The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Charge of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on January 16, 2001.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by Respondent, Toucan's Restaurant, as a cocktail waitress. The record is unclear as to when she began her employment there. Her last day on the job was March 18, 2000. The record is not entirely clear as to the exact legal entity that owned Toucan's Restaurant (the restaurant). However, Mary Ann Pistilli was an apparent officer of the corporation which owned the restaurant and acted in the capacity of manager. There is no evidence in the record showing that Mary Ann Pistilli's husband, Craig Pistilli, was an owner or manager of the restaurant. However, he was sometimes at the restaurant. The extent or frequency of his presence at the restaurant is also unclear. According to Rene Brewer, a bartender at the restaurant, Mr. Pistilli "wasn't there a lot." While present at the restaurant, Mr. Pistilli would sometimes give direction to employees on certain issues. For example, he directed Ms. Brewer as to the amount of liquor she put in a customer's drink. It was Ms. Brewer's understanding that Mrs. Pistilli knew that Mr. Pistilli would sometimes direct employees regarding such employment tasks. However, Mrs. Pistilli did not testify as to her knowledge of Mr. Pistilli's actions of giving any direction to employees, and, therefore, the extent of her actual knowledge of Mr. Pistilli's actions regarding directing employees on employment matters was not established. On Friday nights, Karaoke entertainment was offered at the restaurant. During a certain song, Petitioner would perform a dance. Petitioner was not asked to perform this dance by her employer and did so voluntarily. Mrs. Pistilli was opposed to Petitioner dancing in this manner. Petitioner would stand on a chair near the Karaoke machine with her back to the patrons, let down her hair, and unbutton her shirt giving the appearance she was undressing. However, she wore a t-shirt under the shirt she unbuttoned. When she turned to face the patrons, it became clear that she wore the t-shirt underneath the shirt she unbuttoned. Then she would dance around the restaurant and its bar area and patrons would give her money for dancing. The money was given to her by both male and female patrons in various ways. For example, when a male patron would put money in the side of his mouth, she would take it with her teeth. Petitioner's dancing was not sexual in nature but was more in the nature of a fun part of the Karaoke. On March 18, 2000, Petitioner was in the bar area of the restaurant. Petitioner's description of what happened is as follows: I was at work, and Craig had come in with one of his friends. It was his friend's birthday. And the bar wasn't very busy at all. I had two customers that just came in. And he was just being loud, and he came over and asked me if I'd get up on the bar and dance, and I told him no. He set me up--at the end of the bar is like a long, and then there's a little like an L, and that part lifts up. The lift-up part was down, and he set me up on top of that. And I told him, you know, to leave me alone. And when I got down, he slapped me on the rear. And then he backed up, he unbuttoned his shirt, he unzipped his pants and said I ought to go in the dining room and dance around like this….Craig's friend was sitting at the bar, and Craig came over and said I got twenty dollars in my pocket, I want you to dance, it's Chris' birthday, and I told him no. And so a few minutes later he came over, he grabbed my arms, he shoved me against-- lifted my arms over my head, shoved me in the corner of the bar. I told him he was hurting me . . . . After the third time of me telling him that he was hurting me, he finally let go and he backed up and he went 00-00-00. And I was very upset. I went into the kitchen, I was crying very hard . . . . While Petitioner's description of what happened contains hearsay statements purportedly made by Mr. Pistilli, Petitioner's testimony describing Mr. Pistilli's actions and her reaction to the incident is deemed to be credible. Petitioner sustained physical injuries as a result of this incident with Mr. Pistilli.2/ Ms. Brewer was behind the bar on Petitioner's last day of employment. She saw Mr. Pistilli come into the restaurant with a friend. Mr. Pistilli appeared to her to be intoxicated. She saw Mr. Pistilli hug Petitioner in front of the bar. She did not see any other contact between Mr. Pistilli and Petitioner on that day. However, she had seen Petitioner hug Mr. Pistilli on other occasions. She also saw Petitioner hug restaurant patrons on other occasions. Teresa Woods was another bartender who worked at the restaurant. On Petitioner's last day of employment, Ms. Woods briefly saw and spoke to Petitioner in the kitchen of the restaurant. Petitioner was upset and told Ms. Woods that her neck and back were hurt. Petitioner then left the building and did not say anything further to Ms. Woods. Petitioner did not return to work. Mrs. Pistilli was not at the restaurant on March 18, 2000. She did not see any of the events that occurred between Petitioner and her husband. She had heard about the allegation that her husband hugged Petitioner but was unaware of the other allegations: Q: When did you first become aware that Mrs. Youngs had filed a workers' compensation claim? A: I can't recall exactly when it was. They did call me. I can't tell you exactly how long a period of time-- Q: Can you give us your best approximation of how close it was in time to--if you assume that the date-- A: A month. A month maybe. I don't know. It was well after. * * * Q: And did the comp carrier tell you the nature of the injury or how Mrs. Youngs contends that it happened? A: Yes, And he came in and I spoke with him, and they said that they'd be back in touch, and never heard from them. Q: And what did they tell you or what was their understanding of what Mrs. Youngs was contending happened after that conversation? A: All I know is my husband hugging her. This stuff I heard today is all new stuff about zippering pants. I never heard of any of that. I never heard any of that. While Mrs. Pistilli was generally aware of an ongoing workers' compensation claim by Petitioner against the restaurant, she was unaware of the most egregious allegations made regarding her husband until well after the fact. While she understood that her husband hugged Petitioner on March 18, 2000, her knowledge of that was gained approximately one month after the fact when finding out about a workers' compensation claim. Moreover, she had knowledge that during Petitioner's period of employment at the restaurant, Petitioner occasionally hugged her husband and some restaurant patrons. No competent evidence was presented that Mrs. Pistilli knew or should have known that Mr. Pistilli engaged in the behavior described by Petitioner that took place on March 18, 2000. Petitioner acknowledged that other than the incident on March 18, 2000, Mr. Pistilli did not make any references to Petitioner about her body during her employment at the restaurant.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of December, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S __ BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of December, 2003.
The Issue Whether Luis A. Gonzalez earned a passing grade on the Professional Engineer Examination of April 14-15, 1988?
Findings Of Fact Luis A. Gonzalez took the Professional Engineer Examination administered by the Department of professional Regulation on April 14-15, 1988. By notice dated July 22, 1988, Mr. Gonzalez was informed by the Respondent's Office of Examination Services that he had failed the Professional Engineer Examination. Question 122 on the Principles & Practices of Engineering Examination, Form 8804, involving Civil/Sanitary/Structural engineering, provided the following: SITUATION: An old, large, retirement community apartment complex has reported sewer overflow and plumbing discharge problems. You are an engineer assigned to review the flow and sizing of the one main sanitary sewer exiting and carrying the total flow of the complex, with the objective of correcting the problem. Review with the manager, and inspection of the plans, reveal there are 490 residential units with an estimated continuing residence population of 1,475. Water bills are paid individually. REQUIREMENTS: NOTE: Use and-show equations for calculations. Do not use a nomograph or hydraulic slide rule. Citing your assumptions and sources, calculate the average, maximum, and minimum sanitary wastewater flows expected, in gallons per day, from the total complex. You measure the main sewer from the project and examine the plans and find it is 10" round ID, VCP, with a slope of 0.0045. Inspection leads to an estimate of n 0/015 (fair) because of age. Calculate theoretical full flow capacity and velocity with no surcharge. Calculate depth and velocity of flow for your estimated maximum flow rate, if you can conclude the sewer is not overloaded. Mr. Gonzalez was instructed to include assumptions and citations in support of his answer to Question 122. The citations included by Mr. Gonzalez in answering part (a) of Question 122, although questioned by the grader of Question 122, were adequate. Mr. Gonzalez failed to list assumptions which he should have taken into account in answering part (a) of Question 122, concerning inflow, infiltration or exfiltration. In answering part (a) of Question 122, Mr. Gonzalez determined "estimated flow." In calculating estimated flow, Mr. Gonzalez multiplied the population of the complex (1,475) times an estimated water use per person of 100 gallons per day. In support of Mr. Gonzalez's use of 100 gallons per person water use, Mr. Gonzalez cited the Civil Engineering Reference Manual, Fourth Edition, and the ASCE Manual on Engineering Practice No. 36. Mr. Gonzalez also provided other references at the formal hearing to support his use of 100 gallons per day. The use of 100 gallons a day per person in answering part (a) of Question 122 by Mr. Gonzalez would be correct only if the problem involved a residential community. The citations used by Mr. Gonzalez indicate that 100 gallons per day is generally acceptable for residential communities or "[i]n the absence of any better basis . . . ." Question 122, however, involves an apartment complex and not a residential community. The weight of the evidence presented at the formal hearing indicates that for an apartment complex an estimated water use of 60 to 80 gallons per day per person should be used. Even some of the references provided by Mr. Gonzalez at the formal hearing support this conclusion. For example, Petitioner's exhibit 5 indicates that a wastewater flow of 67 to 79 gallons per person per day should be used for "[m]ultiple-family dwellings (apartments)." Mr. Gonzalez's use of 100 gallons per day in answering part (a) of Question 122 was incorrect. Mr. Gonzalez failed to demonstrate an adequate understanding of flow in answering Question 122. Although Mr. Gonzalez demonstrated an understanding of full flow, he failed to demonstrate an understanding of partial flow. Mr. Gonzalez's answer to part (b) of Question 122 was adequate. Mr. Gonzalez's answer to part (c) of Question 122 was incorrect. Mr. Gonzalez did not dispute this conclusion at the forma1 hearing. Mr. Gonzalez was awarded a score of 4 for his solution of Question 122. Question 122 was graded pursuant to the National Council of Engineering Examiners Standard Scoring Plan Outline (DPR Exhibit #4). This Outling provides that a grade of 4 is to be awarded under the following circumstances: UNQUALIFIED: Applicant has failed to demonstrate adequate knowledge in more than one ASPECT of one CATEGORY. BU. Fails to demonstrate an understanding of flow and velocity calculations for pipes flowing full or partially full; or contains multiple errors; or one part is missing or wrong with other gross or multiple errors; or the record is deficient; or in combination. A grade of 5 was to awarded under circumstances similar to the circumstances for awarding a score of 4, except that a score of 5 is appropriate only if an "[a]pplicant has failed to demonstrate adequate knowledge in [only] one ASPECT of one CATEGORY." The Respondent properly concluded that Mr. Gonzalez is entitled to a score of 4 for his answer to Question 122 and not a score of 5. Mr. Gonzalez failed to "demonstrate an understanding of flow . . . calculations for pipes flowing . . . partially full . . . ." His answer also "contains multiple errors" and at least "one part is . . . wrong." Finally, Mr. Gonzalez's answer to Question 122 "failed to demonstrate adequate knowledge in more than one ASPECT of one CATEGORY" as opposed to "[only] one ASPECT of one CATEGORY." [Emphasis added]. Question 123 of the Principles & Practice of Engineering Examination, Form 