The Issue Whether Petitioner's request for arbitration before the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Danielle Manfredo (Manfredo), purchased a 1992 Mitsubishi Eclipse from Leheman Mitsubishi in Miami, Florida, on November 5, 1992, and took possession of the vehicle on the same date. When Manfredo purchased the automobile she was given an owner's manual for a 1993 Mitsubishi Eclipse. She did not receive a brochure concerning the Florida Lemon Law nor was she provided any information by the car dealer concerning her rights under the Florida Lemon Law. In January, 1993, Manfredo began experiencing problems with the vehicle and continued experiencing problems into 1995. The two primary problems dealt with the transmission and the car pulling to the right. Manfredo continued to take the car in for repairs. In August, 1995, Manfredo obtained a Lemon Law form from her future mother-in-law. On August 25, 1995, Manfredo sent a Motor Vehicle Notification to the manufacturer and to the Attorney General. Respondent, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Affairs, Division of Consumer Affairs (Department) is the state agency charged with the responsibility to receive and evaluate Requests for Arbitration before the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board for referral to the Attorney General for further processing and action. On September 27, 1995, Manfredo called the Department to get an application for arbitration. On October 17, 1995, she filed a Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board. By letter dated November 8, 1995, the Department denied Manfredo's request for arbitration, stating that the request was not timely. The latest possible date Manfredo could have filed a request for arbitration was May 5, 1995. Manfredo's request for arbitration was not timely filed. The Vehicle Defect Notification and the Request for Arbitration are not the same document and do not serve the same purpose. Mitsubishi does not have a state-certified manufacturer procedure.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Danielle Manfredo's request for arbitration. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of April, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of April, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 96-192 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1995), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. No proposed recommended order was filed. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1. Paragraphs 1-12: Accepted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Danielle Manfredo 1412 Southwest 129th Court Miami, Florida 33184 Rhonda Long Bass, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 515 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue The issue presented for decision is whether Proposed Rules 20-15.001, 20-15.002, and 20-15.003 constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority pursuant to Section 120.52(8)(a)-(e), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulated facts, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Florida Citrus Commission was established in 1935 to organize and promote the growing and sale of various citrus products, fresh and processed, in the State of Florida. The purpose of the Citrus Commission is today reflected in Section 601.02, Florida Statutes. The powers of the Florida Citrus Commission ("the Commission") and the Department, are set forth in full in Section 601.10, Florida Statutes. The powers of the Department include the power to tax and raise other revenue to achieve the purposes of the Department. In particular, Section 601.10(1) and (2), Florida Statutes, state: The Department of Citrus shall have and shall exercise such general and specific powers as are delegated to it by this chapter and other statutes of the state, which powers shall include, but shall not be confined to, the following: To adopt and, from time to time, alter, rescind, modify, or amend all proper and necessary rules, regulations, and orders for the exercise of its powers and the performance of its duties under this chapter and other statutes of the state, which rules and regulations shall have the force and effect of law when not inconsistent therewith. To act as the general supervisory authority over the administration and enforcement of this chapter and to exercise such other powers and perform such other duties as may be imposed upon it by other laws of the state. The Department is authorized to set standards by Section 601.11, Florida Statutes, as follows: The Department of Citrus shall have full and plenary power to, and may, establish state grades and minimum maturity and quality standards not inconsistent with existing laws for citrus fruits and food products thereof containing 20 percent or more citrus or citrus juice, whether canned or concentrated, or otherwise processed, including standards for frozen concentrate for manufacturing purposes, and for containers therefor, and shall prescribe rules or regulations governing the marking, branding, labeling, tagging, or stamping of citrus fruit, or products thereof whether canned or concentrated, or otherwise processed, and upon containers therefor for the purpose of showing the name and address of the person marketing such citrus fruit or products thereof whether canned or concentrated or otherwise processed; the grade, quality, variety, type, or size of citrus fruit, the grade, quality, variety, type, and amount of the products thereof whether canned or concentrated or otherwise processed, and the quality, type, size, dimensions, and shape of containers therefor, and to regulate or prohibit the use of containers which have been previously used for the sale, transportation, or shipment of citrus fruit or the products thereof whether canned or concentrated or otherwise processed, or any other commodity; provided, however, that the use of secondhand containers for sale and delivery of citrus fruit for retail consumption within the state shall not be prohibited; provided, however, that no standard, regulation, rule, or order under this section which is repugnant to any requirement made mandatory under federal law or regulations shall apply to citrus fruit, or the products thereof, whether canned or concentrated or otherwise processed, or to containers therefor, which are being shipped from this state in interstate commerce. All citrus fruit and the products thereof whether canned or concentrated or otherwise processed sold, or offered for sale, or offered for shipment within or without the state shall be graded and marked as required by this section and the regulations, rules, and orders adopted and made under authority of this section, which regulations, rules, and orders shall, when not inconsistent with state or federal law, have the force and effect of law. The Department is authorized to conduct citrus research by Section 601.13, Florida Statutes. To help pay for these duties of the Department, the Legislature first enacted the "box tax" in 1949. The box tax is now codified as Section 601.15(3), Florida Statutes. Section 601.15(3)(a), Florida Statutes, provides in relevant part: There