, 1991.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57120.68267.061380.06
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HOWARD SAUTER vs DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 00-002885 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida Jul. 13, 2000 Number: 00-002885 Latest Update: Dec. 24, 2024
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DAVID AND PATTY COLE vs PAUL CRUM AND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 06-002314 (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Jun. 28, 2006 Number: 06-002314 Latest Update: Feb. 08, 2007

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondents Paul Crum, Sr., and Paul Crum, Jr. (the "Crums"), are entitled to the Noticed General Permit issued by the Department of Environmental Protection ("Department") for the construction of a single- family residential dock and associated structures.

Findings Of Fact Background The Crums are the owners of the riparian property located at 15696 Shark Road West, Jacksonville, Florida. The Crum property is adjacent to Pumpkin Hill Creek, which lies within the Nassau River-St. Johns River Marshes Aquatic Preserve. Extending from the Crum property into Pumpkin Hill Creek is an existing wood dock approximately 90 feet long and four feet wide, with a platform near the landward end of the dock. Petitioner Brooks owns the property immediately adjacent to and north of the Crum property. Petitioner Brooks has a dock and boat lift. Petitioner Cole owns the property immediately adjacent to and southeast of the Crum property. The Cole property is located on a salt marsh and has no dock. Petitioner Jones lives approximately 3,200 feet north of the Crum property, on a tributary to Pumpkin Hill Creek. Petitioner Jones has fished Pumpkin Hill Creek and the surrounding waters for over 25 years. Noticed General Permits are a type of environmental resource permit granted by rule for those activities which have been determined to have minimal impacts to water resources. Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-341.427 grants by rule a general permit to construct a single family pier, along with boat lifts and terminal platforms, provided certain specific criteria are met. In August 2005, the Crums applied for a Noticed General Permit to extend their existing dock into deeper water. The Department issued a Notice of Determination of Qualification for Noticed General Permit, but later rescinded the authorization after Petitioner Brooks complained to the Department that the landward end of the existing dock is located only 21 feet from her property boundary and, therefore, did not comply with Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-21.004(3)(d), which requires that a dock be set back a minimum of 25 feet "inside the applicant's riparian rights lines." In November 2005, the Crums re-applied for a Noticed General Permit. Their revised plans called for removal of the existing dock and construction of a new dock extending approximately 255 feet out into Pumpkin Hill Creek. The proposed dock would be located a minimum of 25 feet inside the Crums' riparian rights lines. On December 6, 2005, the Department issued a Notice of Determination of Qualification for a Noticed General Permit for the revised dock, stating that the project satisfied the requirements of Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-341.427, as well as the conditions for authorization to perform activities on state-owned submerged lands set forth in Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-21 and for activities in an aquatic preserve under Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-20. In April 2006, Petitioners filed three petitions for hearing with the Department alleging that the proposed dock significantly impedes navigation by restricting access to a tidal creek and extends more waterward than necessary to access a water depth of (minus) -4 feet at mean low water, which is prohibited for docks in aquatic preserves under Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-20.005(3)(b)3. Petitioners attached to their petitions a copy of a bathymetric survey showing the elevations of the submerged lands in the vicinity of the proposed project. In response to the information contained in the survey, the Crums revised their plans to shorten the dock to its currently proposed length of 186.56 feet. A new Notice of Determination of Qualification for a Notice General Permit was then issued by the Department on October 16, 2006. The final dock project consists of: (a) removal of the existing wood dock; (b) construction of a four-foot wide, 186.56-foot long, single family residential dock consisting of an access pier, a 12-foot by 12-foot terminal platform, and a 14-foot by 20-foot open boat lift with catwalk (the “proposed dock”). The proposed dock will terminate where the water will be four feet deep at mean low water. Navigating in and Near the Tidal Creek To the south of the Crum property is a wide expanse of salt marsh. Within the salt marsh are unnamed tidal creeks. The mouth of one tidal creek that flows to Pumpkin Hill Creek is located approximately 90 feet south of the existing Crum dock. The tidal creek is shallow and is not navigable at or near low tide. Petitioner Jones owns an 18-foot flatboat which he sometimes keeps at his residence and sometimes at Petitioner Brooks' property. The boat draws about one foot