8804, involving Civil/Sanitary/Structural engineering, includes parts (a) through (j). Mr. Gonzalez questioned parts (b), (d) and (e) of Question 123. In pertinent part, Question 123 provides the following: SITUATION: In a detailed study of traffic flow on one lane of a 2-lane urban freeway, the following data were collected: Average Distance between the front bumper of successive vehicles 75 feet Space Mean Speed = 33 mph Time Mean Speed = 32 mph REQUIREMENTS: (b) Determine the traffic density. Assuming that the 30th highest hourly volume is to be used for design purposes on this highway, what is a reasonable estimate of the 30th highest hourly volume in one direction on this facility? Briefly justify any assumptions made. Determine the most widely accepted value of the capacity of a freeway lane operating under ideal conditions of uninterrupted flow. Mr. Gonzalez was instructed to include assumptions and citations in support of his answer to Question 123. Mr. Gonzalez answered part (b) of Question 123 by calculating a density of 70.40. The grader of Question 123 circled this answer and wrote "DECIMAL." The Respondent agreed at the formal hearing that the use of decimals by Mr. Gonzalez was insignificant. In answering part (d) of Question 123 Mr. Gonzalez failed to include adequate assumptions. Although the statements made by Mr. Gonzalez in answering part (d) of Question 123 are correct, his equation is wrong. Mr. Gonzalez did not offer adequate proof at the formal hearing that his response to part (d) of Question 123 was correct. In answering part (e) of Question 123 Mr. Gonzalez assumed a capacity of 2,000 cars per hour. The grader of Question 123 indicated that this capacity is an "obsolete value." The Solutions to be used in grading the Professional Engineer Examination and, in particular, Question 123, indicates the following: Based on the 1985 Highway Capacity Manual or other similar sources, the capacity of a multi-lane freeway lane operating under ideal conditions is 2,000 vehicles per hour. ANSWER Although Mr. Gonzalez's answer to part (e) of Question 123 is consistent with this solution, the capacity of a multi-lane freeway lane operating under ideal conditions, based on the 1985 Highway Capacity Manual is actually 2,800 vehicles per hour and not 2,000 vehicles per hour. The answer to part (e) of Question 123 provided in the Solutions used by graders of the Professional Engineer Examination and Mr. Gonzalez's answer are therefore incorrect. The Solutions provided to graders are to be used only to assist graders and are not binding on them. Although Mr. Gonzalez's answer to part (e) of Question 123 is consistent with the Solutions provided, the answer is incorrect. Therefore, the grader properly took into account Mr. Gonzalez's incorrect solution to part (e) of Question 123. Even if Mr. Gonzalez is given credit for his response to part (e) of Question 123, his grade for Question 123 will not change. Mr. Gonzalez correctly answered parts (a)-(c) and (f)-(j) of Question 123. Mr. Gonzalez was awarded a score of 8 points for his answer to Question 123. Question 123 was graded pursuant to a Six Level Item Specific Scoring Plan (155P). The Plan provides that a grade of 8 is to be awarded under the following circumstances: CLEARLY QUALIFIED: All categories satisfied with at least one at a higher than minimum level. Correct approach but a solution with math errors or answers outside allowable tolerances for parts (d), (e), and (h) or An [sic] slightly incomplete solution. The next highest grade which can be awarded for Question 123 is 10 points, the maximum award possible for Question 123. Ten points are to be awarded under the following circumstances: HIGHLY QUALIFIED: All categories satisfied. -Presentation -may lack in completeness or equations, diagrams, orderly steps in solution, etc. Results within allowable tolerance. Correct approach and correct solution within allowable tolerances for parts (d), (e), and (h) and correct interpretation of results. All parts complete. The Respondent properly concluded that Mr. Gonzalez is entitled to a score of 8 for his answer to Question 123 and not a score of 10. Mr. Gonzalez did not satisfy all categories and he failed to arrive at the "correct solution within allowable tolerances for parts (d), [and] (e) . . . " in answering Question 123. Mr. Gonzalez failed to prove that he should have been awarded a score of 10 for Question 123. Mr. Gonzalez failed to prove that he should be awarded an additional point on the Professional Engineer Examination of April 14-15, 1988.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Engineers issue a final order concluding that Luis A. Gonzalez's grade on the Professional Engineer Examination of April 14- 15, 1988, was a failing grade. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of April, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 1989. APPENDIX Case Number 88-6056 Mr. Gonzalez has submitted a letter dated March 21, 1989, containing proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Respondent did not file a proposed recommended order. Mr. Gonzalez's Proposed Findings of Fact Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection Paragraphs 1-2, 6 Not proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 3 The first sentence is a statement of the issue concerning Question 122. The second and third sentences are not supported by the weight of the evidence. The Florida Department of Environmental Regulation established water per day usage is for regulatory purposes and not necessarily consistent with the engineering principles to be used in answering questions on the Professional Engineer Examination. References which should have been used in answering Question 122 indicate that a water use rate of 67 to 79 gallons per day should have been used for apartments. The letter referred to was not accepted into evidence and can not form any basis for a finding of fact. Paragraph 4 The first and fifth sentences are accepted in findings of fact 20 and 21. The second and fourth sentences are not relevant to this proceeding. The third sentence is based upon a letter apparently received after the formal hearing. It cannot be taken into account in this proceeding. The sixth sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. The grader used the correct information and not "personal conviction." Although it is true that Mr. Gonzalez used the most recent data he was aware of concerning vehicles per hour, the fact remains that the value he used at the time of the examination was incorrect. Paragraph 5 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Mr. Gonzalez included two references with his letter of March 21, 1989, which were not offered at the formal hearing. Those references cannot be relied upon in this case and have played no part in making the findings of fact and conclusions of law in this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: H. Reynolds Sampson Deputy General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Luis A Gonzalez 7419 Sandy Bluff Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32211 Kenneth Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Allen R. Smith, Jr. Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
The Issue Whether Respondent knowingly submitted an inaccurate timesheet for April 4, 2018, as charged in the agency action letter dated May 11, 2018.
Findings Of Fact ECUA is a public utility that provides water, wastewater, and sanitation services to customers in Escambia and Santa Rosa counties. ECUA’s mission statement specifies that the Board and employees of ECUA “are committed to providing the highest quality service” and that “ECUA will always provide cost- effective services.” The Manual sets forth the terms and conditions of employment with ECUA. The Manual specifies that: Overtime work should be for emergency or unforeseen situations and to solve problems which are not a part of the daily activities. Supervisors are expected to use overtime work sparingly and employees should respond when called upon. Overtime and compensatory time authorization will be established by the supervisor with the approval of the department director. During the relevant time period, ECUA employed Mr. Boyd as an Industrial Plant Mechanic I. On June 26, 2012, Mr. Boyd signed a document acknowledging that a copy of the Manual was available to him in his supervisor’s office, via ECUA’s intranet, in ECUA’s Human Resources Department, and via compact disc upon request. Mr. Boyd also acknowledged on June 26, 2012, that it was his “responsibility to read the entire Manual/Handbook and to comply with the plans, guidelines, directives, and procedures contained in the Manual/Handbook and any revisions to it.” As an Industrial Plant Mechanic I, Mr. Boyd works under the supervision of a senior mechanic. He normally begins his workday by reporting to the Central Wastewater Reclamation Facility (“CWRF”) at 7:00 a.m. and is dispatched to assigned worksites. He uses an ECUA truck to travel to and from those sites. Mr. Boyd has a 30-minute lunch break for which he is not compensated. He is also allowed one 15-minute break in the morning and another in the afternoon. Mr. Boyd’s typical workday ends at 3:30 p.m. With a 30-minute lunch break, that amounts to an eight-hour workday. In April of 2018, ECUA needed to replace all of the diffusers at its Bayou Marcus Water Reclamation Facility (“the BMWRF”). Mack H. Weeks, ECUA’s Plant Maintenance Manager at the time, had supervisory authority over Mr. Boyd. Shortly before April 4, 2018, Mr. Boyd mentioned to Mr. Weeks that he wanted to stop at the BMWRF on April 4, 2018, prior to reporting to the CWRF, in order to see if the water level had decreased to a point where the diffusers in question were visible. According to Mr. Boyd, that information would enable him and the three other members of his four-person work crew to ascertain what parts they needed to complete the repair. However, there was no benefit for Mr. Boyd to stop at the BMWRF prior to reporting to the CWRF.3/ At 6:32 a.m. on April 4, 2018, ECUA’s security system recorded Mr. Boyd passing through a gate at the BMWRF. Mr. Boyd took a picture of a portion of the BMWRF a few minutes later. The security system at the CWRF recorded Mr. Boyd entering the facility at 7:13 a.m. on April 4, 2018. Mr. Boyd traveled back to the BMWRF with Kevin Spinks, an ECUA co-worker, in an ECUA work truck that had been assigned to Mr. Spinks. Carl Ayliffe and another ECUA employee were the remainder of the four-person work crew assigned to that job, and they traveled to the BMWRF in a separate ECUA truck. The tank at the BMWRF was on-line by 3:00 p.m. on April 4, 2018. Every ECUA truck has a global positioning system that enables ECUA to know precisely where each truck is at virtually any given point in time. The GPS on Mr. Spinks’ truck was not functioning because the antenna had been disconnected. However, the GPS on Mr. Ayliffe’s truck was functioning and recorded that he was done working at 4:29 p.m., on April 4, 2018.4/ Rather than returning his truck to the CWRF, Mr. Ayliffe drove the truck to his home because he was on call that night. A camera at the back gate of the CWRF recorded Mr. Spinks returning his truck at 5:07 p.m. on April 4, 2018. ECUA’s security system recorded Mr. Boyd using his employee badge to enter the CWRF through the southeast shop door at 5:09 p.m. on April 4, 2018. In consideration of a need to gather any belongings and/or complete paperwork, Mr. Boyd’s work on April 4, 2018, should have ended at approximately 5:30 p.m. on April 4, 2018. On April 16, 2018, Mr. Boyd, Mr. Spinks, and Mr. Ayliffe submitted timesheets indicating that they each worked eight regular hours and three overtime hours on April 4, 2018. Ultimate Findings The greater weight of the evidence demonstrates that there was no benefit to Mr. Boyd stopping at the BMWRF on April 4, 2018, prior to reporting for work at the CWRF. The greater weight of the evidence also demonstrates that his stop at the BMWRF was unauthorized by anyone who supervised Mr. Boyd. As a result, Mr. Boyd’s stop at the BMWRF on April 4, 2018, was an attempt to accumulate unnecessary overtime pay. The undisputed evidence demonstrates that Mr. Boyd began his workday at 7:13 a.m. on April 4, 2018, and his workday should have ended at approximately 5:30 p.m. after he reported back to the CWRF at 5:09 p.m. Given that Mr. Boyd was entitled to a 30-minute, unpaid lunch break, the undisputed evidence indicates that he worked 9.75 hours on April 4, 2018, rather than the 11 hours indicated on his timesheet.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Executive Director of the Emerald Coast Utilities Authority find that Robert D. Boyd, II, violated Section B-3, attendance records; Section B-13 A (4), conduct unbecoming an ECUA employee; Section B-13 A (13), falsification of records; and Section B-13 A (33), violation of ECUA rules or guidelines or state or federal law. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of September, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of September, 2018.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, George H. Hopper, submitted an application for a license to operate a Class "C" wastewater treatment plant to the Respondent on or about April 8, 1977. On November 28, 1977, the Respondent issued a letter of intent to deny the license. This letter of intent was subsequently modified by a letter to petitioner from Respondent dated January 4, 1978. The Respondent, in the above-referenced correspondence, based its letters of intent to deny the Petitioner a Class "C" wastewater treatment plant operator's license based upon two primary grounds. Those grounds are as follows: "This Department has concluded that you have not fulfilled the actual experience requirement of section 17-16.03(2)(b), Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C.), as defined by section 17-16.02(8) F.A.C." (See letter dated November 28, 1977.) "In addition to the above referenced deficiency in actual work experience, it has been noted that you have not completed an approved course related to wastewater treatment plant operation as required by Section 17-16.03(2)(c), Florida Administrative Code." (See letter dated January 4, 1978.) Respecting the second allegation, Petitioner presented testimony during the course of the hearing which, in fact, indicates that he did complete an approved coarse related to wastewater treatment plant operation as required by Section 17-16.03(2)(c), Florida Administrative Code. Additionally, Petitioner presented a diploma supporting this contention. This certificate reflects the fact that the Petitioner satisfactorily completed the course on "Operation of Wastewater Treatment Plants" on or about May 2, 1977. Based thereon, and the testimony of Respondent's certification officer, Robert W. Hall, to the effect that the Respondent did comply with the Code requirement which mandates completion of an approved course related to wastewater treatment plant operation, that ground is no longer a basis for the denial of Petitioner's certification. Petitioner testified, and the other documentary evidence introduced during the coarse of the hearing indicates, that Petitioner was employed from January, 1975, through December 25, 1975, as administrator of the Margate Utility Authority. From December 25, 1975, through February 15, 1976, the Petitioner was employed in a position other than as administrator, his resignation being effective on February 15, 1976. Accordingly, the Petitioner was employed at the Authority for a period in excess of one year. What is at issue, is the Respondent's contention that the Petitioner was not actually performing duties tantamount to fulfillment of the actual experience requirement of Section 17-16.03(2)(b), Florida Administrative Cede, inasmuch as his duties as an administrator were more in the nature of being in charge of the facility, with little practical experience as the term "experience" is meant in Chapter 17 of the Florida Administrative Code. Additionally, it was noted that the Petitioner was re-employed by the City of Margate as a supervisor. During the hearing, the Petitioner outlined his duties as an administrator which included being in charge off the overall operation of the wastewater treatment plant. Petitioner testified that when he was first employed at the Margate Utility Authority, the wastewater treatment plants were not operational. He testified that a water-sewer moratorium had been placed by the Board of Health, citing approximately five violations. Petitioner testified that he instituted numerous changes in the operations of the wastewater treatment facilities which included hiring a contractor to supervise deficiencies in the wastewater treatment plant and its injector systems which were over-pressurized. He testified that within approximately two months of his employment with the Authority, he was able to correct approximately 80 percent of the problems and was able to again make the treatment plant operational. Petitioner testified that he normally worked a five day week; however, he was on duty in excess of forty hours weekly for the resolution of all daily operational problems. Evidence introduced during the course of the hearing reveals that the wastewater treatment facility here involved is fully automated and that the operators have very little to do in terms of manual tasks. In this regard, the Petitioner testified that he was on duty at the facility throughout his employment during the period January, 1975, through December, 1975, to operate the wastewater treatment plant. Additionally, the Petitioner testified that his office, as an administrator, was located in close proximity to the wastewater treatment facilities and he was available to in fact operate the wastewater treatment plant, as needed. Finally, Respondent's certification officer, Robert W. Hall, testified that in his opinion, being available to operate as opposed to actual operation is what is required by the actual experience requirements of the Florida Administrative Code. Based thereon, I shall recommend that the Respondent withdraw its notice of intent to deny Petitioner's application for a Class "C" wastewater treatment plant operator's license.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner's application for a Class "C" wastewater treatment operator's license be GRANTED. RECOMMENDED this 8th day of May, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Russell L. Forkey, Esquire 3081 East Commercial Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33308 Randall E. Denker, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice by terminating the Petitioner’s employment on the basis of handicap.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, John Tadlock, (Tadlock) is a white male, age 46, and a resident of Panama City, Bay County, Florida. The Respondent, Westinghouse Electric Company, d/b/a Bay County Energy Systems, Inc. (Energy Systems), was and is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Florida. Energy Systems maintains a facility that collects garbage and burns it as fuel. The operation serves two basic functions. First, it disposes of unwanted garbage. Second, it produces energy by creating steam that in turn drives a turbine and produces electricity. From January, 1987, until September, 1993, Tadlock was employed by Energy Systems. Tadlock began as a B-class maintenance mechanic and advanced to the position of A-class maintenance mechanic. Subsequently, Tadlock moved to the operations portion of the company where he worked on boilers. Tadlock testified that he suffered injuries while at work during the years 1987, 1991, and 1993. Tadlock further testified that after each injury he recovered fully and resumed work at Energy Systems. As a result of the injuries sustained in his accidents at Energy System, Tadlock never testified that he was informed by any physician that he would have any permanent restrictions. In addition, at no time did Tadlock inform his employer, Energy Systems, that he suffered from any disability or restrictions relating to his ability to perform his job. During the period from October, 1991 through September, 1993, Tadlock had been cited for numerous violations of company policy and provided written warnings or reprimands. The first such violation occurred on October 24, 1991, when Tadlock was cited for violating company policy by failing to wear appropriate safety gear. Specifically, Tadlock failed to wear his indirect venting goggles. The memorandum memorializing the complaint noted that just two days prior to the complaint, Tadlock had received emergency training and, in response to a direct question raised by Tadlock, was informed that he must wear venting goggles. On September 17, 1992, Tadlock was cited for a safety violation for failing to wear appropriate hearing protection devices. As a result of this violation, Tadlock was given an oral warning. On June 3, 1993, Tadlock was cited for failing to wear gloves while on the floor of the facility. As a result of this violation of safety procedure, Tadlock was orally counseled on the correct policy and informed that such departure from set safety procedures would not be acceptable. On June 14, 1993, Tadlock was cited for failing to wear a personal respirator while in specific areas of the facility in violation of published safety procedures. On June 25, 1993, Tadlock received a written warning regarding his “unsatisfactory” safety record. Specifically, Tadlock was informed that he had a total of eleven accidents since his employment and that five of them were reportable to OSHA. The memorandum warned Tadlock that if he failed to show “immediate and sustained” improvement in his accident rate that he would be subject to disciplinary action. On July 30, 1993, Tadlock was verbally warned for failing to properly replace “pig pans” under an air dryer that resulted in oil running into a water drain. On August 31, 1993, Tadlock was verbally warned for failing perform his duties as an outside operator by failing to properly read his turnover log. As a result of his lack of action, Tadlock placed 55 gallons of bleach into a drainage basin. On September 19, 1993, Tadlock was informed, for a second time, that his safety record continued to be unsatisfactory. The letter referenced two accidents that occurred in August, 1993, that could have been avoided by practicing proper safety measures. As a result of those accidents and for his many past safety violations, Tadlock was suspended for three working days. Tadlock was offered employee assistance to help him perform his work in a more satisfactory and safe manner. On September 28, 1993, Tadlock was cited for a safety violation for failing to wear the appropriate shields on his prescription glasses. On October 10, 1993, Tadlock was cited for failing to properly maintain a boiler operator sheet log. This was the second time that Tadlock had been cited for improper maintenance of a log. Tadlock was also informed that if this type of action happened again, it would result in discipline. On October 15, 1993, Tadlock was observed urinating on the Boiler Room floor of the facility. Tadlock was cited for violating several rules of company conduct. A result of violating this company policy, coupled with the countless verbal and written warnings he had received, Tadlock was dismissed for cause. At the hearing, Tadlock admitted that he urinated on the floor of the facility but countered that he had no choice because Energy Systems failed to properly maintain its restroom. Tadlock was unable to support his assertion that there were no operating restroom facilities. First, in spite of every witness called by Tadlock, there was no testimony, even from Tadlock himself, that any of the bathrooms were not in working order.4 Energy Systems maintained that it had operational restroom facilities throughout its facilities. In addition, no competent evidence was presented that indicated that any of the restroom facilities were inoperable thus requiring someone to urinate in the middle of the facility. After being fired for the numerous safety violations and for violating company policy, Tadlock filed a complaint with the Commission on Human Relations alleging that he was discriminated against because of his handicap. Specifically, Tadlock asserted that he had suffered several on-the-job injuries that rendered him disabled and that he was discriminated because of the type injury or the lack of adequate medical treatment that he received. Such allegations were never proven and appear irrelevant to these proceedings. Specifically, any issues relating to his medical treatment and his injuries are more appropriately resolved in a worker’s compensation forum. At no time during his employment with Energy Systems did Tadlock inform his employer that he suffered from a handicap. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Energy Systems was aware that Tadlock suffered a disability or handicap. For example, Mr. James M. Leddy, the plant manager for Energy Systems testified that he was not aware of any condition which prevented Tadlock from functioning in a normal manner. The record is void of any evidence by a physician to indicate that Tadlock was considered disabled or handicapped. Mr. Dale J. McKeand, Manager of Plant Operations for Energy Systems, stated that Tadlock was not disabled and never asked for any accommodation for his “condition.” In addition, Mr. Richard S. Brookins, an industrial hygiene, safety and environmental coordinator for Energy Systems, stated that Tadlock worked full-time with no medical or duty restrictions and that he was terminated for his safety violations including urinating on the boiler room floor. Assuming that Tadlock could prove that he was handicapped, his actions after he was dismissed do not indicate a person with a handicap. Specifically, immediately after Tadlock’s dismissal, Tadlock opened a skinning shop for the purpose of skinning wild game (alligators, etc.). Skinning is a very physical job and it requires an individual to handle large game animals for the purpose of skinning hides from the carcasses of the animals. For the reasons stated above, there is no evidence to support that Tadlock was dismissed for any reason other than cause.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that this matter be dismissed with prejudice. DONE and ORDERED this 27th day of March, 1997, at Tallahassee, Florida. ` WILLIAM A. BUZZETT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of March, 1997.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent Laniger Enterprises of America, Inc. (Laniger), is entitled to the renewal of its domestic wastewater facility permit that was denied by Petitioner Department of Environmental Protection (Department).
