The Issue The issue to determine in this matter is whether Petitioner Darryl Maurice Young’s application for real estate license should be denied for the reasons stated in Respondent Department of Business Regulation, Florida Real Estate Commission’s (Commission), Notice of Intent to Deny, rendered April 5, 2018.
Findings Of Fact On January 22, 2018, Mr. Young submitted a State of Florida, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Florida Real Estate Commission, Application for Sales Associate License, Form # DBPR RE 1. Background question 1, in Mr. Young’s application, asks, in part: Have you ever been convicted or found guilty of, or entered a plea of nolo contendere or guilty to, regardless of adjudication, a crime in any jurisdiction, or are you currently under criminal investigation? Mr. Young provided the following explanation for Background question 1: DUI Manslaughter Duval/Orlando, Florida 20 years in prison; 1 year probation May 3, 1997. Additionally, the Commission presented, through FDLE and court records, Mr. Young’s lengthy past criminal offenses and convictions, dating 2/07/1987 back to 1987: Petty theft with prior 2/17/1987 Petty theft 6/01/1987 Burglary (dismissed when pled to above charges) 11/04/1987 Petty theft (merchandise) 8/29/1988 Burglary Petty theft and prior jail offenses Convicted/committed to prison 10/26/1988 Petty theft with priors CA Medical Facility Sentence - 1 year, 4 months 1/02/1991 Petty theft with priors Sentence - 2 years, state prison 1/30/1991 Petty theft Sentence – state prison 3/26/1992 Petty theft with priors Sentence - state prison 8/10/1995 Shoplifting/petit theft Resisting merchant Convicted of both misdemeanors 6/18/1996 Aggravated assault with weapon Felony conviction 7/08/1996 Fraud – failure to deliver a hired vehicle Felony conviction 5/03/1997 Resisting officer with violence Felony conviction 7/22/1997 Violation of Probation (Fraud) Felony conviction 8/22/1997 Violation of Probation (DUI Manslaughter) Felony conviction 8/22/1997 Leaving the scene of an accident Felony conviction 7/13/1999 DUI Manslaughter DUI with serious bodily injury Felony conviction Sentence - 20 years, 5 months, and 7 days While in prison for the 20-plus year sentence for DUI Manslaughter, Mr. Young completed a substance abuse program, and a faith-based residential program. The Florida Department of Corrections discharged Mr. Young from supervision (probation) on April 25, 2016. Michelle Gordon testified that she has known Mr. Young since his release from prison, has had a friendly working relationship with Mr. Young, and that she shared a few culinary classes with him. She further testified that he was a helpful and nice person. Tracy Pray testified that she too has known Mr. Young since his release from prison, and that Mr. Young had assisted her in obtaining a food truck, and that they worked together for about two years. Ms. Pray testified that Mr. Young voluntarily helped her complete the paperwork for the food truck operation. Geneva Carter testified that she works for PRIDE Enterprises as a transition specialist. She testified that she helped Mr. Young gain some useful work experience while he was incarcerated. Ms. Carter further testified that she met with him briefly on two occasions after his release to help him make the transition from prison to working outside of prison. Petitioner failed to establish the following requirements for a real estate sales associate license: that he is honest, trustworthy, of good character, has a reputation for fair dealing, and he is competent and qualified to make real estate transactions and conduct negotiations with safety to investors and others. Petitioner also failed to overcome the disqualification for eligibility found in section 475.25(1)(f), which results from convictions to multiple crimes involving moral turpitude or fraudulent or dishonest dealing. Based on Mr. Young’s failure to appear and offer evidence, there is no evidentiary basis on which findings can be made that he satisfied the requirements for a real estate sales associate license.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Commission issue a final order deny Mr. Young’s application for licensure as a real estate sales associate. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of May, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT J. TELFER III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of May, 2019.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Ideal Security Services, Inc. (“Respondent or Ideal”), retaliated against Petitioner, John Mercurio (“Petitioner”), for exercising his right to file a complaint on an alleged unlawful employment practice pursuant to section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2019).1/
Findings Of Fact Ideal is an employer as that term is defined in section 760.02(7). While the exact number of employees is not reflected in this record, the evidence established that Ideal employs greater than 15 employees. Ideal provides security officers to different locations for access control and on-site patrol. Petitioner worked for Respondent as a security officer from June 20, 2018, through February 7, 2019. At the time he was hired by Ideal, Petitioner was informed in writing of the company’s “Interchange” practice, which provides: Although employees generally are hired to work at one specific client location or facility, the company (Ideal Services, Inc.) uses its Guard Force INTERCHANGEABLY to meet its needs: In case of cancellation of any accounts, reduction or increase in hours provided, or an employee who may request a transfer. Also Ideal Services, Inc. wishes to point out that they DO NOT guarantee a full 40 hour work week. Overtime is given to employees depending on where the overtime will occur and the availability of employees to work an assignment. Ideal Services, Inc. wishes to also point out that hourly pay rates will depend on job placement as some client assigned jobs will carry higher pay rates than others. It is therefore Ideal Services, Inc.’s policy to inform all individuals who are applying for employment that Ideal Services, Inc. DOES NOT HIRE for only one site at one set pay rate . . . because both of these are subject to change. On the date he was hired, Petitioner signed a copy of the above policy statement, acknowledging that he had read and understood its contents. Petitioner’s first assignment was to provide security at a Krispy Kreme Donuts retail location, an assignment which carried a pay rate of $9.50 per hour. In July 2018, Petitioner was assigned to several other locations, in addition to the Krispy Kreme location. Those new locations were at Daytona Beach Housing Authority apartments, including the Maley, Windsor, and Trails apartment complexes. The public housing assignments carried a pay rate of $8.50 per hour. As of August 2018, Petitioner was no longer assigned to the Krispy Kreme location, but rather was working exclusively at the public housing locations. In December 2018, another Ideal security guard was newly assigned to the same public housing complex as Petitioner. It was clear to Petitioner that this individual was a racist based on his words and actions. While standing next to Petitioner, the new security officer referred to the building residents as "monkeys." It was clear to Petitioner that this remark was made in reference to the African-American residents of the complex. Dan Montrose, the senior security officer and Petitioner’s partner, was also within earshot when the newly assigned officer made the derogatory remark. Petitioner was stunned by the racist comment, especially since Mr. Montrose’s wife is an African-American female. Petitioner also testified that on another occasion, the new officer posted a picture of a Caucasian baby on the common area's fridge with an arrow that said, "Dan" on it, as well as a black finger/arm covering the baby's mouth which said, "Dan's wife." While Petitioner’s first impulse was to report the above racist incidents to his employer, at the request of Officer Montrose he did not immediately do so. However, while the exact date of the conversation is not of record, sometime in the second or third week of December 2018, Petitioner reported the “monkey remark” to Ideal’s Manager and CFO, Diane Cox. Ms. Cox assured Petitioner that she would discuss the racist comment with the offending security guard. Ms. Cox testified that the offending security guard was given a verbal warning for his inappropriate comment, but was