The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner’s husband’s selection of Option 1 for his pension plan benefits could be changed.
Findings Of Fact Mrs. Renaud, who is deaf, was married to Mr. Renaud for approximately 40 years. Mr. Renaud was employed by the State of Florida as a correctional officer at all times relevant hereto. He entered the State retirement program (in the pension plan) in November 1994. Mr. Renaud was in the “special risk” category of retirement class based on his position as a correctional officer. On October 24, 2013, Mr. Renaud signed and submitted a “Florida Retirement System Pension Plan Application for Service Retirement” form to the Department, indicating his intent to retire. The application was signed and notarized; it designated Mrs. Renaud as the sole beneficiary of his retirement benefits. On the same day, Mr. Renaud signed an “Option Selection” form, wherein he designated which of four payment options he wanted to utilize for payment of his retirement income. He selected Option 1, which states: A monthly benefit payable for my lifetime. Upon my death the monthly benefit will stop and my beneficiary will receive only a refund of any contributions I have paid which are in excess of the amount I have received in benefits. This option does not provide a continuing benefit to my beneficiary. The form also contains the following statement: “I understand that I must terminate all employment with FRS employers to receive a retirement benefit under Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. I also understand that I cannot add service, change options or change my type of retirement . . . once my retirement becomes final. My retirement becomes final when any benefit payment is cashed, deposited or when my Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) participation begins.” The option selection form was signed by Mr. Renaud and notarized by a certified notary public. Inasmuch as Mr. Renaud selected Option 1, it was necessary that he and his designated beneficiary (Mrs. Renaud) also fill out form SA-1, the “Spousal Acknowledgement” form. On the acknowledgement form, Mr. Renaud indicated that he was married. Mrs. Renaud then signed the “spousal acknowledgement” portion of the form. The acknowledgement statement included this statement: “I, Vivian Renaud, being the spouse of the above named member [Mr. Renaud], acknowledge that the member has selected either Option 1 or 2.” Option 2 provides for continued benefits during the retiring person’s lifetime. However, benefits to the person’s spouse will continue for only a 10-year period. If the retiring person dies within the first 10 years of retirement, the spouse would only receive benefits for the balance of the 10-year period starting at the retirement date. The benefits under Option 2 are, therefore, limited in nature. The state retirement system requires a person selecting Option 1 or Option 2 to have their spouse acknowledge that selection choice because those benefits have finite ending dates, whereas retirement benefits under the other options continue as long as either the retiree or his/her beneficiary is living. By letter dated October 30, 2013, the Department acknowledged receipt of Mr. Renaud’s retirement application. The letter referenced the date the application was received (October 24, 2013) and the option Mr. Renaud had selected (Option 1). The letter was mailed to Mr. Renaud’s address of record, the same address he listed in his retirement application. The letter was sent to Mr. Renaud some 30 days before the first retirement benefit check was deposited in his account. Mrs. Renaud does not remember seeing the letter, but inasmuch as it was addressed to Mr. Renaud, her recollection of its receipt is not relevant. After Mr. Renaud’s death, his family found numerous un-opened letters in his car; the acknowledgement letter from the Department could well have been in that group. Mr. Renaud retired on November 1, 2013. His first payment of retirement benefits was transferred to his bank by way of electronic fund transfer, commonly referred to as direct deposit, on November 27, 2013. The gross amount of his monthly retirement benefit was $1,987.85; the net amount was $1,937.75 after $30.09 had been deducted for taxes. At that time, Mr. Renaud had not signed form W4P, the form which showed how many dependents the retiree was claiming for tax purposes. After later filling out that form (in which he indicated he would prefer to file as “single” for tax purposes), his monthly net benefit was reduced to about $1,735. Mr. Renaud received a direct deposit of retirement benefits on December 31, 2013; on January 31, 2014; and again on February 28, 2014. Mr. Renaud passed away on March 26, 2014, only five months after commencing his retirement. In accordance with the provisions of Option 1, Mr. Renaud’s retirement benefits ceased at that time. His beneficiary was entitled to payment for the entire month that he expired, but was not to be provided any further retirement benefits. Thus, a final payment was deposited in Mr. Renaud’s account on March 31, 2014. Mrs. Renaud was provided notice of the cessation of retirement benefits due to Mr. Renaud’s death. She timely filed a protest, seeking to have the payment of benefits reinstated. The Department denied her request, resulting in the instant matter. It is clear from the evidence that Mr. Renaud selected Option 1, Mrs. Renaud acknowledged that Mr. Renaud had selected either Option 1 or Option 2, and that retirement benefits were directly deposited to Mr. Renaud’s bank account for several months. Mr. and Mrs. Renaud’s signatures were duly notarized and have a presumption of legitimacy. Mrs. Renaud disagrees as to whether Mr. Renaud’s selection of Option 1 was legitimate, legal, or proper under the circumstances as she views them. First, Mrs. Renaud contends that Mr. Renaud was not mentally well at the time he signed the option selection form. The basis for her contention is that Mr. Renaud had experienced some seizure-related behavior during the year prior to signing the form. He had driven his car north on US Highway 301 one day in July 2012, “heading to work,” but ended up in Georgia without remembering why or how he got there. He later apparently lost his driver’s license because of the seizures (although the testimony on that issue was not clear).1/ Mr. Renaud worked for approximately 15 more months after his inexplicable drive to Georgia. Mrs. Renaud also argued that Mr. Renaud’s signatures on the three different forms he signed on October 24, 2013, were not similar to each other, indicating in her mind that he was having some sort of medical or psychological difficulty at that time. Inasmuch as there could have been any number of reasons the signatures were different (whether he was in a hurry, what base existed under the paperwork, etc.), there is insufficient evidence to determine why the signatures did not match. Mrs. Renaud’s testimony regarding the signatures is not persuasive. Ed Renaud said Mr. Renaud had been forced to retire due to his medical condition, i.e., that he had lost his driver’s license due to having seizures and the Department of Corrections would not let him work if he could not drive. However, Ed Renaud also said Mr. Renaud was able to continue working even when he was “forced” to retire. Again, the testimony on these facts was not clear. Mrs. Renaud said she should have been provided an interpreter on the day she signed the acknowledgement form. She did not state whether she requested an interpreter or whether the agency employee who provided her the form was aware of her disability.2/ Again, no one from Mr. Renaud’s employer, the Department of Corrections, testified at final hearing as to what happened on the day the forms were signed. Mrs. Renaud stated that she could read and write English, so she knew what she was signing.3/ She did claim to be confused as to whether her husband had selected Option 1 or Option 2, but candidly admitted that Mr. Renaud never told her one way or the other which option he had chosen. He only told her that he would “continue to provide for her in the future.” She believed the amount which was to be deposited in their account each month under Option 2 would be approximately $1900. The first check was in that approximate amount (due to the fact that Mr. Renaud had not established the amount of taxes to be deducted from his check at that time). The next five checks were in a lesser amount, approximately $1700. There is no evidence that Mrs. Renaud questioned the amount of the later checks. However, once the first check had been deposited in Mr. Renaud’s bank account, he would not have been allowed to change his option anyway. Lastly, Mrs. Renaud said her husband’s medical and mental condition was not conducive to making the option selection in October 2013. However, there was no competent evidence to support her claim. There was no direct testimony as to Mr. Renaud’s condition on the day he signed, nor as to whether he was or was not capable of understanding what he was signing. The only statement about his condition that day was that he wanted to park the car far enough away from the building that his co-workers could not see that Mrs. Renaud had driven the car. Ed Renaud also pointed out the issue of Mr. Renaud’s three signatures that day looking different from each other, but his lay opinion is not evidence upon which a finding of fact can be made as to Mr. Renaud’s mental condition. On October 24, 2013, Mr. Renaud had not been adjudged mentally incapacitated and no guardian had been appointed. Ed Renaud said that Mr. Renaud still believed he could perform his work assignments at that time and did not want to retire. But, other than his wife, no one provided any evidence that Mr. Renaud did not understand what he was signing. Mrs. Renaud, however, could not say which option he had selected because he never told her. Her subsequent presumption that Mr. Renaud did not intend to choose Option 1 is not persuasive. It should be noted that selection of Option 1 by Mr. Renaud set his average pre-tax monthly benefit at around $1,900.00; had he chosen Option 2, the benefit would have been around $1,700. Thus, there was incentive to “roll the dice” and select Option 1, hoping that he would survive long enough to provide for his wife. In this case, sadly, that gamble did not pay off. The facts of this case are sad in that Mr. Renaud had every intention of providing for his wife financially as long as she lived. However, he either made a mistake when he selected his payment option or he attempted to tempt fate and hope for the best. In either case, once he made his selection and began receiving benefits, the die was cast. Based upon the facts as presented, there is no basis for overturning the Department’s denial of Mrs. Renaud’s requested amendment of the payment option.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Management Services denying Petitioner's request for entitlement to her husband’s retirement benefits following his untimely death. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of June, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of June, 2015.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement (“Respondent”), is entitled to a deduction of the retirement benefits to be paid to Aubrie-Elle Perez, and if Respondent is entitled to a deduction, whether the deduction should be in the amount of the gross disbursements of $19,833.21 or the net payments to Edward Perez (“Lt. Perez”) in the amount of $17,017.80.