Findings Of Fact The Parties The Department is the administrative agency of the State of Florida having the power and duty to protect Florida's air and water resources and to administer and enforce the provisions of Chapter 403, Florida Statutes (2005),1 and the rules promulgated in Florida Administrative Code Title 62. Laniger is a Florida corporation that owns and operates the WWTP that is the subject of this case, located at 1662 Northeast Dixie Highway, Jensen Beach, Martin County, Florida. The WWTP is referred to in the Department permit documents as the Beacon 21 WWTP. The WWTP Laniger acquired the WWTP in 1988 in a foreclosure action. At that time, the WWTP was in a "dilapidated" condition and was operating under a consent order with the Department. After acquiring the WWTP, Laniger brought it into compliance with the Department's requirements. Laniger's WWTP is commonly referred to as a "package plant."2 The WWTP's treatment processes are extended aeration, chlorination, and effluent disposal to percolation ponds. The WWTP does not have a direct discharge to surface water. It was permitted to treat 99,000 gallons per day (gpd) of wastewater. Its average daily flow during the past year was about 56,000 gallons. The east side of the WWTP site is adjacent to Warner Creek. On the north side of the WWTP site, an earthen berm separates the WWTP's percolation ponds from a drainage ditch that connects to Warner Creek. Warner Creek is a tributary to the St. Lucie River. The St. Lucie River is part of the Indian River Lagoon System. The Indian River Lagoon Act In 1989, the St. Johns River Water Management District and the South Florida Water Management District jointly produced a Surface Water Improvement and Management (SWIM) Plan for the Indian River Lagoon System ("the lagoon system"). For the purpose of the planning effort, the lagoon system was defined as composed of Mosquito Lagoon, Indian River Lagoon, and Banana River Lagoon. It extends from Ponce de Leon Inlet in Volusia County to Jupiter Inlet in Palm Beach County, a distance of 155 miles. The SWIM Plan identified high levels of nutrients as a major problem affecting water quality in the lagoon system. Domestic wastewater was identified as the major source of the nutrients. The SWIM Plan designated 12 problem areas within the lagoon system and targeted these areas for "research, restoration and conservation projects under the SWIM programs." Department Exhibit 2 at 11-13. Neither Warner Creek nor the area of the St. Lucie River that Warner Creeks flows into is within any of the 12 problem areas identified in the SWIM Plan. With regard to package plants, the SWIM Plan stated: There are numerous, privately operated, "package" domestic WWTPs which discharge indirectly or directly to the lagoon. These facilities are a continual threat to water quality because of intermittent treatment process failure, seepage to the lagoon from effluent containment areas, or overflow to the lagoon during storm events. Additionally, because of the large number of "package" plants and the lack of enforcement staff, these facilities are not inspected or monitored as regularly as they should be. Where possible, such plants should be phased out and replaced with centralized sewage collection and treatment facilities. Department Exhibit 2 at 64. In 1990, the Legislature passed the Indian River Lagoon Act, Chapter 90-262, Laws of Florida. Section 1 of the Act defined the Indian River Lagoon System as including the same water bodies as described in the SWIM Plan, and their tributaries. Section 4 of the Act provided: Before July 1, 1991, the Department of Environmental Regulation shall identify areas served by package sewage treatment plants which are considered a threat to the water quality of the Indian River Lagoon System. In response to this legislative directive, the Department issued a report in July 1991, entitled "Indian River Lagoon System: Water Quality Threats from Package Wastewater Treatment Plants." The 1991 report found 322 package plants operating within the lagoon system and identified 155 plants as threats to water quality. The 1991 report described the criteria the Department used to determine which package plants were threats: Facilities that have direct discharges to the system were considered threats. Facilities with percolation ponds, absorption fields, or other sub-surface disposal; systems located within 100 feet of the shoreline or within 100 feet of any canal or drainage ditch that discharges or may discharge to the lagoon system during wet periods were considered threats. * * * Facilities with percolation ponds, absorption fields, or other sub-surface disposal systems located more than 100 feet from surface water bodies in the system were evaluated case-by-case based on [operating history, inspection reports, level of treatment, and facility reliability]. Laniger's package plant was listed in the 1991 report as a threat to the water quality of the lagoon system because it was within 100 feet of Warner Creek and the drainage ditch that connects to Warner Creek. Laniger's WWTP was not determined to be a threat based on its wastewater treatment performance. There was no evidence presented that Laniger's WWTP had ever had intermittent treatment process failure, seepage to the lagoon system from effluent containment areas, or overflow during storm events. Those were the concerns related to package plants that were described in the SWIM Plan and the Department's 1991 report. Laniger's WWTP was not determined to be a threat based on evidence that it was causing or contributing to excess nutrients in Warner Creek or in that part of the St. Lucie River nearest to Laniger's WWTP. No evidence was presented that there are excess nutrients in Warner Creek or in that part of the St. Lucie River nearest to Laniger's WWTP. The Department's 1991 report concluded that the solution for package plants threats was to eliminate the package plants and connect their wastewater flow to centralized sewage collection and treatment facilities. To date, over 90 of the 155 package plants identified in the Department's 1991 report as threats to the water quality of the lagoon system have been connected to centralized sewage collection and treatment systems. The 1999 Permit and Administrative Order On August 26, 1999, the Department issued Domestic Wastewater Facility Permit No. FLA013879 to Laniger for the operation of its WWTP. Attached to and incorporated into Laniger's 1999 permit was Administrative Order No. AO 99-008- DW43SED. The administrative order indicates it was issued pursuant to Section 403.088(2)(f), Florida Statutes. That statute pertains to discharges that "will not meet permit conditions or applicable statutes and rules" and requires that the permit for such a discharge be accompanied by an order establishing a schedule for achieving compliance. The administrative order contains a finding that the Beacon 21 WWTP is a threat to the water quality of the lagoon system and that the WWTP "has not provided reasonable assurance . . . that operation of the facility will not cause pollution in contravention of chapter 403, F.S., and Chapter 62-610.850 of the Florida Administrative Code." The cited rule provides that "land application projects shall not cause or contribute to violations of water quality standards in surface waters." The administrative order required Laniger to connect its WWTP to a centralized wastewater collection and treatment [facility] "within 150 days of its availability . . . or provide reasonable assurance in accordance with Chapter 620.320(1) of the Florida Administrative Code that continued operation of the wastewater facility is not a threat to the water quality of the Indian River Lagoon System." As a result of an unrelated enforcement action taken by the Department against Martin County, and in lieu of a monetary penalty, Martin County agreed to extend a force main from its centralized sewage collection and treatment facility so that the Laniger WWTP could be connected. The extension of the force main was completed in April 2003. On April 10, 2003, the Department notified Laniger by letter that a centralized wastewater collection and treatment system "is now available for the connection of Beacon 21." In the notification letter, the Department reminded Laniger of the requirement of the administrative order to connect within 150 days of availability. On May 9, 2003, Laniger's attorney responded, stating that the administrative order allowed Laniger, as an alternative to connecting to the centralized wastewater collection and treatment system, to provide reasonable assurance that the WWTP was not a threat to the water quality of the lagoon system, and Laniger had provided such reasonable assurance. Laniger's attorney also stated, "due to the location of Martin County's wastewater facilities, such facilities are not available as that term is defined in the [administrative] order." On September 29, 2003, the Department issued a warning letter to Laniger for failure to connect to the Martin County force main and for not providing reasonable assurance that the WWTP will not cause pollution in contravention of Chapter 403, Florida Statutes. The Department took no further formal action until it issued the NOV in August 2005. Laniger's challenge of the NOV was consolidated with this permit case. The Permit Renewal Application In an "enforcement meeting" between Laniger and the Department prior to the expiration of 1999 permit, the Department told Laniger that it would not renew Laniger's WWTP permit. Later, when Laniger filed its permit renewal application, the Department offered to send the application back so Laniger would not "waste" the filing fee, because the Department knew it was not going to approve the application. Laniger submitted its permit renewal application to the Department on February 15, 2005. The Department considered Laniger's permit application to be complete, but proceeded to prepare the Notice of Denial without any technical review of the application. The Department denied the application on April 6, 2005. The Department's Notice of Permit Denial stated that the permit was denied because Laniger had not connected to the available centralized wastewater collection and treatment system nor provided reasonable assurance that the WWTP "is not impacting water quality within the Indian River Lagoon System." The record evidence showed that the "reasonable assurance" that would have been necessary to satisfy the Department was more than the reasonable assurance the Department usually requires for package plants, and more than the Department would have required if Laniger's WWTP was 100 feet from Warner Creek. Competent substantial evidence was presented that Laniger's WWTP is capable of being operated in accordance with the statutes and rules of Department generally applicable to package wastewater treatment plants. Laniger's 1999 permit expired on August 25, 2004. Laniger has operated the plant continuously since the permit expired. Whether the Martin County Facility is Available As discussed below in the Conclusions of Law, it is concluded that the Department did not have authority to require Laniger to connect the WWTP to the Martin County force main or to require assurance beyond the reasonable assurance generally required for package treatment plants in order to obtain a permit. However, because considerable evidence and argument was directed to whether the force main was available, that issue will be addressed here. The Martin County force main was not extended to the boundary of the Laniger WWTP site. The force main terminates approximately 150 feet north of the Laniger WWTP site and is separated from the WWTP site by a railroad and railroad right-of-way. Laniger presented undisputed evidence that the cost to connect to the Martin County force main would be approximately $490,000 and that cost was