is hereby levied and imposed upon each standard-packed box of citrus fruit grown and placed into the primary channel of trade in this state an excise tax at annual rates for each citrus season as determined from the tables in this paragraph and based upon the previous season's actual statewide production as reported in the United States Department of Agriculture Citrus Crop Production Forecast as of June 1. Section 601.15(3)(a), Florida Statutes, goes on to set forth specific rates for fresh grapefruit, processed grapefruit, fresh oranges, processed oranges, and fresh or processed tangerines and citrus hybrids. Section 601.15(1), Florida Statutes, sets forth the Department's authority to administer the box tax, as follows: The administration of this section shall be vested in the Department of Citrus, which shall prescribe suitable and reasonable rules and regulations for the enforcement hereof, and the Department of Citrus shall administer the taxes levied and imposed hereby. All funds collected under this section and the interest accrued on such funds are consideration for a social contract between the state and the citrus growers of the state whereby the state must hold such funds in trust and inviolate and use them only for the purposes prescribed in this chapter. The Department of Citrus shall have power to cause its duly authorized agent or representative to enter upon the premises of any handler of citrus fruits and to examine or cause to be examined any books, papers, records, or memoranda bearing on the amount of taxes payable and to secure other information directly or indirectly concerned in the enforcement hereof. Any person who is required to pay the taxes levied and imposed and who by any practice or evasion makes it difficult to enforce the provisions hereof by inspection, or any person who, after demand by the Department of Citrus or any agent or representative designated by it for that purpose, refuses to allow full inspection of the premises or any part thereof or any books, records, documents, or other instruments in any manner relating to the liability of the taxpayer for the tax imposed or hinders or in anywise delays or prevents such inspection, is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. The box tax was challenged in 1936 under various provisions of the Florida Constitution as well as the Export Clause, Article 1, s. 9, cl. 5, of the United States Constitution. The Florida Supreme Court issued an opinion in 1937 upholding the validity of the box tax. C.V. Floyd Fruit Company v. Florida Citrus Commission, 128 Fla. 565, 175 So. 248 (1937). In 1970, the Legislature enacted the "equalization tax," codified as Section 601.155, Florida Statutes. The statute mirrored Section 601.15, Florida Statutes, but added certain processors who were mixing foreign citrus products with Florida products. The purpose of the equalization tax was to have all Florida processors of citrus products help pay for the costs of the Department, rather than have the burden fall entirely on the Florida growers subject to the box tax. Section 601.155, Florida Statutes, provides, in relevant part: The first person who exercises in this state the privilege of processing, reprocessing, blending, or mixing processed orange products or processed grapefruit products or the privilege of packaging or repackaging processed orange products or processed grapefruit products into retail or institutional size containers or, except as provided in subsection (9) or except if a tax is levied and collected on the exercise of one of the foregoing privileges, the first person having title to or possession of any processed orange product or any processed grapefruit product who exercises the privilege in this state of storing such product or removing any portion of such product from the original container in which it arrived in this state for purposes other than official inspection or direct consumption by the consumer and not for resale shall be assessed and shall pay an excise tax upon the exercise of such privilege at the rate described in subsection (2). Upon the exercise of any privilege described in subsection (1), the excise tax levied by this section shall be at the same rate per box of oranges or grapefruit utilized in the initial production of the processed citrus products so handled as that imposed, at the time of exercise of the taxable privilege, by s. 601.15 per box of oranges. In order to administer the tax, the Legislature provided the following relevant provisions in Section 601.155, Florida Statutes: Every person liable for the excise tax imposed by this section shall keep a complete and accurate record of the receipt, storage, handling, exercise of any taxable privilege under this section, and shipment of all products subject to the tax imposed by this section. Such record shall be preserved for a period of 1 year and shall be offered for inspection upon oral or written request by the Department of Citrus or its duly authorized agent. Every person liable for the excise tax imposed by this section shall, at such times and in such manner as the Department of Citrus may by rule require, file with the Department of Citrus a return, certified as true and correct, on forms to be prescribed and furnished by the Department of Citrus, stating, in addition to other information reasonably required by the Department of Citrus, the number of units of processed orange or grapefruit products subject to this section upon which any taxable privilege under this section was exercised during the period of time covered by the return. Full payment of excise taxes due for the period reported shall accompany each return. All taxes levied and imposed by this section shall be due and payable within 61 days after the first of the taxable privileges is exercised in this state. Periodic payment of the excise taxes imposed by this section by the person first exercising the taxable privileges and liable for such payment shall be permitted only in accordance with Department of Citrus rules, and the payment thereof shall be guaranteed by the posting of an appropriate certificate of deposit, approved surety bond, or cash deposit in an amount and manner as prescribed by the Department of Citrus. * * * (11) This section shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purposes set forth and as additional and supplemental powers vested in the Department of Citrus under the police power of this state. In March 2000, certain citrus businesses challenged Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, as being unconstitutional. At the time of the suit, Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, read as follows: All products subject to the taxable privileges under this section, which products are produced in whole or in part from citrus fruit grown within the United States, are exempt from the tax imposed by this section to the extent that the products are derived from oranges or grapefruit grown within the United States. In the case of products made in part from citrus fruit grown within the United States, it shall be the burden of the persons liable for the excise tax to show the Department of Citrus, through competent