of water. Petitioner Jones uses this boat to fish in the tidal creek located near the Crum property about ten times every month. No evidence was presented to show that Petitioner Brooks or Petitioner Cole ever navigate in or otherwise use this tidal creek. There are many other tidal creeks located in the marshes associated with Pumpkin Hill Creek. Petitioner Jones boats and fishes in most of them. Petitioner Jones said that, currently, he must wait two hours past low tide for the water depth to be sufficient for him to get into the tidal creek near the Crum property. His usual course to the creek lies just beyond the end of the existing Crum dock. He claims there is a channel there, but no channel is shown on the survey or in any of the parties' photographs. After the proposed dock is constructed, Petitioner Jones' usual course to the tidal will be obstructed. He contends that the new course he would have to take to the tidal creek will take him across shallower areas of Pumpkin Hill Creek so that he will have to wait two more hours (a total of four hours) after low tide to get into the creek. Therefore, Petitioner Jones' alleged injury is the reduction of the hours available to him to navigate in and out of the tidal creek for fishing. The existing Crum dock terminates on a broad mud flat which is exposed at mean low water. However, the bathymetric survey shows the mud flat is at a lower elevation near the end of the dock so water covers this area before it covers the rest of the mud flat. However, the bathymetric survey also shows the elevation of the bottom rising as one moves south from the existing dock. At the mouth of the tidal creek the elevation is 1.0 feet NGVD (National Geodetic Vertical Datum, an official, surveyed reference point). Because the tidal creek drains into the main body of Pumpkin Hill Creek, a reasonable inference can be made that the bottom elevations in the creek generally become higher (and the water depths decrease) as one moves up the creek toward dry land. Prop scars in the exposed bottom at the end of the existing dock indicate that boats have traveled over this area when the water was so shallow that the engine props were striking the bottom. Prop scarring can cause turbidity and damage to benthic organisms. The bathymetric survey indicates that mean high water in this area of Pumpkin Hill Creek is 3.03 feet NGVD, and the mean low water is -1.78 feet NGVD. The mean tidal fluctuation between mean low water and mean high water is thus 4.81 feet. Randall Armstrong, who was accepted as an expert in navigation and piloting, explained that in this area, where there are two daily tides, the water elevation will generally increase by 1/12 of the mean tidal fluctuation in the first hour after mean low water, another 2/12 of the fluctuation in the second, and 3/12 in the third hour. Applying this general rule to the tidal fluctuation here of 4.81 feet results in an estimated 1.2-foot increase in water elevation two hours after low tide and a 2.4-foot increase three hours after low tide. Based on the mean low water elevation of -1.78 feet NGVD, the water elevation would usually be about -0.6 foot NGVD two hours after low tide and 0.6 foot NGVD three hours after low tide. Therefore, the tidal creek (with a bottom elevation of 1.0 foot NGVD at the mouth) would usually be "dry" two hours after low tide and would usually have less than a foot of water three hours after low tide. That evidence contradicts Petitioner Jones' statement that he now navigates into the tidal creek two hours after low tide. That might occasionally be possible, but the bathymetric survey indicates the creek would usually be too shallow at that time. In fact, the evidence suggests that the tidal creek is only reliably navigable without causing prop scars to the bottom by using boats with very shallow draft and waiting until high tide (or shortly before or after) when the water depth at the mouth of the creek would be about two feet. It was Mr. Armstrong's opinion that the 1.0-foot NGVD elevation at the mouth of the tidal creek determines when and how long the tidal creek is navigable, and those times would not be affected by the proposed dock. He described the new course that a boater would use to navigate into the tidal creek after the proposed dock is built. He used the bathymetric survey to show that when the water is deep enough to navigate into the tidal creek, the water depth is also sufficient to navigate the new course. The proposed dock might, as Petitioner Jones alleges, cause boaters to traverse a longer section of the mudflat then they do currently. However, the more persuasive testimony supports the Crums' position that the navigability of the tidal creek is controlled by its shallowest point at the 1.0-foot NGVD elevation and that the proposed dock will not interfere with navigation of the tidal creek by requiring boaters to traverse shallower areas. Petitioner Jones testified that he regularly navigates his boat close to the existing Crum dock. The evidence does not indicate that the proposed dock would cause an unreasonable risk of collision for boaters using the new course to the tidal creek.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Secretary of the Florida Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order that grants Noticed General Permit No. 16-253057-002-EG to the Crums. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 2006.