not otherwise disciplined because he had worked for the company for many years without incident. When Ms. Cox spoke with the offending security guard about his inappropriate remark, she did not raise the issue of the racist picture that had been posted on the common area refrigerator. According to the testimony of Ms. Cox, this is because she had not been informed by anyone about the existence of the picture, and first became aware of it when she read Petitioner’s Complaint. Ms. Cox testified that had she been informed of the racist picture, disciplinary action would have been taken against the offending employee. Again, while the exact date is not of record, sometime in late December 2018, Petitioner requested a copy of his payroll records from Ms. Cox. While gathering the records for Petitioner, Ms. Cox discovered that Petitioner’s rate of pay had erroneously not been reduced from $9.50 per hour to $8.50 per hour when he was transferred from the Krispy Kreme location to the public housing locations. Upon discovering this accounting error, Ms. Cox informed Petitioner that effective immediately his rate of pay while on duty at the public housing locations would be adjusted to $8.50 per hour, but that Ideal would not be attempting to recoup the overpayments that had been made over the previous months, since the error had been theirs. Respondent offered in evidence payroll records which demonstrated that all Ideal security guards assigned to the public housing locations were paid at the rate of $8.50 per hour. At about the same time as Petitioner’s downward rate adjustment, another Ideal security guard requested that he be assigned an additional eight-hour shift in order to bring him to 40 hours per week. In an attempt to accommodate this request, Ms. Cox contacted several of the Ideal security guards, including Petitioner, to inquire as to whether any wished to relinquish an eight-hour shift. Petitioner advised Ms. Cox that he did not want to give up an eight-hour shift, and that request was honored by Ideal. The timing of Petitioner’s reporting of the racist remarks to Ms. Cox; Petitioner being informed that his hourly rate was being reduced; and Petitioner being invited to give up a work shift; is unfortunate. Because of the temporal proximity of these events, it is understandable that Petitioner concluded that the reduction in his pay rate and attempted reduction in his assigned hours were in retaliation of his reporting the racist remarks. However, the evidence does not prove a causal link between Petitioner's complaint and the adverse action he suffered. Rather, the credible testimony of Ms. Cox established legitimate nonretaliatory reasons for how Petitioner was treated, and there is no evidence that the reasons articulated by Ms. Cox were a pretext for retaliation. Petitioner failed to persuasively prove any incidents of retaliation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Ideal Security Services, Inc. did not commit any unlawful employment practices and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of January, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of January, 2020.
The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner James Joseph Richardson has met his burden of proving actual innocence, thereby entitling him to compensation under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Compensation Act.
Findings Of Fact On October 25, 1967, Petitioner's wife prepared a breakfast of grits for their seven children. In a separate pot she prepared the children's lunch of beans, gravy, rice, and hogs head meat. She also fried some fresh chicken which she used to make sandwiches for her and Petitioner's lunch. She and Petitioner then left to get a ride to the grove where they worked picking fruit. It was their routine for Petitioner's wife to cook the food. The eldest child, eleven-year-old Betty Jean Bryant, would later serve it to all the children after the Richardsons left for work. It is not clear whether the children actually ate their breakfast grits that day. The school-age children went to school while the younger children remained at home. It was the routine for Petitioner's neighbor Betsy Reese to look after them. Petitioner's family and Betsy Reese and her children lived in the same structure, assumedly similar to a duplex. There was a common porch across the front. There was also a shed in the back yard. The school-age children returned to the home at lunchtime. Reese divided the food in the second pot into seven equal portions, and the children ate lunch. Right after the children returned to school after lunch, they began exhibiting terrible symptoms, such as leaking from their orifices, twitching, and rigidity. Teachers began grabbing the Richardson children and rushing them to the hospital. One of the teachers, knowing there were younger children at home, drove to the Richardson home. Those children were on the shared porch, displaying the same symptoms. Reese was sitting on the porch, holding one of the children. The teacher took them to the hospital. Petitioner and his wife were summoned to the hospital. Six of the children died that same day, and the seventh child died early the next morning. At the hospital, medical personnel did not know what substance was causing the illness and deaths. Sheriff Frank Cline went to the Richardson home and conducted several searches of the home and the shed attempting to find what had poisoned the children. When Petitioner and his wife arrived at the hospital, Cline obtained from Petitioner the key to the refrigerator and searched again. The next morning Reese and Charlie Smith, who was described as the town drunk, found a bag of parathion, a highly- toxic insecticide, in the shed behind the house. Cline and his deputies had searched the shed approximately four times during the day the children became sick and Cline had searched the shed by himself late that night, and no bag of parathion had been seen by them. It was determined that parathion was present in the pot the grits were cooked in, the pot the lunch was cooked in, the frying pan the chicken may have been cooked in, flour, corn meal, sugar, and other substances found in the refrigerator. It was also determined that parathion is what killed the children. Petitioner had a key to the refrigerator as did his wife. Indications are that a third key was left on the refrigerator for the babysitter's use. Petitioner was tried for the first degree murder of the eldest child Betty Jean Bryant and was convicted. The jury did not recommend mercy, and he was sentenced to death. His conviction was reviewed by the Supreme Court of Florida. Richardson v. State, 247 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1971). Petitioner's death sentence was commuted to life when Florida's death penalty was held to be unconstitutional the following year. In October 1988, 21 years after the seven children were murdered, the official file, which had been stolen ten years earlier from the office of the assistant state attorney who had prosecuted Petitioner, appeared in the office of the Governor of the State of Florida. Governor Bob Martinez ordered the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) to investigate the disappearance and re-appearance of the file and accompanying information. That investigation resulted in new information and admissions surrounding the circumstances leading to the arrest and conviction of Petitioner. The Governor entered an Executive Order on July 31, 1989, appointing Janet Reno, State Attorney for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, to provide prosecutorial assistance to FDLE. That Executive Order further directed FDLE to continue its investigation into all statements and evidence concerning Petitioner's arrest and conviction and to also investigate any violations of the criminal laws or misconduct by public officials relative to the events surrounding the deaths of the children and the arrest and conviction of Petitioner. On February 13, 1989, another Executive Order, amending the first, was signed by the Governor assigning State Attorney Reno to the Twelfth and Twentieth Judicial Circuits to discharge the duties of the State Attorneys in those Circuits relating to the investigation and prosecution of Petitioner's case. On March 31, 1989, a third Executive Order was signed. It amended the first two and recited that Reno and FDLE had reported their findings to the Governor and that Reno had also advised the Governor that Petitioner