evidence, proof of that part which is not subject to a taxable privilege. The citrus businesses claimed the exemption in Section 601.155(5) rendered the tax unconstitutionally discriminatory, in that processors who imported juice from foreign countries to be blended with Florida juice were subject to the equalization tax, whereas processors who imported juice from places such as California, Arizona and Texas enjoyed an exemption from the tax. The case, Tampa Juice Service, Inc., et al. v. Department of Citrus, Case No. GCG-00-3718 (Consolidated) ("Tampa Juice"), was brought in the Tenth Judicial Circuit Court, in and for Polk County. Judge Dennis P. Maloney of that court continues to preside over that case. In a partial final declaratory judgment effective March 15, 2002, Judge Maloney found Section 601.155, Florida Statutes, unconstitutional because it violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution due to its discriminatory effect in favor of non-Florida United States juice. In an order dated April 15, 2002, Judge Maloney severed the exemption in Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, from the remainder of the statute. The court's decision necessitated the formulation of a remedy for the injured plaintiffs. While the parties were briefing the issue before the court, the Florida Legislature met and passed Chapter 2002-26, Laws of Florida, which amended Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, to read as follows: Products made in whole or in part from citrus fruit on which an equivalent tax is levied pursuant to s. 601.15 are exempt from the tax imposed by this section. In the case of products made in part from citrus fruit exempt from the tax imposed by this section, it shall be the burden of the persons liable for the excise tax to show the Department of Citrus, through competent evidence, proof of that part which is not subject to a taxable privilege. Chapter 2002-26, Laws of Florida, was given an effective date of July 1, 2002. By order dated August 8, 2002, Judge Maloney set forth his decision as to the remedy for the plaintiffs injured by the discriminatory effect of Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes. Judge Maloney expressly relied on the rationale set forth in Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco v. McKesson Corporation, 574 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 1991)("McKesson II"). In its initial McKesson decision, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco v. McKesson Corporation, 524 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1988), the Florida Supreme Court affirmed a summary judgment ruling that Florida's alcoholic beverage tax scheme, which gave tax preferences and exemptions to certain alcoholic beverages made from Florida crops, unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate commerce. The Florida Supreme Court also affirmed that portion of the summary judgment giving the ruling prospective effect, thus denying the plaintiff a refund of taxes paid pursuant to the unconstitutional scheme. The decision was appealed to the United States Supreme Court. In McKesson Corporation v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18 (1990), the United States Supreme Court reversed the Florida Supreme Court's decision as to the prospective effect of its decision. The United States Supreme Court held that: The question before us is whether prospective relief, by itself, exhausts the requirements of federal law. The answer is no: If a State places a taxpayer under duress promptly to pay a tax when due and relegates him to a postpayment refund action in which he can challenge the tax's legality, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment obligates the State to provide meaningful backward-looking relief to rectify any unconstitutional deprivation. 496 U.S. at 31 (footnotes omitted). The United States Supreme Court set forth the following options by which the state could meet its obligation to provide "meaningful backward-looking relief": [T]he State may cure the invalidity of the Liquor Tax by refunding to petitioner the difference between the tax it paid and the tax it would have been assessed were it extended the same rate reductions that its competitors actually received. . . . Alternatively, to the extent consistent with other constitutional restrictions, the State may assess and collect back taxes from petitioner's competitors who benefited from the rate reductions during the contested tax period, calibrating the retroactive assessment to create in hindsight a nondiscriminatory scheme. . . . Finally, a combination of a partial refund to petitioner and a partial retroactive assessment of tax increases on favored competitors, so long as the resultant tax actually assessed during the contested tax period reflects a scheme that does not discriminate against interstate commerce, would render Petitioner's resultant deprivation lawful and therefore satisfy the Due Process Clause's requirement of a fully adequate postdeprivation procedure. 496 U.S. at 40-41 (citations and footnotes omitted). The United States Supreme Court expressly provided that the state has the option of choosing the form of relief it will grant. In keeping with the United States Supreme Court opinion, the Florida Supreme Court granted the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco (the "Division") leave to advise the Court as to the form of relief the state wished to provide. The Division proposed to retroactively assess and collect taxes from those of McKesson's competitors who had benefited from the discriminatory tax scheme. McKesson contended that a refund of the taxes it had paid was the only clear and certain remedy, because retroactive taxation of its competitors would violate their due process rights. McKesson II, 574 So. 2d at 116. The Florida Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings on McKesson's refund claim, with the following instructions: While McKesson may not necessarily be entitled to a refund, it is entitled to a "clear and certain remedy," as outlined in the Supreme Court's opinion. Because nonparties, such as amici, will be directly affected by the retroactive tax scheme proposed by the state, all affected by the proposed emergency rule must be given notice and an opportunity to intervene in this action. Therefore, on remand, the trial court not only must determine whether the state's proposal meets "the minimum federal requirements" outlined in the Supreme Court's opinion, it also must determine whether the proposal comports with federal and state protections afforded those against whom the proposed tax will be assessed. We emphasize that the state has the option of choosing the manner in which it will reformulate the alcoholic beverage tax during the contested period so that the resultant tax actually assessed during that period reflects a scheme which does not discriminate against interstate commerce. Therefore, if the trial court should rule that the state's proposal to retroactively assess and collect taxes from McKesson's competitors does not meet constitutional muster and such ruling is upheld on appeal, the state may offer an alternative remedy for the trial court's review. However, any such proposal likewise must satisfy the standards set forth by the Supreme Court as well as be consistent with other constitutional restrictions. 