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57403.814
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MARSHALL WOLFE AND ANN WOLFE vs. RUSSELL D. HORN AND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 81-002828 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-002828 Latest Update: Jun. 02, 1982

The Issue Issues presented here concerned the entitlement of Respondent, Russell D. Horn, Sr., to be granted an environmental permit by Respondent, Department of Environmental Regulation, to build a boat stall on an existing dock in Putnam County, Florida. The boat stall's dimensions are ten feet wide by twenty feet deep and the construction would be on the St. Johns River.

Findings Of Fact On July 13, 1981, Russell D. Horn, Sr., who has a residence in Putnam County, Florida, bade application to the State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation, for the necessary permits to construct a boat stall ten feet wide by twenty feet deep at the site of an existing dock. A copy of the application may be found as Respondent Horn's Exhibit No. 2 admitted into evidence. The dock where Horn applied to build the boat slip is found in the St. Johns River, a navigable water body and waters of the State of Florida in Putnam County, Florida. The application form which was executed by Horn required him to indicate the name of adjacent property owners to the property at which the dock site was located, both upland and adjacent to the uplands. See Rule 17- 4.28(11)(c), Florida Administrative Code. To accomplish this task, the applicant utilized a sketch which he had been provided when he purchased his homesite in the area and indicated to the Department that the adjoining landowners were Milton Kilis and Robert Michal. In fact, Robert Michal was not an adjacent landowner. The adjacent landowner, Milton G. Kilis, wrote to advise the Department that he had no objection to the construction of the boat slip. This correspondence was dated September 11, 1981. A copy of that correspondence may be found as Respondent Department's Exhibit No. 3 admitted into evidence. After reviewing the initial application, additional information was requested by a document entitled "Completeness Summary" which was addressed from the Department to the Applicant Horn. A copy of this "Completeness Summary" requesting additional information may be found as Department's Exhibit No. 1 admitted into evidence. Through this summary, Horn was requested to provide written authorization from the dock owners. It was also requested that Respondent provide an affidavit of ownership of the upland property adjacent to the dock site. Horn received permission to construct from Frank Scussell and William A. Reaves, persons he understood to be the dock owners. See Respondent Horn's Exhibit No. 3 admitted into evidence. Horn misunderstood the question related to ownership of upland property and provided a mortgage deed with its attendant description of his home site property in Putnam County, which is at a different location from that of the upland property adjacent to the dock. A copy of that deed and other matters may be found as Respondent Horn's Exhibit No. 4 admitted into evidence. Department of Environmental Regulation reviewing authorities wrote on the "Completeness Summary" form, Respondent Department's Exhibit No. 1, indicating that the task of seeking written authorization from the dock owners had been achieved and that the affidavit of ownership of upland property owners was satisfactory. In fact, all adjacent property owners had not been notified of the pendency of the application request through the process of Horn's advising the Respondent agency of the names of all adjacent property owners to the uplands and the affidavit of ownership of the upland property owner at the dock site was not filed. During the review process, permission was given by the Department of the Army, Corps of Engineers, for the construction of the boat slip. A copy of this permission, by letter dated August 31, 1981, is Respondent Department's Exhibit No. 2, admitted into evidence. The Department of Environmental Regulation reviewed the permit application and prepared an application appraisal, which may be found as Respondent Department's Exhibit No. 5 admitted into evidence. The findings made by that application appraisal related to application review are found to be accurate. In particular the permit application appraisal indicated that the boat slip would be located at the waterward end of the existing dock structure, which existing dock structure accommodated four boats. The appraisal found that the project was located in South Putnam County in the town of Georgetown on the St. Johns River. The permit appraisal found that the project site would be located in the littoral zone of the river about one hundred feet waterward of the mean high water line. No littoral growth was seen at the depth of the proposed construction. Tapegrass, Mexican waterlily and cattail were present near the shore. Several large hardwood swamp trees were present at the shoreline. The project was found to be located in a Water Class III and adjacent waters were Class III according to the appraisal, no significant immediate or long-term adverse environmental impacts were to be expected to occur due to the completion of the boat slip. Horn was subsequently given a construction permit to add the boat stall to the existing dock. A copy of that permit may be found as Respondent Department's Exhibit No. 6 admitted into evidence. The only specific conditions related to that matter pertain to the necessity for the utilization of turbidity curtains throughout the project for purposes of containing the turbidity that might exceed State water quality standards, The permit was issued on September 22, 1981. After receiving the permit, sometime around October 20, 1981, Horn purchased the necessary lumber to construct the stall and on October 24, 1981, went to the dock site to begin the installation of pilings related to the construction of the boat stall. While placing the pilings on October 24, 1981, an adjoining property owner and Petitioner in this cause, Marshall Wolfe, stood on his dock, that is, Wolfe's dock, and hailed to Horn to stop building. Horn did not know Wolfe before that time and did not know that Wolfe, not Michal, was the adjacent property owner on that side of the dock. On October 28, 1981, Marshall Wolfe and his wife, Ann Wolfe, wrote to the Department in the person of G. Doug Dutton, Subdistrict Manager, and indicated that they were opposed to the issuance of the permit, which is under the number of the permit issued to Respondent, and requested a hearing on the question of the issuance. A copy of that correspondence may be found as Department's Exhibit No. 7 admitted into evidence. On the same date, October 28, 1981, Horn was contacted by the Department of Environmental Regulation and advised of the Wolfe complaint and Horn was told that he would receive a cease and desist order from the Department of Environmental Regulation. On October 30, 1981, Horn returned to the construction site and found four of his neighbors finishing the construction of the stall. In fact, the neighbors did conclude the construction and the boat slip remains in place. A cease and desist letter was mailed on November 2, 1981; however, this letter was not received by Horn immediately. Horn did subsequently learn of the contents of the letter some time in November or December, 1981. A copy of the cease and desist letter may be found as Respondent Department's Exhibit No. 8 admitted into evidence. On December 13, 1981, an attempt was made at the instigation of Department officials for the Petitioners and Respondent Horn to resolve the controversy. This effort was unsuccessful. As a consequence, a formal hearing was necessary in keeping with the request of the Department that the Division of Administrative Hearings conduct a Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, formal hearing. This request had been made on November 12, 1981, and an initial hearings had been scheduled for February 11, 1982, following consultation between the various parties and the Hearing Officer. At the initial hearing session on February 11, 1982, which was to be held in Palatka, Florida, counsel for Department indicated that the upland property was not owned by Horn and that easement rights to that property were unclear. In view of this fact the hearing was continued until the ostensible upland property owner could be notified of the pendency of the issuance of an environmental permit and be allowed to participate. Notification was subsequently provided by an Intent to Issue Statement, a copy of which may be found as Respondent Department's Exhibit No. 9 admitted into evidence. This notification was through the Department at the instigation of the Hearing Officer. The date of notification was February 12, 1982. An order was entered on March 17, 1982, which allowed the intervention of St. Johns Crescent Lakesites, Inc. into the proceedings and that party, in the person of its counsel, Lauren E. Merriam, III, Esquire, participated in the April 15, 1982 hearing. St. Johns Crescent Lakesites, Inc. is the owner of the upland property adjacent to the dock in which Horn had constructed the boat slip. No indication was given that any easement rights were ever granted by that corporation to grant access to the boat slip from the adjacent property. The overall dock area, in terms of square feet, is between 500 and 1000 square feet. Other than the permit application made by Horn, no other permission has been received by the Department to construct the other features of the dock. A further appraisal of the project site subsequent to the September 18, 1981, appraisal has been made. That appraisal was made by the field inspector for the Department. This appraisal by Melvin Rechtor agrees with the project appraisal made by the first field inspector, John Hendricks. The testimony of Melvin Rechtor on environmental impacts of the project are accepted as accurate. Rechtor's testimony established that the project would have an insignificant impact on water quality considerations and would not adversely affect the species or the conservation of fish, marine and wildlife or other natural resources. Rechtor's testimony established that there would be no unreasonable interference with waterward access of adjacent property owners. Rechtor's testimony also established that there would be no navigational hazard nor interference with fishing and swimming by persons using the river.

