Findings Of Fact At all times relevant thereto, Respondent, Anthony S. Coco, held chiropractic license number 0001508 issued by Petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Chiropractic Examiners. He is authorized to practice chiropractic in the State of Florida and presently maintains an office at 65 Royal Palm Beach Boulevard, Vero Beach, Florida. In response to a newspaper advertisement, Thomas A. Murphy visited the office of Respondent on May 13, 1980, regarding treatment of low back pain, impotence, nervousness, headaches and general aches and pains. Murphy had a 100 percent service-connected disability and was already being treated by a medical physician for other undisclosed ailments. Murphy was given a complete examination by Coco, including neurological and orthopedic tests. Additionally, eight x-rays were taken of the patient. As a general practice, Coco does not record negative (or normal) results on the patient's records. Because all tests except the x-rays were negative, the results of the examination were not reflected on Murphy's patient records. However, a detailed record of his findings were prepared in a request for authorization to provide chiropractic treatment forwarded to the Veteran's Administration (VA) on May 15, 1980. The request was later denied by the VA, and Murphy terminated his relationship with Respondent. Murphy became involved in a dispute with a secretary in Coco's office and filed a complaint against him with Petitioner. Petitioner then retained the services of an outside consultant, Dr. Fred C. Blumenfeld, to examine Murphy's patient file. Blumenfeld was initially given an incomplete file to examine, and based upon his initial review of the incomplete file, concluded that Respondent failed to exercise reasonable care in his treatment of Murphy. That precipitated the instant proceeding. Prior to the final hearing, Blumenfeld gained access to the entire file, and upon examining the same, reached an opinion that no "malpractice" had occurred. Although he testified that he would have marked the x-rays differently, and would have noted all negative findings on Murphy's patient chart, he did not otherwise criticize Coco's treatment of Murphy, and saw no basis for the issuance of an administrative complaint. Three other experts, including a nationally recognized professor of chiropractic and a former member of the Board of Chiropractic Examiners, each concluded that Coco's treatment of Murphy was proper and consistent with generally recognized standards of skill and care of chiropractors in the community. They also concluded that Coco's diagnosis of Murphy's ailments, as reflected on his patient notes and letter of May 15, were consistent with the x- rays taken of Murphy. Although Mr. Murphy appeared at the final hearing, he did so reluctantly and had no complaint regarding his examination and the diagnosis rendered by Coco.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that all charges against Respondent be DISMISSED. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of March, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of March, 1983.
The Issue The issue is whether the application for the certificate of need for a cardiac catheterization laboratory filed by Humana Hospital Bennett should be approved. The proceeding is governed by Section 381.705(1), Florida Statutes (1987), and Rule 10-5.011(1)(e), Florida Administrative Code. Humana Bennett and the Department maintain that Section 381.705(2), Florida Statutes, is inapplicable to this matter, but the other parties believe that statute applies. Not all subsections of these statutes or rules are in dispute, however. According to the prehearing stipulation, the following are either not in dispute or inapplicable: 1. Section 381.705(1) (c) , (e) , (f) , (g) (h) [except for the applicant's ability to recruit health manpower resources], (i),(j),(k),(m) 2. As to Section 381.705(2), subsection (e) is not in dispute. 3. As to Rule 10-5.011(1) (e), the following subparagraphs are not in dispute: 7.a., 7.b., 7.c., 7.d., 8.a., 8.b., 9.a., 9.c., 9.d., 9.e. (II) and (III), 13., 14., and 15.b. The parties dispute whether the application of Humana Bennett meets the following statutory and rule criteria for a certificate of need: 1. Section 381.705(1) (a), (b) , (d) , [as to health manpower] (1), and (n). As to Section 381.705(2), the following: (a) , (b) , (c) , and (d). 3. As to Rule 10-5.011(1) (e) , the following: 8.c., 9.b., 9.e.(I), 10., 11., 12., 15.a., and 15.c. FINDINGS OF FACT Description of the parties and their characteristics Humana Hospital Bennett is a 204-bed, acute care medical surgical hospital located in west central Broward County. It is the westernmost facility in Broward County. It is owned by Humana, Inc., and operated or profit. Western Broward is growing faster than the mature communities on the Atlantic Coast. Humana Bennett is fully accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, and provides an array of services for the diagnosis and treatment of coronary disease including electrocardiology, echocardiology, nuclear medicine heart studies, stress testing, and other non-invasive procedures. It does not offer open heart surgery. Humana Bennett also has a 14-bed intensive care/coronary unit, a 22-bed intermediate care unit, and a progressive cardiac rehabilitation program. The Humana medical staff is composed of 460 physicians, 28 of whom specialize in the treatment of cardiovascular disease; 24 of these 28 are board- certified in cardiology. An additional 12 physicians are board-certified in cardiovascular and thoracic surgery. About 63% of all discharges at Humana are cardiac- related. This percentage has increased over time. In fiscal year 1985 52.3% of discharges were cardiac-related. Humana Bennett has contracts with health maintenance organizations for hospital services. These include the Humana Care Plus and International Medical Center health maintenance organizations which are owned and operated by Humana, Inc. About 65,000 Broward County residents are subscribers to these plans. The Humana Bennett catheterization laboratory would involve 2,500 square feet of new construction and 750 square feet of renovation. The hospital projects that the laboratory will be operational by September 1989. The laboratory would be capable of providing a full range of diagnostic cardiac catheterization procedures, which would include a cardiac catheterization laboratory, a control area, a storage area, a darkroom, and other related preparation, recovery and support areas. The total project cost would be approximately $1,302,600. There are both diagnostic and therapeutic uses for catheterization; the therapeutic uses include angioplasty. By Department rule, only a hospital with an open heart surgery program may perform angioplasty. Humana Bennett's laboratory could perform only diagnostic catheterizations. The South Broward Hospital District was created by a special act of the 1947 Florida Legislature, Chapter 24415, Laws of Florida, as an independent taxing authority. It does not operate to produce a profit. It was created to provide health care services to the residents of south Broward County by constructing and operating health care facilities serving all types of health care needs within its boundaries. It provides services without regard to the ability of district residents to pay for health care. The service areas of South Broward's hospital (Memorial Hospital) and Humana Bennett overlap, and numerous physicians are on the staff of both facilities. If the Humana Bennett application is approved, the number of cardiac catheterizations performed at Memorial Hospital will be reduced. The catheterization laboratory at Memorial Hospital generates a substantial amount of income for South Broward Hospital District. The initiation of catheterization services at Humana Bennett would reduce revenues at Memorial Hospital without any offsetting reduction in costs at Memorial. The substantial interests of the South Broward Hospital District are affected by the application filed by Humana Bennett. Over the years, Memorial Hospital has been expanded from a 100-bed facility to a 737-bed full service hospital. It is the only hospital in south Broward County which provides cardiac surgery, cardiac catheterization, physical rehabilitation with a distinct comprehensive unit, psychiatric services, pediatric surgical services, pediatric intensive care, full service neonatology, new born intensive care and progressive care, high-risk obstetric maternity care, and residential substance abuse programs. Some of the services Memorial Hospital provides are operated at a loss. Uncompensated care amounted to 22.1% of South Broward Hospital District's gross revenue in fiscal year 1987. The District projects that $44.9 million will be spent in the current fiscal year for uncompensated care. Operating revenues and the District's power to levy property taxes pay for the services provided to indigents. Memorial Hospital is the primary provider of services to the indigent and medically needy in south Broward County. Florida Medical Center is a 459-bed acute care hospital. It provides a broad range of cardiology services, including cardiac catheterization. It currently operates three separate cardiac catheterization laboratories. The first laboratory opened in 1974, the second two were equipped in 1983. The second laboratory was fully staffed at that time but the third was only fully staffed in December 1987. FMC has the present ability to perform three cardiac catheterization procedures simultaneously in its laboratories and the staff to perform procedures in that manner. Its third laboratory was opened primarily to accommodate the desire of physicians to perform catheterizations in the morning and is also used for other purposes. Florida Medical Center is located within five to six miles of Humana Bennett and under normal driving conditions the drive between the facilities takes 15 to 20 minutes. Florida Medical Center and Humana Bennett compete for patients within the same geographic area. Approximately 73% of the cardiac catheterizations performed at Florida Medical Center during 1987 were performed by physicians who are also on the staff of Humana Bennett. If the new cardiac catheterization service for Humana Bennett is approved, Florida Medical Center will lose patients and will therefore perform fewer catheterization procedures. Florida Medical Center would lose revenue without any offsetting reduction in its costs. The interests of Florida Medical Center are substantially affected by the CON application filed by Humana Bennett. Plantation General Hospital is a 264-bed general acute care hospital located in Plantation, Florida, which is in central Broward County. It is owned by and operated for profit by HealthTrust, Inc. It offers a broad range of cardiology services including cardiac catheterization. Its cardiac catheterization laboratory opened in April 1985. Plantation General is located approximately three and a half miles from Humana Bennett. Plantation General and Humana Bennett compete for substantially identical service areas and have overlapping medical staffs. Of the 37 cardiologists on the staff of Planation, 24 are also the on staff of Humana Bennett. Ten of 14 physicians performing cardiac catheterization procedures at Planation are on the staff of Humana Bennett. Approval of a cardiac catheterization service at Humana Bennett would result in fewer catheterizations being performed at Plantation. Plantation would suffer a loss of revenue without any offsetting reduction in costs. The interests of Plantation General Hospital are substantially affected by the CON application filed by Humana Bennett. FACTUAL FINDINGS CONCERNING THE APPLICABLE CRITERIA AGAINST WHICH THE APPLICATION MUST BE EVALUATED The criteria to be used in evaluating the application are found in statutes, and in the rules of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services which implement those statutes. The application will first be analyzed for consistency with Section 381.705(1), Florida Statutes, and, to the extent the rules make those criteria more specific, those considerations will be discussed in a later portion of this order. Consistency with Statutory Criteria Consistency with the state health plan and the District X local plan. Section 381.705(1) (a), Florida Statutes. a. The district health plan The District X Health Plan for 1985 is the most recent complete plan, and was the plan in effect when the Humana Bennett application was filed. it contains three recommendations relevant to approval of cardiac catheterization services. These are: Applicants for certificate of need approval should document either their intention and/or experience in meeting or exceeding the standards promulgated for the provision of cardiac catheterization and/or cardiac surgery by the appropriate national accreditation organization(s). Applicants proposing to initiate or expand cardiac catheterization or cardiac surgery must make their services available to all segments of the population regardless of the ability to pay. The provision of new cardiac catheterization or cardiac surgery programs should not be approved unless they meet or exceed the standards and criteria set forth by HRS. Humana Bennett is currently accredited by the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals, and proposes to seek accreditation of its cardiac catheterization laboratory if approved. In 1985, Humana Bennett provided 1.2% of the total uncompensated care provided by Broward County hospitals. Humana Bennett's application, as revised in June 1987 in response to an omissions letter from the Department, proposed to provide 1% of patient days to Medicaid patients, 45% of patient days to Medicare patients, 43% of patient days to insurance patients, and 11% of patients days to private pay patients (Humana's exhibit 3, page 87).1/ Humana Bennett also has a Medicaid contract. Humana has the following emergency care policy for its hospitals Facilities will provide emergency care without regard to the patient's ability to pay. An indigent patient will be treated just as any other patient, and will receive whatever care is required to stabilize his/her condition. Non-emergency patients must make payment or arrangement for payment, before health services are delivered to them. (Humana exhibit 3, page 54.) For purposes of the Humana Bennett emergency care policy, indigent patients include "patients who are not eligible for Medicare or Medicaid, who do not have private or employer- provided health insurance, and who are unable to pay for their health care." Emergency patients are defined as patients "in a life or health threatening situation who require immediate treatment or hospitalization." After an attending physician determines that an indigent patient is stabilized, the patient is transferred to a hospital which receives government funds for indigent care; the Humana Bennett manager must approve this action before it is taken. All actions, including the attending physician's approval, are documented and maintained in the patient's business office folder. These policies indicate no substantial commitment to indigent care. Cardiac catheterization is not ordinarily an emergency procedure, but a diagnostic one. The existing emergency care policy, therefore, indicates that practically no