The Issue The ultimate issue for determination at final hearing was whether Petitioner's application for licensure as a real estate salesperson should be approved.
Findings Of Fact In October 1992, Petitioner filed an application with Respondent for licensure as a real estate salesperson, together with the required fee. The application asked several questions, including in pertinent part: Question 9: if Petitioner had been "convicted of a crime, found guilty or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld," and Question 13: if Petitioner had had a license to practice any regulated profession revoked upon grounds of fraudulent or dishonest dealing or violations of law. Petitioner responded in the affirmative to both questions and provided written documentation and statements regarding the questions. Petitioner attached to her October 1992 application for licensure various letters to support her application. The letters included one from her probation officer indicating her compliance with her probation; from the local board of realtors indicating that no complaints had been registered against Petitioner during her membership with them, which was from 1979 to 1982 and 1990 to 1992; and from her present employer who is a licensed real estate agent and has employed Petitioner since 1989. On October 21, 1992, Respondent denied Petitioner's application for licensure as a real estate salesperson. The denial was based upon her response to questions 9 and 13 on the application, specifically her 1991 conviction and sentence and the 1992 revocation of her real estate salesperson license. On May 29, 1991, Petitioner plead nolo contendere to three felony counts of grand theft in the third degree. She was placed on probation for five years with special conditions, and adjudication of guilt was withheld. The special conditions of Petitioner's probation were that she would make restitution in the amount of $19,864.52, that she would perform 500 hours of community service, that she would fully cooperate with the State Attorney's Office in the investigation of the criminal activity in which she was involved, and that the probation may be terminated, upon motion, after 30 months. The theft involved a scheme devised by Petitioner's "boss" to obtain funds, beyond entitlement, from the City of Miami. Petitioner was employed as a bookkeeper by an elderly center from 1986 to 1988, which provided transportation, lunches and recreational activities for senior citizens. The center received funds from the City of Miami to operate by being reimbursed for monies paid to vendors. From 1986 to 1988, the center was performing poorly economically. In order to obtain additional monies, the invoices of vendors who did business with the center were inflated or increased and submitted by the center to the City of Miami for reimbursement. As bookkeeper, Petitioner was instrumental in the scheme. The difference between the actual cost and the inflated cost was retained by Petitioner and her boss and distributed at the end of the year to the center's employees, including Petitioner and her boss. Petitioner and her boss controlled the illegally obtained funds. At the end of the center's budget year, which was June 30th of each year, the center was withholding back payments to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS), using the funds held to pay salaries. As a result, a debt to IRS was created, and when IRS attempted to collect on the debt in 1988, the scheme was discovered and stopped. Petitioner cooperated fully with the State Attorney's Office. At the time of her conviction, Petitioner was licensed by Respondent as a real estate salesperson. Less than a month after her plea of nolo contendere to the grand theft charge and sentence, in June 1991 Petitioner notified Respondent of her conviction and sentence in accordance with statutory provisions regulating the practice of her profession as a licensed real estate salesperson. No evidence of any other conviction was presented. Subsequently, on or about October 30, 1991, an administrative complaint was filed by Respondent against Petitioner based upon her conviction. Petitioner admitted the allegations contained in the administrative complaint. She saw no need to deny the allegations, since she had reported the incident to Respondent. To Petitioner's shock and surprise, in a Final Order dated February 14, 1992, Petitioner's license as a real estate salesperson was revoked by Respondent. Petitioner had been licensed for 13 years without a complaint being filed against her. On February 13, 1992, Petitioner's probationary terms were modified by the court due to her inability to pay the $19,864.52 restitution. The modification included, among other things, that Petitioner was only required to pay monthly the restitution to individuals, which totaled $1,700, that the restitution to the City of Miami could be paid through community service at $10.00 per hour for each month that Petitioner was unable to pay, and that probation could be terminated early after 30 months if restitution was paid in full. By March 9, 1993, Petitioner had completed 500 hours of community service in accordance with the original court order, and for compliance with the modified court order, she had completed 235 hours of community service and paid $125.00 restitution to individuals. Prior to her conviction and license revocation, in 1989. Petitioner was employed with a real estate broker at Allied Associates of the South, Inc. (Allied Associates), in Miami Springs, Florida, as a sales associate, and continued in that position until sometime in 1991 when, due to economic constraints on Allied Associates, the broker cut her staff, choosing a more experienced salesperson over Petitioner. During her employment as a sales associate, no complaints were received by Allied Associates against Petitioner, and no money which was entrusted to her was reported missing. Allied Associates received many complimentary remarks from clients and real estate brokers alike. Subsequently, in November 1991, the broker re-employed Petitioner as a sales manager at Allied Associates. Petitioner informed the broker of her conviction and the circumstances of her conviction. The broker has allowed Petitioner to manage the financial books of the business with no problems. And Respondent has audited Allied Associates' financial books without citing a problem. Furthermore, Petitioner has handled escrow deposits and cash without any problems. Since October 1992, Petitioner has been working with Allied Associates as a sales manager on a part-time basis due to financial constraints experienced by Allied Associates. She has continued to handle escrow deposits and cash without any problems. Moreover, the broker/owner of Allied Associates has no hesitation in putting Petitioner in a position of trust. Further, Petitioner has assisted in the guidance of Allied Associates' sales associates.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order allowing Petitioner to take the real estate salesperson's examination. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 29th day of October 1993. ERROL H. POWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of October 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-7368 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact consists of one paragraph with several sentences. 