prohibitively high, given the relatively small number of households served by the WWTP. The Laniger WWTP is subject to rate regulation by the Public Service Commission (PSC). Laniger presented evidence suggesting that connection to the Martin County force main would result in rates that would not be approved by the PSC. The evidence was speculative and not competent to support a finding regarding PSC action. The evidence does show, however, that PSC rate regulation was not a factor that the Department considered when it determined that the Martin County force main was available. There is no Department rule that defines when a centralized sewage collection and treatment facility is "available." The determination that the Martin County force main was available to Laniger was made informally by members of the Department's compliance staff in the Department's St. Lucie office. Mr. Thiel testified that he considered the force main to be available because it was "in close proximity" to Laniger's WWTP. However, Mr. Thiel admitted that there is a difference of opinion within DEP as to when a facility is available and reasonable persons could disagree about whether a facility was available. Mr. Thiel thought that the cost to connect is a factor to be considered in determining whether a facility is available, but another Department employee did not think cost should be considered. There was no evidence that the Department took into account Laniger's cost to connect in determining that the Martin County force main was available. The Department simply assumed that the Martin County force main was close enough to the Laniger WWTP site that the cost to Laniger would not be prohibitive. In addition, the Department was aware of other package plants that had connected to centralized sewage collection and treatment facilities that were the same distance or a greater from the package plant, and the Department did not hear from the owners of the package plants that the costs were prohibitive. Timothy Powell of the Department stated that force mains are usually made available by extending the force main so that it is "abutting the property as much as possible." He also stated that he assumed that Martin County would extend its force main under the railroad and to the boundary of the Laniger WWTP site after Laniger agreed to connect. However, there was no evidence to show that this is Martin County's intent, and the Department did not tell Laniger that Laniger did not have to connect to the force main unless Martin County brought the line to the boundary of the WWTP site. If the Department had authority to require Laniger to connect to the Martin County force main when it became available, and in the absence of any rule criteria to determine when a centralized sewage collection and treatment facility is available, the determination would have to be based on reasonableness. Reasonableness in this context must take into account the cost of the connection. Cost is the inherent reason that Laniger was not required to connect to the Martin County centralized sewage collection and treatment facility without regard to whether the facility was available. Laniger showed that the cost of connecting to the force main is unreasonably high due to the need to construct a line beneath the railroad. Therefore, Laniger proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the Martin County force main is not available.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order granting Laniger Enterprises of America, Inc., a renewal of its wastewater treatment plant operating permit. The permit should contain the same conditions as were contained in the 1999 permit, with the exception of those conditions derived from Administrative Order No. AO 99-008- DW43SED. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of September, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of September, 2006.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner was retaliated against in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA), chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses and other evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner worked for FCTC for several years in several different positions, including as a career pathways supervisor, and most recently as a grant writer. FCTC was, for all times relevant to Petitioner’s allegations, a conversion charter technical center in St. Johns County, Florida, operating pursuant to a charter contract with the District by a privately organized 501(c)(3) non-profit corporation, the First Coast Technical Institute (FCTI). On July 1, 2016, the District began operating the educational programs at FCTC, due to the dire financial situation which had developed at the college. In taking over the programs at FCTC, the District immediately recognized that the administrative staff at FCTC was bloated and needed to be streamlined. Further, because FCTC would now be operated by the District, the District endeavored to evaluate FCTC’s structure to determine how it could operate more like a District school, including with respect to personnel structure. The District set out to reorganize and restructure FCTC to align it with the District and address administrative redundancy and financial issues. To facilitate this transition and evaluation, the District placed all administrative employees at FCTC on temporary contracts, effective July 1, 2016. This decision was made sometime in June 2016. On the morning of July 1, 2016, all employees of FCTC were called to a meeting held by Dr. Joseph Joyner, the District Superintendent. At that meeting, Dr. Joyner introduced Cathy Mittelstadt as the interim principal. At the conclusion of the meeting, all administrative personnel, including Petitioner, were offered temporary employment contracts, for a term of approximately six months. The contracts could be terminated by either party with two weeks’ notice. No administrative employee was placed on a longer temporary contract. The temporary employment contracts, including Petitioner’s, began on July 1, 2016, and terminated on December 21, 2016. Petitioner’s temporary employment contract expressly incorporates District Board Rule 6.10(3). Board Rule 6.10(3) concerns temporary employment with the District, and provides that temporary employees work for a limited amount of time. The rule does not state that temporary employees enjoy an expectation of employment beyond the contract term. As the interim principal, Ms. Middelstadt was tasked by the District with evaluating the structure of FCTC to determine how it could be streamlined to address budget and financial issues and also bring it in line with how other District schools operated. The elimination of positions at FCTC was contemplated as part of this evaluation. Every administrative position at FCTC was evaluated for potential elimination. Ultimately, Ms. Mittelstadt was responsible for recommending to the District’s Executive Cabinet (Executive Cabinet) how FCTC should be restructured. As part of this process, Ms. Mittelstadt was also responsible for recommending to the Executive Cabinet those positions that would be eliminated as part of the restructuring process. The Executive Cabinet did not reject any of Ms. Mittelstadt’s recommendations, but rather, accepted them without change. The Executive Cabinet would not have taken any action with respect to any employee working at FCTC without a recommendation from Ms. Mittelstadt. Ms. Weber had limited involvement in the restructuring process. She provided ministerial assistance to Ms. Mittelstadt during this process, but she was not responsible for, or involved in, the decision as to how the school would be restructured, or for any recommendations regarding the same. FCTC employees were kept informed as to the status of restructuring during the process. Ms. Mittelstadt and Ms. Weber did not tell any administrative employee at FCTC, including Petitioner, that they could expect their contract would be renewed or that they would retain their positions past the term of their temporary employment contract. Petitioner understood that he was being appointed to a temporary employment contract not to extend past December 21, 2016. Ms. Mittelstadt made the determination as part of the restructuring process that Petitioner’s position should be eliminated, and that his temporary employment contract would be allowed to expire pursuant to its terms. Ms. Mittelstadt recommended this course of action to the Executive Cabinet, which approved it. Through Ms. Mittelstadt’s evaluation and assessment of the needs of FCTC, she determined that a full-time grant writer was not necessary for FCTC. Certain tasks related to grants obtained by the School District, including accounting related tasks, are handled in the District’s main office, and the remaining tasks related to grants are handled at particular schools by a different position, career specialists. Indeed, no other District school employs a full-time grant writer. In furtherance of the District’s decision to streamline administration at FCTC and realign it with how other District schools operated, Ms. Mittelstadt determined that the grant writer position occupied by Petitioner, as well as another type of position at FCTC, the program manager position, should be eliminated, and the duties performed within those positions subsumed within the career specialist position, as in other District schools. The District distributed a vacancy announcement for the Career Specialist position to all FCTC employees, including Petitioner. The announcement included a job description for the position. The job description and vacancy announcement were used to fill the position. The job description provides that grant writing and management, encompassing Petitioner’s duties as a grant writer, are part of the duties, among others, of a career specialist. Petitioner did not apply for this position. Petitioner was informed at a meeting on November 18, 2016, that his contract would be allowed to expire effective December 21, 2016, and not renewed. Present at this meeting, in addition to Petitioner, were Ms. Mittelstadt, Ms. Weber, and Brennan Asplen, the District’s Deputy Superintendent for Academic & Student Services. At the meeting, Petitioner was provided a notice indicating that his temporary employment contract was expiring pursuant to its terms. Petitioner was permitted to work through the remainder of his contract term with no diminution in benefits or pay. Petitioner requested to be placed in another position at FCTC at this time, but was informed there were no vacancies posted for him to be moved to, that the District was not placing non-renewed employees into positions, and that he could apply to any position he liked when it was posted. One position, a Case Manager in the Career Pathways program, was funded from a grant, and that position was technically vacant under the grant. However, FCTC was in a hiring freeze at the time, as Ms. Mittelstadt made the decision to not fill the Case Manager position given, and during, the extensive realignment and assessment of FCTC whose budget was being scrutinized at a deep level. The District did not place any other non-renewed employees into positions. The Case Manager position was eventually advertised in April 2017. Petitioner did not apply for the position despite being informed of it and having nothing restricting him from doing so. Petitioner’s work performance played no role in the decision to eliminate his position. Ms. Mittelstadt and Ms. Weber both indicated that they did not retaliate against Petitioner for any reason. In fact, Petitioner was not the only person whose position was eliminated. Ms. Mittelstadt also recommended that six or seven other positions also be eliminated. Furthermore, approximately 12 to 15 FCTC employees resigned, and their positions were eliminated. Had those employees not resigned, their positions still would have been eliminated and those employees’ contracts would have been allowed to expire. Petitioner filed the complaint or charge, at issue in this proceeding, with the FCHR on December 22, 2016 (December 22nd Complaint). In it, Petitioner alleges that he was retaliated against in violation of the FCRA. While Petitioner was not represented by counsel at the time that he filed the December 22nd Complaint, he obtained representation from a lawyer thereafter, and during the FCHR’s investigation of this complaint. This was not Petitioner’s first complaint filed with FCHR concerning his work at FCTC. Just before the District began operating the programs at FCTC, and specifically on June 27, 2016, Petitioner filed a complaint (June 27th Complaint) with the FCHR also alleging retaliation. The June 27th Complaint was received by the FCHR on June 28, 2016. Petitioner introduced no evidence showing that at the time the decision was made to place individuals on temporary employment contracts, that the