catheterization will be done for indigents. This is inconsistent with the local health plan's requirement to make catheterization services available to all segments of the population. The application update submitted by Humana (exhibit 6, pro forma income statement) shows initial total patient revenues of $543,750, with a deduction of $27,188 for "indigent care/bad debt." This allowance is an indication of the amount the hospital expects to be unable to collect from patients it admitted with the expectation of payment. It is not the result of any community outreach to provide catheterization services to indigent residents of Broward County. The State Health Plan The 1985-87 State Health Plan discusses cardiac catheterization at pages 94 through 96. In the portion entitled "Criteria and Standards," the State Health Plan quotes from the Inter-Society Commission on Heart Disease Resources concerning the need for physical proximity and relationships between diagnostic catheterization facilities and open heart surgery programs. According to the Inter-Society Commission: ... there can be little justification for the development of these highly specialized facilities (cath labs) unless expertise in cardiology, cardiovascular radiology, and cardiovascular surgery are immediately available. Optimally therefore, catheterization laboratories should be located only in institutions with well organized and closely related programs of cardiovascular surgery. ... such an arrangement not only facilitates close inter-disciplinary cooperation and minimizes unnecessary, repetitive, inadequate, or unsafe diagnostic studies, but it also allows prompt intervention should life threatening complications develop during catheterization studies....it should be emphasized... that separation of the diagnostic laboratory from the surgical facility is less than optimal and may present serious problems. The National Health Planning Guidelines supports this emphasis through a recommendation that no new cardiac catheterization unit be opened in any facility not providing open heart surgery. (Humana exhibit 8) (emphasis supplied) Because there is no open heart surgery program at Humana Bennett, the proposal is inconsistent with the State Health Plan's clear preference for locating catheterization laboratories at facilities where open heart surgery is available. As discussed in section II B.3. of this order infra, the absence of a written referral agreement in the Humana Bennett application, identifying a facility with open heart surgery capability to which patients needing immediate open heart surgery will be transferred, is a serious deficiency in the application. 2. Availability, quality of care, efficiency, appropriateness, accessibility, extent of utilization and adequacy of existing services. Section 381.705(1)(b), Florida Statutes There is no contention that existing cardiac catheterization laboratories in District X failed to provide quality care, and there is no geographic problem with the availability of catheterization services. Nothing in the Humana Bennett application would expand the availability of these services to segments of the population that are not currently being served for economic reasons. The issue of the efficiency and extent of utilization of existing services raises the question whether there is additional capacity in existing catheterization laboratories which ought to be utilized in preference to incurring the capital expenditure involved in constructing and equipping a catheterization laboratory at Humana Bennett. This consideration is related to the need calculation made under the Department rule discussed in a later portion of this order. When the Humana Bennett application was filed there were 10 existing laboratories in District X: one at Broward General, two at FMC, two at Holy Cross Hospital, two at North Ridge Medical Center, one at Plantation General, one at North Broward Medical Center, and one at Memorial Hospital. Shortly before the final hearing, Holy Cross Hospital reported that the physician who operates the catheterization laboratories there under contract with the hospital, Dr. Zachariah, had added a third laboratory. That physician opened the third laboratory for his own convenience, not because the volume of his practice required it. Florida Medical Center also added an additional laboratory for the convenience of cardiologists who practice there, which it also uses for other procedures. Expansion by existing providers can take place without certificate of need approval when the capital expenditure needed for expansion is less than one million dollars. These existing providers were able to add laboratories without the necessity of HRS approval. An additional laboratory also has been added to District X by the approval of the lab for imperial Point Medical Center, which had applied in the same batching cycle as Humana Bennett. No party objected to the issuance of that certificate of need, and therefore it should be considered in determining the statutory issue of the extent of the utilization and adequacy of like and existing health care services, because its services will be available at the planning horizon year, 1989 Humana Bennett could have prevented the consideration of that capacity by objecting to the grant of the certificate of need to Imperial Point and requiring a comparative hearing on the competing applications of Humana Bennett and Imperial Point but it decided not to do so. Some of the existing providers have argued that existing unused capacity at their facilities should be taken into consideration in determining whether there is a need for the Humana Bennett laboratory. Rule 10- 5.011(1)(e)12., Florida Administrative Code, provides in part that: The need for cardiac catheterization capacity in a service area shall be determined by computing the projected number of cardiac catheterization procedures in the service area. The capacity issue is therefore controlled by the provisions of the rule and will be discussed under the rule calculation. That competitors maintain they can provide more catheterizations than the rule projects for each provider is not legally relevant under this subsection of the statute. 3. The availability and adequacy of other health care services which may serve as alternatives to the services to be provided by the applicant. Section 381.705(1) (d), Florida Statutes. There is no persuasive evidence that there are other diagnostic procedures which serve as an alternative to cardiac catheterization which should be utilized in preference to catheterization. 4. Availability of resources including health manpower. Section 381.705(1) (h), Florida Statutes Nurses and technicians who work on cardiac catheterization teams have specialized skills and these skilled employees are difficult to recruit and retain. The proof demonstrates, however1 that Humana Bennett can staff the positions necessary for its catheterization laboratory by national recruitment and by cross-training of in-house nursing and radiology personnel. A catheterization lab requires cardiac care R.N.s, radiology technicians, and a specialized procedure/cardiovascular technician. Critical care nurses at Humana Bennett have already expressed an interest in becoming cardiac catheterization R.N.s and critical care nurses can easily be trained as cardiac catheterization nurses. Similarly, cross-training of existing radiology employees can fill the radiology technician positions. Humana Bennett has already received three resumes from cardiovascular technicians. 5. Probable impact of the proposed project on the cost of providing health services proposed by the applicant upon consideration of factors including, but not limited to, the effects of competition on the supply of health services being proposed. Section 381.705(1) (1), Florida statutes Humana Bennett projects gross revenue charges during the first year of operation of the catheterization laboratory of $1,450 and a net revenue per procedure in the first year of $913. The net revenue figure is lower because it reduces gross revenue by contractual allowances due to HMO/PPO discounts, and the difference between the hospital's customary charge and the amount reimbursed by Medicare or Medicaid for catheterization procedures. The gross charge for the second year of operation is $1,500 with a net revenue per procedure of $945. These projected charges are about the same as those charged by existing providers; FMC charges currently about $1,400-$1,500 with a net revenue of about $1,200-$1,300 for inpatient catheterizations. During the first four months of calendar year 1987, South Broward Hospital District (Memorial Hospital) charged about $1,431 for catheterizations. Plantation General charged approximately $2,300. Thus, there will be no increase in the charge for such procedures due to additional competition. There was no evidence from any existing provider that entry of Humana Bennett into the catheterization market would cause it to lose revenue to the point where any existing provider would withdraw from the catheterization market and thereby contract the supply of catheterization services. Providers do not have the option of simply raising charges to compensate for diminished market share because Medicare, Medicaid, and HMO/PPO charges are fixed, and open market competition will drive private pay patients to lower cost providers. Obviously, the entry of an additional provider into the market will reduce the current market share which existing providers enjoy. The certificate of need statute is not meant to protect competitors' incomes. While existing providers will be affected, the increased competition would be a positive impact, with the exception of the impact on the public health care provider, South Broward Hospital District. If the Humana Bennett catheterization laboratory is approved, South Broward Hospital District would lose approximately 50% of the catheterization procedures it now provides to persons who live in Humana Bennett's service area, and also would lose 10% of the referrals for open heart surgery or therapeutic catheterizations (angioplasty) for patients it would have served, but for the laboratory at Humana Bennett. The South Broward Hospital District would lose about $324,000 of net revenue. In 1987, South Broward Hospital District provided $41,392,000 in uncompensated care. Approximately 11 million dollars was provided by tax revenues and 30 million dollars was provided from profitable operations. This $324,000 probable loss in net revenue would add to the public hospital district's burden, but this revenue loss is not grave enough to restrict the entry of another competitor into the catheterization market in and of itself. 6. The applicant's past and proposed provision of health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent. Section 381.705(1) (n), Florida Statutes Humana Bennett maintains a Medicaid contract and does admit and treat Medicaid patients who present themselves. In fiscal year 1987, 5.31% of Humana's gross revenues were provided for uncompensated care, which equates to 3.15 million dollars. There is, however, no proof that this figure is anything other than money which the hospital had expected admitted patients to pay, but which, for whatever reasons, went unpaid. Accordingly, the proof is not persuasive that any portion of that 3.15 million dollar amount was generated by a conscious commitment on the part of Humana Bennett to provide hospital services to indigents on a charity basis. While prudent accounting requires a for-profit hospital to have a reserve for bad debts, it is not entitled to have its application viewed more favorably by passing off its bad debt reserve as if it were charity care. This factor, therefore, does not enhance the Humana Bennett application; neither does it detract from it. Consistency with rule criteria Service accessibility to undeserved population groups. Rule 10-5.011(1) (e)8.c. Florida Administrative Code This rule criteria requires little additional analysis to that already expressed above in Section II. A.1 and 6 of this order under Section 381.705(1)(b) and (n), Florida Statutes. While the applicant does propose to serve all persons needing catheterizations, including Medicare and Medicaid patients, the Medicaid projected utilization is only 1%, which is essentially cosmetic. It shows no real commitment to serve the medically needy and shows no commitment to indigent patients, as distinct from that group of patients which may be served but who may not pay their bills, thereby producing "bad debt" on the hospital's books. The emergency policy of the hospital is such that indigents would be eligible to be served in the unlikely event catheterization was needed on an emergency basis. The application, therefore, is sufficient to meet the requirements of this portion of the rule. The means by which it does so, however; does not enhance the application when balancing all of the statutory and rule criteria to determine whether the application should be granted. 2. Availability of health personnel. Rule 10- 5.011(1) (e)9.b., Florida Administrative Code The proof demonstrates that Humana Bennett has documented the ability to staff its cardiac catheterization laboratory under the standards in this rule. 3. Coordination of services. Rule 10-5.O11(1)(e)9.e.(I) Florida Administrative Code The rule requires that proposed cardiac catheterization laboratories and facilities not performing open heart surgery must submit, at the time of certificate of need application, a written referral agreement with a facility providing open heart surgery services which is within 30 minutes' travel time by emergency vehicle under average travel conditions. (emphasis supplied) It is undisputed that no referral agreement was included when Humana Bennett filed its application. Humana argues that it sought referral agreements with hospitals in the service district which offered open heart surgery, including Broward General Hospital, North Ridge Medical Center, Holy Cross Hospital, and Memorial Hospital, but none of those hospitals agreed to accept transfers from Humana Bennett. The executive director of Humana Bennett personally contacted an official of Florida Medical Center to obtain a referral agreement. That official specifically declined to enter into a referral agreement in order to prevent Humana Bennett from competing with FMC for cardiac catheterization services. There is no evidence that the other hospitals declined to enter into a referral agreement simply to block Humana Bennett's application. It may be that those other hospitals had other valid reasons for declining to enter into referral agreements. Nothing to the contrary was proven. Eventually, Humana Bennett did receive a referral agreement from the executive director of North Ridge Medical Center. It is dated January 8, 1988, six months after the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services declared the Humana Bennett catheterization laboratory application complete. (Humana exhibit 30) Due to the absence of a referral agreement, the Humana Bennett application should have been rejected by the Department as incomplete when submitted. 