had filed a motion for post-conviction relief in the Circuit Court for the Twelfth Judicial Circuit. The Executive Order directed Reno to assume and discharge the duties of the State Attorney relating to any post-conviction proceedings involving Petitioner. A fourth Executive Order was then entered amending the first three by adding to Reno's duties consideration of any further prosecution of Petitioner. As a result of the extensive investigations conducted by Reno and FDLE, Reno joined in Petitioner's pending motion for post-conviction relief. Petitioner's request that his conviction and sentence be vacated was granted, and Petitioner was released from prison. Reno also made the decision that Petitioner would not be re-tried for the murder of Betty Jean Bryant and would not be prosecuted for the murders of the six other children. On May 5, 1989, Reno issued a 35-page Nolle Prosse Memorandum explaining in detail the evidence she had reviewed, the conflicting evidence she had considered, the apparent- perjured testimony that had been given at Petitioner's trial, and the conflicting witness statements which the State had before trial but had not disclosed to Petitioner's attorneys despite a court order to do so. The Memorandum discussed additional problems she had encountered because the physical evidence from the trial 21 years earlier had been misplaced or destroyed, a witness had later recanted his trial testimony, and key witnesses had died since the trial had taken place. Further, as a result of the publicity surrounding her investigation a number of persons had come forward claiming to have evidence, but they had never come forward during the initial investigation. Reno and the two Assistant State Attorneys who worked with her on her investigation determined that in evaluating whether Petitioner should be given post-conviction relief and whether Petitioner should be re-tried, they would only consider the files, records, and evidence that existed at the time that Petitioner was tried. They considered the evidence that had not been disclosed to anyone for 21 years to be unreliable. Some of it was also conflicting. She signed the Nolle Prosse Memorandum as did the two Assistant State Attorneys Don L. Horn and Richard L. Shiffrin. At the final hearing in this cause Don Horn testified extensively as to the contents of the Memorandum. Although he, Shiffrin, and Reno had discussed the misconduct they discovered on the part of the Sheriff and the prosecuting attorneys, they knew that the statute of limitations prevented taking action against those public officials, so the Memorandum did not discuss any action to be taken against them. It only considered the evidence against Petitioner. The Memorandum concluded that a "totally inadequate and incomplete investigation" into the deaths of the seven children had been conducted. Obvious leads had not been pursued, inconsistencies were not resolved, and standard investigative procedures had not been followed. The Memorandum further opined that at the time that Petitioner was charged with murder, the State did not have sufficient evidence to prove his guilt beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt. The Memorandum concluded that Petitioner "was probably wrongfully accused" based upon the evidence that existed at the time. Three years later a 260-page Memorandum Opinion prepared by United States Attorney Robert Merkle and indicating a need for further investigation into the 1968 prosecution of Petitioner was presented to the Treasurer of Florida. The Opinion, which was not admitted in evidence, was described as a "scathing indictment" of Reno's investigation. As a result, Governor Lawton Chiles issued a confidential Executive Order on October 16, 1992, appointing State Attorney Reno to further investigate all matters pertaining to or arising from the issues raised in the Opinion involving Petitioner's prosecution. On October 30, 1992, the Governor issued a second Executive Order deleting the provisions of his prior Order requiring that it be sealed and confidential. Assistant State Attorney Richard L. Shiffrin, who participated in Reno's first investigation, and Gertrude M. Novicki, Reno's Chief Assistant for Special Prosecutions, were assigned to conduct this investigation. Both of those Assistant State Attorneys signed the Response of the State Attorney of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit. The Response is not dated but a word-processing notation suggests it may have been issued on or about April 30, 1993. At the final hearing, Novicki testified regarding her Response. Rather than responding to or explaining each of the details set forth in Merkle's Memorandum Opinion, Novicki and Shiffrin re-examined the propriety of both the vacating of the original judgment of guilty and the decision to enter a nolle prosse. In doing so, they reviewed the original prosecution in light of the evidence at trial and of the law as it existed in 1968 and also reviewed the ability to re-prosecute Petitioner in light of the evidence currently available and admissible. The Response concluded that the Order granting Petitioner's motion to vacate his conviction and sentence was supported by the facts and the law and that the decision to enter a nolle prosse reached in 1989 was proper. The Response's summary states that the physical evidence against Petitioner did not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the testimonial evidence as to Petitioner's admissions of culpability were of dubious admissibility and value, the evidence of motive was equivocal at best, and the decision to enter a nolle prosse was unquestionably correct. The summary ends as follows: "Whether or not [Petitioner] is guilty of this horrible crime is uncertain. What is certain is that proof beyond a reasonable doubt of guilt is lacking." The prior proceedings involving Petitioner and the prior reviews of those proceedings have focused on the criminal law standard of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That standard, however, is not applicable to this proceeding. In this proceeding wherein Petitioner is seeking monetary compensation for his wrongful incarceration, Section 961.03, Florida Statutes, requires Petitioner to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he committed neither the act nor the offense that served as the basis for the conviction and incarceration and that he did not aid, abet, or act as an accomplice to a person who committed the act or offense. Further, he must prove his actual innocence by verifiable and substantial evidence in order to meet the definition of wrongfully incarcerated person. Petitioner testified that he did not poison his children, that he did not kill his children, and that he never told anyone that he did. He also testified that he did not aid or assist anyone in poisoning or killing his children. In order to provide verifiable and substantial evidence in support of his testimony that he is innocent, Petitioner has taken two approaches. The first is by relying on the investigation detailed in the 1989 Nolle Prosse Memorandum and the testimony of Don Horn, one of the authors. (In its defense, the State offered the 1993 Response and the testimony of Gertrude Novicki, one of its authors.) In so doing, Petitioner has offered clear and convincing evidence that the investigation leading up to Petitioner’s prosecution and conviction was incomplete. The investigation revealed conflicting evidence about whether Petitioner had obtained life insurance policies on his children the night before they were murdered, which he had not, and whether Petitioner believed that he had. The investigation did not determine how the parathion got into the pots and skillet and various food products in the refrigerator or when. The investigation appeared to focus only on Petitioner as a suspect and not also on others whose involvement was suspicious. Toward the end of the investigation and prior to Petitioner’s criminal trial, the prosecutors wrote memos expressing concern about the weakness of their case and their possible inability to present even a prima facie case. After those memos were written, the Sheriff produced three jailhouse informants to testify that Petitioner admitted to them his crimes. They also gave statements that Petitioner said he thought that Reese did it and gave details of different motives she might have had. Rather than resolving the conflicting statements, the prosecution withheld the conflicting statements from the