The Issue The issue in the case is whether the Respondent is quilty of the violation alleged in the Administrative Complaint; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent was certified by the Commission on February 28, 1992, and was issued Law Enforcement certificate number 122723. (Stipulation) The Respondent was employed as a Special Agent for the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, from September 13, 1991, to October 18, 1996. (Stipulation) Kenneth Hunter is employed as a deputy sheriff with the Leon County Sheriff's Office, and has been so employed since July 5, 1989. Deputy Hunter has known the Respondent since 1991, when they attended law enforcement academy together. Deputy Hunter and the Respondent kept in touch over that period of time. On June 17, 1995, at approximately 9:00 a.m., the Respondent called Deputy Hunter at his residence. The Respondent told Deputy Hunter that the Respondent's brother, Reverend Gregory James, had been beaten up by Colby Richardson, and that Richardson had stolen some money from his brother, a local minister. The Respondent told Deputy Hunter that the amount stolen was $1,500.00. Some of the money which was taken was money which Reverend James had withdrawn intending to give it to the Respondent. The Respondent stated to Hunter that the prior evening he had spoken to Colby Richardson, and that Mr. Richardson had agreed to return the money taken from Reverend James. The Respondent asked Deputy Hunter to accompany him to Quincy, Florida, to find Richardson. When Respondent called Hunter, the Respondent was on his way to Pensacola, Florida, for a professional course, and was driving his state-issued vehicle which was equipped with a police radio and strobe light. The Respondent picked up Deputy Hunter at Hunter's residence, and introduced Hunter to Reverend James, who was riding in the back seat of the vehicle. Deputy Hunter asked the Respondent why his brother had not reported the robbery, and the Respondent stated that his brother was well known in the community, and did not want to make "a big stink" about it. The Respondent, Deputy Hunter, and Reverend James traveled to Quincy, Florida. While in Quincy, the Respondent spoke to two females who knew Mr. Richardson, and gave the Respondent the telephone number of Mr. Richardson's girlfriend, Rosilyn Copeland. The Respondent telephoned Ms. Copeland and asked for and received directions to her residence. The Respondent, Respondent's brother, and Deputy Hunter traveled to Ms. Copeland's residence in Quincy, Florida. The Respondent knocked on the door, and when Ms. Copeland answered the door, introduced himself as "Agent James," and introduced Deputy Hunter as "Officer Hunter." The Respondent was wearing black pants, a black polo shirt, and a black baseball cap. A conflict in the testimony exists regarding whether the Respondent, who was wearing a badge on a chain around his neck, removed his Special Agent badge from beneath his shirt and showed it to Ms. Copeland. Ms. Copeland later believed that the Respondent was a law enforcement officer who was looking for Mr. Richardson to recover money Mr. Richardson had stolen from Respondent's brother. The Respondent testified at hearing, and stated he was wearing a black shirt on the day in question, and his badge could have been visible. Deputy Hunter gave a statement to the investigator. It is noted that Hunter was also outside his jurisdiction and was the subject or the potential subject of an investigation into his activities in association with the Respondent during this incident. Hunter stated that he never identified himself to anyone they met, and that the Respondent identified himself as “Agent James” and him as “Deputy Hunter.” Hunter stated that he informed the Respondent that it was inappropriate to introduce themselves as officers, and told him not to do that. The Respondent continued to talk with Ms. Copeland about Mr. Richardson's location, and Ms. Copeland told them that she had driven Mr. Richardson to his mother's house. The Respondent asked Ms. Copeland how he could get in touch with Mr. Richardson, and she stated that she would call Mr. Richardson. Ms. Copeland contacted Mr. Richardson on the telephone, and the Respondent, who was standing outside, entered the apartment and took the telephone from Ms. Copeland. The Respondent talked to Mr. Richardson and told him that he had better give back the money. The Respondent told Deputy Hunter to talk to Mr. Richardson. Mr. Richardson stated to Hunter that he wanted to return the money, but was worried about what would happen to him. Deputy Hunter informed Mr. Richardson that nothing would happen to him, and that they only wanted the money back. Mr. Richardson stated that he didn't have all of the money, but would have it by 1:00 p.m. The Respondent gave Mr. Richardson a pager number with which to get in touch with him when Richardson had the money. The Respondent, his brother, and Hunter left Copeland’s, and drove to the residence of Bruce (last name unknown), where the robbery had occurred. Bruce was not there when they arrived, but they met Bruce driving up as they drove away. In the conversation that followed, the Respondent identified himself as Agent James. The Respondent was confrontational with Bruce and accused him of setting his brother up. Bruce denied having been involved, but Hunter was suspicious of Bruce’s version of events. Deputy Hunter told the Respondent that the facts did not sound right, and that they should report the matter to local law enforcement. The Respondent, Deputy Hunter and Reverend James went to the local police department; however, they were advised that the Gadsden County sheriff had jurisdiction. They did not seek assistance from the sheriff's department because of a personal conflict between Respondent's brother and the watch officer at the sheriff's department. Thereafter, the Respondent called Ms. Copeland to find out where Mr. Richardson was living. The Respondent, Reverend James, and Deputy Hunter traveled to the area known as Coon Bottom in the vicinity of State Road 12 in Gadsden County looking for Mr. Richardson. They encountered three boys, and the Respondent identified himself as Agent James. He asked them if they knew where Mrs. Richardson lived, and the boys pointed out her house. The Respondent, Respondent's brother, and Deputy Hunter went to her house and asked her where her son, Colby, was. When she asked why they wanted to know, the Respondent identified himself as "Agent James" and stated that they were looking for Colby. Ms. Richardson stated that she did not know where he was. Deputy Hunter wrote the Respondent's beeper number on the back of his (Hunter's) business cards, gave it to Ms. Richardson, and they left. Later that day, when Colby did not contact them, Deputy Hunter again suggested to the Respondent and Reverend James that they report the offense to the local sheriff. They obtained the mobile number of an investigator with the local Sheriff's Office. Reverend James dialed the number and handed the phone to Deputy Hunter who advised the sheriff investigator of the information as he knew it. On March 18, 1996, eight months after the incident, the Respondent gave a sworn statement to Internal Inspector John W. Harris of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation. Prior to giving his statement, the Respondent was allowed to review the statements previously given by Ms. Copeland and Deputy Hunter. The Respondent was placed under oath and notified that giving a false statement under oath constituted perjury. The Respondent stated to the investigator that he was in Tallahassee on June 17, 1995, on his way to a Narcotics Investigations Identification school in Pensacola. The Respondent stated that he and Deputy Hunter traveled to Quincy in his state vehicle to find the individual identified as Colby Richardson, who had robbed his brother. The Respondent stated that he was driving his police car, carrying his weapon and wearing his badge around his neck. Respondent stated they went to Colby Richardson's girlfriend's house, and that he introduced himself as "James" and that he introduced Deputy Hunter as "Hunter." When the Respondent was asked if he introduced himself as "Agent James" to Ms. Copeland, he stated, "No, I just said James." When asked if he had shown Ms. Copeland a badge, he stated, "No, I can't recall showing her a badge." When he was again asked if he reached inside his shirt and pulled out his badge to show her, he stated, "No, not that I can recall." The Respondent was asked if he showed his badge to anyone while he was near Colby Richardson's mother's house. The Respondent stated that he did not show his badge to the juveniles nor to Ms. Richardson. Respondent admitted that he wore his badge on a chain around his neck, and that he had it on his neck when he was talking to Ms. Copeland. The Respondent believes that Ms. Copeland knew that he was wearing a badge because she could see the outline of the badge under his shirt. There is no evidence and it is not alleged that Respondent knew at the time of the incident that his brother had not been robbed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent be found guilty of failure to maintain good moral character, as required by Subsection 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, (1995), and that Respondent's certifications be suspended for a period of twelve months and until he presents evidence to the commission that he has taken such courses as the commission may direct on professional responsibility. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of December, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of December, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard D. Courtemanche, Jr., Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Theodore E. Mack, Esquire Powell & Mack 803 North Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent Community Education Partners, d/b/a Emerald Bay Academy, engaged in an unlawful employment practice as to Petitioner Adam Killick, and, if so, what relief should be granted to Petitioner, if any.