Findings Of Fact The FRS is a public retirement system as defined by Florida law. There are approximately 400,000 active members within the FRS. Respondent is charged with managing, governing, and administering the FRS. In 1997, Lt. Perez began employment with the Miami-Dade County Fire Department. For over 16 years, Lt. Perez served as a fire fighter with the Miami-Dade County Fire Department, his last position being a Lieutenant. Lt. Perez was a vested member of the FRS. Upon his initial employment and enrollment with the FRS in 1997, Lt. Perez entered the Investment Plan and made a retirement benefits election designating that if he died before his retirement and chose not to designate a beneficiary, retirement benefits would be paid in accordance with section 121.091(8), Florida Statutes. Lt. Perez chose not to designate a beneficiary. Thus, according to this statute, retirement benefits would first be paid to Lt. Perez’s spouse, and if no spouse, then to his only child, the Petitioner. Tragically, on April 7, 2013, Lt. Perez collapsed at the fire station. Subsequently, Lt. Perez was diagnosed with a grade-four malignant brain tumor known as a glioblastoma multi-forming--a very aggressive and generally terminal form of brain cancer. There is no cure and the median survival rate for adults with this form of brain cancer is 9 to 14 months. Due to his terminal brain cancer and the treatments he had undergone and was undergoing, Lt. Perez was unable to continue his duties with the Miami-Dade County Fire Department. On February 19, 2014, a two-page FRS Investment Plan Application for Disability Retirement Form PR-13 (“application for disability retirement”), and an FRS Investment Option Selection Form PR-11o (“option selection form”), were submitted to Respondent for Lt. Perez. They were sent to Respondent by mail by Lt. Perez’s sister, Alecs Perez-Crespo. The effect of the application for disability retirement and the selection of Option 1 on the option selection form would be to transfer the monies from the Investment Plan into the Pension Plan, and convert Lt. Perez’s accumulated Investment Plan retirement benefits to monthly disability retirement benefits during his lifetime. Then, upon his death, the monthly benefit payments would stop, and the beneficiary would receive only a relatively small amount, if any--a refund of contributions Lt. Perez had paid into the Investment Plan retirement account, which are in excess of the amount he received in benefits, not including the transferred Investment Plan account balance.2/ The two-page application for disability retirement was not completed by the member, Lt. Perez, and was not signed by Lt. Perez in the presence of a notary public. The option selection form was not completed by the member, Lt. Perez, and was not signed by Lt. Perez in the presence of a notary public. Affirmative medical and factual evidence establishes, and rebuts any legal presumption to the contrary, that Lt. Perez was not mentally, physically, cognitively, or legally competent to execute the option selection form or the application for disability retirement in February 2014, or to understand their legal nature and effect. Nevertheless, Respondent processed the application for disability retirement and option selection form. As a result, Lt. Perez was deemed to have retired effective April 1, 2014, and he forfeited approximately $238,000, which was transferred from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan. Subsequently, two disability retirement benefit warrants were issued by the State of Florida, Department of Financial Services, to Lt. Perez, via the Pension Plan, in care of Alecs Perez-Crespo, POA. The dates of these warrants are April 30, 2014, and May 30, 2014. Both warrants were endorsed by Ms. Perez-Crespo, “POA For Edward Perez.” Respondent made these disability retirement gross benefit disbursements resulting in net payments to Lt. Perez on the following dates and in the following amounts: April 30, 2014: gross disbursement of $4,950.63, less deducted taxes of $413.20, for a net payment to Lt. Perez of $4,537.43; May 30, 2014: gross disbursement of $4,950.63, less taxes of $413.20 and less a medical insurance deduction of $386.00, for a net payment to Lt. Perez of $4,151.43.3/ A direct deposit authorization for electronic transfer of future retirement benefit warrants into a checking account solely in the name of Lt. Perez was signed by Alecs Perez Crespo, “POA for Edward Perez,” on May 9, 2014. Two additional disability retirement gross benefit disbursements resulting in net payments to Lt. Perez were sent to the checking account of Lt. Perez on the following dates and in the following amounts: June 30, 2014: gross disbursement of $4,950.63, less taxes of $413.20 and less a medical deduction of $386.00, for a net payment to Lt. Perez of $4,151.43; July 31, 2014: gross disbursement of $4,981.32, less taxes of $417.81 and less a medical insurance deduction of $386.00, for a net payment to Lt. Perez of $4,177.51, bringing the total sum of the gross disbursements for the four payments made to Lt. Perez $19,833.21, and the total sum of the net disbursements for the four payments made to Lt. Perez $17,017.80. The net sum of $17,017.80 issued by the Pension Plan as disability retirement benefits to Lt. Perez was deposited into Lt. Perez’s checking account. Accordingly, $19,833.21 (gross)/ $17,017.80 (net), was received by Lt. Perez. Lt. Perez died on July 16, 2014, from the cancer. At the time of Lt. Perez’s death, Petitioner was, and remains, his sole surviving child (natural or adopted). Lt. Perez was not married at the time of his death and, thus, left no surviving spouse. Because of the receipt of the four payments during his lifetime, which are applied first to the personal contributions made by Lt. Perez into the Investment Plan during his lifetime, the amount of Lt. Perez’s small contributions into the plan were exhausted by the time of his death. Therefore, if the option selection form is valid, Petitioner, as the sole beneficiary and child of Lt. Perez, would receive nothing. Respondent concedes that notwithstanding the facial appearance of the option selection form and application for disability retirement, the documents are void and invalid because they failed to comply with the statutory, rule, and manual requirements applicable to properly effectuate the Option 1 selection, in that they were not completed by the member, Lt. Perez, and not signed by Lt. Perez in the presence of a notary public. Respondent concedes that due to Lt. Perez lacking the mental, cognitive, physical, and legal capacity to understand the nature and legal effect of executing the option selection form and application for disability retirement, the purported execution by Lt. Perez of the option selection form and of the application for disability retirement are void and invalid. Respondent concedes that the option selection form is invalid and void ab initio, and Lt. Perez’s earlier selection in 1997, pursuant to section 121.091(8), should be reinstated under the FRS Investment Plan. Respondent concedes that with Lt. Perez having died in 2014 with no surviving spouse, and with Petitioner being his sole surviving child at the time of his death, that the full retirement benefits of $234,035.81, to which Lt. Perez was entitled under his Investment Plan designation of beneficiary should be paid directly to Petitioner. Respondent asserts, however, that the payment of the retirement benefits to which Petitioner is entitled should be reduced by the amount of the four payments made by Respondent to Lt. Perez, which gross disbursements total $19,833.21, or net disbursements total $17,017.80, making the retirement benefits to which Petitioner is entitled to be $214,202.60 or $217,018.01, not $234,035.81. Respondent’s position is correct because the gross benefits in the amount of $19,833.21 were received by Lt. Perez when the four payments, after applicable required deductions, were deposited into his personal checking account. At hearing, no persuasive and credible evidence was presented indicating whatever happened, if anything, to the net payments of $17,017.80 deposited into Lt. Perez’s checking account. No persuasive or credible evidence was presented indicating whether any of the monies were withdrawn from the checking account before or after Lt. Perez’s death. No persuasive or credible evidence was presented indicating that Ms. Perez-Crespo used, diverted, or withdrew any of the funds from the checking account. No bank statements were offered into evidence. Petitioner, who is the personal representative of the estate, did not testify. No accounting of the assets of Lt. Perez’s estate was presented. Even if any of the $17,017.80 was used or diverted by Ms. Perez-Crespo after being deposited into Lt. Perez’s checking account, Petitioner, as personal representative of the estate of Lt. Perez, might have a remedy in another forum to recover such funds from Ms. Perez-Crespo. In any event, such a potential claim, not borne by the evidence presented in the instant proceeding, is beyond the scope of this administrative proceeding. Based on the evidence adduced at hearing and the stipulations of the parties, it is clear that $19,833.21 was received by Lt. Perez when $17,017.80 (after the required deductions) was deposited into his personal checking account. To require Respondent to pay the entire amount of $234,035.81 would result in overpayment of $19,833.21. Respondent is, therefore, entitled to a deduction in the amount of the gross disbursement of $19,833.21.4/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a Final Order requiring that that the total sum of $214,202.60 be returned by Respondent to the FRS Investment Plan for the benefit of Lt. Perez, deceased, and that pursuant to section 121.091(8)(a), Florida Statutes, that Petitioner, Aubrie-Elle Perez, as the sole surviving child of and the sole beneficiary of Lt. Perez, immediately receive the amount of $214,202.60. The undersigned reserves jurisdiction to address issues regarding Petitioner’s entitlement to, and the amount of, attorneys’ fees, costs, and interest. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of January, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of January, 2017.