574 So. 2d at 116. In the Tampa Juice case, Judge Maloney assessed the options prescribed by the series of McKesson cases and concluded that the only fair remedy was to assess and collect back assessments from those who benefited from the unconstitutional equalization tax exemption. His August 8, 2002, order directed the Department to "take appropriate steps, consistent with existing law, to assess and collect the Equalization tax from those entities which [benefited] from the unconstitutional exemption." On September 18, 2002, the Department promulgated the Emergency Rules that were at issue in DOAH Case No. 02-3648RE. The Emergency Rules were filed with the Department of State on September 24, 2002, and took effect on that date. Those emergency rules were held invalid in Peace River, and are not at issue in the instant case. In the November 15, 2002 issue of the Florida Administrative Weekly (vol. 28, no. 46, pp. 4996-4998), the Department published the Proposed Rules that were at issue in DOAH Case No. 02-4607RP. In the March 7, 2003, issue of the Florida Administrative Weekly (vol. 29, no. 10, p. 1036), the Department published amendments to the Proposed Rule. The Proposed Rules, as amended, read as follows: EQUALIZATION TAX ON NON-FLORIDA UNITED STATES JUICE 20-15.001 Intent. The Court in Tampa Juice Service, et al v. Florida Department of Citrus in Consolidated Case Number GCG-003718 (Circuit Court in and for Polk County, Florida) severed the exemption contained in Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, that provided an exemption for persons who exercised one of the enumerated Equalization Tax privileges on non-Florida, United States juice. The Court had previously determined that the stricken provisions operated in a manner that violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. On August 8, 2002, the Court ordered that the Florida Department of Citrus "take appropriate steps, consistent with existing law, to assess and collect the Equalization tax from those entities which [benefited] from the unconstitutional exemption." It is the Florida Department of Citrus' intent by promulgating the following remedial rule to implement a non- discriminatory tax scheme, which does not impose a significant tax burden that is so harsh and oppressive as to transgress constitutional limitations. These rules shall be applicable to those previously favored persons who received favorable tax treatment under the statutory sections cited above. Specific Authority 601.02, 601.10, 601.15, 601.155 FS. Law Implemented 601.02, 601.10, , 601.155 FS. History-- New . 20-15.002 Definitions. "Previously favored persons" shall be defined as any person who exercised an enumerated Equalization Tax privilege as defined by Section 601.155, Florida Statutes, but who was exempt from payment of the Equalization Tax due to the exemption for non-Florida, United States juice set forth in the statutory provision, which was ultimately determined to be unconstitutional and severed from Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes. The "tax period" during which the severed provisions of Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, were in effect shall be defined as commencing on October 6, 1997, and ending on March 14, 2002. "Tax liability" shall be defined as the total amount of taxes due to the Florida Department of Citrus during the "tax period," at the following rates per box for each respective fiscal year: Fiscal Year Processed Rate Orange Grapefruit 1997-1998 .175 .30 1998-1999 .17 .30 1999-2000 .18 .325 2000-2001 .175 .30 2001-2002 .165 .18 Specific Authority 601.02, 601.10, 601.15, 601.155 FS. Law Implemented 601.02, 601.10, , 601.155 FS. History-- New . 20-15.003 Collection. The Florida Department of Citrus shall calculate the tax liability for each person or entity that exercised an enumerated Equalization Tax privilege outlined in section 601.155, Florida Statutes, upon non-Florida, United States juice based upon inspection records maintained by Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services and the United States Department of Agriculture. Subsequent to adoption of this rule, the Florida Department of Citrus will provide to the previously favored persons by certified mail a Notice of Tax Liability which shall contain a demand for payment consistent with the above-referenced itemized statement. The Department will deem late payment of Equalization Taxes owed by previously favored persons to constitute good cause, and shall waive the 5 percent penalty authorized by Section 601.155(10), F.S., as compliance with either of the following is established by Department [sic]: Lump sum payment of the tax liability remitted with the filing of Department of Citrus Form 4R (incorporated by reference in Rule 20-100.004, F.A.C.) for the relevant years and then-applicable tax rate(s) per subsection 20-15.002(3), F.A.C., within 61 days of receiving Notice of Tax Liability; or Equal installment payments remitted with the filing of Department of Citrus Form 4R (incorporated by reference in Rule 20- 100.004, F.A.C.) for the relevant years and then-applicable tax rate(s) per subsection subsection [sic] 20-15.002(3), F.A.C., over a 60-month period, the first payment being due within 61 days of receiving Notice of Tax Liability pursuant to subsection 20- 15.003(2), F.A.C.; or The Good Cause provisions of 601.155(10), F.S., shall not apply to persons who do not comply with paragraph 20- 15.003(2)(a), F.A.C., or paragraph 20- 15.003(2)(b), F.A.C. Failure to pay the taxes or penalties due under 601.155, F.S. and Chapter 20-15, F.A.C., shall constitute grounds for revocation or suspension of a previously favored person's citrus fruit dealer's license pursuant to 601.56(4), F.S., 601.64(6), F.S., 601.64(7), F.S., and/or 601.67(1), F.S. The Florida Department of Citrus will not oppose the timely intervention of persons who previously enjoyed the subject exemption that wish to present a claim to the Court in the Tampa Juice Service, Inc., et al v. Florida Department of Citrus. However, the Florida Department of Citrus does not waive any argument regarding the validity of the calculation of the tax liability or that imposition of this tax is constitutional. Specific Authority 601.02, 601.10, 601.15, 601.155 FS. Law Implemented 601.02, 601.10, 601.15, 601.155 FS. History-- New . The Final Order in Peace River held that the Proposed Rules were not an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, for reasons discussed in the Conclusions of Law below. Judge Maloney has yet to rule on the backward-looking remedy proposed by the Department. On March 26, 2003, Judge Maloney entered an order extending until May 1, 2003, the time for interested parties to file motions to intervene with regard to the Department's proposed backward-looking relief. The order noted that the parties have stipulated to the suspension of the back tax as to plaintiffs and objecting non-parties until further order of