4. Service costs. Rule 10-5.011(1)(e)10. Florida Administrative Code 43. The cost for cardiac catheterizations to be provided by Humana Bennett is projected to be about the same or less than the charges of current providers. The projected charges are reasonable. The application meets this portion of the rule. 5. Relationship with the state and local health plans. Rule 10-5.011(1) (e)11. Florida Administrative Code 44. This matter has already been discussed in Section II A.1. of this order with respect to statutory criteria 381.705(1) (a), Florida Statutes, and will not be repeated, except to say that the application is not consistent with the local and state health plans and therefore does not meet this rule criteria. 6. Need determination. Rule 10-5.011(1)(e)12. and 15. Florida Administrative Code The Department's rule provides that it will "not normally" approve applications for new cardiac catheterization services unless need is shown as calculated through an algorithm. See Rule 10-5.011(1)(e)6., Florida Administrative Code. The algorithm is found at Rule 10-5.011(1)(e)12., Florida Administrative Code. Several versions of how the formula should be applied were presented at the hearing. Witnesses for Humana Bennett and the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services found need for an additional catheterization laboratory in Broward County according to their analysis of how "need" is defined in the algorithm. Health planners for FMC and South Broward Hospital District applied the algorithm in a manner demonstrating that there is no need for an additional catheterization service. The interpretations differed in two respects. First, the health planners disagreed on the number of catheterization procedures that were performed during the 12- month period that is used under the rule to establish an historical use rate, i.e., the number of procedures performed per 100,000 population in the district in the past. They also disagreed as to the number of catheterization laboratories presently operating in Broward County. The algorithm projects the number of catheterization "procedures" that will be performed for the year in which the catheterization laboratory will begin service. The laboratory obviously will not open on the date the application is filed; but at some date in the future. That future time is the "planning horizon" for which a projected use rate in the service area is determined. An actual use rate is first determined. It is the number of catheterizations performed per 100,000 population during the 12-month period which begins 14 months prior to the date the health care facility must file its letter of intent to file an application for a new service. This actual use rate is multiplied by the projected population at the planning horizon and then divided by 100,000. The result is the projected number of procedures at the planning horizon. The projection is divided by 600 in order to establish the number of catheterization laboratories that can be approved in the District. The number of existing laboratories is subtracted from that number to determine how many, if any, additional laboratories should be approved. It is important to determine the number of "procedures" performed in the applicable 12-month period to determine the actual use rate. The higher that number, the higher will be the number of projected procedures, and therefore the more likely it will be that additional laboratories may be approved. Rule 10-5.011(1) (e)2. and 4., Florida Administrative Code, defines the terms "cardiac catheterization" and "procedure" as follows: 2. Cardiac Catheterization. Cardiac catheterization is defined as a medical procedure used as a diagnostic and therapeutic tool for heart and circulatory conditions.... * * * 4. Procedure. Procedure means an angiographic study, a physiologic study or a therapeutic activity within a cardiac catheterization laboratory which utilizes the equipment customarily used in cardiac catheterization. These definitions are unclear because they are circular--a catheterization is defined as a procedure, and a procedure means a study utilized in cardiac catheterization. The term "study" is not defined by rule. Florida Medical Center contended that when a patient visited a cardiac catheterization laboratory, more than one study might take place as tubes are inserted into a blood vessel in the patient's arm or leg to diagnose circulatory conditions. Even if a patient undergoes multiple studies during one visit to the laboratory only one catheterization "procedure" takes place. In contrast, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and Humana Bennett argued that if one patient underwent multiple studies during one visit, each should be counted as a different procedure. The substantive portions of Rule 10-5.011(1) (e) variously use the term catheterization or procedure. For example, in setting a minimum service volume for laboratories, Rule 10-5.011(1) (e)9.d. requires a minimum service volume defined in terms of cardiac catheterizations. On the other hand, in the need algorithm, the calculation is based upon the number of cardiac catheterization procedures. See Rule 10-5.011(1)(e)12., Florida Administrative Code. Rule 10-5.011(1) (e)15.a.(I), and c. further add to the difficulty in interpreting the rule by using the words "catheterization" and "procedure" interchangeably: There shall be no additional adult cardiac catheterization laboratories established in a service area unless: (i) The average number of catheterizations performed per year by existing and approved laboratories performing adult procedures in the service area is greater than 600;.... * * * Applications proposing to establish cardiac catheterization laboratories will not be approved if they would reduce the average volume of procedures performed by laboratories in the service area below 600 adult procedures. ...(Emphases added) The State Health Plan, Volume II, at page 95 contains a discussion which is informative on the issue of whether, in applying the need algorithm, one should count individual studies on a patient or patient visits, stating: Up until 1977 the literature showed a consensus on the need for minimum caseloads. Since 1977, expert opinion has become more divided on the issue, with many provider representatives advocating that the standards now reflected in federal and many state laws are no longer necessary and justifiable. However, a general opinion among the medical profession is that a certain minimum caseload is essential to assure quality results. ...The established federal and state minimum standards of 300 procedures annually for adult [patients] ... are believed to be adequate to maintain the expertise of the professional team engaged in this highly specialized service. (Humana exhibit 8) (Emphasis added) Thus, the term "cases," which focuses on number of patients, and "procedures" appear to be used synonymously. The National Health Planning Guidelines are referenced in the State Health Plan and were influential in the drafting of the catheterization rule. The Guidelines were published in the Federal Register on March 29, 1978, and Section 121.208(a) (1) of the Guidelines stated: There should be a minimum of 300 cardiac catheterizations,...within 3 years of initiation. in subsection (b), the Guidelines stated: Based on recommendations from the Inter-Society Commission on Heart Disease Resources, the Department [of Health, Education and Welfare] believes that a minimum level of 300 catheterizations per year is indicated to achieve economic use of resources. The report of the Inter-Society Commission on Heart Disease Resources, referenced in both the State Health Plan and the National Health Planning Guidelines, also assist in interpreting the use of the terms "catheterizations" and "procedures" in the Florida rule. That entity publishes a journal, Circulation, in which it is stated: To maintain adequate performance levels and to minimize risks, each team of physicians should perform, on the average, at least 600 adult examinations* a week, or 300 cases per annum. *An examination includes all cardiac diagnostic procedures (angiographic and physiologic studies) performed on a patient during one session in the laboratory. Report of the Inter-Society Commission for Heart Disease Resources. Circulation, Volume 53, No. 2, page 8-9 (1976) The Society's publications indicate an understanding that many patients have multiple procedures and specifically rejected a further breakdown of their caseload recommendation: in considering this matter, we have decided against further breakdown of caseload recommendations. The number of patients requiring only angiographic or physiologic evaluation is rapidly decreasing: in most cases both angiographic and selected hemodynamic studies are now performed. Therefore, in the hands of an appropriately trained and experienced team these "mixed" caseloads generally should be adequate to maintain an acceptable level of performance. Id. The Inter-Society Commission reports used the terms "procedure" and "case" interchangeably: Laboratories supporting an active coronary surgical program may generate a caseload close to 9 procedures a week or 450 cases per annum. Id. The representative of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services testified at the hearing, and stated her view that when referring to a minimum service volume of 300 catheterizations annually, Rule 10-5.011(1) (e)9.d. was speaking of the number of procedures, which could be 100 patients receiving 3 procedures, 150 patients receiving 2 procedures, or 300 patients receiving 1 procedure. Clearly more than one "procedure" can be performed during a visit to a laboratory, often through a single catheter inserted into a patient on a single occasion. Many of these "procedures" take just a few minutes. Each procedure or study may generate a separate billing to the patient, however. The more persuasive proof on how to properly county "procedures" under the rule was presented by FMC's expert health planner, Mr. Konrad, whose opinions are credited. Mr. Konrad had been employed with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and had developed the first State Health Plan. He testified that the existing rule on cardiac catheterization came from the Inter-Society Commission for Heart Disease Resources Report, which is referenced in the Federal Health Planning Law. While the Florida rule has been amended since its first promulgation, no amendment has altered the original concept regarding the definition of procedure. According to Mr. Konrad the procedure means "a case" and all studies performed during one visit to the catheterization lab constitute one procedure. The number of cardiac catheterization procedures that were performed in laboratories in HRS District X during 1986 was 7,611. The laboratories then operating were located at Broward General, FMC, Holy Cross Hospital, North Ridge, Plantation General, North Broward Medical Center, and Memorial Hospital. The counts for the numbers of procedures performed at these laboratories were reported by the facilities to the District X Local Health Council. FMC originally reported it performed 2,166 procedures in 1986. Subsequently, officials at FMC realized their figures were erroneous and notified the Local Health Council and the Department that the correct number of procedures was 1,840. The lower figure is correct. The difference in figures is accounted for by the confusion over whether a single cardiac catheterization was a "procedure" or whether a single patient catheterized for a number of studies should have been recorded as the number of "procedures" equal to the number of studies performed. This reduces the total number of procedures performed in District X during 1986 to no more than 7,611. Fewer procedures than that were likely performed, because the Local Health Council never defined the term "procedure" for the hospitals reporting to it. Consequently the numbers are probably inflated somewhat because some hospitals incorrectly counted each study as a procedure, rather than counting only the number of patient visits for catheterization as one "procedure". The July 1986 population of Broward County was 1,165,922. This figure is divided by 7,611 to produce an actual cardiac catheterization use rate per 100,000 for District X in 1986, of 652.78. The total projected population for District X during 1989, the year in which Humana Bennett intends to open its service, is 1,234,484. When the 1986 use rate is applied to this population, the estimated number of procedures for 1989 is 8,058. This figure is then divided by 600 according to Rule 10- 5.011(1)(e)15.a.(I), Florida Administrative Code, to produce the number of laboratories needed in the District at the planning horizon, which is 13. At the time the application was submitted, there were 10 existing cardiac catheterization laboratories in the district. North Broward Hospital District filed in the same batch as Humana its application for a catheterization laboratory at Imperial Point. As stated earlier, that application was approved giving a total of 11 existing or approved laboratories. There is, therefore, a need projected by the algorithm for an additional laboratory which Humana Bennett can fill. None of the cardiac catheterization laboratories in Broward County are providing fewer than 300 adult catheterizations per year. The limitation on additional laboratories found in Rule 10-5.011(1) (e)15.a.(II), Florida Administrative Code, therefore does not prohibit the approval of an additional laboratory. Findings with respect to Section 381.705(2), Florida Statutes The prehearing stipulation indicates that Humana Bennett and HRS maintain that Section 381.705(2), Florida Statutes, is not applicable to this proceeding, while the other parties maintain that it does apply. Nothing in the prehearing stipulation explains the basis on which any party argues that this statute does or does not apply. The application discloses the total cost for the project is approximately $1,300,000. Consequently, it would appear to be a "capital expenditure proposal" as that term is used in Section 381.705(2) , Florida Statutes. The definition of capital expenditure found in Section 381.702(1), Florida Statutes, refers to the dollar limit of 1 million dollars found in Section 381.706(1) (c), Florida Statutes. Section 381.705(2) does apply, and the following findings of fact are made. 1. Less costly, more efficient or appropriate alternatives to inpatient services. Section 381.705(2)(a), Florida statutes 65. No party has proven that outpatient catheterization services are a more appropriate alternative to the catheterization laboratory purposed by Humana Bennett. Moreover, all parties have stipulated that the design and construction costs, as well as equipment costs and other miscellaneous costs in Humana Bennett's proposal are reasonable. Prehearing stipulation, section D. 4 and 5. 2. Use of the existing inpatient facilities in an appropriate and efficient manner. Section 381.705(2) (b), Florida Statutes 66. Existing catheterization laboratories are performing more than the minimum service volume prescribed in Rule 10-5.011(1)(e)9. d., Florida Administrative Code, of 300 catheterizations annually. On the average, they were also performing more than the 600 catheterizations annually required by Rule 10-5.011(1)(e)15. A. (I), Florida Administrative Code. 3. Alternatives to new construction such as modernization or sharing arrangements. Section 381.705(2) (c),Florida Statutes Given the demonstration of need pursuant to the need algorithm, the establishment of a new service is one appropriate method of meeting that need. Existing catheterization laboratories do have the capacity, however, to serve many additional patients. More extensive utilization of these facilities avoids the additional capital construction and equipment costs of opening a new cardiac catheterization laboratory. The ten existing cardiac catheterization laboratories each have the ability to perform, on the average, at least 1,000 catheterizations per year. The new laboratory at Imperial Point will also have a similar capacity. The laboratories in Broward County, therefore, have an ability to provide approximately 11,000 catheterizations per year (this ignores the intermittent use of the third "convenience" laboratories at Holy Cross and at FMC). Assuming the need for 8,060 catheterization procedures at the 1989 planning horizon, there is still an excess capacity, using only existing or approved laboratories, to provide annually an additional 2,940 catheterizations. More intensive use of existing and approved facilities would certainly be a more efficient way of providing catheterization services than is spending approximately $1,300,000 to construct and equip the laboratory at Humana Bennett. 4. Problems in obtaining inpatient care in the absence of the proposed new service. Section 381.705(2)(d), Florida Statutes There is no evidence that patients will have difficulty in obtaining cardiac catheterization services in Broward County if the proposed laboratory at Humana Bennett is not approved.