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner's deceased wife, Dorothy Bazzel, made a valid selection of retirement "option 1" instead of "option 2"; whether that apparent selection was a mistake and, consequently, whether the Petitioner should be allowed to receive retirement survivors benefits in accordance with "option 2", as provided for under section 121.091(6), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Joe Bazzel, is a resident of Blountstown, Florida, and is retired. His wife, now deceased, was Dorothy Bazzel. She was a longtime teacher in the Bay County school system, with more than 46 years continuous creditable service in the Florida Retirement System and as a teacher. She retired on July 1, 1988. The Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida charged with administering and enforcing the statutes, embodied in Chapter 121, and related rules, by which operation of the Florida Retirement System, including determinations of entitlement to and payment of benefits, is accomplished. Mrs. Bazzel underwent surgery for breast cancer on January 11, 1987. She had been diagnosed by Dr. Dixon McCloy, of Panama City, with breast cancer sometime in January of that year. Her progress after surgery was satisfactory, and she kept all appointments, had required x-rays, examinations and mammograms thereafter, by which her physicians monitored her progress. She had expressed to several persons of her acquaintance a desire to retire by the end of the 1987-1988 school year. In order to prepare for that event, she contacted her brother-in-law, Ray Bazzel, who testified in this case, and asked him to contact the Division of Retirement in Tallahassee, Florida, to obtain an estimate of her expected retirement benefits. He made that request to Ms. Loreen Vause, an employee of the Division, on July 16, 1987, by telephone. The Division of Retirement has an ongoing program which automatically generates an estimate of benefits for members who have certain amounts of creditable service and are of a certain age. When Mr. Bazzel made his request for an estimate of benefits for Mrs. Bazzel, the Division was already in the process of preparing a benefit estimate for her through its routine program. That estimate was forwarded to Mrs. Bazzel on July 22, 1987, and it stated as follows: This is a routine audit of your account. Noting the many years of service you have, we are furnishing you an estimate of your benefits as if you terminate your employment on June 30, 1988, and retire effective July 1, 1988. This is furnished for informational purposes only. By means of that estimate, Mrs. Bazzel was informed as to the benefit amounts which she would receive under all four retirement options. See Respondent's exhibit 8 in evidence. Ray Bazzel would visit Mrs. Bazzel on occasion during his visits to Panama City. She was described by him in his testimony to be a very private person not given to talking much about her illness or the operation. She did discuss the possibility of her retirement on one occasion with him, sometime during the summer of 1987. They discussed all four retirement options, and he explained the options in detail to her. He advised her that she would have to make a decision as to which option she would take, but he was never advised by Mrs. Bazzel nor anyone else as to which option she had actually selected until after her death. He did not know that she had made application for retirement on January 14, 1988. Harold Bazzel is a nephew of the Petitioner. He testified that he did not know that Mrs. Bazzel had made an application for retirement and did not know what option she selected until after her death. Richard Locker was the personnel officer with the school board where she was employed and knew Mrs. Bazzel personally and professionally. He was the principal for six years at Cove Elementary School where both his wife, Nan Locker, and Mrs. Bazzel taught. Mr. Locker had a policy of discussing retirement issues with Florida Retirement Service members on his staff and advising them of correct procedures to follow, as to the paperwork involved, and as to the full retirement options which they could select. He advised all members who were employed at his school to call the Division of Retirement in Tallahassee for more information. He never advised anyone of which option they should take because each case is an individual case, and he did not feel comfortable advising an employee or friend which option to take and then later have that person accuse him of advising the wrong option. Mr. Locker saw Mrs. Bazzel after her surgery and stated that after the surgery, she appeared to be in good health. He saw her in May of 1988 and stated that she was very optimistic and appeared capable of teaching the next year. She did not seem moody or depressed in any way to him. He believed that she exhibited an attitude that her treatment had been a success and that her health had been restored. He discussed with her the possibility of her retiring at the end of the 1987-88 school year, and he believed that she would retire at that time. In two telephone calls, he and Mrs. Bazzel discussed the four different retirement options. She appeared to know what he was talking about and to understand those options. He felt that she understood that option 1 would pay the highest benefit amount to her of the four options. He, however, did not really know what option she had chosen until after the Petitioner, her husband, informed him after Mrs. Bazzel's death. Based upon the testimony of Ray and Harold Bazzel and that of Richard Locker, concerning their contact and discussions with and advice to Mrs. Bazzel, it is found that Mrs. Bazzel was aware of the four options and the differences between them. She was aware that option 1 provided the highest benefit to the retiring member for the lifetime of that member and that it would cease at the death of the member with no further benefits being payable to any person. On January 14, 1988, the Petitioner, Joe Bazzel, drove his wife to the offices of the school board, where she completed the forms necessary for her retirement. She talked with Vicky Poole, the records clerk, who helped teachers and administrators complete necessary retirement forms as part of her job duties. Ms. Poole had worked at the school board offices for approximately seven years and had an established procedure for informing prospective retirees of all information needed to process retirement applications. As part of her instructions to them, she would ask each potential retiree to inform her of the option they wanted to select, who their beneficiary would be and where the checks were to be sent. She would inform them when they would start receiving checks, would discuss with them their sick leave balance "payoff", and what steps they needed to take to obtain social security benefits. This discussion with prospective retirees would take up to one-half hour if the retirement form had not been partially completed before the retiree came into the office, or about 15 minutes if the form had already been partially completed. If Mrs. Bazzel already understood the retirement options and had formed an opinion of what she wanted to do concerning retirement and the selection of an option, and if the form had already been partially completed, then the entire process on January 14, 1988 could have occurred in a few minutes. It was Ms. Poole's practice to sit next to the prospective retiree, obtain the necessary information, and type it on the retirement form at that time. She would then advise the member of the various options by referring to the back of the retirement form (Respondent's exhibit 12 in evidence) or to a pamphlet explaining the options issued by the Division of Retirement. Both of those documents contain a narrative description of the retirement options. Ms. Poole did not choose a retirement option or advise a prospective retiree of which option to choose. The retiree must choose his or her own option. Ms. Poole would never advise a person concerning which option to take and had been advised by the Division of Retirement never to give such advice on option selection. If Ms. Poole perceived that a prospective retiree was indecisive about option selection or did not appear to understand the options or the consequences of such election, she would advise that person to speak with someone else who was knowledgeable about the retirement system and about the retiree's financial situation, such as a friend or relative. If a prospective retiree was still indecisive or unsure of the meaning of options or which option to select, Ms. Poole would hold the form and not complete it without being sure in her own mind that the retiree understood the option and knew what it meant. In her standard procedure, she would go over each item on the form at least two and up to four times with a retiree. If they were very certain of the option they wanted to select, she would then finish the form and have the person sign it and give it to Ms. Bolinger to notarize. Ms. Poole realized that the choice of an option was an important decision and conducted her interview with the retiree accordingly. She testified in this regard as follows: If they said well I'm looking at 2 and 3, that's waivering. If they said I want option 1, I typed 1 in and I would say it several times as I typed it in. I mean I was very well aware that this selection was for the rest of their life and could affect someone else. I was very well aware of that. So, I would repeat it several times and when I was complete, when the form was complete, I'd give it back and go over it again, again reemphasizing the option. If they did waiver, I would briefly go over the options and there was time, I always mention, you know, there's time to do this, to choose your option, perhaps you want to talk to someone. I could not advise them. That's what I did. Ms. Poole remembered that Mrs. Bazzel came into the office but did not remember if the retirement forms had already been completed or partially completed prior to the visit. She testified that there was no doubt in her mind that Mrs. Bazzel chose option 1 and no doubt that she knew what option 1 meant. Ms. Bolinger began to work with the school board dealing with retirement applications in 1984. She is now the records clerk who handles retirement matters for teachers and school administrators. This is the same job that Ms. Poole performed in January of 1988. Ms. Bolinger notarized the retirement form of Mrs. Bazzel. Ms. Bolinger learned her job from Ms. Poole and testified that the retirement form was always completed in the office before a retirement clerk and was never sent to anyone. She stated that the clerk would ask the member if they understood each of the options, and the clerk would be sure that the member did understand them. It was the practice to ask such a retiring person if he or she was familiar with the options. If the retiree seemed the least bit confused, Ms. Bolinger testified that the clerk would discuss each option all over again with the prospective retiree, give him the form with the options listed on the back, and they would then discuss each one and make sure that the prospective retiree understood each option before continuing the process of executing the requisite forms. Thus, Ms. Poole and Ms. Bolinger or any school board clerk follows a routine