the court. On February 19, 2003, Judge Maloney entered an "Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment-- Import-Export." The sole issue before Judge Maloney was "whether Section 601.155, Florida Statutes, (the 'Equalization Tax'), as it existed in 1997, violates Article I, Section 10, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States (the 'Import- Export Clause')." (Emphasis in original) After setting forth the standard for analysis of whether a taxing scheme violates the Import-Export Clause under Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 96 S. Ct. 535, 46 L.Ed.2d 495 (1976), Judge Maloney ruled as follows: It is precisely [the exemption for United States products found in 601.155(5), Florida Statutes] that causes the 1997 Equalization Tax to contravene the Import-Export Clause. Specifically, the court finds that because the statute exempts "citrus fruit grown within the United States," but does not exempt citrus fruit grown in foreign countries, the exemption causes the tax to "fall on imports as such simply because of their place of origin." Michelin, 423 U.S. at 286. Additionally, because the tax falls on foreign-grown citrus as such simply because of its origin but does not fall on domestic-grown citrus, the Equalization Tax, with the exemption, creates a "special tariff or particular preference for certain domestic goods." Id. (i.e. California, Arizona, and Texas citrus products). * * * In conclusion, because the court finds the exemption contained within the 1997 Equalization Tax violates both the first and third elements of the Michelin test,1 the court finds the 1997 Equalization Tax violates Article I, Section 10, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States (the "Import-Export Clause"). On March 31, 2003, Judge Maloney entered an "Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment." In this order, Judge Maloney found that the box tax itself, Section 601.15, Florida Statutes, violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Petitioners and Intervenor in the instant case are licensed citrus fruit dealers regulated by Chapter 601, Florida Statutes. As such, they are subject to the rules of the Department. Petitioners and Intervenor buy, sell, and manufacture citrus juices. They shipped products made with non- Florida U.S. juice during the tax period without paying equalization taxes. Petitioners and Intervenor have been notified by the Department that they are liable to pay back taxes pursuant to the Proposed Rules, as well as the invalid Emergency Rules.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of failing to maintain good moral character and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner granted Respondent law enforcement certificate number 62593 on December 4, 1984. On November 24, 1996, Respondent was employed as a patrol officer by the Lee County Port Authority Police Department. The incidents in question took place in the vicinity of the Southwest Florida International Airport in Fort Myers. Due to reports of stolen property, the Lee County Port Authority Police Department conducted an Officer Integrity Operation, which is a manufactured situation designed to test whether an officer will recover and process lost or stolen property with integrity and in compliance with department policy. Thus, one of the officers of the police department secured a rental car from an airport rental car company and placed $150 in marked currency inside a bank envelope, sealed the envelope, and placed the sealed envelope on the center console in front of the gear shifter. The officer then drove the rental car to a location beside a service road inside the airport complex. The officer left a handwritten note on the windshield explaining that the car had broken down and the driver had had to catch a flight. The officer left the car keys with the note, and the bank envelope remained in the vehicle when he left the scene and assumed a surveillance position about 40-50 yards from the vehicle, which was never out of his sight from the moment he began to walk away from the vehicle. Another officer then dispatched Respondent to check out the vehicle, which the dispatcher reported to be apparently abandoned. At approximately 7:16 a.m., Respondent, while in uniform, arrived at the vehicle's location in a marked patrol car and radioed in the tag number to determine ownership. About three minutes later, he entered the vehicle. Respondent remained in the vehicle for four minutes. He searched the vehicle and found the envelope with the money inside, as well as a rental car contract. He returned to his marked car for a minute before returning to the rental car and moving it to the shoulder of the road at 7:22 a.m. At about 7:27 a.m., Respondent checked the trunk of the marked car. Less than a minute later, Respondent returned to his marked vehicle with the keys and contract to the rental car and drove away. He drove directly to the rental car agency to return the keys and contract. A representative of the agency informed him that they were sending a wrecker and asked that he return the keys to the rental car. At about 7:35 a.m., Respondent informed the dispatcher that he was returning to the rental car to return the keys. While at the rental car agency, the rental agents asked Respondent to pick up their breakfasts at a nearby Waffle House. Respondent drove to the Waffle House, after returning the keys to the rental car at 7:40 a.m., and paid for the breakfasts with a marked $10 bill. Shortly after this, an officer of the police department ordered Respondent to return to the airport station. Respondent met the officer at the station. The officer asked Respondent if he had any money in his pockets. Respondent reached into his right pants pocket and handed the officer $11. The officer took the money to his vehicle where he could examine it to see if it was the marked currency. After determining that it was not, the officer returned to Respondent and asked him if he had any other money. Respondent stared at the officer for 15-20 seconds, and then he handed the officer $140 in currency. When the officer checked the currency, he found it was $140 of the $150 of marked currency. The officer then asked Respondent where the bank envelope was. Respondent denied knowledge of a bank envelope. The officer asked Respondent where the missing $10 was, and Respondent replied that he had used it to purchase others' breakfasts at the Waffle House. Any attempt by Respondent to suggest that he intended to relinquish possession of the currency is rebutted by four facts: he used $10 of the currency to buy breakfast, he paused for a considerable time before producing the $140 in currency, he did not mention any intent to turn in the money when he handed the currency to the officer, and he lied about the bank envelope.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of failing to maintain good moral character and revoking his certificate. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of April, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of April, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Richard D. Courtemanche, Jr. Assistant General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Alvin L. Curry 2197 Mitchell Court Fort Myers, Florida 33916