District was aware of his June 27th Complaint. Petitioner alleges in the December 22nd Complaint that the District terminated his employment because he engaged in protected activity under the FCRA. Petitioner does not allege in the complaint that he was subjected to a hostile work environment or harassment due to any retaliatory animus on the part of the District. Rather, Petitioner only alleges that he believes he frustrated his supervisor at various times, not that he was subjected to a hostile work environment. On August 17, 2017, the FCHR issued a no-cause determination. On September 20, 2017, Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from Unlawful Employment Practice, initiating the instant proceeding. In the Petition, Petitioner largely alleges that he believes the District submitted false information to the FCHR and that the District was guilty of various acts of fraud and abuses. Specifically, Petitioner alleged: Not only did the SJCSD lie about its relationship with FCTC, the SJCSD deliberately lied about my position working collaboratively with other SJCSD personnel assigned to grants administration and my unique ability to assist the SJCSD in avoiding mistakes that they were driven to make, mistakes that rose to the point that they became criminal. The SJCSD committed to a path of making such criminal errors with federal funds and falsifying their account of why they fired me. I have assembled sufficient evidence to show that the SJCSD is guilty of violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and that they fired me as a whistle blower having abundant evidence of their crimes committed against the public interest for the personal benefit of key administrators. In his Petition, Petitioner did not identify reasons why he believes the FCHR’s “No Reasonable Cause” finding was without merit. And other than his alleged retaliatory firing, Petitioner does not identify any other adverse effects that he suffered as a result of the SJCSD “criminal” activities, or allege that he was subjected to a hostile work environment. Petitioner alleged for the first time at hearing that the District subjected him to a hostile work environment in retaliation for engaging in protected activity. He alleged this hostile work environment centered on three actions. First, that the District did not provide him a copy of a harassment complaint filed by another employee concerning him in a timely manner, and did not set up the meetings he requested to address that complaint the way he wished. Second, that District personnel did not provide him access to “SunGard” software. And, third, that District officials asked him to sign a form related to grants that he did not wish to sign. Regarding the first allegation, sometime prior to July 1, 2016, Renee Staufaccher filed a complaint with Stephanie Thomas regarding Petitioner’s conduct. This complaint was lodged while the District was not operating the programs at FCTC. District officials told Petitioner that complaints lodged during this time period should be referred to FCTI. Once the District began operating the programs at FCTC, Petitioner reached out to Ms. Weber for a copy of Ms. Staufaccher’s complaint. Ms. Weber took steps to obtain that complaint, and it was provided to Petitioner within roughly two weeks of his request, despite Ms. Weber being out of the office one of those weeks. Petitioner requested to meet with Ms. Staufaccher and Ms. Thomas regarding the nature of the complaint and his concerns about whether the complaint was authentic. Ms. Staufaccher was no longer employed at FCTC within a matter of days of this request. Petitioner also requested to meet with Ms. Thomas only a matter of days before she ceased working at FCTC. Petitioner was not afforded the meeting or other items requested because the matter concerned old, not ongoing events occurring prior to the time the District began operating FCTC. Petitioner did not interact with, or report to, Ms. Staufaccher or Ms. Thomas during this time, and neither supervised him. Petitioner never disclosed to the District that he was suffering continued harassment at the hands of Ms. Staufaccher or Ms. Thomas subsequent to July 1, 2016. Petitioner offered no evidence that his request was handled differently from any other District employee, and Ms. Weber credibly testified he was treated the same as any other District employee in this regard. Regarding the second allegation, Petitioner alleged at the hearing that the District did not provide him access to SunGard, a computer program that had some relation to the performance of his job duties. At hearing, Petitioner represented that he was never provided access to this program. However, he later conceded that he did have access to this program during his employment. Specifically, prior to being given direct access to this program, Petitioner was provided access to the information in the program through the assistance of another District employee. This provided Petitioner with access to the information he needed to perform his job, including generating reports. Accordingly, it was not necessary for Petitioner to have direct access to SunGard to perform his job duties. The District was not authorizing extensive access to SunGard during this time because it was in the process of creating new systems and processes to bring FCTC in line with the District’s standards. In short, Petitioner was still able to perform his job, despite his complaint that he was not given direct access to SunGard. As to Petitioner’s third complaint, on or about October 2016, Jena Young, formerly employed in the District’s accounting office, asked Petitioner to sign a form related to grant accounting. Ms. Young was not Petitioner’s supervisor. Petitioner stated that he did not want to sign the form because he believed there was incorrect information on the form. Petitioner was not forced to sign the form, and was not told he must sign the form or face adverse consequences. Ultimately, he did not sign the form. The District maintains a rule governing harassment in the workplace. The rule provides a complaint procedure for employees to complain of harassment. The rule provides multiple avenues for employees to report harassment, and provides that complaints will be investigated and discipline meted out for employees impermissibly harassing others in violation of the rule. The rule prohibits retaliation against an employee who files a complaint. Notably, Petitioner never filed a harassment complaint about conduct occurring subsequent to July 1, 2016, despite his being aware of the rule. Petitioner’s protected activity at issue in this case concerns his June 27th Complaint and varied grievances that he filed while he was an employee at FCTC prior to July 1, 2016. Petitioner only offered three grievances into evidence--his first grievance, his ninth grievance and his tenth grievance-- all lodged prior to July 1, 2016, and all concerning the conduct of administrators at FCTC while it was still operated by FCTI and not the District. Petitioner’s first grievance was filed on May 21, 2015, alleging that FCTC’s then-president, Sandra Fortner, engaged in nepotism by hiring her friends and family, and that he experienced a hostile work environment because a co-worker, William Waterman, was rude to him in meetings and in e-mails. Petitioner does not allege in this grievance that he was being discriminated against on the basis of a protected class or that he believed anyone else was being discriminated against or adversely affected because of their protected class. Petitioner’s ninth and tenth grievances, both filed on June 13, 2016, allege that Ms. Fortner engaged in nepotism by hiring her associates, and that Stephanie Thomas, FCTC’s Human Resources Director, and Ms. Stauffacher, were complicit in that nepotism. Indeed, Petitioner testified that the thrust of these grievances was that members of potential protected classes did not get to interview for jobs at FCTC, not because of those protected classes, but because they were not Ms. Fortner’s friends or family. Ms. Mittelstadt had not seen the grievances that Petitioner filed, and had no knowledge of the June 27th Complaint when she determined that his contract be allowed to expire pursuant to its terms and his position eliminated. Petitioner introduced no evidence that Ms. Mittelstadt ever saw any of his grievances or the June 27th Complaint at the time she made the decision to eliminate his position. Ms. Mittelstadt credibly testified that none of Petitioner’s grievances, requests for grievances, e-mails related to grievances, or his June 27th Complaint played any role in her recommendation that his position be eliminated.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Gregory R. Lulkoski in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of June, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 2019. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Gregory Ryan Lulkoski 212 River Island Circle St. Augustine, Florida 32095 (eServed) Michael P. Spellman, Esquire Sniffen & Spellman, P.A. 123 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Jeffrey Douglas Slanker, Esquire Sniffen & Spellman, P.A. 123 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Robert J. Sniffen, Esquire Sniffen & Spellman, P.A. 123 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the Petitioner was harassed on the basis of national origin or discriminated against on the basis of a disability.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner began employment with the Respondent in the summer of 1994 and was terminated from his employment on July 28, 1999. The Respondent operates a machine shop where different types of large metal parts are fabricated according to customer order. The Petitioner was employed as a "mill operator" in the "caterpillar" department. As a mill operator, the Petitioner was required to load metal parts into machines for further processing, check the quality of his work, and return the parts to a container of finished parts. At all times material to this case, the Respondent had a policy prohibiting employee harassment on the basis of numerous grounds including "national origin." The policy provided that any employee who believed that such harassment was occurring should report it immediately to a supervisor or to another company official. The non-harassment policy was included in the employee handbook. The Petitioner received the handbook when the Respondent employed him and was aware of the policy. The Petitioner, of Polish origin, asserted that at various times he was harassed on the basis of national origin; specifically, he was sometimes addressed as "pollock" by some co-workers. Although the evidence establishes that employees, perhaps including the Petitioner, occasionally referred to each other by ethnic slurs (i.e., "pollock," "speedy Gonzalez," and "buddha") the testimony regarding such incidents was anecdotal, and the times and dates of such references are uncertain. The evidence fails to establish that the Petitioner was subjected to a hostile work environment or was harassed on the basis of national origin. Other than as set forth herein, the evidence fails to establish that the Petitioner or any other employee ever advised a supervisor or a manager that co-workers were making ethnic references or that any employee felt harassed by the behavior. In March 1998, a note was taped to the men's restroom door reading "Polish Department – Jerry's [sic] Office." The Petitioner reported the note to his supervisor. A meeting was held with the Petitioner's co-workers on March 16, 1998, where the Respondent's managers advised the employees that such behavior was not acceptable and that similar events in the future would result in disciplinary action against the perpetrators. The Petitioner also asserts that he was discriminated against on the basis of an alleged disability. In December 1998, the Petitioner had a total replacement of his right hip. He was medically cleared to return to work on March 1, 1999, with restrictions of not working more than 10 hours per day for two weeks and not lifting more than 20 pounds. The Petitioner reported for work on March 4, 1999, but was sent home by his supervisor because there was no work that met his restrictions, particularly the weight restriction. Generally the metal parts involved in the Respondent's manufacturing process weighed in excess of 20 pounds. By March 18, 1999, the restrictions were lifted and the Petitioner returned to work without incident until July 1999. On July 6, 1999, the Petitioner received a written warning from a plant supervisor who determined that the Petitioner was not properly inspecting parts being produced in the Petitioner's machine. An excessive number of parts were not within acceptable fabrication tolerances and had to be "re- worked." The warning specifically provided that failure to improve the quality and inspection