Findings Of Fact On October 3, 2005, the Commission filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings Petitioner's Petition for Relief. On that same date, an Initial Order was entered by the assigned Administrative Law Judge requesting certain information for the scheduling of the final hearing in this cause. Due to the parties' failure to comply with that Order, venue rights were deemed waived. On October 14, 2005, a Notice of Hearing was entered scheduling this cause for final hearing on December 19, 2005. An Order of Pre-Hearing Instructions was entered that same day requiring the parties to disclose to each other no later than seven days before the final hearing the names of their witnesses and further requiring them to exchange copies of their exhibits by that same deadline. That Order further provided that failure to timely disclose could result in exclusion of that evidence at the final hearing. On December 12 Respondent filed its Motion for Continuance of the final hearing. On December 13 Respondent filed correspondence advising that Petitioner had agreed to the continuance, that Petitioner would be out of the country the entire month of January 2006, and that Petitioner and Respondent had agreed to certain dates for re-scheduling the final hearing. One of those dates was February 17, 2006. On December 14, 2005, an Order Granting Continuance and Re-Scheduling Hearing was entered, scheduling this cause for final hearing on February 17, 2006, validating any served subpoenas for the new date, and incorporating the provisions of the first Notice of Hearing and the Order of Pre-Hearing Instructions. On January 26, 2006, Respondent filed its Agreed Motion for Leave to Present Testimony Telephonically, requesting that a witness who lives in New Mexico be allowed to testify telephonically at the final hearing on February 17, 2006. The Agreed Motion clearly set forth Petitioner's agreement to allow the telephonic testimony of that witness at the final hearing. On January 27, 2006, that Agreed Motion was granted, subject to Respondent making the necessary arrangements and subject to compliance with Florida Administrative Code Rule 28-106.213(5), which, inter alia, requires a notary public to be physically present with the witness to administer the oath. On February 3, 2006, Respondent filed its Notice of No Opposition advising that it did not oppose Petitioner's request for a continuance of the February 17, 2006, final hearing date. Petitioner's Motion for Continuance was filed on February 9, 2006. By Order Granting Continuance entered February 9, 2006, Petitioner's motion was granted, the final hearing scheduled for February 17, 2006, was cancelled, and the parties were afforded up to and including February 28, 2006, to advise the undersigned as to the status of this matter, as to the length of time required for the final hearing, and as to several mutually- agreeable dates for re-scheduling the final hearing. That Order further provided that failure to timely comply would result in the conclusion that this matter had been amicably resolved and the file of the Division of Administrative Hearings would be closed. Neither party filed any document or pleading on or before February 28, 2006. On March 3, 2006, Petitioner filed his first Request for Discovery and sent a letter to the Clerk of the Division requesting subpoenas and indicating that he would accommodate a hearing date convenient to the undersigned and to Respondent. The letter also advised that after he had received all materials, he needed time to prepare. The letter did not provide dates for re-scheduling the final hearing in compliance with the February 9, 2006, Order. Subpoenas were issued to Petitioner pursuant to his request in that letter. The Order Re-Scheduling Hearing entered March 6, 2006, recited the provisions of the prior Order giving a deadline for providing mutually-agreeable dates for re-scheduling the final hearing and the failure of the parties to comply with that Order. It also recited that despite the earlier Order providing for the automatic closure of the Division's file if the parties failed to timely provide dates, since Petitioner had filed documents subsequent to the deadline, it was assumed that the case had not been amicably resolved. The Order re-scheduled the final hearing in this matter to be held on March 24, 2006, validated any served subpoenas for the new date, and incorporated the provisions of the first Notice of Hearing and the Order of Pre-Hearing Instructions. On March 14, 2006, Petitioner filed a Motion to Compel Discovery and a Motion for Rehearing. The Motion for Rehearing is confusing: it asks for reconsideration of his discovery request (no ruling had previously been requested or made); it complains about the December 2005 hearing date having been continued; it withdraws Petitioner's prior agreement to allow a witness to testify by telephone (which agreement had been subsequently ordered); it specifically states that Petitioner is not requesting another continuance but then speaks of requiring time to prepare that would extend well beyond the scheduled final hearing date. On March 16, 2006, Respondent's Response to Petitioner's Motion to Compel Discovery and Motion for Rehearing was filed, opposing the granting of Petitioner's pending motions. Petitioner's motions were heard telephonically on March 20, 2006. The manual he wanted produced, which Respondent agreed to give him, was ordered produced, but the remainder of Petitioner's requests were denied. An Order on Pending Motions was entered that same day to memorialize the rulings announced during the telephonic hearing. The Order specifically provided that Petitioner's request for a postponement of the final hearing was denied, a ruling made and discussed during the telephonic hearing. On March 17, 2006, Respondent filed its witness list, together with a cover letter advising that Respondent had provided Petitioner with its witness and exhibits lists in December. Petitioner has not filed any witness list in accordance with the Order of Pre-hearing Instructions entered October 14, 2005. On March 22, 2006, Respondent filed a Motion to Quash Subpoenas, together with a request that a hearing be held on the Motion that same day. A telephonic hearing was conducted on March 22, 2006, and an Order Granting Respondent's Motion to Quash Subpoenas was entered. During the course of that telephonic hearing, Petitioner indicated that he might not come to the hearing. In response to that statement, the undersigned explained to Petitioner that it was up to him whether he attended the hearing, dismissed his petition for relief, or withdrew his request for a hearing. The undersigned explained to the parties that the hearing would go forward as scheduled, that Petitioner had the burden of proof in this proceeding, and that not appearing or presenting evidence would prevent him from meeting his burden of proof. After normal business hours on March 22, 2006, and therefore on March 23, 2006, Petitioner filed a Facsimile Letter to Judge Rigot. Although somewhat confusing, the Letter appears to re-argue points previously argued and memorialize Petitioner's understanding (and misunderstandings) of what transpired during the telephonic hearing on March 22, 2006. At 9:30 a.m., on March 24, 2006, Respondent's attorney and its witnesses were present for the scheduled final hearing. The undersigned waited for 35 minutes before opening the record and almost 10 minutes more before closing the record, with no appearance by Petitioner or anyone on his behalf.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof and dismissing his Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of March, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of March, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Adam Killick Post Office Box 18331 Panama City, Florida 32417 M. Brenk Johnson Winstead Sechrest & Minick, P.C. 1201 Elm Street, Suite 5400 Dallas, Texas 75270