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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KATHRYN HAUGHNEY vs DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 90-007215 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Ormond Beach, Florida Nov. 14, 1990 Number: 90-007215 Latest Update: Apr. 25, 1991

The Issue Whether or not Petitioner is entitled to a dredge and fill permit to construct a dock and seawall by provision of reasonable assurances that the project is in the public interest.

Findings Of Fact On May 8, 1989, the Petitioner, Kathryn Haughney, applied to DER for a permit to construct a dock and seawall on the shore of the Halifax River in Volusia County. The portion of the Haughney property where the dock and seawall would be constructed is separated from the Haughney home by John Anderson Drive, which parallels the river's edge and is separated from the river by a ribbon of undeveloped property at that location and to the south. A house is located at water's edge on the lot to the north of the proposed construction site. The Haughney home itself is set well back from John Anderson drive on the side of the street away from the river. The Halifax River is classified as a Class III water body under DER rules. The particular part of the Halifax River where the Haughney property is located and where the dock and seawall are proposed is also within the Tomoka Marsh Aquatic Preserve, which is an Outstanding Florida Water under DER rules. The dock as proposed by Petitioner will be 320 square feet. DER denied the permit application on July 19, 1990, but in so doing did not deny the application on the basis of the proposed dock, which, because of its dimensions, is exempt from DER permitting requirements. The seawall as proposed is to be 137 feet long. Petitioner applied to extend it 16 feet out into waters of the state at the northern end, gradually increasing to 34 feet into waters of the state at the south end. Additionally, 5 feet of riprap would also extend out into waters of the state along the seawall's entire length. The waters of the state that would be filled by the proposed seawall contain lush wetland vegetation that provides habitat for a number of macroinvertebrate species which are part of the food chain feeding fish and wading birds such as egrets and herons. Fiddler crabs and colonies of mussels have been observed on the site. The area to be filled provides a valuable habitat for fish and wildlife. There was no mitigation offered by Petitioner to make up for the loss of habitat to be occasioned by the proposed construction. Although Petitioner asserted DER had named no "endangered species" and that the Environmental Protection Administration had not designated this area as "endangered," those federal concerns were not at issue. If such federally designated species or location designation existed in the locale, it might militate against granting this application for permit, but in the negative, it is irrelevant. A vertical seawall exists immediately north of Petitioner's shoreline. The shoreline to the south remains undeveloped. (See Finding of Fact 2). Construction of seawalls, especially those that extend out from the existing shoreline, typically causes erosion on adjacent shorelines, and additional seawalls exaggerate wave energy and can have a cumulative erosive effect. The foregoing fact is found in reliance upon the testimony of Don Medellin, an Environmental Specialist II for DER, and Barbara Bess, an Environmental Manager for DER, both accepted as experts in environmental aspects of dredge and fill permits. The assertion that actual erosion on the property to the south has already occurred was contained in a letter from Petitioner's southern neighbor (DER Exhibit 6). Petitioner's representatives objected to consideration of this exhibit as "hearsay." They are correct and current erosion to the south is not found as a fact. Nonetheless, actual erosion in a pocket on the north end of Petitioner's shoreline has been shown by the direct testimony of Emmett and Martha Haughney, who assert that their property is eroding due to the existing seawall and that Petitioner wants a permit for a seawall to alleviate this erosion. Their evidence is confirmed by the personal observations and testimony of Mr. Medellin and Ms. Bess. Further, upon their testimony, it is accepted that this minimal pocket of erosion is most likely due to the existing seawall to the north and that if the Petitioner builds a seawall to the specifications now set out in the permit application, there is potential for similar and perhaps cumulative erosion to the shoreline to the south of Petitioner's lot. Neither the city nor county involved has land use restrictions which would prohibit Petitioner's proposed seawall except that Volusia County advocates riprap requirements if this permit application were granted. In its Notice of Permit Denial, DER advised Petitioner as follows: The Department has determined that the follow- ing changes to the project may make the project permittable: The vertical seawall should be eliminated and replaced with coquina rock riprap revet- ment. The riprap should be located further landward and conform to the slope of the existing embankment. Backfilling on the north property line is acceptable provided the fill area does not extend more than 10 feet westward in the most eroded area. Accordingly, the riprap could extend to the adjacent seawall and gradually extend in a more landward direc- tion to prevent excessive elimination of the littoral zone vegetation. Whatever alternative the applicant elects to choose, the removal or elimination of littoral zone vegetation must be offset in the form of mitigation if the impacts can not be reduced any further. Finally, the agent should eliminate the use of generic drawings which must be continually revised. All drawings should reflect the existing and proposed conditions and the impacts associated with the project. Petitioner's contractor, Andy Harris, testified to other alternatives that could be used by Petitioner in constructing her seawall, but the evidence of Mr. Medellin and Ms. Bess is persuasive that the alternative measures proposed by Mr. Harris would not provide the reasonable assurances the law requires DER to obtain from Petitioner.

Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Regulation enter a Final Order affirming its July 19, 1990 Notice of Permit Denial. RECOMMENDED this 25th day of April, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of April, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-7215 The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Petitioner's letter to Hearing Officer (filed March 22, 1991) The first paragraph complains that a VCR was unavailable in the hearing room so that Petitioner's videotape could not be shown. Petitioner should have made arrangements for showing the tape and did not. Likewise, Petitioner never offered the tape in evidence (for viewing by the Hearing Officer afterwards in preparation of this Recommended Order). Therefore, it very properly was not considered. The next 3 paragraphs refer to the Casden letter (DER Exhibit 6), which is covered in FOF 8-9. The remaining paragraphs are rhetoric and legal argument upon which no ruling need to made under Section 120.59(2) F.S.; however, they are alluded to in the Conclusions of Law. Petitioner's letter to DER Counsel (filed March 25, 1991 by DER, suggesting it was Petitioner's proposed findings of fact) 1-3 For the reasons set out above, the Petitioner's videotape was not considered. The subject of erosion to the degree proved at the hearing is covered in the Recommended Order. 4-5, PS 1-3 Mere rhetoric and legal argument upon which no ruling need be made under Section 120.59(2) F.S.; covered in the Conclusions of Law to the degree appropriate. Respondent's PFOF: 1-11 Accepted as modified to reflect the greater weight of the credible and probative record evidence as a whole. That which is rejected is rejected as not proven or not persuasive. Unnecessary or irrelevant material has likewise been excluded. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas MacLaughlin Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Kathryn Haughney 2301 John Anderson Drive Ormond Beach, FL 32074 Emmett and Martha Haughney 2301 John Anderson Drive Ormond Beach, FL 32074 Carol Browner, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson, General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400

Florida Laws (2) 120.57403.813
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CALOOSA PROPERTY OWNERS` ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 82-003458RX (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-003458RX Latest Update: May 19, 1983

Findings Of Fact The Intervenors filed an Application for Dredge and Fill Permit with the Department of Environmental Regulation. The Department entered a notice of its intent to issue a permit. Petitioner requested a formal administrative hearing. The Department forwarded the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings, where it was given Case No. 82-3155. A Recommended Order which includes Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law has been entered in Case No. 82-3155. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set out in the Recommended Order are hereby incorporated into this Final Order and constitute a part of this Final Order. The Petitioner is an association of home owners within a residential development known as "Caloosa." Intervenors are seeking to develop an industrial park on land adjacent to the Caloosa development. Surface and ground waters from the proposed industrial park would drain toward Caloosa. Prior to the Department's entry of the notice of intent to issue a permit to Intervenors, the Department's personnel evaluated the application in free-form proceedings. An environmental specialist who works with the Department as a permit processor proposed to deny the application on account of the fact that Intervenors proposed to fill approximately 70 acres of wetlands, 24 of which were within the Department's permitting authority under Rule 17-4.28, Florida Administrative Code. The administrator of the Department's Dredge and Fill Permitting Section came to the conclusion that denial of the application could not be justified. He felt that the wetlands to be filled served only marginally to preserve water quality in the area. The Intervenors had proposed to artificially create wetland areas in order to compensate for the loss of filled wetland areas. The program administrator suggested to the permit processor that they negotiate to get the Intervenors to create additional artificial wetlands in order to mitigate against any possible adverse effect from the loss of natural wetland areas. These negotiations occurred, and the Intervenors agreed to increase artificially created wetland areas. The Department of Environmental Regulation does not have a rule which provides that its personnel can engage in negotiations respecting a permit application. Negotiations are, however, an inherent part of a permitting process. The Department does not have any written or unwritten policy whereby it accepts such mitigating factors as artificially created wetlands as justifying the filling of natural wetlands. It does not appear that the Department has any rule or nonrule policy concerning mitigation or trade-offs, and it does not appear that the Department has ever had such a rule or policy. The Department does not have a policy of accepting concessions, trade-offs, or mitigating factors so as to allow an applicant to violate the Department's water quality standards. Since there has been a permitting process, such factors as artificially created wetlands have been considered by the Department in determining whether an application meets the Department's criteria for issuance of a permit. The Department's policy is to consider whether an applicant has provided reasonable assurance that the short-term and long-term effects of proposed activities will not result in violations of water quality standards, as required under Rule 17- 4.28(3), Florida Administrative Code. If an applicant has proposed to construct artificial wetlands, the Department would logically consider it in making determinations about granting the permit. There is no evidence in the record of this proceeding from which it could be concluded that the Department has any unpromulgated "mitigation" policy which has the effect of a rule.