practice of examining and discussing in detail each retirement option with a prospective retiree and makes sure that person understands the wording of the four options and what the four options mean before making a selection, answering any questions the prospective retiree might have and advising them to seek counsel from a qualified person if the prospective retiree remains unsure of which option to elect. After the forms are completed, the clerks, including Ms. Bolinger and Ms. Poole, when she was performing that function, examine the forms with the retiring member to make sure that all information is correct. "We wait until they check the whole thing and this is exactly what they want, and I watch them sign it." The signature is the last item which is placed on the retirement form. If the retiring member appears unsure about the options, Ms. Poole and Ms. Bolinger will ask them to go home and think about it and think it all through before they decide. Like Ms. Poole, Ms. Bolinger leaves the option selection up to the retiring member and does not attempt to advise persons about which option to select, merely giving them the information concerning the effect of selecting a particular option. In her capacity as a notary, Ms. Bolinger stated that if a person did not look like they knew what they were doing in executing the form, she would not notarize the form. If they did not appear to understand that they were applying for retirement, or which facet of it they were applying for, she would, likewise, not notarize the form. She would not notarize a signature after the fact of the signature being placed on the form. Ms. Bolinger was shown a copy of Petitioner's exhibit 7, in evidence, which is a copy of the retirement form that did not have her notary signature. She observed that her notary stamp was on that copy but that her name had merely been signed in the wrong place, possibly because she was new to those duties concerning retirement clerk matters. She testified, however, that her signature was correctly placed on the form, she believes, that same day. See pages 17 and 37 of Petitioner's exhibit 7, in evidence. On January 14, 1988, Mrs. Bazzel completed two forms: FR-11, "Application for Service Retirement", and FR-9, "Request for Audit", (see Respondent's exhibits 9 and 10, in evidence). Both of those forms contain Mrs. Bazzel's signature and are dated with the same date, January 14, 1988. The FR- 11 form had that date written on it in three places. The two forms were then filed with the Division of Retirement. They were acknowledged by the Division as being received on the next day, January 15, 1988, according to the form FST- 40C, "Acknowledgment of Retirement Application", which has January 15, 1988 as the received date. See Respondent's exhibit 11 and the testimony of Stanley Colvin, in evidence. The Petitioner testified that he believes the retirement application forms referenced above were suspect as to accuracy because, according to his testimony, he took his wife to the school board offices on a Friday to sign the forms after the end of the teaching day on either January 8th or January 15th, and states that generally he remembers that it was a Friday because that was the day they had the habit of leaving the Panama City area to visit relatives for the weekend. However, the forms are dated January 14, 1988 in several places. The forms in evidence and the testimony of Ms. Colvin establish that the application documents were received on January 15th in the offices of the Respondent agency. Thus, they could not have been signed on Friday, January 15th. If they had been signed on Friday, January 8th, the record leaves no explanation as to why all of the forms were dated January 14th. The Hearing Officer can only logically find that, indeed, the forms were signed by Mrs. Bazzel on January 14, 1988 and received in the offices of the Division in Tallahassee, Florida, on January 15, 1988. The date of January 20, 1988, appearing on the documents, was established to be the date they were received in the bureau within the department which actually performs benefit calculations, not the date it was first received by the department. The evidence establishes that Mrs. Bazzel selected option 1, the retirement option which provides no survivor's benefits. None of the exhibits in evidence can support a finding that she chose or intended to choose option 2, which provides survivor's benefits. The application for service retirement shows an election for option 1 and the acknowledgment of receipt of that retirement application, FST-40C, shows that option 1 was selected, as well as the letter that informed Mrs. Bazzel that she was being added to the retirement payroll in the category of option 1 benefits. On August 1, 1988, the day after the first retirement warrant would have been received by Mrs. Bazzel, Ray Bazzel called the offices of the Division of Retirement to state that Mrs. Bazzel had checked the wrong number of income tax exemptions and wanted to change them. In order to know how many exemptions she had, he would have had to see the stub from that first retirement warrant. The stub would have depicted the gross amount of the benefit, which was the same amount as that provided for option 1, and not the gross amount attributable to option 2. See FST-40C form, in evidence as Respondent's exhibit 8. Additionally, in a conversation with one of her closest friends, Nan Locker, Mrs. Bazzel led Ms. Locker and friends at school to believe that her surgery had alleviated her medical problem with cancer and that she was in good health. During a conversation they had approximately nine months before Mrs. Bazzel's death, Mrs. Bazzel, in talking about retirement with Ms. Locker, who was also contemplating retirement, made a comment as follows: "Well, I've got my retirement and Joe's got his." This comment was made sometime in the fall of 1989 before Mrs. Bazzel's death in July of 1990. Although the Petitioner introduced exhibits 1, 2 and 4 in an attempt to show that his wife meant to select option 2 and that some mistake was made by the school board or the Division in preparing and submitting the documentation setting up Mrs. Bazzel's retirement benefit situation; in reality, those exhibits merely show that Mrs. Bazzel possibly did some calculations as to the difference in monthly amounts between option 1 and option 2. The exhibits can only show that she may have been aware of the difference in monthly benefit amounts between the two options, but they do not show that she intended to select option 2. Indeed, the evidence and testimony, considered in its totality, shows that her selection of option 1 was a voluntary, knowing selection. The evidence also shows that Mrs. Bazzel was mentally and medically competent to make that selection, freely and voluntarily. Her visits with Dr. McCloy, her treating physician, in the first half of 1988, to monitor her health situation after the cancer surgery, were normal and showed nothing unusual as far as any recurrence of cancer was concerned. Her chest x-rays were negative for recurrent cancer. On June 3, 1988, she was diagnosed as having a small duodenal ulcer, but no indication of recurrent cancer was present. Dr. McCloy treated her for the ulcer with medication; and by August 10, 1988, her symptoms attributable thereto had largely been alleviated. Her visits to Dr. McCloy were routine for the remainder of 1988 and 1989, with normal results. It was not until March of 1990 that she was diagnosed with a spot on the left rib, which proved to be recurrent cancer, probably attributable to the original breast cancer. She deceased as a result of this condition on July 9, 1990. Dr. McCloy testified that he never advised Mrs. Bazzel that her cancer was terminal because he believed that it had been successfully treated after the surgery and for a long period of time thereafter he had no evidence of its recurrence. Therefore, he had not advised her that she was terminally ill during the period of time she was making the retirement decisions, applying for and receiving her first retirement check during essentially the first half of 1988. Dr. McCloy's testimony further establishes, without doubt, that Mrs. Bazzel was alert, possessed her full intelligence and faculties, and understood the significance of his medical instructions, and understood his advice as to her health status. Accordingly, it has been established that Mrs. Bazzel did not have a recurrence of cancer until it was diagnosed in March of 1990, long after she had made the relevant retirement decisions pertinent hereto, and that she knew and was fully aware of her medical condition during the process of applying for her retirement benefits. She, therefore, understood the steps she took for retirement application and benefit receipt purposes, and was not medically or mentally impaired to make those decisions. It was established that she began her teaching career as a member of the Teacher Retirement System, pursuant to Chapter 238, Florida Statutes. She subsequently transferred into the Florida Retirement System under Chapter 121, Florida Statutes, during an open enrollment period. While a member of the Teacher Retirement System, she paid $12,870.33 in total contributions, plus interest, which accumulated on those contributions in the amount of $8,561.97, for a total on deposit in her account of $21,432.30. During the period of her retirement before her death, Mrs. Bazzel received total benefits in the amount of $49,551.95. She, therefore, received $28,119.65 more in benefits than she had paid into the Teacher Retirement System in contributions, plus accumulated interest. It was proven that the distance to the residence or places of business of the deponents, whose depositions were admitted into evidence, comports with the standard of Rule 1.330, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. Since the locations of the deponents as potential witnesses accorded with the 100 mile standard, their depositions were admitted in lieu of live testimony.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued by the Division of Retirement determining that the Petitioner, Joe Bazzel, is not entitled to have the retirement option selected by Dorothy Bazzel changed from option 1 to option 2. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of September, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of September, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 91-5774 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-5. Rejected as not being in accord with the preponderant weight of the evidence. 6. Accepted but not itself materially dispositive. 7-11. Rejected as not being in accord with the preponderant weight of the evidence. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-25. Accepted. 26-30. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: A.J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Bldg. C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1560 Mr. Larry Strong Acting Secretary Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 307 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-0950 Joe Bazzel P.O. Box 46 Blountstown, FL 32424 Stanley M. Danek, Esq. Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street, Bldg. C Tallahassee, FL 32399-1560