defense. The Nolle Prosse Memorandum discusses these statements and informants and finds that one of the jailhouse informants recanted his testimony after Petitioner’s trial and one was drunk when he testified. The third one, whose statements were given under circumstances that made them highly doubtful, died before the trial, and his testimony given at the preliminary hearing was given to the jury in the form of five witnesses who testified as to their recollections of his testimony. The informants were not the only ones to provide perjured testimony at Petitioner’s trial; the Sheriff also appears to have done so. A review of the Nolle Prosse Memorandum and the detailed evidence it discusses makes it clear that Petitioner was wrongfully accused based upon the evidence and lack of evidence the prosecution had gathered. It is further clear that Petitioner’s conviction and sentence based upon that insufficient evidence should have been vacated, and they were. It is further clear that re-trying Petitioner would be fruitless because the evidence available 21 years after the murders was insufficient: the physical evidence was missing or destroyed, many of the key witnesses were dead, and the evidence that might have been admissible for a re-trial was conflicting. However, the inability of the State to prove Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt does not prove that Petitioner is actually innocent of committing the murders or aiding in the commission. Petitioner’s second approach to providing verifiable and substantial evidence of his actual innocence is attempting to show that Reese, not the Petitioner, murdered the children. The 1989 investigation showed that, at the time the Richardson children were poisoned, Reese was on parole for killing her second husband with a gun. Although there was also a rumor that she had poisoned her first husband, no evidence was found to support that rumor. Parenthetically, there was also a rumor that Petitioner killed his three other children in Jacksonville, but that was also untrue. Similarly, there was a rumor that Sheriff Cline fathered Reese’s granddaughter and that was why he steered the investigation away from her. The blood tests of all concerned done as part of the 1989 investigation proved that rumor also untrue. Petitioner relies also upon the facts that Reese was the last person in the Richardson home on the day in question, the person who served the children the poisoned lunch, and the person who found the parathion in the shed. Her unconcerned behavior while the Richardson toddlers were exhibiting horrible symptoms on her porch and her lack of concern about whether her children who were playing there might be at risk from whatever was making the Richardson children so sick are suggested to be evidence that she knew why the Richardson children were sick and why her children would not be. It was also suggested that she must have been the murderer since her third husband had gone to Jacksonville with Petitioner and his wife but they had returned without Reese’s husband who never did return to her. Petitioner relies heavily on evidence which he suggests constitutes admissions of her guilt by Reese. The 1988 investigation considered an affidavit by one certified nursing assistant and a taped interview of another, both of whom worked at a nursing home where Reese became a patient in 1986. The affidavit by Belinda Romeo asserts that Romeo asked Reese on more than 100 separate occasions if she killed the seven Richardson children, that Reese replied that she did, and that Reese was competent at the times Romeo asked that question. On the other hand, the transcript of a taped interview of Doris Harris, who was present several times when Romeo questioned Reese, is clearly contrary to that affidavit. Harris states that by the time Reese was admitted to the nursing home, she was incontinent, unable to walk, unable to feed herself, only “half way aware,” unable to say what day or year it was, "back to a child's state," and suffering from Alzheimer’s. When Romeo would ask if she killed the children, she would say that she killed them, say the name Charlie, and then lapse into incoherent mumbling. Harris believed that Reese was saying she killed them because she was the one who fed them the poisoned food, and not because she was the one who put the poison in the food. Reese’s “admissions” are, therefore, ambiguous and not trustworthy. Petitioner also introduced into evidence a 1988 affidavit of Richard H. Barnard, the Chief of Police who began an investigation into the children’s deaths. After he got Reese to admit she was in the Richardson home that day and served the children their lunch, he was removed from the investigation by the “Governor’s office” in a phone call which he believes Sheriff Cline instigated. His affidavit undermines the statements of the jailhouse informants, expresses his concern that Sheriff Cline may have tampered with the jury, and states his opinion that Sheriff Cline framed Petitioner. He concludes with his opinion that Petitioner was innocent and Reese was guilty. The hearsay evidence and suggestions that Reese was guilty of the murders do not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner’s innocence. Opinion testimony does not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner's innocence. The Nolle Prosse Memorandum and the Response do not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner’s innocence. The testimony of Horn and Novicki as to what they considered during their investigations does not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner’s innocence. Lastly, Petitioner’s own testimony denying his guilt is not verifiable and substantial evidence of his innocence. Simply put, the evidence in this proceeding does not establish Petitioner’s actual innocence. Since Chapter 961, Florida Statutes, does not provide a definition of “actual innocence,” Petitioner argues that the definition should be that based upon the evidence it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him. That definition is found in Supreme Court of the United States and Supreme Court of Florida cases. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995); Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 2008); Mills v. State, 786 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 2001). Petitioner’s argument is not persuasive. All of those cases involved motions for post-conviction relief, not claims for money damages. That definition of actual innocence was likely utilized when Petitioner was granted post-conviction relief by having his conviction and sentence vacated and being released from prison, which is the relief which results from meeting that definition. That definition of actual innocence tests the legal sufficiency of evidence. The Statute regulating this proceeding does not consider legal sufficiency; rather, it considers factual sufficiency by requiring the undersigned to make findings of fact as to Petitioner’s actual innocence if proven by verifiable and substantial evidence. In other words, proof of factual innocence is required. Perhaps the reason the Statute does not contain its own definition of actual innocence is that the Legislature intended the words to have their plain, ordinary meaning. A review of the two investigations of Petitioner’s prosecution clearly shows an absence of evidence proving Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. However, a review of the two investigations does not show that Petitioner is actually innocent. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proving actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence and, thus, has failed to establish that he is a wrongfully incarcerated person eligible for compensation under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Compensation Act. RECOMMENDED DETERMINATION Based on the record in this proceeding and the above Findings of Fact, it is RECOMMENDED that an order be entered by the Circuit Judge determining that Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proving actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence, denying Petitioner’s claim for compensation, and dismissing his Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of August, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of August, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert I. Barrar, Esquire Law Offices of Ellis Rubin & Robert I. Barrar 6619 South Dixie Highway, No. 311 Miami, Florida 33143 Raul C. De La Heria, Esquire 2100 Coral Way, Suite 500 Miami, Florida 33145 Dennis Nales, Esquire Office of the State Attorney 2071 Ringling Boulevard, Suite 400 Sarasota, Florida 34237 Earl Moreland, Esquire Office of the State Attorney 2071 Ringling Boulevard, Suite 400 Sarasota, Florida 34237