Recommendation It is recommended that the application of Humana Hospital Bennett for a certificate of need to establish a cardiac catheterization laboratory be denied. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 30th day of September, 1988. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 (904) 488-9765 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of September, 1988.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Richard Powers, was at all times material hereto a licensed chiropractor in the State of Florida, having been issued license number CH0003372. Respondent has routinely advertised his chiropractic practice in the Palm Beach Post. On July 8, 1984, July 15, 1984, and September 2, 1984, Respondent ran an advertisement in the Palm Beach Post which offered a free examination and which stated that the "usual value of this exam is $80. This includes X-rays if needed." The advertisement did not include the disclaimer mandated by Section 455.24, Florida Statutes. That statute, effective June 12, 1984, required that: In any advertisement for a free, discounted fee, or reduced fee service, examination, or treatment by a health care provider ... (such as Respondent) ... the following statement shall appear in capital letters clearly distinguishable from the rest of the text: THE PATIENT AND ANY OTHER PERSON RESPONSIBLE FOR PAYMENT HAS A RIGHT TO REFUSE TO PAY, CANCEL PAYMENT, OR BE REIMBURSED FOR PAYMENT FOR ANY OTHER SERVICE, EXAMINATION, OR TREATMENT WHICH IS PERFORMED AS A RESULT OF AND WITHIN 72 HOURS OF RESPONDING TO THE ADVERTISEMENT FOR THE FREE, DISCOUNTED FEE, OR REDUCED FEE SERVICE, EXAMINATION, OR TREATMENT. By memorandum dated September 30, 1984, the Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Chiropractic (Board), advised all licensees of the aforesaid amendment to section 455.24. Respondent asserts he had no knowledge of the amendment until his receipt of the Board's memorandum in October, 1984, and that he complied, or attempted to comply, with the amendment at all times thereafter. The evidence supports Respondent's assertions. The advertisements of July 8, 1984, and July 15, 1984, were captioned in bold type "ADVANCED APPLIED CHIROPRACTIC," listed Respondent as a diplomate of the National Board of Chiropractic, and concluded in bold type "A STANDARD OF EXCELLENCE." The advertisement of September 2, 1984, touted Respondent's clinic as "Advanced Applied Chiropractic and Comprehensive Pain Center." The generally accepted definition within the medical community of diplomate is an individual who has completed an extensive post graduate program and successfully passed the board's examination. This establishes superior qualifications in the individual's field of practice. Although the National Board of Chiropractic issues diplomate certification to those individuals who pass its examination, its examination is a basic licensing examination which establishes minimal competency, not excellence. Respondent's use of the phrase "Advanced Applied Chiropractic" to describe his clinic implies that he possesses skills superior to the average chiropractor. Respondent has registered the phrase "Advanced Applied Chiropractic" as a fictitious name. Respondent was, on one prior occasion, disciplined by the Board for an advertising violation.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Wayne A. Bryan, is a chiropractic physician holding license number 0001861 issued by the Board of Chiropractic Examiners. At all times pertinent to the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint, the Respondent engaged in the practice of chiropractic at the Bryan Chiropractic Clinic, 155 Ridgeway Drive, Sebring, Florida. On April 24, 1981, Jeanne Speight went to the Respondent's office for treatment of low back pain, which she attributed to work in her garden. Upon her arrival at the Respondent's office, Mrs. Speight was advised by an unknown female office employee that she would have to be "X-rayed before she was seen by the Respondent. A total of ten x-rays were taken of Mrs. Speight by an unknown employee before she was seen by the Respondent. After a physical examination, the Respondent told Mrs. Speight to return the next day with her husband because she had a serious, life-threatening problem. On the following day, Mrs. Speight returned to the Respondent's office with her husband. The Respondent spoke with the Speights and advised them that Mrs. Speight required an intensive treatment program consisting of four treatments per week over a three-month period with complete x-ray work-up each month during the treatment. When Mr. Speight questioned the necessity of so many x-rays and suggested they obtain a second opinion, the Respondent became angry and predicted that Mrs. Speight would lose 99 percent of the use of her legs and be paralyzed if she did not take his treatment. After her visits with the Respondent, Mrs. Speight sought treatment from another chiropractic physician, Dr. O. A. Speigel. Dr. Speigel requested Mrs. Speight's x-rays from the Respondent; however, the Respondent did not provide the x-rays, but furnished Dr. Speigel with a full report of the Respondent's findings, which Dr. Speigel described as excellent. Mrs. Speight's records and x-rays were later examined by Dr. Richard Carr, a chiropractic physician. According to Drs. Speigel and Carr, Respondent's diagnosis concerning Mrs. Speight's condition was consistent with the x-rays and reports. Further, did Respondent's prognosis as stated to the Speights that Mrs. Speight would lose 99 percent of the use of her legs was inconsistent with his diagnosis. On January 6, 1981, J. C. Hickman sought chiropractic treatment from the Respondent for a muscle spasm in his leg. Upon Hickman's arrival at the Respondent's office, prior to being seen by him but after a medical history was taken, Hickman had a series of spinal x- rays taken by Barbara Bryan, the wife of the Respondent. Mrs. Bryan was not licensed as a radiologic technologist in the State of Florida until February 12, 1982. During Hickman's first visit, an unknown female employee of Respondent's demanded and obtained a sample of Hickman's hair without explaining the purpose for obtaining this sample. Hickman was examined by the Respondent, who advised him that he had serious problems and proposed a series of chiropractic treatments. The Respondent told Hickman that he did not use his hands directly on a patient in rendering treatment. According to Hickman, the Respondent had him lie on the examining table in a prone position, and while he was in this position he received a mechanized blow or thrust to his chest. This description by Hickman of his treatment is not rejected but given less weight than his testimony on other aspects of his treatment with which Hickman was more familiar than the nature of Respondent's manner and method of treatment. The Respondent advised Hickman to return the following day in order to receive the same treatment for his leg. At no time did the Respondent examine or touch Hickman's leg. On or about July 11, 1980, Don Payne sought chiropractic treatment from the Respondent. Prior to examination by the Respondent, his wife, Barbara Bryan, took a series of x-rays of Payne. As stated above, Mrs. Bryan was not licensed as a radiologic technologist in the State of Florida until February 12, 1982. Thereafter, without explaining the purpose of it, Mrs. Bryan demanded a sample of hair from Payne. The manner in which the sample of hair was demanded annoyed Payne, who, although he permitted her to take the sample, did not advise Mrs. Bryan that he wore a full hairpiece from which the sample was taken. The medical records of Mary Scofield were received into the record as Petitioner's Exhibit 4. The only other evidence presented concerning Ms. Scofield was the deposition of Dr. Richard Carr based upon his examination of her medical records. Dr. Carr could not conclude from the records that the Respondent's diagnosis and treatment of Ms. Scofield were improper. Based upon their medical records, Dr. Carr opined whether hair analysis was proper with regard to the Respondent's patients. Dr. Carr based his opinion of the appropriateness of using this technique upon whether heavy metal poisoning was indicated in these patients. Because the test is recognized but controversial with regard to testing for vitamin deficiency, Dr. Carr's opinion is appropriately qualified. Mrs. Speight did not testify to any hair analysis performed. Hickman and Payne stated, and it is found that Respondent performed hair analysis.
Recommendation Having found the Respondent, Wayne A. Bryan, guilty of the allegations contained in Count Three, Count Six, Count Seven, and Count Ten of the Administrative Complaint, it is recommended that the Board of Chiropractic Examiners revoke the license of Respondent. DONE and RECOMMENDED this day of December, 1983, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of December, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Diane F. Kiesling, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Nonroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Wayne A. Bryan 12837 Township Road, 168-RR3 Findlay, Ohio 45840 Frederick Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jane Raker, Executive Director Board of Chiropractic Examiners 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner is entitled to a passing score on the Physical Diagnosis portion of the May 2001 chiropractic licensure examination.
Findings Of Fact Pursuant to Chapter 456, Florida Statutes, Respondent is the agency of the State of Florida that develops, administers, scores, and reports scores for licensure examinations, such as the examination at issue in this proceeding. The Board of Chiropractic Medicine is created as a part of Respondent by Section 460.404(1), Florida Statutes. Pursuant to Section 456.013(4), Florida Statutes, this Recommended Order is to be forwarded to the Board of Chiropractic Medicine, which will enter a final order. Section 460.406(1), Florida Statutes, provides that anyone seeking licensure as a chiropractic physician must pass a licensure examination. The Florida Chiropractic Medicine Licensure Examination consists of two portions: (a) a practical examination and (b) a Florida Laws and Rules examination. The practical examination is further subdivided into three areas: (a) interpretation of chiropractic and pathology films (the X-ray portion), (b) physical diagnosis, and (c) technique. A candidate cannot be licensed as a chiropractic physician until he or she has passed all portions of the licensure examination, including the physical diagnosis portion. In May 2001, Petitioner sat only for the physical diagnosis portion, having passed all other portions in a prior examination. The physical diagnosis section is a practical examination that tests a candidate's competency to choose, name, demonstrate, and interpret diagnostic imaging and laboratory reports based on a hypothetical case history. The examination generally presents a case history, including the patient's complaint and vital signs, then asks a series of questions designed to lead to a diagnosis. The examination also asks some separate, stand-alone questions designed to elicit knowledge of specific techniques, such as how to obtain particular diagnostic imaging views. The physical diagnosis section of the May 2001 examination consisted of 26 tasks, for which varying numbers of points were awarded for correct answers. Two examiners evaluated the candidate's performance and independently awarded scores for each task. Petitioner's overall score was the average of the two examiners' scores. The examiners who scored Petitioner's performance on the physical diagnosis section met the criteria for selection as examiners. An examiner must have been licensed in Florida as a chiropractor for at least five years, must not have had a chiropractic or other health care license suspended, revoked, or otherwise acted against, and must not be currently under investigation by the Department or any other state or federal agency. Rule 64B2-11.007(1), Florida Administrative Code. The Department requires each examiner to attend a training session prior to administration of the examination. The training is designed to ensure that scoring standards are uniform and objective among the various examiners. The examiners who scored Petitioner's performance on the physical diagnosis section had successfully completed the training session. The first series of questions on the physical diagnosis section dealt with a female patient in her early thirties whose main complaint was constant, severe pain in her left calf. The patient's temperature was slightly elevated at 99.8ºF, and she had swelling in her left ankle. Ultimately, the candidate was expected to arrive at a diagnosis of thrombophlebitis, inflammation of a vein in the left calf. Tasks 1 and 2, for which Petitioner received full credit, required the candidate to obtain a case history from the patient and to discuss the physical examination the candidate would perform on the patient. Task 3 asked the candidate to identify what laboratory tests or diagnostic procedures, if any, should be used to assist in arriving at a diagnosis. Task 4 asked the candidate to state his reasoning for choosing these tests. The correct answer to Task 3 was that the candidate should order either an erythrocyte sedimentation rate (ESR) test or a C-reactive protein (CRP) test. The correct answer to Task 4 was that the ESR and CRP assess the inflammatory processes that the candidate should suspect in the patient's left calf. On Task 3, Petitioner responded that he would order a complete blood count (CBC) and a urinalysis. On Task 4, Petitioner responded that he chose these tests because the patient's increased temperature indicated that there might be an infection present, and that a CBC and