of parts would result in termination of employment. On July 27, 1999, the Petitioner reported hip pain to his physician and was again placed on a restricted workload that included no lifting of weight in excess of 20 pounds and no "twisting" until the physician determined that the pain had been resolved. Based on the medical restrictions and his experience, the Respondent was unable to locate work suitable for the Petitioner. The Petitioner's employment was terminated because there were no jobs available that complied with the Petitioner's medical restrictions. Review of the Petitioner's performance evaluations establishes that he was generally an average worker who was sometimes warned about becoming too involved in other employees' activities. His evaluations of August 1996 and September 1998 contained references to such involvement and indicated that he should "spend less time worrying" about other employees. The 1996, 1997, and 1998 performance evaluations suggested that the Petitioner obtain additional training in order to advance his career. The Respondent offered a program to fund such training, and notices regarding the training were posted on a bulletin board accessible to employees, but the Petitioner did not take advantage of the program. At the time of the July 1999 medical restrictions, the Petitioner's skill set did not qualify him to perform tasks other than as a mill operator using the machine for which he was originally employed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Jerzy Josefik in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of May, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of May, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jerzy Jozefik 9605 Southwest 27th Avenue Ocala, Florida 34476 Grant D. Petersen, Esquire Ignacio J. Garcia, Esquire Haynsworth Baldwin Johnson & Greaves LLC 600 North Westshore Boulevard, Suite 200 Tampa, Florida 33609-1117 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact I. Statement of the Parties' Positions In their prehearing statement, the parties set forth their respective positions on the propriety of respondent's termination: SFWMD: Arthur Torvela [respondent] exhibited numerous performance problems throughout his career as an engineer with the South Florida Water Management District. Torvela's perfor- mance has been consistently marginally acceptable or less. Recently, Torvela has failed to properly perform the duties and projects assigned to him in spite of clear and explicit direction and warnings by his supervisors. Torvela has admitted that his work has been found to be unsatisfactory by several different supervisors. Therefore, based upon his overall performance failures, Torvela was properly discharged. Respondent: Throughout Torvela's career with the Respondent, his work never received an overall rating of unsatisfactory by his superiors. Merit review ratings at the District are conducted in an arbitrary and selective fashion. Other employees with similar job performance have not been termi- nated from employment with the Respondent. As a result of Torvela's subpoenaed testimony to an investigator from the Florida Commission on Ethics which suggested that certain District staff members gave preferential treatment to Stanley Hole (a District Governing Board Member) during the permit review process, Torvela was singled out for special treatment. This special treatment was initiated as a work evaluation assignment which was designed in such a fashion to prohibit proper completion by an engineer in a similar position to Torvela. Subsequently Torvela was discharged. II. Respondent's Work Performance Was Inadequate Over an Extended Period Respondent was employed in an entry level Water Resource Engineer I position by SFWMD from November 18, 1982, to July 15, 1983, when he was terminated for alleged inadequate overall performance. A Water Resource Engineer I position is "an entry level professional position involving routine engineering work in the analysis and review of hydrologic and water resources related projects." (R-1) The standardized position description states that "Experience in computer programming is desirable." (R-1) Nevertheless, when SFWMD recruited to fill respondent's position, it made proficiency in the use of computers a qualification for the job. In respondent's initial employment interview, it was explained to him that his main function in the Water Resource Division would involve computer programming. Respondent accepted the job knowing that proficiency in computer programming was an explicit job requirement. (Testimony of Marban, Chapman, Torvela; P-27) During his first 14 months with SFWMD, respondent worked as an Engineer I in the Permit Review Section of the Division of Surface Water Management, part of the Resource Control Department. Frank A. Caluwe, Jr. was his immediate supervisor and Charles Hall was his Division Director. After respondent had worked with SFWMD for about four months, Mr. Hall told him that he would be terminated. Respondent sought help from his supervisor, Mr. Caluwe, who intervened on his behalf. Because of Mr. Caluwe's timely intervention, respondent was not terminated from his employment. In May 1981, respondent received his six-month probationary review from Mr. Caluwe, who gave him an overall satisfactory rating. He noted, however, that "his [respondent's] knowledge of work and quality of work should improve through OJT. The employee needs considerable improvement in communication skills." He recommended that respondent take public speaking and technical writing courses. (P-28) In January 1982, respondent--at his own request--was transferred to the Water Resources Division. Just prior to his transfer, he was given a second merit review, with an overall rating of "excellent." He received this rating despite the fact that he was doing minimal work at that time. He believed he was given the "excellent" rating because he was leaving Surface Water Management. He attributed his problems in Surface Water Management to a personality conflict between he and Mr. Hall. When he received the "excellent" rating, respondent disagreed with it, making this notation on the end of the review sheet: During my 14 months in Resource Control Mr. Hall: Did not talk to me. Was not fair to me. (R-10) In July 1982--after completing six months in the Water Resource Division--respondent was given the required probationary merit review. On that review, he was rated overall as "minimally acceptable," an unusually poor rating in that Division and one which, in actuality, was considered unsatisfactory. 2/ His then supervisor, Steve Lin, commented that he needed to improve his computer skills and knowledge of hydrology. Jorge Marban, his reviewing Division Director, extended his probationary period for another three months, noting that he "seems to have problems in adjusting to Water Resources and computer related subjects." They recommended that respondent obtain training in all aspects of computer programming. Although respondent disagreed with this rating, there is no indication that he appealed it. Although given a "minimally acceptable" rating, it is clear that respondent's work performance during his first six months in Water Resources was, in fact, unsatisfactory. For the first two months, his supervisor, Tom MacVicar, assigned him a project involving rainfall data and computer programming. Although this would not have been a difficult project for an Engineer I, respondent was unable to complete it--although he worked on it six to eight weeks, and had continuing assistance from Mr. MacVicar. Mr. MacVicar finally reassigned this project to a technician who completed the project in two weeks. Respondent was then reassigned to work under another supervisor, Steve Lin. During his two months under Mr. MacVicar's supervision, respondent lacked motivation and showed little initiative. He needed constant, close and direct supervision. He lacked the requisite technical skills and needed to improve all aspects of his computer knowledge. (Testimony of MacVicar, Marban, P-21) Mr. Lin assigned respondent two specific projects: to develop a water budget for Lake Okeechobee, and estimate the amount of water back-pumped into Lake Okeechobee by private pumps. Respondent satisfactorily completed the back- pumping estimates but, after four or five months, was unable to complete the water budget. This would not have been a technically difficult task for an Engineer I, and he should have been able to complete it within the time alloted. (Testimony of Marban) When the "minimally acceptable" merit review was given respondent, he was counseled by Mr. Marban and Mr. Lin. They discussed with him his deficiencies and questioned whether he really wanted to spend his career in water resources. They also encouraged him to take an in-house computer programming course. Three months later, he was given his next merit review. (Testimony of Marban) This (extended probation) merit review rated him satisfactory or "completely acceptable." Although Mr. Lin initially rated him "minimally acceptable" in "knowledge of work," "initiative" and other performance standards, he changed his evaluation after encouraged to do so by Mr. Marban. Mr. Lin also scratched out his written comment on the last page of the review: "However, this [good attendance, quietness] is not enough [for respondent] to be a member of our Division." (TR-30) If Mr. Marban had not intervened on respondent's behalf, respondent would have received a second "minimally acceptable" rating, mandating his dismissal. SFWMD does not retain employees whose level of performance is consistently "minimally acceptable." Even after the review was upgraded (due to Mr. Marban's intervention), it indicated that respondent needed to improve his computer skills, try harder and show more motivation. (Testimony of Marban; P-21) Mr. Marban upgraded respondent's initial review in order to avoid terminating him. He was convinced that respondent had shown some improvement and that he could be motivated to become a productive member of the Division. On respondent's request, Mr. Marban also moved him from under Mr. Lin's supervision and placed him, again, under the supervision of Tom MacVicar. Three months later respondent received the required semiannual merit review. (Testimony of Marban) In this January 1983 semiannual merit review, respondent again received a "minimally acceptable" rating. His work performance had been inadequate and he had shown a lack of motivation to improve. Mr. MacVicar's rating comment reiterated the recurring problem with respondent's performance: Art has been here for 12 months and contri- buted very little. His technical background is very weak (hydrology and computers) and he has displayed very little ambition to improve his abilities. He must increase his motivation if he is to become useful to the Division. Mr. MacVicar also noted that respondent "does not seem interested in improving his engineering ability," and "needs constant close supervision." (P-3) In his reviewing capacity, Mr. Marban wrote that it is taking respondent "more time than expected to become proficient in this area [computer programming]." (P-3) Although Mr. MacVicar had rated respondent "unacceptable" for "initiative," Mr. Marban increased it to "minimally acceptable." He also up-graded a "minimally acceptable" rating for "communication skills" to "completely acceptable." 