Florida Laws (2) 120.52120.56
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NORTH LAKELAND CITIZENS LEAGUE, INC., ET AL. vs. SAM RODGERS AND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 80-001732 (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-001732 Latest Update: Jan. 19, 1981

The Issue The issue in this case is whether the DER should exempt the stormwater discharge anticipated from the initial phase of a residential development proposed by Sam Rodgers from the licensing requirements laid down by Rule 17- 4.248, Florida Administrative Code.

Findings Of Fact Sam Rodgers (applicant) proposes to alter an existing stormwater conveyance system in connection with transforming part of an orange grove in Polk County into a residential development, Foxwood Lake Estates. If all goes according to plan, the development will eventually occupy all or parts of four distinct basins. The applicant's agents furnished DER data pertaining to all four basins. The only discharge at issue in these proceedings, however, is the stormwater expected to drain from Basin III. See DER Exhibit No. 1, Master Plan-Key Map. Phase I of the development, a trailer park, would lie completely within the 123-acre expanse of Basin III, but would not completely displace the citrus trees. According to the applicant, roofs, streets, parking lots and other impervious surfaces will comprise some two-fifths of the area, when developed. DER Exhibit No. 1. Construction activity increases suspended solids in stormwater draining from construction sites. Lesser but still elevated levels of suspended solids can be expected when people take up residence. Heavy metals from automobile exhaust will end up in stormwater draining from Basin III, if some of the people moving in bring cars. Residential development also increases the biochemical oxygen demand of stormwater washing over it. The applicant proposes sodded roadside swales of varying slope to collect stormwater and, together with occasional pipes under roads, to convey it to an existing pond (Foxwood Lake), which is to be enlarged to an area of 4.82 acres. Foxwood Lake would be 12 feet deep in places. Testimony that the swales and pond would fill with silt in two or three years has not been credited, although it may not take centuries, as another expert testified. The swales will require maintenance and the applicant plans to hire somebody for that purpose. The applicant also contemplates dedicating some road rights-of-way, including swales, to Polk County. Lake Foxwood's present surface elevation of 160.58 feet above mean sea level would remain virtually unchanged, during times of moderate rainfall, at 161 feet above mean sea level. Neither groundwater tables nor the soil's storage capacity would be perceptibly altered, even during periods when the lake was temporarily elevated by the control structure planned for it. The applicant has agreed to a design that would detain on his property a volume of water equal to one inch of rainfall over the whole of Basin III for five to seven days. At the western end of Foxwood Lake, a PVC overflow pipe with a diameter of six inches would be installed in a concrete outfall structure at an elevation of 161 feet above mean sea level. At 164.55 feet above mean sea level, a vertical V-notch in the weir would allow water to spill out of Foxwood Lake, if stormwater should raise the lake's surface to that elevation. Both the overflow pipe and the V-notch would empty through a pipe 36 inches across into an intermittent tributary to Blackwater Creek, which the parties stipulated to be Class III waters. The stream into which water leaving Foxwood Lake would flow meanders west to Martin Lake, about a mile away. James M. Pollock, Jr., owns property on the western edge of Martin Lake and farms land on the lake's edge. Mr. Forrest Sawyer of 1712 Gibsonia-Galloway Road owns land to the north of Mr. Rodgers' property. Mr. Sawyer's property is generally higher ground than the Rodgers property, although three or four acres of the Sawyer property lie in a low area into which drain water from the Rodgers property as well as water from elsewhere on the Sawyer property. No water drains onto the Sawyer property from Basin III, however. Charles C. Krug, his sister, and his brother together own 40 acres abutting the west side of the northwest 40 acres of the Rodgers property. A dike along the southern boundary of the Krug property prevents water entering from the south. No water has drained onto the Krug property from the Rodgers property in the last 45 years. Dorothy Thompson lives 300 or 400 feet east of Orange Avenue which is the eastern boundary of the Rodgers property. There is a small area east of Orange Avenue in Basin III which drains west through three culverts onto the Rodgers property. The Thompson home property evidently drains to the east; however, only since the widening of U.S. Highway 98, which runs north and south to the east of Mrs. Thompson's property have heavy rains resulted in flooding on her property. The applicant gave DER notice of the changes in stormwater discharge proposed for Basin III. Water discharged from the system the applicant proposes would meet the criteria for Class III waters, according to the uncontroverted evidence. Virtually all pollutants except colloidal solids should precipitate or be filtered out by the time water leaves Foxwood Lake for waters of the state. Respondent's witness' suggestion that the swales be paved to decrease the siltation overlooks the filtration and percolation grassy swales make possible. At one time DER required that developers design stormwater systems to detain, instead of a one-inch storm, the mean annual storm, for five to seven days. The applicant's system is designed to avoid any increase in the present rate of discharge under weather conditions up to and including a 100 year 24-hour storm.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That DER grant Sam Rodgers' application for exemption from stormwater discharge licensure for Phase I of the proposed Foxwood Lake Estates. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of December, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Telephone: (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of December, 1980 COPIES FURNISHED: Andrew Reilly, Esquire Post Office Box 2039 Haines City, Florida 33844 Walter R. Mattson, Esquire 1240 East Lime Street Lakeland, Florida 33801 David Levin, Esquire 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301