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, a certified law enforcement officer, failed to maintain good moral character by knowingly making a false statement in writing with the intent to mislead a public servant in the performance of his official duties, a failure that, if proved, would warrant the imposition of discipline upon Respondent's certificate.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Pablo Barrios ("Barrios") is a Florida- certified law enforcement officer and, as such, falls under the regulatory and disciplinary jurisdiction of Petitioner Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission ("Commission"). At the time of the final hearing, and at all times relevant to this case, Barrios was employed as a police officer by Florida International University ("FIU"). The events giving rise to this proceeding took place on July 17, 2003. That morning, Barrios attended an in-service training class taught by Sgt. Alfonso. There were about a dozen other FIU police officers in the class. Shortly after the class began, Barrios and Sgt. Alfonso got into an argument over Barrios's use of a digital recorder. (Sgt. Alfonso was apparently offended that Barrios would record the lecture; Barrios claimed that he was merely using the device to keep track of the time.) Sgt. Alfonso asked Barrios to leave the classroom. Barrios did leave, remarking on his way out that if he (Barrios) had intended to turn on the recording device, he would first have told everyone in the "fucking room." Barrios later returned to the classroom and sat in the back. The lesson proceeded to conclusion uneventfully. When the class ended, Capt. Wright entered the room. Someone had reported the verbal altercation between Barrios and Sgt. Alfonso, and Capt. Wright was there to find out what had happened. To that end, Capt. Wright asked each of the officers present to prepare a statement describing the incident and stating specifically whether "improper language" had been used. In response to Capt. Wright's request, Barrios wrote the following statement: I was single[d] out by Sergeant Alfonso for taking out [sic] a personal recorder out of my laptop bag. Capt. Wright considered Barrios's statement to be incomplete. He therefore wrote the following question beneath Barrios's description of the event: Lt. Barrios, was improper language ever used during the incident. Barrios answered the captain's query, in writing, with one word: "No."1 Ultimate Factual Determinations The undersigned infers (and is convinced) that Barrios knew, when presented with Capt. Wright's imprecisely drafted question regarding the use of "improper language," that this interrogatory, though ambiguous and open to interpretation, was meant to require Barrios to either admit or deny using the "f" word during the incident. The undersigned further infers (but is not convinced) that Barrios was likely aware that Capt. Wright would misinterpret Barrios's negative answer as an affirmation that no one (including Barrios) had uttered the word "fuck" or any of its cognates. The undersigned is not clearly convinced, however, that Barrios intended to mislead Capt. Wright.2 Rather, since admitting that his language had been "improper" would have been tantamount to confessing misbehavior,3 Barrios likely intended to deny having engaged in inappropriate behavior. The undersigned is also not clearly convinced that Barrios's statement was false, for two reasons. First, the undersigned is not convinced that Barrios believed his language to have been improper.4 To the contrary, the evidence persuades the undersigned that Barrios subjectively believed his words were justified. It is likely, in other words, that Barrios made what was, for him, a true statement. Second, Barrios's statement has not been clearly and convincingly falsified——that is, shown via ordinary evidence to be objectively untrue. Because the adjective "improper" reflects an opinion or judgment about something, such an opinion could be falsified only if5 (among other things) there were a clear objective standard against which to measure or judge the thing in question.6 The Commission offered no evidence regarding such an objective standard for determining that Barrios's language was improper and hence failed objectively to falsify Barrios's denial that improper language had been used.7 In sum, the Commission failed clearly and convincingly to prove, as was its burden, that Barrios made a "false statement" with the intent to mislead Capt. Wright.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order finding Barrios not guilty of failing to maintain good moral character by knowingly making a false statement in writing with the intent to mislead a public servant in the performance of his official duties. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of February, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of February, 2005.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent violated Sections 943.1395(6), 943.1395(7), and 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2001), and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was employed as a certified correctional officer at the Franklin County jail in Apalachicola, Florida. She held the rank of sergeant. On the evening of May 19, 2001, Respondent was not on duty. Instead, she was driving her vehicle around Apalachicola, Florida. Patricia Carroll was a passenger in Respondent's vehicle. Ms. Carroll was employed as the Finance Director for the Franklin County Sheriff's Office. At approximately 7:45 p.m., two females in another vehicle stopped in the street to talk to Respondent. The driver of the second vehicle, H.B., was 16 years old. The passenger in the second vehicle, C.B., was 18 years old. H.B. and C.B. asked Respondent if she would purchase some alcohol for them. Respondent agreed to make the purchase, telling H.B. and C.B. to meet her at the grocery store. Respondent and H.B. drove their vehicles to a grocery store parking lot. Respondent asked H.B. and C.B. if they wanted a six-pack of beer. Responding affirmatively, H.B. and C.B. asked Respondent to buy them a six-pack of Zima. H.B. and C.B. gave Respondent money to buy the alcohol. Respondent went into the grocery store and purchased a six-pack of Zima. She exited the store and gave the alcohol to H.B. and C.B. through passenger window of H.B.'s vehicle. The two vehicles then left the parking lot. Casey Nash, an employee at the Franklin County Courthouse, was sitting in a vehicle in the grocery store parking lot when Respondent and H.B. arrived there. Ms. Nash saw Respondent give the alcohol to H.B. and C.B. Ms. Nash knew H.B. was a minor. Subsequently that evening, Ms. Nash reported her observations to a deputy sheriff. On May 21, 2001, H.B. and C.B. gave sworn written statements regarding the incident to an investigator for the Franklin County Sheriff's Office. In the statements, H.B. and C.B. stated that Respondent had purchased beer from them. On May 29, 2001, Respondent gave a sworn written statement to an investigator for the Franklin County Sheriff's Office. Respondent's statement indicated that she purchased an alcoholic beverage for Ms. Carroll at the grocery store on the evening of May 19, 2001. She did not reveal her purchase of alcohol for H.B. and C.B. Respondent was charged in a criminal case with contributing to the delinquency of a minor. She subsequently pled nolo contendere to a lesser included charge of aiding and abetting possession of alcohol by an underaged person. On June 7, 2001, the judge accepted Respondent's plea, withheld adjudication of guilt, and ordered Respondent to pay a $195 fine. On June 20, 2001, Respondent made a second sworn statement to an investigator for the Franklin County Sheriff's Office. In the second sworn statement, Petitioner admitted that she had purchased the alcohol for H.B. and C.B. on May 19, 2001, and that she had avoided revealing all the facts in her May 29, 2001, sworn statement. According to the second sworn statement, Respondent did not tell the whole truth because she "was confused and scared about what had happened." As a result of her actions, Respondent's employer demoted her, taking away the rank of sergeant and placing her on probation for six months. Respondent's employment at the Franklin County jail subsequently was terminated for reasons unrelated to this case. The record does not reveal how long Respondent has been a certified correctional officer. There is no evidence that Respondent has a prior disciplinary history. Respondent currently is working as a painter. It was apparent at the hearing that Petitioner is remorseful for her misconduct.