The Issue Is Petitioner, Cheryl Walker, entitled to an Option Two retirement benefit from the account of the deceased member, Mary Fowler (Fowler), in the Florida Retirement System (FRS)?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: On January 8, 1975, Fowler began employment with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Hillsborough County, Florida (Clerk) as an Administrative Secretary. On January 8, 1975, Fowler enrolled in the retirement plan (Plan) that was being offered by the Clerk for her position. Fowler made regular payments to the Plan and remained current until the Clerk offered the Plan as a benefit package and paid the premiums on behalf of his employees. Fowler purchased her previous years employment with the Neighborhood Service Center for retirement purposes. On September 29, 1997, Fowler, due to a serious health condition took a medical leave of absence and went on no-pay status. While on no-pay status Fowler's salary was reported for creditable service in the FRS and the Clerk's office paid Fowler's life and health insurance premiums except for certain supplemental health and life insurance premiums. On October 31, 1997, Dr. Greenberg advised Fowler that she was suffering from terminal lung cancer and prescribed certain pain medication. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Fowler was eligible for retirement with the FRS. After Fowler was diagnosed as having terminal cancer, Petitioner moved in with Fowler and Petitioner became her caretaker. Petitioner's testimony that she held a durable-family power of attorney for Fowler and made all business decisions for Fowler after she was diagnosed with terminal cancer lacks credibility based on Petitioner's own testimony and the testimony of Grace Burmeister (Burmeister) and Victoria Spence (Spence), both of whom worked with Fowler before her illness and consulted with Fowler during her illness concerning her retirement. Likewise, there is insufficient evidence to show that Fowler advised the Clerk's office that Petitioner held a durable-family power of attorney for her and that Petitioner would be taking care of Fowler's business and business affairs. Fowler was never declared incompetent, and there is no evidence that she was incompetent to handle her own business affairs, notwithstanding that she was taking treatment for the cancer and taking pain medication. Sometime around November 3, 1997, Fowler notified the Clerk's office that she was terminally ill and would not be returning to work. At this time, Fowler was eligible for retirement under the FRS. On November 18, 1997, Petitioner talked to Burmeister concerning Fowler making a change of beneficiary for FRS and for life insurance benefits. Certain information concerning the rights of joint annuitants and beneficiaries was provided to Fowler by letter dated November 19, 1997. On November 19, 1997, Burmeister, Spence, and Neva Merckle, from the Clerk's office visited Fowler at her home and provided Fowler with certain forms to be completed for her retirement. Among those forms was a form to facilitate the change of beneficiary which Fowler completed and signed on November 19, 1997, naming Petitioner as beneficiary for her retirement benefits. Also among the forms provided to Fowler by Burmeister on November 19, 1997, was an Application for Service Retirement (Application). The Application was not completed by Fowler on November 19, 1997, as she apparently had not decided on the exact date for her retirement. In fact, Fowler, according to Spence, did not appear be interested in retiring on November 19, 1997, but agreed to consider retiring. Also at the meeting with Fowler at her residence on November 19, 1997, both Burmeister and Spence advised Fowler, among other things, that her date of retirement would occur on the first day of the month following her date of termination and that should her death occur before her date of retirement then there were serious consequences as far as the beneficiary was concerned. One of those consequences was that since Fowler did not have a joint annuitant, no one would receive the monthly benefit, except for monies Fowler had contributed to her retirement in the FRS. Both Burmeister and Spence advised Fowler to move forward immediately to set her date of termination so that her date of retirement would occur on December 1, 1997. Apparently, the comment expressed by Petitioner that the Clerk's office was attempting to push Fowler out the door had some impact on her decision not to fill out the retirement application until later. By letter dated December 2, 1997, Fowler gave the Clerk formal notice of her intent to resign December 31, 1997, for the primary purpose of retirement effective January 1, 1998. Although Burmeister could not remember going to Fowler's home but on one occasion, which was November 19, 1997, Spence was very clear in her testimony that she and Burmeister went to Fowler's home on two occasions to discuss Fowler's retirement. Although Spence could not remember the exact dates of their visits, apparently, the date of the second visit was on December 3, 1997, when Fowler completed and signed the Application in the presence of Burmeister, who notarized the Application, notwithstanding Petitioner's testimony to the contrary, which lacks credibility in that regard. Fowler selected Option 2, whereby she would receive a slightly reduced benefit payable monthly for her lifetime. However, should Fowler die before receiving 120 monthly payments, her designated beneficiary, Cheryl Walker, would receive the monthly benefit until the total number of monthly benefits paid to Fowler and to Cheryl Walker equaled 120. Fowler, either through documents furnished to her by the Division concerning retirement or information furnished by Burmeister during her visits on November 19, 1997, and December 3, 1997, had available to her sufficient information concerning retirement in order to make an intelligent decision concerning, among other things, her date of termination, date of retirement, and her Options. The FRS received Fowler's Application on December 9, 1997. However, an attempt to change the date of termination to November 30, 1997, and thereby change the date of retirement to December 1, 1997, was rejected by the FRS in that the FRS did not recognize retroactive terminations. Even though the Clerk's office was paying certain life and health insurance premiums, there is no evidence that this influenced Fowler's decision on retirement. Fowler died on December 14, 1997, and was an active member of the FRS at that time. Therefore, her termination date was established as the date of her death. Fowler also changed her life insurance and deferred compensation documents to name Cheryl Walker as the primary beneficiary. There is no provision in the FRS, nor is the FRS funded to provide a "death benefit" for the beneficiary of an active member who dies before the active member's effective retirement date, unless the beneficiary is a spouse or dependent beneficiary of the deceased member. By letter dated January 29, 1998, the Division notified Petitioner that since Fowler died before her retirement date, the only benefit available to her was a refund of retirement contributions paid by Fowler in the amount of $3,811.98. The Division also advised Petitioner that in order to receive the refund she would need to complete an application for beneficiary refund. Petitioner completed and filed the beneficiary refund application with the Division in February 1998. A warrant in the amount of $3,811.98 was mailed to Petitioner, which she cashed on April 8, 1998. Subsequently, Petitioner unsuccessfully challenged the Division's position and this proceeding ensued.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Division of Retirement enter a final order finding Petitioner, Cheryl Walker not eligible for an Option 2 benefit from the account of Mary Fowler. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of October, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of October, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: J. David Pobjecky, Esquire Post Office Drawer 7323 Winter Haven, Florida 33883-7323 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Erin Sjostrom, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Monesia Taylor Brown, Acting General Counsel Division of Retirement Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
The Issue The issue for determination in this proceeding is whether Petitioner is entitled to receive benefits under the retirement plan of his deceased mother, Violet Portee, pursuant to the Florida Retirement System, Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. 1/
Findings Of Fact Violet Portee was employed by Jackson Memorial Hospital ("Jackson") in Dade County, Florida, as a ward clerk from 1970 through October 3, 1990. Mrs. Portee retired from her employment at Jackson effective December 1, 1990. 4/ Mrs. Portee was a member of the Florida Retirement System. Petitioner is the son of Mrs. Portee and Mrs. Portee's closest surviving relative. Mrs. Portee was diagnosed with terminal, gastric cancer sometime in August, 1990. Petitioner first learned of his mother's condition from the attending physician when Petitioner visited his mother in the hospital. Mrs. Portee was admitted to the hospital for approximately one week on three separate occasions between August, 1990, and December, 1990. She began taking medications for pain in November, 1990. Her pain medication included Percodan, Tylenol 3 with codeine, Demerol, and morphine. Mrs. Portee went on sick and annual leave, and eventually went on leave without pay. Mrs. Portee executed a power of attorney in favor of her son on October 25, 1990. On November 14, 1990, Mrs. Portee met for approximately an hour and a half with Luis Gonzalez, a compensation specialist in the Jackson Human Resources Division. One of Mr. Gonzalez's primary functions is counseling employees on retirement matters. Mrs. Portee completed a request for estimate of her retirement benefits ("FRS Form FR-9") and her application for retirement ("FRS Form FR-11"). A retiree may select one of four options for retirement benefits on the FRS Form FR-11. Mrs. Portee selected Option 1 on her Application For Service Retirement, Form FR-11. Option 1, Member Benefit Only, provides maximum monthly benefits for the retiree during his or her lifetime but provides no benefit for survivors of the retiree. Option 2, Ten Years Certain, provides benefits to the retiree during the retiree's lifetime and, in the event of the retiree's death within 10 years of the date of retirement, the same monthly amount is paid to the retiree's beneficiary for the balance of the 10 year period. The monthly benefit to the retiree under Option 2 is paid at an actuarial rate that is less than that paid under Option 1. Options 3 and 4 provide benefits to joint annuitants. 