3/ They, again, recommended additional training in computer programming. This particular merit review was the subject of a 4.5 hour conference between respondent, Mr. Lin, Mr. MacVicar, and Mr. Marban. Although respondent disputed each of the ratings on the review, the overall "minimally acceptable" rating was not changed. Mr. Marban, employed as a supervisor by SFWMD for 10 1/2 years, has never known an instance where an employee was given two "minimally acceptable" merit reviews. He discussed the matter with his supervisor, Pete Rhoads, Director of Resource Planning. Several months later, Mr. Rhoads sent a memorandum to respondent emphasizing the seriousness of the situation and the need to improve his performance. In that memorandum, dated May 2, 1983, Mr. Rhoads advised respondent that if his performance did not improve, he would face disciplinary action. He further advised him that he would be given specific work assignments and would be required to submit weekly progress reports. Meetings would be held, not less frequent than once every two weeks, to assess his progress and performance. It was explicitly stated that the accuracy and completeness of his work product would be the basis of his next merit review. (P-5) This memorandum resulted in respondent being given two specific work assignments on May 5, 1993: A 30-minute unit hydrograph for Royal Palm Colony, and a unit hydrograph for the Jim Branch Creek Basin. These projects were designed to test respondent's engineering ability, not his computer skills. A Water Resource Engineer I, with average skills conscientiously applied, could have completed these two projects with little difficulty. (Testimony of Marban, MacVicar) On May 31, 1983, Mr. Marban, together with Mr. MacVicar and Mr. Lin, evaluated respondent's completed hydrograph for Royal Palm Colony. Several inaccuracies were found, including an error in estimation of velocities and errors in arithmetic. The hydrograph also revealed a basic misconception of the meaning of a unit hydrograph, a failure to understand the concept of a 30-minute unit hydrograph, and a lack of knowledge on how to develop the hydrograph using the Cypress formula for peak run-off. His performance of this hydrograph was unsatisfactory. Respondent was then instructed to proceed with the second assignment, which was required to be completed by June 28 and evaluated on June He was given this explicit warning: After this evaluation, an assessment of your work will be made and appropriate personnel action, up to and including discharge, will be taken if your performance is found unacceptable. (P-18) Respondent also failed to adequately perform the second assignment. His work product indicated a basic error in engineering judgment. In defining the land area which would provide water flow to a specific weir, respondent included a significant portion of land which was downstream from the weir: For these lands to contribute flow to the weir, water would have had to run uphill. Respondent's failure to adequately perform these two specific engineering tasks precipitated his termination on the basis of his overall inadequate job performance. III. SFWMD Followed Termination Procedures In terminating respondent, SFWMD followed its Corrective Action Procedures for dealing with employees with performance problems. Under these procedures, where unsatisfactory performance is the result of lack of skills, knowledge, or abilities needed to meet the performance standard, supervisors must 1) document the problem; 2) discuss the problem and a solution with the employee; and 3) document expected performance standards and plan solutions. Respondent's inadequate performance was the subject of numerous merit reviews, and his performance problems and solutions were discussed with him many times. Performance expectations were documented and clearly expressed by his supervisors. He was provided constant and close supervision and given additional in-house computer training. In an effort to accommodate him, he was transferred between divisions and among supervisors. He was given the benefit of the doubt on numerous occasions, in hopes that his future performance would improve. (Testimony of Marban, MacVicar; R-3) IV. Termination Unrelated to His Testimony Before Ethics Commission Respondent holds the sincere belief that he was terminated because of his testimony before the State Ethics Commission concerning alleged improprieties by SFWMD employees. His belief has no basis in fact and is wholly unsubstantiated. He has shown no nexus between his testimony before the Commission and his termination. None of his supervisors, who were instrumental in and responsible for his ultimate termination, were aware of his testimony before the Commission when they faulted his job performance or recommended his termination. Both Mr. Marban and Mr. MacVicar deny knowledge of his testimony (about alleged preferential treatment given to a SFWMD Board member) and their denials are accepted as credible and persuasive. Despite the absence of evidence, respondent persists in his belief that SFWMD employees conspired to terminate him in retaliation for his testimony. The uncorroborated and conclusory testimony which he relies on to prove his theory is, at best, speculative, inconsistent, and unreliable. V. Failure to Show Respondent was Singled Out for Arbitrary Treatment Respondent has also failed to substantiate his allegation that he was singled out for arbitrary termination when other employees with like performance records were not similarly treated. To the contrary, the evidence demonstrates that there were few, if any, employees who performed their jobs as poorly as did respondent. Of 1,651 employees evaluated in SFWMD between September 1982 and September 1983, only 17 were rated "minimally acceptable" or less. During that same time period, respondent was the only employee in the Water Resource Division who received a minimally acceptable" rating. For the entire Resource Planning Department, the average evaluation was "excellent." (Testimony of Chapman; P-24, P-25) VI. Ultimate Conclusions Respondent was terminated from his employment because of his overall inadequate performance demonstrated over a lengthy period of time. He clearly lacked the knowledge and skills in engineering and computer programming which his supervisors had a right to expect and require. He also lacked the motivation to improve his performance and overcome his deficiencies. Despite close supervision, frequent counseling, opportunities for additional training, and explicit warnings by his supervisors, his inadequate performance persisted. SFWMD has good cause to terminate him from his employment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That SFWMD terminate respondent from his employment for inadequate overall work performance. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of June 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of June 1984.
Findings Of Fact In May, 1986, Radar Corporation, owned by Ronald Ross, bought the assets of United Water Consultants, Inc., and continued the business of selling water purifiers under the fictitious name, United Water Consultants. As part of the agreement to purchase the United Water Consultants' assets, Ross, who had no experience in the business, insisted that the seller arrange to have an experienced manager agree to stay on and work for Radar at least until either Ross was able to learn the business adequately or could hire another suitable manager. The seller recommended, and Radar hired as manager, a man named Robert Gillette, who had about 30 years experience in the business. One of the first orders of business for Radar and Gillette was to hire staff, including telephone solicitors, the heart of the business. Among-those Gillette hired were the petitioners--Leisha F. Fickes, Petitioner in Case No. 87-2605, hired in early June, 1986; Marian C. Norz, Petitioner in Case No. 86- 2606, hired in late May, 1986; and Eileen A. Warner, Petitioner in Case No. 86- 2607, hired approximately May 20, 1986. Fickes, Norz and Warner (like all other United Water Consultants personnel) signed agreements shortly after they began work stating that they were independent contractors. But the main purpose of those agreements, as Gillette explained to them, was to help justify Radar's failure to take federal income tax withholding and social security out of their pay checks. Functionally, the petitioners had the attributes of employees. They were under the close supervision, direction and control of Gillette in the day-to-day details of their work. They were paid a salary based on an hourly wage, plus commissions on telephone solicitations that resulted in sales. Soon after the petitioners began work, Gillette began making advances towards them. At first, Gillette was not too bold and some of his advances were innocent enough to be in public. He would do things like come up behind one of them and gently massage her shoulders and neck. This type touching was not entirely unwelcome, especially to someone who had been sitting in one place making telephone calls for some length of time. But very quickly, Gillette began to subject the petitioners to coarse and unwelcomed sexual advances in private. On one occasion, Gillette came in the room where Fickes was working and, after massaging her shoulders, began to try to kiss her neck. On another occasion, Gillette loaned Fickes $20 and implied she could pay him back with sexual favors. Later, he began to take opportunities to drop pens and similar articles down her blouse and offer to retrieve them himself. One day Gillette came up behind Warner after posting recent sales and began to rub her breasts, saying "see what I got for you?" Warner pushed him away, and he angrily stormed out of the office. On one Friday, Gillette offered Warner $20 for oral sex and asked her to think about it. On Monday, Gillette followed up his offer and, when Warner declined the offer, said he thought she probably did it for her husband for free. Later, to punish Warner for her refusal to give him sexual favors, Gillette began to give her customer lists for solicitation bearing the names of people who recently had declined to buy a water purifier, and Warner's commissions dropped. When Warner complained, Gillette hold her, "you do for me, and I'll do for you." When Norz asked Gillette for higher commissions, Gillette also told her that he would get her more money in return for sexual favors. He also told her, when she refused his requests that they go out socially together, that he did not know why she was married to an "old man." As Gillette's conduct worsened, all three of the petitioners separately went directly to Ross to complain. Ross said he would look into the allegations and "take care of it." In fact, Ross did nothing. Although most of Gillette's coarser sexual advances were made in private, Norz once observed Gillette rubbing Warner's shoulders as he closed the door of the room they were in, and Warner once observed Gillette drop an article down Fickes' blouse. As they talked with one another, the petitioners began to realize the extent of Gillette's conduct and decided to approach Ross together to see if they could be more persuasive. On July 11, 1986, the petitioners met Ross in the parking lot as he came in to work and demanded to speak to him. They reiterated the facts and demanded that Ross fire Gillette or move him out of the telephone room or they would quit. Ross asked them to come back after lunch. Meanwhile, Ross confronted Gillette for the first time, and Gillette denied the allegations. Gillette demanded a direct confrontation with the petitioners, thinking they would back down. At the meeting after lunch, the petitioners re-asserted their allegations, and Gillette angrily stormed out of the room, expressing an ultimatum that it looked like it would have to be him or them. Ross, whose business would be seriously adversely affected by the departure of Gillette, his manager, told the petitioners that he would have to discuss the situation with his "colleagues" and would get back with them. They told him that they were anxious to hear from him because they (especially Warner and Fickes) needed the work but that they would no longer work under Gillette. When the petitioners did not hear from Ross, Fickes telephoned him and was told that they all had been fired, allegedly because a customer list had turned up missing. (If true, the petitioners had nothing to do with it.) Later, Ross would maintain that the petitioners voluntarily quit on July 11, 1986. Fickes and Warner earned approximately $220 per week and Norz earned approximately $195 per week at United Water Consultants. Norz made no real effort to mitigate damages by seeking other employment after July 11, 1986. Warner and Fickes, both of whom were pregnant, were unable to find other employment before the birth of their babies in August and November, 1986, respectively. Warner took about six weeks off after childbirth and worked three different jobs from late October, 1986, through July, 1987, each of which paid her approximately $140 per week. Fickes did not return to work until March, 1987, when she began earning approximately $170 per week at a restaurant. /1 At least from the time Radar took over the United Water Consultants business through at least December, 1986, at least five employees worked for the business each and every week. Radar operates the United Water Consultants business out of an address located in Largo, a municipality in Pinellas County other than the City of Clearwater.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is recommended that the Community Relations Board of the City of Clearwater, acting as the Commission that administers Pinellas County Ordinance 84-10, codified under Chapter 17.5 of the Pinellas County Code, enter a final order: Holding the respondents, Radar Corporation and United Water Consultants, guilty of having violated Section 2-17.5-3, Pinellas County Code, by discriminating against the petitioners, Leisha F. Fickes, Marian C. Norz and Eileen A. Warner, in employment on the basis of sex; and Ordering the respondents, Radar Corporation and United Water Consultants, jointly and severally, to pay to Leisha F. Fickes $7,740 and to Eileen A. Warner $5,880 as actual damages RECOMMENDED this 6th day of November, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of November, 1987.