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a final order revoking Respondent's certification as a correctional officer. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of September, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of September, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Erika R. Bartley 215 Martin Luther King Avenue Apalachicola, Florida 32320 Laurie B. Binder, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Louis A. Vargas, General Counsel Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-6563 James Crosby, Jr., Secretary Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-6563
The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Respondent has failed to maintain good moral character as defined in Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011(4)(b), in violation of section 943.1395(7), Florida Statutes (2011).
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a certified law enforcement officer, to whom Petitioner issued certification number 62352. In or around 2005-2006, Respondent and Ashley Jourdan had a dating relationship. That relationship ended in December 2006, upon Respondent's arrest for battering her. On or about April 17, 2007, Respondent pleaded nolo contendere to a misdemeanor charge of battery, in violation of section 784.03(1)(a)1., Florida Statutes. As a result of this plea, adjudication was withheld and Respondent was sentenced to 12 months of probation requiring 775 hours of community service; no contact with Ms. Jourdan; participation in a Batterers’ Intervention Program; and restitution. Respondent completed the conditions of probation and it was terminated April 28, 2008. After Mr. Plante's arrest, Ms. Jourdan sought and received an injunction against him, which remained in place until September 2009. She let it expire at that time because she was then married and expecting her first child, and had had no contact with Respondent since his arrest. She wanted to "move on" with her life and thought it was safe to do so. Ashley Jourdan and James Hegler married in 2009. In December 2011, the Heglers were living together. Ms. Hegler was working at the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. On December 2, 2011, James Hegler received two text messages about his wife, Ashley Jourdan Hegler. The text messages stated: "We the women of fdle would like 2 ask u to keep your wife from f---ing her way through our workplace."1/ The phone number from which the messages were sent was (850) 274- 8056. Mr. Hegler showed the message to his wife, and one of them posted the number on Facebook to see if anyone knew whose phone number was used. He also blocked the number on his telephone. On December 11, 2011, Mr. Hegler received four additional text messages, originating from a different telephone. Those messages are as follows: (Sent at 1:28 a.m.): We the women and wives of FDLE would like u 2 controll ur wife and keep her from f---ing her way through the entire agency. Yes its gotten that bad. We r annomimous cause she brags how she can't b touched here at fdle cause her daddy. She braggs that u knew what she was when u met her[2/] (Sent at 1:50 a.m.): Surely this comes as no shock 2 u. she braggs how u knew thats what she was when u met (Sent at 2:03 a.m.): Yes we r conectected but r daddies aren’t doyl. But if u think we arent sick of here trying to f--- up as she puts it. Or as she says if ur not f--- in up ur f---in up (Sent at 2:09 a.m.): Truly u already know u werent the only dick in that s--- The texts were sent from a phone with the number (850) 545-6952. James Hegler showed the texts to his wife, Ashley Jourdon Hegler, who considered the possibility that they might originate with Respondent. The texts alone made her feel harassed, and that someone must hate her a lot to try to text her husband. The idea that Respondent might have sent them made her frightened and upset. The Heglers contacted a friend whose husband was employed by the Leon County Sheriff's Office (LCSO) for guidance, and as a result, went to the LCSO to file a complaint. The case was assigned to Detective Shannon Black of the Violent Crimes/Homicide Unit of the LCSO. Detective Black's ex-wife is the friend to whom the Heglers’ had spoken before going to the LCSO. When Detective Black spoke to the couple, Ms. Hegler raised the possibility that Respondent might be the person responsible for the texts. Detective Black dismissed the possibility as implausible. Detective Black's investigation showed that the number used in the December 11, 2011, text messages (850-545-6492) was attached to a Verizon Wireless pre-paid account. A subpoena was sent to Verizon Wireless to obtain the purchase information for the telephone assigned to this number. The information received from Verizon in response to the subpoena revealed that the telephone used to send the text messages to Mr. Hegler was an LG Revere VN150 model telephone purchased at the Walmart at 1500 Thomasville Road in Tallahassee, Florida (Store 1223), on December 10, 2011. The phone was activated the same day. Detective Black then visited the Walmart on Thomasville Road and met with Larry Gunn, Walmart's Asset Protection Manager for Store 1223. A review of Walmart records showed that two LG Revere VN150 model telephones were purchased at the store on December 10, 2011. Detective Black and Mr. Gunn reviewed surveillance tapes as well as transaction records for Store 1223, and determined that one of the phones purchased December 10, 2011, was purchased by a female customer with a credit card, and the other was purchased by a man who paid cash. The female customer was identified as Kathryn Wells. She purchased the prepaid phone, along with other grocery items. The phone was purchased as a part of a project for her church to provide Christmas gifts for the children at the Florida Baptist Children's Home. She never activated the phone, but wrapped it up and delivered it to her church, and was present when it was opened in front of the congregation on Christmas. Detective Black was also able to review the surveillance tape of the purchase of the second telephone, which identified a white male wearing dark clothing and a baseball cap. Mr. Gunn was then able to backtrack, using the time stamps, and follow the video footage to the point where the purchaser entered the store, where there was a better view. Detective Black was able to positively identify Respondent as the purchaser based upon his personal knowledge of Respondent as his former training officer and fellow member of the SWAT team. Detective Black obtained a copy of the video from Mr. Gunn and took it to the LCSO. There, he asked several co- workers to identify the person in the video. According to Detective Black, all identified the purchaser as Jon Plante. Detective Black also called Ms. Hegler and asked her to come in and identify the person