5/ Sometime before November 28 or 29, 1990, Petitioner and Mr. Gonzalez discussed the retirement status of Mrs. Portee. Petitioner asked Mr. Gonzalez for instructions on how to change the option selected by Mrs. Portee on her Application For Service Retirement, Form FR-11, from Option 1 to Option 2. Mr. Gonzalez explained that Mrs. Portee's selection of options could be changed in one of two ways. First, Mrs. Portee could come into Mr. Gonzalez's office, execute a new Form FR-11, and select Option 2. Second, Mrs. Portee could return the first retirement benefit warrant uncashed to the Division of Retirement and write on the warrant that she wished to change the benefits option from Option 1 to Option 2. Mrs. Portee was too ill to return to Mr. Gonzalez's office to execute a new retirement option. Petitioner decided to wait and return the first benefit warrant uncashed and request a change in the options selected. The first benefit warrant was dated December 31, 1990, Warrant No. 0580615. Mrs. Portee died on December 6, 1990, before receiving the first benefit warrant. The first benefit warrant was neither cashed nor returned to the Division of Retirement with written instructions to change the selection of benefit from Option 1 to Option 2. During his conversations with Mr. Gonzalez, Petitioner disclosed neither the seriousness of Mrs. Portee's medical condition nor that Petitioner had power of attorney for Mrs. Portee. If Mr. Gonzalez had known either fact, he would have proceeded more expeditiously to change Mrs. Portee's selection of Option 1 to Option 2. Petitioner and Mr. Gonzalez next spoke on December 8, 1990. Petitioner had telephoned Mr. Gonzalez on December 6, 1990, but Mr. Gonzalez was not in. When Mr. Gonzalez returned Petitioner's telephone call on December 8, 1990, Petitioner informed Mr. Gonzalez that Mrs. Portee had died two days earlier. A meeting between the two men was set for December 18, 1990. At the meeting on December 18, 1990, Petitioner inquired about changing his mother's retirement benefits from Option 1 to Option 2. Mr. Gonzalez telephoned the Division of Retirement in Tallahassee, Florida, and was advised that Mrs. Portee's retirement benefits option selection could not be changed after her death. A final meeting was conducted on December 24, 1990, between Petitioner, Mr. Gonzalez, and Mr. Brian Derer, a benefits specialist with Jackson. Petitioner had come into the office to complete certain documents concerning Mrs. Portee's life insurance. During this meeting, Petitioner informed Mr. Gonzalez and Mr. Derer for the first time that Petitioner had power of attorney from Mrs. Portee. Mr. Gonzalez informed Petitioner that there was nothing he could do to change Mrs. Portee's option selection after her death. Mr. Gonzalez explained that he was an employee of Jackson and that neither he nor Jackson was an agency of the Division of Retirement or the Florida Retirement System. Petitioner contacted the Division of Retirement on January 14, 1991, for assistance. Petitioner was advised by Stanley Colvin to write to the Division of Retirement. In response to Petitioner's written request, the Division of Retirement advised Petitioner that the only benefit to be paid was a return of contributions to the retirement plan.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent should enter a final order awarding Petitioner those benefits that are most favorable to Petitioner pursuant to Sections 121.091(6), (7)(b), and (8), Florida Statutes. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of July, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of July, 1991.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was eligible to participate in the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) of the Florida Retirement System (FRS) when he applied on October 4, 2002.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is employed by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation as a law enforcement officer, and has been since October 17, 1977 (Testimony of Petitioner). Petitioner was considered "vested" in the special risk class of the FRS when he reached ten years of service in 1987 (Testimony of Ira Gaines). On January 15, 2001, Petitioner reached 55 years of age. On October 4, 2002, Respondent received Petitioner's application to participate in the DROP. The Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement (Division), denied Petitioner's application for DROP participation because more than 12 months had passed since he first became eligible, and his opportunity to enter the program had lapsed. Petitioner testified that he was confused by the language of the educational materials on the Division's web site and thought he could defer DROP participation until he reached 25 years of service. The Division's web site stated the following regarding DROP eligibility when Petitioner became eligible: Eligibility - You are eligible to participate in the DROP when you are a participant of the Pension Plan, are vested and have reached your normal retirement date. Your "normal retirement date" is the earliest date at which you are eligible for full, unreduced benefits based upon your age and service. In most cases, you reach your normal retirement date when you are vested and reach age 62, or when you complete 30 years of service, regardless of your age (age 55 or 25 years of service for special risk members). You may make your election to participate in DROP up to 6 months before the date you plan to begin participation, and you must elect DROP participation within 12 months after you first reach your normal retirement date . . . . (Emphasis added) Petitioner admitted he never sought advice either from his personnel office or from the Division. Petitioner filed a timely request for a review of the Division's denial of his DROP application and this hearing followed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order denying Petitioner's request to participate in the DROP. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of June, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 2003.
The Issue Whether the Division properly denied Petitioner's request to change Petitioner's retirement in the Florida Retirement System from an early retirement service benefit to disability retirement.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is charged with managing, governing, and administering the Florida Retirement System ("FRS"). Royal worked for the Florida Department of Transportation ("DOT") over 28 years. As a prior employee of DOT, Royal is a member of the FRS. Royal was injured on his job on July 16, 2002. After being informed by the Social Security Administration that he was disabled, Royal started applying for line-of-duty disability retirement with the FRS. Since Royal's injury, Royal has gotten his neighbor, Levern Speights, to prepare his retirement applications and write letters to the Division on his behalf. Royal signs every submission. Royal first applied for disability retirement on December 19, 2003. About three months later, Royal applied for early service retirement benefits on or about March 9, 2004. Directly above Royal's signature, the application stated: I understand I must terminate all employment with FRS employers to receive a retirement benefit under Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. I also understand that I cannot add additional service, change options, or change my type of retirement (Regular, Disability, and Early) once my retirement becomes final. My retirement becomes final when any benefit payment is cashed or deposited. While the two applications were pending, Royal contacted the Division to check on the status of his disability retirement application. During the call, Royal found out that he could obtain retirement monies immediately if he wrote a letter requesting early retirement. On or about April 12, 2004, Royal submitted a letter to the Division that stated he "wish[ed] to apply for early service retirement." Upon receipt of the April 12, 2004, letter, the Division switched Royal's application from a disability application to early retirement application and Royal went on the Florida Retirement System payroll effective March 1, 2004. Royal has been receiving early service retirement checks and cashing or depositing them since March 2004. However, Royal still believes he is entitled to disability retirement benefits since he is disabled. Throughout the years, Royal has continuously contacted the Division periodically in an effort to still try and get disability retirement benefits. In January, April, and May 2006, the Division received three letters from Royal questioning his receipt of early service retirement benefits and requesting to apply for in-line- of-duty disability retirement benefits. On May 16, 2006, Royal applied for disability benefits again. On June 3, 2006, the Division responded to Royal's request by letter stating: The Division of Retirement has received your letter requesting that you receive disability benefits. Our records indicated you are receiving a service retirement benefit. According to Chapter 60S-4.002(4), Florida Administrative Code, you cannot change your option selection, purchase additional service, or change your type of retirement after you have cashed or deposited any benefit payment. Therefore the Division is unable to honor your request.[2] On December 24, 2008, Royal wrote the Division and requested that his "retirement be changed to disability retirement to reflect my current condition."3 On January 21, 2009, the Division informed Royal again by letter that "Florida law does not have provisions that allow the Division of Retirement to change a member's retirement type from service retirement to disability retirement. Therefore, your service retirement benefit is final and cannot be changed to disability retirement." Royal contacted the Division on several more occasions trying to get disability benefits. On or about June 25, 2011, Royal requested a hearing regarding the issue.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's request to change his early service retirement benefit to disability retirement. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. MCKINNEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 2011.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner, a surviving beneficiary, is entitled to change the Florida Retirement System retirement benefits 1 All references to chapter 120 are to the 2019 version. payment option selected by her now-deceased spouse, a member of the Florida Retirement System.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, is the state agency charged under chapter 121, Florida Statutes (2002),2 with administering the Florida Retirement System ("FRS"). Petitioner is the spouse of James L. Williams, now deceased, who was employed by the School District of Palm Beach ("District) for 38 years, and was a member of the FRS. Williams retired from his employment with the District on August 23, 2002. At that time, he executed the Florida Retirement System Application for Service Retirement Form, Form FR-11. On Form FR-11, he designated Petitioner as his primary beneficiary and Jones as his contingent beneficiary. Williams signed this form, and his signature was notarized. Also on August 23, 2002, Williams executed the Florida Retirement System Option Selection for FRS Members Form, Form FRS-11o. On that form, he selected FRS retirement benefits payment Option 2, and designated that choice by writing an "X" on the line next to Option 2. Option 2 was described on Form FRS-11o as: A reduced monthly payment for my lifetime. If I die before receiving 120 monthly payments, my designated beneficiary will receive a monthly benefit in the same amount as I was receiving until the monthly benefit payments to both of us equal 120 monthly payments. No further benefits are then payable. 