urinalysis are useful tests for infection. Task 3 was worth a maximum of four points. Task 4 was worth a maximum of three points. Each examiner independently awarded Petitioner zero points for Task 3 and for Task 4. The results of the physical examination, particularly "Homan's sign," or pain in the calf with dorsiflexion of the foot, caused Petitioner to suspect thrombophlebitis. Petitioner knew of no laboratory test that returns a specific positive result for thrombophlebitis. He introduced textbook references to establish that the ESR and CRP tests are not specific to diagnosing thrombophlebitis. Petitioner did not believe that Tasks 3 and 4 gave him the option of ordering no laboratory tests at all, so he chose the most common tests that would at least confirm that no infection was present. Dr. Densmore, Respondent's expert, agreed with Petitioner that a positive Homan's sign is specific for diagnosing thrombophlebitis. However, he disagreed with Petitioner's choice of ordering a CBC and urinalysis. Dr. Densmore admitted that many doctors order these tests as a general standard for all patients, but stated that in this case they would do nothing to narrow the diagnosis. The CBC and urinalysis are useful for identifying infections; thrombophlebitis is an inflammatory disease, not an infectious disease. Dr. Densmore conceded that ESR and CRP are not specific to thrombophlebitis. However, Dr. Densmore believed that Petitioner should have chosen ESR or CRP because inflammation is present in 90 percent of thrombophlebitis cases and therefore those tests would assist the practitioner in arriving at a diagnosis. Petitioner should not be awarded credit for his answer to Tasks 3 and 4 because his answers were not the best answers to those questions. The correct answers set forth by the Department were supported by the textbook authorities and expert testimony introduced at the hearing. Task 5 dealt with the same patient discussed above, and asked the candidate to indicate which, if any, diagnostic imaging procedures should be performed. The correct answer, worth four points, was "none" or "A-P & lateral leg." "A-P" stands for anteroposterior, or from the front to the back. On the videotape of the examination, Petitioner appeared confused by the question. He said that he would x-ray the "lower leg." One of the examiners asked him to be more specific as to which views he would take. Petitioner stated that he would x-ray the ankle because of the swelling there. Petitioner then mentioned the swelling in the calf, and stated that he would x-ray the "femur." The femur is the thigh bone, extending from the pelvis to the knee. An x-ray of the femur obviously would reveal nothing about the condition of the patient's calf. The examiner, likely sensing Petitioner's confusion, advised Petitioner to read the question again. Petitioner read the question aloud, then reiterated that he would take x-rays of the patient's ankle and femur. Task 5 was worth a maximum of four points. Each examiner independently awarded Petitioner zero points for Task 5. Petitioner contended that he should have received partial credit for his initial response that he would x-ray the lower leg. However, Task 5 required the candidate to identify the specific views of the x-rays he would take. When the examiner asked him to name the specific views, Petitioner identified the femur. The context of the discussion makes it evident that Petitioner must have been thinking of the fibula or the tibia, i.e., the bones of the lower leg, when he repeatedly named the femur in connection with the patient's calf pain. However, the examiners had no choice but to grade Petitioner on the answer he actually gave. Petitioner should not be awarded any points for his answer to Task 5. Task 18 was a stand-alone question dealing with x- rays. The challenged portion of Task 18, worth two points, asked the candidate what he would do to obtain a quality lumbar spine x-ray of a severely obese patient if his office was equipped with a 300/125 x-ray machine. One of the examiners specified that this patient weighs around 500 pounds. The correct answer was that the candidate would use a higher capacity x-ray machine or refer the patient to a facility that has one. Petitioner's answer was that he would collimate close to the area of injury, decrease milliampere seconds (mAs), increase kilovolt peak (kVp) to increase penetration, and use a rare earth screen. Again, Petitioner appeared to be confused by the question. At the hearing, he testified that Task 18 did not ask what specific view he would take of the obese patient, whether of the arm, the chest, or the skull. Petitioner misread the question. Task 18 clearly states that the required view is of the patient's lumbar spine. Petitioner's misreading of the question led him to treat Task 18 as an x-ray physics question, hence his response, intended to demonstrate how he would maximize the clarity of an x-ray using the equipment at hand. Dr. Densmore stated that an x-ray of a patient this size taken on this equipment would simply be a white picture because of the amount of fatty tissue involved. With a patient of this size, the kVp would have to be increased so much that the practitioner would over-radiate the patient. The practitioner would have no choice but to send the patient out for an x-ray on a higher capacity machine. The examiners independently awarded Petitioner zero points for his response to this portion of Task 18. Their scoring was correct, supported by the textbook authorities and expert testimony introduced at the hearing. Petitioner alleged that the Candidate Information Booklet (CIB) provided him by the Department did not adequately prepare him for format changes that occurred since his first sitting for the examination. Petitioner compared the CIB for the May 2001 examination to that for the November 2001 examination. He found that the detailed sample questions in the November 2001 CIB more closely reflected the examination he took in May 2001, and contended that the May 2001 CIB was outdated at the time it was distributed. All candidates for the May 2001 examination received the same Candidate Information Booklet that Petitioner received. Respondent's psychometrician, Dr. Linda Dean, testified that the passing rate for the May 2001 examination was in the range of 70 percent, consistent with other administrations of the examination. Petitioner's allegation concerning the adequacy of the CIB is not supported by the evidence. Petitioner also alleged that he was placed at a disadvantage by the fact that the examiners appeared to know that he was not taking the examination for the first time. Both Dr. Dean, the psychometrician assigned to the chiropractic licensure examination, and Dr. Densmore, who has served as an examiner many times, testified that examiners are not told the names or the status of the candidates. Dr. Dean testified that nothing is done to segregate first-time candidates from those who are retaking the examination, though an examiner may suspect that a candidate who is sitting for only one section of the examination is retaking that section. Even if Petitioner's allegation were credited, it would not change the result. Petitioner's responses to Tasks 3, 4, 5, and 18 were incorrect. The examiners properly awarded him zero points for those tasks. Their knowledge that he was retaking the physical diagnosis section had no bearing on Petitioner's incorrect responses to the challenged tasks.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Chiropractic Medicine enter a final order denying Petitioner additional credit for his responses to Tasks 3, 4, 5, and 18 of the physical diagnosis portion of the chiropractic licensure examination administered in May 2001. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of February, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of February, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Ken Allan Niebrugge 4785 Barkley Circle No. 22 Fort Myers, Florida 33907 Cherry A. Shaw, Esquire Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703 Theodore M. Henderson, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent committed the allegations contained in the Corrected Amended Administrative Complaint, and if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner Department of Health has regulatory jurisdiction over licensed chiropractic physicians such as Respondent. In particular, Petitioner is authorized to file and prosecute an administrative complaint, as it has done in this instance, when a panel of the Board of Chiropractic Medicine has found probable cause to suspect that the chiropractic physician has committed one or more disciplinable offenses. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was a chiropractic physician licensed in the State of Florida, having been issued license number CH 2363. Background / Arrangement with Dr. Wagner In or around 1975, Respondent completed his training at the National University of Health Sciences and began to practice chiropractic medicine shortly thereafter. Some 15 years later, Respondent and an acquaintance—— Dr. Joseph Wagner, also a licensed chiropractor in the State of Florida——matriculated at a medical school in the Dominican Republic. Although both Respondent and Dr. Wagner ultimately earned Doctor of Medicine ("MD") degrees in the mid 1990s, Respondent was not licensed in Florida to practice as an MD until early 2006. Significantly, Dr. Wagner never obtained licensure as a medical doctor. In 2007, Respondent and Dr. Wagner entered into a joint venture designed, in the words of Respondent, to "expand" Dr. Wagner's chiropractic practice. At that time, and for the duration of their business agreement, Respondent's principal place of business was located in Palm Beach County, while Dr. Wagner practiced chiropractic medicine in Daytona Beach. Under the joint venture (which continued until August 2011, when both their offices were raided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation), Respondent traveled to Daytona Beach several times each month and interacted with Dr. Wagner concerning some, but not all, of Dr. Wagner's chiropractic clients (hereinafter "joint-venture clients" or "JVCs"). From what can be gleaned of the credible portions of Respondent's deposition and final hearing testimony, it appears that Respondent's activity with respect to JVCs included a review of client files, and, in some cases, a determination that one or more medications——including narcotics——should be prescribed. Indeed, Respondent's level of participation was so minimal that his face-to-face interaction with JVCs consisted, at most, of an initial introduction, and on no occasion did Respondent personally examine——or perform treatments upon——any JVC. At the conclusion of an office visit, Dr. Wagner——and Respondent, if the JVC was seen on a day when Respondent was present in the Daytona office——dictated medical notes that Dr. Wagner usually transcribed at a later time. Respondent has acknowledged, both at the final hearing and during his deposition, that he provided Dr. Wagner with blanket authority to create claim forms and medical notes in connection with each JVC. Incredibly, Respondent also granted Dr. Wagner complete authority to affix his (Respondent's) signature to claim forms and submit them——without Respondent looking at the forms beforehand——to insurance carriers for reimbursement. This was accomplished not by the use of a stamp, which medical professionals often provide to their subordinates to expedite business affairs, but by Dr. Wagner manually signing, in cursive, "John P. Christensen" inside the box of the claim form labeled "signature of the physician or supplier." Another unusual aspect of the business arrangement between Respondent and Dr. Wagner was the manner in which they dealt with reimbursement checks from insurance carriers. By agreement, reimbursement checks for claims that related to JVCs were received by mail at Dr. Wagner's place of business in Daytona Beach. Upon their receipt, Dr. Wagner deposited the checks into a SunTrust checking account for which Respondent had sole signatory authority. At the end of each month, Respondent would transfer the entire balance of the SunTrust account into his business account at PNC Bank. Shortly thereafter, Respondent would draft a check on the PNC account to Dr. Wagner in an amount equal to 50 percent of the monthly proceeds.2/ Against the foregoing backdrop, the undersigned will turn to the specific allegations enumerated in the Complaint, namely: that Dr. Wagner, in connection with JVCs, submitted claims to an insurance carrier for services that were never provided——i.e., he overbilled——and that Respondent approved, authorized, and/or knew or should have known of the misconduct (as charged in Counts One and Three); and that the Respondent and Dr. Wagner's billing practices with respect to the four JVCs constituted fraudulent, deceptive, or untrue representations related to the practice of a profession (Count Two). The undersigned will begin with a discussion of the facts relating to Count Two. Deceptive Billing Practices In or around August 2009, three individuals——S.J., J.J. (S.J's cousin), and L.J. (S.J's mother)——were involved in an automobile accident. Thereafter, in late 2009 and early 2010, S.J., J.J., and L.J. presented themselves on a number of occasions for chiropractic services at Dr. Wagner's office in Daytona Beach. Roughly one year earlier, patient C.H. was likewise involved in a car accident. C.H. was subsequently referred to Dr. Wagner for chiropractic treatment by her personal injury attorney, Joshua Wagner, who happens to be the son of Dr. Joseph Wagner. It appears from the record that C.H. was treated at Dr. Wagner's clinic on multiple dates. Pursuant to the parties' Joint Prehearing Stipulation, it is undisputed that S.J., J.J., L.J., and C.H. each had personal injury protection (PIP) insurance from Direct General Insurance Company ("DGIC"). PIP insurance coverage allows a medical or chiropractic provider to treat insured persons and then submit a reimbursement claim to the insurance company for the service(s) provided. Beginning with the claims associated with C.H., Respondent has consistently maintained that C.H. was not a joint-venture client, that he had no knowledge of C.H., and that any claim submitted by Dr. Wagner in connection with C.H. was without his knowledge or authorization. The undersigned credits this portion of Respondent's testimony; thus, any bills that relate to C.H. cannot sustain a finding of a deceptive or fraudulent practice. However, the cases of S.J., J.J., and L.J. are another matter. Based upon Respondent's deposition testimony, the undersigned is persuaded that Dr. Wagner, with Respondent's knowledge and authorization, submitted reimbursement claims to DGIC in connection with S.J., J.J., and L.J. that bear the following dates: January 30, 2010 (S.J.); January 30, 2010, and March 13 and 27, 2010 (L.J.); and April 10 and 24, 2010 (J.J.).3/ While the exact services billed to DGIC varied by JVC and date, the content of each of these claim forms represented unambiguously that the examinations and/or treatments——e.g., a trigger point injection for L.J. on March 27, 2010——were performed by Respondent and no other. This was unquestionably deceptive in light of Respondent's consistent testimony that he never physically conducted medical examinations or treatments in connection with any joint-venture client. Alleged Overbilling In contrast to Count Two, the charges that relate to overbilling (Counts One and Three) cannot be sustained merely by proof that claims for reimbursement——i.e., the claims identified in paragraph 16 above, which Respondent authorized——were submitted for services that Respondent did not perform. Rather, it is incumbent upon Petitioner to demonstrate that the services billed were not performed at all. In this regard, the deposition transcripts of L.J. and S.J., which consist entirely of hearsay, are the only evidence that the billed services were not performed by anyone. While the deposition testimony of L.J. and S.J. is credible, there is a complete absence of non-hearsay evidence as to what procedures or services were never provided to these specific patients during their office visits. All that was proven——based upon Respondent's admissions and supplemented by the hearsay testimony of the JVCs——is that Respondent did not perform the billed services, which, as explained in greater detail in the Conclusions of Law of this Recommended Order, is insufficient to satisfy Petitioner's burden. Ultimate Findings of Fact It is determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Respondent engaged in deceptive, untrue, or fraudulent representations in or related to the practice of his profession. It is further determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Petitioner failed to demonstrate that Respondent submitted to a third-party payor a claim for a service or treatment that was not actually provided to a patient. Finally, as a matter of ultimate fact, it is determined that that Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent, in connection with a personal injury protection claim, intentionally submitted a bill or claim for reimbursement for services that were not rendered.