1. Substantially adopted in findings of fact 2, 4, 5, and 7-14; but rejected, regarding the second sentence, as unnecessary to the determination of the issues of this case and rejected, regarding the sixth sentence, as constituting argument, conclusions of law, or recitation of testimony. Respondent's proposed findings of fact. Substantially adopted in finding of fact 1. Substantially adopted in findings of fact 1 and 4. Substantially adopted in finding of fact 4. Substantially adopted in finding of fact 10. Substantially adopted in finding of fact 10. Substantially adopted in finding of fact 11. Substantially adopted in finding of fact 9. Substantially adopted in finding of fact 9. Substantially adopted in finding of fact 9. Substantially adopted in finding of fact 9; but rejected, regarding notice and failure of Petitioner to appear at the informal hearing, as unnecessary to the determination of the issues of this case. Addressed in the Preliminary Statement of this Recommended Order. Addressed in the Preliminary Statement of this Recommended Order. Substantially adopted in finding of fact 5; but rejected, regarding the first sentence, as constituting argument, conclusions of law, or recitation of testimony and rejected, regarding the last sentence which indicates that only Petitioner received and used the monies, as contrary to the evidence present. Substantially adopted in finding of fact 8. Substantially adopted in findings of fact 12-14. Note: Respondent proposed finding of fact is very close to constituting recitation of testimony. Substantially adopted in finding of fact 13. Note: Respondent proposed finding of fact is very close to and constituting recitation of testimony. Addressed in the Preliminary Statement of this Recommended Order. Addressed in the Preliminary Statement of this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Marina P. Cintron 151 Fairway Drive #2301 Miami Springs, Florida 33166 Manuel E. Oliver Assistant Attorney General 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 107 South Orlando, Florida 32801 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Jack McRay General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Under the Administrative Complaint filed by the Florida Real Estate Commission there were five counts containing allegations against Bartley C. Johnson, Anthony Johnson, Barry P. Rifkin, and Flag Realty, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Flag). Prior to the commencement of the hearing, all allegations against Anthony Johnson were dropped by the Florida Real Estate Commission. The issues raised under the five counts of the Administrative Complaint were as follows: Whether Barry P. Rifkin and Flag were guilty of negligence and breach of trust in a real estate transaction by violating a duty imposed upon them by law and the terms of a listing contract by allowing Bartley C. Johnson to handle a closing and prepare a closing statement reflecting the erroneous proration of taxes, and failing to refund the excess taxes upon demand by the Sanchez's contrary to 475.25(1)(a), F.S. Whether Bartley Johnson failed to account for and deliver upon demand personal property in the form of money which he had in his possession and which was not his property or was not property which he was entitled to retain contrary to 475.25(1)(c), F.S. Whether Barry P. Rifkin and Bartley Johnson were guilty of fraud and concealment by not revealing to the Sanchez's that Bartley Johnson was a licensed real estate salesman contrary to the provision of 475.25(1)(a), F.S. Whether Barry P. Rifkin and Flag were found guilty of misconduct by the Florida Real Estate Commission warranting suspension of their licenses on August 8, 1975. Whether Barry P. Rifkin and Flag if found guilty of counts one and three, would be guilty of a second offense warranting suspension of their registration and have demonstrated a course of conduct and practices which show that they are incompetent, negligent, dishonest and untruthful and that money, property, transactions and rights of investors are those with whom they may sustain a confidential relationship may not be entrusted to them whereupon their registrations should be revoked pursuant to 475.25(3), F.S.
Findings Of Fact Barry P. Rifkin is a registered real estate broker as stipulated by Counsel for Rifkin and Counsel for the Commission. Bartley Johnson is a licensed real estate salesman as stipulated by Bartley Johnson and Counsel for the Commission. Flag Realty, Inc. is a registered real estate broker corporation as stipulated by Counsel for Flag and Counsel for the Commission. At no time has Bartley Johnson been employed by or working for Barry P. Rifkin or Flag. About February 11, 1974 Vince Zarra, a salesman for Flag Realty, Inc. entered into an exclusive right of sale contract with Mr. and Mrs. Armando J. Sanchez (hereinafter referred as Sanchez) to sell certain real property located in Putnam County. Subsequently, on or about April 29, 1974 Bartley Johnson and his wife, Dorothy M. Johnson, signed a deposit receipt contract to purchase the aforesaid property from Sanchez for $12,000. Said contract for purchase was negotiated by Vince Zarra, salesman for Flag Realty, Inc. Prior to July 16, 1974, Vince Zarra arranged for a closing in the real estate transaction described above between Bartley C. Johnson and Sanchez. This closing was to take place on July 16, 1974 in the office of Flag Realty., Inc. Vince Zarra was not present at the closing and made no arrangements for Flag to be represented at the closing but did advise a secretary at the Flag office to expect the arrival of the parties. Bartley Johnson arrived at the closing first and obtained certain data from the files of Flag from their secretary. Subsequently, the Sanchez's arrived at the Flag office, unaware that Zarra was not going to be present at the closing. The Sanchez's were greeted by Johnson and shown certain papers related to the closing. These papers indicated a purchase price of some $600 less than the contract price of $12,000. This $600 reduction was represented by Johnson to be the Sanchez cost of filling certain portions of the property. The Sanchez's did not agree to the reduction in the contract price but demanded and received the full $12,000 contract price. The Sanchez's had had prepared by an out-of-town attorney a proposed closing statement which prorated the various costs of the transaction to include the real property taxes. Johnson controverted the proration of the real estate taxes as presented in the proposed closing statement. Johnson attempted to determine the tax assessment for 1974 on the real property in question. Sanchez although not in agreement with the proration of the taxes, but, in an effort to conclude the closing, accepted proration of the taxes in accordance with the figures provided by Bartley Johnson. Rifkin arrived at the Flag office after Bartley Johnson and the Sanchez's. Upon his arrival, Rifkin was made aware that the Johnsons and Sanchez's were closing on their real estate transaction and that Vince Zarra was not present. Rifkin introduced himself to the Sanchez's and Johnson, who he already knew, and advised the parties that he was available if they needed him. He subsequently wrote checks from Flag's account necessary to complete the transaction; however, he did not participate in the closing. Although Rifkin had known Bartley Johnson and Anthony Johnson, his son, Rifkin did not know that Bartley Johnson was a licensed real estate salesman. Johnson did not advise the Sanchez's of the fact that he was a licensed real estate salesman until after the closing. Within days after the closing, Sanchez began to make inquiries as to what the actual 1974 taxes were. He eventually determined that the proration of the taxes at the closing were incorrect, whereupon he made demands upon Johnson and Zarra for a refund of the excess taxes he had been assessed at closing. At the time of the final hearing in this cause Sanchez had not received a refund of the excess taxes assessed at closing. Bartley Johnson asserted at hearing that the property purchased was not as represented by the Sanchez's and that he had advised them by letter that he was willing to reconvey to them their property in return for his money. However, because of the misrepresentations he would not repay them the taxes. Exhibit A, an Order of Dismissal and Final Order of the Florida Real Estate Commission, was presented as a joint exhibit of the Florida Real Estate Commission, Barry P. Rifkin and Flag. The Order of Dismissal states in pertinent part: "It is, therefore, ORDERED, that the above information be, and the same is hereby dismissed."