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner's Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board pursuant to Chapter 681, Florida Statutes, should be denied on the ground that the request was not timely filed with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Division of Consumer Services (hereinafter referred to as the "Department").
Findings Of Fact On May 20, 1993, the Petitioner took delivery of a new 1993 Volvo (the subject vehicle) from Gold Coast Volvo in Pompano Beach, Florida. The Petitioner put 24,000 miles on the subject vehicle on or before October 2, 1995. The Petitioner had problems with the subject vehicle, the most serious of which were that on an intermittent basis the vehicle would stall at slow speeds or would hesitate and stall when acceleration was attempted. During the first 18 months following delivery of the subject vehicle, the dealer made several (more than three) unsuccessful attempts to repair the hesitation and stalling problems. The Petitioner's initial Lemon Law rights period ended on November 19, 1994. As a result of the unsuccessful attempts to repair the hesitation and stalling problems during the initial Lemon Law rights period, the Petitioner was entitled to a six month extension of the Lemon Law rights period. That extension ended on May 19, 1995. Consumers are entitled to file for relief under the subject statutory provisions for a period of six months after the expiration of the Lemon Law rights period. In this case, that filing period ended on November 19, 1995. Prior to the expiration of the filing period that ended on November 19, 1995, the Petitioner had a copy of the pamphlet titled "Preserving Your Rights Under the Florida Lemon Law." The Petitioner attempted to comply with the instructions contained in that pamphlet. Following the expiration of the initial Lemon Law rights period, and following the expiration of the six month extension of that period, the dealer continued to make attempts to repair the continuing intermittent problems and continued to make assurances that eventually the problems would be resolved. In reliance on these attempts and assurances, the Petitioner postponed taking action to enforce his rights under the Lemon Law. On January 10 or 11, 1996, representatives of Volvo told the Petitioner they were unable to fix the intermittent hesitation and stalling problems on the subject vehicle. On January 15, 1996, the Petitioner filled out and signed a Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board. The Petitioner sent the request for arbitration to the Department, where it was received on January 26, 1996. By letter dated February 7, 1996, the Department advised the Petitioner that it intended to deny his request for arbitration because his "application was not submitted in a timely manner." Volvo does not have a certified procedure for the resolution of consumer complaints. The Vehicle Defect Notification form and the Request for Arbitration form are separate documents with separate functions.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a Final Order in this case denying the Petitioner's Request for Arbitration as untimely. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of August, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Louis E. Martucci 5100 North Springs Way Coral Springs, Florida 33076 Rhonda Long Bass, Esquire Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Office of the General Counsel Mayo Building, Room 515 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to arbitration on his claim under the Florida Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner resides in Naples, Florida. He has resided in Naples since December 1992. Petitioner formerly resided in the New York City area. When he became interested in purchasing a new automobile, Petitioner contacted a friend of his son. The friend worked at North Shore Oldsmobile in Flushing, New York. Petitioner soon entered into negotiations with a sales representative of the Flushing dealership for the purchase of a new 1993 Oldsmobile Cutlass Cierra. Petitioner conducted these negotiations, which took place in April 1993, exclusively by telephone with Petitioner in Naples and the sales representative at the dealership in New York. Petitioner wanted a stationwagon, and the dealership had one car of this type in stock. It was the right color and had most of the options that Petitioner wanted. After a week or ten days of negotiating the price over the telephone, Petitioner, satisfied with the price, agreed to purchase the car, and North Shore Oldsmobile agreed to sell the car. Petitioner and representatives of the dealership then discussed by telephone financing arrangements. After they finished working out the details, Petitioner agreed to come to Flushing, New York to pick up the car. They agreed that Petitioner would take delivery of the car on May 3, 1993. Prior to Petitioner's departure, North Shore Oldsmobile sent him by mail in Naples various papers that Petitioner needed to complete prior to taking delivery. A North Shore Oldsmobile representative informed Petitioner that he was required to obtain insurance and sent him sufficient information so that he could obtain insurance in Florida prior to traveling to New York to get the car. North Shore Oldsmobile also sent Petitioner a copy of the retail instalment sales contract. Petitioner and some friends drove to New York, and, on the appointed day, Petitioner visited North Shore Oldsmobile in Flushing and either signed the closing papers at the dealership or delivered already-signed closing papers to the dealership. Petitioner also paid the necessary amounts to North Shore Oldsmobile at the dealership. North Shore Oldsmobile did not charge Petitioner any New York sales tax, but disclosed the amount of Florida use tax that Petitioner would be required to pay on registering the new car in Florida. Petitioner then took possession of the automobile, which he claims did not satisfactorily operate on the trip back to Florida or thereafter. Upon his return to Florida, Petitioner registered the new car in Florida and paid the Florida use tax, as well as title, tag, and registration fees imposed under Florida law.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's request for arbitration under the Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act. ENTERED on May 22, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on May 22, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Carmine Cavaseno 2722 Fountain View Circle Apartment Number 104 Naples, Florida 33942 Attorney Rhonda Long Bass Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Room 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Citra-Life, Inc., LLC, is indebted to Petitioner for the purchase of citrus fruit; and, if so, in what amount.