The Issue The issue is whether Grand Boulevard Health and Rehabilitation, d/b/a FL HUD Destin, LLC (“Grand Boulevard”), committed an unlawful employment practice by discriminating against Angela D. Jones based on her race.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, the entire record of this proceeding, and matters subject to official recognition, the following Findings of Fact are made: Ms. Jones is a 49-year-old African American female. She has a high school degree and earned certifications or licenses enabling her to work as a certified nursing assistant (“CNA”), a home-health aide, a cosmetologist, and a security guard. However, healthcare has been her primary field of work. 2 Ms. Jones stated during the final hearing that she had transmitted to DOAH an audio recording made by Mr. Manning and that she had intended to move that audio recording into evidence. The audio recording was not received by DOAH. Nonetheless, the undersigned has determined that no prejudice resulted to Ms. Jones because there was no dispute regarding the event described by Mr. Manning’s affidavit. In May of 2019, Ms. Jones was working in a nursing home and heard from a coworker about the substantial benefits and signing bonus that Grand Boulevard was offering new hires. Grand Boulevard’s employment application contained a question asking each applicant to respond “yes” or “no” as to whether he or she had “ever pled guilty, pled no contest, had adjudication withheld, or been placed in a pre- trial intervention program as a result of being charged with a crime.” Ms. Jones left that portion of her application blank.3 Ms. Jones responded “no” in response to a question asking if she had “ever been convicted of any criminal violation of law, or [if she was] now under pending investigation or charges of violation of criminal law.”4 The employment application contained a provision requiring Ms. Jones to certify that: the information provided in this employment application (and accompanying resume, if any) is true and complete. I understand that any false, incomplete, or misleading information given by me on this form, regardless of when it is discovered, may disqualify me from further consideration for employment, and may be justification for my 3 Ms. Jones testified that she told Shakara Mayberry, Grand Boulevard’s Director of Staff Development at the time, that she had a criminal background and that she left that portion of the application blank because she could not remember specific details about the charges. Ms. Jones also testified that she offered to supplement her application with precise information after she had an opportunity to consult documentation in her possession. According to Ms. Jones, Ms. Mayberry accepted her application and told her to not worry about disclosing her criminal background. Ms. Mayberry also testified during the final hearing and denied telling Ms. Jones that she could leave that portion of her application blank. During the final hearing, Grand Boulevard provided no satisfactory explanation as to why Ms. Jones was hired without completing that portion of her application. 4 Respondent’s Exhibit 3 was Ms. Jones’s responses to interrogatories from Grand Boulevard. Via her responses, Ms. Jones provided documentation regarding her criminal history. However, Grand Boulevard did not request that Respondent’s Exhibit 3 be accepted into evidence. When being questioned about Respondent’s Exhibit 3, Ms. Jones acknowledged that she has: (1) pled no contest to a battery charge; (2) been charged or arrested for resisting an officer; (3) been arrested for criminal mischief; and (4) entered a plea on a different criminal mischief charge. dismissal from employment, if discovered at a later date. After conducting a background check through the Agency for Health Care Administration (“AHCA”) indicating Ms. Jones had no disqualifying offenses, Grand Boulevard hired Ms. Jones.5 Ms. Jones began working for Grand Boulevard on May 15, 2019, as a CNA helping nursing home residents with activities of daily living such as dental hygiene, grooming, and eating. On June 16, 2019, a resident in Ms. Jones’s care suffered injuries after he rolled out of his bed while Ms. Jones was cleaning him. Pursuant to its policy, Grand Boulevard suspended Ms. Jones while the Walton County Police Department investigated the incident. Ms. Jones returned to work at Grand Boulevard three days later but was suspended again on June 20, 2019, because she had allowed her CNA certificate to expire. Ms. Jones paid her delinquency fee, and her certificate was reinstated. During the course of the investigation of the June 16, 2019, incident, an investigator from the Walton County Sheriff’s Office asked Heather Hanna, Grand Boulevard’s Director of Nursing at the time, why Grand Boulevard would hire someone such as Ms. Jones with a criminal history. Ms. Hanna then had Ms. Jones’s application pulled and noticed that Ms. Jones did not 5 Section 400.9065, Florida Statutes, mandates that AHCA “shall require level 2 background screening for personnel as required in s. 408.809(1)(e) pursuant to chapter 435 and s. 408.809.” Section 408.809(1)(e), Florida Statutes, requires level 2 background screening of any person who is expected to provide personal care services directly to nursing home residents. Section 435.04(2), Florida Statutes, lists many specific offenses that disqualify someone from working in a nursing home. Accordingly, the background screening conducted through AHCA is narrower in scope than Grand Boulevard’s employment application, which asks applicants if they have “ever pled guilty, pled no contest, had adjudication withheld, or been placed in a pre-trial intervention program as a result of being charged with a crime.” For example, while Ms. Jones acknowledged that she has pled no contest to a battery charge, that charge would not necessarily have been a disqualifying offense because section 435.04(2) only encompasses felony battery, battery on a minor, sexual battery, and battery on a vulnerable adult. Likewise, resisting an officer and criminal mischief are not disqualifying offenses. respond to the question asking if she had ever been charged with a crime. Ms. Hanna sent the following report to Connie Zuraff on June 28, 2019: I received a visit from Investigator Donna Armstrong with Walton County PD and Julianne Dalton APS investigator. The investigator questioned why we would have an employee who had a recent arrest record, she stated that she knew Angela Jones from the community and that she was concerned that she was employed here. We reviewed her application and found that she had not checked the boxes related to history of arrests.[6] I called Ms. Jones with Tuwanna RN Risk Manager and [Shakara] Mayberry LPN SDC present in the room. I placed Ms. Jones on speaker phone and asked if she had been arrested for any recent criminal activity and she confirmed that she was arrested for battery, petty theft and fighting. I notified the employee that failure to disclose this information could lead to termination and suspended her at that time. The DCS did pull her background through the AHCA clearing house and we confirmed that she still showed eligible for employment. Grand Boulevard then suspended Ms. Jones and ultimately terminated her on June 27, 2019, on the basis that she “knowingly falsified [her] employment application.” There was no persuasive evidence of Grand Boulevard giving more favorable treatment to nonminority employees who neglected to fully disclose whether they had “ever pled guilty, pled no contest, had adjudication withheld, or been placed in a pre-trial intervention program as a result of being charged with a crime.” Any testimony from Ms. Jones on that point was 6 The pertinent question on the application does not require applicants to disclose arrests. The question asks applicants if they have “ever pled guilty, pled no contest, had adjudication withheld, or been placed in a pre-trial intervention program as a result of being charged with a crime.” either unpersuasive, unsubstantiated, or insufficiently specific. Accordingly, the greater weight of the evidence does not demonstrate that Grand Boulevard committed an unlawful employment practice.