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer finds the allegations contained in counts two, three, four and five unfounded and recommends that they be dismissed; and further the Hearing Officer finds that the allegations contained in count one were proven; however, the fact that Barry Rifkin was present and did offer his services if needed must be considered in mitigation together with the fact that the parties did tacitedly agree to the disbursement of the funds as presented in the closing statement. Based upon the factors in mitigation, the Hearing Officer would recommend that the registration of Barry P. Rifkin and Flag Realty not be suspended but that they be required to refund the excess taxes paid by the Sanchez's. DONE and ORDERED this 12th day of August, 1976 in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Richard J. R. Parkinson, Esquire Associate Counsel Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 Barry D. Schreiber, Esquire 2020 Northeast 163rd Street North Miami Beach, Florida 33162 Bartley C. Johnson Ethel Birmingham 655 Northeast 123rd Street Miami, Florida 33162 Charles Felix, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Mike Somogyi, filed an application for registration as a real estate salesman with the Respondent, Board of Real Estate, on or about April 16, 1980. By Order dated June 23, 1980, Respondent denied Petitioner's application because Petitioner had not made it appear to the Board that he was honest, truthful, trustworthy, and of good character as required by Section 475.17, Florida Statutes. Respondent based its denial on Petitioner's arrest in 1980 for possession of controlled substances, i.e., marijuana, quaaludes and narcotic equipment. A five count information was filed against Petitioner on March 4, 1980, in Martin County. Petitioner entered a not guilty plea and was subsequently approved for the Pretrial Intervention Program. Petitioner's required involvement with the program will expire on January 15 1981, and if the program is successfully completed, all charges pending against Petitioner will be dismissed. Respondent further relied upon Petitioner's arrest on September 1, 1976, in Dade County, Florida, for resisting arrest. However, that charge was dismissed in October, 1976. Petitioner has no other record of arrests or convictions.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Jerry R. Erickson, who is now thirty years old, made application on May 29, 1986 for licensure as a real estate salesman by examination with respondent, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Division). Question six on the application requires the applicant to state whether he or she "has ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld". Petitioner answered in the affirmative and gave the following response: February 10, 1984 incurred several felonies, all drug and alcohol related, there were several incidents in my past that were drug and alcohol related. (See attached letters). A subsequent background check by respondent revealed the following arrests and/or convictions: 1980 - Arrest for driving while under the influence. 1982 - Arrest for trespassing after warning and assault and battery. 1982 - Arrest and conviction for driving while under the influence. 1983 - Disorderly intoxication ar- rest. 1984 - Arrest and conviction for armed burglary, kidnap, false imprisonment, aggravated assault, and burglary to a business. Although arrested on the above five occasions, he was convicted only twice. For the most recent conviction in 1984, Erickson was allowed to enter into a negotiated plea whereby he received 455 days incarceration, two years community control, and ten years probation, each to run consecutively. 1/ Because of his record, petitioner's application for licensure was denied by respondent on September 15, 1986. Erickson's problems are directly related to alcohol and drug addiction. Its origin began at age thirteen when he was given valium by his parents for hyperactivity. Following this exposure to drugs, Erickson freely admits that he abused alcohol and drugs until early February, 1984. Having taken a large dose of valiums over a 48 hour period, and still not being able to sleep, Erickson entered a drug store on February 9, 1984 and demanded, at gunpoint, an ampule of morphine to help him calm down. For that episode, he was arrested and charged with a number of serious crimes. Apparently recognizing that Erickson's underlying problem of drug and alcohol addiction was the reason for his actions, the State allowed Erickson to enter a negotiated plea if he could master his addiction problem. He has successfully done so and is now under community control until November, 1986. After that, he must serve 10 years probation. In addition, he must receive an annual psychological review during the term of his probation. In addition to his own testimony, a psychiatrist, executive vice- president of a bank, and the chief of the public defender's criminal trial division testified on Erickson's behalf. All were aware of Erickson's background and prior legal problems. Erickson was described as being responsible, mature, reliable and honest. The banker stated he would have no hesitation in using Erickson in a real estate transaction and that Erickson has met all obligations on several loans with the bank. The public defender described Erickson's conduct as "exceptional", and that he is one out of perhaps five hundred clients who has been assigned to community control. All felt Erickson had rehabilitated himself. Erickson desires to become a real estate salesman, and eventually to obtain a broker's license. He is married, has a child, and is employed at a West Palm Beach newspaper. He was most candid and forthright in his testimony and appeared to the undersigned to have rehabilitated himself by reason of good conduct and lapse of time since his 1984 conviction.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner's application for licensure as by examination as a real estate salesman be GRANTED. DONE AND ORDERED this 31st of October, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of October, 1986.
The Issue Should Petitioner, Darius Jermaine Santiago's, application for a real estate sales associate license be granted.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner is an applicant for licensure as a real estate sales associate. He is 36 years old and has lived in Florida since June 2004. He works in a Subway restaurant. Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing real estate professionals in the State of Florida and has the statutory authority to approve or deny Petitioner's application. Petitioner’s application discloses the following criminal offenses: Indecent exposure [Exposed sexual organ to law enforcement officer] Volusia County, Florida Date of offense 7/28/2005 Pled no contest; adjudication withheld, 6 mos. probation, fined. Possession of cannabis, possession of narcotic paraphernalia, [Possession of cannabis not more than 20 grams] Volusia County, Florida Date of offense 2/9/2009 Completed a “Level I” program, charge Nolle Prosequi Trespassing of conveyance [Accused of entering a truck without permission] Volusia County, Florida Date of offense 5/12/2009 In February, 2010, Petitioner pled nolo contendere to the charge referenced in 3c. He has performed 15 of 25 hours of community service imposed by the Court. On October 2, 2009, Respondent denied Petitioner's application for real estate sales associate licensure. The stated reasons listed in the Notice of Intent to Deny are: C. Having engaged in conduct or practices which would have been grounds for revoking or suspending a real estate license. 475.17(1)(a), 475.181, F.S. Convicted or found guilty or entered a plea of nolo contendere to, regardless of adjudication, a crime which directly relates to activities of a licensed broker or sales associate or involves moral turpitude or fraudulent or dishonest dealing. 475.25(1)(f), 475.181, F.S. Applicant has not had sufficient lapse of time, without government supervision, to establish rehabilitation by being crime free. M. The Commission concludes that it would be a breach of its duty to protect the health, safety and welfare of the public to license this applicant and thereby provide him easy access to the homes, families or personal belongings of the citizens of Florida. 455.201, F.S.