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Board of Medicine: Dismissing Counts One and Three of the Corrected Amended Administrative Complaint; Finding that Respondent violated section 456.072(1)(m), Florida Statutes, as charged in Count Two; Suspending Respondent's license to practice chiropractic medicine for a period of one year; Placing Respondent on probation for a period of two years, with conditions deemed appropriate by the Board; and Imposing a fine of $10,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of March, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S EDWARD T. BAUER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of March, 2012.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Ahmed Elkadi, who holds a license to practice medicine in Florida, No. 0031490, was one of two surgeons (among some half dozen physicians) on the staff of Weems Memorial Hospital in Apalachicola, Florida, in August of 1988. Whether the physicians on staff who were not surgeons had other specialties and, if so, what they were, the proof did not show. A duly licensed 29-bed general hospital, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7, Weems Memorial had, "on a . . . stat basis," (Fitzgerald Deposition at 13), despite its small size, "24-hour respiratory therapy capability, 24-hour laboratory coverage, [and] 24-hour radiology coverage," (Fitzgerald Deposition at 5), which did not, however, include computed tomographic scanning or magnetic resonance imaging technology, both available only at facilities some 60 or 70 miles away. Continuous cardiac monitoring was available in house. Id. at 16. Weems Memorial had a physician in house 24 hours a day and a registered nurse on duty 24 hours a day, along with "at least one LPN," (Fitzgerald Deposition at 6), and two nurse's aides. Id. On average, Weems Memorial only had five or six inpatients at any one time during 1988. Staff off premises but on call were required to report within 30 minutes of being summoned. Fitzgerald Deposition at 13. On August 22, 1988, Dr. Elkadi admitted A. L. as a patient, in preparation for gastric bypass surgery the following day. A 29-year-old woman, A. L. (who worked as a nurse at the hospital) stood 5 feet 1.5 inches tall and weighed 303 pounds, when admitted. A chest x-ray taken before she was admitted uncovered no abnormalities other than obesity. Because she "was in excess of twice her standard weight for height," (MacGregor Deposition, p.7) and had "blood cholesterol elevation and [elevated levels of] blood triglycerides," Id., p.8, and because of her age, A. L. was an appropriate candidate for gastric bypass surgery, Corwin Deposition. She signed a form consenting to the operation. Roux-en-Y Dr. Elkadi performed the surgery, a "gastric bypass with Roux-en-y gastrojejunostomy," Petitioner, Exhibit No. 2, p. 7, on August 23, 1988. A. L., who was anxious about the impending operation, received Valium as well as anesthesia before the procedure began. While A. L. lay on her back anesthetized, he cut open her abdomen and partitioned her stomach with staples, thus reducing the capacity of her stomach to receive food; and joined the small, newly segregated, upper portion of her stomach directly to the small intestine. In a contemporaneous operative note, Dr. Elkadi described the procedure: . . . . The TA 90 stapler was used twice to proximal gastric from the proximal apply a double staple line across the stomach to separate a small proximal pouch with a capacity of about 30 cc remaining stomach cavity. A loop of in side using inner for was jejunal completed. 14 the the jejunum was pulled up through an opening the transverse mesocolon and anastomosed to side to the proximal gastric pouch a running suture of 3-0 chromic for the layer and interrupted 3-0 silk sutures the outer layer. A naso-gastric tube passed into the distal limb of the loop before the anastomosis was The gastrojejunostomy measured about 12- mm in diameter. The proximal limb of jejunal loop was then disconnected just proximal to the gastrojejunostomy using GIA stapler, and the cut end was anastomosed to the distal limb about 60 cm distal to the also gastrojejunostomy. The GIA stapler was used for the entero-enterostomy supported by a running 3-0 silk suture for the serosal transverse loop layer. The edges of the opening of the mesocolon were sutured to the jejunal . The using a fascia, a of using interrupted 3-0 silk sutures. . . abdominal wall was closed in layers running suture of #1 Dexon for the running suture of #3-0 Dexon for the subcutaneous layer, and a running suture #3-0 Nylon for the skin. . . . Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. As reported and as is customary, Dr. Elkadi severed the small intestine just above the newly fashioned connection to the "small proximal gastric pouch." Because gastric juices continue to leave the distal stomach and travel through the disconnected intestinal segment, the procedure was not complete until this segment of the jejunum was rejoined to the small intestine lower down. In manipulating the jejunum to accomplish the reconnection, it was necessary to cut and tie off various blood vessels, including tributaries of the mesenteric vein. Dr. MacGregor, one of petitioner's expert witnesses, testified that "[t]he record indicates that [the surgery] was done appropriately." T.15. On deposition, petitioner's counsel asked and Dr. MacGregor answered: Q. It seems to be a normal surgery? A. Right. Q. Except for the amount of time? A. Correct MacGregor deposition 15. The operation took four hours. The other surgeon petitioner called as an expert testified that "probably four hours would be a reasonable time." Corwin Deposition at 12. Petitioner produced no witness who testified that respondent's work in the operating room failed to meet standards of any kind. Sequelae In the wake of operations of this kind, "mortality can be as high as 2.7 to 2.9 per cent at training centers who have documented teams of specialists and post op care specialists." T.15. Complications "tend to be in two major groups . . . pulmonary embolism and infections." Id. The "most important complication of gastric bypass surgery is perforation or leakage," (MacGregor Deposition at 16) which leads to infection. In many hospitals, nursing administration routinely assigns a formal nursing plan for postoperative patients, after consulting with the surgeon. MacGregor Deposition at 15. But practices vary (Corwin Deposition at 13) and the omission of a formal nursing plan altogether "in and of itself . . . is not unusual," (Fitzgerald Deposition at 12) at least in smaller hospitals. No formal, written nursing or contingency plan was drawn up for A. L. Dr. Elkadi did not originally direct care for A. L. "beyond what [staff] would normally do [for] any postoperative surgical patient." Fitzgerald Deposition at 11. A. L. left the operating room at ten before two on the afternoon of August 23, 1988. An hour and 40 minutes later, her pulse rate was 84 and her respiration was 28. Petitioner's Exhibit NO. 2. At ten o'clock that night, her pulse was 112 and her respiration was 36; and, at or about the same time, her temperature was approximately 97.2o F. A half hour later, with Dr. Elkadi present, A. L. was standing by her bedside and taking a few steps. The next morning she sat up, first on the side of her bed, then in a chair. At half past one on August 24, 1988, she walked to the nursing station, which she "tolerated well." But, after she returned to her bed, she complained of "surgical pain." At six o'clock that evening she walked a short distance in the hall, returned to her room, sat in a chair and, after she had gone back to bed, again complained of "surgical pain." A chest x-ray taken the day after the operation revealed "[s]mall areas of linear atelectasis . . . in the lung bases," Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, p. 43, which a radiologist attributed to A. L.'s not having taken a full breath. He found that a "full inspiration was not taken during filming," Id., and that the atelectasis was "probably for this reason." Id. On the evening of August 24, 1988, the nursing notes reported "slight drainage of dark green fluid" from the nasogastric tube. Earlier that day, bloody drainage ("scant") was reported for what may have been the first and only time. The last entry in the nurse's notes characterized the drainage as dark brown; "scant amt greenish drainage," Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, was reported as late as four o'clock on August 26, 1988. Also at four o'clock on the afternoon of August 26, 1988, the nurse's notes reported, "Bowel sounds [were] audible in all 4 quadrants." Petitioner's Exhibit NO. 2. At seven o'clock that evening, according to the same source, A. L. "had small tan colored lo[ose] stool." Id. A blood specimen drawn at nine o'clock on the morning of August 26, 1988, yielded a "WBC" test result of "19.9." Id. at an unnumbered page. The white blood cell count had "c[o]me down to 11,000 on the day of [A. L.'s] admission." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, p. 7. On the morning of August 25, 1988, another walk in the hall ended with A. L.'s sitting in a chair. The nurses' notes reported that she was "[t]olerating activity well." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. At eleven o'clock that night, "belching incessantly," she complained of back and stomach pain, and a nurse helped her take a walk. She was still up (sitting in a chair) at midnight, when a second walk resulted in "much relief in stomach." Pain and belching persisted, nevertheless, and Dr. Elkadi was called, arriving at ten before one o'clock in the early morning of August 26, 1988. After seeing A. L., respondent ordered an enema and a dose of Vistaril. At quarter past one, she was pushing on her stomach to relieve gas pains. The nurses' notes reported that she was "extremely anxious," and Dr. Elkadi prescribed five milligrams of Valium. She continued to belch, and Dr. Elkadi was notified of her distress and anxiety at three o'clock in the morning. After she received another five milligrams of Valium (presumably at Dr. Elkadi's behest), she fell asleep. At 5:20 that morning, she was given a third five milligram dose of Valium, and at seven o'clock three milligrams more. In each instance, it was administered intravenously by "slow push." Awake by seven, when she complained of abdominal pain, she was given two milligrams of Levodromoran, after walking to and from the nursing station. When the respiratory therapist saw her at nine o'clock, she was sitting in a chair, again complaining of abdominal pain. But an hour later, when she went to the shower, she said she had less gas pain. That afternoon, she rested in bed, sat in a chair, and walked in the hall. The day after the operation, A. L.'s temperature had risen to 100.5o F., and her pulse had reached 128. When her pulse declined on the following day, August 25, 1988, her temperature remained elevated. On August 26, however, her temperature dropped to normal and her pulse leveled off at the low to mid 90s. On August 23, 1988, the day of the surgery, and again on each of the two following days, Dr. Elkadi ordered extra intravenous fluids. On more than one occasion, the nurse's notes reported that intravenous solution was infusing with difficulty, or words to that effect. While a 1500-milliliter per day discrepancy between fluid intake and urine output is to be expected, the discrepancy averaged some 3500 milliliters per day in A. L.'s case, following her surgery. After surgery, she was given morphine in five-milligram doses, intravenously, as needed. The day after the operation, A. L. also received Levodromoran for pain. On August 25, 1988, although she again received both pain-killing medications, she required less morphine. On August 26, 1988, however, in response to complaints of pain, the amounts both of morphine and of Levodromoran she received increased over the previous day's totals. Dr. Elkadi also prescribed Valium and Vistaril; and A. L. received a total of 100 milligrams of the latter, on August 26, 1988, in multiple doses. In addition, Dr. Elkadi prescribed and A. L. received Nubain, an analgesic that, according to Dr. MacGregor, "is a narcotic antagonist." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 to MacGregor Deposition. It is therefore possible that Nubain offset the increased dosages of narcotics in whole or in part. The Last Day A. L. awoke at half past six on the morning of August 27, 1988, complained of pain, and received an injection of Nubain. Only 30 minutes later, she complained of "pain between shoulders," but she received no more pain medication, according to the nurse's notes, until five after two that afternoon, when she was given an injection of five milligrams of Valium. (Twelve hours earlier, she had received ten milligrams of Valium.) At seven o'clock on the morning of August 27, 1988, the nurse's notes again reported "good bowel sounds heard in all quad." Id. Early that afternoon, after an enema, according to the nurse's notes, "pt had good results of flatus & sm amt of lg stool." Id. At four o'clock, she "passed some flatus." Id. At quarter of eight that morning, and again at nine, A. L. used a spirometer. Dr. Solman saw her at eight o'clock. She complained of shortness of breath at nine. A chest x-ray taken August 27, 1988, showed "areas of atelectasis in each lung base, somewhat more pronounced on the right side." Id. at 44. At three o'clock that afternoon, she was hyperventilating. When Dr. Loutfi saw her at half past three, her lungs were clear, and the X-ray taken earlier in the day had evidently not yet been seen by a radiologist. At half past four, a nurse gave A. L. ten milligrams of Valium "for relaxation/rest," Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, and, fifteen minutes later, a "bag to breathe in," which A. L. used for about five minutes. The nurse initialled A. L.'s chart next to a physician's order that concluded: "Valium 10 mg. IV slowly." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. Asked on deposition who ordered the Valium, Dr. Corwin testified: And then it says. I can't read what it says. record to Loutfi in far as NAR? I don't know. DR. ELKADI: Dr. Ludwig [sic]. BY DR. ELKADI: Q. All right. In patients having - - MRS. SMALL: I would object for the the questioner testifying. Corwin Deposition at 42. Perhaps Dr. ordered the Valium. The order was not, any event, given by the respondent, as the evidence shows. At quarter past five, the nurse "encouraged [A. L.] to slow/deep breathe." Id. Ten minutes later she found A. L., whom she had last seen sitting on the side of her bed, sprawled across it. Cyanotic around the mouth, she was not breathing. After Drs. Loutfi and Elkadi tried in vain to resuscitate A. L., respondent pronounced her dead, at 6:30 p.m. on August 27, 1988. Cause of Death Unclear Each of the four physicians who testified at hearing or on deposition assigned a different reason for A. L.'s death. Dr. Elkadi reported the following in a discharge summary: The postoperative course during the first 4 occasional the blood of be Patient the The was patient was days was uneventful except for episodes of anxiety, usually related to incisional pain or discomfort caused by NG-tube, and which always responded to sedation or analgesis medication. The oxygenation was measured during several these anxiety episodes and was found to satisfactory with 02 saturation level of 95-97% using the finger tip oxymeter. was walking outside the room already on first postoperative day. By the fourth postoperative day the Foley catheter was removed and she had 2 bowel movements. incision was healing well, and the chest clear to auscultation. On 8/27/88, about 5:20 p.m., the suddenly arrested, and cardiopulmonary resuscitation was carried out. There heart to over an The of considerable airway resistance, and the was in asystole which failed to respond large doses of cardiac drugs. After hour of intensive resuscitative efforts, patient was pronounced dead at 6:30 p.m. course of events was strongly suggestive massive pulmonary embolism. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. After the autopsy revealed that the only blood clots in the lungs had formed post mortem, Dr. Elkadi refined his hypothesis, and posited a fat embolus or emboli in the lungs, which, he surmised, degraded into free fatty acids before the autopsy took place, perhaps before death occurred. He testified that free fatty acids produce serotonin, which causes bronchospasms, and he cited resistance the airway offered during the unsuccessful attempt to resuscitate A. L. Ventilation and oxygenation were virtually impossible, even though the endotracheal tube was already in place. Although Dr. Mahoney, the pathologist who performed the autopsy, found a fatty liver, he ruled out a pulmonary fat embolism because he saw no evidence of infection or trauma to the liver (which might have dislodged fat) and because examination of lung and brain tissue (a single section of each) revealed no fat globules. "No intravascular lipid vacuoles were identified in the lung." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. On the other hand, "[o]ccasional perivascular lipid vacuoles were seen . . . in the brain section . . . ," Id., indicating fat cells must have passed through the lungs at some point. The autopsy report made no mention of any mechanical blockage or of distension of any part of the gastrointestinal track. Nor was there evidence of alimentary leakage. All sutures held. "Inspection [during the autopsy] of the surgical sites where the surgeon had done anastomotic, reanastomosis of stomach and bowel . . . [showed] these sites were intact and grossly appeared viable." T. 9. Dr. Mahoney listed as a major finding in the autopsy report "[i]schemic enteritis with focal necrosis of the proximal jejunal segment at the entero-enterostomy junction of the Roux-en-y procedure; mesenteric vein thrombosis." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. But at hearing he testified, consistently with reported results of microscopic examination, that "major findings at the autopsy . . . [included] a segment of intestine, the jejunal segment, which had undergone a hemorrhagic necrosis." T. 8. Ischemic changes occur when blood supply is insufficient, while hemorrhagic changes are the result of insufficient ability to remove blood. Blood clots blocked veins serving the necrotic tissue. At hearing, Dr. Mahoney concluded "that the most probable cause [of A. L.'s death] was this dead bowel segment essentially causing sepsis." T. 13. Microorganisms penetrating the transmural necrosis caused localized infection outside the bowel or peritonitis, he testified, which led to infection in the blood stream. Septic toxins circulating in the blood caused cardiovascular failure, he theorized. These conclusions rest on autopsy findings of serositis and "approximately 1 liter of cloudy brown fluid with fibrin strands," (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2) in the abdominal cavity. But Dr. Mahoney did not find "certain types of cells" (T.94) usually found two and a half to three days after peritonitis sets in. In fact, the autopsy findings "are not unusual findings after abdominal surgery without any complication." T.130. Dr. Corwin, one of two surgeons testifying as experts for petitioner, testified that "the autopsy report . . . [contained] essentially no indication of peritonitis." Corwin Deposition at 46. In a report petitioner put in evidence, Dr. Corwin had earlier written that "there really is no evidence of peritonitis." Dr. Corwin wrote, on June 25, 1990, after examining A. L.'s records, "In my opinion the heavy dose of intravenous Valium within the hour before the patient's sudden cardiac arrest almost certainly caused apnea, respiratory shutdown and subsequent to this, the patient suffered a cardiac arrest from which she could not be resuscitated." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. Dr. Mahoney testified that the final administration of Valium "may have actually contributed to a respiratory arrest" (T.15) and so to A. L.'s death. A. L. received her last dose of valium 45 minutes before she was last seen alive and 55 minutes before she was found dead. Dr. Corwin conceded that he had ordered Valium for patients in circumstances comparable to A. L.'s over a period of some 17 years, but always, he said, in situations where the patient would be watched, until the effects of the drug wore off. When administered intravenously, Valium has its maximum effect within five minutes. As far as the evidence showed, A. L. did not have an adverse effect to any earlier dose of Valium. For moderate anxiety, the Physicians' Desk Reference (1987 ed.) recommends dosages of "2 mg to 5 mg, I. M. or I. V. Repeat in 3 to 4 hours, if necessary." For severe anxiety, the same reference recommends dosages of "5 mg to 10 mg, I. M. or I. V. Repeat in 3 to 4 hours, if necessary." "Valium is indicated for the management of . . . short-term relief of the symptoms of anxiety." Respondent's Exhibit No. 2. Contraindications are "known hypersensitivity" and glaucoma. Dr. MacGregor, the other surgeon whose opinion petitioner relied on, testified that the "fundamental cause [of A. L.'s death was hypovolemic shock . . . [shock brought on by l]ow blood volume." MacGregor Deposition at 30. When asked, Dr. MacGregor agreed that Valium "may have contributed," id. at 29, to A. L.'s death. But his principal contention was that the focal necrosis created an ileus or physiological obstruction, which caused distension of the stomach and upper gastrointestinal tract which in turn led to a loss of fluid into the lining of the stomach and bowel and ultimately to hypovolemic shock. Recordkeeping Petitioner presented evidence from the same two surgeons on the question whether respondent had adequate medical records while treating A. L. In a letter attached to Dr. Corwin's deposition as an exhibit, he wrote: Did the subject prepare and keep written medical records justifying the course of treatment of the patient, including history, examination and test results? The answer to this question is yes. Deposition of Corwin, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. Dr. MacGregor testified that respondent's operative note was "inadequate in terms of . . . [d]etails of sutures and the techniques that were used . . . the instruments used . . . not the number of sutures but the type of sutures and the number of layers." Deposition of MacGregor at 12. But on cross-examination, Dr. MacGregor conceded that "similar operative notes [are] found in many other surgeons' records." Deposition of MacGregor at 35. The hospital records contain a separate, presumably complete list of the surgical instruments Dr. Elkadi used. Although Dr. Elkadi ordered arterial blood gas evaluations, and blood tests specifically to determine oxygen saturation, results of these tests are not in the hospital records, insofar as the hearing officer could discover. Dr. MacGregor testified the results were not in the copy of the records he was furnished. He testified: I think a blood gas was obtained but it's not two helpful normal in the records; and oxygen saturation on occasions. . . . [T]hey would be quite because they might well indicate fairly levels in a patient who has a rapid respiratory rate . . . Deposition of MacGregor at 24. Dr. MacGregor testified that he "would have thought that [it] would have been standard hospital procedure for whoever obtained those, to have recorded them in the record." Deposition of MacGregor at 25.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That petitioner dismiss the administrative complaint against respondent. DONE and ENTERED this 25th day of January, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. Administrative Hearings 1550 the Administrative Hearings 1991. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399- (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of Division of this 28th day of January, APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1 through 7, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20, 21, 22 and 28 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 8 and 9, see paragraphs 11 through 28 of the findings of fact. With respect to petitioner's proposed findings fact No. 10, the record showed dosages, before the final dose, of five, five, five, three, ten and five milligrams. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 11, some tests were done; others were not. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 13, 19, 23, 24, and 26 pertain to subordinate matters. With respect to petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 17 and 25, the cause of death was not clear. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 27 and 29 were not proven. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact No. 31 is immaterial. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 2 and 3 in Part 1 and 3 in Part 2, have been accepted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 4 in Part 1 and No. 10 in Part 3, these matters are not material to the allegations of the administrative complaint. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 5 in Part 1 and Part 2, the cause of death is unclear. With respect to respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 2 and 8 in Part 3, see findings of fact Nos. 11 through 28. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 4 in Part 3, the autopsy report does not reflect this but he so testified at hearing. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 9 pertain to subordinate matters. COPIES FURNISHED: Wellington H. Meffert, II, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Ahmed Elkadi, M.D. 236 S. Tyndall Parkway Panama City, FL 32404 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Board of Medicine 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the corrected administrative complaint, and, if so, what action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Kenneth Douglas Glaeser (Respondent) was a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 0058606. Respondent's area of specialty is Emergency Medicine. On or about May 30, 1993, at approximately 9:45 p.m., Patient L. H., a 47 year old male, presented to the emergency room (ER) at Parkway Regional Medical Center (PRMC) in Miami, Florida complaining of chest pain. Patient L. H. and his wife were visiting his mother in Miami. At first, Patient L. H. believed he had heartburn, but it would not go away. His mother convinced him to go to the hospital. Patient L. H.'s wife and mother accompanied him to the hospital. His wife parked the vehicle while Patient L. H. and his mother entered the ER. Patient L. H.'s wife completed paperwork for the ER while the ER staff attended to her husband. Patient L. H.'s mother was with him. After completing the paperwork, approximately 10 minutes later, Patient L. H.'s wife joined Patient L. H. and his mother in the examining room. At the time, Respondent was the ER physician on duty at PRMC. Respondent was the only ER physician who attended to Patient L. H. Respondent has no independent recollection of Patient L. H. or what happened during Patient L. H.'s visit to the ER at PRMC. The first goal of an ER physician is to determine if the patient has a life-threatening condition, which, often times than not, involves excluding diagnoses. The second goal of an ER physician is to determine if the patient has a condition which can receive immediate treatment and to provide that immediate treatment whether the condition is life-threatening or not. Respondent obtained Patient L. H.'s history which included the type of pain, description of the pain, location of the pain, associated symptomatology, time frame of the pain (including onset), and past history. Respondent recorded, among other things, that Patient L. H. had chest pressure which radiated bilaterally to his shoulders and a numb left shoulder; that the pain lasted for approximately 10-15 minutes, subsided, and re-occurred 30 minutes later; that Patient L. H. had no shortness of breath, diaphoresis (sweating), nausea or vomiting, or palpitations; and that Patient L. H. had no cardiac history. Respondent's history of Patient L. H. was within that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar ER physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. Respondent performed a physical examination on Patient L. H. The physical examination included taking vital signs and examination of the cardiovascular system, lungs, and pulses of the extremities. Respondent's physical examination was within that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar ER physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. Respondent had laboratory work performed on Patient L. H. Respondent