Conclusions For Petitioner: Angela D. Jones, pro se 115 Christie Lane Panama City, Florida 32404 For Respondent: David Sydney Harvey, Esquire Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard and Smith 401 East Jackson Street, Suite 3400 Tampa, Florida 33602
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Ms. Jones’s Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of August, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of August, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Angela D. Jones 115 Christie Lane Panama City, Florida 32404 David Sydney Harvey, Esquire Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard and Smith 401 East Jackson Street, Suite 3400 Tampa, Florida 33602 Stanley Gorsica, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for a Class "CC" (private investigator intern) license should be denied on the grounds set forth in the Department of State, Division of Licensing's (Department's) May 4, 1992, denial letter to Petitioner?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner is 31 years of age and has resided in Palm Beach County his entire life. He is now, and has been for the last few years, self-employed as certified process server in Palm Beach County. After receiving his certification, he applied for and obtained a State of Florida license to carry a concealed firearm. Petitioner has been married to his present wife for approximately a year. He and his wife have an infant daughter and are expecting another child. This is Petitioner's second marriage. His first marriage ended in a bitter divorce. Petitioner has had several brushes with the law in the past, all of which occurred prior to the termination of his first marriage. In 1980, Petitioner was arrested for, and subsequently charged in Palm Beach County Circuit Court Case No. 80-5141CF with, carrying a concealed firearm, resisting arrest with violence and battery on a police officer. Pursuant to the terms of a plea bargain agreement, Petitioner pled guilty to the charge of resisting arrest with violence and the remaining charges against him were dropped. Adjudication of guilt on the resisting arrest charge was withheld and Petitioner was placed on three years probation. In 1984, while still on probation, Petitioner was arrested for, and charged in Palm Beach County Circuit Court Case No. 84-4810MM with, possession of under 20 grams of marijuana, a misdemeanor. He was adjudicated guilty of this offense after entering a guilty plea to the charge and sentenced to time served. Petitioner's commission of this misdemeanor marijuana possession offense also resulted in a finding that he had violated the conditions of his probation in Case No. 80-5141CF. Based upon this finding, Petitioner's probation was extended an additional two years. In accordance with the recommendation of his probation officer, Petitioner was discharged from his probation on January 9, 1986, more than five months prior to the date it was due to expire. In 1989, Petitioner was separated, but not yet divorced, from his first wife, Theresa. Theresa was living in the home she and Petitioner had shared prior to their separation. Petitioner was living in a trailer on his parent's property. Theresa had changed the locks on the doors in an effort to prevent Petitioner from entering the marital home. She had also obtained a court order enjoining Petitioner from harassing her. In late June or early July of 1989, Petitioner and Theresa reconciled. Theresa gave Petitioner a key to the marital home and invited him to move back in and live with her again. Petitioner accepted the invitation. The couple lived together peaceably and without incident for approximately a week. On the morning of July 8, 1992, however, Petitioner and Theresa had an altercation that abruptly put an end to their reconciliation. The altercation began when, using the key Theresa had given him the week before, Petitioner opened the front door to their home and went inside. Petitioner was tired inasmuch as he had spent a sleepless night in the hospital room of his ill grandmother. He intended to go directly to his bedroom to try to get some sleep. Theresa was home, but she was not alone. She was with another man. As Petitioner walked through the doorway and into the home, Theresa confronted him. She had a firearm in her hand. The gun was pointed in Petitioner's direction and was very close to his face. Petitioner pushed the firearm aside and headed upstairs to his bedroom. Theresa followed close behind Petitioner, threatening to shoot him. In the bedroom was a jewelry box that contained a wedding ring that Petitioner had given Theresa to wear. 1/ Petitioner took the box. He then exited the bedroom, walked downstairs and went out the front door with the jewelry box still in his possession. Theresa unsuccessfully attempted to prevent Petitioner from getting into his car by pulling his hair and trying to choke him. As Petitioner drove off, Theresa shot at his car. Based upon erroneous information provided by Theresa about this incident, Petitioner was arrested for strong armed robbery, breaking and entering by forced entry, battery on a spouse and violating the terms of the injunction that Theresa had obtained against him. 2/ No formal charges, however, were filed against Petitioner as a result of the incident. The aforementioned injunction was subsequently vacated retroactive to the day before the incident. It appears that, although he may have run afoul of the law when he was younger, Petitioner has since matured and transformed himself into a responsible, honest and law-abiding citizen.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order finding that Petitioner should not be denied licensure as a private investigator intern on the grounds cited in the Department's May 4, 1992, denial letter, as amended at hearing. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 12th day of October, 1992. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of October, 1992.
The Issue Whether the registration of the Respondent, Betty Lou Haber, license #0034988 should be revoked or suspended, or whether Respondent should be otherwise disciplined.
Findings Of Fact An administrative complaint was filed by the Petitioner, Florida Real Estate Commission, on September 29, 1978, seeking to revoke or suspend or otherwise discipline Respondent Haber. The administrative complaint charged that the licensee was presently confined in a state prison. Respondent requested an administrative hearing. A stipulation was entered by Barry A. Cohen, Esquire, the attorney for Respondent, confirming that Respondent Haber was and had been continuously confined in the Broward Correctional Institution since August 16, 1977. Said stipulation is attached hereto and made a part hereof. Prior to the hearing a letter was received by the Petitioner, Florida Real Estate Commission, advising the Petitioner that Respondent did not intend to proceed to hearing and requesting Petitioner to close the matter. The Division of Administrative Hearings was not so notified. A copy of said letter is attached hereto and made a part hereof. Petitioner presented the aforesaid stipulation and aforesaid letter and a witness at the hearing. The witness, Martha Iglesias, Inmate Records Supervisor for the Broward Correctional Institution, testified that Respondent Haber was an inmate of said institution, having been found guilty by a jury of First Degree Murder in Case #75-518 in the Circuit Court in and for Hillsborough County, Florida, and sentenced to be imprisoned in the State Penitentiary for a period of her natural life.