in the video. She immediately identified the person as Jon Plante, and Detective Black described her reaction as shocked and terrified. In Ms. Hegler's words, she is "scared to death" of Respondent. After seeing him in the video surveillance, she and her husband took their young daughter to Fort Lauderdale to stay with her mother for a while, believing she would be safer there. They also purchased a firearm for her vehicle, took shooting lessons, and had additional security installed. Extra patrols from the sheriff's office were instituted and another male family member stayed with the Heglers for a few nights because of Ms. Hegler's emotional reaction upon learning that Respondent was responsible for the texts. Ms. Hegler also filed another petition for injunction against Respondent. She testified credibly that a temporary injunction was entered December 30, 2011, "put in place" in January 2012, and remains in effect. Detective Black attempted to contact Respondent during the investigation but was unsuccessful. A warrant for Respondent's arrest was issued on December 22, 2011, and he turned himself in to authorities on December 29, 2011. Both Ms. Hegler and Detective Black believed that, based upon the content of the messages, the text messages sent December 2 and December 11 were sent from the same person. It is so found. At the time of the hearing, the Heglers had separated, Detective Black had gone through a divorce, and sometime after the divorce, Ms. Hegler and Detective Black had started seeing each other. However, there was no credible evidence to indicate that they were involved in anything but a friendship between couples at the time of the investigation of this case, or that their current relationship affected the conduct of the investigation in any way.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a Final Order finding that Respondent violated section 943.1395(7), as defined by rule 11B- 27.0011(4)(b), and revoking his certification as a law enforcement officer. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of June, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of June, 2013.
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent should deny Petitioner's application to be licensed as a resident personal lines insurance agent.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing insurance agents in the state pursuant to Chapter 626, Florida Statutes (2004). On October 29, 2004, Respondent received Petitioner's application to be licensed as a resident personal lines insurance agent (insurance agent). On October 13, 2005, Respondent issued a Notice of Denial to Petitioner. Respondent based the denial on several grounds that fall into three categories. The first category is based on Petitioner's prior criminal history. In relevant part, the Notice of Denial denies the application because Petitioner pled nolo contendere to a crime punishable by imprisonment of one year or more. The Notice of Denial further states that the crime was one of moral turpitude and that Subsection 626.611(14), Florida Statutes (2004), makes denial of the application compulsory. Even if the crime were not one of moral turpitude, the Notice of Denial states that the plea of nolo contendere provides a discretionary ground to deny the application pursuant to Subsection 626.621(8), Florida Statutes (2004). The Notice of Denial states a second category of grounds that are also compulsory. The second category of grounds may be fairly summarized as alleging a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance. The second category of grounds generally relates to turpitude inherent in the criminal offense and an inaccurate application answer stating that Petitioner had no prior criminal record. The Notice of Denial states that Petitioner lacks one or more qualifications for the license, that Petitioner committed a material misstatement or misrepresentation on her application, and that Petitioner demonstrated a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance as provided in Subsections 626.611(1), 626.611(2), and 626.611(7), Florida Statutes (2004). The third category of grounds relates to waiting periods. The Notice of Denial states that Petitioner must wait 17 years from the date she pled nolo contendere before applying for a license as an insurance agent. The waiting period is based on agency rules in Florida Administrative Code Rules 69B-211.042(4)(b) and 69B-211.042(8) that are promulgated pursuant to Subsection 626.207(1), Florida Statutes (2004). The remaining Findings of Fact address the factual sufficiency of the second category of grounds for denial. The conclusions of law, in relevant part, address the legal sufficiency of the remaining grounds for denial. The criminal record of Petitioner is not disputed. On October 4, 2004, Petitioner pled nolo contendere to a third degree felony of grand theft in the Circuit Court in and for Pasco County, Florida, Case No. CRCO4-1177-CFAES. The court withheld adjudication of guilt and imposed fines and costs of $395. Petitioner served 30 days in the Pasco County jail. The court placed Petitioner on supervised probation for 18 months, which Petitioner successfully terminated early on September 27, 2005. Petitioner contests neither the inaccuracy of the application answer stating she had no prior criminal record nor the materiality of the inaccuracy. However, Petitioner does contest the agency's assertion that Petitioner possessed the culpable knowledge or scienter required to misstate, misrepresent, or commit fraud in attempting to obtain a license within the meaning of Subsection 626.611(2), Florida Statutes (2004). Petitioner also contests the assertions that she lacks one or more qualifications for licensure and that she lacks fitness or trustworthiness within the meaning of Subsections 626.611(1), 626.611(2), and 626.611(7), Florida Statutes (2004). Petitioner testified that her employer submitted her application electronically. Petitioner testified that she gave her employer accurate information concerning her application, but she did not review the application before transmission. The trier of fact finds the testimony concerning Petitioner's lack of culpable knowledge to be credible and persuasive. Petitioner testified with extraordinary candor. Her demeanor was frank and unguarded. Her denial of culpable intent to mislead the agency is consistent with the totality of evidence in this proceeding and with Petitioner's demonstrated fitness and trustworthiness after November 2002. After Petitioner gave birth to a son on March 20, 2002, her treating physician advised her to undergo a tubal ligation, and the subsequent surgery was successful. The resulting inability to bear more children, however, led Petitioner into a mental state that was subsequently diagnosed as severe clinical depression. Petitioner returned to work approximately 12 weeks after surgery. From August 2002 through November 2002, Petitioner engaged in an episode of compulsive spending in which she incurred approximately $70,000 in credit card debt that she charged to personal and business credit cards. In order to pay the debt, Petitioner began taking money from her employer. Petitioner describes her hedonistic offense in her own words: [T]his incident occurred when I was suffering from severe depression that was [subsequently] diagnosed by a physician. I have been under the treatment of a psychiatrist and also a psychologist. I still see my psychiatrist quarterly to make sure that all is well with my medications . . . . The psychologist released me from her care because she felt that I can now deal with everyday stress. . . . So in order to fill that void [of no more children] I started shopping. And I would - I would go to the mall in a day and I would spend several thousand dollars on absolute garbage, you know, when