2 All references to chapter 121 are to the 2002 version of the Florida Statutes, which was in effect at the time that the retirement benefits application and option selection forms that have given rise to this proceeding were executed. Form FRS-11o contained a section, immediately below the description of Option 2, that was required to be completed by the spouse of a married FRS member who had selected Option 1 or Option 2. On August 23, 2002, Petitioner completed, signed, and dated that section, confirming that she was the legal spouse of Williams and acknowledging that she was informed that Williams had selected either Option 1 or Option 2. The purpose of that section on Form FRS-11o is to inform the spouse of the FRS member that, by the member's selection of either Option 1 or Option 2, the surviving spouse is not entitled to receive a continuing benefit for the rest of his or her life. The last sentence on Form FRS-11o, immediately above the space for the FRS member's signature, states in pertinent part: "[m]y retirement becomes final when any payment is cashed . . . [or] deposited." DeVonnia Jones was present with Williams at the time he was given Form FR-11 and Form FRS-11o to execute. Jones testified that when Williams arrived at the District office on August 23, 2002, Form FR-11 and Form FRS-11o already had been filled out by District staff, and were presented to him by his supervisor, who informed him that he needed to retire or he would be terminated. According to Jones, Williams did not wish to retire at that time. Jones asked District staff how much more Williams' monthly benefits would be if he did not retire for another year or two, and was told that Williams' benefits would be between $25 and $30 more per month. According to Jones, "my dad basically shed a couple tears. He was not comfortable, but he went ahead and signed it because I told him to, because they made it seem like he wasn't going to be eligible to get what he was supposed to get." Williams signed and dated Form FRS-11o on August 23, 2002, and his signature was notarized. On August 28, 2002, Respondent sent Williams a document titled "Acknowledgement of Service Retirement Application." This document stated, among other things, that Williams had selected FRS Option 2, and that his retirement was effective September 2002. At the bottom of this document was a standalone paragraph, in bold face type, that read: "ONCE YOU RETIRE, YOU CANNOT ADD ADDITIONAL SERVICE OR CHANGE OPTIONS. RETIREMENT BECOMES FINAL WHEN ANY BENEFIT PAYMENT IS CASHED OR DEPOSITED!" Also on August 28, 2002, Respondent sent Williams a document titled "Florida Division of Retirement Estimate of Retirement Benefit (Estimate only, subject to final verification of all factors)." This document provided information regarding the amount of the monthly benefits Williams would receive for the four options offered under the FRS. A statement in bold face type at the bottom of the document read: "Comments: You have chosen Option 2. Your option selection cannot be changed after you cash or deposit any benefit payment." Had Williams wished to change his retirement benefits payment option, he could have done so up to the time he cashed or deposited a retirement benefits payment. Williams began receiving his monthly FRS retirement benefits payments from Respondent on October 4, 2002. He cashed or deposited the first FRS benefits warrant (Warrant #0618275) that he received. Thereafter, Williams received monthly FRS retirement benefits payments until his death on April 26, 2010. Williams received a total of 92 monthly benefits payments before his death. All of the FRS retirement benefits payment warrants issued to Williams were deposited or cashed. On May 17, 2010, Respondent contacted Petitioner to inform her that she needed to complete a Florida Retirement System Pension Plan Application for Beneficiary of Monthly Retirement Benefits Form, Form FST- 11b, in order for her to receive monthly FRS retirement benefits payments as Williams' beneficiary. In the contact letter, Respondent informed Petitioner that "you will receive the same gross monthly benefits to which the member was entitled through August 31, 2012." Petitioner completed Form FST-11b on June 25, 2010, and began receiving FRS monthly benefits payments on June 30, 2010. Petitioner received a total of 28 FRS retirement monthly benefits payments. The last warrant issued to Petitioner (Warrant #0375196) was issued on August 31, 2012. All of the warrants issued to Petitioner were cashed or deposited. In sum, Williams and Petitioner collectively received a total of 120 FRS retirement monthly benefits payments, pursuant to Option 2. All of the warrants issued to Williams, and then to Petitioner, as his beneficiary, were deposited or cashed. Petitioner testified that beginning in 2003, she made numerous attempts, over a period of years, to contact the District and Respondent regarding changing the FRS retirement benefits payment option that Williams had selected on August 23, 2002. During this time, Williams and Petitioner continued to cash or deposit the benefits payment warrants they received from Respondent. In this proceeding, Petitioner does not claim that Williams accidentally selected Option 2, or that he intended to select another option, when he signed Form FRS-11o on August 23, 2002. Rather, she asserts that at the time Williams retired, he suffered from confusion and memory loss such that he did not understand the option he chose—effectively, that he lacked the mental capacity to have chosen Option 2 as his retirement benefits payment option. Alternatively, Petitioner contends that because Williams was forced to retire under threat of termination from his employment, he was under duress when he chose Option 2 on Form FRS-11o. On these grounds, Petitioner asserts that she should be permitted to change Williams' choice of retirement benefits payment option.3 3 Here, Petitioner, has requested that she be allowed to "change" Williams' choice of Option 2 on the FRS retirement option selection forms. She did not identify, or present evidence, Petitioner's impassioned testimony at the final hearing shows that she fervently believes her husband was wrongly treated by the District when it required him to retire in 2002, against his desire to continue to work.4 However, as was explained to Petitioner at the final hearing, the purpose of this proceeding was not to determine whether the District wrongly forced Williams out of his employment; rather, it is to determine whether there is any factual or legal basis for changing the retirement benefits option that Williams selected when he executed Form FRS-11o nearly 18 years ago. The evidence does not support Petitioner's argument that Williams lacked the mental capacity to adequately understand the option that he chose on Form FRS-11o. Although Petitioner testified that Williams had been treated by a neurologist, no direct medical evidence was presented establishing that Williams was mentally incapacitated at the time he executed Form FRS-11o. Additionally, at the time Williams signed the form, he was accompanied by his daughter, who, after speaking to District staff regarding his options, advised him to sign the form. Petitioner herself also was present at the District office and signed Form FRS-11o, expressly acknowledging that she understood Williams had chosen Option 2. Thus, to the extent that Williams may not, on his own, have fully appreciated his choice of options on Form FRS-11o—and there is no competent direct evidence showing that to be the case—both his daughter and wife were present with him when he executed Form FRS-11o, his daughter told him to sign the form, and his wife expressly acknowledged that she understood his choice of Option 2. These circumstances do not support a finding that Williams lacked the mental capacity to understand, or did not adequately regarding which specific option she would choose, if permitted to change Williams' selected FRS benefits option. 4 The evidence indicates that the District required Williams to retire because he began having difficulty with his job as a mail carrier. According to Petitioner, Williams had an accident in a District vehicle and did not report the accident to the District, and that when he was transferred to the mail room, he had difficulty remembering to do certain required tasks. understand, the consequence of choosing Option 2 when he executed Form FRS-11o. The evidence also does not support a finding that Williams' choice of Option 2 should be changed, due to duress. There is no direct evidence establishing that Williams was under duress when he chose Option 2. Although Jones testified, credibly, that her father was upset about being forced to retire when he wanted to continue working, her testimony that he was under duress was based on her subjective conclusion. Furthermore, even if Williams was emotionally distressed when he signed the FRS benefits options forms, there is no evidence showing that as result of such distress, he chose Option 2 instead of a different option. It also is noted that Form FR-11 and Form FRS-11o both expressly informed Williams that once his retirement became final—which would occur when any benefit payment was cashed or deposited—his retirement benefits option selection would become final and could not be changed. Further, Williams received two more pieces of correspondence from Respondent—both containing statements in bold face type—expressly informing him that once any FRS retirement benefits payments were cashed or deposited, his retirement benefits option choice could not be changed. As noted above, Williams could have changed his FRS benefits option at any time before he cashed or deposited a benefits payment; however, he did not do so. Thus, pursuant to the express terms of Form FR-11 and Form FRS-11o, when Williams cashed or deposited the first benefits payment, his selection of Option 2 became final and could not be changed. In sum, the evidence does not establish any factual basis for permitting Petitioner to change Williams' selection of Option 2 as his FRS retirement benefits payment option.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Management Services, enter a final order denying Petitioner's request to change the FRS retirement benefits payment option selected by her husband, an FRS member, when he retired. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of March, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Ladasiah Jackson Ford, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Deloris Williams 1219 West Ninth Street Riviera Beach, Florida 33404 (eServed) Nikita S. Parker, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) David DiSalvo, Director Division of Retirement Department of Mangement Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 (eServed) Sean Gellis, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Mangement Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed)
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner, as a surviving spouse, is entitled to a continuing benefit from the Florida Retirement System (FRS) based on the retirement account of her deceased husband, George S. Bohler. More specifically, it must be determined whether the forgery of the spousal acknowledgement form renders the member's election of the "Option 1" retirement benefit payment, which precludes a survivor's benefit for his spouse, invalid and void.