Findings Of Fact The final hearing was convened, as duly noticed, on November 30, 2017, at 9:30 a.m. Neither party appeared at the final hearing. No evidence was presented by either party. Prior to the final hearing, neither party filed any correspondence or motions with DOAH requesting a continuance of, or objecting to, the hearing date.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s complaint against Citra-Life. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of December, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. BRUCE CULPEPPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of December, 2017.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent Delicious Citrus Packing, LLC (Respondent), as a citrus fruit dealer, has failed to pay Petitioner for citrus fruit, as required by section 601.64(4), Florida Statutes; and, if so, the amount that Respondent owes Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Respondent holds a Citrus Fruit Dealer's License number 252, effective August 31, 2015, for the 2015-16 season. The surety is Respondent Platte River Insurance Company. During the 2015-16 season, Petitioner picked citrus fruit from the groves of various third parties and transported the fruit to Respondent, which cleaned, waxed, and graded the fruit prior to selling it to various retailers, primarily, it seems, in South Florida. During the 2014-15 season, Petitioner and Respondent entered into contracts covering their respective rights and obligations in connection with transactions identical to those set forth in the preceding paragraph. An example is a contract dated April 10, 2015, signed by Petitioner and Respondent, specifying that Petitioner would purchase from a named third party from a named portion of a grove approximately 2000 citrus fruit for a delivered price of $16 per box with payment due upon delivery. The contract provides that Petitioner makes no allowance for fruit not meeting Respondent's specifications because Respondent had examined and preapproved the fruit on the tree. The parties did not document their agreement during the 2015-16 season, but the conditions were identical, although the price per box decreased, as set forth below. As was their practice during the preceding season, prior to the purchase and delivery by Petitioner, representatives of both companies visited the grove with the fruit still on the tree, and Respondent's representative approved the fruit, so, again, the agreement permitted no allowances for nonconforming fruit. Petitioner produced trip tickets documenting the delivery of 791 boxes of citrus fruit--all oranges--from September 25, 2015, through October 24, 2015. At this point, representatives of Petitioner and Respondent met to discuss the price of the fruit. Respondent complained that the fruit was too expensive based on what it could charge its purchasers, so Petitioner went back to the grove owners and negotiated a reduction in price. On November 2, 2015, Petitioner agreed to reduce its price from an undisclosed price per box to $15.50 per box, so as to reduce the outstanding balance for the 7791 boxes already delivered to $120,760.50. At that time, Respondent paid $85,250.50, leaving a balance due of $35,510. The parties promptly resumed their business dealings. A trip ticket dated November 2, 2015, documented the delivery of 550 boxes, for which the agreed-upon price was the $15.50 that the parties had set for the previous deliveries. However, even this price proved too high for Respondent, so the next two trip tickets, dated November 3 and 4, 2015, for a total of 1072 boxes, were priced at $13.50 per box. At some point, Respondent made two payments totaling $8811, and Respondent processed other fruit for Petitioner, earning a total credit of $2486 to be applied to the outstanding balance. These transactions reduced the balance to $47,210, which is the amount that Respondent presently owes Petitioner. The finding in the preceding paragraph reduced Petitioner's claim by $7157. As shown on the invoice dated April 6, 2016, received into evidence as Petitioner Exhibit 5, this balance was carried forward from the 2014-15 season. As explained in the Conclusions of Law, this case is limited to the 2015-16 season due to the timing of the filing of the Complaint. The findings in the preceding paragraphs discredit the testimony of Respondent's witnesses as to bad fruit that could not be sold. First, Respondent bore the risk of fruit that could not be sold for any reason, including spoilage. Second, Respondent did not assert this complaint when it negotiated a new purchase price on November 2, 2015. Third, Respondent did not object to the series of invoices that Petitioner submitted to Respondent, culminating in the April 6 invoice. Fourth, the testimony of Respondent's owner was vague and confusing, but twice seemed to confirm the indebtedness.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order determining that Respondent has violated section 601.64(4) by failing to pay Petitioner the sum of $47,210 for citrus fruit that Petitioner sold to Respondent during the 2015-16 shipping season and fixing a reasonable time within which Respondent shall pay such sum to Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of March, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of March, 2017. COPIES FURNISHED: W. Alan Parkinson, Bureau Chief Bureau of Mediation and Enforcement Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Rhodes Building, R-3 2005 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-6500 (eServed) Emmitt King, Jr. KAD Harvesting and Hauling, LLC 850 South 21st Street Fort Pierce, Florida 34950 Platte River Insurance Company Attn: Claims Department Post Office Box 5900 Madison, Wisconsin 53705-0900 Douglas A. Lockwood, Esquire Straughn & Turner, P.A. 255 Magnolia Avenue Southwest Post Office Box 2295 Winter Haven, Florida 33880 (eServed) Dwight Johnathan Rhodeback, Esquire Rooney & Rooney, P.A. 1517 20th Street Vero Beach, Florida 32960 (eServed) Lorena Holley, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 407 South Calhoun Street, Suite 520 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 (eServed) Honorable Adam Putnam Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
Findings Of Fact Background Petitioner, Chrysler Corporation (Chrysler), is a "manufacturer" of motor vehicles as that term is defined by Section 681.102(10), Florida Statutes (1992 Supp.), 1/ and, as such, is subject to the provisions of Chapter 681, Florida Statutes, the "Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act." Consequently, Chrysler is substantially affected by the rules promulgated by respondent, Department of Legal Affairs (Department) to implement Chapter 681, and the parties have stipulated that it has standing to maintain this rule challenge proceeding. The Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act (the "Lemon Law") imposes upon manufacturers, as defined by Section 681.102(10), a duty to repair nonconformities which are first reported by consumers during the "Lemon Law rights period," and liability for the refund of the purchase price or replacement of those motor vehicles if their nonconformities are not corrected within a reasonable number of repair attempts. A consumer's right to exercise the remedies provided by the Lemon Law accrue from the date the consumer takes delivery of the motor vehicle. The "Lemon Law rights period" is defined by Section 681.102(9), Florida Statutes, as follows: "Lemon Law rights period" means the period ending 18 months after the date of the original delivery of a motor vehicle to a consumer or the first 24,000 miles of operation, whichever occurs first. On October 9, 1992, the Department published notice, inter alia, of proposed rule 2-30.001(3)(e), in volume 18, number 41, of the Florida Administrative Weekly. Such rule would define "24,000 miles of operation," for purposes of calculating the running of the Lemon Law rights period established by Section 681.102(9), Florida Statutes, as "miles of operation by the consumer." By petition filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on October 30, 1992, Chrysler timely challenged the validity of such proposed rule as an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. The predicate for Chrysler's challenge was its contention that the proposed rule enlarges, modifies or contravenes Section 618.102(9), Florida Statutes, the provision of law sought to be implemented. 