Recommendation Revoke the non-active salesman license held by the Respondent, Betty Lou Haber. DONE and ORDERED this 18TH day of April, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Manuel E. Oliver, Esquire 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Barry A. Cohen, Esquire 100 Twiggs Street, Suite 4000 Tampa, Florida 33602 DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675
The Issue Whether Respondent's conduct in recruiting, selecting, and hiring Robert Denson as Associate University Attorney was improper and justifies imposition of University discipline pursuant to Rule 6C-5.27, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Ultimate facts are conclusions reached by applying inference and logic to evidentiary facts. See, Feldman v. Department of Transportation, 389 So.2d 692, 694 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). The following conclusions address the charges brought against Biggs by the University. XII. Preselection A preponderance of evidence does not establish that Biggs preselected or decided to hire Robert Denson prior to recruiting and evaluating other applicants for the job of Associate University Attorney. Although Biggs was impressed with Denson's performance as an Assistant Dean and, no doubt, felt Denson could be an effective Associate University Attorney, such facts, in themselves, do not establish preselection. There is no evidence that Biggs ever encouraged Denson to seek employment as an Associate University Attorney; at the time of the alleged preselection, Biggs believed Denson planned to enter private practice. 16/ With such a belief, it would have been improbable that Biggs decided, in advance, that Denson would be his choice. Prior to learning of Denson's interest in the position, Biggs engaged in conduct designed to broaden the applicant search and open the position to increased numbers of out-of-state female and black applicants. 17/ Denson's ultimate selection and employment under those broadened search criteria does not provide a sufficient basis to conclude that the criteria were originally devised with Denson in mind. Out of over 70 applicants, the Search Committee independently selected Denson as its number two choice. It was not until after his justifiable rejection of the Committee's number one choice that Biggs decided that Denson was the most qualified applicant and should be selected. His tenacious efforts to defend that decision are consistent with his conviction that his decision was correct. XIII. Service on the Search Committee Biggs did not know and was not reasonably on notice that his service on the Search Committee was contrary to University Search and Screen Procedures. At the time, the published procedures did not expressly prohibit a hiring authority from serving on a Search Committee which he or she appoints; neither did the guidelines infer or give reasonable notice that such action was proscribed. Although Biggs served on the Search Committee, the weight of evidence indicates the Committee functioned in an independent manner: its discussions were free and open, its decisions were made by consensus. Biggs neither manipulated its decisions nor unduly influenced its discussions. XIV. Hiring "Unqualified Applicant for the Position Biggs reasonably believed that the SUS requirement of Florida Bar membership had been "waived" by the University's Personnel Office. This conclusion is based on Personnel's action in advertising the position and subsequently screening and approving applicants; on Biggs' prior experience in obtaining waivers of the Florida Bar membership requirement; and on Personnel's inconsistent decisions and interpretations regarding waivers. When Biggs announced his decision to hire Denson, Willits protested that the SUS Florida Bar membership requirement had not, in fact, been "waived"; however, the final decision was then placed before the University Personnel Director, Robert Button. Biggs asked Button whether Denson met the minimum job qualifications and could be hired. (P-27.) Button answered that exceptions (a term seemingly synonymous with waivers) were allowed only for affirmative action purposes, that he did not see how an exception could be applied to hire a white male when there were qualified blacks and women who exceeded the minimum qualifications but that the decision on whether or not to hire Denson must be made by Biggs. Button did not say that Denson could not be hired, or that such a hiring would be disapproved by Personnel. Biggs reasonably construed this to mean that Personnel questioned the wisdom of his hiring Denson but that the decision was a permissible one which was his, and his alone, to make. If Denson could not be hired without violating University fair hiring practices, he had a right to expect that Button would have told him so. Biggs also had reasonable cause to believe that he could successfully justify hiring Denson on his merits--an impressive applicant with unique experience and demonstrated competence. XV. Compliance with the Affirmative Action Policy Biggs' hiring of Denson was not proscribed by any provision of the University's Affirmative Action Plan, a fact seemingly admitted by the University's personnel officer--the person charged with monitoring compliance with the Plan. (Tr. 320-321.) No showing was made that the Plan placed a mandatory duty upon Biggs to hire a black or female applicant who he reasonably concluded was less qualified than a white male. Search Committees were created, in part, to ensure affirmative action and equal employment opportunity; Biggs hired the second choice of his Committee after reasonably rejecting its first choice. Due process requires that charges against an accused be specific in nature. Care must be taken when accusing persons of violating affirmative action policies which are often couched in vague or general terms. XVI. Discrimination in Employment By his recruitment and selection of Denson, Biggs did not discriminate against female or black applicants on the basis of sex or race. His action was not motivated by discriminatory intent; any inference to the contrary is effectively negated by his prior nondiscriminatory hiring decisions and his effort to increase the number of female and black applicants for Carole Taylor's vacant position. His overriding objective was to select the best and most qualified applicant. His failure to select a black or female applicant who he reasonably considered less qualified than a white male cannot and should not be considered impermissible discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the University of Florida enter a Final Order dismissing its charges against Thomas S. Biggs, Jr. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 17th day of April, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of April, 1981.
The Issue The amount of attorneys fees and costs, if any, that should be awarded Petitioners pursuant to the Final Order issued on March 4, 1997, in Division of Administrative Hearings Case No. 96-1418RU, et al., finding Petitioners entitled to attorneys fees and costs pursuant to the provisions of Section 120.595, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996) and retaining jurisdiction to determine the "reasonable amounts" of such fees and costs
Findings Of Fact By Joint Prehearing Stipulation and without waiving objections to applicability of Section 120.595, Florida Statutes, the Agency For Health Care Administration (AHCA), has stipulated with all parties as to the "reasonable amounts" of requested fees and costs to be awarded Petitioners in the event that such an award is determined to be applicable. All parties have also stipulated to the lack of liability of Intervenor Citizens of the State of Florida for payment of any award of fees and costs in this proceeding. That stipulation in its entirety is incorporated by this reference within these findings of fact and attached to this Final Order as Exhibit "A." The amendments to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, were adopted as part of a major rewrite of the APA. See, Chapter 96-159, Laws of Florida. The amendments were effective October 1, 1996, and were effective prior to the hearing related to the rule challenge cases. All parties requesting attorneys’ fees and costs rely upon Section 120.595(4), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996) as authority for an award of fees. Provisions of Section 120.595(4), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996), are applicable to the facts of this case. See, Final Order issued on March 4, 1997, in Division of Administrative Hearings Case No. 96-1418RU, et al.