Findings Of Fact George Bohler, the FRS member at issue, was employed, at times pertinent, as a Professor of Economics at Florida Community College in Jacksonville. The College is an FRS employer and Mr. Bohler was a member of the FRS retirement system. The Division of Retirement is an administrative agency charged with regulation and operation of the Florida retirement system, including calculation of and determination of entitlement to retirement benefits, under various options and member circumstances. On March 22, 1999, Mr. Bohler filed a completed Florida Retirement System Application for service retirement and the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP). This was accomplished through his filing of "Form DP-11." The Form provides a retiree with information pertaining to four options by which his retirement benefits may be paid. One full page of that form provides an explanation of each option. Mr. Bohler selected Option 1, a retirement benefit pay-out plan which provides the highest monthly benefit. The Option 1 selection provides that this highest monthly benefit is payable for the lifetime of the retiree only. Upon his death, the benefit would stop and his beneficiary, here his spouse, the Petitioner, would receive only a refund of any contributions the member might have paid into the FRS which exceeds the amount he had received in benefits. Option 1 provides no continuing or survivor benefit to a beneficiary or surviving spouse. The DP-11 Form filed with the retirement application contained an apparent spousal acknowledgement purportedly signed by Deborah T. Bohler, the spouse of member George Bohler. It appears to acknowledge that the member had elected either Option 1 or Option 2, which provide no survivor/spouse benefit. The DP-11 Form indicated to the Division that the member was married. The parties have stipulated, however, that the Petitioner's signature on the FRS application for service retirement and the DROP program was actually forged. George Bohler, the member, was an FRS member from August 19, 1968, to March 31, 2005. He received FRS retirement benefits based upon the above-referenced application from the Division from April 1, 2000, to October 31, 2007. The Form DP-11 contained a statement to the effect that the retiree member understood that he could not add additional service, change options, or change his type of retirement once his retirement became final. Mr. Bohler began participation in the DROP program on April 1, 2000. Thereafter, his last date of employment was March 31, 2005, and he passed away on October 18, 2007. He received FRS benefits from April 1, 2000, until October 31, 2007. For 28 years, until his death on that date, Mr. Bohler was legally married to the Petitioner, Deborah Bohler, during which time they were never separated or divorced. On March 10, 1999, Mr. Bohler executed the FRS Application for Service Retirement and the DROP program. He had his signature notarized as required for that form. Joint Exhibit 1, in evidence. Mr. Bohler designated the Petitioner as his primary beneficiary on the DROP Application. He elected to begin participation in the DROP program as of April 1, 2000, and to retire from state employment effective March 31, 2005, which he did. There are four options which an FRS member may select for his or her retirement benefits to be paid to the member or to the survivors/beneficiaries. Mr. Bohler selected "Option 1" on his DROP Application form. This results in a significantly higher retirement monthly benefit than does Options 3 or 4, which have survivorship rights. The acknowledgement section on the DROP Application form requires that a member's spouse be notified and must acknowledge a member's selection of Option 1 or Option 2 by signing that DROP Application form, so that the FRS is thus informed that the spouse made a knowing, intelligent waiver of survivorship rights to benefits. The spousal acknowledgement provision or section does not require that the member's spouse's signature be notarized. The form also does not require a member to swear under oath that the spouse was notified. The parties have stipulated that the Petitioner's apparent signature shown on Mr. Bohler's retirement application form was forged. The Petitioner had no knowledge that her name had been placed on the form by some other person, nor did she have any knowledge that Mr. Bohler had selected Option 1 prior to his death. The Petitioner first learned that her husband had selected Option 1 when she contacted the Respondent, after his death, to request that his retirement benefits now be paid to her. She believed that she was entitled to survivorship benefits. Her husband never informed her that he had selected a retirement option which would not pay her survivorship benefits, nor had they discussed the matter before or since his retirement. In their marital and family relationship, the Bohlers had divided certain duties in such a way that Mr. Bohler, the FRS member at issue, handled all financial matters himself. The Petitioner, Mrs. Bohler, dealt with any tax issues or filings the couple was required to make during the years of their marriage. The Petitioner is a certified public accountant. The Petitioner was simply aware that her husband received retirement benefits, and knew the amount of them, but did not know that they represented benefits for Option 1 rather than Option 3 or 4. The Petitioner's signature on the spousal acknowledgment section of the DROP Application form is stipulated to have been forged. The fact of the forgery, and the Petitioner's un-refuted testimony, establishes that she was never notified, nor did she ever acknowledge that her husband had selected Option 1. She was not aware that an attempt to waive or extinguish her survivor's benefits had been made. She believed, during his lifetime, that she was to be accorded survivor benefits. Testimony presented by the Respondent shows that the Respondent Division will not accept a retirement application form, or process it, if a member fails to complete the spousal acknowledgement section or, alternatively, to submit a signed statement explaining why that section is left blank, or the signature of the spouse has not been obtained. The fact that the Division will not accept a retirement or DROP Application form or process the related benefits if the acknowledgement section is unsigned or blank establishes the mandatory nature of the requirement that a spouse acknowledge a member's election to receive benefits under an option which would preclude a spouse's survivorship benefits. The acknowledgement is thus not an optional requirement. In fact, the legislature clearly placed that requirement in the statute, Section 121.091(6)(a), Florida Statutes, as a mandatory requirement so a spouse would know of any such attempt to waive the spouse's survivorship rights and benefits. It is an acknowledgement that the spouse has a vested or property right in such benefits, which must be knowingly and intelligently waived. The Statute says, in fact, that the spouse of any member "shall be notified of and shall acknowledge any such election." Therefore, obtaining a spouse's signature is not the only desired result set forth by the legislature (and under the rule adopted pursuant thereto) because it requires actual notification of the spouse, not merely the obtaining of a spouse's signature, whether genuine or forged. Actual notification is what must be accomplished. The required notification and indeed the obtaining of the Petitioner's signature was not accomplished in the facts of this case. In light of these facts, the act of declaring and accomplishing retired status, and selection of the related benefit option, was never completed. The Option selection was obviously a nullity and void ab initio because the mandatory condition precedent never was accomplished by the member.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the State of Florida, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, awarding the Petitioner retirement benefits based upon her status as a surviving spouse and joint annuitant, in the manner described above, adjusted to reflect re-calculation and recoupment of overpayment based upon the amount of benefits already paid from the subject retirement account pursuant to Option 1. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Elizabeth Regina Stevens, Esquire Department of Management Services Office of the General Counsel 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32327 T. A. Delegal, Esquire Delegal Law Offices, P.A. 424 East Monroe Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 John Brenneis, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a resident of Florida and resides at 306 Sweetwater Cove Boulevard, North, Longwood, Florida 32779. Respondent, Department of Administration, Division of Retirement, is an agency of the State of Florida located at Cedars Executive Center, Building C, 2639 North Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32303. Intervenor is a resident of 5448 San Luis Drive, Orlando, Florida 32807. The agency action challenged by the Petition is the determination that the continuing monthly retirement benefit available under Option 4 of the Florida Highway Patrol Pension Plan, which provides for a continuing monthly benefit to the "spouse" of the retiree shall be paid to the person who was the spouse at the time of the retiree's retirement, not the individual who was the spouse of the retiree at the time of the retiree's death. Petitioner was not married to Florida Highway Patrol retiree Jack E. Walden on the date of his retirement, which was November 1, 1972, but was the legal spouse of Jack E. Walden at the time of his death on January 9, 1985. Florida Highway Patrol retiree Jack E. Walden was married to Barbara C. Walden on the date of his retirement; however, subsequently on January 22, 1976, Barbara Walden and Jack Walden were divorced. Thereafter, on February 6, 1976, Jack Walden married Marilyn S. Walden and she remained his spouse during the following nine years until his death. Petitioner has sought to be paid a "surviving spouse" or other benefit available from the Florida Highway Patrol pension plan, however, the Agency has determined that any benefit must be paid to the former spouse of Jack E. Walden, not Petitioner. Intervenor, Barbara C Yeater, was married to Jack E. Walden on January 19, 1949. She was his spouse during the entire time of his service with the Florida Highway Patrol, at the time of his retirement in 1972, and until dissolution of their marriage in 1976. In September, 1972, prior to his retirement, Jack E. Walden designated Barbara Walden as his beneficiary under the Highway Patrol Retirement System. (Exhibit 1)2 On June 27, 1975, Respondent received Exhibit 2,3 but did not respond to it. At the time Exhibit 2 was received by Respondent, it was the Division of Retirement policy that a retiree who had selected Option 4 under Chapter 321, F.S., could not change the previously selected recipient of survivor benefits subsequent to retirement and cashing of the first warrant. A copy of Exhibit 2 was not sent to Barbara Yeater. There was no further communication from Jack E. Walden to Respondent concerning changes in beneficiary or option selection after June 27, 1975. There was an exchange of correspondence between Respondent and Barbara Yeater (Exhibits 3, 4 and 5),4 but copies of that correspondence were not sent to Jack E. Walden. The Petition and final judgment of dissolution between Jack Walden and Barbara Yeater are Exhibits 7 and 8 in evidence. The subject retirement benefits were not disposed of in the final judgment of dissolution. The monthly benefit payable to Jack E. Walden's surviving spouse is $622.00 plus cost-of-living adjustments. Decedent retired with 21.60 years service, which produced an initial benefit of $475.91. Jack E. Walden believed, at the time of his death, that he had accomplished the change in beneficiary which he sought to carry out by filing Exhibit 2 with Respondent. This fact is based on the absence of any reply by Respondent rejecting the proposed change, by Decedent's failure to make other arrangements for Marilyn Walden, by not seeking to modify the alimony payments awarded to Intervenor, and by his statements to Petitioner and to his friend, George Watson, indicating his belief that the change had been effected, and, finally, by the fact that Respondent accepted and thereafter utilized the change of address contained in the change of beneficiary notice. Respondent relied on the Arnow case5 in its decision to award the continuing benefits to Intervenor on the death of Jack E. Walden (discussed below).
Recommendation From the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a Final Order awarding continuing retirement benefits to Petitioner. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of August, 1985 in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 1985.