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, Florida Real Estate Commission, enter a final order denying Petitioner, Darius Jermaine Santiago’s application for licensure. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of April, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Barnhart, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Darius Jermaine Santiago 1534 Dunlap Drive Deltona, Florida 32725 Thomas W. O’Bryant Jr., Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, N801 Orlando, Florida 32801 Roger P. Enzor, Chair Real Estate Commission 400 W. Robinson Street, N801 Orlando, Florida 32801 Reginald Dixon, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations contained in this case, Respondent was a Florida licensed real estate salesman, having been issued license numbered 0376339. Respondent had been employed by American Specialty Properties (ASP) for several years as an expediter prior to being assigned to Tampa, Florida. As an expediter, his duties were to take over stagnated operations of his employer and take whatever action was necessary to clear blockages and bring the operation to a successful conclusion. Respondent came to Tampa to resolve difficulties his employer, ASP, was encountering in regard to certain properties it had contracted to purchase at the Mission Bell Square shopping center being developed in Tampa by K-Mart Corporation. ASP wanted to build on the out-lots and lease the properties to various selected tenants. However, numerous legal and technical problems had come up that delayed the projects, and Respondent was to resolve those problems and get the structures erected and leased. It very soon became apparent to Respondent that his duties for ASP would not occupy all his time, so he secured the permission of Mark M. Mayers, president of ASP and Respondent's employer, to apply for a Florida real estate license and, once having secured it, to engage in outside employment to earn extra income. In furtherance of that plan, after becoming licensed as a real estate salesman, Respondent entered into an arrangement with Timothy Kerwin, president of Max Properties, Inc., in November, 1980, whereby Respondent's license would be registered with that firm, but no actual work would be done within that relationship by Respondent until some further date when Respondent was finished with his Mission Bell Square duties and room was available for him within the Max Properties organization. Kerwin says he does not recall knowing of Respondent's other employment with ASP until February, 1982, when he discovered that Respondent had been instrumental in the sale of the four out-lots at Mission Bell Square, which sale had not gone through Max Properties. He does admit, however, that Respondent may have discussed his work with ASP earlier than February, 1982, and in fact may have advised him that he, Respondent, still had work to do for ASP before he could do work for Kerwin. Kerwin did not, however, check with ASP to determine Respondent's status when he became aware of the possible conflict. When Kerwin found out about the closing of the sales on the Mission Bell Square out-lots, he questioned Respondent about them, and Respondent readily advised him that two lots had been closed and the remaining two were about to be closed. Respondent did bring about the sale of the four out-lots in question. At the time he did this, he was an employee of ASP and paid a regular salary of $2,000 per month plus expenses. A memorandum purportedly from Mr. Mayers dated March 25, 1982, to James W. Roberts, Jr., an independent real estate broker who-had done work on this property for ASP, indicates Respondent was to receive $1,250 commission for the sale of each of the four lots. However, Mr. Mayers indicated that he did not prepare the memorandum, did not sign it, and renounced it. In fact, Mr. Mayers' assistant, Tom Ferguson, in discussions with Mr. Roberts, indicated that notwithstanding the commissions mentioned in the memorandum, Respondent was paid only salary and expenses, and no commissions. I find, therefore, that Respondent did not receive any commission for these transactions nor, for that matter, at any time while he was an employee of ASP. The sale of the four lots was dictated by Respondent's employers at ASP, who, because of changed economic factors, made a business decision to dispose of the four properties rather than follow the prior plan of developing and leasing them. Respondent, in arranging the sales, was following the directions of his employers--not serving as a broker or salesman for commission. The sales were arranged through the offices of Mr. Roberts, and Respondent did not receive any commission out of these sales. He did, however, receive a bonus to his regular salary from ASP, his employer, as a reward for extricating his employer from a potentially unprofitable business arrangement. The negotiations for the sale, however, were conducted during the time Respondent's real estate license was registered with Max Properties.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Administrative Complaint filed against the Respondent in this action be dismissed. RECOMMENDED this 10th day of June, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1983 COPIES FURNISHED: Fred Langford, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Stephen M. Crawford, Esquire Annis, Mitchell, Cockey, Edwards & Roehn, P.A. Post Office Box 3433 Tampa, Florida 33601 William M. Furlow, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Mr. Fred Roche Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Harold Huff Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint issued against him and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at the "formal hearing," and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is now, and has been since October of 2000, a licensed real estate sales associate in the State of Florida, holding license number 695252. He is currently associated with AAA Realty, Inc., a broker corporation doing business in Broward County, Florida. From March 1, 2001, through June 26, 2001, Respondent was an active real estate sales associate with Allen Real Estate, Inc. (Allen), a broker corporation doing business in St. Lucie County, Florida. From June 27, 2001, through August 13, 2001, Respondent was an active real estate sales associate with Realty Unlimited, Inc. (Unlimited), a broker corporation (affiliated with GMAC Real Estate) with offices in Port St. Lucie and Stuart, Florida. Unlimited is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, owned by Kevin Schevers, a Florida-licensed real estate broker. Gary Sprauer is a Florida-licensed real estate sales associate. He is currently associated with Unlimited. Like Respondent, Mr. Sprauer began his association with Unlimited on June 27, 2001, immediately after having worked for Allen. Respondent and Mr. Sprauer worked as "partners" at both Allen and Unlimited. They had an understanding that the commissions they each earned would be "split 50-50" between them. On February 7, 2001, Allen, through the efforts of Respondent and Mr. Sprauer, obtained an exclusive listing contract (Listing Contract) giving it, for the period of a year, the "exclusive right to sell," in a representative capacity, commercial property located at 3800 South Federal Highway that was owned by Vincent and Renee Piazza (Piazza Property). Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Listing Contract addressed the subjects of "compensation," "cooperation with other brokers," and "dispute resolution," respectively, and provided, in pertinent part as follows as follows: COMPENSATION: Seller will compensate Broker as specified below for procuring a buyer who is ready, willing, and able to purchase the Property or any interest in the Property on the terms of this Agreement or on any other terms acceptable to Seller. Seller will pay Broker as follows (plus applicable sales tax): 8% of the total purchase price or $15,000 maximum, no later than the date of closing specified in the sales contract. However closing is not a prerequisite for Broker's fee being earned. * * * (d) Broker's fee is due in the following circumstances: (1) If any interest in the Property is transferred . . . , regardless of whether the buyer is secured by Broker, Seller or any other person. * * * COOPERATION WITH OTHER BROKERS: Broker's office policy is to cooperate with all other brokers except when not in the Seller's best interest, and to offer compensation to: Buyer's agents, who represent the interest of the buyer and not the interest of Seller in a transaction, even if compensated by Seller or Broker Nonrepresentatives Transaction brokers. None of the above (if this box is checked, the Property cannot be placed in the MLS). * * * 10. DISPUTE RESOLUTION: This Agreement will be construed under Florida law. All controversies, claim and other matters in question between the parties arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach thereof will be settled by first attempting mediation under the rules of the American Arbitration Association or other mediator agreed upon by the parties. . . . Shortly after they left the employ of Allen and began working for Unlimited, Respondent and Mr. Sprauer showed Nicholas Damiano the Piazza Property. Mr. Damiano thereafter made a written offer to purchase the Piazza Property, which the Piazzas accepted, in writing, on July 4, 2001. The sales price was $165,000.00. Mr. Damiano put down a $10,000.00 deposit, which, in accordance with paragraph 2(a) of the contract between Mr. Damiano and the Piazzas (Sales Contract), was "held in escrow by [Unlimited]." The obligations of Unlimited, as escrow agent, were described in paragraph 6 of the Sales Contract, which provided as follows: ESCROW. Buyer and Seller authorize GMAC, Realty Unlimited Telephone: . . . Facsimile: . . . Address: . . . to receive funds and other items and, subject to clearance, disburse them in accordance with the terms of this Contract. Escrow Agent will deposit all funds received in a non- interest bearing account. If Escrow Agent receives conflicting demands or has a good faith doubt as to Escrow Agent's duties or liabilities under this Contract, he/she may hold the subject matter of the escrow until the parties mutually agree to its disbursement or until issuance of a court order or decision of arbitrator determining the parties' rights regarding the escrow or deposit the subject matter of the escrow with the clerk of the circuit court having jurisdiction over the dispute. Upon notifying the parties of such action, Escrow Agent will be released from all liability except for the duty to account for items previously delivered out of escrow. If a licensed real estate broker, Escrow Agent will comply with applicable provisions of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. In any suit or arbitration in which Escrow Agent is made a party because of acting as agent hereunder or interpleads the subject matter of the escrow, Escrow Agent will recover reasonable attorneys' fees and costs at all levels, with such fees and costs to be paid from the escrowed funds or equivalent and charged and awarded as court or other costs in favor of the prevailing party. The parties agree that Escrow Agent will not be liable to any person for misdelivery to Buyer or Seller of escrowed items, unless the misdelivery is due to Escrow Agent's willful breach of this Contract or gross negligence. Paragraph 12 of the Sales Contract addressed the subject of "brokers" and provided as follows: BROKERS. Neither Buyer nor Seller has utilized the services of, or for any other reason owes compensation to, a licensed real estate broker other than: Listing Broker: Allen Real Estate, Inc. who is a transaction broker and who will be compensated by x Seller _ Buyer _ both parties pursuant to x a listing agreement _ other (specify) Cooperating Broker: GMAC Realty Unlimited who is a transaction broker who will compensated by _ Buyer x Seller _ both parties pursuant to _ an MLS or other offer of compensation to a cooperating broker _ other (specify) (collectively referred to as "Broker") in connection with any act relating to the Property, included but not limited to, inquiries, introductions, consultations and negotiations resulting in this transaction. Seller and Buyer agree to indemnify and hold Broker harmless from and against losses, damages, costs and expenses of any kind, including reasonable attorneys' fees at all levels, and from liability to any person, arising from (1) compensation claimed which is inconsistent with the representation in this Paragraph, (2) enforcement action to collect a brokerage fee pursuant to Paragraph 10, (3) any duty accepted by Broker at the request of Buyer or Seller, which duty is beyond the scope of services regulated by Chapter 475, F.S., as amended, or (4) recommendations of or services provided and expenses incurred by any third party whom Broker refers, recommends or retains for or on behalf of Buyer or Seller. The Damiano/Piazza transaction was originally scheduled to close on July 25, 2001. At the request of the Piazzas, the closing was rescheduled for August 7, 2001. A few days before August 7, 2001, Mr. Sprauer asked Respondent "where the closing was going to take place" and "what title company" would be handling the matter. Respondent replied that the closing was "going to be delayed again because Mr. Damiano . . . was going to have to have some type of cancer surgery." It turned out that the closing was not "delayed again." It took place on August 7, 2001. At the closing were Mr. Damiano, the Piazzas, Respondent, and the closing agent from the title company, First American Title Insurance Company (First American).3 Neither Mr. Schevers, nor Mr. Sprauer, was in attendance. Mr. Sprauer did not even know that the closing was taking place. He was under the impression, based on what Respondent had told him, that the closing had been postponed. Had he not been misinformed, he would have attended the closing. Respondent did not contact Mr. Sprauer following the closing to let him know that, in fact, the closing had occurred. Mr. Schevers, on the other hand, was made aware that closing would be held on August 7, 2001. He was unable to attend because he had "prior commitments." It was Respondent who informed Mr. Schevers of the August 7, 2001, closing date. The morning of August 7, 2001, Respondent went to Unlimited's Stuart office and asked Mr. Schevers for the $10,000.00 Unlimited was holding in escrow in connection with the Damiano/Piazza transaction, explaining that he needed it for the closing that was going to be held later that day. Before complying with Respondent's request, Mr. Schevers contacted First American and asked that he be faxed a copy of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development Settlement Statement (HUD Statement) that First American had prepared for the closing. As requested, First American faxed a copy of the HUD Statement to Mr. Schevers. Upon reviewing the document, Mr. Schevers "immediately noticed that [it indicated that] the entire commission [of $7,000.00] was going to Allen." Mr. Schevers "then proceeded to call First American" and asked why Unlimited was not "reflected on this settlement statement." Mr. Schevers was told that a First American representative "would get right on it and get back to [him]." Mr. Schevers did not wait to hear back from First American before handing an "escrow check" in the amount of $10,000.00 to Respondent. He instructed Respondent, however, to "not give anybody this check unless that statement [the HUD Statement] [was] changed and reflect[ed] [Unlimited's]" share of the commission earned from the sale of the Piazza Property. He further directed Respondent to telephone him if this change was not made. Respondent did not follow the instructions Mr. Schevers had given him. He delivered the $10,000.00 "escrow check" to the closing agent at the closing, even though the HUD Statement had not been changed to reflect Unlimited's sharing of the commission. At no time during the closing did Mr. Schevers receive a telephone call from Respondent. According to the HUD Statement that Mr. Damiano, the Piazzas, and the closing agent signed at the closing, Allen