2/ The proposed rule Proposed rule 2-30.001(3)(e) provides: When calculating the running of the Lemon Law rights period as defined by s. 681.102(9), FS., "24,000 miles of operation" means miles of operation by the consumer. If the consumer is a subsequent transferee as defined in s. 681.102(4), FS., "24,000 miles of operation" means miles of operation by both the original consumer and the subsequent transferee. The gravamen of the dispute between the parties concerning the propriety of the proposed rule is a disagreement regarding the interpretation to be accorded Section 681.102(9), Florida Statutes, which defines the "Lemon Law rights period" as: . . . the period ending 18 months after the date of the original delivery of a motor vehicle to a consumer or the first 24,000 miles of operation, whichever occurs first. Chrysler contends that the "Lemon Law rights period," as defined by Section 681.102(9), is clear and unambiguous, and that the "first 24,000 miles of operation" refers to the actual mileage shown on the odometer of the motor vehicle, without regard to when or by whom the mileage was accrued. So read, proposed rule 2-30.001(3)(e) conflicts with the law sought to be implemented. The position advanced by Chrysler is of import to it since Chrysler impresses new motor vehicles into use as company cars and permits its dealers to purchase and use new vehicles for demonstration purposes for customers or personal use, prior to their retail sale. During this period, the motor vehicle accumulates mileage on its odometer as a result of such "demonstrator" use. Excluding the mileage so accrued from the running of the "Lemon Law rights period," as contemplated by the proposed rule, could extend Chrysler's liability under the Lemon Law beyond the first 24,000 miles of operation registered on the vehicle, if it issued a warranty as a condition of sale to the consumer. See Section 681.102(14), definition of "motor vehicle," discussed infra. Contrasted with Chrysler's position, the Department interprets the "first 24,000 miles of operation" provision of Section 681.102(9), to relate to operation by a consumer, and would exclude any mileage accrued on the vehicle prior to its delivery to the consumer when calculating the "Lemon Law rights period." So interpreted, the proposed rule is consistent with the law sought to be implemented. The Department's interpretation is premised on its reading of Section 681.102(9) in pari materia with Section 681.102(14) which defines a "motor vehicle" as: . . . a new vehicle, . . . and includes a vehicle used as a demonstrator or leased vehicle if a manufacturer's warranty was issued as a condition of sale, or the lessee is responsible for repairs. . . . So read, a demonstrator is considered a new vehicle, and no distinction is made in applying the Lemon Law rights period between consumers who purchase a motor vehicle with no or minimal mileage on its odometer at delivery and those who purchase a demonstrator. The proposed rule's predecessor Pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 88-95, Laws of Florida, Chapter 681, Florida Statutes, was amended effective January 1, 1989, to establish what has been referred to as the Lemon Law. At that time, the "Lemon Law rights period" was defined as: . . . the period ending 1 year after the date of the original delivery of a motor vehicle to a consumer or the first 12,000 miles of operation, whichever occurs first. Section 681.102(7), Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.). To implement the provisions of the Lemon Law, the Department adopted Rule 2-30.001, Florida Administrative Code, in or about January 1989. At that time, the rule included the following definition of the "Lemon Law rights period": The "Lemon Law Rights period" is the period ending one year after the date of the original delivery of the motor vehicle to the consumer, or the first 12,000 miles of operation, whichever occurs first. This period may be extended if a substantial defect or condition is reported to the manufacturer or its authorized dealer during the Lemon Law Rights period, but has not been cured by the expiration of the period. If you put 12,000 miles on your vehicle (miles driven minus miles on the vehicle on the date of delivery) before the end of the first year of operation, you should note that date in your personal records. If a warranty problem is examined or repaired during the Lemon Law Rights period, be sure you get and keep a copy of the work order which contains the date, odometer reading, and a description of that problem. Your work order copy provides the best proof as to when the problem was first reported. [Respondent's exhibits 3 and 15]. Consistent with the foregoing rule, the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board, which is charged with the responsibility of arbitrating disputes under the Lemon Law, has consistently construed the provisions of the "Lemon Law rights period" concerning "miles of operation" to relate to operation by the consumer, and has excluded any mileage accrued on the vehicle prior to its delivery to the consumer when calculating the "Lemon Law rights period." [See e.g., Respondent's exhibits 5, 8 and 9]. Since the Lemon Law was enacted, there has been no change in the definition of "Lemon Law rights period," or the Department's rule, until the passage of Chapter 92-88, Laws of Florida, effective July 1, 1992. Under such law, the "Lemon Law rights period" was amended to read as follows: (9)(7) "Lemon Law rights period" means the period ending 18 months 1 year after the date of the original delivery of a motor vehicle to a consumer or the first 24,000 12,000 miles of operation, whichever occurs first. Section 681.102(9), Florida Statutes. Here, the proposed rule is designed to reflect the change in the "Lemon Law rights period" from one year or 12,000 miles to 18 months or 24,000 miles, occasioned by the aforesaid amendment to Chapter 681. The Department's interpretation of the "Lemon Law rights period" concerning "miles of operation" to relate to operation by the consumer remains, however, consistent with its prior rule and interpretation.