you look. I mean. I started buying clothes; I bought furniture. I just was a shopaholic. I would go every Saturday and Sunday and spend time at the mall and just shop like crazy. [M]y husband had no idea of our finances. He just gave the paycheck and said: You do what you need to do. As long as he could have cash he didn't care. So he had no idea. He didn't even know how much money I made; he didn't know how much our mortgage was; he didn't know anything about our finances. And then once I started having all these credit card bills then I was, you know, robbing Peter to pay Paul . . . . And then it just got where I snapped . . . . And . . . unfortunately it looked like the easy way out. It was an answer to my problems and I could continue doing what I needed to do. [T]he attorney [employer] pretty much left me to do what I needed to do. I wrote all of his court motions, and I wrote all of his pleadings, and accountings, and inventories, and he didn't even look at them. He would just sign them. He didn't review them at all. And so when I would give him checks to sign . . . I would just take him the check and say, "I need you to sign a check," and he would sign the check and wouldn't even look to see . . . it was [to me]. Transcript (TR), pages 15 and 24-26. After November 2002, Petitioner voluntarily disclosed her offense to her employer. Petitioner's effort to reclaim her integrity and trustworthiness was both epiphanic and Herculean. The effort is best described in her own words: I started contemplating suicide and said: Oh, well, this will take care of all the problems. But then I had read up and didn't want my kids to grow up without a parent or think that for some reason they caused me to do it. So at that point in time I was just - I didn't know what to do or where to turn. I was just completely lost. And so I hadn't been to church in like a year. For whatever reason the Sunday before the Monday that I went to [an] attorney I went to church and they told a story. And I said: You know, I'm willing to confess to what I've done at whatever cost because I can't - I can't keep going like this, and I can't keep pretending like nothing is wrong, and laying in bed and the couch all day. So I went to [an] attorney the very next day. Q. Do you need a moment? A. I'm okay. * * * In January 2003, I'm sorry. This is hard reliving it. THE COURT: That's okay. Take your time and if you need a recess just let me know. A. This is the first time that I just really said it out loud. THE COURT: Yes. A. In January of 2003, I contacted [an attorney]. I informed him . . . that I had done something wrong and I didn't know where to turn to or who to turn to. At this point in time I hadn't told my family and nobody knew. All they knew is that something was wrong with me. I wasn't myself. I was withdrawn and I stayed in bed . . . all day. The attorney immediately contacted my former employer to advise that there was a problem with his accounting system. Up until this time he had no knowledge of any . . . problems. My attorney also contacted a doctor for me to see immediately because he could tell that something was not right with me. At this time that my attorney contacted my former employer I offered to make immediate restitution, which I did [over time]. At this point in time my employer said that he did not want to contact any authorities because he didn't want the publicity in a small town. And as far as I knew, the situation was taken care of. I was making restitution and I thought it was over. At some point in time my former employer contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). After meeting with the FBI, I agreed to assist them because my former employer was billing my time as the attorney's time in guardianship cases. This would cause clients to run out of money and become eligible for Medicaid and other state governmental services. The federal government ended up dropping the charge against me and I . . . agreed to assist them in any cases against my employer. When things were not moving along in the federal case my former employer also contacted the local authorities. I was arrested on May 1 of 2004. And this was almost - this was almost a year-and-a-half after I had first come forward. And then in September 2004, my attorney was ready to go to trial. At the last minute the State Attorney offered a plea deal. I was told that I could finally put this nightmare behind me by pleading no contest and I would have no criminal record because the court would withhold adjudication. [T]he judge made a point to mention that adjudication was being withheld so I would have no felony criminal record. And also at this time there was no restitution ordered because I had already paid it all back. TR at 15-18. Petitioner paid approximately $85,000 in restitution. Restitution was a Sisyphean effort, as Petitioner explains: I paid back cash. I had taken - I had calculated $40,000. He said that I calculated - that I had taken $60,000 and then he raised it to $80,000 for his time. But I - I paid back $45,000 in cash. The credit card companies, he contacted every credit card company that I paid and they all reversed all of their [charges]. So I ended up owing, you know, another $45,000 back in credit cards that he had . . . all the payments reversed. . . . So I paid a total - it was $85,000. * * * [W]e sold everything we had. . . . We sold our home. I had bought my husband a third vehicle. We sold that. We had a motorcycle that sold. We had a lot of toys. TR at 27-28. The trier of fact is not persuaded that Petitioner would have lied on her license application in October 2005 after voluntarily disclosing her offense in January 2003. When Petitioner exercised a conscious choice to confess her offense, she knew with certainty that shame would follow her exposure to her husband and children. Petitioner also knew that her choice would subject her family to the financial hardship and social upheaval inherent in selling everything they owned to make restitution to her former employer. Petitioner learned a new occupation, contributed to her family's recovery, and testified candidly and frankly about her offense. When the court sentenced Petitioner to 30 days in jail, Petitioner requested that she be allowed to serve the sentence every other weekend. Petitioner worked during the week and did not want to be away from her children all week and every weekend. The judge granted the request. The trier of fact finds that Petitioner neither misstated nor misrepresented her criminal record on her license application. Nor did Petitioner commit fraud in answering the questions on the application within the meaning of Subsection 626.611(2), Florida Statutes (2004). The trier of fact finds that Petitioner does not lack one or more of the qualifications for licensure required in Subsection 626.611(1), Florida Statutes (2004).1 Nor does Petitioner demonstrate a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance within the meaning of Subsection 626.611(7), Florida Statutes (2004).
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order determining that Petitioner's license application has been granted by operation of law. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of May, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 2006.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Beatrice Yazbeck, a guidance counselor under contract with Petitioner, Orange County School Board, violated an express work rule of Petitioner's Management Directive A-9; and whether Respondent violated Florida Administrative Code Rule 6B-1.006(5)(d) and (e), by committing misconduct in office; and, if so, whether any such offense provides just cause for discipline up to, and including, dismissal of Respondent pursuant to Subsection 1012.33(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2004).