received a commission of $7,000.00 "from seller's funds at settlement." The document makes no mention of any other commission having been paid as part of the closing. On or about August 9, 2001, Respondent received a "commission check" from Allen. The check was made payable to Respondent and was in the amount of $3,000.00. Under the "DOLLARS" line on the check, the following was typed: 4200 Total Comm[4] 1200 ADVANCE[5] Typed next to "MEMO" on the bottom left hand corner of the check was "DAMIANO-PIAZZA 165,000 S&L." It has not been shown that the "commission check" Respondent received from Allen was for anything other than the commission Allen owed Respondent for services performed when Respondent was still employed by Allen. Mr. Schevers' consent to Respondent's receiving this $3,000.00 "commission check" was neither sought nor given. Less than a week after the closing, having spotted Mr. Damiano mowing grass on a vacant lot that Mr. Damiano owned, Mr. Sprauer walked up to him and asked "how his surgery [had gone]." Mr. Damiano "acted very surprised [like] he didn't know what [Mr. Sprauer] was talking about." Mr. Damiano's reaction to his inquiry led Mr. Sprauer to believe "that the closing had probably taken place." He "immediately contacted [Mr. Schevers] and asked him to check into it." Mr. Schevers subsequently learned from First American that Allen "had gotten all of the [commission] check" at the closing. Mr. Schevers then telephoned Respondent. This was the first communication he had had with Respondent since before the closing. Respondent told Mr. Schevers that "he got the check" and "he would be right over with it." Respondent, however, did not keep his promise. After his telephone conversation with Respondent, Mr. Schevers discovered that Allen "had cut [Respondent] a check and [Respondent] had gone immediately and deposited it." This discovery prompted Mr. Schevers to place another telephone call to Respondent. This telephone conversation ended with Mr. Schevers telling Respondent "he was terminated." Mr. Schevers thereafter notified Petitioner in writing that Respondent was no longer associated with Unlimited. He also filed with Petitioner a complaint against Respondent alleging that Respondent had "acted inappropriately" in connection with the Damiano/Piazza transaction. Mr. Schevers had expected Unlimited to receive, for the role it played in the Damiano/Piazza transaction, "50 percent of the total commission," or $3,500.00, in accordance with the provisions of the "multiple listing service for St. Lucie County."6 He holds Respondent responsible, at least in part, for Unlimited's not receiving these monies.7 At the time of the Damiano/Piazza transaction, Unlimited had contracts with its sales associates which provided that the associates would receive "70 percent of the net" of any commission Unlimited earned as a result of the associates' efforts. Had Unlimited received a commission as a result of the Damiano/Piazza transaction, it would have "split" it with Respondent and Mr. Sprauer as required by the contracts it had with them.8
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint issued against Respondent in the instant case in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of July, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of July, 2004.
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent should deny an application for a real estate broker's license on the grounds that the applicant pled nolo contendere to a crime involving moral turpitude, within the meaning of Subsection 475.25(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2004), was adjudicated guilty of the crime, and has not been rehabilitated.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing real estate brokers and sales persons in the State of Florida, pursuant to Chapter 475, Florida Statutes (2003). Respondent has licensed Petitioner as a real estate sales person since July 1, 1996. Petitioner has also been licensed in the state as a mortgage broker since September 1, 1993. On June 25, 2004, Petitioner applied for a license as a real estate broker. On December 1, 2004, Respondent issued a Notice of Denial. The Notice of Denial proposes to deny the license application on specific grounds. The Notice limits the grounds for denial to those included in the following statement: The Florida Real Estate Commission has determined that the Applicant has been adjudicated guilty of crimes relating to the activities of a licensed broker or sales associate, and crimes of moral turpitude or fraudulent or dishonest dealing. Specifically it has found that the applicant . . . has been convicted of or found guilty of, or entered a plea of nolo contendere to: Contributing To The Delinquency of A Minor, 2001 During the hearing, Respondent stipulated that it does not seek denial of the application on the grounds that the alleged crimes relate to the activities of a licensed broker or sales associate or to fraudulent or dishonest dealing. Respondent relies solely on allegations that Petitioner pled nolo contendere to the misdemeanor charge of contributing to the delinquency of a minor; that the crime involved moral turpitude; and that Petitioner was adjudicated guilty and has not been rehabilitated.1 It is undisputed that Petitioner pled nolo contendere in 2001 to a first-degree misdemeanor in the Circuit Court of Charlotte County, Florida, for contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The factual allegations in the criminal proceeding were that Petitioner solicited a 13-year-old female (minor female) to pose topless or nude on August 2, 2001, when Petitioner was approximately 38 years old. It is undisputed that the minor female did not pose for Petitioner. The court adjudicated Petitioner guilty and withheld sentencing. Petitioner paid $353 in costs, served 75 hours of community service, and successfully completed probation of 12 months. The Notice of Denial does not allege that Petitioner actually committed the crime of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Nor does the applicable statute require proof that Petitioner committed the acts alleged in the criminal proceeding as a prerequisite for denial in this proceeding.2 It is legally unnecessary to determine whether Petitioner is guilty of the crime to which he pled nolo contendere. The entry of the plea, by itself, is a sufficient statutory ground for the proposed denial. The plea does not operate statutorily as conclusive evidence that Petitioner committed the crime to which he pled nolo contendere.3 No finding is made in this proceeding that Petitioner either did or did not solicit the minor female. The court adjudicated Petitioner guilty, and this Recommended Order refers to the solicitation as the adjudicated solicitation. The threshold factual issue in this proceeding is whether the adjudicated solicitation involved moral turpitude. If so, it must be determined whether there is a rational connection between the moral turpitude and Petitioner's fitness to engage in the real estate business. If the requisite connection exists, it must be determined whether Petitioner has been rehabilitated and is not a "danger to the public." The adjudicated solicitation involved an act of moral turpitude. Solicitation of a 13-year-old female to pose topless or nude was a substantial deviation from the standard of conduct acceptable in the community, violated the duties owed to society, and was an inherently base or depraved act.4 The base or depraved nature of the adjudicated solicitation did not arise from a desire for monetary gain, as the motive typically is in other crimes, such as grand theft or the intent to sell controlled substances, that have been held to involve moral turpitude.5 Rather, the base or depraved nature of the adjudicated solicitation arose from an attempt to coerce the involuntary compliance of a minor female by exploiting her vulnerability; exploiting a financial relationship over which Petitioner enjoyed financial control; and exploiting a quasi- familial relationship in which Petitioner was imbued with the advantage of an authority figure.6 A person of common