ordered SL (sublingual) nitroglycerine for Patient L. H. But, the nitroglycerine was not administered because Patient L. H. was not complaining of chest pains at the time. The ordering of the nitroglycerine and not administering it until chest pain developed was within that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar ER physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. Respondent ordered diagnostic tests to be performed on Patient L. H. The tests included an electrocardiogram (EKG), a chest x-ray, and cardiac enzymes. Neither Patient L. H.'s wife nor his mother were present during the tests. ER physicians are trained to read EKGs. Generally, a cardiologist is not immediately available to the ER for the reading of EKGs. An ER physician looks for an injury pattern in the EKG, which would evidence an acute cardiac event. Most times, a cardiologist will over-read the EKG a day or two after the EKG is performed on a patient. Respondent's reading of Patient L. H.'s EKG did not show an injury pattern which would evidence an acute cardiac event. Respondent determined that Patient L. H.'s EKG was within normal limits. Even though an abnormality was demonstrated in the EKG, the abnormality could have been a false/positive reading. Respondent's reading of the EKG was within that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar ER physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. A cardiologist over-read Patient L. H.'s EKG after he left PMRC. The cardiologist found a "definite abnormality." Respondent's reading of Patient L. H.'s chest x-ray indicated that it was within normal limits. Respondent's reading of the chest x-ray was within that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar ER physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. Respondent's interpretation of the cardiac enzymes tests (CPK and LDH) indicated that they were within normal limits. If a heart is damaged, often times the enzymes contained in the heart cells will be released, and the cardiac enzymes tests would detect the enzymes. Respondent's interpretation of the cardiac enzymes tests was within that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar ER physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. It is undisputed that based upon Patient L. H.'s history, the physical examination, the tests results, including diagnostic and laboratory results, a recommendation to Patient L. H. by Respondent for admission to PRMC was medically warranted. Admission would allow for monitoring and further evaluation. However, a patient has a right to refuse admission. Respondent discussed his findings with the doctor who was listed as Patient L. H.'s primary physician on the ER record. The primary physician was the private physician, a cardiologist, of Patient L. H.'s mother. The primary physician authorized Respondent to contact the physician on-call. Respondent discussed his findings and his concern with Patient L. H. Respondent recommended to Patient L. H. that he be admitted to PRMC. However, Patient L. H. did not wish to be admitted; he wanted to leave the hospital. Patient L. H. rejected Respondent's recommendation for admission to PRMC. 1/ Patient L. H.'s mother attempted to convince him to agree to admission and remain in the hospital, but he refused. It is undisputed that if a patient refuses admission, the physician should advise the patient of the risks involved and recommend admission. In Patient L. H.'s circumstances, it was medically warranted that Respondent advise Patient L. H. that, if he was not admitted, he could suffer a heart attack and die and recommended admission to Patient L. H. Taking the totality of the circumstances, an inference is drawn and a finding is made that Respondent advised Patient L. H. of the risks involved if he rejected admission and recommended to Patient L. H. that he be admitted. Respondent did not record in the ER record that he advised Patient L. H. of the risks involved in rejecting admission and recommended admission. ER physicians are not medically required to spell-out in the medical record what risks are discussed with a patient and that the patient left against medical advice. It is sufficient that the ER physician explains the risks to the patient. Respondent ordered a GI cocktail (Maalox, Donnatal, and viscous Lidocaine) for Patient L. H. 2/ The GI cocktail was not administered until approximately 12:15 a.m. on May 31, 1993. 3/ The ordering or not of the GI cocktail for or the time in which the GI cocktail was given to Patient L. H. has no effect on the standard of care that Respondent provided to Patient L. H. Respondent diagnosed Patient L. H.'s condition as atypical chest pain. This diagnosis essentially indicates that a number of different things may have been causing Patient L. H. to experience chest pain. Patient L. H. left PRMC on May 31, 1993, at approximately 12:20 a.m. against medial advice even though the ER record indicates that he was discharged. 4/ Before leaving PRMC, Patient L. H. was informed by Respondent to, among other things, follow-up with the primary physician and return to the ER if needed. Neither Patient L. H. nor his wife completed any discharge papers or received discharge instructions. It is not uncommon for a patient to be discharged from a hospital without completing discharge papers or receiving discharge instructions. However, hospitals attempt to prevent such occurrences. When a patient leaves PRMC against medical advice, the patient is requested to complete certain documentation. That documentation was not completed in the case of Patient L. H. However, the absence of the documentation is not considered to evidence that Respondent failed to advise Patient L. H. of the risks involved in rejecting admission and to recommend admission. On May 31, 1993, at approximately 8:45 a.m., Patient L. H. went into cardiac arrest at his mother's home. He was transported to the ER at PRMC by emergency vehicle, where he was pronounced dead. On June 1, 1993, Respondent entered an addendum to the ER notes of May 30 and 31, 1993. The addendum provided, among other things, that Patient L. H. was opposed to admission to PRMC and that, even when Respondent explained the risks to Patient L. H., he continued to oppose admission and wanted to leave. Furthermore, the addendum provided, among other things, that Respondent instructed Patient L. H. to return to the ER if the chest pain returns and to follow-up with the primary physician. An addendum to ER notes by an ER physician is not unusual and is an accepted practice. The Dade County Medical Examiner determined that Patient L. H.'s cause of death was occlusive coronary artery disease. Respondent's medical records justified the course of treatment of Patient L. H. Respondent practiced medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar ER physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. Respondent is a defendant in a pending civil suit brought by Patient L. H.'s surviving spouse.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine dismiss the corrected administrative complaint. DONE AND ENTERED in this 27th day of January 1997 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January 1997.
The Issue This is a license discipline case in which the Petitioner seeks to take disciplinary action against the Respondent on the basis of alleged violations of paragraphs (i), (m), (n), (r), and of Section 460.413(1), Florida Statutes, as set forth in a five-count Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is a licensed chiropractic physician, having been issued license number CH 0002560. He has been so licensed at all times material to this proceeding. On or about March 4, 1994, patient L. M. was involved in a motor vehicle accident. On November 7, 1994, patient L. M. presented to the Respondent with the following ten major complaints: frequent headaches, neck pain, black stool, upper- back pain, mid-back pain, lower-back pain, painful feet, bilateral thigh pain, bilateral knee pain, and bilateral calf pain. The Respondent presented his fee schedule to patient L. M. and the patient signed a copy of the fee schedule. The fee schedule stated, among other things, that missed appointments would be charged to the patient. The patient was a nursing assistant who had been treating herself at home with hot water and Tylenol. On November 7, 1994, the Respondent took a surgical and medical history, a history of the March 4, 1994, accident, a history of the onset of symptoms, and a history of the home care the patient had been attempting. The Respondent reviewed the nature of the patient's pain and how each area of her body was affected by her activities. The Respondent decided to perform physical, orthopedic, and neurological examinations of the patient. He also decided to obtain x-rays of her pelvis, of the lumbar, dorsal, and cervical areas of her spine, and of both of her knees. On November 8, 1994, the Respondent saw the patient again, at which time he began an examination of the patient by noting her height and weight, making a structural visual evaluation, checking her motor coordination, performing a cardiovascular examination, measuring her extremities, performing a sensory examination, and checking her reflexes. On November 8, 1994, the Respondent also took x-rays of the patient and read the x-rays that same day. The x-rays revealed subluxations. Based on the information he had obtained up to that point, the Respondent elected to commence treatment to the patient's lumbar spine. On November 8, 1994, he adjusted the patient's lumbar spine and also applied ultra sound and low voltage to the patient's lumbar spine. Where there are many complaints involving several areas of the patient's body, it is not unusual for a chiropractic physician to begin treatment prior to the completion of the full examination. It is not a deviation from the appropriate standard of care for a chiropractic physician to begin treatment prior to the completion of the full examination under such circumstances. Under the circumstances presented by the patient in this case, it was reasonable for the Respondent to commence treatment to her lower back on November 8, 1994, and to complete the examination the following day. On November 9, 1994, the Respondent did range of motion measurements and performed various orthopedic tests. He also performed a series of muscle tests. Based on the information he received on November 7, 8, and 9, 1994, the Respondent developed a treatment plan and treatment goals. His treatment plan called for adjustment to subluxated vertebrae and knees, ultrasound for tissue repair, low voltage muscle stipulation for spasm, traction to decrease intersegmental joint irritation, and acupressure for stimulation of the acupuncture points. He also proposed to brace the knees and the lumbar spine. The Respondent noted in his records that his treatment goals were to stabilize the patient's condition, increase range of motion, promote tissue repair, decrease spasm, and reduce subluxation. The Respondent also recorded a treatment frequency plan which provided for daily treatment for the first one or two weeks, followed by three weeks of treatment at a frequency of three times per week. The frequency plan was to be reevaluated at the end of one month. The Respondent's records provide a reasonable rationale for the services provided to the patient on November 7, 8, and 9, 1994. The course of treatment of the subject patient consisted of chiropractic adjustments and physiotherapeutic modalities such as low voltage, ultrasound, and traction. Chiropractic adjustment is performed to promote the reduction of subluxations, to increase the healing processes within the body, to increase the normal transmission of nerve impulses, and to reduce spasm. Ultrasound is administered to affect tissue where two dissimilar tissues come together. Low voltage stimulation is designed to relax tissue. All of the treatments administered by the Respondent were designed to meet the treatment goals he had previously established. Such treatments were consistent with a therapeutic outcome. The Respondent's course of treatment was appropriate for the various complaints and symptoms presented by the subject patient. The x-rays taken by the Respondent were appropriate under the circumstances presented by the subject patient. Justification for those x-rays is contained in the patient records. On December 16, 1994, the patient was involved in a second motor vehicle accident. The Respondent's records contain a history regarding the second accident. The Respondent obtained a copy of the accident report regarding the second accident. He also obtained x-ray reports from the hospital to which the patient was taken after the second accident. The Respondent noted in the patient records that he was going to continue with the same course of treatment following the second accident. That was a reasonable course of action under the circumstances of this case. Following the second motor vehicle accident, the Respondent concluded there was reason to suspect that the patient had a herniated disc. This conclusion was based on the chronicity of the patient and the acuteness of her problems. Accordingly, the Respondent ordered an MRI. The Respondent's patient records document a reasonable basis for the tests he ordered for the patient. The testing was reasonably calculated to assist in arriving at a diagnosis and treatment plan for the patient. The Respondent's patient records are legible in all material details. The few instances of illegible words do not materially affect an understanding of what is written in the records. The Respondent's patient records are sufficient to meet the record-keeping requirements of the rules that were in effect at the time the records were created. On or about November 7, 1994, the Respondent billed the patient's insurance company for a detailed one-hour consultation. On or about November 8, 1994, the Respondent billed the patient's insurance company for a half-hour consultation, a spinal adjustment, and two therapeutic modalities. On or about November 8, 1994, the Respondent also billed the patient's insurance company for skull, neck, thoracic, lumbar, left and right knee, and pelvic x-rays. On or about November 9, 1994, the Respondent billed the patient's insurance company for completion of the detailed physical, orthopedic, and neurological examination. Each time the patient visited the Respondent's office, the Respondent billed for an office visit. On numerous occasions, the Respondent billed the patient's insurance company for an office visit and for manipulations on the same day. On or about December 6, 1994, the Respondent billed the patient's insurance company for an office visit and for a re-examination. On or about January 3, 1995, the Respondent billed the patient's insurance company for an intermediate office visit and a consultation. On or about January 18, 1995, the Respondent billed the patient's insurance company for multiple vertebral segment manipulations. The Respondent has his own unique billing system in place. He does not use the current procedural terminology codes that are generally used by other chiropractic physicians in their billing.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued in this case dismissing all counts of the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of December, 1997.