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence received at the final hearing, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner is the governing board of the Orange County School District, and Ronald Blocker is the Superintendent of Orange County Public Schools and the executive officer of Petitioner. Respondent is employed by Petitioner as a high school guidance counselor at the campuses of WPHS and the Winter Park Ninth Grade Center (Ninth Grade Center). She has held a Professional Services Contract with Petitioner for several years. Respondent's employment is subject to a Collective Bargaining Agreement referred to as the "Contract Between the School Board of Orange County, Florida, and the Orange County Classroom Teachers' Association, 2004-2005." Article XII of the Collective Bargaining Agreement pertains to employee discipline and provides: An employee may be disciplined only for just cause and discipline shall be imposed only for a violation of an expressed rule, an expressed order, an expressed policy or reasonable expectation of management, which reasonably should have been known to the employee. This shall not be construed as to prohibit the administrator from questioning an employee and/or offering reasonable direction at the time of the occurrence of any incident, the result of which might later be dealt with in a disciplinary manner. Any teacher may be suspended or dismissed at any time during the year, provided that the charges against him/her are based on immorality, misconduct in office, incompetency, gross insubordination, willful neglect of duty, drunkenness, or conviction of any crime involving moral turpitude where applicable, and in accordance with Florida Statutes. Respondent, as a member of the instructional staff of Petitioner, is required to abide by the "Code of Ethics of the Education Profession in Florida (Code of Ethics)." Fla. Admin. Code R. 6B-1.006(5). The State Board of Education established "Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession in Florida (Principles of Professional Conduct)" that specifically require that educators: shall not engage in harassment or discriminatory conduct which unreasonably interferes with an individual's performance of professional or work responsibilities or with the orderly processes of education or which creates a hostile, intimidating, abusive, offensive, or oppressive environment; and, further, shall make reasonable effort to assure that each individual is protected form such harassment or discrimination. shall not make malicious or intentionally false statements about a colleague. Fla. Admin. Code R. 6B-1.006(5). At the start of the 2004/2005 school year, Respondent was provided a copy of the WPHS's Faculty Handbook, which contained Petitioner's Management Directive A-9. Management Directive A-9 is a work rule prohibiting employees from misusing school computers and internet access for personal, non-educational activities. Management Directive A-9 provides, in pertinent part: Employee Access to Network e. The District authorizes employees to use District computer technology resources and data bases for assigned responsibilities. These resources shall be used by employees to enhance job productivity as it relates to District business. These resources shall be used for District-related purposes and not for personal use or gain or for the benefit of private, "for profit" or "not for profit" organizations. Network Security and Acceptable Use b. Internet resources and e-mail shall be us ed by employees to enhance job productivity as they relate to District business and shall not be used to send abusive, threatening or harassing messages. Employees shall refrain from communications where the meaning of the message, or its transmission or distribution, would be illegal, unethical or irresponsible . . . . * * * 6. Due Process a. Any employee failing to comply with this Management Directive may be subject to disciplinary action as well as civil liability or criminal charges. At the beginning of the 2003/2004 school year, Respondent was involuntarily transferred from Evans High School (EHS) to WPHS. EHS is also racially diverse, however, both the student and faculty population is predominately African- American. WPHS has a student population of approximately 3,800 students and 308 staff members. The student population at WPHS is racially diverse with between 18 percent and 19 percent of the students being African-American. The faculty at WPHS is equally diverse. Within the past two years, WPHS has had an increase in racial diversity among its students due, in significant part, to the advent of opportunity scholarships which enable students of underperforming schools to transfer to other schools within the District. Mary Brinson is an African-American mathematics teacher at WPHS, who has been employed with Petitioner for 30 years. At all times material, Kimrey Ross-Myers was employed as assistant principal for instruction for WPHS and was the assessing administrator of Respondent. William Gordon was employed as principal at WPHS. Donald Shearer is a senior manager in the Employee Relations Department of Petitioner. On January 7, 2005, Respondent, while on duty in the guidance counselor's office at the Ninth Grade Center, composed a personal e-mail to her brother using the school's computer. Among other things, this e-mail contained the following passage: Finally, this at the end of too many horrible experiences of struggle, stress and strife imposed by inept, incompetent, ignorant persons of color and this dike on our main campus whom I have finally discovered may be the culprit responsible for the problems I've had with this female administrator, Kimrey. Funny, isn't it, after all the shit I've put up with at the hand of black folks, I still can't get myself to use the n word. Wonder why???? I'll try to talk to you soon. On January 7, 2005, Respondent accidentally touched the print button, rather than the send button on her computer, which printed the e-mail at a printer networked to the WPHS campus. Recognizing this error, Respondent departed the Ninth Grade Center and drove to WPHS to retrieve the printed e-mail. Unbeknownst to both Mary Brinson and Respondent, the e-mail printed among Ms. Brinson's school grade reports which Ms. Brinson had collected for processing. While reviewing her student grade reports, Ms. Brinson came upon Respondent's e-mail of January 7, 2005, and was alarmed by its demeaning, discriminatory content. Troubled by the fact that the e-mail was authored by a school guidance counselor with whom she had professional contact, Ms. Brinson took it home, and on Monday, gave the e-mail to Kimrey Ross-Myers for handling within her discretion. Ms. Brinson advised Ms. Ross-Myers of the e-mail because she regarded its content as evidencing discriminatory conduct directed at African-Americans and lesbians. Further, she advised Ms. Ross-Myers of the e-mail because she was required to abide by the Code of Ethics requiring that she protect against harassment and discrimination. Ms. Ross-Myers took it to Principal Gordon, who, in turn, referred the e-mail to Mr. Shearer of Petitioner's Employee Relations Department. Upon learning of the January 7, 2005, e-mail, Mr. Shearer instructed the District staff to review Respondent's computer for other similarly offensive e-mails. Two such e-mails were retrieved: one composed by Respondent on May 25, 2004, at 6:47 p.m., and the other on October 7, 2004, at 9:43 a.m., which was transmitted during school hours. In the e-mail composed by Respondent on May 25, 2004, she criticized Ms. Ross-Myers, writing: My work and my nemesis, this evil administrator from hell didn't want me to stay here, has me running around in circles. Respondent, again, criticized her immediate supervisor, Ms. Ross-Myers, in her e-mail of October 7, 2004, writing: Kimrey is the Assistant Principal who was on my case from day one. I was transferred to this school on short notice (one week before the beginning of school) after a perfect evaluation and realignment to the school that transferred me. Referring to her former principal at EHS, Elaine Scott, Respondent also wrote in her e-mail of October 7, 2004: The principal, an ignorant black female, gave all the Counselors a serious ultimatum about our performance, although all of us had gotten impeccable evaluations. The e-mails of May 25, 2004, and October 7, 2004, were transmitted via