understanding would have known there was a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such conduct would encourage delinquency and that disregard of that risk was a gross deviation from an appropriate standard of conduct. At age 13, the minor female was nowhere near the 18 years of age required for legal majority. That vulnerability was accentuated during the adjudicated solicitation by Petitioner's age of 38. The minor female was also financially dependent on Petitioner for income as the family babysitter. Petitioner enjoyed the advantage of financial control of that relationship and possessed the power to terminate the relationship. Petitioner also enjoyed the benefit of an authority figure in a quasi-familial relationship. The minor female is the daughter of the brother of Petitioner's wife. The minor female is not legally the niece of Petitioner because the brother never married the mother of the minor female. The minor female is also a long-time friend of Petitioner's daughter. There is no direct evidence of actual intent to exploit the vulnerability of the minor female and any existing relationship. However, Petitioner should have known that the minor female was in a position of vulnerability and that the adjudicated solicitation necessarily exploited her vulnerability and the advantages he enjoyed in their relationship. A person of common understanding would have known there was a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the solicitation would tend to cause or encourage delinquency. The risk was of such a nature and degree that Petitioner's adjudicated disregard of that risk was a gross deviation from the appropriate standard of conduct.7 The moral turpitude evidenced by the adjudicated solicitation in 2001 is not rationally connected to the applicant's fitness to engage in the real estate business. Respondent admits that the adjudicated solicitation is not related to the activities of a licensed broker or sales associate and does not involve fraudulent or dishonest dealing. It is undisputed that the adjudicated solicitation did not impugn Petitioner's fitness to engage in the real estate business. From July 1, 1996, through the date of hearing, Petitioner has functioned as a licensed real estate sales person with no harm to the public before or after the adjudicated solicitation. Petitioner disclosed the adjudicated solicitation to Respondent sometime after June 25, 2004. Respondent did not prevent Petitioner from engaging in the real estate business as a sales person. Respondent cited no evidence or authority to support a finding or conclusion that the misdemeanor disqualifies Petitioner from performing the functions of a real estate broker, but does not disqualify Petitioner from performing the duties and responsibilities of a real estate sales person. As a mortgage broker, Petitioner maintains trust accounts and transfers client deposits to third parties, including surveyors and credit reporting agencies. The absence of a rational connection to the applicant's fitness to practice real estate imbues the allegation of moral turpitude with the potential for arbitrary and discriminatory denial of the license application.8 The potential for selective enforcement should be avoided. The issue of whether Petitioner has been rehabilitated is moot in the absence of a rational connection between an act of moral turpitude and the fitness to engage in the real estate business. If it were determined that a rational connection existed between the adjudicated solicitation in 2001 and the fitness of Petitioner to engage in the real estate business, Petitioner has been rehabilitated.9 Petitioner paid the required court costs, served the community service, and completed his probation. Petitioner is a father of three children, has been married for more than 16 years, is a licensed real estate sales person, a licensed mortgage broker, and has not exhibited a pattern or practice of violations before or after the incident on August 2, 2001. Rather, the incident in 2001 stands alone as the only blemish on an otherwise flawless professional record as a real estate agent and a mortgage broker. The issuance of a broker's license to Petitioner does not frustrate legislative intent. The issuance of a license does not expose the public to a dishonest real estate broker that engages in fraudulent practices. The crime for which Petitioner was adjudicated guilty does not impugn the honesty of Petitioner or his ability to deal fairly with the public in the real estate business.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order granting the license application. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of August, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of August, 2005. 1/ Transcript at pages 44-45. 2/ The last sentence in Subsection 475.25(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2003), states that the court record of conviction is prima facie evidence of guilt. However, the statutory language preceding the last sentence does not expressly require proof of guilt as a prerequisite for denial. The last sentence appears to be a vestige from former statutory language that required a plea of nolo contendere to be treated as a conviction. The legislature deleted the former statutory language from the current statute, but, so far, has not deleted the remaining vestige of the former statute. The issue is discussed further in the Conclusions of Law. If proof of guilt were a statutory prerequisite for denial, evidence Petitioner submitted to overcome the prima facie showing of guilt or to mitigate the prima facie showing of guilt is neither credible nor persuasive to the trier of fact. The relevant evidence consists of Petitioner's own testimony and hearsay statements that the testimony attributes to the minor female, members of her family, and others. The hearsay did not supplement or explain competent and substantial evidence within the meaning of Subsection 120.57(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2003). 3/ Cf. McNair v. Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, 518 So. 2d 390, 391 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)(plea is not statutorily evaluated as conclusive evidence of the commission of wrongdoing but is, by itself, statutorily sufficient for disciplinary action). This issue is discussed further in the Conclusions of Law. 4/ Neither party cited an applicable statute or rule that defines moral turpitude. Judicial decisions generally hold that moral turpitude involves: . . . the idea of inherent baseness or depravity in the private social relations or duties owed by man to man or by man to society. (citations omitted) It has also been defined as anything done contrary to justice, honesty, principle, or good morals. . . . State ex rel. Tullidge v. Hollingsworth et al., 108 Fla. 607, 146 So. 660, 611 (Fla. 1933). 5/ Judicial decisions finding moral turpitude in the exploitation of others for monetary gain are discussed in the Conclusions of Law. 6/ Judicial decisions discussing exploitation of vulnerable persons in professional relationships are discussed further in the Conclusions of Law. 7/ Culpable knowledge is an element in the judicial definition of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. State v. Shamrani, 370 So. 2d 1, 2 n.3 (Fla. 1979); Kito v. State, 888 So. 2d 114, 116 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). 8/ By analogy, the Florida Supreme Court has held that a rational connection to an applicant's fitness to practice law must be applied to the requirement for good moral character or the requirement could become "a dangerous instrument for arbitrary and discriminatory denial of the right to practice law." Florida Board of Bar Examiners Re: G.W.L., 364 So. 2d 454, 458-459 (Fla. 1978). 9/ Counsel for Respondent questioned Petitioner in an unsuccessful attempt to show that Petitioner currently lacks veracity and is therefore dishonest. Counsel stipulated that the grounds for denial do not include dishonesty or fraudulent practices. The attempt to show current dishonesty is relevant only to the issue of rehabilitation. See Transcript at pages 36-51. 