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CHARLIE JONES vs PAUL CRUM AND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 06-002313 (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Jun. 28, 2006 Number: 06-002313 Latest Update: Feb. 08, 2007

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondents Paul Crum, Sr., and Paul Crum, Jr. (the "Crums"), are entitled to the Noticed General Permit issued by the Department of Environmental Protection ("Department") for the construction of a single- family residential dock and associated structures.

Findings Of Fact Background The Crums are the owners of the riparian property located at 15696 Shark Road West, Jacksonville, Florida. The Crum property is adjacent to Pumpkin Hill Creek, which lies within the Nassau River-St. Johns River Marshes Aquatic Preserve. Extending from the Crum property into Pumpkin Hill Creek is an existing wood dock approximately 90 feet long and four feet wide, with a platform near the landward end of the dock. Petitioner Brooks owns the property immediately adjacent to and north of the Crum property. Petitioner Brooks has a dock and boat lift. Petitioner Cole owns the property immediately adjacent to and southeast of the Crum property. The Cole property is located on a salt marsh and has no dock. Petitioner Jones lives approximately 3,200 feet north of the Crum property, on a tributary to Pumpkin Hill Creek. Petitioner Jones has fished Pumpkin Hill Creek and the surrounding waters for over 25 years. Noticed General Permits are a type of environmental resource permit granted by rule for those activities which have been determined to have minimal impacts to water resources. Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-341.427 grants by rule a general permit to construct a single family pier, along with boat lifts and terminal platforms, provided certain specific criteria are met. In August 2005, the Crums applied for a Noticed General Permit to extend their existing dock into deeper water. The Department issued a Notice of Determination of Qualification for Noticed General Permit, but later rescinded the authorization after Petitioner Brooks complained to the Department that the landward end of the existing dock is located only 21 feet from her property boundary and, therefore, did not comply with Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-21.004(3)(d), which requires that a dock be set back a minimum of 25 feet "inside the applicant's riparian rights lines." In November 2005, the Crums re-applied for a Noticed General Permit. Their revised plans called for removal of the existing dock and construction of a new dock extending approximately 255 feet out into Pumpkin Hill Creek. The proposed dock would be located a minimum of 25 feet inside the Crums' riparian rights lines. On December 6, 2005, the Department issued a Notice of Determination of Qualification for a Noticed General Permit for the revised dock, stating that the project satisfied the requirements of Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-341.427, as well as the conditions for authorization to perform activities on state-owned submerged lands set forth in Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-21 and for activities in an aquatic preserve under Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-20. In April 2006, Petitioners filed three petitions for hearing with the Department alleging that the proposed dock significantly impedes navigation by restricting access to a tidal creek and extends more waterward than necessary to access a water depth of (minus) -4 feet at mean low water, which is prohibited for docks in aquatic preserves under Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-20.005(3)(b)3. Petitioners attached to their petitions a copy of a bathymetric survey showing the elevations of the submerged lands in the vicinity of the proposed project. In response to the information contained in the survey, the Crums revised their plans to shorten the dock to its currently proposed length of 186.56 feet. A new Notice of Determination of Qualification for a Notice General Permit was then issued by the Department on October 16, 2006. The final dock project consists of: (a) removal of the existing wood dock; (b) construction of a four-foot wide, 186.56-foot long, single family residential dock consisting of an access pier, a 12-foot by 12-foot terminal platform, and a 14-foot by 20-foot open boat lift with catwalk (the “proposed dock”). The proposed dock will terminate where the water will be four feet deep at mean low water. Navigating in and Near the Tidal Creek To the south of the Crum property is a wide expanse of salt marsh. Within the salt marsh are unnamed tidal creeks. The mouth of one tidal creek that flows to Pumpkin Hill Creek is located approximately 90 feet south of the existing Crum dock. The tidal creek is shallow and is not navigable at or near low tide. Petitioner Jones owns an 18-foot flatboat which he sometimes keeps at his residence and sometimes at Petitioner Brooks' property. The boat draws about one foot of water. Petitioner Jones uses this boat to fish in the tidal creek located near the Crum property about ten times every month. No evidence was presented to show that Petitioner Brooks or Petitioner Cole ever navigate in or otherwise use this tidal creek. There are many other tidal creeks located in the marshes associated with Pumpkin Hill Creek. Petitioner Jones boats and fishes in most of them. Petitioner Jones said that, currently, he must wait two hours past low tide for the water depth to be sufficient for him to get into the tidal creek near the Crum property. His usual course to the creek lies just beyond the end of the existing Crum dock. He claims there is a channel there, but no channel is shown on the survey or in any of the parties' photographs. After the proposed dock is constructed, Petitioner Jones' usual course to the tidal will be obstructed. He contends that the new course he would have to take to the tidal creek will take him across shallower areas of Pumpkin Hill Creek so that he will have to wait two more hours (a total of four hours) after low tide to get into the creek. Therefore, Petitioner Jones' alleged injury is the reduction of the hours available to him to navigate in and out of the tidal creek for fishing. The existing Crum dock terminates on a broad mud flat which is exposed at mean low water. However, the bathymetric survey shows the mud flat is at a lower elevation near the end of the dock so water covers this area before it covers the rest of the mud flat. However, the bathymetric survey also shows the elevation of the bottom rising as one moves south from the existing dock. At the mouth of the tidal creek the elevation is 1.0 feet NGVD (National Geodetic Vertical Datum, an official, surveyed reference point). Because the tidal creek drains into the main body of Pumpkin Hill Creek, a reasonable inference can be made that the bottom elevations in the creek generally become higher (and the water depths decrease) as one moves up the creek toward dry land. Prop scars in the exposed bottom at the end of the existing dock indicate that boats have traveled over this area when the water was so shallow that the engine props were striking the bottom. Prop scarring can cause turbidity and damage to benthic organisms. The bathymetric survey indicates that mean high water in this area of Pumpkin Hill Creek is 3.03 feet NGVD, and the mean low water is -1.78 feet NGVD. The mean tidal fluctuation between mean low water and mean high water is thus 4.81 feet. Randall Armstrong, who was accepted as an expert in navigation and piloting, explained that in this area, where there are two daily tides, the water elevation will generally increase by 1/12 of the mean tidal fluctuation in the first hour after mean low water, another 2/12 of the fluctuation in the second, and 3/12 in the third hour. Applying this general rule to the tidal fluctuation here of 4.81 feet results in an estimated 1.2-foot increase in water elevation two hours after low tide and a 2.4-foot increase three hours after low tide. Based on the mean low water elevation of -1.78 feet NGVD, the water elevation would usually be about -0.6 foot NGVD two hours after low tide and 0.6 foot NGVD three hours after low tide. Therefore, the tidal creek (with a bottom elevation of 1.0 foot NGVD at the mouth) would usually be "dry" two hours after low tide and would usually have less than a foot of water three hours after low tide. That evidence contradicts Petitioner Jones' statement that he now navigates into the tidal creek two hours after low tide. That might occasionally be possible, but the bathymetric survey indicates the creek would usually be too shallow at that time. In fact, the evidence suggests that the tidal creek is only reliably navigable without causing prop scars to the bottom by using boats with very shallow draft and waiting until high tide (or shortly before or after) when the water depth at the mouth of the creek would be about two feet. It was Mr. Armstrong's opinion that the 1.0-foot NGVD elevation at the mouth of the tidal creek determines when and how long the tidal creek is navigable, and those times would not be affected by the proposed dock. He described the new course that a boater would use to navigate into the tidal creek after the proposed dock is built. He used the bathymetric survey to show that when the water is deep enough to navigate into the tidal creek, the water depth is also sufficient to navigate the new course. The proposed dock might, as Petitioner Jones alleges, cause boaters to traverse a longer section of the mudflat then they do currently. However, the more persuasive testimony supports the Crums' position that the navigability of the tidal creek is controlled by its shallowest point at the 1.0-foot NGVD elevation and that the proposed dock will not interfere with navigation of the tidal creek by requiring boaters to traverse shallower areas. Petitioner Jones testified that he regularly navigates his boat close to the existing Crum dock. The evidence does not indicate that the proposed dock would cause an unreasonable risk of collision for boaters using the new course to the tidal creek.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Secretary of the Florida Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order that grants Noticed General Permit No. 16-253057-002-EG to the Crums. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 2006.