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent committed the unlawful employment practice alleged in the Employment Complaint of Discrimination filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (''FCHR''), and, if so, what relief should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female. Petitioner began working for Respondent as a part-time Self-Checkout Host on February 1, 2017. Upon hiring, her initial rate of pay was $9.00 per hour. After three months of employment, Petitioner’s pay was increased to $10.00 per hour in May of 2017. Subsequently, Petitioner received pay increases raising her hourly rate to $11.00, and then $11.50. In April of 2018, Petitioner was promoted to the full-time position of Customer Service Manager (''CSM''). Along with the promotion, Petitioner also received a raise, bringing her rate of pay to $13.65 per hour. In April of 2019, Respondent gave Petitioner another raise, resulting in hourly pay of $13.90. Respondent maintained a Statement of Ethics, of which Petitioner was aware. The Statement of Ethics explained that Respondent’s overall operations were guided by four core Beliefs, which were: Respect for the Individual; Service to our Customers; Striving for Excellence; and Act with Integrity. Based on what she heard from her coworkers, Petitioner believed that she was entitled to a market-adjustment pay increase in April of 2019. She sought information about the pay increase from her store manager and others. Petitioner reported her belief that she was entitled to a pay increase, which she had not received, to Respondent’s Associate Relations Department (''Department''). After what was described as a thorough review of Petitioner’s concerns, the Department closed the matter. Petitioner testified that a white male named Chance was making more money than she, based on conversations between Petitioner and Chance. Chance worked as a Money Manager Associate, a position that Petitioner never held during her employment with Respondent. Ms. Durocher testified that Chance was not paid more than Petitioner. In 2019, there were ten individuals who held the position of CSM at the store where Petitioner worked. In addition to Petitioner, those who worked in CSM positions included multiple African-American females and one African-American male. Petitioner did not present any evidence to suggest or establish that any male, or non-African-American, employee was paid more than she was for performing similar work. On October 26, 2019, Petitioner discussed the problem she perceived with her rate of pay with Ms. Durocher. During their conversation, Petitioner raised her voice and the interaction escalated to the point that another employee went to enlist the assistance of the Store Manager. When the Store Manager arrived, he joined the conversation with Petitioner and Ms. Durocher. Ms. Durocher expressed to Petitioner that she believed that Petitioner was being paid commensurate with her skills and duties; and that her rate of pay had been investigated and was determined to be appropriate. Throughout the conversation, Ms. Durocher perceived Respondent’s conduct to be disrespectful. Ms. Durocher and the Store Manager repeatedly encouraged Petitioner to calm down, but their attempts were unsuccessful. On the same day, Petitioner’s employment was terminated by Respondent for violating the core Belief of Respect for the Individual.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of February, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk S BRITTANY O. FINKBEINER Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of February, 2021. Jamie Rotteveel, Esquire Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Jeruscha Toussaint 5835 Northwest Lomb Court Port St. Lucie, Florida 34986 Allison Wiggins, Esquire Littler Mendelson, P.C. 111 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1750 Orlando, Florida 32801 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Littler Mendelson, P.C. 2301 McGee Street, 8th Floor Kansas City, Missouri 64108 Kimberly Doud, Esquire Littler Mendelson, P.C. 111 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1750 Orlando, Florida 32801 Nancy A. Johnson, Esquire Littler Mendelson, P.C. 111 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1750 Orlando, Florida 32801
The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her sex, by sexual harassment, in violation of Subsection 760.10(1) and/or (2), Florida Statutes (2008).1
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an adult female, and as such, is a member of a protected class. Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida charged with the duty to protect the public through the incarceration and supervision of offenders and to rehabilitate offenders, pursuant to Section 20.315, Florida Statutes. In August 2007, Petitioner applied for a job as a correctional officer with the Florida Department of Corrections through the Charlotte Correctional Institution (the Facility) located in Punta Gorda, Florida. Petitioner's contact person during the application process was Recruitment Sergeant Dennis Britton. Petitioner was initially interviewed by Sergeant Britton. At the conclusion of the interview, Petitioner was about to leave when Britton grabbed her by the shoulder, pulled her to him and bent down to her face in a kissing position. Petitioner put her hands on his chest, pushed him away and left. On other occasions during the interview process, specifically on August 21, 2007, and October 1, 2007, Briton coerced Petitioner to come into his office at the Facility and proceeded to physically and sexually assault Petitioner. Britton would grope, grab, and forcibly kiss Petitioner against her will. Throughout the recruitment process, both Britton and Petitioner exchanged e-mails of a professional and personal nature. On or about September 10, 2007, Warden Adro Johnson approved Petitioner for employment with the DOC. Warden Johnson, not Sergeant Britton, made the hiring decisions at Charlotte Correctional Institution. November 30, 2007, was Petitioner's first day of employment at the Facility. On November 30, 2007, Petitioner was again compelled to appear at Britton's office where he proceeded to physically and sexually assault Petitioner. Britton groped, grabbed, and forcibly kissed Petitioner against her will. On several other occasions between November 2007 and March 2008, Britton would summon Petitioner to his office and proceed to make sexual advances on her against her will. In December 2007, Petitioner completed New Employee Orientation. A component of the New Employee Orientation is training with regard to Respondent's Equal Employment Opportunity Policy and, specifically, the Sexual Harassment policy. Petitioner completed the computer-assisted training on sexual harassment in December 2007. In addition, new employees are routinely provided with hard-copy pamphlets on sexual harassment. Respondent's sexual harassment policy is also posted at various locations at Charlotte Correctional Institution. At no time during this period did Petitioner complain, verbally or in writing, to her supervisor or anyone else at the Facility. On March 14, 2008, Petitioner started the correctional officer training academy at the Facility. On March 17, 2008, Petitioner filled out an incident report stating she had been sexually harassed by Sergeant Dennis Britton. The report was sent up the chain of command, and Warden Johnson immediately removed Sergeant Britton from his position as the recruitment sergeant and reassigned him to a position on the compound. An investigation into the allegations was started on March 19, 2008, by Respondent's Office of the Inspector General. The investigation was led by Inspector Daryl J. McCasland of the Office of the Inspector General. The findings of the investigation were that Britton violated Section 784.03, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-208.033(22) (Conduct Unbecoming a Public Employee). On April 9, 2008, while the investigation was still pending, Sergeant Britton submitted his resignation, effective May 1, 2008. Britton admitted to the accusations of sexual battery against Petitioner to the warden of the Facility. Britton was removed from the Facility on or about April 9, 2008. Petitioner testified that on at least five separate occasions between April 23, 2008, and May 23, 2008, Respondent allowed Britton to return into the Facility and granted Britton access into the restricted-access inner-compound where Petitioner worked so that he was able to continue to harass Petitioner. However, this testimony was uncorroborated and deemed unreliable. At no time during Petitioner's employment did Sergeant Britton supervise Petitioner or work directly with her. He did not discipline her, set her schedule, or assign her duties. From November 30, 2007, until March 14, 2008, Petitioner worked inside the secure perimeter, while Britton worked as the recruitment sergeant outside the secure perimeter in the administration building at the Facility. Petitioner was in the academy beginning March 14, 2008, and Sergeant Britton had no supervisory or training responsibilities over officers in the training academy. Petitioner was continually in the correctional officer academy from the time she filed her initial complaint on March 17, 2008, until Britton's resignation became effective on May 1, 2008. While in the academy, Petitioner was continually with other trainees and other instructors. Sergeant Britton never made any additional sexual advances or had any conversation with Petitioner following her complaint on March 17, 2008. Inspector Daryl McCasland substantiated the complaint against Sergeant Britton for battery, conduct unbecoming a public employee, and failure to follow written procedures. The inspector forwarded his results to the Office of the State Attorney in Punta Gorda which declined to prosecute. Respondent acted in a prompt and reasonable manner to stop the harassment and address it once it was known. Petitioner failed to exercise reasonable care in the reporting of the harassment. Petitioner presented no evidence on the issue of retaliation. Petitioner presented no evidence of quantifiable damages. Her testimony was that she felt harassed and physically upset by the conduct of Britton and that she felt harassed and physically upset by her fellow officers after her complaint become known, but no proof of an adverse employment action was presented. Given the lack of evidence to support Petitioner's allegations, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issued a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of December, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of December, 2009.