10/ The agency action in McNair was mandatory but is discretionary in this proceeding. The substantially affected party in McNair pled nolo contendere to a felony while Petitioner entered a similar plea to a misdemeanor. However, those factual distinctions are not material to the absence in the applicable statute of the former statutory infirmity that spawned the requirement of proof of guilt in Ayala and Son. 11/ Unlike the facts in the instant case, the holding in some of the cited cases are arguably ambiguous in that the allegations recite all of the grounds in the applicable statute, and it is not clear in every case whether the decision is restricted to allegations of moral turpitude. COPIES FURNISHED: Barbara Rockhill Edwards, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Daniel Villazon, Esquire Daniel Villazon, P.A. 419 West Vine Street Kissimmee, Florida 34741 Guy Sanchez, Chairman Florida Real Estate Commission Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 801N Orlando, Florida 32801 Leon Biegalski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent is guilty of failing to account for and deliver a share of a real estate commission, as required by Section 475.25(1)(d)1., Florida Statutes, and, if, so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Petitioner has been a licensed real estate broker, holding license number 0314643. Petitioner does business under the name, Blue Ribbon Realty. Petitioner employs several real estate salesmen in her brokerage business. Virginia M. Poole is a licensed real estate salesman. During 1988, she was looking for a house to buy. At the time, she was working in a hotel as a cashier. While working at the hotel, Ms. Poole met Mary Asian, who was also working at the hotel. At the same time, Ms. Asian was and remains a real estate salesman working at Blue Ribbon Realty. In a period of several weeks, Ms. Asian showed Ms. Poole several houses and presented at least one offer with a small deposit. One day while driving on her own, Ms. Poole came across a house that appealed to her. At or prior to this time, Ms. Poole had placed her salesman's license with Blue Ribbon Realty. Ms. Poole negotiated a sales contract with the seller. The contract was signed by Ms. Poole and the seller on November 10, 1988. By a separate commission agreement signed the same date, the seller agreed to pay Respondent a commission equal to 3% of the sales price. The closing took place on December 14, 1988. The closing agent duly paid Respondent the sum of $2172, which represents 3% of the purchase price. Respondent cashed the check and received the proceeds thereof. Under the agreement between Ms. Poole and Respondent, Ms. Poole was to be paid one-half of all commissions that she earned for Blue Ribbon Realty. At the closing, Ms. Poole asked about her share of the commission. Refusing to pay anything to Ms. Poole, Respondent told her, "You get it any way you can." Respondent believed that Ms. Asian, not Ms. Poole, was due the salesman's share of the commission, which by agreement was one-half of the sum paid to Blue Ribbon Realty. Ms. Poole, who never listed or sold any properties for the two or three months that her license was placed with Respondent, had placed her license with another broker over ten days in advance of the December 14 closing. Under the agreement between Respondent and her salesmen, no commission was due any salesman who left Blue Ribbon Realty more than ten days prior to a closing. The reason for this policy was that much work had to be done in the ten days preceding a closing, and it was unfair to require others to perform the work while paying the salesman's share of the commission to a departed salesman. After repeated attempts to obtain payment of the $1086 due her, Ms. Poole filed a legal action against Respondent in Orange County Court. The defenses raised by Respondent apparently proved unavailing. On April 12, 1989, Ms. Poole received a final judgment in the total amount of $1197.44, including interest and costs. Although the filing date does not appear from the face of the exhibit, a Notice of Appeal was served on Ms. Poole on June 30, 1989. Subsequent attempts to recover on the judgment were unsuccessful. At this point, Ms. Poole filed a complaint with Petitioner. Respondent never requested the Florida Real Estate Commission to issue an escrow disbursement order determining who was entitled to the disputed half of the commission, never sought an adjudication of the dispute by court through interpleader or other procedure, and never submitted the matter to arbitration with the consent of the parties. The only thing that Respondent has done in this regard is to deposit the contested sum in the trust account of her attorney, apparently pending the resolution of the appeal.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of failing to account or deliver a share of a commission to one of her salesmen, issuing a written reprimand, and imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $1000. ENTERED this 23 day of May, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23 day of May, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Senior Attorney Division of Real Estate P.O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802 Attorney Raymond O. Bodiford P.O. Box 1748 Orlando, FL 32802 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32801 Kenneth Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Petitioner graduated from the University of Texas at El Paso in 1976. Since that time she taught school in Texas for six years, entered a stockbroker training program, qualified, but did not work as a stockbroker. She completed one semester of pre-law before moving to Florida in 1983. Since her arrival in Florida she ran an antique restoration business, taught at a private school for girls, and did a lot of volunteer counseling services principally in the evenings in group sessions. Her primary interest in the field of counseling has been to help rape victims and abused children. While carrying out these counseling services, Petitioner came into contact with a family of three children, the father of whom had recently remarried after the death of their mother. They were experiencing difficulties with their stepmother, and ultimately the father sided with his children and separated from the new wife. Although Petitioner has never met this woman, she evidentally blamed Petitioner for her failed marriage and commenced a program of harassment of Petitioner that included threatening phone calls, discontinuance of Petitioner's telephone service, and access to confidential information about some of Petitioner's clients she was counseling. Unable to get any protection from the police absent some overt act by the harasser, Petitioner succumbed to the pressure and in desperation, paid two young men $100 to rattle the woman's door and tell her to leave Petitioner alone. The two men did not carry out the intimidation and shortly thereafter Petitioner notified the police of her plans. She was subsequently arrested and brought to trial on a charge of solicitation to commit burglary. Upon advice of counsel, she pleaded guilty, adjudication of guilt was withheld by the court, and she was placed on probation for four years. In her application for licensure Petitioner accurately reported this incident. Petitioner has never before been arrested or otherwise involved with the police on the wrong side of the law. She has been an exemplary parolee and her probation will likely be reduced to two years if Petitioner continues on her present course. Since this incident Petitioner has been named guardian advocate for a party placed in involuntary placement due to incompetence. Raul Martin, a registered real estate broker, has known Petitioner and members of her family for many years. He is fully aware of the criminal charges that were brought against Petitioner and that as supervising broker, he would be responsible for her actions as a real estate salesman. He will hire her as a salesman if she is allowed to take, and successfully passes, the real estate examination for salesman.