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57403.814
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ROSE LEON vs. CITY OF CLEARWATER AND ANTONIOS MARKOPOULOS, 87-004978 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-004978 Latest Update: Jan. 13, 1988

Findings Of Fact Petitioner applied for conditional use approval from Respondent for the package sale of beer, wine and liquor (4-COP) at 2779 Gulf-To-Bay Boulevard, Clearwater, Florida, on or after September 4, 1987. The subject property is zoned general commercial (CG), and conditional use approval is required for package sales on property zoned CG. Conditional use approval was previously granted for this property on June 30, 1987, to allow on-premises consumption of alcoholic beverages, but this prior approval is not under review in this proceeding. On October 13, 1987, the Planning and Zoning Board voted unanimously to deny Petitioner's application for the package sale of beer, wine and liquor. Petitioner has timely sought review of the Planning and Zoning Board decision. It is undisputed that the subject property is less than 500 feet from an adult congregate living facility (ACLF) which constitutes the residence of approximately 300 persons. Frank Pascoe, the President and representative of the ACLF, testified about the residents' concerns about security, and the adverse impact of this application on the general welfare of their neighborhood. Paula Harvey, Planning Director, testified about the adverse impacts of this application on neighborhood noise, traffic and parking. Ordinance 4470-87 applies to this application since said Ordinance, by its terms, governs applications filed subsequent to September 3, 1987. Petitioner offered no evidence in support of its application. Specifically, there is no evidence in the record favorable to the applicant concerning noise, parking and the compatibility of this application with the neighborhood.

Florida Laws (1) 120.65
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