Petitioner's internet account to Respondent's brother. Principal Gordon testified that after considering all three e-mails composed by Respondent, he became concerned that Respondent may be prejudiced against African-Americans. The ostensibly discriminatory content of the e-mails, combined with all reasonable inferences that could fairly be drawn from them, caused Principal Gordon to believe that Respondent's effectiveness to serve as a high school guidance counselor had been seriously compromised. Petitioner has adopted a Code of Civility that applies to students and staff alike. During the 2004/2005 school year, the Code of Civility was published within the Student Code of Conduct. The Code of Civility specifically prohibits individuals from ethnic stereotyping and uttering slurs. The Code of Student Conduct also prohibits demeaning, abusive, or obscene content in any communication. The e-mails composed by Respondent on January 7, 2005, and October 7, 2004, violate standards of conduct expressly incorporated into the Code of Civility. Ms. Brinson, Ms. Ross-Myers, Principal Gordon, and Superintendent Blocker testified that these e-mails, individually and collectively, caused them to question whether Respondent would interact with students in a fair and equitable fashion while serving in her role as a high school guidance counselor. These concerns were elevated to the extent that Principal Gordon, Ms. Ross-Myers, and Ms. Brinson testified that they would refrain from referring students to Respondent for counseling on matters of racial or sexual orientation sensitivity. The "black" administrator Respondent referred to in her e-mail of October 7, 2004, as "ignorant" is EHS principal, Elaine Scott. At the final hearing, Respondent admitted she inaccurately characterized Principal Scott as being "ignorant." When criticizing her previous administrators at EHS, Respondent associated their race with her finding that they were ignorant, inept, or incompetent. When offering criticism of Caucasian administrators, namely Ms. Ross-Myers, Respondent omitted any racial reference. Respondent testified with respect to her e-mail of January 7, 2005, that the statements therein were true and that she "had many horrible experiences, struggles, stress and strife imposed by inept, incompetent, ignorant persons of color," while serving as a guidance counselor at EHS. Respondent further testified that she did not intend to stereotype African-Americans in a derogatory manner and that she was referring to four specific African-American administrators with whom she worked: James Lawson, Elaine Scott, Chuck Rivers, and Joe Salsby. Respondent gave credible testimony relating to her referring to the "n" word, but not using it. This explanation is that she considers the use of the "n" word to be racist and a horrible thing to say to a person of color and that is why she could not use it. Both Ms. Ross-Myers and Principal Gordon testified that they have had professional contact with these four administrators and confirmed that they are regarded by their peers as being capable, competent, and professional. However, no additional investigation was conducted. The term "dike [sic]," as used in the context of the e-mail, is a disparaging term for a lesbian. Respondent refused to identify the female staff member who was the target of her slur and testified, "I would never put that label on anyone." Despite this denunciation, Respondent did so use this term to disparage a co-worker and, further, did so without any knowledge of her co-worker's true sexual orientation. Respondent testified that she does not use the term "dyke" in public to put labels on people. The term was suggested to her in a telephone conversation by her homosexual brother after she described the conduct of a specific person toward her. In the e-mail to her brother, Respondent used the word as an identifying term to refer to the person by the appellation which her brother had already used for that person. Respondent is so unfamiliar with the word that she misspelled it as "dike" in her e-mail. Respondent assailed Ms. Brinson's motives in coming forward and reporting her accidental discovery of the January 7, 2004, e-mail. Respondent accused Ms. Brinson of "snooping" and of being an "intermeddler," who purposely schemed to get Respondent "fired." At the final hearing, Respondent further accused Ms. Brinson of having committed professional misconduct in reporting the e-mail to her supervisor. Respondent admitted violating Management Directive A-9 when she used the District's computer and internet account to write and transmit a personal e-mail to her brother. Two of the subject e-mails were composed during school hours. Prior to the filing of administrative charges against Respondent, Petitioner had discharged other employees for violating Management Directive A-9, by misusing the District's computer network to compose and send e-mails for personal gain or for transmitting e-mails with obscene and abusive content. Superintendent Blocker further testified that he believed that Respondent's misconduct violated Petitioner's anti-discrimination policy that requires all OCPS employees to act with impartiality and fairness in dealing with co-workers, students, and the public at large. In Petitioner's Administrative Complaint of March 8, 2005, Petitioner alleges that: 1) Respondent violated Management Directive A-9 in misuse of the District's computer network to compose and transmit e-mail that demeaned African- Americans and which contained a slur against lesbians; 2) Respondent violated Subsection 1012.795(1), Florida Statutes (2004), by committing misconduct in office, which seriously reduced her effectiveness as an employee; 3) Respondent violated the Code of Ethics and the Principles of Professional Conduct, Florida Administrative Code Rule 6B-1.006(5)(d) and (e); and 4) Respondent engaged in misconduct in office, willful neglect of duty, gross insubordination, and conduct unbecoming of an employee in breach of Respondent's employment agreement with Petitioner. There is no evidence that Respondent committed any act of sexual discrimination against any person or group of persons. There is no evidence that Respondent failed to deliver appropriate counseling services to any student or group of students. There is no evidence that Respondent ever failed to deliver appropriate services to any student, allowed harm to any student, or committed harm to any student for any reason, including the racial or sexual orientation diversity of any student. There is no evidence of harm to any student of diversity by Respondent during her entire career in education. There was no investigation as to whether Respondent was, in fact, racially prejudiced or whether she was, in fact, prejudiced against persons of alternative sexual orientation. Rather, Petitioner ascribed racial and sexual prejudice to her based entirely on the content of the thoughts expressed in her e-mail, which was intended to be a private communication and was not intended for exposure by any person who might be offended by it. All of Petitioner's witnesses admitted that their concern about Respondent's effectiveness as a counselor is anticipatory. The preponderance of the evidence proves that Respondent violated Management Directive A-9 by misusing the District's computer network to compose and transmit e-mails that demeaned African-Americans and which contained a slur against lesbians. Respondent violated Subsection 1012.795(1), Florida Statutes (2004), by committing misconduct in office, which seriously reduced her effectiveness as an employee. Respondent violated the Code of Ethics and Principles of Professional Conduct. Fla. Admin. Code R. 6B-1.006(5)(d) and (e) Respondent engaged in conduct unbecoming of an employee in breach of Respondent's employment agreement with Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Orange County School Board, enter a final order as follows: 1) Find Respondent, Beatrice Yazbeck, guilty of violating Management Directive A-9, Florida Administrative Code Rule 6B-1.006(5)(d) and (e); and terminating the Professional Services Contract of Respondent. It is further RECOMMENDED that Respondent be returned to annual contract status and that she be suspended, without pay, for a period of two months. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of September, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of September, 2005.
